2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
115 #include "ssl_locl.h"
116 #include <openssl/evp.h>
117 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
118 #include <openssl/rand.h>
120 #ifndef EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
121 # define EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK 0
124 #if defined(OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT) || \
125 !( defined(AES_ASM) && ( \
126 defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) || \
127 defined(_M_AMD64) || defined(_M_X64) || \
128 defined(__INTEL__) ) \
130 # undef EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
131 # define EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK 0
134 static int do_ssl3_write(SSL
*s
, int type
, const unsigned char *buf
,
135 unsigned int len
, int create_empty_fragment
);
136 static int ssl3_get_record(SSL
*s
);
138 int ssl3_read_n(SSL
*s
, int n
, int max
, int extend
)
140 /* If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase
141 * packet by another n bytes.
142 * The packet will be in the sub-array of s->s3->rbuf.buf specified
143 * by s->packet and s->packet_length.
144 * (If s->read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may be stored in rbuf
145 * [plus s->packet_length bytes if extend == 1].)
152 if (n
<= 0) return n
;
156 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s
))
160 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
161 align
= (long)rb
->buf
+ SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
;
162 align
= (-align
)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD
-1);
167 /* start with empty packet ... */
170 else if (align
!= 0 && left
>= SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
)
172 /* check if next packet length is large
173 * enough to justify payload alignment... */
174 pkt
= rb
->buf
+ rb
->offset
;
175 if (pkt
[0] == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
176 && (pkt
[3]<<8|pkt
[4]) >= 128)
178 /* Note that even if packet is corrupted
179 * and its length field is insane, we can
180 * only be led to wrong decision about
181 * whether memmove will occur or not.
182 * Header values has no effect on memmove
183 * arguments and therefore no buffer
184 * overrun can be triggered. */
185 memmove (rb
->buf
+align
,pkt
,left
);
189 s
->packet
= rb
->buf
+ rb
->offset
;
190 s
->packet_length
= 0;
191 /* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */
194 /* For DTLS/UDP reads should not span multiple packets
195 * because the read operation returns the whole packet
196 * at once (as long as it fits into the buffer). */
199 if (left
> 0 && n
> left
)
203 /* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */
212 /* else we need to read more data */
214 len
= s
->packet_length
;
216 /* Move any available bytes to front of buffer:
217 * 'len' bytes already pointed to by 'packet',
218 * 'left' extra ones at the end */
219 if (s
->packet
!= pkt
) /* len > 0 */
221 memmove(pkt
, s
->packet
, len
+left
);
223 rb
->offset
= len
+ align
;
226 if (n
> (int)(rb
->len
- rb
->offset
)) /* does not happen */
228 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N
,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
233 /* ignore max parameter */
239 if (max
> (int)(rb
->len
- rb
->offset
))
240 max
= rb
->len
- rb
->offset
;
245 /* Now we have len+left bytes at the front of s->s3->rbuf.buf
246 * and need to read in more until we have len+n (up to
247 * len+max if possible) */
252 s
->rwstate
=SSL_READING
;
253 i
=BIO_read(s
->rbio
,pkt
+len
+left
, max
-left
);
257 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N
,SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET
);
264 if (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS
&&
267 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s
);
271 /* reads should *never* span multiple packets for DTLS because
272 * the underlying transport protocol is message oriented as opposed
273 * to byte oriented as in the TLS case. */
277 n
= left
; /* makes the while condition false */
281 /* done reading, now the book-keeping */
284 s
->packet_length
+= n
;
285 s
->rwstate
=SSL_NOTHING
;
289 /* MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS defines the number of consecutive, empty records that will
290 * be processed per call to ssl3_get_record. Without this limit an attacker
291 * could send empty records at a faster rate than we can process and cause
292 * ssl3_get_record to loop forever. */
293 #define MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS 32
295 /* Call this to get a new input record.
296 * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error
297 * or non-blocking IO.
