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[thirdparty/openssl.git] / ssl / s3_pkt.c
1 /* ssl/s3_pkt.c */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
3 * All rights reserved.
4 *
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8 *
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15 *
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22 *
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25 * are met:
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40 *
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
51 * SUCH DAMAGE.
52 *
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
57 */
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
60 *
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
63 * are met:
64 *
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
67 *
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
71 * distribution.
72 *
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
77 *
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
82 *
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
86 *
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
88 * acknowledgment:
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
91 *
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
105 *
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
109 *
110 */
111
112 #include <stdio.h>
113 #include <errno.h>
114 #define USE_SOCKETS
115 #include "ssl_locl.h"
116 #include <openssl/evp.h>
117 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
118
119 static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
120 unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment);
121 static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s);
122
123 int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, int n, int max, int extend)
124 {
125 /* If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase
126 * packet by another n bytes.
127 * The packet will be in the sub-array of s->s3->rbuf.buf specified
128 * by s->packet and s->packet_length.
129 * (If s->read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may be stored in rbuf
130 * [plus s->packet_length bytes if extend == 1].)
131 */
132 int i,len,left;
133 long align=0;
134 unsigned char *pkt;
135 SSL3_BUFFER *rb;
136
137 if (n <= 0) return n;
138
139 rb = &(s->s3->rbuf);
140 if (rb->buf == NULL)
141 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
142 return -1;
143
144 left = rb->left;
145 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
146 align = (long)rb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
147 align = (-align)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1);
148 #endif
149
150 if (!extend)
151 {
152 /* start with empty packet ... */
153 if (left == 0)
154 rb->offset = align;
155 else if (align != 0 && left >= SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
156 {
157 /* check if next packet length is large
158 * enough to justify payload alignment... */
159 pkt = rb->buf + rb->offset;
160 if (pkt[0] == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
161 && (pkt[3]<<8|pkt[4]) >= 128)
162 {
163 /* Note that even if packet is corrupted
164 * and its length field is insane, we can
165 * only be led to wrong decision about
166 * whether memmove will occur or not.
167 * Header values has no effect on memmove
168 * arguments and therefore no buffer
169 * overrun can be triggered. */
170 memmove (rb->buf+align,pkt,left);
171 rb->offset = align;
172 }
173 }
174 s->packet = rb->buf + rb->offset;
175 s->packet_length = 0;
176 /* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */
177 }
178
179 /* For DTLS/UDP reads should not span multiple packets
180 * because the read operation returns the whole packet
181 * at once (as long as it fits into the buffer). */
182 if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION || SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
183 {
184 if (left > 0 && n > left)
185 n = left;
186 }
187
188 /* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */
189 if (left >= n)
190 {
191 s->packet_length+=n;
192 rb->left=left-n;
193 rb->offset+=n;
194 return(n);
195 }
196
197 /* else we need to read more data */
198
199 len = s->packet_length;
200 pkt = rb->buf+align;
201 /* Move any available bytes to front of buffer:
202 * 'len' bytes already pointed to by 'packet',
203 * 'left' extra ones at the end */
204 if (s->packet != pkt) /* len > 0 */
205 {
206 memmove(pkt, s->packet, len+left);
207 s->packet = pkt;
208 rb->offset = len + align;
209 }
210
211 if (n > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset)) /* does not happen */
212 {
213 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
214 return -1;
215 }
216
217 if (!s->read_ahead)
218 /* ignore max parameter */
219 max = n;
220 else
221 {
222 if (max < n)
223 max = n;
224 if (max > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset))
225 max = rb->len - rb->offset;
226 }
227
228 while (left < n)
229 {
230 /* Now we have len+left bytes at the front of s->s3->rbuf.buf
231 * and need to read in more until we have len+n (up to
232 * len+max if possible) */
233
234 clear_sys_error();
235 if (s->rbio != NULL)
236 {
237 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
238 i=BIO_read(s->rbio,pkt+len+left, max-left);
239 }
240 else
241 {
242 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N,SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET);
243 i = -1;
244 }
245
246 if (i <= 0)
247 {
248 rb->left = left;
249 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS)
250 if (len+left == 0)
251 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
252 return(i);
253 }
254 left+=i;
255 /* reads should *never* span multiple packets for DTLS because
256 * the underlying transport protocol is message oriented as opposed
257 * to byte oriented as in the TLS case. */
258 if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION || SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
259 {
260 if (n > left)
261 n = left; /* makes the while condition false */
262 }
263 }
264
265 /* done reading, now the book-keeping */
266 rb->offset += n;
267 rb->left = left - n;
268 s->packet_length += n;
269 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
270 return(n);
271 }
272
273 /* Call this to get a new input record.
