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1 /* ssl/s3_pkt.c */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
3 * All rights reserved.
4 *
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8 *
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15 *
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22 *
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25 * are met:
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40 *
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
51 * SUCH DAMAGE.
52 *
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
57 */
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
60 *
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
63 * are met:
64 *
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
67 *
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
71 * distribution.
72 *
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
77 *
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
82 *
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
86 *
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
88 * acknowledgment:
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
91 *
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
105 *
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
109 *
110 */
111
112 #include <stdio.h>
113 #include <errno.h>
114 #define USE_SOCKETS
115 #include <openssl/evp.h>
116 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
117 #include "ssl_locl.h"
118
119 static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
120 unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment);
121 static int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
122 unsigned int len);
123 static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s);
124 static int do_compress(SSL *ssl);
125 static int do_uncompress(SSL *ssl);
126 static int do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *ssl);
127
128 /* used only by ssl3_get_record */
129 static int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, int n, int max, int extend)
130 {
131 /* If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase
132 * packet by another n bytes.
133 * The packet will be in the sub-array of s->s3->rbuf.buf specified
134 * by s->packet and s->packet_length.
135 * (If s->read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may be stored in rbuf
136 * [plus s->packet_length bytes if extend == 1].)
137 */
138 int i,off,newb;
139
140 if (!extend)
141 {
142 /* start with empty packet ... */
143 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0)
144 s->s3->rbuf.offset = 0;
145 s->packet = s->s3->rbuf.buf + s->s3->rbuf.offset;
146 s->packet_length = 0;
147 /* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */
148 }
149
150 /* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */
151 if (s->s3->rbuf.left >= (int)n)
152 {
153 s->packet_length+=n;
154 s->s3->rbuf.left-=n;
155 s->s3->rbuf.offset+=n;
156 return(n);
157 }
158
159 /* else we need to read more data */
160 if (!s->read_ahead)
161 max=n;
162
163 {
164 /* avoid buffer overflow */
165 int max_max = s->s3->rbuf.len - s->packet_length;
166 if (max > max_max)
167 max = max_max;
168 }
169 if (n > max) /* does not happen */
170 {
171 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
172 return -1;
173 }
174
175 off = s->packet_length;
176 newb = s->s3->rbuf.left;
177 /* Move any available bytes to front of buffer:
178 * 'off' bytes already pointed to by 'packet',
179 * 'newb' extra ones at the end */
180 if (s->packet != s->s3->rbuf.buf)
181 {
182 /* off > 0 */
183 memmove(s->s3->rbuf.buf, s->packet, off+newb);
184 s->packet = s->s3->rbuf.buf;
185 }
186
187 while (newb < n)
188 {
189 /* Now we have off+newb bytes at the front of s->s3->rbuf.buf and need
190 * to read in more until we have off+n (up to off+max if possible) */
191
192 clear_sys_error();
193 if (s->rbio != NULL)
194 {
195 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
196 i=BIO_read(s->rbio, &(s->s3->rbuf.buf[off+newb]), max-newb);
197 }
198 else
199 {
200 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N,SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET);
201 i = -1;
202 }
203
204 if (i <= 0)
205 {
206 s->s3->rbuf.left = newb;
207 return(i);
208 }
209 newb+=i;
210 }
211
212 /* done reading, now the book-keeping */
213 s->s3->rbuf.offset = off + n;
214 s->s3->rbuf.left = newb - n;
215 s->packet_length += n;
216 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
217 return(n);
218 }
219
220 /* Call this to get a new input record.
221 * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error
222 * or non-blocking IO.
