2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
115 #include "ssl_locl.h"
116 #include <openssl/evp.h>
117 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
119 static int do_ssl3_write(SSL
*s
, int type
, const unsigned char *buf
,
120 unsigned int len
, int create_empty_fragment
);
121 static int ssl3_get_record(SSL
*s
);
123 int ssl3_read_n(SSL
*s
, int n
, int max
, int extend
)
125 /* If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase
126 * packet by another n bytes.
127 * The packet will be in the sub-array of s->s3->rbuf.buf specified
128 * by s->packet and s->packet_length.
129 * (If s->read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may be stored in rbuf
130 * [plus s->packet_length bytes if extend == 1].)
137 if (n
<= 0) return n
;
141 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
142 align
= (long)rb
->buf
+ SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
;
143 align
= (-align
)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD
-1);
148 /* start with empty packet ... */
151 else if (align
!= 0 && left
>= SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
)
153 /* check if next packet length is large
154 * enough to justify payload alignment... */
155 pkt
= rb
->buf
+ rb
->offset
;
156 if (pkt
[0] == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
157 && (pkt
[3]<<8|pkt
[4]) >= 128)
159 /* Note that even if packet is corrupted
160 * and its length field is insane, we can
161 * only be led to wrong decision about
162 * whether memmove will occur or not.
163 * Header values has no effect on memmove
164 * arguments and therefore no buffer
165 * overrun can be triggered. */
166 memmove (rb
->buf
+align
,pkt
,left
);
170 s
->packet
= rb
->buf
+ rb
->offset
;
171 s
->packet_length
= 0;
172 /* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */
175 /* extend reads should not span multiple packets for DTLS */
176 if ( SSL_version(s
) == DTLS1_VERSION
&&
179 if ( left
> 0 && n
> left
)
183 /* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */
192 /* else we need to read more data */
194 len
= s
->packet_length
;
196 /* Move any available bytes to front of buffer:
197 * 'len' bytes already pointed to by 'packet',
198 * 'left' extra ones at the end */
199 if (s
->packet
!= pkt
) /* len > 0 */
201 memmove(pkt
, s
->packet
, len
+left
);
203 rb
->offset
= len
+ align
;
206 max
= rb
->len
- rb
->offset
;
207 if (n
> max
) /* does not happen */
209 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N
,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
218 /* Now we have len+left bytes at the front of s->s3->rbuf.buf
219 * and need to read in more until we have len+n (up to
220 * len+max if possible) */
225 s
->rwstate
=SSL_READING
;
226 i
=BIO_read(s
->rbio
,pkt
+len
+left
, max
-left
);
230 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N
,SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET
);
242 /* done reading, now the book-keeping */
245 s
->packet_length
+= n
;
246 s
->rwstate
=SSL_NOTHING
;
250 /* Call this to get a new input record.
251 * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error
252 * or non-blocking IO.