274 * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error
275 * or non-blocking IO.
276 * When it finishes, one packet has been decoded and can be found in
277 * ssl->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
278 * ssl->s3->rrec.data, - data
279 * ssl->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes
280 */
281 /* used only by ssl3_read_bytes */
282 static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s)
283 {
284 int ssl_major,ssl_minor,al;
285 int enc_err,n,i,ret= -1;
286 SSL3_RECORD *rr;
287 SSL_SESSION *sess;
288 unsigned char *p;
289 unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
290 short version;
291 int mac_size;
292 int clear=0;
293 size_t extra;
294 int decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 0;
295 unsigned char *mac = NULL;
296
297 rr= &(s->s3->rrec);
298 sess=s->session;
299
300 if (s->options & SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER)
301 extra=SSL3_RT_MAX_EXTRA;
302 else
303 extra=0;
304 if (extra && !s->s3->init_extra)
305 {
306 /* An application error: SLS_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER
307 * set after ssl3_setup_buffers() was done */
308 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
309 return -1;
310 }
311
312 again:
313 /* check if we have the header */
314 if ( (s->rstate != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) ||
315 (s->packet_length < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH))
316 {
317 n=ssl3_read_n(s, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s->s3->rbuf.len, 0);
318 if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking */
319 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_BODY;
320
321 p=s->packet;
322
323 /* Pull apart the header into the SSL3_RECORD */
324 rr->type= *(p++);
325 ssl_major= *(p++);
326 ssl_minor= *(p++);
327 version=(ssl_major<<8)|ssl_minor;
328 n2s(p,rr->length);
329 #if 0
330 fprintf(stderr, "Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr->type, rr->length);
331 #endif
332
333 /* Lets check version */
334 if (!s->first_packet)
335 {
336 if (version != s->version)
337 {
338 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
339 /* Send back error using their
340 * version number :-) */
341 s->version=version;
342 al=SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
343 goto f_err;
344 }
345 }
346
347 if ((version>>8) != SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
348 {
349 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
350 goto err;
351 }
352
353 if (rr->length > s->s3->rbuf.len - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
354 {
355 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
356 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
357 goto f_err;
358 }
359
360 /* now s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */
361 }
362
363 /* s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */
364
365 if (rr->length > s->packet_length-SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
366 {
367 /* now s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */
368 i=rr->length;
369 n=ssl3_read_n(s,i,i,1);
370 if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking io */
371 /* now n == rr->length,
372 * and s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length */
373 }
374
375 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; /* set state for later operations */
376
377 /* At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length,
378 * and we have that many bytes in s->packet
379 */
380 rr->input= &(s->packet[SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]);
381
382 /* ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr'
383 * rr->input points at rr->length bytes, which
384 * need to be copied into rr->data by either
385 * the decryption or by the decompression
386 * When the data is 'copied' into the rr->data buffer,
387 * rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer */
388
389 /* We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ]
390 * rr->length bytes of encrypted compressed stuff. */
391
392 /* check is not needed I believe */
393 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH+extra)
394 {
395 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
396 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
397 goto f_err;
398 }
399
400 /* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */
401 rr->data=rr->input;
402
403 enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,0);
404 if (enc_err <= 0)
405 {
406 if (enc_err == 0)
407 /* SSLerr() and ssl3_send_alert() have been called */
408 goto err;
409
410 /* Otherwise enc_err == -1, which indicates bad padding
411 * (rec->length has not been changed in this case).