298 * When it finishes, one packet has been decoded and can be found in
299 * ssl->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
300 * ssl->s3->rrec.data, - data
301 * ssl->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes
303 /* used only by ssl3_read_bytes */
304 static int ssl3_get_record(SSL
*s
)
306 int ssl_major
,ssl_minor
,al
;
307 int enc_err
,n
,i
,ret
= -1;
311 unsigned char md
[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
];
315 unsigned empty_record_count
= 0;
320 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER
)
321 extra
=SSL3_RT_MAX_EXTRA
;
324 if (extra
&& !s
->s3
->init_extra
)
326 /* An application error: SLS_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER
327 * set after ssl3_setup_buffers() was done */
328 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
333 /* check if we have the header */
334 if ( (s
->rstate
!= SSL_ST_READ_BODY
) ||
335 (s
->packet_length
< SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
))
337 n
=ssl3_read_n(s
, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
, s
->s3
->rbuf
.len
, 0);
338 if (n
<= 0) return(n
); /* error or non-blocking */
339 s
->rstate
=SSL_ST_READ_BODY
;
343 s
->msg_callback(0, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER
, p
, 5, s
, s
->msg_callback_arg
);
345 /* Pull apart the header into the SSL3_RECORD */
349 version
=(ssl_major
<<8)|ssl_minor
;
352 fprintf(stderr
, "Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr
->type
, rr
->length
);
355 /* Lets check version */
356 if (!s
->first_packet
)
358 if (version
!= s
->version
)
360 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD
,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER
);
361 if ((s
->version
& 0xFF00) == (version
& 0xFF00) && !s
->enc_write_ctx
&& !s
->write_hash
)
362 /* Send back error using their minor version number :-) */
363 s
->version
= (unsigned short)version
;
364 al
=SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
369 if ((version
>>8) != SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR
)
371 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD
,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER
);
375 if (rr
->length
> s
->s3
->rbuf
.len
- SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
)
377 al
=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW
;
378 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD
,SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
382 /* now s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */
385 /* s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */
387 if (rr
->length
> s
->packet_length
-SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
)
389 /* now s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */
391 n
=ssl3_read_n(s
,i
,i
,1);
392 if (n
<= 0) return(n
); /* error or non-blocking io */
393 /* now n == rr->length,
394 * and s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length */
397 s
->rstate
=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER
; /* set state for later operations */
399 /* At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length,
400 * and we have that many bytes in s->packet
402 rr
->input
= &(s
->packet
[SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
]);
404 /* ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr'
405 * rr->input points at rr->length bytes, which
406 * need to be copied into rr->data by either
407 * the decryption or by the decompression
408 * When the data is 'copied' into the rr->data buffer,
409 * rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer */
411 /* We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ]
412 * rr->length bytes of encrypted compressed stuff. */
414 /* check is not needed I believe */
415 if (rr
->length
> SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH
+extra
)
417 al
=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW
;
418 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD
,SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
422 /* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */
424 rr
->orig_len
=rr
->length
;
425 /* If in encrypt-then-mac mode calculate mac from encrypted record.
426 * All the details below are public so no timing details can leak.
428 if (SSL_USE_ETM(s
) && s
->read_hash
)
431 mac_size
=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s
->read_hash
);
432 OPENSSL_assert(mac_size
<= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
);
433 if (rr
->length
< mac_size
)
435 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
436 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD
,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
439 rr
->length
-= mac_size
;
440 mac
= rr
->data
+ rr
->length
;
441 i
=s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->mac(s
,md
,0 /* not send */);
442 if (i
< 0 || CRYPTO_memcmp(md
, mac
, (size_t)mac_size
) != 0)
444 al
=SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC
;
445 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD
,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC
);
450 enc_err
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->enc(s
,0);
452 * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid.
453 * 1: if the padding is valid
454 * -1: if the padding is invalid */
457 al
=SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED
;
458 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD
,SSL_R_BLOCK_CIPHER_PAD_IS_WRONG
);
463 printf("dec %d\n",rr
->length
);
464 { unsigned int z
; for (z
=0; z
<rr
->length
; z
++) printf("%02X%c",rr
->data
[z
],((z
+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
468 /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */
469 if ((sess
!= NULL
) &&
470 (s
->enc_read_ctx
!= NULL
) &&
471 (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s
->read_hash
) != NULL
) && !SSL_USE_ETM(s
))
473 /* s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */
474 unsigned char *mac
= NULL
;
475 unsigned char mac_tmp
[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
];
476 mac_size
=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s
->read_hash
);
477 OPENSSL_assert(mac_size
<= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
);
479 /* orig_len is the length of the record before any padding was
480 * removed. This is public information, as is the MAC in use,
481 * therefore we can safely process the record in a different
482 * amount of time if it's too short to possibly contain a MAC.
484 if (rr
->orig_len
< mac_size
||
485 /* CBC records must have a padding length byte too. */
486 (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s
->enc_read_ctx
) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE
&&
487 rr
->orig_len
< mac_size
+1))
489 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
490 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD
,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
494 if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s
->enc_read_ctx
) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE
)
496 /* We update the length so that the TLS header bytes
497 * can be constructed correctly but we need to extract
498 * the MAC in constant time from within the record,
499 * without leaking the contents of the padding bytes.