253 * When it finishes, one packet has been decoded and can be found in
254 * ssl->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
255 * ssl->s3->rrec.data, - data
256 * ssl->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes
258 /* used only by ssl3_read_bytes */
259 static int ssl3_get_record(SSL
*s
)
261 int ssl_major
,ssl_minor
,al
;
262 int enc_err
,n
,i
,ret
= -1;
266 unsigned char md
[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
];
268 unsigned int mac_size
;
271 int decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac
= 0;
272 unsigned char *mac
= NULL
;
277 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER
)
278 extra
=SSL3_RT_MAX_EXTRA
;
281 if (extra
&& !s
->s3
->init_extra
)
283 /* An application error: SLS_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER
284 * set after ssl3_setup_buffers() was done */
285 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
290 /* check if we have the header */
291 if ( (s
->rstate
!= SSL_ST_READ_BODY
) ||
292 (s
->packet_length
< SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
))
294 n
=ssl3_read_n(s
, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
, s
->s3
->rbuf
.len
, 0);
295 if (n
<= 0) return(n
); /* error or non-blocking */
296 s
->rstate
=SSL_ST_READ_BODY
;
300 /* Pull apart the header into the SSL3_RECORD */
304 version
=(ssl_major
<<8)|ssl_minor
;
307 fprintf(stderr
, "Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr
->type
, rr
->length
);
310 /* Lets check version */
311 if (!s
->first_packet
)
313 if (version
!= s
->version
)
315 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD
,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER
);
316 /* Send back error using their
317 * version number :-) */
319 al
=SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
324 if ((version
>>8) != SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR
)
326 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD
,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER
);
330 if (rr
->length
> s
->s3
->rbuf
.len
- SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
)
332 al
=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW
;
333 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD
,SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
337 /* now s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */
340 /* s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */
342 if (rr
->length
> s
->packet_length
-SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
)
344 /* now s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */
346 n
=ssl3_read_n(s
,i
,i
,1);
347 if (n
<= 0) return(n
); /* error or non-blocking io */
348 /* now n == rr->length,
349 * and s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length */
352 s
->rstate
=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER
; /* set state for later operations */
354 /* At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length,
355 * and we have that many bytes in s->packet
357 rr
->input
= &(s
->packet
[SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
]);
359 /* ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr'
360 * rr->input points at rr->length bytes, which
361 * need to be copied into rr->data by either
362 * the decryption or by the decompression
363 * When the data is 'copied' into the rr->data buffer,
364 * rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer */
366 /* We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ]
367 * rr->length bytes of encrypted compressed stuff. */
369 /* check is not needed I believe */
370 if (rr
->length
> SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH
+extra
)
372 al
=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW
;
373 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD
,SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
377 /* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */
380 enc_err
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->enc(s
,0);
384 /* SSLerr() and ssl3_send_alert() have been called */
387 /* Otherwise enc_err == -1, which indicates bad padding
388 * (rec->length has not been changed in this case).
389 * To minimize information leaked via timing, we will perform
390 * the MAC computation anyway. */
391 decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac
= 1;
395 printf("dec %d\n",rr
->length
);
396 { unsigned int z
; for (z
=0; z
<rr
->length
; z
++) printf("%02X%c",rr
->data
[z
],((z
+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
400 /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */
401 if ( (sess
== NULL
) ||
402 (s
->enc_read_ctx
== NULL
) ||
403 (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s
->read_hash
) == NULL
))
408 mac_size
=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s
->read_hash
);
410 if (rr
->length
> SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH
+extra
+mac_size
)
412 #if 0 /* OK only for stream ciphers (then rr->length is visible from ciphertext anyway) */
413 al
=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW
;
414 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD
,SSL_R_PRE_MAC_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
417 decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac
= 1;
420 /* check the MAC for rr->input (it's in mac_size bytes at the tail) */
421 if (rr
->length
>= mac_size
)
423 rr
->length
-= mac_size
;
424 mac
= &rr
->data
[rr
->length
];
428 /* record (minus padding) is too short to contain a MAC */
429 #if 0 /* OK only for stream ciphers */
430 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
431 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD
,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
434 decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac
= 1;
438 i
=s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->mac(s
,md
,0);
439 if (mac
== NULL
|| memcmp(md
, mac
, mac_size
) != 0)
441 decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac
= 1;
445 if (decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac
)
447 /* A separate 'decryption_failed' alert was introduced with TLS 1.0,
448 * SSL 3.0 only has 'bad_record_mac'. But unless a decryption
449 * failure is directly visible from the ciphertext anyway,
450 * we should not reveal which kind of error occured -- this
451 * might become visible to an attacker (e.g. via a logfile) */
452 al
=SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC
;
453 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD
,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC
);
457 /* r->length is now just compressed */
458 if (s
->expand
!= NULL
)
460 if (rr
->length
> SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH
+extra
)
462 al
=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW
;
463 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD
,SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
466 if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s
))
468 al
=SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE
;
469 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD
,SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION
);
474 if (rr
->length
> SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
+extra
)
476 al
=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW
;
477 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD
,SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
482 /* So at this point the following is true
483 * ssl->s3->rrec.type is the type of record
484 * ssl->s3->rrec.length == number of bytes in record
485 * ssl->s3->rrec.off == offset to first valid byte
486 * ssl->s3->rrec.data == where to take bytes from, increment
490 /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */
493 /* just read a 0 length packet */
494 if (rr
->length
== 0) goto again
;
497 fprintf(stderr
, "Ultimate Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr
->type
, rr
->length
);
503 ssl3_send_alert(s
,SSL3_AL_FATAL
,al
);
508 int ssl3_do_uncompress(SSL
*ssl
)
510 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
514 rr
= &(ssl
->s3
->rrec
);
515 i
=COMP_expand_block(ssl
->expand
,rr
->comp
,
516 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
,rr
->data
,(int)rr
->length
);
526 int ssl3_do_compress(SSL
*ssl
)
528 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
532 wr
= &(ssl
->s3
->wrec
);
533 i
=COMP_compress_block(ssl
->compress
,wr
->data
,
534 SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH
,
535 wr
->input
,(int)wr
->length
);
546 /* Call this to write data in records of type 'type'
547 * It will return <= 0 if not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
549 int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL
*s
, int type
, const void *buf_
, int len
)
551 const unsigned char *buf
=buf_
;
552 unsigned int tot
,n
,nw
;
555 s
->rwstate
=SSL_NOTHING
;
559 if (SSL_in_init(s
) && !s
->in_handshake
)
561 i
=s
->handshake_func(s
);
562 if (i
< 0) return(i
);
565 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES
,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
573 if (n
> s
->max_send_fragment
)
574 nw
=s
->max_send_fragment
;
578 i
=do_ssl3_write(s
, type
, &(buf
[tot
]), nw
, 0);
586 (type
== SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
&&
587 (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE
)))
589 /* next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment
590 * in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness: */
591 s
->s3
->empty_fragment_done
= 0;
601 static int do_ssl3_write(SSL
*s
, int type
, const unsigned char *buf
,
602 unsigned int len
, int create_empty_fragment
)
604 unsigned char *p
,*plen
;
605 int i
,mac_size
,clear
=0;
609 SSL3_BUFFER
*wb
=&(s
->s3
->wbuf
);
612 /* first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written
613 * out. This will happen with non blocking IO */
615 return(ssl3_write_pending(s
,type
,buf
,len
));
617 /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
618 if (s
->s3
->alert_dispatch
)
620 i
=s
->method
->ssl_dispatch_alert(s
);
623 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
626 if (len
== 0 && !create_empty_fragment
)
632 if ( (sess
== NULL
) ||
633 (s
->enc_write_ctx
== NULL
) ||
634 (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s
->write_hash
) == NULL
))
640 mac_size
=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s
->write_hash
);
642 /* 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself */
643 if (!clear
&& !create_empty_fragment
&& !s
->s3
->empty_fragment_done
)
645 /* countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites
646 * (see http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) */
648 if (s
->s3
->need_empty_fragments
&& type
== SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
)
650 /* recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set;
651 * this prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment
652 * (these 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later
653 * together with the actual payload) */
654 prefix_len
= do_ssl3_write(s
, type
, buf
, 0, 1);
659 (SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
+ SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD
))
661 /* insufficient space */
662 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
667 s
->s3
->empty_fragment_done
= 1;
670 if (create_empty_fragment
)
672 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
673 /* extra fragment would be couple of cipher blocks,
674 * which would be multiple of SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD, so
675 * if we want to align the real payload, then we can
676 * just pretent we simply have two headers. */
677 align
= (long)wb
->buf
+ 2*SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
;
678 align
= (-align
)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD
-1);
685 p
= wb
->buf
+ wb
->offset
+ prefix_len
;
689 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
690 align
= (long)wb
->buf
+ SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
;
691 align
= (-align
)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD
-1);
697 /* write the header */
702 *(p
++)=(s
->version
>>8);
703 *(p
++)=s
->version
&0xff;
705 /* field where we are to write out packet length */
709 /* lets setup the record stuff. */
712 wr
->input
=(unsigned char *)buf
;
714 /* we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into
717 /* first we compress */
718 if (s
->compress
!= NULL
)
720 if (!ssl3_do_compress(s
))
722 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
,SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE
);
728 memcpy(wr
->data
,wr
->input
,wr
->length
);
732 /* we should still have the output to wr->data and the input
733 * from wr->input. Length should be wr->length.