412 * To minimize information leaked via timing, we will perform
413 * the MAC computation anyway. */
414 decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
415 }
416
417 #ifdef TLS_DEBUG
418 printf("dec %d\n",rr->length);
419 { unsigned int z; for (z=0; z<rr->length; z++) printf("%02X%c",rr->data[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
420 printf("\n");
421 #endif
422
423 /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */
424 if ( (sess == NULL) ||
425 (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL) ||
426 (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) == NULL))
427 clear=1;
428
429 if (!clear)
430 {
431 /* !clear => s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */
432 mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
433 OPENSSL_assert(mac_size >= 0);
434
435 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+extra+mac_size)
436 {
437 #if 0 /* OK only for stream ciphers (then rr->length is visible from ciphertext anyway) */
438 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
439 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_PRE_MAC_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
440 goto f_err;
441 #else
442 decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
443 #endif
444 }
445 /* check the MAC for rr->input (it's in mac_size bytes at the tail) */
446 if (rr->length >= (unsigned int)mac_size)
447 {
448 rr->length -= mac_size;
449 mac = &rr->data[rr->length];
450 }
451 else
452 {
453 /* record (minus padding) is too short to contain a MAC */
454 #if 0 /* OK only for stream ciphers */
455 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
456 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
457 goto f_err;
458 #else
459 decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
460 rr->length = 0;
461 #endif
462 }
463 i=s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,md,0);
464 if (i < 0 || mac == NULL || memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0)
465 {
466 decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
467 }
468 }
469
470 if (decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac)
471 {
472 /* A separate 'decryption_failed' alert was introduced with TLS 1.0,
473 * SSL 3.0 only has 'bad_record_mac'. But unless a decryption
474 * failure is directly visible from the ciphertext anyway,
475 * we should not reveal which kind of error occured -- this
476 * might become visible to an attacker (e.g. via a logfile) */
477 al=SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC;
478 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
479 goto f_err;
480 }
481
482 /* r->length is now just compressed */
483 if (s->expand != NULL)
484 {
485 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+extra)
486 {
487 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
488 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
489 goto f_err;
490 }
491 if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s))
492 {
493 al=SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE;
494 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION);
495 goto f_err;
496 }
497 }
498
499 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH+extra)
500 {
501 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
502 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
503 goto f_err;
504 }
505
506 rr->off=0;
507 /* So at this point the following is true
508 * ssl->s3->rrec.type is the type of record
509 * ssl->s3->rrec.length == number of bytes in record
510 * ssl->s3->rrec.off == offset to first valid byte
511 * ssl->s3->rrec.data == where to take bytes from, increment
512 * after use :-).
513 */
514
515 /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */
516 s->packet_length=0;
517
518 /* just read a 0 length packet */
519 if (rr->length == 0) goto again;
520
521 #if 0
522 fprintf(stderr, "Ultimate Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr->type, rr->length);
523 #endif
524
525 return(1);
526
527 f_err:
528 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
529 err:
530 return(ret);
531 }
532
533 int ssl3_do_uncompress(SSL *ssl)
534 {
535 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
536 int i;
537 SSL3_RECORD *rr;
538
539 rr= &(ssl->s3->rrec);
540 i=COMP_expand_block(ssl->expand,rr->comp,
541 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,rr->data,(int)rr->length);
542 if (i < 0)
543 return(0);
544 else
545 rr->length=i;
546 rr->data=rr->comp;
547 #endif
548 return(1);
549 }
550
551 int ssl3_do_compress(SSL *ssl)
552 {
553 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
554 int i;
555 SSL3_RECORD *wr;
556
557 wr= &(ssl->s3->wrec);
558 i=COMP_compress_block(ssl->compress,wr->data,
559 SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH,
560 wr->input,(int)wr->length);
561 if (i < 0)
562 return(0);
563 else
564 wr->length=i;
565
566 wr->input=wr->data;
567 #endif
568 return(1);
569 }
570
571 /* Call this to write data in records of type 'type'
572 * It will return <= 0 if not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
573 */
574 int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len)
575 {
576 const unsigned char *buf=buf_;
