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send out the raw SSL/TLS headers to the msg_callback and display them in SSL_trace
[thirdparty/openssl.git] / ssl / s3_pkt.c
1 /* ssl/s3_pkt.c */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
3 * All rights reserved.
4 *
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8 *
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15 *
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22 *
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25 * are met:
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40 *
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
51 * SUCH DAMAGE.
52 *
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
57 */
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
60 *
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
63 * are met:
64 *
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
67 *
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
71 * distribution.
72 *
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
77 *
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
82 *
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
86 *
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
88 * acknowledgment:
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
91 *
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
105 *
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
109 *
110 */
111
112 #include <stdio.h>
113 #include <errno.h>
114 #define USE_SOCKETS
115 #include "ssl_locl.h"
116 #include <openssl/evp.h>
117 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
118 #include <openssl/rand.h>
119
120 static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
121 unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment);
122 static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s);
123
124 int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, int n, int max, int extend)
125 {
126 /* If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase
127 * packet by another n bytes.
128 * The packet will be in the sub-array of s->s3->rbuf.buf specified
129 * by s->packet and s->packet_length.
130 * (If s->read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may be stored in rbuf
131 * [plus s->packet_length bytes if extend == 1].)
132 */
133 int i,len,left;
134 long align=0;
135 unsigned char *pkt;
136 SSL3_BUFFER *rb;
137
138 if (n <= 0) return n;
139
140 rb = &(s->s3->rbuf);
141 if (rb->buf == NULL)
142 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
143 return -1;
144
145 left = rb->left;
146 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
147 align = (long)rb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
148 align = (-align)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1);
149 #endif
150
151 if (!extend)
152 {
153 /* start with empty packet ... */
154 if (left == 0)
155 rb->offset = align;
156 else if (align != 0 && left >= SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
157 {
158 /* check if next packet length is large
159 * enough to justify payload alignment... */
160 pkt = rb->buf + rb->offset;
161 if (pkt[0] == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
162 && (pkt[3]<<8|pkt[4]) >= 128)
163 {
164 /* Note that even if packet is corrupted
165 * and its length field is insane, we can
166 * only be led to wrong decision about
167 * whether memmove will occur or not.
168 * Header values has no effect on memmove
169 * arguments and therefore no buffer
170 * overrun can be triggered. */
171 memmove (rb->buf+align,pkt,left);
172 rb->offset = align;
173 }
174 }
175 s->packet = rb->buf + rb->offset;
176 s->packet_length = 0;
177 /* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */
178 }
179
180 /* For DTLS/UDP reads should not span multiple packets
181 * because the read operation returns the whole packet
182 * at once (as long as it fits into the buffer). */
183 if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION || SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
184 {
185 if (left > 0 && n > left)
186 n = left;
187 }
188
189 /* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */
190 if (left >= n)
191 {
192 s->packet_length+=n;
193 rb->left=left-n;
194 rb->offset+=n;
195 return(n);
196 }
197
198 /* else we need to read more data */
199
200 len = s->packet_length;
201 pkt = rb->buf+align;
202 /* Move any available bytes to front of buffer:
203 * 'len' bytes already pointed to by 'packet',
204 * 'left' extra ones at the end */
205 if (s->packet != pkt) /* len > 0 */
206 {
207 memmove(pkt, s->packet, len+left);
208 s->packet = pkt;
209 rb->offset = len + align;
210 }
211
212 if (n > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset)) /* does not happen */
213 {
214 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
215 return -1;
216 }
217
218 if (!s->read_ahead)
219 /* ignore max parameter */
220 max = n;
221 else
222 {
223 if (max < n)
224 max = n;
225 if (max > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset))
226 max = rb->len - rb->offset;
227 }
228
229 while (left < n)
230 {
231 /* Now we have len+left bytes at the front of s->s3->rbuf.buf
232 * and need to read in more until we have len+n (up to
233 * len+max if possible) */
234
235 clear_sys_error();
236 if (s->rbio != NULL)
237 {
238 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
239 i=BIO_read(s->rbio,pkt+len+left, max-left);
240 }
241 else
242 {
243 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N,SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET);
244 i = -1;
245 }
246
247 if (i <= 0)
248 {
249 rb->left = left;
250 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS &&
251 SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_VERSION && SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
252 if (len+left == 0)
253 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
254 return(i);
255 }
256 left+=i;
257 /* reads should *never* span multiple packets for DTLS because
258 * the underlying transport protocol is message oriented as opposed
259 * to byte oriented as in the TLS case. */
260 if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION || SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
261 {
262 if (n > left)
263 n = left; /* makes the while condition false */
264 }
265 }
266
267 /* done reading, now the book-keeping */
268 rb->offset += n;
269 rb->left = left - n;
270 s->packet_length += n;
271 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
272 return(n);
273 }
274
275 /* Call this to get a new input record.
