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Align data payload for better performance.
[thirdparty/openssl.git] / ssl / s3_pkt.c
1 /* ssl/s3_pkt.c */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
3 * All rights reserved.
4 *
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8 *
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15 *
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22 *
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25 * are met:
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40 *
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
51 * SUCH DAMAGE.
52 *
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
57 */
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
60 *
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
63 * are met:
64 *
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
67 *
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
71 * distribution.
72 *
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
77 *
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
82 *
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
86 *
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
88 * acknowledgment:
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
91 *
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
105 *
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
109 *
110 */
111
112 #include <stdio.h>
113 #include <errno.h>
114 #define USE_SOCKETS
115 #include "ssl_locl.h"
116 #include <openssl/evp.h>
117 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
118
119 static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
120 unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment);
121 static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s);
122
123 int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, int n, int max, int extend)
124 {
125 /* If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase
126 * packet by another n bytes.
127 * The packet will be in the sub-array of s->s3->rbuf.buf specified
128 * by s->packet and s->packet_length.
129 * (If s->read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may be stored in rbuf
130 * [plus s->packet_length bytes if extend == 1].)
131 */
132 int i,len,left,align=0;
133 unsigned char *pkt;
134 SSL3_BUFFER *rb;
135
136 if (n <= 0) return n;
137
138 rb = &(s->s3->rbuf);
139 left = rb->left;
140 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
141 align = (int)rb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
142 align = (-align)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1);
143 #endif
144
145 if (!extend)
146 {
147 /* start with empty packet ... */
148 if (left == 0)
149 rb->offset = align;
150 else if (align != 0 && left >= SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
151 {
152 /* check if next packet length is large
153 * enough to justify payload alignment... */
154 pkt = rb->buf + rb->offset;
155 if (pkt[0] == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
156 && (pkt[3]<<8|pkt[4]) >= 128)
157 {
158 /* Note that even if packet is corrupted
159 * and its length field is insane, we can
160 * only be led to wrong decision about
161 * whether memmove will occur or not.
162 * Header values has no effect on memmove
163 * arguments and therefore no buffer
164 * overrun can be triggered. */
165 memmove (rb->buf+align,pkt,left);
166 rb->offset = align;
167 }
168 }
169 s->packet = rb->buf + rb->offset;
170 s->packet_length = 0;
171 /* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */
172 }
173
174 /* extend reads should not span multiple packets for DTLS */
175 if ( SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION &&
176 extend)
177 {
178 if ( left > 0 && n > left)
179 n = left;
180 }
181
182 /* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */
183 if (left >= n)
184 {
185 s->packet_length+=n;
186 rb->left=left-n;
187 rb->offset+=n;
188 return(n);
189 }
190
191 /* else we need to read more data */
192
193 len = s->packet_length;
194 pkt = rb->buf+align;
195 /* Move any available bytes to front of buffer:
196 * 'len' bytes already pointed to by 'packet',
197 * 'left' extra ones at the end */
198 if (s->packet != pkt) /* len > 0 */
199 {
200 memmove(pkt, s->packet, len+left);
201 s->packet = pkt;
202 rb->offset = len + align;
203 }
204
205 max = rb->len - rb->offset;
206 if (n > max) /* does not happen */
207 {
208 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
209 return -1;
210 }
211
212 if (!s->read_ahead)
213 max=n;
214
215 while (left < n)
216 {
217 /* Now we have len+left bytes at the front of s->s3->rbuf.buf
218 * and need to read in more until we have len+n (up to
219 * len+max if possible) */
220
221 clear_sys_error();
222 if (s->rbio != NULL)
223 {
224 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
225 i=BIO_read(s->rbio,pkt+len+left, max-left);
226 }
227 else
228 {
229 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N,SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET);
230 i = -1;
231 }
232
233 if (i <= 0)
234 {
235 rb->left = left;
236 return(i);
237 }
238 left+=i;
239 }
240
241 /* done reading, now the book-keeping */
242 rb->offset += n;
243 rb->left = left - n;
244 s->packet_length += n;
245 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
246 return(n);
247 }
248
249 /* Call this to get a new input record.
250 * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error
251 * or non-blocking IO.
