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Only use explicit IV if cipher is in CBC mode.
[thirdparty/openssl.git] / ssl / s3_pkt.c
1 /* ssl/s3_pkt.c */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
3 * All rights reserved.
4 *
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8 *
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15 *
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22 *
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25 * are met:
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40 *
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
51 * SUCH DAMAGE.
52 *
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
57 */
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
60 *
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
63 * are met:
64 *
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
67 *
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
71 * distribution.
72 *
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
77 *
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
82 *
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
86 *
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
88 * acknowledgment:
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
91 *
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
105 *
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
109 *
110 */
111
112 #include <stdio.h>
113 #include <errno.h>
114 #define USE_SOCKETS
115 #include "ssl_locl.h"
116 #include <openssl/evp.h>
117 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
118 #include <openssl/rand.h>
119
120 static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
121 unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment);
122 static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s);
123
124 int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, int n, int max, int extend)
125 {
126 /* If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase
127 * packet by another n bytes.
128 * The packet will be in the sub-array of s->s3->rbuf.buf specified
129 * by s->packet and s->packet_length.
130 * (If s->read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may be stored in rbuf
131 * [plus s->packet_length bytes if extend == 1].)
132 */
133 int i,len,left;
134 long align=0;
135 unsigned char *pkt;
136 SSL3_BUFFER *rb;
137
138 if (n <= 0) return n;
139
140 rb = &(s->s3->rbuf);
141 if (rb->buf == NULL)
142 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
143 return -1;
144
145 left = rb->left;
146 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
147 align = (long)rb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
148 align = (-align)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1);
149 #endif
150
151 if (!extend)
152 {
153 /* start with empty packet ... */
154 if (left == 0)
155 rb->offset = align;
156 else if (align != 0 && left >= SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
157 {
158 /* check if next packet length is large
159 * enough to justify payload alignment... */
160 pkt = rb->buf + rb->offset;
161 if (pkt[0] == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
162 && (pkt[3]<<8|pkt[4]) >= 128)
163 {
164 /* Note that even if packet is corrupted
165 * and its length field is insane, we can
166 * only be led to wrong decision about
167 * whether memmove will occur or not.
168 * Header values has no effect on memmove
169 * arguments and therefore no buffer
170 * overrun can be triggered. */
171 memmove (rb->buf+align,pkt,left);
172 rb->offset = align;
173 }
174 }
175 s->packet = rb->buf + rb->offset;
176 s->packet_length = 0;
177 /* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */
178 }
179
180 /* For DTLS/UDP reads should not span multiple packets
181 * because the read operation returns the whole packet
182 * at once (as long as it fits into the buffer). */
183 if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION || SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
184 {
185 if (left > 0 && n > left)
186 n = left;
187 }
188
189 /* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */
190 if (left >= n)
191 {
192 s->packet_length+=n;
193 rb->left=left-n;
194 rb->offset+=n;
195 return(n);
196 }
197
198 /* else we need to read more data */
199
200 len = s->packet_length;
201 pkt = rb->buf+align;
202 /* Move any available bytes to front of buffer:
203 * 'len' bytes already pointed to by 'packet',
204 * 'left' extra ones at the end */
205 if (s->packet != pkt) /* len > 0 */
206 {
207 memmove(pkt, s->packet, len+left);
208 s->packet = pkt;
209 rb->offset = len + align;
210 }
211
212 if (n > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset)) /* does not happen */
213 {
214 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
215 return -1;
216 }
217
218 if (!s->read_ahead)
219 /* ignore max parameter */
220 max = n;
221 else
222 {
223 if (max < n)
224 max = n;
225 if (max > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset))
226 max = rb->len - rb->offset;
227 }
228
229 while (left < n)
230 {
231 /* Now we have len+left bytes at the front of s->s3->rbuf.buf
232 * and need to read in more until we have len+n (up to
233 * len+max if possible) */
234
235 clear_sys_error();
236 if (s->rbio != NULL)
237 {
238 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
239 i=BIO_read(s->rbio,pkt+len+left, max-left);
240 }
241 else
242 {
243 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N,SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET);
244 i = -1;
245 }
246
247 if (i <= 0)
248 {
249 rb->left = left;
250 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS)
251 if (len+left == 0)
252 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
253 return(i);
254 }
255 left+=i;
256 /* reads should *never* span multiple packets for DTLS because
257 * the underlying transport protocol is message oriented as opposed
258 * to byte oriented as in the TLS case. */
259 if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION || SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
260 {
261 if (n > left)
262 n = left; /* makes the while condition false */
263 }
264 }
265
266 /* done reading, now the book-keeping */
267 rb->offset += n;
268 rb->left = left - n;
269 s->packet_length += n;
270 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
271 return(n);
272 }
273
274 /* Call this to get a new input record.