734 * wr->data still points in the wb->buf */
738 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->mac(s
,&(p
[wr
->length
]),1);
739 wr
->length
+=mac_size
;
744 /* ssl3_enc can only have an error on read */
745 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->enc(s
,1);
747 /* record length after mac and block padding */
748 s2n(wr
->length
,plen
);
750 /* we should now have
751 * wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is
753 wr
->type
=type
; /* not needed but helps for debugging */
754 wr
->length
+=SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
;
756 if (create_empty_fragment
)
758 /* we are in a recursive call;
759 * just return the length, don't write out anything here
764 /* now let's set up wb */
765 wb
->left
= prefix_len
+ wr
->length
;
767 /* memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write retries later */
768 s
->s3
->wpend_tot
=len
;
769 s
->s3
->wpend_buf
=buf
;
770 s
->s3
->wpend_type
=type
;
771 s
->s3
->wpend_ret
=len
;
773 /* we now just need to write the buffer */
774 return ssl3_write_pending(s
,type
,buf
,len
);
779 /* if s->s3->wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this */
780 int ssl3_write_pending(SSL
*s
, int type
, const unsigned char *buf
,
784 SSL3_BUFFER
*wb
=&(s
->s3
->wbuf
);
787 if ((s
->s3
->wpend_tot
> (int)len
)
788 || ((s
->s3
->wpend_buf
!= buf
) &&
789 !(s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER
))
790 || (s
->s3
->wpend_type
!= type
))
792 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING
,SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY
);
801 s
->rwstate
=SSL_WRITING
;
803 (char *)&(wb
->buf
[wb
->offset
]),
804 (unsigned int)wb
->left
);
808 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING
,SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET
);
815 s
->rwstate
=SSL_NOTHING
;
816 return(s
->s3
->wpend_ret
);
825 /* Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
826 * 'type' is one of the following:
828 * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
829 * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
830 * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
832 * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
833 * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
835 * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
836 * Alert records (e.g. close_notify), ChangeCipherSpec records (not really
837 * a surprise, but handled as if it were), or renegotiation requests.
838 * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
839 * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
840 * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
841 * Change cipher spec protocol
842 * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
844 * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
846 * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
847 * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
848 * here, anything else is handled by higher layers
849 * Application data protocol
850 * none of our business
852 int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL
*s
, int type
, unsigned char *buf
, int len
, int peek
)
857 void (*cb
)(const SSL
*ssl
,int type2
,int val
)=NULL
;
859 if (s
->s3
->rbuf
.buf
== NULL
) /* Not initialized yet */
860 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s
))
863 if ((type
&& (type
!= SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
) && (type
!= SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
) && type
) ||
864 (peek
&& (type
!= SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
)))
866 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
870 if ((type
== SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
) && (s
->s3
->handshake_fragment_len
> 0))
871 /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
873 unsigned char *src
= s
->s3
->handshake_fragment
;
874 unsigned char *dst
= buf
;
879 while ((len
> 0) && (s
->s3
->handshake_fragment_len
> 0))
882 len
--; s
->s3
->handshake_fragment_len
--;
885 /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
886 for (k
= 0; k
< s
->s3
->handshake_fragment_len
; k
++)
887 s
->s3
->handshake_fragment
[k
] = *src
++;
891 /* Now s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE. */
893 if (!s
->in_handshake
&& SSL_in_init(s
))
895 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
896 i
=s
->handshake_func(s
);
897 if (i
< 0) return(i
);
900 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
905 s
->rwstate
=SSL_NOTHING
;
907 /* s->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
908 * s->s3->rrec.data, - data
909 * s->s3->rrec.off, - offset into 'data' for next read
910 * s->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes. */
913 /* get new packet if necessary */
914 if ((rr
->length
== 0) || (s
->rstate
== SSL_ST_READ_BODY