502 ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp
, rr
, mac_size
);
503 rr
->length
-= mac_size
;
507 /* In this case there's no padding, so |rec->orig_len|
508 * equals |rec->length| and we checked that there's
509 * enough bytes for |mac_size| above. */
510 rr
->length
-= mac_size
;
511 mac
= &rr
->data
[rr
->length
];
514 i
=s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->mac(s
,md
,0 /* not send */);
515 if (i
< 0 || mac
== NULL
|| CRYPTO_memcmp(md
, mac
, (size_t)mac_size
) != 0)
517 if (rr
->length
> SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH
+extra
+mac_size
)
523 /* A separate 'decryption_failed' alert was introduced with TLS 1.0,
524 * SSL 3.0 only has 'bad_record_mac'. But unless a decryption
525 * failure is directly visible from the ciphertext anyway,
526 * we should not reveal which kind of error occurred -- this
527 * might become visible to an attacker (e.g. via a logfile) */
528 al
=SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC
;
529 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD
,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC
);
533 /* r->length is now just compressed */
534 if (s
->expand
!= NULL
)
536 if (rr
->length
> SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH
+extra
)
538 al
=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW
;
539 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD
,SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
542 if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s
))
544 al
=SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE
;
545 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD
,SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION
);
550 if (rr
->length
> SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
+extra
)
552 al
=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW
;
553 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD
,SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
558 /* So at this point the following is true
559 * ssl->s3->rrec.type is the type of record
560 * ssl->s3->rrec.length == number of bytes in record
561 * ssl->s3->rrec.off == offset to first valid byte
562 * ssl->s3->rrec.data == where to take bytes from, increment
566 /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */
569 /* just read a 0 length packet */
572 empty_record_count
++;
573 if (empty_record_count
> MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS
)
575 al
=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
576 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD
,SSL_R_TOO_MANY_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS
);
583 fprintf(stderr
, "Ultimate Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr
->type
, rr
->length
);
589 ssl3_send_alert(s
,SSL3_AL_FATAL
,al
);
594 int ssl3_do_uncompress(SSL
*ssl
)
596 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
600 rr
= &(ssl
->s3
->rrec
);
601 i
=COMP_expand_block(ssl
->expand
,rr
->comp
,
602 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
,rr
->data
,(int)rr
->length
);
612 int ssl3_do_compress(SSL
*ssl
)
614 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
618 wr
= &(ssl
->s3
->wrec
);
619 i
=COMP_compress_block(ssl
->compress
,wr
->data
,
620 SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH
,
621 wr
->input
,(int)wr
->length
);
632 /* Call this to write data in records of type 'type'
633 * It will return <= 0 if not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
635 int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL
*s
, int type
, const void *buf_
, int len
)
637 const unsigned char *buf
=buf_
;
640 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
641 unsigned int max_send_fragment
;
643 SSL3_BUFFER
*wb
=&(s
->s3
->wbuf
);
646 s
->rwstate
=SSL_NOTHING
;
650 if (SSL_in_init(s
) && !s
->in_handshake
)
652 i
=s
->handshake_func(s
);
653 if (i
< 0) return(i
);
656 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES
,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
661 /* ensure that if we end up with a smaller value of data to write
662 * out than the the original len from a write which didn't complete
663 * for non-blocking I/O and also somehow ended up avoiding
664 * the check for this in ssl3_write_pending/SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY as
665 * it must never be possible to end up with (len-tot) as a large
666 * number that will then promptly send beyond the end of the users
667 * buffer ... so we trap and report the error in a way the user
672 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES
,SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH
);
676 /* first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written
677 * out. This will happen with non blocking IO */
680 i
= ssl3_write_pending(s
,type
,&buf
[tot
],s
->s3
->wpend_tot
);
683 /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */
687 tot
+= i
; /* this might be last fragment */
690 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
692 * Depending on platform multi-block can deliver several *times*
693 * better performance. Downside is that it has to allocate
694 * jumbo buffer to accomodate up to 8 records, but the
695 * compromise is considered worthy.
697 if (type
==SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
&&
698 len
>= 4*(max_send_fragment
=s
->max_send_fragment
) &&
699 s
->compress
==NULL
&& s
->msg_callback
==NULL
&&
700 !SSL_USE_ETM(s
) && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s
) &&
701 EVP_CIPHER_flags(s
->enc_write_ctx
->cipher
)&EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
)
703 unsigned char aad
[13];
704 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_PARAM mb_param
;
707 /* minimize address aliasing conflicts */
708 if ((max_send_fragment
&0xffff) == 0)
709 max_send_fragment
-= 512;
711 if (tot
==0 || wb
->buf
==NULL
) /* allocate jumbo buffer */
713 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s
);
715 packlen
= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s
->enc_write_ctx
,
716 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_MAX_BUFSIZE
,
717 max_send_fragment
,NULL
);
719 if (len
>=8*max_send_fragment
) packlen
*= 8;
722 wb
->buf
=OPENSSL_malloc(packlen
);
725 else if (tot
==len
) /* done? */
727 OPENSSL_free(wb
->buf
); /* free jumbo buffer */
735 if (n
< 4*max_send_fragment
)
737 OPENSSL_free(wb
->buf
); /* free jumbo buffer */
742 if (s
->s3
->alert_dispatch
)
744 i
=s
->method
->ssl_dispatch_alert(s
);
752 if (n
>= 8*max_send_fragment
)
753 nw
= max_send_fragment
*(mb_param
.interleave
=8);
755 nw
= max_send_fragment
*(mb_param
.interleave
=4);
757 memcpy(aad
,s
->s3
->write_sequence
,8);
759 aad
[9]=(unsigned char)(s
->version
>>8);
760 aad
[10]=(unsigned char)(s
->version
);
767 packlen
= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s
->enc_write_ctx
,
768 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_AAD
,
769 sizeof(mb_param
),&mb_param
);
771 if (packlen
<=0 || packlen
>wb
->len
) /* never happens */
773 OPENSSL_free(wb
->buf
); /* free jumbo buffer */
778 mb_param
.out
= wb
->buf
;
779 mb_param
.inp
= &buf
[tot
];
782 if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s
->enc_write_ctx
,
783 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_ENCRYPT
,
784 sizeof(mb_param
),&mb_param
)<=0)
787 s
->s3
->write_sequence
[7] += mb_param
.interleave
;
788 if (s
->s3
->write_sequence
[7] < mb_param
.interleave
)
791 while (j
>=0 && (++s
->s3
->write_sequence
[j
--])==0) ;
797 s
->s3
->wpend_tot
= nw
;
798 s
->s3
->wpend_buf
= &buf
[tot
];
799 s
->s3
->wpend_type
= type
;
800 s
->s3
->wpend_ret
= nw
;
802 i
= ssl3_write_pending(s
,type
,&buf
[tot
],nw
);
807 OPENSSL_free(wb
->buf
);
815 OPENSSL_free(wb
->buf
); /* free jumbo buffer */
825 if (tot
==len
) /* done? */
827 if (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS
&&
829 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s
);
838 if (n
> s
->max_send_fragment
)
839 nw
=s
->max_send_fragment
;
843 i
=do_ssl3_write(s
, type
, &(buf
[tot
]), nw
, 0);
846 /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */
852 (type
== SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
&&
853 (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE
)))
855 /* next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment
856 * in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness: */
857 s
->s3
->empty_fragment_done
= 0;
859 if ((i
==(int)n
) && s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS
&&
861 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s
);
871 static int do_ssl3_write(SSL
*s
, int type
, const unsigned char *buf
,
872 unsigned int len
, int create_empty_fragment
)
874 unsigned char *p
,*plen
;
875 int i
,mac_size
,clear
=0;
880 SSL3_BUFFER
*wb
=&(s
->s3
->wbuf
);
884 /* first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written
885 * out. This will happen with non blocking IO */
887 return(ssl3_write_pending(s
,type
,buf
,len
));
889 /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
890 if (s
->s3
->alert_dispatch
)
892 i
=s
->method
->ssl_dispatch_alert(s
);
895 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
899 if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s
))
902 if (len
== 0 && !create_empty_fragment
)
908 if ( (sess
== NULL
) ||
909 (s
->enc_write_ctx
== NULL
) ||
910 (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s
->write_hash
) == NULL
))
913 clear
=s
->enc_write_ctx
?0:1; /* must be AEAD cipher */
921 mac_size
=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s
->write_hash
);
926 #if 0 && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
927 if (type
==SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
&& s
->compress
==NULL
&&
928 !SSL_USE_ETM(s
) && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s
) && /*!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) &&*/
929 EVP_CIPHER_flags(s
->enc_write_ctx
->cipher
)&EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
)
931 unsigned char aad
[13];
932 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_PARAM mb_param
= {NULL
,aad
,sizeof(aad
),0};
935 memcpy(aad
,s
->s3
->write_sequence
,8);
937 aad
[9]=(unsigned char)(s
->version
>>8);
938 aad
[10]=(unsigned char)(s
->version
);
939 aad
[11]=(unsigned char)(len
>>8);
940 aad
[12]=(unsigned char)len
;
941 packlen
= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s
->enc_write_ctx
,
942 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_AAD
,
943 sizeof(mb_param
),&mb_param
);
945 if (packlen
==0 || packlen
> wb
->len
) break;
947 mb_param
.out
= wb
->buf
;
950 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s
->enc_write_ctx
,
951 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_ENCRYPT
,
952 sizeof(mb_param
),&mb_param
);
954 s
->s3
->write_sequence
[7] += mb_param
.interleave
;
955 if (s
->s3
->write_sequence
[7] < mb_param
.interleave
)
958 while (j
>=0 && (++s
->s3
->write_sequence
[j
--])==0) ;
964 /* memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write retries later */
965 s
->s3
->wpend_tot
=len
;
966 s
->s3
->wpend_buf
=buf
;
967 s
->s3
->wpend_type
=type
;
968 s
->s3
->wpend_ret
=len
;
970 /* we now just need to write the buffer */
971 return ssl3_write_pending(s
,type
,buf
,len
);
975 /* 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself */
976 if (!clear
&& !create_empty_fragment
&& !s
->s3
->empty_fragment_done
)
978 /* countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites
979 * (see http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) */
981 if (s
->s3
->need_empty_fragments
&& type
== SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
)
983 /* recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set;
984 * this prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment
985 * (these 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later
986 * together with the actual payload) */
987 prefix_len
= do_ssl3_write(s
, type
, buf
, 0, 1);