275 * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error
276 * or non-blocking IO.
277 * When it finishes, one packet has been decoded and can be found in
278 * ssl->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
279 * ssl->s3->rrec.data, - data
280 * ssl->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes
281 */
282 /* used only by ssl3_read_bytes */
283 static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s)
284 {
285 int ssl_major,ssl_minor,al;
286 int enc_err,n,i,ret= -1;
287 SSL3_RECORD *rr;
288 SSL_SESSION *sess;
289 unsigned char *p;
290 unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
291 short version;
292 int mac_size;
293 int clear=0;
294 size_t extra;
295 int decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 0;
296 unsigned char *mac = NULL;
297
298 rr= &(s->s3->rrec);
299 sess=s->session;
300
301 if (s->options & SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER)
302 extra=SSL3_RT_MAX_EXTRA;
303 else
304 extra=0;
305 if (extra && !s->s3->init_extra)
306 {
307 /* An application error: SLS_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER
308 * set after ssl3_setup_buffers() was done */
309 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
310 return -1;
311 }
312
313 again:
314 /* check if we have the header */
315 if ( (s->rstate != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) ||
316 (s->packet_length < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH))
317 {
318 n=ssl3_read_n(s, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s->s3->rbuf.len, 0);
319 if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking */
320 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_BODY;
321
322 p=s->packet;
323
324 /* Pull apart the header into the SSL3_RECORD */
325 rr->type= *(p++);
326 ssl_major= *(p++);
327 ssl_minor= *(p++);
328 version=(ssl_major<<8)|ssl_minor;
329 n2s(p,rr->length);
330 #if 0
331 fprintf(stderr, "Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr->type, rr->length);
332 #endif
333
334 /* Lets check version */
335 if (!s->first_packet)
336 {
337 if (version != s->version)
338 {
339 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
340 if ((s->version & 0xFF00) == (version & 0xFF00))
341 /* Send back error using their minor version number :-) */
342 s->version = (unsigned short)version;
343 al=SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
344 goto f_err;
345 }
346 }
347
348 if ((version>>8) != SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
349 {
350 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
351 goto err;
352 }
353
354 if (rr->length > s->s3->rbuf.len - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
355 {
356 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
357 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
358 goto f_err;
359 }
360
361 /* now s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */
362 }
363
364 /* s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */
365
366 if (rr->length > s->packet_length-SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
367 {
368 /* now s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */
369 i=rr->length;
370 n=ssl3_read_n(s,i,i,1);
371 if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking io */
372 /* now n == rr->length,
373 * and s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length */
374 }
375
376 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; /* set state for later operations */
377
378 /* At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length,
379 * and we have that many bytes in s->packet
380 */
381 rr->input= &(s->packet[SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]);
382
383 /* ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr'
384 * rr->input points at rr->length bytes, which
385 * need to be copied into rr->data by either
386 * the decryption or by the decompression
387 * When the data is 'copied' into the rr->data buffer,
388 * rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer */
389
390 /* We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ]
391 * rr->length bytes of encrypted compressed stuff. */
392
393 /* check is not needed I believe */
394 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH+extra)
395 {
396 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
397 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
398 goto f_err;
399 }
400
401 /* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */
402 rr->data=rr->input;
403
404 enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,0);
405 if (enc_err <= 0)
406 {
407 if (enc_err == 0)
408 /* SSLerr() and ssl3_send_alert() have been called */
409 goto err;
410
411 /* Otherwise enc_err == -1, which indicates bad padding
412 * (rec->length has not been changed in this case).
