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1 /* ssl/s3_pkt.c */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
3 * All rights reserved.
4 *
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8 *
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15 *
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22 *
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25 * are met:
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40 *
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
51 * SUCH DAMAGE.
52 *
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
57 */
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
60 *
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
63 * are met:
64 *
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
67 *
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
71 * distribution.
72 *
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
77 *
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
82 *
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
86 *
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
88 * acknowledgment:
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
91 *
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
105 *
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
109 *
110 */
111
112 #include <stdio.h>
113 #include <errno.h>
114 #define USE_SOCKETS
115 #include <openssl/evp.h>
116 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
117 #include "ssl_locl.h"
118
119 static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
120 unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment);
121 static int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
122 unsigned int len);
123 static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s);
124 static int do_compress(SSL *ssl);
125 static int do_uncompress(SSL *ssl);
126 static int do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *ssl);
127
128 /* used only by ssl3_get_record */
129 static int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, int n, int max, int extend)
130 {
131 /* If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase
132 * packet by another n bytes.
133 * The packet will be in the sub-array of s->s3->rbuf.buf specified
134 * by s->packet and s->packet_length.
135 * (If s->read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may be stored in rbuf
136 * [plus s->packet_length bytes if extend == 1].)
137 */
138 int i,off,newb;
139
140 if (!extend)
141 {
142 /* start with empty packet ... */
143 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0)
144 s->s3->rbuf.offset = 0;
145 s->packet = s->s3->rbuf.buf + s->s3->rbuf.offset;
146 s->packet_length = 0;
147 /* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */
148 }
149
150 /* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */
151 if (s->s3->rbuf.left >= (int)n)
152 {
153 s->packet_length+=n;
154 s->s3->rbuf.left-=n;
155 s->s3->rbuf.offset+=n;
156 return(n);
157 }
158
159 /* else we need to read more data */
160 if (!s->read_ahead)
161 max=n;
162
163 {
164 /* avoid buffer overflow */
165 int max_max = s->s3->rbuf.len - s->packet_length;
166 if (max > max_max)
167 max = max_max;
168 }
169 if (n > max) /* does not happen */
170 {
171 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
172 return -1;
173 }
174
175 off = s->packet_length;
176 newb = s->s3->rbuf.left;
177 /* Move any available bytes to front of buffer:
178 * 'off' bytes already pointed to by 'packet',
179 * 'newb' extra ones at the end */
180 if (s->packet != s->s3->rbuf.buf)
181 {
182 /* off > 0 */
183 memmove(s->s3->rbuf.buf, s->packet, off+newb);
184 s->packet = s->s3->rbuf.buf;
185 }
186
187 while (newb < n)
188 {
189 /* Now we have off+newb bytes at the front of s->s3->rbuf.buf and need
190 * to read in more until we have off+n (up to off+max if possible) */
191
192 clear_sys_error();
193 if (s->rbio != NULL)
194 {
195 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
196 i=BIO_read(s->rbio, &(s->s3->rbuf.buf[off+newb]), max-newb);
197 }
198 else
199 {
200 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N,SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET);
201 i = -1;
202 }
203
204 if (i <= 0)
205 {
206 s->s3->rbuf.left = newb;
207 return(i);
208 }
209 newb+=i;
210 }
211
212 /* done reading, now the book-keeping */
213 s->s3->rbuf.offset = off + n;
214 s->s3->rbuf.left = newb - n;
215 s->packet_length += n;
216 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
217 return(n);
218 }
219
220 /* Call this to get a new input record.
221 * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error
222 * or non-blocking IO.