577 unsigned int tot,n,nw;
578 int i;
579
580 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
581 tot=s->s3->wnum;
582 s->s3->wnum=0;
583
584 if (SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake)
585 {
586 i=s->handshake_func(s);
587 if (i < 0) return(i);
588 if (i == 0)
589 {
590 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
591 return -1;
592 }
593 }
594
595 n=(len-tot);
596 for (;;)
597 {
598 if (n > s->max_send_fragment)
599 nw=s->max_send_fragment;
600 else
601 nw=n;
602
603 i=do_ssl3_write(s, type, &(buf[tot]), nw, 0);
604 if (i <= 0)
605 {
606 s->s3->wnum=tot;
607 return i;
608 }
609
610 if ((i == (int)n) ||
611 (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
612 (s->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE)))
613 {
614 /* next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment
615 * in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness: */
616 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 0;
617
618 return tot+i;
619 }
620
621 n-=i;
622 tot+=i;
623 }
624 }
625
626 static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
627 unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment)
628 {
629 unsigned char *p,*plen;
630 int i,mac_size,clear=0;
631 int prefix_len=0;
632 long align=0;
633 SSL3_RECORD *wr;
634 SSL3_BUFFER *wb=&(s->s3->wbuf);
635 SSL_SESSION *sess;
636
637 if (wb->buf == NULL)
638 if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s))
639 return -1;
640
641 /* first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written
642 * out. This will happen with non blocking IO */
643 if (wb->left != 0)
644 return(ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len));
645
646 /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
647 if (s->s3->alert_dispatch)
648 {
649 i=s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
650 if (i <= 0)
651 return(i);
652 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
653 }
654
655 if (len == 0 && !create_empty_fragment)
656 return 0;
657
658 wr= &(s->s3->wrec);
659 sess=s->session;
660
661 if ( (sess == NULL) ||
662 (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) ||
663 (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash) == NULL))
664 clear=1;
665
666 if (clear)
667 mac_size=0;
668 else
669 {
670 mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
671 if (mac_size < 0)
672 goto err;
673 }
674
675 /* 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself */
676 if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done)
677 {
678 /* countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites
679 * (see http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) */
680
681 if (s->s3->need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
682 {
683 /* recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set;
684 * this prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment
685 * (these 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later
686 * together with the actual payload) */
687 prefix_len = do_ssl3_write(s, type, buf, 0, 1);
688 if (prefix_len <= 0)
689 goto err;
690
691 if (prefix_len >
692 (SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD))
693 {
694 /* insufficient space */
695 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
696 goto err;
697 }
698 }
699
700 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1;
701 }
702
703 if (create_empty_fragment)
704 {
705 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
706 /* extra fragment would be couple of cipher blocks,
707 * which would be multiple of SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD, so
708 * if we want to align the real payload, then we can
709 * just pretent we simply have two headers. */
710 align = (long)wb->buf + 2*SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
711 align = (-align)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1);
712 #endif
713 p = wb->buf + align;
714 wb->offset = align;
715 }
716 else if (prefix_len)
717 {
718 p = wb->buf + wb->offset + prefix_len;
719 }
720 else
721 {
722 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
723 align = (long)wb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
724 align = (-align)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1);
725 #endif
726 p = wb->buf + align;
727 wb->offset = align;
728 }
729
730 /* write the header */
731
732 *(p++)=type&0xff;
733 wr->type=type;
734
735 *(p++)=(s->version>>8);
736 *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
737
738 /* field where we are to write out packet length */
739 plen=p;
740 p+=2;
741
742 /* lets setup the record stuff. */
743 wr->data=p;
744 wr->length=(int)len;
745 wr->input=(unsigned char *)buf;
746
747 /* we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into
748 * wr->data */
749
750 /* first we compress */
751 if (s->compress != NULL)
752 {
753 if (!ssl3_do_compress(s))
754 {
755 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE);
756 goto err;
757 }
758 }
759 else
760 {
761 memcpy(wr->data,wr->input,wr->length);
762 wr->input=wr->data;
763 }
764
765 /* we should still have the output to wr->data and the input
766 * from wr->input. Length should be wr->length.