413 * To minimize information leaked via timing, we will perform
414 * the MAC computation anyway. */
415 decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
416 }
417
418 #ifdef TLS_DEBUG
419 printf("dec %d\n",rr->length);
420 { unsigned int z; for (z=0; z<rr->length; z++) printf("%02X%c",rr->data[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
421 printf("\n");
422 #endif
423
424 /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */
425 if ( (sess == NULL) ||
426 (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL) ||
427 (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) == NULL))
428 clear=1;
429
430 if (!clear)
431 {
432 /* !clear => s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */
433 mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
434 OPENSSL_assert(mac_size >= 0);
435
436 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+extra+mac_size)
437 {
438 #if 0 /* OK only for stream ciphers (then rr->length is visible from ciphertext anyway) */
439 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
440 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_PRE_MAC_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
441 goto f_err;
442 #else
443 decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
444 #endif
445 }
446 /* check the MAC for rr->input (it's in mac_size bytes at the tail) */
447 if (rr->length >= (unsigned int)mac_size)
448 {
449 rr->length -= mac_size;
450 mac = &rr->data[rr->length];
451 }
452 else
453 {
454 /* record (minus padding) is too short to contain a MAC */
455 #if 0 /* OK only for stream ciphers */
456 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
457 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
458 goto f_err;
459 #else
460 decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
461 rr->length = 0;
462 #endif
463 }
464 i=s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,md,0);
465 if (i < 0 || mac == NULL || memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0)
466 {
467 decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
468 }
469 }
470
471 if (decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac)
472 {
473 /* A separate 'decryption_failed' alert was introduced with TLS 1.0,
474 * SSL 3.0 only has 'bad_record_mac'. But unless a decryption
475 * failure is directly visible from the ciphertext anyway,
476 * we should not reveal which kind of error occured -- this
477 * might become visible to an attacker (e.g. via a logfile) */
478 al=SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC;
479 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
480 goto f_err;
481 }
482
483 /* r->length is now just compressed */
484 if (s->expand != NULL)
485 {
486 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+extra)
487 {
488 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
489 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
490 goto f_err;
491 }
492 if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s))
493 {
494 al=SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE;
495 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION);
496 goto f_err;
497 }
498 }
499
500 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH+extra)
501 {
502 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
503 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
504 goto f_err;
505 }
506
507 rr->off=0;
508 /* So at this point the following is true
509 * ssl->s3->rrec.type is the type of record
510 * ssl->s3->rrec.length == number of bytes in record
511 * ssl->s3->rrec.off == offset to first valid byte
512 * ssl->s3->rrec.data == where to take bytes from, increment
513 * after use :-).
514 */
515
516 /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */
517 s->packet_length=0;
518
519 /* just read a 0 length packet */
520 if (rr->length == 0) goto again;
521
522 #if 0
523 fprintf(stderr, "Ultimate Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr->type, rr->length);
524 #endif
525
526 return(1);
527
528 f_err:
529 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
530 err:
531 return(ret);
532 }
533
534 int ssl3_do_uncompress(SSL *ssl)
535 {
536 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
537 int i;
538 SSL3_RECORD *rr;
539
540 rr= &(ssl->s3->rrec);
541 i=COMP_expand_block(ssl->expand,rr->comp,
542 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,rr->data,(int)rr->length);
543 if (i < 0)
544 return(0);
545 else
546 rr->length=i;
547 rr->data=rr->comp;
548 #endif
549 return(1);
550 }
551
552 int ssl3_do_compress(SSL *ssl)
553 {
554 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
555 int i;
556 SSL3_RECORD *wr;
557
558 wr= &(ssl->s3->wrec);
559 i=COMP_compress_block(ssl->compress,wr->data,
560 SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH,
561 wr->input,(int)wr->length);
562 if (i < 0)
563 return(0);
564 else
565 wr->length=i;
566
567 wr->input=wr->data;
568 #endif
569 return(1);
570 }
571
572 /* Call this to write data in records of type 'type'
573 * It will return <= 0 if not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
574 */
575 int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len)
576 {
577 const unsigned char *buf=buf_;
578 unsigned int tot,n,nw;
579 int i;
580
581 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
582 tot=s->s3->wnum;
583 s->s3->wnum=0;
584
585 if (SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake)
586 {