223 * When it finishes, one packet has been decoded and can be found in
224 * ssl->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
225 * ssl->s3->rrec.data, - data
226 * ssl->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes
227 */
228 /* used only by ssl3_read_bytes */
229 static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s)
230 {
231 int ssl_major,ssl_minor,al;
232 int enc_err,n,i,ret= -1;
233 SSL3_RECORD *rr;
234 SSL_SESSION *sess;
235 unsigned char *p;
236 unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
237 short version;
238 unsigned int mac_size;
239 int clear=0;
240 size_t extra;
241
242 rr= &(s->s3->rrec);
243 sess=s->session;
244
245 if (s->options & SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER)
246 extra=SSL3_RT_MAX_EXTRA;
247 else
248 extra=0;
249 if (extra != s->s3->rbuf.len - SSL3_RT_MAX_PACKET_SIZE)
250 {
251 /* actually likely an application error: SLS_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER
252 * set after ssl3_setup_buffers() was done */
253 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
254 return -1;
255 }
256
257 again:
258 /* check if we have the header */
259 if ( (s->rstate != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) ||
260 (s->packet_length < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH))
261 {
262 n=ssl3_read_n(s, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s->s3->rbuf.len, 0);
263 if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking */
264 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_BODY;
265
266 p=s->packet;
267
268 /* Pull apart the header into the SSL3_RECORD */
269 rr->type= *(p++);
270 ssl_major= *(p++);
271 ssl_minor= *(p++);
272 version=(ssl_major<<8)|ssl_minor;
273 n2s(p,rr->length);
274
275 /* Lets check version */
276 if (s->first_packet)
277 {
278 s->first_packet=0;
279 }
280 else
281 {
282 if (version != s->version)
283 {
284 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
285 /* Send back error using their
286 * version number :-) */
287 s->version=version;
288 al=SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
289 goto f_err;
290 }
291 }
292
293 if ((version>>8) != SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
294 {
295 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
296 goto err;
297 }
298
299 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH+extra)
300 {
301 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
302 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
303 goto f_err;
304 }
305
306 /* now s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */
307 }
308
309 /* s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */
310
311 if (rr->length > s->packet_length-SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
312 {
313 /* now s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */
314 i=rr->length;
315 n=ssl3_read_n(s,i,i,1);
316 if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking io */
317 /* now n == rr->length,
318 * and s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length */
319 }
320
321 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; /* set state for later operations */
322
323 /* At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length,
324 * and we have that many bytes in s->packet
325 */
326 rr->input= &(s->packet[SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]);
327
328 /* ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr'
329 * rr->input points at rr->length bytes, which
330 * need to be copied into rr->data by either
331 * the decryption or by the decompression
332 * When the data is 'copied' into the rr->data buffer,
333 * rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer */
334
335 /* We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ]
336 * rr->length bytes of encrypted compressed stuff. */
337
338 /* check is not needed I believe */
339 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH+extra)
340 {
341 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
342 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
343 goto f_err;
344 }
345
346 /* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */
347 rr->data=rr->input;
348
349 enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,0);
350 if (enc_err <= 0)
351 {
352 if (enc_err == 0)
353 /* SSLerr() and ssl3_send_alert() have been called */
354 goto err;
355
356 /* otherwise enc_err == -1 */
357 goto decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac;
358 }
359
360 #ifdef TLS_DEBUG
361 printf("dec %d\n",rr->length);
362 { unsigned int z; for (z=0; z<rr->length; z++) printf("%02X%c",rr->data[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
363 printf("\n");
364 #endif
365
366 /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */
367 if ( (sess == NULL) ||
368 (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL) ||
369 (s->read_hash == NULL))
370 clear=1;
371
372 if (!clear)
373 {
374 mac_size=EVP_MD_size(s->read_hash);
375
376 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+extra+mac_size)
377 {
378 #if 0 /* OK only for stream ciphers (then rr->length is visible from ciphertext anyway) */
379 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
380 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_PRE_MAC_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
381 goto f_err;
382 #else
383 goto decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac;
384 #endif
385 }
386 /* check the MAC for rr->input (it's in mac_size bytes at the tail) */
387 if (rr->length < mac_size)
388 {
389 #if 0 /* OK only for stream ciphers */
390 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
391 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
392 goto f_err;
393 #else
394 goto decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac;
395 #endif
396 }
397 rr->length-=mac_size;
398 i=s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,md,0);
399 if (memcmp(md,&(rr->data[rr->length]),mac_size) != 0)
400 {
401 goto decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac;
402 }
403 }
404
405 /* r->length is now just compressed */
406 if (s->expand != NULL)
407 {
408 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+extra)
409 {
410 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
411 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
412 goto f_err;
413 }
414 if (!do_uncompress(s))
415 {
416 al=SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE;
417 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION);
418 goto f_err;
419 }
420 }
421
422 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH+extra)
423 {
424 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
425 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
426 goto f_err;
427 }
428
429 rr->off=0;
430 /* So at this point the following is true
431 * ssl->s3->rrec.type is the type of record
432 * ssl->s3->rrec.length == number of bytes in record
433 * ssl->s3->rrec.off == offset to first valid byte
434 * ssl->s3->rrec.data == where to take bytes from, increment
435 * after use :-).