767 * wr->data still points in the wb->buf */
768
769 if (mac_size != 0)
770 {
771 if (s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,&(p[wr->length]),1) < 0)
772 goto err;
773 wr->length+=mac_size;
774 wr->input=p;
775 wr->data=p;
776 }
777
778 /* ssl3_enc can only have an error on read */
779 s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,1);
780
781 /* record length after mac and block padding */
782 s2n(wr->length,plen);
783
784 /* we should now have
785 * wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is
786 * wr->length long */
787 wr->type=type; /* not needed but helps for debugging */
788 wr->length+=SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
789
790 if (create_empty_fragment)
791 {
792 /* we are in a recursive call;
793 * just return the length, don't write out anything here
794 */
795 return wr->length;
796 }
797
798 /* now let's set up wb */
799 wb->left = prefix_len + wr->length;
800
801 /* memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write retries later */
802 s->s3->wpend_tot=len;
803 s->s3->wpend_buf=buf;
804 s->s3->wpend_type=type;
805 s->s3->wpend_ret=len;
806
807 /* we now just need to write the buffer */
808 return ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len);
809 err:
810 return -1;
811 }
812
813 /* if s->s3->wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this */
814 int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
815 unsigned int len)
816 {
817 int i;
818 SSL3_BUFFER *wb=&(s->s3->wbuf);
819
820 /* XXXX */
821 if ((s->s3->wpend_tot > (int)len)
822 || ((s->s3->wpend_buf != buf) &&
823 !(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER))
824 || (s->s3->wpend_type != type))
825 {
826 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING,SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY);
827 return(-1);
828 }
829
830 for (;;)
831 {
832 clear_sys_error();
833 if (s->wbio != NULL)
834 {
835 s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
836 i=BIO_write(s->wbio,
837 (char *)&(wb->buf[wb->offset]),
838 (unsigned int)wb->left);
839 }
840 else
841 {
842 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING,SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET);
843 i= -1;
844 }
845 if (i == wb->left)
846 {
847 wb->left=0;
848 wb->offset+=i;
849 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS)
850 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
851 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
852 return(s->s3->wpend_ret);
853 }
854 else if (i <= 0) {
855 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION ||
856 s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
857 /* For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the whole
858 point in using a datagram service */
859 wb->left = 0;
860 }
861 return(i);
862 }
863 wb->offset+=i;
864 wb->left-=i;
865 }
866 }
867
868 /* Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
869 * 'type' is one of the following:
870 *
871 * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
872 * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
873 * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
874 *
875 * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
876 * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
877 *
878 * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
879 * Alert records (e.g. close_notify), ChangeCipherSpec records (not really
880 * a surprise, but handled as if it were), or renegotiation requests.