))
916 ret
=ssl3_get_record(s
);
917 if (ret
<= 0) return(ret
);
920 /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
922 if (s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
/* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
923 * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
924 && (rr
->type
!= SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
))
926 al
=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
927 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
,SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED
);
931 /* If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away
932 * (even in 'peek' mode) */
933 if (s
->shutdown
& SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN
)
936 s
->rwstate
=SSL_NOTHING
;
941 if (type
== rr
->type
) /* SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE */
943 /* make sure that we are not getting application data when we
944 * are doing a handshake for the first time */
945 if (SSL_in_init(s
) && (type
== SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
) &&
946 (s
->enc_read_ctx
== NULL
))
948 al
=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
949 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
,SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE
);
953 if (len
<= 0) return(len
);
955 if ((unsigned int)len
> rr
->length
)
958 n
= (unsigned int)len
;
960 memcpy(buf
,&(rr
->data
[rr
->off
]),n
);
967 s
->rstate
=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER
;
975 /* If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake
976 * message, then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello). */
978 /* In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage,
979 * fill that so that we can process the data at a fixed place.
982 unsigned int dest_maxlen
= 0;
983 unsigned char *dest
= NULL
;
984 unsigned int *dest_len
= NULL
;
986 if (rr
->type
== SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
)
988 dest_maxlen
= sizeof s
->s3
->handshake_fragment
;
989 dest
= s
->s3
->handshake_fragment
;
990 dest_len
= &s
->s3
->handshake_fragment_len
;
992 else if (rr
->type
== SSL3_RT_ALERT
)
994 dest_maxlen
= sizeof s
->s3
->alert_fragment
;
995 dest
= s
->s3
->alert_fragment
;
996 dest_len
= &s
->s3
->alert_fragment_len
;
1001 n
= dest_maxlen
- *dest_len
; /* available space in 'dest' */
1003 n
= rr
->length
; /* available bytes */
1005 /* now move 'n' bytes: */
1008 dest
[(*dest_len
)++] = rr
->data
[rr
->off
++];
1012 if (*dest_len
< dest_maxlen
)
1013 goto start
; /* fragment was too small */
1017 /* s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
1018 * s->s3->alert_fragment_len == 2 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT.
1019 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.) */
1021 /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */
1023 (s
->s3
->handshake_fragment_len
>= 4) &&
1024 (s
->s3
->handshake_fragment
[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST
) &&
1025 (s
->session
!= NULL
) && (s
->session
->cipher
!= NULL
))
1027 s
->s3
->handshake_fragment_len
= 0;
1029 if ((s
->s3
->handshake_fragment
[1] != 0) ||
1030 (s
->s3
->handshake_fragment
[2] != 0) ||
1031 (s
->s3
->handshake_fragment
[3] != 0))
1033 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1034 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
,SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST
);
1038 if (s
->msg_callback
)
1039 s
->msg_callback(0, s
->version
, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
, s
->s3
->handshake_fragment
, 4, s
, s
->msg_callback_arg
);
1041 if (SSL_is_init_finished(s
) &&
1042 !(s
->s3
->flags
& SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS
) &&
1043 !s
->s3
->renegotiate
)
1045 ssl3_renegotiate(s
);
1046 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s
))
1048 i
=s
->handshake_func(s
);
1049 if (i
< 0) return(i
);
1052 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
1056 if (!(s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY
))
1058 if (s
->s3
->rbuf
.left
== 0) /* no read-ahead left? */
1061 /* In the case where we try to read application data,
1062 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
1063 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
1064 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
1065 s
->rwstate
=SSL_READING
;
1066 bio
=SSL_get_rbio(s
);
1067 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio
);
1068 BIO_set_retry_read(bio
);
1074 /* we either finished a handshake or ignored the request,
1075 * now try again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for */
1079 if (s
->s3
->alert_fragment_len
>= 2)
1081 int alert_level
= s
->s3
->alert_fragment
[0];
1082 int alert_descr
= s
->s3
->alert_fragment
[1];
1084 s
->s3
->alert_fragment_len
= 0;
1086 if (s