252 * When it finishes, one packet has been decoded and can be found in
253 * ssl->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
254 * ssl->s3->rrec.data, - data
255 * ssl->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes
256 */
257 /* used only by ssl3_read_bytes */
258 static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s)
259 {
260 int ssl_major,ssl_minor,al;
261 int enc_err,n,i,ret= -1;
262 SSL3_RECORD *rr;
263 SSL_SESSION *sess;
264 unsigned char *p;
265 unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
266 short version;
267 unsigned int mac_size;
268 int clear=0;
269 size_t extra;
270 int decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 0;
271 unsigned char *mac = NULL;
272
273 rr= &(s->s3->rrec);
274 sess=s->session;
275
276 if (s->options & SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER)
277 extra=SSL3_RT_MAX_EXTRA;
278 else
279 extra=0;
280 if (extra && !s->s3->init_extra)
281 {
282 /* An application error: SLS_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER
283 * set after ssl3_setup_buffers() was done */
284 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
285 return -1;
286 }
287
288 again:
289 /* check if we have the header */
290 if ( (s->rstate != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) ||
291 (s->packet_length < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH))
292 {
293 n=ssl3_read_n(s, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s->s3->rbuf.len, 0);
294 if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking */
295 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_BODY;
296
297 p=s->packet;
298
299 /* Pull apart the header into the SSL3_RECORD */
300 rr->type= *(p++);
301 ssl_major= *(p++);
302 ssl_minor= *(p++);
303 version=(ssl_major<<8)|ssl_minor;
304 n2s(p,rr->length);
305 #if 0
306 fprintf(stderr, "Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr->type, rr->length);
307 #endif
308
309 /* Lets check version */
310 if (s->first_packet)
311 {
312 s->first_packet=0;
313 }
314 else
315 {
316 if (version != s->version)
317 {
318 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
319 /* Send back error using their
320 * version number :-) */
321 s->version=version;
322 al=SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
323 goto f_err;
324 }
325 }
326
327 if ((version>>8) != SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
328 {
329 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
330 goto err;
331 }
332
333 if (rr->length > s->s3->rbuf.len - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
334 {
335 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
336 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
337 goto f_err;
338 }
339
340 /* now s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */
341 }
342
343 /* s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */
344
345 if (rr->length > s->packet_length-SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
346 {
347 /* now s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */
348 i=rr->length;
349 n=ssl3_read_n(s,i,i,1);
350 if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking io */
351 /* now n == rr->length,
352 * and s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length */
353 }
354
355 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; /* set state for later operations */
356
357 /* At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length,
358 * and we have that many bytes in s->packet
359 */
360 rr->input= &(s->packet[SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]);
361
362 /* ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr'
363 * rr->input points at rr->length bytes, which
364 * need to be copied into rr->data by either
365 * the decryption or by the decompression
366 * When the data is 'copied' into the rr->data buffer,
367 * rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer */
368
369 /* We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ]
370 * rr->length bytes of encrypted compressed stuff. */
371
372 /* check is not needed I believe */
373 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH+extra)
374 {
375 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
376 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
377 goto f_err;
378 }
379
380 /* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */
381 rr->data=rr->input;
382
383 enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,0);
384 if (enc_err <= 0)
385 {
386 if (enc_err == 0)
387 /* SSLerr() and ssl3_send_alert() have been called */
388 goto err;
389
390 /* Otherwise enc_err == -1, which indicates bad padding
391 * (rec->length has not been changed in this case).