881 * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
882 * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
883 * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
884 * Change cipher spec protocol
885 * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
886 * Alert protocol
887 * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
888 * Handshake protocol
889 * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
890 * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
891 * here, anything else is handled by higher layers
892 * Application data protocol
893 * none of our business
894 */
895 int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek)
896 {
897 int al,i,j,ret;
898 unsigned int n;
899 SSL3_RECORD *rr;
900 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type2,int val)=NULL;
901
902 if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL) /* Not initialized yet */
903 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
904 return(-1);
905
906 if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) && (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && type) ||
907 (peek && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)))
908 {
909 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
910 return -1;
911 }
912
913 if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
914 /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
915 {
916 unsigned char *src = s->s3->handshake_fragment;
917 unsigned char *dst = buf;
918 unsigned int k;
919
920 /* peek == 0 */
921 n = 0;
922 while ((len > 0) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
923 {
924 *dst++ = *src++;
925 len--; s->s3->handshake_fragment_len--;
926 n++;
927 }
928 /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
929 for (k = 0; k < s->s3->handshake_fragment_len; k++)
930 s->s3->handshake_fragment[k] = *src++;
931 return n;
932 }
933
934 /* Now s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE. */
935
936 if (!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s))
937 {
938 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
939 i=s->handshake_func(s);
940 if (i < 0) return(i);
941 if (i == 0)
942 {
943 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
944 return(-1);
945 }
946 }
947 start:
948 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
949
950 /* s->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
951 * s->s3->rrec.data, - data
952 * s->s3->rrec.off, - offset into 'data' for next read
953 * s->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes. */
954 rr = &(s->s3->rrec);
955
956 /* get new packet if necessary */
957 if ((rr->length == 0) || (s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY))
958 {
959 ret=ssl3_get_record(s);
960 if (ret <= 0) return(ret);
961 }
962
963 /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
964
965 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
966 * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
967 && (rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE))
968 {
969 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
970 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED);
971 goto f_err;
972 }
973
974 /* If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away
975 * (even in 'peek' mode) */
976 if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN)
977 {
978 rr->length=0;
979 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
980 return(0);
981 }
982
983
984 if (type == rr->type) /* SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE */
985 {
986 /* make sure that we are not getting application data when we
987 * are doing a handshake for the first time */
988 if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
989 (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL))
990 {
991 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
992 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE);
993 goto f_err;
994 }
995
996 if (len <= 0) return(len);
997
998 if ((unsigned int)len > rr->length)
999 n = rr->length;
1000 else
1001 n = (unsigned int)len;
1002
1003 memcpy(buf,&(rr->data[rr->off]),n);
1004 if (!peek)
1005 {
1006 rr->length-=n;
1007 rr->off+=n;
1008 if (rr->length == 0)
1009 {
1010 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
1011 rr->off=0;
1012 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS)
1013 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
1014 }
1015 }
1016 return(n);
1017 }
1018
1019
1020 /* If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake
1021 * message, then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello). */
1022
1023 /* In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage,
1024 * fill that so that we can process the data at a fixed place.
1025 */
1026 {
1027 unsigned int dest_maxlen = 0;
1028 unsigned char *dest = NULL;
1029 unsigned int *dest_len = NULL;
1030
1031 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
1032 {
1033 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->handshake_fragment;
1034 dest = s->s3->handshake_fragment;
1035 dest_len = &s->s3->handshake_fragment_len;
1036 }
1037 else if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT)
1038 {
1039 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->alert_fragment;
1040 dest = s->s3->alert_fragment;
1041 dest_len = &s->s3->alert_fragment_len;
1042 }
1043
1044 if (dest_maxlen > 0)
1045 {
1046 n = dest_maxlen - *dest_len; /* available space in 'dest' */
1047 if (rr->length < n)
1048 n = rr->length; /* available bytes */
1049
1050 /* now move 'n' bytes: */
1051 while (n-- > 0)
1052 {
1053 dest[(*dest_len)++] = rr->data[rr->off++];
1054 rr->length--;
1055 }
1056
1057 if (*dest_len < dest_maxlen)
1058 goto start; /* fragment was too small */
1059 }
1060 }
1061
1062 /* s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
1063 * s->s3->alert_fragment_len == 2 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT.