223 * When it finishes, one packet has been decoded and can be found in
224 * ssl->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
225 * ssl->s3->rrec.data, - data
226 * ssl->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes
227 */
228 /* used only by ssl3_read_bytes */
229 static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s)
230 {
231 int ssl_major,ssl_minor,al;
232 int enc_err,n,i,ret= -1;
233 SSL3_RECORD *rr;
234 SSL_SESSION *sess;
235 unsigned char *p;
236 unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
237 short version;
238 unsigned int mac_size;
239 int clear=0,extra;
240
241 rr= &(s->s3->rrec);
242 sess=s->session;
243
244 if (s->options & SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER)
245 extra=SSL3_RT_MAX_EXTRA;
246 else
247 extra=0;
248 if (extra != (s->s3->rbuf.len - SSL3_RT_MAX_PACKET_SIZE))
249 {
250 /* actually likely an application error: SLS_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER
251 * set after ssl3_setup_buffers() was done */
252 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
253 return -1;
254 }
255
256 again:
257 /* check if we have the header */
258 if ( (s->rstate != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) ||
259 (s->packet_length < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH))
260 {
261 n=ssl3_read_n(s, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s->s3->rbuf.len, 0);
262 if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking */
263 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_BODY;
264
265 p=s->packet;
266
267 /* Pull apart the header into the SSL3_RECORD */
268 rr->type= *(p++);
269 ssl_major= *(p++);
270 ssl_minor= *(p++);
271 version=(ssl_major<<8)|ssl_minor;
272 n2s(p,rr->length);
273
274 /* Lets check version */
275 if (s->first_packet)
276 {
277 s->first_packet=0;
278 }
279 else
280 {
281 if (version != s->version)
282 {
283 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
284 /* Send back error using their
285 * version number :-) */
286 s->version=version;
287 al=SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
288 goto f_err;
289 }
290 }
291
292 if ((version>>8) != SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
293 {
294 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
295 goto err;
296 }
297
298 if (rr->length >
299 (unsigned int)SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH+extra)
300 {
301 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
302 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
303 goto f_err;
304 }
305
306 /* now s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */
307 }
308
309 /* s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */
310
311 if (rr->length > (s->packet_length-SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH))
312 {
313 /* now s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */
314 i=rr->length;
315 n=ssl3_read_n(s,i,i,1);
316 if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking io */
317 /* now n == rr->length,
318 * and s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length */
319 }
320
321 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; /* set state for later operations */
322
323 /* At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length,
324 * and we have that many bytes in s->packet
325 */
326 rr->input= &(s->packet[SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]);
327
328 /* ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr'
329 * rr->input points at rr->length bytes, which
330 * need to be copied into rr->data by either
331 * the decryption or by the decompression
332 * When the data is 'copied' into the rr->data buffer,
333 * rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer */
334
335 /* We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ]
336 * rr->length bytes of encrypted compressed stuff. */
337
338 /* check is not needed I believe */
339 if (rr->length > (unsigned int)SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH+extra)
340 {
341 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
342 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
343 goto f_err;
344 }
345
346 /* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */
347 rr->data=rr->input;
348
349 enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,0);
350 if (enc_err <= 0)
351 {
352 if (enc_err == 0)
353 /* SSLerr() and ssl3_send_alert() have been called */
354 goto err;
355
356 /* otherwise enc_err == -1 */
357 goto decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac;
358 }
359
360 #ifdef TLS_DEBUG
361 printf("dec %d\n",rr->length);
362 { unsigned int z; for (z=0; z<rr->length; z++) printf("%02X%c",rr->data[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
363 printf("\n");
364 #endif
365
366 /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */
367 if ( (sess == NULL) ||
368 (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL) ||
369 (s->read_hash == NULL))
370 clear=1;
371
372 if (!clear)
373 {
374 mac_size=EVP_MD_size(s->read_hash);
375
376 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+extra+mac_size)
377 {
378 #if 0 /* OK only for stream ciphers (then rr->length is visible from ciphertext anyway) */
379 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
380 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_PRE_MAC_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
381 goto f_err;
382 #else
383 goto decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac;
384 #endif
385 }
386 /* check the MAC for rr->input (it's in mac_size bytes at the tail) */
387 if (rr->length < mac_size)
388 {
389 #if 0 /* OK only for stream ciphers */
390 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
391 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
392 goto f_err;
393 #else
394 goto decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac;
395 #endif
396 }
397 rr->length-=mac_size;
398 i=s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,md,0);
399 if (memcmp(md,&(rr->data[rr->length]),mac_size) != 0)
400 {
401 goto decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac;
402 }
403 }
404
405 /* r->length is now just compressed */
406 if (s->expand != NULL)
407 {
408 if (rr->length >
409 (unsigned int)SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+extra)
410 {
411 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
412 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
413 goto f_err;
414 }
415 if (!do_uncompress(s))
416 {
417 al=SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE;
418 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION);
419 goto f_err;
420 }
421 }
422
423 if (rr->length > (unsigned int)SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH+extra)
424 {
425 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
426 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
427 goto f_err;
428 }
429
430 rr->off=0;
431 /* So at this point the following is true
432 * ssl->s3->rrec.type is the type of record
433 * ssl->s3->rrec.length == number of bytes in record
434 * ssl->s3->rrec.off == offset to first valid byte
435 * ssl->s3->rrec.data == where to take bytes from, increment
436 * after use :-).