392 * To minimize information leaked via timing, we will perform
393 * the MAC computation anyway. */
394 decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
395 }
396
397 #ifdef TLS_DEBUG
398 printf("dec %d\n",rr->length);
399 { unsigned int z; for (z=0; z<rr->length; z++) printf("%02X%c",rr->data[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
400 printf("\n");
401 #endif
402
403 /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */
404 if ( (sess == NULL) ||
405 (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL) ||
406 (s->read_hash == NULL))
407 clear=1;
408
409 if (!clear)
410 {
411 mac_size=EVP_MD_size(s->read_hash);
412
413 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+extra+mac_size)
414 {
415 #if 0 /* OK only for stream ciphers (then rr->length is visible from ciphertext anyway) */
416 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
417 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_PRE_MAC_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
418 goto f_err;
419 #else
420 decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
421 #endif
422 }
423 /* check the MAC for rr->input (it's in mac_size bytes at the tail) */
424 if (rr->length >= mac_size)
425 {
426 rr->length -= mac_size;
427 mac = &rr->data[rr->length];
428 }
429 else
430 {
431 /* record (minus padding) is too short to contain a MAC */
432 #if 0 /* OK only for stream ciphers */
433 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
434 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
435 goto f_err;
436 #else
437 decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
438 rr->length = 0;
439 #endif
440 }
441 i=s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,md,0);
442 if (mac == NULL || memcmp(md, mac, mac_size) != 0)
443 {
444 decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
445 }
446 }
447
448 if (decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac)
449 {
450 /* A separate 'decryption_failed' alert was introduced with TLS 1.0,
451 * SSL 3.0 only has 'bad_record_mac'. But unless a decryption
452 * failure is directly visible from the ciphertext anyway,
453 * we should not reveal which kind of error occured -- this
454 * might become visible to an attacker (e.g. via a logfile) */
455 al=SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC;
456 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
457 goto f_err;
458 }
459
460 /* r->length is now just compressed */
461 if (s->expand != NULL)
462 {
463 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+extra)
464 {
465 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
466 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
467 goto f_err;
468 }
469 if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s))
470 {
471 al=SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE;
472 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION);
473 goto f_err;
474 }
475 }
476
477 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH+extra)
478 {
479 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
480 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
481 goto f_err;
482 }
483
484 rr->off=0;
485 /* So at this point the following is true
486 * ssl->s3->rrec.type is the type of record
487 * ssl->s3->rrec.length == number of bytes in record
488 * ssl->s3->rrec.off == offset to first valid byte
489 * ssl->s3->rrec.data == where to take bytes from, increment
490 * after use :-).
491 */
492
493 /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */
494 s->packet_length=0;
495
496 /* just read a 0 length packet */
497 if (rr->length == 0) goto again;
498
499 #if 0
500 fprintf(stderr, "Ultimate Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr->type, rr->length);
501 #endif
502
503 return(1);
504
505 f_err:
506 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
507 err:
508 return(ret);
509 }
510
511 int ssl3_do_uncompress(SSL *ssl)
512 {
513 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
514 int i;
515 SSL3_RECORD *rr;
516
517 rr= &(ssl->s3->rrec);
518 i=COMP_expand_block(ssl->expand,rr->comp,
519 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,rr->data,(int)rr->length);
520 if (i < 0)
521 return(0);
522 else
523 rr->length=i;
524 rr->data=rr->comp;
525 #endif
526 return(1);
527 }
528
529 int ssl3_do_compress(SSL *ssl)
530 {
531 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
532 int i;
533 SSL3_RECORD *wr;
534
535 wr= &(ssl->s3->wrec);
536 i=COMP_compress_block(ssl->compress,wr->data,
537 SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH,
538 wr->input,(int)wr->length);
539 if (i < 0)
540 return(0);
541 else
542 wr->length=i;
543
544 wr->input=wr->data;
545 #endif
546 return(1);
547 }
548
549 /* Call this to write data in records of type 'type'
550 * It will return <= 0 if not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
551 */
552 int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len)
553 {
554 const unsigned char *buf=buf_;
555 unsigned int tot,n,nw;
556 int i;
557
558 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
559 tot=s->s3->wnum;
560 s->s3->wnum=0;
561
562 if (SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake)
563 {
564 i=s->handshake_func(s);
565 if (i < 0) return(i);
566 if (i == 0)
567 {
568 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
569 return -1;
570 }
571 }
572
573 n=(len-tot);
574 for (;;)
575 {
576 if (n > s->max_send_fragment)
577 nw=s->max_send_fragment;
578 else
579 nw=n;
580
581 i=do_ssl3_write(s, type, &(buf[tot]), nw, 0);
582 if (i <= 0)
583 {
584 s->s3->wnum=tot;
585 return i;
586 }
587
588 if ((i == (int)n) ||
589 (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
590 (s->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE)))
591 {
592 /* next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment
593 * in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness: */
594 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 0;
595
596 return tot+i;
597 }
598
599 n-=i;
600 tot+=i;
601 }
602 }
603
604 static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
605 unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment)
606 {
607 unsigned char *p,*plen;
608 int i,mac_size,clear=0;
609 int prefix_len=0,align=0;
610 SSL3_RECORD *wr;
611 SSL3_BUFFER *wb=&(s->s3->wbuf);
612 SSL_SESSION *sess;
613
614 /* first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written
615 * out. This will happen with non blocking IO */
616 if (wb->left != 0)