992 (SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
+ SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD
))
994 /* insufficient space */
995 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1000 s
->s3
->empty_fragment_done
= 1;
1003 if (create_empty_fragment
)
1005 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
1006 /* extra fragment would be couple of cipher blocks,
1007 * which would be multiple of SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD, so
1008 * if we want to align the real payload, then we can
1009 * just pretent we simply have two headers. */
1010 align
= (long)wb
->buf
+ 2*SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
;
1011 align
= (-align
)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD
-1);
1013 p
= wb
->buf
+ align
;
1016 else if (prefix_len
)
1018 p
= wb
->buf
+ wb
->offset
+ prefix_len
;
1022 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
1023 align
= (long)wb
->buf
+ SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
;
1024 align
= (-align
)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD
-1);
1026 p
= wb
->buf
+ align
;
1030 /* write the header */
1035 *(p
++)=(s
->version
>>8);
1036 /* Some servers hang if iniatial client hello is larger than 256
1037 * bytes and record version number > TLS 1.0
1039 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B
1041 && TLS1_get_version(s
) > TLS1_VERSION
)
1044 *(p
++)=s
->version
&0xff;
1046 /* field where we are to write out packet length */
1049 /* Explicit IV length, block ciphers appropriate version flag */
1050 if (s
->enc_write_ctx
&& SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s
))
1052 int mode
= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s
->enc_write_ctx
);
1053 if (mode
== EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE
)
1055 eivlen
= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(s
->enc_write_ctx
);
1059 /* Need explicit part of IV for GCM mode */
1060 else if (mode
== EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE
)
1061 eivlen
= EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN
;
1068 /* lets setup the record stuff. */
1069 wr
->data
=p
+ eivlen
;
1070 wr
->length
=(int)len
;
1071 wr
->input
=(unsigned char *)buf
;
1073 /* we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into
1076 /* first we compress */
1077 if (s
->compress
!= NULL
)
1079 if (!ssl3_do_compress(s
))
1081 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
,SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE
);
1087 memcpy(wr
->data
,wr
->input
,wr
->length
);
1091 /* we should still have the output to wr->data and the input
1092 * from wr->input. Length should be wr->length.
1093 * wr->data still points in the wb->buf */
1095 if (!SSL_USE_ETM(s
) && mac_size
!= 0)
1097 if (s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->mac(s
,&(p
[wr
->length
+ eivlen
]),1) < 0)
1099 wr
->length
+=mac_size
;
1107 /* if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, eivlen) <= 0)
1109 wr
->length
+= eivlen
;
1112 /* ssl3_enc can only have an error on read */
1113 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->enc(s
,1);
1115 if (SSL_USE_ETM(s
) && mac_size
!= 0)
1117 if (s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->mac(s
,p
+ wr
->length
,1) < 0)
1119 wr
->length
+=mac_size
;
1122 /* record length after mac and block padding */
1123 s2n(wr
->length
,plen
);
1125 if (s
->msg_callback
)
1126 s
->msg_callback(1, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER
, plen
- 5, 5, s
, s
->msg_callback_arg
);
1128 /* we should now have
1129 * wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is
1130 * wr->length long */
1131 wr
->type
=type
; /* not needed but helps for debugging */
1132 wr
->length
+=SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
;
1134 if (create_empty_fragment
)
1136 /* we are in a recursive call;
1137 * just return the length, don't write out anything here
1142 /* now let's set up wb */
1143 wb
->left
= prefix_len
+ wr
->length
;
1145 /* memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write retries later */
1146 s
->s3
->wpend_tot
=len
;
1147 s
->s3
->wpend_buf
=buf
;
1148 s
->s3
->wpend_type
=type
;
1149 s
->s3
->wpend_ret
=len
;
1151 /* we now just need to write the buffer */
1152 return ssl3_write_pending(s
,type
,buf
,len
);
1157 /* if s->s3->wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this */
1158 int ssl3_write_pending(SSL
*s
, int type
, const unsigned char *buf
,
1162 SSL3_BUFFER
*wb
=&(s
->s3
->wbuf
);
1165 if ((s
->s3
->wpend_tot
> (int)len
)
1166 || ((s
->s3
->wpend_buf
!= buf
) &&
1167 !(s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER
))
1168 || (s
->s3
->wpend_type
!= type
))
1170 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING
,SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY
);
1177 if (s
->wbio
!= NULL
)
1179 s
->rwstate
=SSL_WRITING
;
1180 i
=BIO_write(s
->wbio
,
1181 (char *)&(wb
->buf
[wb
->offset
]),
1182 (unsigned int)wb
->left
);
1186 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING
,SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET
);
1193 s
->rwstate
=SSL_NOTHING
;
1194 return(s
->s3
->wpend_ret
);
1197 if (s
->version
== DTLS1_VERSION
||
1198 s
->version
== DTLS1_BAD_VER
) {
1199 /* For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the whole
1200 point in using a datagram service */
1210 /* Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
1211 * 'type' is one of the following:
1213 * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
1214 * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
1215 * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
1217 * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
1218 * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
1220 * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
1221 * Alert records (e.g. close_notify), ChangeCipherSpec records (not really
1222 * a surprise, but handled as if it were), or renegotiation requests.