276 * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error
277 * or non-blocking IO.
278 * When it finishes, one packet has been decoded and can be found in
279 * ssl->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
280 * ssl->s3->rrec.data, - data
281 * ssl->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes
282 */
283 /* used only by ssl3_read_bytes */
284 static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s)
285 {
286 int ssl_major,ssl_minor,al;
287 int enc_err,n,i,ret= -1;
288 SSL3_RECORD *rr;
289 SSL_SESSION *sess;
290 unsigned char *p;
291 unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
292 short version;
293 int mac_size;
294 int clear=0;
295 size_t extra;
296 int decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 0;
297 unsigned char *mac = NULL;
298
299 rr= &(s->s3->rrec);
300 sess=s->session;
301
302 if (s->options & SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER)
303 extra=SSL3_RT_MAX_EXTRA;
304 else
305 extra=0;
306 if (extra && !s->s3->init_extra)
307 {
308 /* An application error: SLS_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER
309 * set after ssl3_setup_buffers() was done */
310 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
311 return -1;
312 }
313
314 again:
315 /* check if we have the header */
316 if ( (s->rstate != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) ||
317 (s->packet_length < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH))
318 {
319 n=ssl3_read_n(s, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s->s3->rbuf.len, 0);
320 if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking */
321 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_BODY;
322
323 p=s->packet;
324 if (s->msg_callback)
325 s->msg_callback(0, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, p, 5, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
326
327 /* Pull apart the header into the SSL3_RECORD */
328 rr->type= *(p++);
329 ssl_major= *(p++);
330 ssl_minor= *(p++);
331 version=(ssl_major<<8)|ssl_minor;
332 n2s(p,rr->length);
333 #if 0
334 fprintf(stderr, "Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr->type, rr->length);
335 #endif
336
337 /* Lets check version */
338 if (!s->first_packet)
339 {
340 if (version != s->version)
341 {
342 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
343 if ((s->version & 0xFF00) == (version & 0xFF00))
344 /* Send back error using their minor version number :-) */
345 s->version = (unsigned short)version;
346 al=SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
347 goto f_err;
348 }
349 }
350
351 if ((version>>8) != SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
352 {
353 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
354 goto err;
355 }
356
357 if (rr->length > s->s3->rbuf.len - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
358 {
359 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
360 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
361 goto f_err;
362 }
363
364 /* now s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */
365 }
366
367 /* s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */
368
369 if (rr->length > s->packet_length-SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
370 {
371 /* now s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */
372 i=rr->length;
373 n=ssl3_read_n(s,i,i,1);
374 if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking io */
375 /* now n == rr->length,
376 * and s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length */
377 }
378
379 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; /* set state for later operations */
380
381 /* At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length,
382 * and we have that many bytes in s->packet
383 */
384 rr->input= &(s->packet[SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]);
385
386 /* ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr'
387 * rr->input points at rr->length bytes, which
388 * need to be copied into rr->data by either
389 * the decryption or by the decompression
390 * When the data is 'copied' into the rr->data buffer,
391 * rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer */
392
393 /* We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ]
394 * rr->length bytes of encrypted compressed stuff. */
395
396 /* check is not needed I believe */
397 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH+extra)
398 {
399 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
400 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
401 goto f_err;
402 }
403
404 /* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */
405 rr->data=rr->input;
406
407 enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,0);
408 if (enc_err <= 0)
409 {
410 if (enc_err == 0)
411 /* SSLerr() and ssl3_send_alert() have been called */
412 goto err;
413
414 /* Otherwise enc_err == -1, which indicates bad padding
415 * (rec->length has not been changed in this case).