437 */
438
439 /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */
440 s->packet_length=0;
441
442 /* just read a 0 length packet */
443 if (rr->length == 0) goto again;
444
445 return(1);
446
447 decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac:
448 /* Separate 'decryption_failed' alert was introduced with TLS 1.0,
449 * SSL 3.0 only has 'bad_record_mac'. But unless a decryption
450 * failure is directly visible from the ciphertext anyway,
451 * we should not reveal which kind of error occured -- this
452 * might become visible to an attacker (e.g. via logfile) */
453 al=SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC;
454 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
455 f_err:
456 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
457 err:
458 return(ret);
459 }
460
461 static int do_uncompress(SSL *ssl)
462 {
463 int i;
464 SSL3_RECORD *rr;
465
466 rr= &(ssl->s3->rrec);
467 i=COMP_expand_block(ssl->expand,rr->comp,
468 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,rr->data,(int)rr->length);
469 if (i < 0)
470 return(0);
471 else
472 rr->length=i;
473 rr->data=rr->comp;
474
475 return(1);
476 }
477
478 static int do_compress(SSL *ssl)
479 {
480 int i;
481 SSL3_RECORD *wr;
482
483 wr= &(ssl->s3->wrec);
484 i=COMP_compress_block(ssl->compress,wr->data,
485 SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH,
486 wr->input,(int)wr->length);
487 if (i < 0)
488 return(0);
489 else
490 wr->length=i;
491
492 wr->input=wr->data;
493 return(1);
494 }
495
496 /* Call this to write data in records of type 'type'
497 * It will return <= 0 if not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
498 */
499 int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len)
500 {
501 const unsigned char *buf=buf_;
502 unsigned int tot,n,nw;
503 int i;
504
505 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
506 tot=s->s3->wnum;
507 s->s3->wnum=0;
508
509 if (SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake)
510 {
511 i=s->handshake_func(s);
512 if (i < 0) return(i);
513 if (i == 0)
514 {
515 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
516 return -1;
517 }
518 }
519
520 n=(len-tot);
521 for (;;)
522 {
523 if (n > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
524 nw=SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
525 else
526 nw=n;
527
528 i=do_ssl3_write(s, type, &(buf[tot]), nw, 0);
529 if (i <= 0)
530 {
531 s->s3->wnum=tot;
532 return i;
533 }
534
535 if ((i == (int)n) ||
536 (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
537 (s->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE)))
538 {
539 /* next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment
540 * in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness: */
541 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 0;
542
543 return tot+i;
544 }
545
546 n-=i;
547 tot+=i;
548 }
549 }
550
551 static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
552 unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment)
553 {
554 unsigned char *p,*plen;
555 int i,mac_size,clear=0;
556 int prefix_len = 0;
557 SSL3_RECORD *wr;
558 SSL3_BUFFER *wb;
559 SSL_SESSION *sess;
560
561 /* first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written
562 * out. This will happen with non blocking IO */
563 if (s->s3->wbuf.left != 0)
564 return(ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len));
565
566 /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
567 if (s->s3->alert_dispatch)
568 {
569 i=ssl3_dispatch_alert(s);
570 if (i <= 0)
571 return(i);
572 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
573 }
574
575 if (len == 0 && !create_empty_fragment)
576 return 0;
577
578 wr= &(s->s3->wrec);
579 wb= &(s->s3->wbuf);
580 sess=s->session;
581
582 if ( (sess == NULL) ||
583 (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) ||
584 (s->write_hash == NULL))
585 clear=1;
586
587 if (clear)
588 mac_size=0;
589 else
590 mac_size=EVP_MD_size(s->write_hash);
591
592 /* 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself */
593 if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done)
594 {
595 /* countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites
596 * (see http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) */
597
598 if (s->s3->need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
599 {
600 /* recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set;
601 * this prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment
602 * (these 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later
603 * together with the actual payload) */
604 prefix_len = do_ssl3_write(s, type, buf, 0, 1);
605 if (prefix_len <= 0)
606 goto err;
607
608 if (s->s3->wbuf.len < prefix_len + SSL3_RT_MAX_PACKET_SIZE)
609 {
610 /* insufficient space */
611 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
612 goto err;
613 }
614 }
615
616 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1;
617 }
618
619 p = wb->buf + prefix_len;
620
621 /* write the header */
622
623 *(p++)=type&0xff;
624 wr->type=type;
625
626 *(p++)=(s->version>>8);
627 *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
628
629 /* field where we are to write out packet length */
630 plen=p;
631 p+=2;
632
633 /* lets setup the record stuff. */
634 wr->data=p;
635 wr->length=(int)len;
636 wr->input=(unsigned char *)buf;
637
638 /* we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into
639 * wr->data */
640
641 /* first we compress */
642 if (s->compress != NULL)
643 {
644 if (!do_compress(s))
645 {
646 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE);
647 goto err;
648 }
649 }
650 else
651 {
652 memcpy(wr->data,wr->input,wr->length);
653 wr->input=wr->data;
654 }
655
656 /* we should still have the output to wr->data and the input
657 * from wr->input. Length should be wr->length.
658 * wr->data still points in the wb->buf */
659
660 if (mac_size != 0)
661 {
662 s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,&(p[wr->length]),1);
663 wr->length+=mac_size;
664 wr->input=p;
665 wr->data=p;
666 }
667
668 /* ssl3_enc can only have an error on read */
669 s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,1);
670
671 /* record length after mac and block padding */
672 s2n(wr->length,plen);
673
674 /* we should now have
675 * wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is
676 * wr->length long */
677 wr->type=type; /* not needed but helps for debugging */
678 wr->length+=SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
679
680 if (create_empty_fragment)
681 {
682 /* we are in a recursive call;
683 * just return the length, don't write out anything here
684 */
685 return wr->length;
686 }
687
688 /* now let's set up wb */
689 wb->left = prefix_len + wr->length;
690 wb->offset = 0;
691
692 /* memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write retries later */
693 s->s3->wpend_tot=len;
694 s->s3->wpend_buf=buf;
695 s->s3->wpend_type=type;
696 s->s3->wpend_ret=len;
697
698 /* we now just need to write the buffer */
699 return ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len);
700 err:
701 return -1;
702 }
703
704 /* if s->s3->wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this */
705 static int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
706 unsigned int len)
707 {
708 int i;
709
710 /* XXXX */
711 if ((s->s3->wpend_tot > (int)len)
712 || ((s->s3->wpend_buf != buf) &&
713 !(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER))
714 || (s->s3->wpend_type != type))
715 {
716 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING,SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY);
717 return(-1);
718 }
719
720 for (;;)
721 {
722 clear_sys_error();
723 if (s->wbio != NULL)
724 {
725 s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
726 i=BIO_write(s->wbio,
727 (char *)&(s->s3->wbuf.buf[s->s3->wbuf.offset]),
728 (unsigned int)s->s3->wbuf.left);
729 }
730 else
731 {
732 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING,SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET);
733 i= -1;
734 }
735 if (i == s->s3->wbuf.left)
736 {
737 s->s3->wbuf.left=0;
738 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
739 return(s->s3->wpend_ret);
740 }
741 else if (i <= 0)
742 return(i);
743 s->s3->wbuf.offset+=i;
744 s->s3->wbuf.left-=i;
745 }
746 }
747
748 /* Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
749 * 'type' is one of the following:
750 *
751 * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
752 * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
753 * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
754 *
755 * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
756 * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
757 *
758 * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
759 * Alert records (e.g. close_notify), ChangeCipherSpec records (not really
760 * a surprise, but handled as if it were), or renegotiation requests.