587 i=s->handshake_func(s);
588 if (i < 0) return(i);
589 if (i == 0)
590 {
591 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
592 return -1;
593 }
594 }
595
596 n=(len-tot);
597 for (;;)
598 {
599 if (n > s->max_send_fragment)
600 nw=s->max_send_fragment;
601 else
602 nw=n;
603
604 i=do_ssl3_write(s, type, &(buf[tot]), nw, 0);
605 if (i <= 0)
606 {
607 s->s3->wnum=tot;
608 return i;
609 }
610
611 if ((i == (int)n) ||
612 (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
613 (s->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE)))
614 {
615 /* next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment
616 * in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness: */
617 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 0;
618
619 return tot+i;
620 }
621
622 n-=i;
623 tot+=i;
624 }
625 }
626
627 static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
628 unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment)
629 {
630 unsigned char *p,*plen;
631 int i,mac_size,clear=0;
632 int prefix_len=0;
633 int eivlen;
634 long align=0;
635 SSL3_RECORD *wr;
636 SSL3_BUFFER *wb=&(s->s3->wbuf);
637 SSL_SESSION *sess;
638
639 if (wb->buf == NULL)
640 if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s))
641 return -1;
642
643 /* first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written
644 * out. This will happen with non blocking IO */
645 if (wb->left != 0)
646 return(ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len));
647
648 /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
649 if (s->s3->alert_dispatch)
650 {
651 i=s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
652 if (i <= 0)
653 return(i);
654 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
655 }
656
657 if (len == 0 && !create_empty_fragment)
658 return 0;
659
660 wr= &(s->s3->wrec);
661 sess=s->session;
662
663 if ( (sess == NULL) ||
664 (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) ||
665 (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash) == NULL))
666 clear=1;
667
668 if (clear)
669 mac_size=0;
670 else
671 {
672 mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
673 if (mac_size < 0)
674 goto err;
675 }
676
677 /* 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself */
678 if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done)
679 {
680 /* countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites
681 * (see http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) */
682
683 if (s->s3->need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
684 {
685 /* recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set;
686 * this prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment
687 * (these 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later
688 * together with the actual payload) */
689 prefix_len = do_ssl3_write(s, type, buf, 0, 1);
690 if (prefix_len <= 0)
691 goto err;
692
693 if (prefix_len >
694 (SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD))
695 {
696 /* insufficient space */
697 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
698 goto err;
699 }
700 }
701
702 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1;
703 }
704
705 if (create_empty_fragment)
706 {
707 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
708 /* extra fragment would be couple of cipher blocks,
709 * which would be multiple of SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD, so
710 * if we want to align the real payload, then we can
711 * just pretent we simply have two headers. */
712 align = (long)wb->buf + 2*SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
713 align = (-align)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1);
714 #endif
715 p = wb->buf + align;
716 wb->offset = align;
717 }
718 else if (prefix_len)
719 {
720 p = wb->buf + wb->offset + prefix_len;
721 }
722 else
723 {
724 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
725 align = (long)wb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
726 align = (-align)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1);
727 #endif
728 p = wb->buf + align;
729 wb->offset = align;
730 }
731
732 /* write the header */
733
734 *(p++)=type&0xff;
735 wr->type=type;
736
737 *(p++)=(s->version>>8);
738 *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
739
740 /* field where we are to write out packet length */
741 plen=p;
742 p+=2;
743 /* Explicit IV length, block ciphers and TLS version 1.1 or later */
744 if (s->enc_write_ctx && s->version >= TLS1_1_VERSION
745 && EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_write_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
746 {
747 eivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(s->enc_write_ctx);
748 if (eivlen <= 1)
749 eivlen = 0;
750 }
751 else
752 eivlen = 0;
753
754 /* lets setup the record stuff. */
755 wr->data=p + eivlen;
756 wr->length=(int)len;
757 wr->input=(unsigned char *)buf;
758
759 /* we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into
760 * wr->data */
761
762 /* first we compress */
763 if (s->compress != NULL)
764 {
765 if (!ssl3_do_compress(s))
766 {
767 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE);
768 goto err;
769 }
770 }
771 else
772 {
773 memcpy(wr->data,wr->input,wr->length);
774 wr->input=wr->data;
775 }
776
777 /* we should still have the output to wr->data and the input
778 * from wr->input. Length should be wr->length.