->msg_callback
)
1087 s
->msg_callback(0, s
->version
, SSL3_RT_ALERT
, s
->s3
->alert_fragment
, 2, s
, s
->msg_callback_arg
);
1089 if (s
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
1090 cb
=s
->info_callback
;
1091 else if (s
->ctx
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
1092 cb
=s
->ctx
->info_callback
;
1096 j
= (alert_level
<< 8) | alert_descr
;
1097 cb(s
, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT
, j
);
1100 if (alert_level
== 1) /* warning */
1102 s
->s3
->warn_alert
= alert_descr
;
1103 if (alert_descr
== SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY
)
1105 s
->shutdown
|= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN
;
1109 else if (alert_level
== 2) /* fatal */
1113 s
->rwstate
=SSL_NOTHING
;
1114 s
->s3
->fatal_alert
= alert_descr
;
1115 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET
+ alert_descr
);
1116 BIO_snprintf(tmp
,sizeof tmp
,"%d",alert_descr
);
1117 ERR_add_error_data(2,"SSL alert number ",tmp
);
1118 s
->shutdown
|=SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN
;
1119 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s
->ctx
,s
->session
);
1124 al
=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1125 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE
);
1132 if (s
->shutdown
& SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN
) /* but we have not received a shutdown */
1134 s
->rwstate
=SSL_NOTHING
;
1139 if (rr
->type
== SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
)
1141 /* 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, so we know
1142 * exactly what the record payload has to look like */
1143 if ( (rr
->length
!= 1) || (rr
->off
!= 0) ||
1144 (rr
->data
[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS
))
1146 al
=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1147 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
,SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
);
1151 /* Check we have a cipher to change to */
1152 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
== NULL
)
1154 al
=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1155 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY
);
1161 if (s
->msg_callback
)
1162 s
->msg_callback(0, s
->version
, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
, rr
->data
, 1, s
, s
->msg_callback_arg
);
1164 s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
=1;
1165 if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s
))
1171 /* Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation) */
1172 if ((s
->s3
->handshake_fragment_len
>= 4) && !s
->in_handshake
)
1174 if (((s
->state
&SSL_ST_MASK
) == SSL_ST_OK
) &&
1175 !(s
->s3
->flags
& SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS
))
1177 #if 0 /* worked only because C operator preferences are not as expected (and
1178 * because this is not really needed for clients except for detecting
1179 * protocol violations): */
1180 s
->state
=SSL_ST_BEFORE
|(s
->server
)
1184 s
->state
= s
->server
? SSL_ST_ACCEPT
: SSL_ST_CONNECT
;
1188 i
=s
->handshake_func(s
);
1189 if (i
< 0) return(i
);
1192 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
1196 if (!(s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY
))
1198 if (s
->s3
->rbuf
.left
== 0) /* no read-ahead left? */
1201 /* In the case where we try to read application data,
1202 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
1203 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
1204 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
1205 s
->rwstate
=SSL_READING
;
1206 bio
=SSL_get_rbio(s
);
1207 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio
);
1208 BIO_set_retry_read(bio
);
1218 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS
1219 /* TLS just ignores unknown message types */
1220 if (s
->version
== TLS1_VERSION
)
1226 al
=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1227 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD
);
1229 case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
:
1231 case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
:
1232 /* we already handled all of these, with the possible exception
1233 * of SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when s->in_handshake is set, but that
1234 * should not happen when type != rr->type */
1235 al
=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1236 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1238 case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
:
1239 /* At this point, we were expecting handshake data,
1240 * but have application data. If the library was
1241 * running inside ssl3_read() (i.e. in_read_app_data
1242 * is set) and it makes sense to read application data
1243 * at this point (session renegotiation not yet started),
1244 * we will indulge it.