416 * To minimize information leaked via timing, we will perform
417 * the MAC computation anyway. */
418 decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
419 }
420
421 #ifdef TLS_DEBUG
422 printf("dec %d\n",rr->length);
423 { unsigned int z; for (z=0; z<rr->length; z++) printf("%02X%c",rr->data[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
424 printf("\n");
425 #endif
426
427 /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */
428 if ( (sess == NULL) ||
429 (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL) ||
430 (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) == NULL))
431 clear=1;
432
433 if (!clear)
434 {
435 /* !clear => s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */
436 mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
437 OPENSSL_assert(mac_size >= 0);
438
439 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+extra+mac_size)
440 {
441 #if 0 /* OK only for stream ciphers (then rr->length is visible from ciphertext anyway) */
442 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
443 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_PRE_MAC_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
444 goto f_err;
445 #else
446 decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
447 #endif
448 }
449 /* check the MAC for rr->input (it's in mac_size bytes at the tail) */
450 if (rr->length >= (unsigned int)mac_size)
451 {
452 rr->length -= mac_size;
453 mac = &rr->data[rr->length];
454 }
455 else
456 {
457 /* record (minus padding) is too short to contain a MAC */
458 #if 0 /* OK only for stream ciphers */
459 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
460 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
461 goto f_err;
462 #else
463 decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
464 rr->length = 0;
465 #endif
466 }
467 i=s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,md,0);
468 if (i < 0 || mac == NULL || memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0)
469 {
470 decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
471 }
472 }
473
474 if (decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac)
475 {
476 /* A separate 'decryption_failed' alert was introduced with TLS 1.0,
477 * SSL 3.0 only has 'bad_record_mac'. But unless a decryption
478 * failure is directly visible from the ciphertext anyway,
479 * we should not reveal which kind of error occured -- this
480 * might become visible to an attacker (e.g. via a logfile) */
481 al=SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC;
482 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
483 goto f_err;
484 }
485
486 /* r->length is now just compressed */
487 if (s->expand != NULL)
488 {
489 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+extra)
490 {
491 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
492 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
493 goto f_err;
494 }
495 if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s))
496 {
497 al=SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE;
498 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION);
499 goto f_err;
500 }
501 }
502
503 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH+extra)
504 {
505 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
506 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
507 goto f_err;
508 }
509
510 rr->off=0;
511 /* So at this point the following is true
512 * ssl->s3->rrec.type is the type of record
513 * ssl->s3->rrec.length == number of bytes in record
514 * ssl->s3->rrec.off == offset to first valid byte
515 * ssl->s3->rrec.data == where to take bytes from, increment
516 * after use :-).
517 */
518
519 /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */
520 s->packet_length=0;
521
522 /* just read a 0 length packet */
523 if (rr->length == 0) goto again;
524
525 #if 0
526 fprintf(stderr, "Ultimate Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr->type, rr->length);
527 #endif
528
529 return(1);
530
531 f_err:
532 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
533 err:
534 return(ret);
535 }
536
537 int ssl3_do_uncompress(SSL *ssl)
538 {
539 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
540 int i;
541 SSL3_RECORD *rr;
542
543 rr= &(ssl->s3->rrec);
544 i=COMP_expand_block(ssl->expand,rr->comp,
545 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,rr->data,(int)rr->length);
546 if (i < 0)
547 return(0);
548 else
549 rr->length=i;
550 rr->data=rr->comp;
551 #endif
552 return(1);
553 }
554
555 int ssl3_do_compress(SSL *ssl)
556 {
557 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
558 int i;
559 SSL3_RECORD *wr;
560
561 wr= &(ssl->s3->wrec);
562 i=COMP_compress_block(ssl->compress,wr->data,
563 SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH,
564 wr->input,(int)wr->length);
565 if (i < 0)
566 return(0);
567 else
568 wr->length=i;
569
570 wr->input=wr->data;
571 #endif
572 return(1);
573 }
574
575 /* Call this to write data in records of type 'type'
576 * It will return <= 0 if not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
577 */
578 int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len)
579 {
580 const unsigned char *buf=buf_;
581 unsigned int tot,n,nw;
582 int i;
583
584 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
585 tot=s->s3->wnum;
586 s->s3->wnum=0;
587
588 if (SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake)
589 {
590 i=s->handshake_func(s);
591 if (i < 0) return(i);
592 if (i == 0)
593 {
594 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
595 return -1;
596 }
597 }
598
599 n=(len-tot);
600 for (;;)
601 {
602 if (n > s->max_send_fragment)
603 nw=s->max_send_fragment;
604 else
605 nw=n;
606