779 * wr->data still points in the wb->buf */
780
781 if (mac_size != 0)
782 {
783 if (s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,&(p[wr->length + eivlen]),1) < 0)
784 goto err;
785 wr->length+=mac_size;
786 }
787
788 wr->input=p;
789 wr->data=p;
790
791 if (eivlen)
792 {
793 /* if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, eivlen) <= 0)
794 goto err; */
795 wr->length += eivlen;
796 }
797
798 /* ssl3_enc can only have an error on read */
799 s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,1);
800
801 /* record length after mac and block padding */
802 s2n(wr->length,plen);
803
804 /* we should now have
805 * wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is
806 * wr->length long */
807 wr->type=type; /* not needed but helps for debugging */
808 wr->length+=SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
809
810 if (create_empty_fragment)
811 {
812 /* we are in a recursive call;
813 * just return the length, don't write out anything here
814 */
815 return wr->length;
816 }
817
818 /* now let's set up wb */
819 wb->left = prefix_len + wr->length;
820
821 /* memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write retries later */
822 s->s3->wpend_tot=len;
823 s->s3->wpend_buf=buf;
824 s->s3->wpend_type=type;
825 s->s3->wpend_ret=len;
826
827 /* we now just need to write the buffer */
828 return ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len);
829 err:
830 return -1;
831 }
832
833 /* if s->s3->wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this */
834 int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
835 unsigned int len)
836 {
837 int i;
838 SSL3_BUFFER *wb=&(s->s3->wbuf);
839
840 /* XXXX */
841 if ((s->s3->wpend_tot > (int)len)
842 || ((s->s3->wpend_buf != buf) &&
843 !(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER))
844 || (s->s3->wpend_type != type))
845 {
846 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING,SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY);
847 return(-1);
848 }
849
850 for (;;)
851 {
852 clear_sys_error();
853 if (s->wbio != NULL)
854 {
855 s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
856 i=BIO_write(s->wbio,
857 (char *)&(wb->buf[wb->offset]),
858 (unsigned int)wb->left);
859 }
860 else
861 {
862 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING,SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET);
863 i= -1;
864 }
865 if (i == wb->left)
866 {
867 wb->left=0;
868 wb->offset+=i;
869 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS)
870 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
871 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
872 return(s->s3->wpend_ret);
873 }
874 else if (i <= 0) {
875 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION ||
876 s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
877 /* For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the whole
878 point in using a datagram service */
879 wb->left = 0;
880 }
881 return(i);
882 }
883 wb->offset+=i;
884 wb->left-=i;
885 }
886 }
887
888 /* Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
889 * 'type' is one of the following:
890 *
891 * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
892 * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
893 * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
894 *
895 * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
896 * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
897 *
898 * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
899 * Alert records (e.g. close_notify), ChangeCipherSpec records (not really
900 * a surprise, but handled as if it were), or renegotiation requests.