617 return(ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len));
618
619 /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
620 if (s->s3->alert_dispatch)
621 {
622 i=s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
623 if (i <= 0)
624 return(i);
625 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
626 }
627
628 if (len == 0 && !create_empty_fragment)
629 return 0;
630
631 wr= &(s->s3->wrec);
632 sess=s->session;
633
634 if ( (sess == NULL) ||
635 (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) ||
636 (s->write_hash == NULL))
637 clear=1;
638
639 if (clear)
640 mac_size=0;
641 else
642 mac_size=EVP_MD_size(s->write_hash);
643
644 /* 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself */
645 if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done)
646 {
647 /* countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites
648 * (see http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) */
649
650 if (s->s3->need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
651 {
652 /* recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set;
653 * this prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment
654 * (these 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later
655 * together with the actual payload) */
656 prefix_len = do_ssl3_write(s, type, buf, 0, 1);
657 if (prefix_len <= 0)
658 goto err;
659
660 if (prefix_len >
661 (SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD))
662 {
663 /* insufficient space */
664 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
665 goto err;
666 }
667 }
668
669 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1;
670 }
671
672 if (create_empty_fragment)
673 {
674 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
675 /* extra fragment would be couple of cipher blocks,
676 * which would be multiple of SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD, so
677 * if we want to align the real payload, then we can
678 * just pretent we simply have two headers. */
679 align = (int)wb->buf + 2*SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
680 align = (-align)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1);
681 #endif
682 p = wb->buf + align;
683 wb->offset = align;
684 }
685 else if (prefix_len)
686 {
687 p = wb->buf + wb->offset + prefix_len;
688 }
689 else
690 {
691 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
692 align = (int)wb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
693 align = (-align)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1);
694 #endif
695 p = wb->buf + align;
696 wb->offset = align;
697 }
698
699 /* write the header */
700
701 *(p++)=type&0xff;
702 wr->type=type;
703
704 *(p++)=(s->version>>8);
705 *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
706
707 /* field where we are to write out packet length */
708 plen=p;
709 p+=2;
710
711 /* lets setup the record stuff. */
712 wr->data=p;
713 wr->length=(int)len;
714 wr->input=(unsigned char *)buf;
715
716 /* we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into
717 * wr->data */
718
719 /* first we compress */
720 if (s->compress != NULL)
721 {
722 if (!ssl3_do_compress(s))
723 {
724 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE);
725 goto err;
726 }
727 }
728 else
729 {
730 memcpy(wr->data,wr->input,wr->length);
731 wr->input=wr->data;
732 }
733
734 /* we should still have the output to wr->data and the input
735 * from wr->input. Length should be wr->length.
736 * wr->data still points in the wb->buf */
737
738 if (mac_size != 0)
739 {
740 s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,&(p[wr->length]),1);
741 wr->length+=mac_size;
742 wr->input=p;
743 wr->data=p;
744 }
745
746 /* ssl3_enc can only have an error on read */
747 s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,1);
748
749 /* record length after mac and block padding */
750 s2n(wr->length,plen);
751
752 /* we should now have
753 * wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is
754 * wr->length long */
755 wr->type=type; /* not needed but helps for debugging */
756 wr->length+=SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
757
758 if (create_empty_fragment)
759 {
760 /* we are in a recursive call;
761 * just return the length, don't write out anything here
762 */
763 return wr->length;
764 }
765
766 /* now let's set up wb */
767 wb->left = prefix_len + wr->length;
768
769 /* memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write retries later */
770 s->s3->wpend_tot=len;
771 s->s3->wpend_buf=buf;
772 s->s3->wpend_type=type;
773 s->s3->wpend_ret=len;
774
775 /* we now just need to write the buffer */
776 return ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len);
777 err:
778 return -1;
779 }
780
781 /* if s->s3->wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this */
782 int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
783 unsigned int len)
784 {
785 int i;
786 SSL3_BUFFER *wb=&(s->s3->wbuf);
787
788 /* XXXX */
789 if ((s->s3->wpend_tot > (int)len)
790 || ((s->s3->wpend_buf != buf) &&
791 !(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER))
792 || (s->s3->wpend_type != type))
793 {
794 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING,SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY);
795 return(-1);
796 }
797
798 for (;;)
799 {
800 clear_sys_error();
801 if (s->wbio != NULL)
802 {
803 s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
804 i=BIO_write(s->wbio,
805 (char *)&(wb->buf[wb->offset]),
806 (unsigned int)wb->left);
807 }
808 else
809 {
810 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING,SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET);
811 i= -1;
812 }
813 if (i == wb->left)
814 {
815 wb->left=0;
816 wb->offset+=i;
817 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
818 return(s->s3->wpend_ret);
819 }
820 else if (i <= 0)
821 return(i);
822 wb->offset+=i;
823 wb->left-=i;
824 }
825 }
826
827 /* Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
828 * 'type' is one of the following:
829 *
830 * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
831 * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
832 * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
833 *
834 * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
835 * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
836 *
837 * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
838 * Alert records (e.g. close_notify), ChangeCipherSpec records (not really
839 * a surprise, but handled as if it were), or renegotiation requests.