1223 * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
1224 * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
1225 * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
1226 * Change cipher spec protocol
1227 * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
1229 * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
1230 * Handshake protocol
1231 * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
1232 * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
1233 * here, anything else is handled by higher layers
1234 * Application data protocol
1235 * none of our business
1237 int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL
*s
, int type
, unsigned char *buf
, int len
, int peek
)
1242 void (*cb
)(const SSL
*ssl
,int type2
,int val
)=NULL
;
1244 if (s
->s3
->rbuf
.buf
== NULL
) /* Not initialized yet */
1245 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s
))
1248 if ((type
&& (type
!= SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
) && (type
!= SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
) && type
) ||
1249 (peek
&& (type
!= SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
)))
1251 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1255 if ((type
== SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
) && (s
->s3
->handshake_fragment_len
> 0))
1256 /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
1258 unsigned char *src
= s
->s3
->handshake_fragment
;
1259 unsigned char *dst
= buf
;
1264 while ((len
> 0) && (s
->s3
->handshake_fragment_len
> 0))
1267 len
--; s
->s3
->handshake_fragment_len
--;
1270 /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
1271 for (k
= 0; k
< s
->s3
->handshake_fragment_len
; k
++)
1272 s
->s3
->handshake_fragment
[k
] = *src
++;
1276 /* Now s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE. */
1278 if (!s
->in_handshake
&& SSL_in_init(s
))
1280 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
1281 i
=s
->handshake_func(s
);
1282 if (i
< 0) return(i
);
1285 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
1290 s
->rwstate
=SSL_NOTHING
;
1292 /* s->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
1293 * s->s3->rrec.data, - data
1294 * s->s3->rrec.off, - offset into 'data' for next read
1295 * s->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes. */
1296 rr
= &(s
->s3
->rrec
);
1298 /* get new packet if necessary */
1299 if ((rr
->length
== 0) || (s
->rstate
== SSL_ST_READ_BODY
))
1301 ret
=ssl3_get_record(s
);
1302 if (ret
<= 0) return(ret
);
1305 /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
1307 if (s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
/* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
1308 * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
1309 && (rr
->type
!= SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
))
1311 al
=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1312 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
,SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED
);
1316 /* If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away
1317 * (even in 'peek' mode) */
1318 if (s
->shutdown
& SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN
)
1321 s
->rwstate
=SSL_NOTHING
;
1326 if (type
== rr
->type
) /* SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE */
1328 /* make sure that we are not getting application data when we
1329 * are doing a handshake for the first time */
1330 if (SSL_in_init(s
) && (type
== SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
) &&
1331 (s
->enc_read_ctx
== NULL
))
1333 al
=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1334 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
,SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE
);
1338 if (len
<= 0) return(len
);
1340 if ((unsigned int)len
> rr
->length
)
1343 n
= (unsigned int)len
;
1345 memcpy(buf
,&(rr
->data
[rr
->off
]),n
);
1350 if (rr
->length
== 0)
1352 s
->rstate
=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER
;
1354 if (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS
&& s
->s3
->rbuf
.left
== 0)
1355 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s
);
1362 /* If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake
1363 * message, then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello). */
1365 /* In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage,
1366 * fill that so that we can process the data at a fixed place.
1369 unsigned int dest_maxlen
= 0;
1370 unsigned char *dest
= NULL
;
1371 unsigned int *dest_len
= NULL
;
1373 if (rr
->type
== SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
)
1375 dest_maxlen
= sizeof s
->s3
->handshake_fragment
;
1376 dest
= s
->s3
->handshake_fragment
;
1377 dest_len
= &s
->s3
->handshake_fragment_len
;
1379 else if (rr
->type
== SSL3_RT_ALERT
)
1381 dest_maxlen
= sizeof s
->s3
->alert_fragment
;
1382 dest
= s
->s3
->alert_fragment
;
1383 dest_len
= &s
->s3
->alert_fragment_len
;
1385 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1386 else if (rr
->type
== TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT
)
1388 tls1_process_heartbeat(s
);
1390 /* Exit and notify application to read again */
1392 s
->rwstate
=SSL_READING
;
1393 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s
));
1394 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s
));
1399 if (dest_maxlen
> 0)
1401 n
= dest_maxlen
- *dest_len
; /* available space in 'dest' */
1403 n
= rr
->length
; /* available bytes */
1405 /* now move 'n' bytes: */
1408 dest
[(*dest_len
)++] = rr
->data
[rr
->off
++];
1412 if (*dest_len
< dest_maxlen
)
1413 goto start
; /* fragment was too small */
1417 /* s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
1418 * s->s3->alert_fragment_len == 2 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT.