901 * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
902 * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
903 * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
904 * Change cipher spec protocol
905 * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
906 * Alert protocol
907 * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
908 * Handshake protocol
909 * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
910 * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
911 * here, anything else is handled by higher layers
912 * Application data protocol
913 * none of our business
914 */
915 int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek)
916 {
917 int al,i,j,ret;
918 unsigned int n;
919 SSL3_RECORD *rr;
920 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type2,int val)=NULL;
921
922 if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL) /* Not initialized yet */
923 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
924 return(-1);
925
926 if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) && (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && type) ||
927 (peek && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)))
928 {
929 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
930 return -1;
931 }
932
933 if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
934 /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
935 {
936 unsigned char *src = s->s3->handshake_fragment;
937 unsigned char *dst = buf;
938 unsigned int k;
939
940 /* peek == 0 */
941 n = 0;
942 while ((len > 0) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
943 {
944 *dst++ = *src++;
945 len--; s->s3->handshake_fragment_len--;
946 n++;
947 }
948 /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
949 for (k = 0; k < s->s3->handshake_fragment_len; k++)
950 s->s3->handshake_fragment[k] = *src++;
951 return n;
952 }
953
954 /* Now s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE. */
955
956 if (!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s))
957 {
958 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
959 i=s->handshake_func(s);
960 if (i < 0) return(i);
961 if (i == 0)
962 {
963 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
964 return(-1);
965 }
966 }
967 start:
968 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
969
970 /* s->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
971 * s->s3->rrec.data, - data
972 * s->s3->rrec.off, - offset into 'data' for next read
973 * s->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes. */
974 rr = &(s->s3->rrec);
975
976 /* get new packet if necessary */
977 if ((rr->length == 0) || (s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY))
978 {
979 ret=ssl3_get_record(s);
980 if (ret <= 0) return(ret);
981 }
982
983 /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
984
985 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
986 * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
987 && (rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE))
988 {
989 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
990 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED);
991 goto f_err;
992 }
993
994 /* If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away
995 * (even in 'peek' mode) */
996 if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN)
997 {
998 rr->length=0;
999 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1000 return(0);
1001 }
1002
1003
1004 if (type == rr->type) /* SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE */
1005 {
1006 /* make sure that we are not getting application data when we
1007 * are doing a handshake for the first time */
1008 if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
1009 (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL))
1010 {
1011 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1012 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE);
1013 goto f_err;
1014 }
1015
1016 if (len <= 0) return(len);
1017
1018 if ((unsigned int)len > rr->length)
1019 n = rr->length;
1020 else
1021 n = (unsigned int)len;
1022
1023 memcpy(buf,&(rr->data[rr->off]),n);
1024 if (!peek)
1025 {
1026 rr->length-=n;
1027 rr->off+=n;
1028 if (rr->length == 0)
1029 {
1030 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
1031 rr->off=0;
1032 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS)
1033 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
1034 }
1035 }
1036 return(n);
1037 }
1038
1039
1040 /* If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake
1041 * message, then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello). */
1042
1043 /* In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage,
1044 * fill that so that we can process the data at a fixed place.
1045 */
1046 {
1047 unsigned int dest_maxlen = 0;
1048 unsigned char *dest = NULL;
1049 unsigned int *dest_len = NULL;
1050
1051 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
1052 {
1053 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->handshake_fragment;
1054 dest = s->s3->handshake_fragment;
1055 dest_len = &s->s3->handshake_fragment_len;
1056 }
1057 else if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT)
1058 {
1059 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->alert_fragment;
1060 dest = s->s3->alert_fragment;
1061 dest_len = &s->s3->alert_fragment_len;
1062 }
1063
1064 if (dest_maxlen > 0)
1065 {
1066 n = dest_maxlen - *dest_len; /* available space in 'dest' */
1067 if (rr->length < n)
1068 n = rr->length; /* available bytes */
1069
1070 /* now move 'n' bytes: */
1071 while (n-- > 0)
1072 {
1073 dest[(*dest_len)++] = rr->data[rr->off++];
1074 rr->length--;
1075 }
1076
1077 if (*dest_len < dest_maxlen)
1078 goto start; /* fragment was too small */
1079 }
1080 }
1081
1082 /* s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
1083 * s->s3->alert_fragment_len == 2 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT.
1084 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.) */
1085
1086 /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */
1087 if ((!s->server) &&
1088 (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
1089 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) &&
1090 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL))
1091 {
1092 s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
1093
1094 if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment[1] != 0) ||
1095 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[2] != 0) ||
1096 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[3] != 0))
1097 {
1098 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1099 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST);
1100 goto f_err;
1101 }
1102
1103 if (s->msg_callback)
1104 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->s3->handshake_fragment, 4, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1105
1106 if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
1107 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) &&
1108 !s->s3->renegotiate)
1109 {
1110 ssl3_renegotiate(s);
1111 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s))
1112 {
1113 i=s->handshake_func(s);
1114 if (i < 0) return(i);
1115 if (i == 0)
1116 {
1117 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1118 return(-1);
1119 }
1120
1121 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY))
1122 {
1123 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */
1124 {
1125 BIO *bio;
1126 /* In the case where we try to read application data,
1127 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
1128 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
1129 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
1130 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
1131 bio=SSL_get_rbio(s);
1132 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1133 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1134 return(-1);
1135 }
1136 }
1137 }
1138 }
1139 /* we either finished a handshake or ignored the request,
1140 * now try again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for */
1141 goto start;
1142 }
1143 /* If we are a server and get a client hello when renegotiation isn't
1144 * allowed send back a no renegotiation alert and carry on.