840 * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
841 * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
842 * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
843 * Change cipher spec protocol
844 * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
845 * Alert protocol
846 * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
847 * Handshake protocol
848 * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
849 * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
850 * here, anything else is handled by higher layers
851 * Application data protocol
852 * none of our business
853 */
854 int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek)
855 {
856 int al,i,j,ret;
857 unsigned int n;
858 SSL3_RECORD *rr;
859 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type2,int val)=NULL;
860
861 if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL) /* Not initialized yet */
862 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
863 return(-1);
864
865 if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) && (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && type) ||
866 (peek && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)))
867 {
868 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
869 return -1;
870 }
871
872 if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
873 /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
874 {
875 unsigned char *src = s->s3->handshake_fragment;
876 unsigned char *dst = buf;
877 unsigned int k;
878
879 /* peek == 0 */
880 n = 0;
881 while ((len > 0) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
882 {
883 *dst++ = *src++;
884 len--; s->s3->handshake_fragment_len--;
885 n++;
886 }
887 /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
888 for (k = 0; k < s->s3->handshake_fragment_len; k++)
889 s->s3->handshake_fragment[k] = *src++;
890 return n;
891 }
892
893 /* Now s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE. */
894
895 if (!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s))
896 {
897 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
898 i=s->handshake_func(s);
899 if (i < 0) return(i);
900 if (i == 0)
901 {
902 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
903 return(-1);
904 }
905 }
906 start:
907 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
908
909 /* s->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
910 * s->s3->rrec.data, - data
911 * s->s3->rrec.off, - offset into 'data' for next read
912 * s->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes. */
913 rr = &(s->s3->rrec);
914
915 /* get new packet if necessary */
916 if ((rr->length == 0) || (s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY))
917 {
918 ret=ssl3_get_record(s);
919 if (ret <= 0) return(ret);
920 }
921
922 /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
923
924 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
925 * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
926 && (rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE))
927 {
928 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
929 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED);
930 goto f_err;
931 }
932
933 /* If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away
934 * (even in 'peek' mode) */
935 if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN)
936 {
937 rr->length=0;
938 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
939 return(0);
940 }
941
942
943 if (type == rr->type) /* SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE */
944 {
945 /* make sure that we are not getting application data when we
946 * are doing a handshake for the first time */
947 if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
948 (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL))
949 {
950 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
951 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE);
952 goto f_err;
953 }
954
955 if (len <= 0) return(len);
956
957 if ((unsigned int)len > rr->length)
958 n = rr->length;
959 else
960 n = (unsigned int)len;
961
962 memcpy(buf,&(rr->data[rr->off]),n);
963 if (!peek)
964 {
965 rr->length-=n;
966 rr->off+=n;
967 if (rr->length == 0)
968 {
969 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
970 rr->off=0;
971 }
972 }
973 return(n);
974 }
975
976
977 /* If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake
978 * message, then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello). */
979
980 /* In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage,
981 * fill that so that we can process the data at a fixed place.
982 */
983 {
984 unsigned int dest_maxlen = 0;
985 unsigned char *dest = NULL;
986 unsigned int *dest_len = NULL;
987
988 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
989 {
990 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->handshake_fragment;
991 dest = s->s3->handshake_fragment;
992 dest_len = &s->s3->handshake_fragment_len;
993 }
994 else if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT)
995 {
996 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->alert_fragment;
997 dest = s->s3->alert_fragment;
998 dest_len = &s->s3->alert_fragment_len;
999 }
1000
1001 if (dest_maxlen > 0)
1002 {
1003 n = dest_maxlen - *dest_len; /* available space in 'dest' */
1004 if (rr->length < n)
1005 n = rr->length; /* available bytes */
1006
1007 /* now move 'n' bytes: */
1008 while (n-- > 0)
1009 {
1010 dest[(*dest_len)++] = rr->data[rr->off++];
1011 rr->length--;
1012 }
1013
1014 if (*dest_len < dest_maxlen)
1015 goto start; /* fragment was too small */
1016 }
1017 }
1018
1019 /* s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
1020 * s->s3->alert_fragment_len == 2 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT.