436 */
437
438 /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */
439 s->packet_length=0;
440
441 /* just read a 0 length packet */
442 if (rr->length == 0) goto again;
443
444 return(1);
445
446 decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac:
447 /* Separate 'decryption_failed' alert was introduced with TLS 1.0,
448 * SSL 3.0 only has 'bad_record_mac'. But unless a decryption
449 * failure is directly visible from the ciphertext anyway,
450 * we should not reveal which kind of error occured -- this
451 * might become visible to an attacker (e.g. via logfile) */
452 al=SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC;
453 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
454 f_err:
455 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
456 err:
457 return(ret);
458 }
459
460 static int do_uncompress(SSL *ssl)
461 {
462 int i;
463 SSL3_RECORD *rr;
464
465 rr= &(ssl->s3->rrec);
466 i=COMP_expand_block(ssl->expand,rr->comp,
467 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,rr->data,(int)rr->length);
468 if (i < 0)
469 return(0);
470 else
471 rr->length=i;
472 rr->data=rr->comp;
473
474 return(1);
475 }
476
477 static int do_compress(SSL *ssl)
478 {
479 int i;
480 SSL3_RECORD *wr;
481
482 wr= &(ssl->s3->wrec);
483 i=COMP_compress_block(ssl->compress,wr->data,
484 SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH,
485 wr->input,(int)wr->length);
486 if (i < 0)
487 return(0);
488 else
489 wr->length=i;
490
491 wr->input=wr->data;
492 return(1);
493 }
494
495 /* Call this to write data in records of type 'type'
496 * It will return <= 0 if not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
497 */
498 int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len)
499 {
500 const unsigned char *buf=buf_;
501 unsigned int tot,n,nw;
502 int i;
503
504 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
505 tot=s->s3->wnum;
506 s->s3->wnum=0;
507
508 if (SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake)
509 {
510 i=s->handshake_func(s);
511 if (i < 0) return(i);
512 if (i == 0)
513 {
514 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
515 return -1;
516 }
517 }
518
519 n=(len-tot);
520 for (;;)
521 {
522 if (n > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
523 nw=SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
524 else
525 nw=n;
526
527 i=do_ssl3_write(s, type, &(buf[tot]), nw, 0);
528 if (i <= 0)
529 {
530 s->s3->wnum=tot;
531 return i;
532 }
533
534 if ((i == (int)n) ||
535 (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
536 (s->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE)))
537 {
538 /* next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment
539 * in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness: */
540 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 0;
541
542 return tot+i;
543 }
544
545 n-=i;
546 tot+=i;
547 }
548 }
549
550 static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
551 unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment)
552 {
553 unsigned char *p,*plen;
554 int i,mac_size,clear=0;
555 int prefix_len = 0;
556 SSL3_RECORD *wr;
557 SSL3_BUFFER *wb;
558 SSL_SESSION *sess;
559
560 /* first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written
561 * out. This will happen with non blocking IO */
562 if (s->s3->wbuf.left != 0)
563 return(ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len));
564
565 /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
566 if (s->s3->alert_dispatch)
567 {
568 i=ssl3_dispatch_alert(s);
569 if (i <= 0)
570 return(i);
571 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
572 }
573
574 if (len == 0 && !create_empty_fragment)
575 return 0;
576
577 wr= &(s->s3->wrec);
578 wb= &(s->s3->wbuf);
579 sess=s->session;
580
581 if ( (sess == NULL) ||
582 (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) ||
583 (s->write_hash == NULL))
584 clear=1;
585
586 if (clear)
587 mac_size=0;
588 else
589 mac_size=EVP_MD_size(s->write_hash);
590
591 /* 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself */
592 if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done)
593 {
594 /* countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites
595 * (see http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) */
596
597 if (s->s3->need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
598 {
599 /* recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set;
600 * this prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment
601 * (these 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later
602 * together with the actual payload) */
603 prefix_len = do_ssl3_write(s, type, buf, 0, 1);
604 if (prefix_len <= 0)
605 goto err;
606
607 if (s->s3->wbuf.len < prefix_len + SSL3_RT_MAX_PACKET_SIZE)
608 {
609 /* insufficient space */
610 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
611 goto err;
612 }
613 }
614
615 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1;
616 }
617
618 p = wb->buf + prefix_len;
619
620 /* write the header */
621
622 *(p++)=type&0xff;
623 wr->type=type;
624
625 *(p++)=(s->version>>8);
626 *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
627
628 /* field where we are to write out packet length */
629 plen=p;
630 p+=2;
631
632 /* lets setup the record stuff. */
633 wr->data=p;
634 wr->length=(int)len;
635 wr->input=(unsigned char *)buf;
636
637 /* we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into
638 * wr->data */
639
640 /* first we compress */
641 if (s->compress != NULL)
642 {
643 if (!do_compress(s))
644 {
645 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE);
646 goto err;
647 }
648 }
649 else
650 {
651 memcpy(wr->data,wr->input,wr->length);
652 wr->input=wr->data;
653 }
654
655 /* we should still have the output to wr->data and the input
656 * from wr->input. Length should be wr->length.
657 * wr->data still points in the wb->buf */
658
659 if (mac_size != 0)
660 {
661 s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,&(p[wr->length]),1);
662 wr->length+=mac_size;
663 wr->input=p;
664 wr->data=p;
665 }
666
667 /* ssl3_enc can only have an error on read */
668 s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,1);
669
670 /* record length after mac and block padding */
671 s2n(wr->length,plen);
672
673 /* we should now have
674 * wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is
675 * wr->length long */
676 wr->type=type; /* not needed but helps for debugging */
677 wr->length+=SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
678
679 if (create_empty_fragment)
680 {
681 /* we are in a recursive call;
682 * just return the length, don't write out anything here
683 */
684 return wr->length;
685 }
686
687 /* now let's set up wb */
688 wb->left = prefix_len + wr->length;
689 wb->offset = 0;
690
691 /* memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write retries later */
692 s->s3->wpend_tot=len;
693 s->s3->wpend_buf=buf;
694 s->s3->wpend_type=type;
695 s->s3->wpend_ret=len;
696
697 /* we now just need to write the buffer */
698 return ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len);
699 err:
700 return -1;
701 }
702
703 /* if s->s3->wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this */
704 static int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
705 unsigned int len)
706 {
707 int i;
708
709 /* XXXX */
710 if ((s->s3->wpend_tot > (int)len)
711 || ((s->s3->wpend_buf != buf) &&
712 !(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER))
713 || (s->s3->wpend_type != type))
714 {
715 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING,SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY);
716 return(-1);
717 }
718
719 for (;;)
720 {
721 clear_sys_error();
722 if (s->wbio != NULL)
723 {
724 s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
725 i=BIO_write(s->wbio,
726 (char *)&(s->s3->wbuf.buf[s->s3->wbuf.offset]),
727 (unsigned int)s->s3->wbuf.left);
728 }
729 else
730 {
731 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING,SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET);
732 i= -1;
733 }
734 if (i == s->s3->wbuf.left)
735 {
736 s->s3->wbuf.left=0;
737 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
738 return(s->s3->wpend_ret);
739 }
740 else if (i <= 0)
741 return(i);
742 s->s3->wbuf.offset+=i;
743 s->s3->wbuf.left-=i;
744 }
745 }
746
747 /* Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
748 * 'type' is one of the following:
749 *
750 * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
751 * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
752 * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
753 *
754 * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
755 * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
756 *
757 * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
758 * Alert records (e.g. close_notify), ChangeCipherSpec records (not really
759 * a surprise, but handled as if it were), or renegotiation requests.