761 * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
762 * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
763 * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
764 * Change cipher spec protocol
765 * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
766 * Alert protocol
767 * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
768 * Handshake protocol
769 * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
770 * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
771 * here, anything else is handled by higher layers
772 * Application data protocol
773 * none of our business
774 */
775 int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek)
776 {
777 int al,i,j,ret;
778 unsigned int n;
779 SSL3_RECORD *rr;
780 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type2,int val)=NULL;
781
782 if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL) /* Not initialized yet */
783 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
784 return(-1);
785
786 if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) && (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && type) ||
787 (peek && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)))
788 {
789 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
790 return -1;
791 }
792
793 if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
794 /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
795 {
796 unsigned char *src = s->s3->handshake_fragment;
797 unsigned char *dst = buf;
798 unsigned int k;
799
800 /* peek == 0 */
801 n = 0;
802 while ((len > 0) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
803 {
804 *dst++ = *src++;
805 len--; s->s3->handshake_fragment_len--;
806 n++;
807 }
808 /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
809 for (k = 0; k < s->s3->handshake_fragment_len; k++)
810 s->s3->handshake_fragment[k] = *src++;
811 return n;
812 }
813
814 /* Now s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE. */
815
816 if (!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s))
817 {
818 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
819 i=s->handshake_func(s);
820 if (i < 0) return(i);
821 if (i == 0)
822 {
823 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
824 return(-1);
825 }
826 }
827 start:
828 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
829
830 /* s->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
831 * s->s3->rrec.data, - data
832 * s->s3->rrec.off, - offset into 'data' for next read
833 * s->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes. */
834 rr = &(s->s3->rrec);
835
836 /* get new packet if necessary */
837 if ((rr->length == 0) || (s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY))
838 {
839 ret=ssl3_get_record(s);
840 if (ret <= 0) return(ret);
841 }
842
843 /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
844
845 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
846 * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
847 && (rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE))
848 {
849 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
850 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED);
851 goto err;
852 }
853
854 /* If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away
855 * (even in 'peek' mode) */
856 if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN)
857 {
858 rr->length=0;
859 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
860 return(0);
861 }
862
863
864 if (type == rr->type) /* SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE */
865 {
866 /* make sure that we are not getting application data when we
867 * are doing a handshake for the first time */
868 if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
869 (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL))
870 {
871 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
872 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE);
873 goto f_err;
874 }
875
876 if (len <= 0) return(len);
877
878 if ((unsigned int)len > rr->length)
879 n = rr->length;
880 else
881 n = (unsigned int)len;
882
883 memcpy(buf,&(rr->data[rr->off]),n);
884 if (!peek)
885 {
886 rr->length-=n;
887 rr->off+=n;
888 if (rr->length == 0)
889 {
890 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
891 rr->off=0;
892 }
893 }
894 return(n);
895 }
896
897
898 /* If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake
899 * message, then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello). */
900
901 /* In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage,
902 * fill that so that we can process the data at a fixed place.
903 */
904 {
905 unsigned int dest_maxlen = 0;
906 unsigned char *dest = NULL;
907 unsigned int *dest_len = NULL;
908
909 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
910 {
911 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->handshake_fragment;
912 dest = s->s3->handshake_fragment;
913 dest_len = &s->s3->handshake_fragment_len;
914 }
915 else if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT)
916 {
917 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->alert_fragment;
918 dest = s->s3->alert_fragment;
919 dest_len = &s->s3->alert_fragment_len;
920 }
921
922 if (dest_maxlen > 0)
923 {
924 n = dest_maxlen - *dest_len; /* available space in 'dest' */
925 if (rr->length < n)
926 n = rr->length; /* available bytes */
927
928 /* now move 'n' bytes: */
929 while (n-- > 0)
930 {
931 dest[(*dest_len)++] = rr->data[rr->off++];
932 rr->length--;
933 }
934
935 if (*dest_len < dest_maxlen)
936 goto start; /* fragment was too small */
937 }
938 }
939
940 /* s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
941 * s->s3->alert_fragment_len == 2 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT.