1021 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.) */
1022
1023 /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */
1024 if ((!s->server) &&
1025 (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
1026 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) &&
1027 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL))
1028 {
1029 s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
1030
1031 if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment[1] != 0) ||
1032 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[2] != 0) ||
1033 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[3] != 0))
1034 {
1035 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1036 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST);
1037 goto f_err;
1038 }
1039
1040 if (s->msg_callback)
1041 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->s3->handshake_fragment, 4, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1042
1043 if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
1044 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) &&
1045 !s->s3->renegotiate)
1046 {
1047 ssl3_renegotiate(s);
1048 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s))
1049 {
1050 i=s->handshake_func(s);
1051 if (i < 0) return(i);
1052 if (i == 0)
1053 {
1054 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1055 return(-1);
1056 }
1057
1058 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY))
1059 {
1060 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */
1061 {
1062 BIO *bio;
1063 /* In the case where we try to read application data,
1064 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
1065 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
1066 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
1067 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
1068 bio=SSL_get_rbio(s);
1069 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1070 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1071 return(-1);
1072 }
1073 }
1074 }
1075 }
1076 /* we either finished a handshake or ignored the request,
1077 * now try again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for */
1078 goto start;
1079 }
1080
1081 if (s->s3->alert_fragment_len >= 2)
1082 {
1083 int alert_level = s->s3->alert_fragment[0];
1084 int alert_descr = s->s3->alert_fragment[1];
1085
1086 s->s3->alert_fragment_len = 0;
1087
1088 if (s->msg_callback)
1089 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->alert_fragment, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1090
1091 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1092 cb=s->info_callback;
1093 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1094 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
1095
1096 if (cb != NULL)
1097 {
1098 j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr;
1099 cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j);
1100 }
1101
1102 if (alert_level == 1) /* warning */
1103 {
1104 s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr;
1105 if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY)
1106 {
1107 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1108 return(0);
1109 }
1110 }
1111 else if (alert_level == 2) /* fatal */
1112 {
1113 char tmp[16];
1114
1115 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1116 s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr;
1117 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr);
1118 BIO_snprintf(tmp,sizeof tmp,"%d",alert_descr);
1119 ERR_add_error_data(2,"SSL alert number ",tmp);
1120 s->shutdown|=SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1121 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session);
1122 return(0);
1123 }
1124 else
1125 {
1126 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1127 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
1128 goto f_err;
1129 }
1130
1131 goto start;
1132 }
1133
1134 if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) /* but we have not received a shutdown */
1135 {
1136 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1137 rr->length=0;
1138 return(0);
1139 }
1140
1141 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
1142 {
1143 /* 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, so we know
1144 * exactly what the record payload has to look like */
1145 if ( (rr->length != 1) || (rr->off != 0) ||
1146 (rr->data[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS))
1147 {
1148 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1149 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
1150 goto f_err;
1151 }
1152
1153 /* Check we have a cipher to change to */
1154 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL)
1155 {
1156 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1157 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1158 goto f_err;
1159 }
1160
1161 rr->length=0;
1162
1163 if (s->msg_callback)
1164 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, rr->data, 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1165
1166 s->s3->change_cipher_spec=1;
1167 if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s))
1168 goto err;
1169 else
1170 goto start;
1171 }
1172
1173 /* Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation) */
1174 if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) && !s->in_handshake)
1175 {
1176 if (((s->state&SSL_ST_MASK) == SSL_ST_OK) &&
1177 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS))
1178 {
1179 #if 0 /* worked only because C operator preferences are not as expected (and
1180 * because this is not really needed for clients except for detecting
1181 * protocol violations): */
1182 s->state=SSL_ST_BEFORE|(s->server)
1183 ?SSL_ST_ACCEPT
1184 :SSL_ST_CONNECT;
1185 #else
1186 s->state = s->server ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT;
1187 #endif
1188 s->new_session=1;
1189 }
1190 i=s->handshake_func(s);
1191 if (i < 0) return(i);
1192 if (i == 0)
1193 {
1194 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1195 return(-1);
1196 }
1197
1198 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY))
1199 {
1200 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */
1201 {
1202 BIO *bio;
1203 /* In the case where we try to read application data,
1204 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
1205 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
1206 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
1207 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
1208 bio=SSL_get_rbio(s);
1209 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1210 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1211 return(-1);
1212 }
1213 }
1214 goto start;
1215 }
1216
1217 switch (rr->type)
1218 {
1219 default:
1220 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS
1221 /* TLS just ignores unknown message types */
1222 if (s->version == TLS1_VERSION)
1223 {
1224 rr->length = 0;
1225 goto start;
1226 }
1227 #endif
1228 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1229 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1230 goto f_err;
1231 case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
1232 case SSL3_RT_ALERT:
1233 case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:
1234 /* we already handled all of these, with the possible exception
1235 * of SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when s->in_handshake is set, but that
1236 * should not happen when type != rr->type */
1237 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1238 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1239 goto f_err;
1240 case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
1241 /* At this point, we were expecting handshake data,
1242 * but have application data. If the library was
1243 * running inside ssl3_read() (i.e. in_read_app_data
1244 * is set) and it makes sense to read application data
1245 * at this point (session renegotiation not yet started),
1246 * we will indulge it.