1246 if (s
->s3
->in_read_app_data
&&
1247 (s
->s3
->total_renegotiations
!= 0) &&
1249 (s
->state
& SSL_ST_CONNECT
) &&
1250 (s
->state
>= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A
) &&
1251 (s
->state
<= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A
)
1253 (s
->state
& SSL_ST_ACCEPT
) &&
1254 (s
->state
<= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A
) &&
1255 (s
->state
>= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A
)
1259 s
->s3
->in_read_app_data
=2;
1264 al
=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1265 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD
);
1272 ssl3_send_alert(s
,SSL3_AL_FATAL
,al
);
1277 int ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL
*s
)
1283 if (s
->state
& SSL_ST_ACCEPT
)
1284 i
=SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ
;
1286 i
=SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ
;
1288 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.key_block
== NULL
)
1290 s
->session
->cipher
=s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
;
1291 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->setup_key_block(s
)) return(0);
1294 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,i
))
1297 /* we have to record the message digest at
1298 * this point so we can get it before we read
1299 * the finished message */
1300 if (s
->state
& SSL_ST_CONNECT
)
1302 sender
=s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->server_finished_label
;
1303 slen
=s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->server_finished_label_len
;
1307 sender
=s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->client_finished_label
;
1308 slen
=s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->client_finished_label_len
;
1311 s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_finish_md_len
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->final_finish_mac(s
,
1312 sender
,slen
,s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_finish_md
);
1317 void ssl3_send_alert(SSL
*s
, int level
, int desc
)
1319 /* Map tls/ssl alert value to correct one */
1320 desc
=s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->alert_value(desc
);
1321 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
&& desc
== SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
)
1322 desc
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
; /* SSL 3.0 does not have protocol_version alerts */
1323 if (desc
< 0) return;
1324 /* If a fatal one, remove from cache */
1325 if ((level
== 2) && (s
->session
!= NULL
))
1326 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s
->ctx
,s
->session
);
1328 s
->s3
->alert_dispatch
=1;
1329 s
->s3
->send_alert
[0]=level
;
1330 s
->s3
->send_alert
[1]=desc
;
1331 if (s
->s3
->wbuf
.left
== 0) /* data still being written out? */
1332 s
->method
->ssl_dispatch_alert(s
);
1333 /* else data is still being written out, we will get written
1334 * some time in the future */
1337 int ssl3_dispatch_alert(SSL
*s
)
1340 void (*cb
)(const SSL
*ssl
,int type
,int val
)=NULL
;
1342 s
->s3
->alert_dispatch
=0;
1343 i
= do_ssl3_write(s
, SSL3_RT_ALERT
, &s
->s3
->send_alert
[0], 2, 0);
1346 s
->s3
->alert_dispatch
=1;
1350 /* Alert sent to BIO. If it is important, flush it now.
1351 * If the message does not get sent due to non-blocking IO,
1352 * we will not worry too much. */
1353 if (s
->s3
->send_alert
[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL
)
1354 (void)BIO_flush(s
->wbio
);
1356 if (s
->msg_callback
)
1357 s
->msg_callback(1, s
->version
, SSL3_RT_ALERT
, s
->s3
->send_alert
, 2, s
, s
->msg_callback_arg
);
1359 if (s
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
1360 cb
=s
->info_callback
;
1361 else if (s
->ctx
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
1362 cb
=s
->ctx
->info_callback
;
1366 j
=(s
->s3
->send_alert
[0]<<8)|s
->s3
->send_alert
[1];
1367 cb(s
,SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT
,j
);