607 i=do_ssl3_write(s, type, &(buf[tot]), nw, 0);
608 if (i <= 0)
609 {
610 s->s3->wnum=tot;
611 return i;
612 }
613
614 if ((i == (int)n) ||
615 (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
616 (s->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE)))
617 {
618 /* next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment
619 * in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness: */
620 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 0;
621
622 return tot+i;
623 }
624
625 n-=i;
626 tot+=i;
627 }
628 }
629
630 static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
631 unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment)
632 {
633 unsigned char *p,*plen;
634 int i,mac_size,clear=0;
635 int prefix_len=0;
636 int eivlen;
637 long align=0;
638 SSL3_RECORD *wr;
639 SSL3_BUFFER *wb=&(s->s3->wbuf);
640 SSL_SESSION *sess;
641
642 if (wb->buf == NULL)
643 if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s))
644 return -1;
645
646 /* first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written
647 * out. This will happen with non blocking IO */
648 if (wb->left != 0)
649 return(ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len));
650
651 /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
652 if (s->s3->alert_dispatch)
653 {
654 i=s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
655 if (i <= 0)
656 return(i);
657 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
658 }
659
660 if (len == 0 && !create_empty_fragment)
661 return 0;
662
663 wr= &(s->s3->wrec);
664 sess=s->session;
665
666 if ( (sess == NULL) ||
667 (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) ||
668 (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash) == NULL))
669 {
670 #if 1
671 clear=s->enc_write_ctx?0:1; /* must be AEAD cipher */
672 #else
673 clear=1;
674 #endif
675 mac_size=0;
676 }
677 else
678 {
679 mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
680 if (mac_size < 0)
681 goto err;
682 }
683
684 /* 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself */
685 if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done)
686 {
687 /* countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites
688 * (see http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) */
689
690 if (s->s3->need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
691 {
692 /* recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set;
693 * this prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment
694 * (these 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later
695 * together with the actual payload) */
696 prefix_len = do_ssl3_write(s, type, buf, 0, 1);
697 if (prefix_len <= 0)
698 goto err;
699
700 if (prefix_len >
701 (SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD))
702 {
703 /* insufficient space */
704 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
705 goto err;
706 }
707 }
708
709 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1;
710 }
711
712 if (create_empty_fragment)
713 {
714 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
715 /* extra fragment would be couple of cipher blocks,
716 * which would be multiple of SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD, so
717 * if we want to align the real payload, then we can
718 * just pretent we simply have two headers. */
719 align = (long)wb->buf + 2*SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
720 align = (-align)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1);
721 #endif
722 p = wb->buf + align;
723 wb->offset = align;
724 }
725 else if (prefix_len)
726 {
727 p = wb->buf + wb->offset + prefix_len;
728 }
729 else
730 {
731 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
732 align = (long)wb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
733 align = (-align)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1);
734 #endif
735 p = wb->buf + align;
736 wb->offset = align;
737 }
738
739 /* write the header */
740
741 *(p++)=type&0xff;
742 wr->type=type;
743
744 *(p++)=(s->version>>8);
745 /* Some servers hang if iniatial client hello is larger than 256
746 * bytes and record version number > TLS 1.0
747 */
748 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B
749 && !s->renegotiate
750 && TLS1_get_version(s) > TLS1_VERSION)
751 *(p++) = 0x1;
752 else
753 *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
754
755 /* field where we are to write out packet length */
756 plen=p;
757 p+=2;
758 /* Explicit IV length, block ciphers and TLS version 1.1 or later */
759 if (s->enc_write_ctx && s->version >= TLS1_1_VERSION)
760 {
761 int mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_write_ctx);
762 if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
763 {
764 eivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(s->enc_write_ctx);
765 if (eivlen <= 1)
766 eivlen = 0;
767 }
768 /* Need explicit part of IV for GCM mode */
769 else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE)
770 eivlen = EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
771 else
772 eivlen = 0;
773 }
774 else
775 eivlen = 0;
776
777 /* lets setup the record stuff. */
778 wr->data=p + eivlen;
779 wr->length=(int)len;
780 wr->input=(unsigned char *)buf;
781
782 /* we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into
783 * wr->data */
784
785 /* first we compress */
786 if (s->compress != NULL)
787 {
788 if (!ssl3_do_compress(s))
789 {
790 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE);
791 goto err;
792 }
793 }
794 else
795 {
796 memcpy(wr->data,wr->input,wr->length);
797 wr->input=wr->data;
798 }
799
800 /* we should still have the output to wr->data and the input
801 * from wr->input. Length should be wr->length.