1247 */
1248 if (s->s3->in_read_app_data &&
1249 (s->s3->total_renegotiations != 0) &&
1250 ((
1251 (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) &&
1252 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) &&
1253 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1254 ) || (
1255 (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) &&
1256 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) &&
1257 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
1258 )
1259 ))
1260 {
1261 s->s3->in_read_app_data=2;
1262 return(-1);
1263 }
1264 else
1265 {
1266 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1267 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1268 goto f_err;
1269 }
1270 }
1271 /* not reached */
1272
1273 f_err:
1274 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1275 err:
1276 return(-1);
1277 }
1278
1279 int ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s)
1280 {
1281 int i;
1282 const char *sender;
1283 int slen;
1284
1285 if (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
1286 i=SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ;
1287 else
1288 i=SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ;
1289
1290 if (s->s3->tmp.key_block == NULL)
1291 {
1292 s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
1293 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) return(0);
1294 }
1295
1296 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,i))
1297 return(0);
1298
1299 /* we have to record the message digest at
1300 * this point so we can get it before we read
1301 * the finished message */
1302 if (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT)
1303 {
1304 sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label;
1305 slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len;
1306 }
1307 else
1308 {
1309 sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label;
1310 slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len;
1311 }
1312
1313 s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
1314 &(s->s3->finish_dgst1),
1315 &(s->s3->finish_dgst2),
1316 sender,slen,s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md);
1317
1318 return(1);
1319 }
1320
1321 void ssl3_send_alert(SSL *s, int level, int desc)
1322 {
1323 /* Map tls/ssl alert value to correct one */
1324 desc=s->method->ssl3_enc->alert_value(desc);
1325 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && desc == SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION)
1326 desc = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; /* SSL 3.0 does not have protocol_version alerts */
1327 if (desc < 0) return;
1328 /* If a fatal one, remove from cache */
1329 if ((level == 2) && (s->session != NULL))
1330 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session);
1331
1332 s->s3->alert_dispatch=1;
1333 s->s3->send_alert[0]=level;
1334 s->s3->send_alert[1]=desc;
1335 if (s->s3->wbuf.left == 0) /* data still being written out? */
1336 s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
1337 /* else data is still being written out, we will get written
1338 * some time in the future */
1339 }
1340
1341 int ssl3_dispatch_alert(SSL *s)
1342 {
1343 int i,j;
1344 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
1345
1346 s->s3->alert_dispatch=0;
1347 i = do_ssl3_write(s, SSL3_RT_ALERT, &s->s3->send_alert[0], 2, 0);
1348 if (i <= 0)
1349 {
1350 s->s3->alert_dispatch=1;
1351 }
1352 else
1353 {
1354 /* Alert sent to BIO. If it is important, flush it now.
1355 * If the message does not get sent due to non-blocking IO,
1356 * we will not worry too much. */
1357 if (s->s3->send_alert[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL)
1358 (void)BIO_flush(s->wbio);
1359
1360 if (s->msg_callback)
1361 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->send_alert, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1362
1363 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1364 cb=s->info_callback;
1365 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1366 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
1367
1368 if (cb != NULL)
1369 {
1370 j=(s->s3->send_alert[0]<<8)|s->s3->send_alert[1];
1371 cb(s,SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT,j);
1372 }
1373 }
1374 return(i);
1375 }
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