1419 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.) */
1421 /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */
1423 (s
->s3
->handshake_fragment_len
>= 4) &&
1424 (s
->s3
->handshake_fragment
[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST
) &&
1425 (s
->session
!= NULL
) && (s
->session
->cipher
!= NULL
))
1427 s
->s3
->handshake_fragment_len
= 0;
1429 if ((s
->s3
->handshake_fragment
[1] != 0) ||
1430 (s
->s3
->handshake_fragment
[2] != 0) ||
1431 (s
->s3
->handshake_fragment
[3] != 0))
1433 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1434 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
,SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST
);
1438 if (s
->msg_callback
)
1439 s
->msg_callback(0, s
->version
, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
, s
->s3
->handshake_fragment
, 4, s
, s
->msg_callback_arg
);
1441 if (SSL_is_init_finished(s
) &&
1442 !(s
->s3
->flags
& SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS
) &&
1443 !s
->s3
->renegotiate
)
1445 ssl3_renegotiate(s
);
1446 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s
))
1448 i
=s
->handshake_func(s
);
1449 if (i
< 0) return(i
);
1452 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
1456 if (!(s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY
))
1458 if (s
->s3
->rbuf
.left
== 0) /* no read-ahead left? */
1461 /* In the case where we try to read application data,
1462 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
1463 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
1464 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
1465 s
->rwstate
=SSL_READING
;
1466 bio
=SSL_get_rbio(s
);
1467 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio
);
1468 BIO_set_retry_read(bio
);
1474 /* we either finished a handshake or ignored the request,
1475 * now try again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for */
1478 /* If we are a server and get a client hello when renegotiation isn't
1479 * allowed send back a no renegotiation alert and carry on.
1480 * WARNING: experimental code, needs reviewing (steve)
1483 SSL_is_init_finished(s
) &&
1484 !s
->s3
->send_connection_binding
&&
1485 (s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
) &&
1486 (s
->s3
->handshake_fragment_len
>= 4) &&
1487 (s
->s3
->handshake_fragment
[0] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO
) &&
1488 (s
->session
!= NULL
) && (s
->session
->cipher
!= NULL
) &&
1489 !(s
->ctx
->options
& SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION
))
1492 /*s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0;*/
1494 ssl3_send_alert(s
,SSL3_AL_WARNING
, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION
);
1497 if (s
->s3
->alert_fragment_len
>= 2)
1499 int alert_level
= s
->s3
->alert_fragment
[0];
1500 int alert_descr
= s
->s3
->alert_fragment
[1];
1502 s
->s3
->alert_fragment_len
= 0;
1504 if (s
->msg_callback
)
1505 s
->msg_callback(0, s
->version
, SSL3_RT_ALERT
, s
->s3
->alert_fragment
, 2, s
, s
->msg_callback_arg
);
1507 if (s
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
1508 cb
=s
->info_callback
;
1509 else if (s
->ctx
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
1510 cb
=s
->ctx
->info_callback
;
1514 j
= (alert_level
<< 8) | alert_descr
;
1515 cb(s
, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT
, j
);
1518 if (alert_level
== 1) /* warning */
1520 s
->s3
->warn_alert
= alert_descr
;
1521 if (alert_descr
== SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY
)
1523 s
->shutdown
|= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN
;
1526 /* This is a warning but we receive it if we requested
1527 * renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with
1528 * a fatal alert because if application tried to
1529 * renegotiatie it presumably had a good reason and
1530 * expects it to succeed.
1532 * In future we might have a renegotiation where we
1533 * don't care if the peer refused it where we carry on.
1535 else if (alert_descr
== SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION
)
1537 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1538 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
,SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION
);
1541 #ifdef SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME
1542 else if (alert_descr
== SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME
)
1546 else if (alert_level
== 2) /* fatal */
1550 s
->rwstate
=SSL_NOTHING
;
1551 s
->s3
->fatal_alert
= alert_descr
;
1552 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET
+ alert_descr
);
1553 BIO_snprintf(tmp
,sizeof tmp
,"%d",alert_descr
);
1554 ERR_add_error_data(2,"SSL alert number ",tmp
);
1555 s
->shutdown
|=SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN
;
1556 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s
->ctx
,s
->session
);
1561 al
=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1562 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE
);
1569 if (s
->shutdown
& SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN
) /* but we have not received a shutdown */
1571 s
->rwstate
=SSL_NOTHING
;
1576 if (rr
->type
== SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
)
1578 /* 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, so we know
1579 * exactly what the record payload has to look like */
1580 if ( (rr
->length
!= 1) || (rr
->off
!= 0) ||
1581 (rr
->data
[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS
))
1583 al
=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1584 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
,SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
);
1588 /* Check we have a cipher to change to */
1589 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
== NULL
)
1591 al
=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1592 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY
);
1596 if (!(s
->s3
->flags
& SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK
))
1598 al
=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1599 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY
);
1603 s
->s3
->flags
&= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK
;
1607 if (s
->msg_callback
)
1608 s
->msg_callback(0, s
->version
, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
, rr
->data
, 1, s
, s
->msg_callback_arg
);
1610 s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
=1;
1611 if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s
))
1617 /* Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation) */
1618 if ((s
->s3
->handshake_fragment_len
>= 4) && !s
->in_handshake
)
1620 if (((s
->state
&SSL_ST_MASK
) == SSL_ST_OK
) &&
1621 !(s
->s3
->flags
& SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS
))
1623 #if 0 /* worked only because C operator preferences are not as expected (and
1624 * because this is not really needed for clients except for detecting
1625 * protocol violations): */
1626 s
->state
=SSL_ST_BEFORE
|(s
->server
)
1630 s
->state
= s
->server
? SSL_ST_ACCEPT
: SSL_ST_CONNECT
;
1635 i
=s
->handshake_func(s
);
1636 if (i
< 0) return(i
);
1639 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
1643 if (!(s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY
))
1645 if (s
->s3
->rbuf
.left
== 0) /* no read-ahead left? */
1648 /* In the case where we try to read application data,
1649 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
1650 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
1651 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
1652 s
->rwstate
=SSL_READING
;
1653 bio
=SSL_get_rbio(s
);
1654 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio
);
1655 BIO_set_retry_read(bio
);
1665 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS
1666 /* TLS up to v1.1 just ignores unknown message types:
1667 * TLS v1.2 give an unexpected message alert.