802 * wr->data still points in the wb->buf */
803
804 if (mac_size != 0)
805 {
806 if (s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,&(p[wr->length + eivlen]),1) < 0)
807 goto err;
808 wr->length+=mac_size;
809 }
810
811 wr->input=p;
812 wr->data=p;
813
814 if (eivlen)
815 {
816 /* if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, eivlen) <= 0)
817 goto err; */
818 wr->length += eivlen;
819 }
820
821 /* ssl3_enc can only have an error on read */
822 s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,1);
823
824 /* record length after mac and block padding */
825 s2n(wr->length,plen);
826
827 if (s->msg_callback)
828 s->msg_callback(1, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, plen - 5, 5, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
829
830 /* we should now have
831 * wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is
832 * wr->length long */
833 wr->type=type; /* not needed but helps for debugging */
834 wr->length+=SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
835
836 if (create_empty_fragment)
837 {
838 /* we are in a recursive call;
839 * just return the length, don't write out anything here
840 */
841 return wr->length;
842 }
843
844 /* now let's set up wb */
845 wb->left = prefix_len + wr->length;
846
847 /* memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write retries later */
848 s->s3->wpend_tot=len;
849 s->s3->wpend_buf=buf;
850 s->s3->wpend_type=type;
851 s->s3->wpend_ret=len;
852
853 /* we now just need to write the buffer */
854 return ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len);
855 err:
856 return -1;
857 }
858
859 /* if s->s3->wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this */
860 int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
861 unsigned int len)
862 {
863 int i;
864 SSL3_BUFFER *wb=&(s->s3->wbuf);
865
866 /* XXXX */
867 if ((s->s3->wpend_tot > (int)len)
868 || ((s->s3->wpend_buf != buf) &&
869 !(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER))
870 || (s->s3->wpend_type != type))
871 {
872 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING,SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY);
873 return(-1);
874 }
875
876 for (;;)
877 {
878 clear_sys_error();
879 if (s->wbio != NULL)
880 {
881 s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
882 i=BIO_write(s->wbio,
883 (char *)&(wb->buf[wb->offset]),
884 (unsigned int)wb->left);
885 }
886 else
887 {
888 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING,SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET);
889 i= -1;
890 }
891 if (i == wb->left)
892 {
893 wb->left=0;
894 wb->offset+=i;
895 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS &&
896 SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_VERSION && SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
897 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
898 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
899 return(s->s3->wpend_ret);
900 }
901 else if (i <= 0) {
902 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION ||
903 s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
904 /* For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the whole
905 point in using a datagram service */
906 wb->left = 0;
907 }
908 return(i);
909 }
910 wb->offset+=i;
911 wb->left-=i;
912 }
913 }
914
915 /* Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
916 * 'type' is one of the following:
917 *
918 * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
919 * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
920 * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
921 *
922 * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
923 * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
924 *
925 * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
926 * Alert records (e.g. close_notify), ChangeCipherSpec records (not really
927 * a surprise, but handled as if it were), or renegotiation requests.