1064 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.) */
1065
1066 /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */
1067 if ((!s->server) &&
1068 (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
1069 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) &&
1070 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL))
1071 {
1072 s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
1073
1074 if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment[1] != 0) ||
1075 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[2] != 0) ||
1076 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[3] != 0))
1077 {
1078 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1079 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST);
1080 goto f_err;
1081 }
1082
1083 if (s->msg_callback)
1084 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->s3->handshake_fragment, 4, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1085
1086 if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
1087 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) &&
1088 !s->s3->renegotiate)
1089 {
1090 ssl3_renegotiate(s);
1091 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s))
1092 {
1093 i=s->handshake_func(s);
1094 if (i < 0) return(i);
1095 if (i == 0)
1096 {
1097 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1098 return(-1);
1099 }
1100
1101 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY))
1102 {
1103 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */
1104 {
1105 BIO *bio;
1106 /* In the case where we try to read application data,
1107 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
1108 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
1109 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
1110 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
1111 bio=SSL_get_rbio(s);
1112 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1113 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1114 return(-1);
1115 }
1116 }
1117 }
1118 }
1119 /* we either finished a handshake or ignored the request,
1120 * now try again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for */
1121 goto start;
1122 }
1123
1124 if (s->s3->alert_fragment_len >= 2)
1125 {
1126 int alert_level = s->s3->alert_fragment[0];
1127 int alert_descr = s->s3->alert_fragment[1];
1128
1129 s->s3->alert_fragment_len = 0;
1130
1131 if (s->msg_callback)
1132 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->alert_fragment, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1133
1134 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1135 cb=s->info_callback;
1136 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1137 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
1138
1139 if (cb != NULL)
1140 {
1141 j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr;
1142 cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j);
1143 }
1144
1145 if (alert_level == 1) /* warning */
1146 {
1147 s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr;
1148 if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY)
1149 {
1150 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1151 return(0);
1152 }
1153 }
1154 else if (alert_level == 2) /* fatal */
1155 {
1156 char tmp[16];
1157
1158 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1159 s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr;
1160 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr);
1161 BIO_snprintf(tmp,sizeof tmp,"%d",alert_descr);
1162 ERR_add_error_data(2,"SSL alert number ",tmp);
1163 s->shutdown|=SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1164 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session);
1165 return(0);
1166 }
1167 else
1168 {
1169 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1170 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
1171 goto f_err;
1172 }
1173
1174 goto start;
1175 }
1176
1177 if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) /* but we have not received a shutdown */
1178 {
1179 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1180 rr->length=0;
1181 return(0);
1182 }
1183
1184 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
1185 {
1186 /* 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, so we know
1187 * exactly what the record payload has to look like */
1188 if ( (rr->length != 1) || (rr->off != 0) ||
1189 (rr->data[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS))
1190 {
1191 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1192 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
1193 goto f_err;
1194 }
1195
1196 /* Check we have a cipher to change to */
1197 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL)
1198 {
1199 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1200 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1201 goto f_err;
1202 }
1203
1204 rr->length=0;
1205
1206 if (s->msg_callback)
1207 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, rr->data, 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1208
1209 s->s3->change_cipher_spec=1;
1210 if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s))
1211 goto err;
1212 else
1213 goto start;
1214 }
1215
1216 /* Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation) */
1217 if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) && !s->in_handshake)
1218 {
1219 if (((s->state&SSL_ST_MASK) == SSL_ST_OK) &&
1220 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS))
1221 {
1222 #if 0 /* worked only because C operator preferences are not as expected (and
1223 * because this is not really needed for clients except for detecting
1224 * protocol violations): */
1225 s->state=SSL_ST_BEFORE|(s->server)
1226 ?SSL_ST_ACCEPT
1227 :SSL_ST_CONNECT;
1228 #else
1229 s->state = s->server ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT;
1230 #endif
1231 s->new_session=1;
1232 }
1233 i=s->handshake_func(s);
1234 if (i < 0) return(i);
1235 if (i == 0)
1236 {
1237 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1238 return(-1);
1239 }
1240
1241 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY))
1242 {
1243 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */
1244 {
1245 BIO *bio;
1246 /* In the case where we try to read application data,
1247 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
1248 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
1249 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
1250 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
1251 bio=SSL_get_rbio(s);
1252 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1253 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1254 return(-1);
1255 }
1256 }
1257 goto start;
1258 }
1259
1260 switch (rr->type)
1261 {
1262 default:
1263 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS
1264 /* TLS just ignores unknown message types */
1265 if (s->version == TLS1_VERSION)
1266 {
1267 rr->length = 0;
1268 goto start;
1269 }
1270 #endif
1271 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1272 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1273 goto f_err;
1274 case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
1275 case SSL3_RT_ALERT:
1276 case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:
1277 /* we already handled all of these, with the possible exception
1278 * of SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when s->in_handshake is set, but that
1279 * should not happen when type != rr->type */
1280 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1281 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1282 goto f_err;
1283 case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
1284 /* At this point, we were expecting handshake data,
1285 * but have application data. If the library was
1286 * running inside ssl3_read() (i.e. in_read_app_data
1287 * is set) and it makes sense to read application data
1288 * at this point (session renegotiation not yet started),
1289 * we will indulge it.