760 * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
761 * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
762 * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
763 * Change cipher spec protocol
764 * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
765 * Alert protocol
766 * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
767 * Handshake protocol
768 * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
769 * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
770 * here, anything else is handled by higher layers
771 * Application data protocol
772 * none of our business
773 */
774 int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek)
775 {
776 int al,i,j,ret;
777 unsigned int n;
778 SSL3_RECORD *rr;
779 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type2,int val)=NULL;
780
781 if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL) /* Not initialized yet */
782 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
783 return(-1);
784
785 if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) && (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && type) ||
786 (peek && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)))
787 {
788 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
789 return -1;
790 }
791
792 if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
793 /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
794 {
795 unsigned char *src = s->s3->handshake_fragment;
796 unsigned char *dst = buf;
797 unsigned int k;
798
799 /* peek == 0 */
800 n = 0;
801 while ((len > 0) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
802 {
803 *dst++ = *src++;
804 len--; s->s3->handshake_fragment_len--;
805 n++;
806 }
807 /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
808 for (k = 0; k < s->s3->handshake_fragment_len; k++)
809 s->s3->handshake_fragment[k] = *src++;
810 return n;
811 }
812
813 /* Now s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE. */
814
815 if (!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s))
816 {
817 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
818 i=s->handshake_func(s);
819 if (i < 0) return(i);
820 if (i == 0)
821 {
822 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
823 return(-1);
824 }
825 }
826 start:
827 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
828
829 /* s->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
830 * s->s3->rrec.data, - data
831 * s->s3->rrec.off, - offset into 'data' for next read
832 * s->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes. */
833 rr = &(s->s3->rrec);
834
835 /* get new packet if necessary */
836 if ((rr->length == 0) || (s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY))
837 {
838 ret=ssl3_get_record(s);
839 if (ret <= 0) return(ret);
840 }
841
842 /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
843
844 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
845 * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
846 && (rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE))
847 {
848 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
849 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED);
850 goto err;
851 }
852
853 /* If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away
854 * (even in 'peek' mode) */
855 if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN)
856 {
857 rr->length=0;
858 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
859 return(0);
860 }
861
862
863 if (type == rr->type) /* SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE */
864 {
865 /* make sure that we are not getting application data when we
866 * are doing a handshake for the first time */
867 if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
868 (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL))
869 {
870 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
871 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE);
872 goto f_err;
873 }
874
875 if (len <= 0) return(len);
876
877 if ((unsigned int)len > rr->length)
878 n = rr->length;
879 else
880 n = (unsigned int)len;
881
882 memcpy(buf,&(rr->data[rr->off]),n);
883 if (!peek)
884 {
885 rr->length-=n;
886 rr->off+=n;
887 if (rr->length == 0)
888 {
889 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
890 rr->off=0;
891 }
892 }
893 return(n);
894 }
895
896
897 /* If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake
898 * message, then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello). */
899
900 /* In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage,
901 * fill that so that we can process the data at a fixed place.
902 */
903 {
904 unsigned int dest_maxlen = 0;
905 unsigned char *dest = NULL;
906 unsigned int *dest_len = NULL;
907
908 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
909 {
910 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->handshake_fragment;
911 dest = s->s3->handshake_fragment;
912 dest_len = &s->s3->handshake_fragment_len;
913 }
914 else if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT)
915 {
916 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->alert_fragment;
917 dest = s->s3->alert_fragment;
918 dest_len = &s->s3->alert_fragment_len;
919 }
920
921 if (dest_maxlen > 0)
922 {
923 n = dest_maxlen - *dest_len; /* available space in 'dest' */
924 if (rr->length < n)
925 n = rr->length; /* available bytes */
926
927 /* now move 'n' bytes: */
928 while (n-- > 0)
929 {
930 dest[(*dest_len)++] = rr->data[rr->off++];
931 rr->length--;
932 }
933
934 if (*dest_len < dest_maxlen)
935 goto start; /* fragment was too small */
936 }
937 }
938
939 /* s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
940 * s->s3->alert_fragment_len == 2 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT.