928 * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
929 * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
930 * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
931 * Change cipher spec protocol
932 * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
933 * Alert protocol
934 * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
935 * Handshake protocol
936 * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
937 * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
938 * here, anything else is handled by higher layers
939 * Application data protocol
940 * none of our business
941 */
942 int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek)
943 {
944 int al,i,j,ret;
945 unsigned int n;
946 SSL3_RECORD *rr;
947 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type2,int val)=NULL;
948
949 if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL) /* Not initialized yet */
950 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
951 return(-1);
952
953 if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) && (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && type) ||
954 (peek && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)))
955 {
956 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
957 return -1;
958 }
959
960 if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
961 /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
962 {
963 unsigned char *src = s->s3->handshake_fragment;
964 unsigned char *dst = buf;
965 unsigned int k;
966
967 /* peek == 0 */
968 n = 0;
969 while ((len > 0) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
970 {
971 *dst++ = *src++;
972 len--; s->s3->handshake_fragment_len--;
973 n++;
974 }
975 /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
976 for (k = 0; k < s->s3->handshake_fragment_len; k++)
977 s->s3->handshake_fragment[k] = *src++;
978 return n;
979 }
980
981 /* Now s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE. */
982
983 if (!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s))
984 {
985 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
986 i=s->handshake_func(s);
987 if (i < 0) return(i);
988 if (i == 0)
989 {
990 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
991 return(-1);
992 }
993 }
994 start:
995 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
996
997 /* s->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
998 * s->s3->rrec.data, - data
999 * s->s3->rrec.off, - offset into 'data' for next read
1000 * s->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes. */
1001 rr = &(s->s3->rrec);
1002
1003 /* get new packet if necessary */
1004 if ((rr->length == 0) || (s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY))
1005 {
1006 ret=ssl3_get_record(s);
1007 if (ret <= 0) return(ret);
1008 }
1009
1010 /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
1011
1012 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
1013 * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
1014 && (rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE))
1015 {
1016 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1017 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED);
1018 goto f_err;
1019 }
1020
1021 /* If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away
1022 * (even in 'peek' mode) */
1023 if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN)
1024 {
1025 rr->length=0;
1026 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1027 return(0);
1028 }
1029
1030
1031 if (type == rr->type) /* SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE */
1032 {
1033 /* make sure that we are not getting application data when we
1034 * are doing a handshake for the first time */
1035 if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
1036 (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL))
1037 {
1038 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1039 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE);
1040 goto f_err;
1041 }
1042
1043 if (len <= 0) return(len);
1044
1045 if ((unsigned int)len > rr->length)
1046 n = rr->length;
1047 else
1048 n = (unsigned int)len;
1049
1050 memcpy(buf,&(rr->data[rr->off]),n);
1051 if (!peek)
1052 {
1053 rr->length-=n;
1054 rr->off+=n;
1055 if (rr->length == 0)
1056 {
1057 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
1058 rr->off=0;
1059 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS)
1060 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
1061 }
1062 }
1063 return(n);
1064 }
1065
1066
1067 /* If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake
1068 * message, then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello). */
1069
1070 /* In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage,
1071 * fill that so that we can process the data at a fixed place.
1072 */
1073 {
1074 unsigned int dest_maxlen = 0;
1075 unsigned char *dest = NULL;
1076 unsigned int *dest_len = NULL;
1077
1078 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
1079 {
1080 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->handshake_fragment;
1081 dest = s->s3->handshake_fragment;
1082 dest_len = &s->s3->handshake_fragment_len;
1083 }
1084 else if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT)
1085 {
1086 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->alert_fragment;
1087 dest = s->s3->alert_fragment;
1088 dest_len = &s->s3->alert_fragment_len;
1089 }
1090 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1091 else if (rr->type == TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT)
1092 {
1093 tls1_process_heartbeat(s);
1094
1095 /* Exit and notify application to read again */
1096 rr->length = 0;
1097 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
1098 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
1099 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
1100 return(-1);
1101 }
1102 #endif
1103
1104 if (dest_maxlen > 0)
1105 {
1106 n = dest_maxlen - *dest_len; /* available space in 'dest' */
1107 if (rr->length < n)
1108 n = rr->length; /* available bytes */
1109
1110 /* now move 'n' bytes: */
1111 while (n-- > 0)
1112 {
1113 dest[(*dest_len)++] = rr->data[rr->off++];
1114 rr->length--;
1115 }
1116
1117 if (*dest_len < dest_maxlen)
1118 goto start; /* fragment was too small */
1119 }
1120 }
1121
1122 /* s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
1123 * s->s3->alert_fragment_len == 2 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT.
1124 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.) */
1125
1126 /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */
1127 if ((!s->server) &&
1128 (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
1129 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) &&
1130 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL))
1131 {
1132 s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
1133
1134 if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment[1] != 0) ||
1135 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[2] != 0) ||
1136 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[3] != 0))
1137 {
1138 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1139 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST);
1140 goto f_err;
1141 }
1142
1143 if (s->msg_callback)
1144 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->s3->handshake_fragment, 4, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1145
1146 if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
1147 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) &&
1148 !s->s3->renegotiate)
1149 {
1150 ssl3_renegotiate(s);
1151 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s))
1152 {
1153 i=s->handshake_func(s);
1154 if (i < 0) return(i);
1155 if (i == 0)
1156 {
1157 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1158 return(-1);
1159 }
1160
1161 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY))
1162 {
1163 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */
1164 {
1165 BIO *bio;
1166 /* In the case where we try to read application data,
1167 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
1168 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
1169 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
1170 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
1171 bio=SSL_get_rbio(s);
1172 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1173 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1174 return(-1);
1175 }
1176 }
1177 }
1178 }
1179 /* we either finished a handshake or ignored the request,
1180 * now try again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for */
1181 goto start;
1182 }
1183 /* If we are a server and get a client hello when renegotiation isn't
1184 * allowed send back a no renegotiation alert and carry on.