1290 */
1291 if (s->s3->in_read_app_data &&
1292 (s->s3->total_renegotiations != 0) &&
1293 ((
1294 (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) &&
1295 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) &&
1296 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1297 ) || (
1298 (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) &&
1299 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) &&
1300 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
1301 )
1302 ))
1303 {
1304 s->s3->in_read_app_data=2;
1305 return(-1);
1306 }
1307 else
1308 {
1309 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1310 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1311 goto f_err;
1312 }
1313 }
1314 /* not reached */
1315
1316 f_err:
1317 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1318 err:
1319 return(-1);
1320 }
1321
1322 int ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s)
1323 {
1324 int i;
1325 const char *sender;
1326 int slen;
1327
1328 if (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
1329 i=SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ;
1330 else
1331 i=SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ;
1332
1333 if (s->s3->tmp.key_block == NULL)
1334 {
1335 if (s->session == NULL)
1336 {
1337 /* might happen if dtls1_read_bytes() calls this */
1338 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1339 return (0);
1340 }
1341
1342 s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
1343 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) return(0);
1344 }
1345
1346 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,i))
1347 return(0);
1348
1349 /* we have to record the message digest at
1350 * this point so we can get it before we read
1351 * the finished message */
1352 if (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT)
1353 {
1354 sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label;
1355 slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len;
1356 }
1357 else
1358 {
1359 sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label;
1360 slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len;
1361 }
1362
1363 s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
1364 sender,slen,s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md);
1365
1366 return(1);
1367 }
1368
1369 int ssl3_send_alert(SSL *s, int level, int desc)
1370 {
1371 /* Map tls/ssl alert value to correct one */
1372 desc=s->method->ssl3_enc->alert_value(desc);
1373 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && desc == SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION)
1374 desc = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; /* SSL 3.0 does not have protocol_version alerts */
1375 if (desc < 0) return -1;
1376 /* If a fatal one, remove from cache */
1377 if ((level == 2) && (s->session != NULL))
1378 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session);
1379
1380 s->s3->alert_dispatch=1;
1381 s->s3->send_alert[0]=level;
1382 s->s3->send_alert[1]=desc;
1383 if (s->s3->wbuf.left == 0) /* data still being written out? */
1384 return s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
1385 /* else data is still being written out, we will get written
1386 * some time in the future */
1387 return -1;
1388 }
1389
1390 int ssl3_dispatch_alert(SSL *s)
1391 {
1392 int i,j;
1393 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
1394
1395 s->s3->alert_dispatch=0;
1396 i = do_ssl3_write(s, SSL3_RT_ALERT, &s->s3->send_alert[0], 2, 0);
1397 if (i <= 0)
1398 {
1399 s->s3->alert_dispatch=1;
1400 }
1401 else
1402 {
1403 /* Alert sent to BIO. If it is important, flush it now.
1404 * If the message does not get sent due to non-blocking IO,
1405 * we will not worry too much. */
1406 if (s->s3->send_alert[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL)
1407 (void)BIO_flush(s->wbio);
1408
1409 if (s->msg_callback)
1410 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->send_alert, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1411
1412 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1413 cb=s->info_callback;
1414 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1415 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
1416
1417 if (cb != NULL)
1418 {
1419 j=(s->s3->send_alert[0]<<8)|s->s3->send_alert[1];
1420 cb(s,SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT,j);
1421 }
1422 }
1423 return(i);
1424 }
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