1145 * WARNING: experimental code, needs reviewing (steve)
1146 */
1147 if (s->server &&
1148 SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
1149 !s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
1150 (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) &&
1151 (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
1152 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
1153 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL) &&
1154 !(s->ctx->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
1155
1156 {
1157 /*s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0;*/
1158 rr->length = 0;
1159 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1160 goto start;
1161 }
1162 if (s->s3->alert_fragment_len >= 2)
1163 {
1164 int alert_level = s->s3->alert_fragment[0];
1165 int alert_descr = s->s3->alert_fragment[1];
1166
1167 s->s3->alert_fragment_len = 0;
1168
1169 if (s->msg_callback)
1170 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->alert_fragment, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1171
1172 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1173 cb=s->info_callback;
1174 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1175 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
1176
1177 if (cb != NULL)
1178 {
1179 j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr;
1180 cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j);
1181 }
1182
1183 if (alert_level == 1) /* warning */
1184 {
1185 s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr;
1186 if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY)
1187 {
1188 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1189 return(0);
1190 }
1191 /* This is a warning but we receive it if we requested
1192 * renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with
1193 * a fatal alert because if application tried to
1194 * renegotiatie it presumably had a good reason and
1195 * expects it to succeed.
1196 *
1197 * In future we might have a renegotiation where we
1198 * don't care if the peer refused it where we carry on.
1199 */
1200 else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION)
1201 {
1202 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1203 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1204 goto f_err;
1205 }
1206 }
1207 else if (alert_level == 2) /* fatal */
1208 {
1209 char tmp[16];
1210
1211 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1212 s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr;
1213 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr);
1214 BIO_snprintf(tmp,sizeof tmp,"%d",alert_descr);
1215 ERR_add_error_data(2,"SSL alert number ",tmp);
1216 s->shutdown|=SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1217 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session);
1218 return(0);
1219 }
1220 else
1221 {
1222 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1223 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
1224 goto f_err;
1225 }
1226
1227 goto start;
1228 }
1229
1230 if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) /* but we have not received a shutdown */
1231 {
1232 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1233 rr->length=0;
1234 return(0);
1235 }
1236
1237 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
1238 {
1239 /* 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, so we know
1240 * exactly what the record payload has to look like */
1241 if ( (rr->length != 1) || (rr->off != 0) ||
1242 (rr->data[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS))
1243 {
1244 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1245 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
1246 goto f_err;
1247 }
1248
1249 /* Check we have a cipher to change to */
1250 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL)
1251 {
1252 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1253 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1254 goto f_err;
1255 }
1256
1257 rr->length=0;
1258
1259 if (s->msg_callback)
1260 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, rr->data, 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1261
1262 s->s3->change_cipher_spec=1;
1263 if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s))
1264 goto err;
1265 else
1266 goto start;
1267 }
1268
1269 /* Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation) */
1270 if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) && !s->in_handshake)
1271 {
1272 if (((s->state&SSL_ST_MASK) == SSL_ST_OK) &&
1273 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS))
1274 {
1275 #if 0 /* worked only because C operator preferences are not as expected (and
1276 * because this is not really needed for clients except for detecting
1277 * protocol violations): */
1278 s->state=SSL_ST_BEFORE|(s->server)
1279 ?SSL_ST_ACCEPT
1280 :SSL_ST_CONNECT;
1281 #else
1282 s->state = s->server ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT;
1283 #endif
1284 s->renegotiate=1;
1285 s->new_session=1;
1286 }
1287 i=s->handshake_func(s);
1288 if (i < 0) return(i);
1289 if (i == 0)
1290 {
1291 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1292 return(-1);
1293 }
1294
1295 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY))
1296 {
1297 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */
1298 {
1299 BIO *bio;
1300 /* In the case where we try to read application data,
1301 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
1302 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
1303 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
1304 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
1305 bio=SSL_get_rbio(s);
1306 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1307 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1308 return(-1);
1309 }
1310 }
1311 goto start;
1312 }
1313
1314 switch (rr->type)
1315 {
1316 default:
1317 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS
1318 /* TLS just ignores unknown message types */
1319 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->version <= TLS1_1_VERSION)
1320 {
1321 rr->length = 0;
1322 goto start;
1323 }
1324 #endif
1325 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1326 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1327 goto f_err;
1328 case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
1329 case SSL3_RT_ALERT:
1330 case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:
1331 /* we already handled all of these, with the possible exception
1332 * of SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when s->in_handshake is set, but that
1333 * should not happen when type != rr->type */
1334 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1335 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1336 goto f_err;
1337 case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
1338 /* At this point, we were expecting handshake data,
1339 * but have application data. If the library was
1340 * running inside ssl3_read() (i.e. in_read_app_data
1341 * is set) and it makes sense to read application data
1342 * at this point (session renegotiation not yet started),
1343 * we will indulge it.