1185 * WARNING: experimental code, needs reviewing (steve)
1186 */
1187 if (s->server &&
1188 SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
1189 !s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
1190 (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) &&
1191 (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
1192 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
1193 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL) &&
1194 !(s->ctx->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
1195
1196 {
1197 /*s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0;*/
1198 rr->length = 0;
1199 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1200 goto start;
1201 }
1202 if (s->s3->alert_fragment_len >= 2)
1203 {
1204 int alert_level = s->s3->alert_fragment[0];
1205 int alert_descr = s->s3->alert_fragment[1];
1206
1207 s->s3->alert_fragment_len = 0;
1208
1209 if (s->msg_callback)
1210 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->alert_fragment, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1211
1212 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1213 cb=s->info_callback;
1214 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1215 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
1216
1217 if (cb != NULL)
1218 {
1219 j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr;
1220 cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j);
1221 }
1222
1223 if (alert_level == 1) /* warning */
1224 {
1225 s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr;
1226 if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY)
1227 {
1228 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1229 return(0);
1230 }
1231 /* This is a warning but we receive it if we requested
1232 * renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with
1233 * a fatal alert because if application tried to
1234 * renegotiatie it presumably had a good reason and
1235 * expects it to succeed.
1236 *
1237 * In future we might have a renegotiation where we
1238 * don't care if the peer refused it where we carry on.
1239 */
1240 else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION)
1241 {
1242 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1243 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1244 goto f_err;
1245 }
1246 #ifdef SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME
1247 else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME)
1248 return(0);
1249 #endif
1250 }
1251 else if (alert_level == 2) /* fatal */
1252 {
1253 char tmp[16];
1254
1255 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1256 s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr;
1257 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr);
1258 BIO_snprintf(tmp,sizeof tmp,"%d",alert_descr);
1259 ERR_add_error_data(2,"SSL alert number ",tmp);
1260 s->shutdown|=SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1261 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session);
1262 return(0);
1263 }
1264 else
1265 {
1266 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1267 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
1268 goto f_err;
1269 }
1270
1271 goto start;
1272 }
1273
1274 if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) /* but we have not received a shutdown */
1275 {
1276 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1277 rr->length=0;
1278 return(0);
1279 }
1280
1281 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
1282 {
1283 /* 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, so we know
1284 * exactly what the record payload has to look like */
1285 if ( (rr->length != 1) || (rr->off != 0) ||
1286 (rr->data[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS))
1287 {
1288 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1289 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
1290 goto f_err;
1291 }
1292
1293 /* Check we have a cipher to change to */
1294 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL)
1295 {
1296 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1297 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1298 goto f_err;
1299 }
1300
1301 rr->length=0;
1302
1303 if (s->msg_callback)
1304 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, rr->data, 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1305
1306 s->s3->change_cipher_spec=1;
1307 if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s))
1308 goto err;
1309 else
1310 goto start;
1311 }
1312
1313 /* Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation) */
1314 if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) && !s->in_handshake)
1315 {
1316 if (((s->state&SSL_ST_MASK) == SSL_ST_OK) &&
1317 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS))
1318 {
1319 #if 0 /* worked only because C operator preferences are not as expected (and
1320 * because this is not really needed for clients except for detecting
1321 * protocol violations): */
1322 s->state=SSL_ST_BEFORE|(s->server)
1323 ?SSL_ST_ACCEPT
1324 :SSL_ST_CONNECT;
1325 #else
1326 s->state = s->server ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT;
1327 #endif
1328 s->renegotiate=1;
1329 s->new_session=1;
1330 }
1331 i=s->handshake_func(s);
1332 if (i < 0) return(i);
1333 if (i == 0)
1334 {
1335 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1336 return(-1);
1337 }
1338
1339 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY))
1340 {
1341 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */
1342 {
1343 BIO *bio;
1344 /* In the case where we try to read application data,
1345 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
1346 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
1347 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
1348 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
1349 bio=SSL_get_rbio(s);
1350 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1351 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1352 return(-1);
1353 }
1354 }
1355 goto start;
1356 }
1357
1358 switch (rr->type)
1359 {
1360 default:
1361 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS
1362 /* TLS up to v1.1 just ignores unknown message types:
1363 * TLS v1.2 give an unexpected message alert.