1669 if (s
->version
>= TLS1_VERSION
&& s
->version
<= TLS1_1_VERSION
)
1675 al
=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1676 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD
);
1678 case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
:
1680 case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
:
1681 /* we already handled all of these, with the possible exception
1682 * of SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when s->in_handshake is set, but that
1683 * should not happen when type != rr->type */
1684 al
=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1685 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1687 case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
:
1688 /* At this point, we were expecting handshake data,
1689 * but have application data. If the library was
1690 * running inside ssl3_read() (i.e. in_read_app_data
1691 * is set) and it makes sense to read application data
1692 * at this point (session renegotiation not yet started),
1693 * we will indulge it.
1695 if (s
->s3
->in_read_app_data
&&
1696 (s
->s3
->total_renegotiations
!= 0) &&
1698 (s
->state
& SSL_ST_CONNECT
) &&
1699 (s
->state
>= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A
) &&
1700 (s
->state
<= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A
)
1702 (s
->state
& SSL_ST_ACCEPT
) &&
1703 (s
->state
<= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A
) &&
1704 (s
->state
>= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A
)
1708 s
->s3
->in_read_app_data
=2;
1713 al
=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1714 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD
);
1721 ssl3_send_alert(s
,SSL3_AL_FATAL
,al
);
1726 int ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL
*s
)
1732 if (s
->state
& SSL_ST_ACCEPT
)
1733 i
=SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ
;
1735 i
=SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ
;
1737 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.key_block
== NULL
)
1739 if (s
->session
== NULL
|| s
->session
->master_key_length
== 0)
1741 /* might happen if dtls1_read_bytes() calls this */
1742 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY
);
1746 s
->session
->cipher
=s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
;
1747 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->setup_key_block(s
)) return(0);
1750 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,i
))
1753 /* we have to record the message digest at
1754 * this point so we can get it before we read
1755 * the finished message */
1756 if (s
->state
& SSL_ST_CONNECT
)
1758 sender
=s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->server_finished_label
;
1759 slen
=s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->server_finished_label_len
;
1763 sender
=s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->client_finished_label
;
1764 slen
=s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->client_finished_label_len
;
1767 i
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->final_finish_mac(s
,
1768 sender
,slen
,s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_finish_md
);
1771 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1774 s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_finish_md_len
= i
;
1779 int ssl3_send_alert(SSL
*s
, int level
, int desc
)
1781 /* Map tls/ssl alert value to correct one */
1782 desc
=s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->alert_value(desc
);
1783 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
&& desc
== SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
)
1784 desc
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
; /* SSL 3.0 does not have protocol_version alerts */
1785 if (desc
< 0) return -1;
1786 /* If a fatal one, remove from cache */
1787 if ((level
== 2) && (s
->session
!= NULL
))
1788 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s
->ctx
,s
->session
);
1790 s
->s3
->alert_dispatch
=1;
1791 s
->s3
->send_alert
[0]=level
;
1792 s
->s3
->send_alert
[1]=desc
;
1793 if (s
->s3
->wbuf
.left
== 0) /* data still being written out? */
1794 return s
->method
->ssl_dispatch_alert(s
);
1795 /* else data is still being written out, we will get written
1796 * some time in the future */
1800 int ssl3_dispatch_alert(SSL
*s
)
1803 void (*cb
)(const SSL
*ssl
,int type
,int val
)=NULL
;
1805 s
->s3
->alert_dispatch
=0;
1806 i
= do_ssl3_write(s
, SSL3_RT_ALERT
, &s
->s3
->send_alert
[0], 2, 0);
1809 s
->s3
->alert_dispatch
=1;
1813 /* Alert sent to BIO. If it is important, flush it now.
1814 * If the message does not get sent due to non-blocking IO,
1815 * we will not worry too much. */
1816 if (s
->s3
->send_alert
[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL
)
1817 (void)BIO_flush(s
->wbio
);
1819 if (s
->msg_callback
)
1820 s
->msg_callback(1, s
->version
, SSL3_RT_ALERT
, s
->s3
->send_alert
, 2, s
, s
->msg_callback_arg
);
1822 if (s
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
1823 cb
=s
->info_callback
;
1824 else if (s
->ctx
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
1825 cb
=s
->ctx
->info_callback
;
1829 j
=(s
->s3
->send_alert
[0]<<8)|s
->s3
->send_alert
[1];
1830 cb(s
,SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT
,j
);