942 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.) */
943
944 /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */
945 if ((!s->server) &&
946 (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
947 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) &&
948 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL))
949 {
950 s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
951
952 if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment[1] != 0) ||
953 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[2] != 0) ||
954 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[3] != 0))
955 {
956 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
957 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST);
958 goto err;
959 }
960
961 if (s->msg_callback)
962 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->s3->handshake_fragment, 4, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
963
964 if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
965 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) &&
966 !s->s3->renegotiate)
967 {
968 ssl3_renegotiate(s);
969 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s))
970 {
971 i=s->handshake_func(s);
972 if (i < 0) return(i);
973 if (i == 0)
974 {
975 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
976 return(-1);
977 }
978
979 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY))
980 {
981 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */
982 {
983 BIO *bio;
984 /* In the case where we try to read application data,
985 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
986 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
987 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
988 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
989 bio=SSL_get_rbio(s);
990 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
991 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
992 return(-1);
993 }
994 }
995 }
996 }
997 /* we either finished a handshake or ignored the request,
998 * now try again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for */
999 goto start;
1000 }
1001
1002 if (s->s3->alert_fragment_len >= 2)
1003 {
1004 int alert_level = s->s3->alert_fragment[0];
1005 int alert_descr = s->s3->alert_fragment[1];
1006
1007 s->s3->alert_fragment_len = 0;
1008
1009 if (s->msg_callback)
1010 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->alert_fragment, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1011
1012 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1013 cb=s->info_callback;
1014 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1015 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
1016
1017 if (cb != NULL)
1018 {
1019 j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr;
1020 cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j);
1021 }
1022
1023 if (alert_level == 1) /* warning */
1024 {
1025 s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr;
1026 if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY)
1027 {
1028 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1029 return(0);
1030 }
1031 }
1032 else if (alert_level == 2) /* fatal */
1033 {
1034 char tmp[16];
1035
1036 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1037 s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr;
1038 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr);
1039 BIO_snprintf(tmp,sizeof tmp,"%d",alert_descr);
1040 ERR_add_error_data(2,"SSL alert number ",tmp);
1041 s->shutdown|=SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1042 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session);
1043 return(0);
1044 }
1045 else
1046 {
1047 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1048 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
1049 goto f_err;
1050 }
1051
1052 goto start;
1053 }
1054
1055 if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) /* but we have not received a shutdown */
1056 {
1057 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1058 rr->length=0;
1059 return(0);
1060 }
1061
1062 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
1063 {
1064 /* 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, so we know
1065 * exactly what the record payload has to look like */
1066 if ( (rr->length != 1) || (rr->off != 0) ||
1067 (rr->data[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS))
1068 {
1069 i=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1070 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
1071 goto err;
1072 }
1073
1074 rr->length=0;
1075
1076 if (s->msg_callback)
1077 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, rr->data, 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1078
1079 s->s3->change_cipher_spec=1;
1080 if (!do_change_cipher_spec(s))
1081 goto err;
1082 else
1083 goto start;
1084 }
1085
1086 /* Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation) */
1087 if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) && !s->in_handshake)
1088 {
1089 if (((s->state&SSL_ST_MASK) == SSL_ST_OK) &&
1090 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS))
1091 {
1092 #if 0 /* worked only because C operator preferences are not as expected (and
1093 * because this is not really needed for clients except for detecting
1094 * protocol violations): */
1095 s->state=SSL_ST_BEFORE|(s->server)
1096 ?SSL_ST_ACCEPT
1097 :SSL_ST_CONNECT;
1098 #else
1099 s->state = s->server ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT;
1100 #endif
1101 s->new_session=1;
1102 }
1103 i=s->handshake_func(s);
1104 if (i < 0) return(i);
1105 if (i == 0)
1106 {
1107 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1108 return(-1);
1109 }
1110
1111 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY))
1112 {
1113 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */
1114 {
1115 BIO *bio;
1116 /* In the case where we try to read application data,
1117 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
1118 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
1119 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
1120 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
1121 bio=SSL_get_rbio(s);
1122 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1123 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1124 return(-1);
1125 }
1126 }
1127 goto start;
1128 }
1129
1130 switch (rr->type)
1131 {
1132 default:
1133 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS
1134 /* TLS just ignores unknown message types */
1135 if (s->version == TLS1_VERSION)
1136 {
1137 rr->length = 0;
1138 goto start;
1139 }
1140 #endif
1141 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1142 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1143 goto f_err;
1144 case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
1145 case SSL3_RT_ALERT:
1146 case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:
1147 /* we already handled all of these, with the possible exception
1148 * of SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when s->in_handshake is set, but that
1149 * should not happen when type != rr->type */
1150 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1151 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1152 goto f_err;
1153 case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
1154 /* At this point, we were expecting handshake data,
1155 * but have application data. If the library was
1156 * running inside ssl3_read() (i.e. in_read_app_data
1157 * is set) and it makes sense to read application data
1158 * at this point (session renegotiation not yet started),
1159 * we will indulge it.