1364 */
1365 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->version <= TLS1_1_VERSION)
1366 {
1367 rr->length = 0;
1368 goto start;
1369 }
1370 #endif
1371 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1372 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1373 goto f_err;
1374 case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
1375 case SSL3_RT_ALERT:
1376 case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:
1377 /* we already handled all of these, with the possible exception
1378 * of SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when s->in_handshake is set, but that
1379 * should not happen when type != rr->type */
1380 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1381 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1382 goto f_err;
1383 case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
1384 /* At this point, we were expecting handshake data,
1385 * but have application data. If the library was
1386 * running inside ssl3_read() (i.e. in_read_app_data
1387 * is set) and it makes sense to read application data
1388 * at this point (session renegotiation not yet started),
1389 * we will indulge it.
1390 */
1391 if (s->s3->in_read_app_data &&
1392 (s->s3->total_renegotiations != 0) &&
1393 ((
1394 (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) &&
1395 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) &&
1396 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1397 ) || (
1398 (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) &&
1399 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) &&
1400 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
1401 )
1402 ))
1403 {
1404 s->s3->in_read_app_data=2;
1405 return(-1);
1406 }
1407 else
1408 {
1409 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1410 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1411 goto f_err;
1412 }
1413 }
1414 /* not reached */
1415
1416 f_err:
1417 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1418 err:
1419 return(-1);
1420 }
1421
1422 int ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s)
1423 {
1424 int i;
1425 const char *sender;
1426 int slen;
1427
1428 if (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
1429 i=SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ;
1430 else
1431 i=SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ;
1432
1433 if (s->s3->tmp.key_block == NULL)
1434 {
1435 if (s->session == NULL)
1436 {
1437 /* might happen if dtls1_read_bytes() calls this */
1438 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1439 return (0);
1440 }
1441
1442 s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
1443 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) return(0);
1444 }
1445
1446 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,i))
1447 return(0);
1448
1449 /* we have to record the message digest at
1450 * this point so we can get it before we read
1451 * the finished message */
1452 if (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT)
1453 {
1454 sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label;
1455 slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len;
1456 }
1457 else
1458 {
1459 sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label;
1460 slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len;
1461 }
1462
1463 s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
1464 sender,slen,s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md);
1465
1466 return(1);
1467 }
1468
1469 int ssl3_send_alert(SSL *s, int level, int desc)
1470 {
1471 /* Map tls/ssl alert value to correct one */
1472 desc=s->method->ssl3_enc->alert_value(desc);
1473 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && desc == SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION)
1474 desc = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; /* SSL 3.0 does not have protocol_version alerts */
1475 if (desc < 0) return -1;
1476 /* If a fatal one, remove from cache */
1477 if ((level == 2) && (s->session != NULL))
1478 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session);
1479
1480 s->s3->alert_dispatch=1;
1481 s->s3->send_alert[0]=level;
1482 s->s3->send_alert[1]=desc;
1483 if (s->s3->wbuf.left == 0) /* data still being written out? */
1484 return s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
1485 /* else data is still being written out, we will get written
1486 * some time in the future */
1487 return -1;
1488 }
1489
1490 int ssl3_dispatch_alert(SSL *s)
1491 {
1492 int i,j;
1493 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
1494
1495 s->s3->alert_dispatch=0;
1496 i = do_ssl3_write(s, SSL3_RT_ALERT, &s->s3->send_alert[0], 2, 0);
1497 if (i <= 0)
1498 {
1499 s->s3->alert_dispatch=1;
1500 }
1501 else
1502 {
1503 /* Alert sent to BIO. If it is important, flush it now.
1504 * If the message does not get sent due to non-blocking IO,
1505 * we will not worry too much. */
1506 if (s->s3->send_alert[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL)
1507 (void)BIO_flush(s->wbio);
1508
1509 if (s->msg_callback)
1510 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->send_alert, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1511
1512 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1513 cb=s->info_callback;
1514 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1515 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
1516
1517 if (cb != NULL)
1518 {
1519 j=(s->s3->send_alert[0]<<8)|s->s3->send_alert[1];
1520 cb(s,SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT,j);
1521 }
1522 }
1523 return(i);
1524 }
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