941 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.) */
942
943 /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */
944 if ((!s->server) &&
945 (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
946 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) &&
947 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL))
948 {
949 s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
950
951 if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment[1] != 0) ||
952 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[2] != 0) ||
953 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[3] != 0))
954 {
955 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
956 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST);
957 goto err;
958 }
959
960 if (s->msg_callback)
961 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->s3->handshake_fragment, 4, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
962
963 if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
964 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) &&
965 !s->s3->renegotiate)
966 {
967 ssl3_renegotiate(s);
968 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s))
969 {
970 i=s->handshake_func(s);
971 if (i < 0) return(i);
972 if (i == 0)
973 {
974 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
975 return(-1);
976 }
977
978 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY))
979 {
980 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */
981 {
982 BIO *bio;
983 /* In the case where we try to read application data,
984 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
985 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
986 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
987 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
988 bio=SSL_get_rbio(s);
989 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
990 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
991 return(-1);
992 }
993 }
994 }
995 }
996 /* we either finished a handshake or ignored the request,
997 * now try again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for */
998 goto start;
999 }
1000
1001 if (s->s3->alert_fragment_len >= 2)
1002 {
1003 int alert_level = s->s3->alert_fragment[0];
1004 int alert_descr = s->s3->alert_fragment[1];
1005
1006 s->s3->alert_fragment_len = 0;
1007
1008 if (s->msg_callback)
1009 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->alert_fragment, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1010
1011 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1012 cb=s->info_callback;
1013 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1014 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
1015
1016 if (cb != NULL)
1017 {
1018 j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr;
1019 cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j);
1020 }
1021
1022 if (alert_level == 1) /* warning */
1023 {
1024 s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr;
1025 if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY)
1026 {
1027 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1028 return(0);
1029 }
1030 }
1031 else if (alert_level == 2) /* fatal */
1032 {
1033 char tmp[16];
1034
1035 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1036 s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr;
1037 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr);
1038 BIO_snprintf(tmp,sizeof tmp,"%d",alert_descr);
1039 ERR_add_error_data(2,"SSL alert number ",tmp);
1040 s->shutdown|=SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1041 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session);
1042 return(0);
1043 }
1044 else
1045 {
1046 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1047 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
1048 goto f_err;
1049 }
1050
1051 goto start;
1052 }
1053
1054 if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) /* but we have not received a shutdown */
1055 {
1056 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1057 rr->length=0;
1058 return(0);
1059 }
1060
1061 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
1062 {
1063 /* 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, so we know
1064 * exactly what the record payload has to look like */
1065 if ( (rr->length != 1) || (rr->off != 0) ||
1066 (rr->data[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS))
1067 {
1068 i=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1069 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
1070 goto err;
1071 }
1072
1073 rr->length=0;
1074
1075 if (s->msg_callback)
1076 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, rr->data, 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1077
1078 s->s3->change_cipher_spec=1;
1079 if (!do_change_cipher_spec(s))
1080 goto err;
1081 else
1082 goto start;
1083 }
1084
1085 /* Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation) */
1086 if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) && !s->in_handshake)
1087 {
1088 if (((s->state&SSL_ST_MASK) == SSL_ST_OK) &&
1089 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS))
1090 {
1091 #if 0 /* worked only because C operator preferences are not as expected (and
1092 * because this is not really needed for clients except for detecting
1093 * protocol violations): */
1094 s->state=SSL_ST_BEFORE|(s->server)
1095 ?SSL_ST_ACCEPT
1096 :SSL_ST_CONNECT;
1097 #else
1098 s->state = s->server ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT;
1099 #endif
1100 s->new_session=1;
1101 }
1102 i=s->handshake_func(s);
1103 if (i < 0) return(i);
1104 if (i == 0)
1105 {
1106 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1107 return(-1);
1108 }
1109
1110 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY))
1111 {
1112 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */
1113 {
1114 BIO *bio;
1115 /* In the case where we try to read application data,
1116 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
1117 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
1118 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
1119 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
1120 bio=SSL_get_rbio(s);
1121 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1122 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1123 return(-1);
1124 }
1125 }
1126 goto start;
1127 }
1128
1129 switch (rr->type)
1130 {
1131 default:
1132 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS
1133 /* TLS just ignores unknown message types */
1134 if (s->version == TLS1_VERSION)
1135 {
1136 rr->length = 0;
1137 goto start;
1138 }
1139 #endif
1140 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1141 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1142 goto f_err;
1143 case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
1144 case SSL3_RT_ALERT:
1145 case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:
1146 /* we already handled all of these, with the possible exception
1147 * of SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when s->in_handshake is set, but that
1148 * should not happen when type != rr->type */
1149 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1150 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1151 goto f_err;
1152 case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
1153 /* At this point, we were expecting handshake data,
1154 * but have application data. If the library was
1155 * running inside ssl3_read() (i.e. in_read_app_data
1156 * is set) and it makes sense to read application data
1157 * at this point (session renegotiation not yet started),
1158 * we will indulge it.