1160 */
1161 if (s->s3->in_read_app_data &&
1162 (s->s3->total_renegotiations != 0) &&
1163 ((
1164 (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) &&
1165 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) &&
1166 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1167 ) || (
1168 (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) &&
1169 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) &&
1170 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
1171 )
1172 ))
1173 {
1174 s->s3->in_read_app_data=2;
1175 return(-1);
1176 }
1177 else
1178 {
1179 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1180 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1181 goto f_err;
1182 }
1183 }
1184 /* not reached */
1185
1186 f_err:
1187 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1188 err:
1189 return(-1);
1190 }
1191
1192 static int do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s)
1193 {
1194 int i;
1195 const char *sender;
1196 int slen;
1197
1198 if (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
1199 i=SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ;
1200 else
1201 i=SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ;
1202
1203 if (s->s3->tmp.key_block == NULL)
1204 {
1205 s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
1206 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) return(0);
1207 }
1208
1209 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,i))
1210 return(0);
1211
1212 /* we have to record the message digest at
1213 * this point so we can get it before we read
1214 * the finished message */
1215 if (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT)
1216 {
1217 sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label;
1218 slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len;
1219 }
1220 else
1221 {
1222 sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label;
1223 slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len;
1224 }
1225
1226 s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
1227 &(s->s3->finish_dgst1),
1228 &(s->s3->finish_dgst2),
1229 sender,slen,s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md);
1230
1231 return(1);
1232 }
1233
1234 void ssl3_send_alert(SSL *s, int level, int desc)
1235 {
1236 /* Map tls/ssl alert value to correct one */
1237 desc=s->method->ssl3_enc->alert_value(desc);
1238 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && desc == SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION)
1239 desc = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; /* SSL 3.0 does not have protocol_version alerts */
1240 if (desc < 0) return;
1241 /* If a fatal one, remove from cache */
1242 if ((level == 2) && (s->session != NULL))
1243 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session);
1244
1245 s->s3->alert_dispatch=1;
1246 s->s3->send_alert[0]=level;
1247 s->s3->send_alert[1]=desc;
1248 if (s->s3->wbuf.left == 0) /* data still being written out? */
1249 ssl3_dispatch_alert(s);
1250 /* else data is still being written out, we will get written
1251 * some time in the future */
1252 }
1253
1254 int ssl3_dispatch_alert(SSL *s)
1255 {
1256 int i,j;
1257 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
1258
1259 s->s3->alert_dispatch=0;
1260 i = do_ssl3_write(s, SSL3_RT_ALERT, &s->s3->send_alert[0], 2, 0);
1261 if (i <= 0)
1262 {
1263 s->s3->alert_dispatch=1;
1264 }
1265 else
1266 {
1267 /* Alert sent to BIO. If it is important, flush it now.
1268 * If the message does not get sent due to non-blocking IO,
1269 * we will not worry too much. */
1270 if (s->s3->send_alert[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL)
1271 (void)BIO_flush(s->wbio);
1272
1273 if (s->msg_callback)
1274 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->send_alert, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1275
1276 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1277 cb=s->info_callback;
1278 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1279 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
1280
1281 if (cb != NULL)
1282 {
1283 j=(s->s3->send_alert[0]<<8)|s->s3->send_alert[1];
1284 cb(s,SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT,j);
1285 }
1286 }
1287 return(i);
1288 }
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