1159 */
1160 if (s->s3->in_read_app_data &&
1161 (s->s3->total_renegotiations != 0) &&
1162 ((
1163 (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) &&
1164 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) &&
1165 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1166 ) || (
1167 (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) &&
1168 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) &&
1169 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
1170 )
1171 ))
1172 {
1173 s->s3->in_read_app_data=2;
1174 return(-1);
1175 }
1176 else
1177 {
1178 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1179 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1180 goto f_err;
1181 }
1182 }
1183 /* not reached */
1184
1185 f_err:
1186 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1187 err:
1188 return(-1);
1189 }
1190
1191 static int do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s)
1192 {
1193 int i;
1194 const char *sender;
1195 int slen;
1196
1197 if (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
1198 i=SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ;
1199 else
1200 i=SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ;
1201
1202 if (s->s3->tmp.key_block == NULL)
1203 {
1204 s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
1205 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) return(0);
1206 }
1207
1208 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,i))
1209 return(0);
1210
1211 /* we have to record the message digest at
1212 * this point so we can get it before we read
1213 * the finished message */
1214 if (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT)
1215 {
1216 sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label;
1217 slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len;
1218 }
1219 else
1220 {
1221 sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label;
1222 slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len;
1223 }
1224
1225 s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
1226 &(s->s3->finish_dgst1),
1227 &(s->s3->finish_dgst2),
1228 sender,slen,s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md);
1229
1230 return(1);
1231 }
1232
1233 void ssl3_send_alert(SSL *s, int level, int desc)
1234 {
1235 /* Map tls/ssl alert value to correct one */
1236 desc=s->method->ssl3_enc->alert_value(desc);
1237 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && desc == SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION)
1238 desc = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; /* SSL 3.0 does not have protocol_version alerts */
1239 if (desc < 0) return;
1240 /* If a fatal one, remove from cache */
1241 if ((level == 2) && (s->session != NULL))
1242 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session);
1243
1244 s->s3->alert_dispatch=1;
1245 s->s3->send_alert[0]=level;
1246 s->s3->send_alert[1]=desc;
1247 if (s->s3->wbuf.left == 0) /* data still being written out? */
1248 ssl3_dispatch_alert(s);
1249 /* else data is still being written out, we will get written
1250 * some time in the future */
1251 }
1252
1253 int ssl3_dispatch_alert(SSL *s)
1254 {
1255 int i,j;
1256 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
1257
1258 s->s3->alert_dispatch=0;
1259 i = do_ssl3_write(s, SSL3_RT_ALERT, &s->s3->send_alert[0], 2, 0);
1260 if (i <= 0)
1261 {
1262 s->s3->alert_dispatch=1;
1263 }
1264 else
1265 {
1266 /* Alert sent to BIO. If it is important, flush it now.
1267 * If the message does not get sent due to non-blocking IO,
1268 * we will not worry too much. */
1269 if (s->s3->send_alert[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL)
1270 (void)BIO_flush(s->wbio);
1271
1272 if (s->msg_callback)
1273 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->send_alert, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1274
1275 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1276 cb=s->info_callback;
1277 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1278 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
1279
1280 if (cb != NULL)
1281 {
1282 j=(s->s3->send_alert[0]<<8)|s->s3->send_alert[1];
1283 cb(s,SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT,j);
1284 }
1285 }
1286 return(i);
1287 }
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