1344 */
1345 if (s->s3->in_read_app_data &&
1346 (s->s3->total_renegotiations != 0) &&
1347 ((
1348 (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) &&
1349 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) &&
1350 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1351 ) || (
1352 (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) &&
1353 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) &&
1354 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
1355 )
1356 ))
1357 {
1358 s->s3->in_read_app_data=2;
1359 return(-1);
1360 }
1361 else
1362 {
1363 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1364 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1365 goto f_err;
1366 }
1367 }
1368 /* not reached */
1369
1370 f_err:
1371 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1372 err:
1373 return(-1);
1374 }
1375
1376 int ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s)
1377 {
1378 int i;
1379 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1380 const char *sender;
1381 int slen;
1382 #endif
1383
1384 if (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
1385 i=SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ;
1386 else
1387 i=SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ;
1388
1389 if (s->s3->tmp.key_block == NULL)
1390 {
1391 if (s->session == NULL)
1392 {
1393 /* might happen if dtls1_read_bytes() calls this */
1394 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1395 return (0);
1396 }
1397
1398 s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
1399 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) return(0);
1400 }
1401
1402 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,i))
1403 return(0);
1404
1405 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1406 /* we have to record the message digest at
1407 * this point so we can get it before we read
1408 * the finished message */
1409 if (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT)
1410 {
1411 sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label;
1412 slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len;
1413 }
1414 else
1415 {
1416 sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label;
1417 slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len;
1418 }
1419
1420 s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
1421 sender,slen,s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md);
1422 #endif
1423
1424 return(1);
1425 }
1426
1427 int ssl3_send_alert(SSL *s, int level, int desc)
1428 {
1429 /* Map tls/ssl alert value to correct one */
1430 desc=s->method->ssl3_enc->alert_value(desc);
1431 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && desc == SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION)
1432 desc = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; /* SSL 3.0 does not have protocol_version alerts */
1433 if (desc < 0) return -1;
1434 /* If a fatal one, remove from cache */
1435 if ((level == 2) && (s->session != NULL))
1436 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session);
1437
1438 s->s3->alert_dispatch=1;
1439 s->s3->send_alert[0]=level;
1440 s->s3->send_alert[1]=desc;
1441 if (s->s3->wbuf.left == 0) /* data still being written out? */
1442 return s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
1443 /* else data is still being written out, we will get written
1444 * some time in the future */
1445 return -1;
1446 }
1447
1448 int ssl3_dispatch_alert(SSL *s)
1449 {
1450 int i,j;
1451 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
1452
1453 s->s3->alert_dispatch=0;
1454 i = do_ssl3_write(s, SSL3_RT_ALERT, &s->s3->send_alert[0], 2, 0);
1455 if (i <= 0)
1456 {
1457 s->s3->alert_dispatch=1;
1458 }
1459 else
1460 {
1461 /* Alert sent to BIO. If it is important, flush it now.
1462 * If the message does not get sent due to non-blocking IO,
1463 * we will not worry too much. */
1464 if (s->s3->send_alert[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL)
1465 (void)BIO_flush(s->wbio);
1466
1467 if (s->msg_callback)
1468 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->send_alert, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1469
1470 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1471 cb=s->info_callback;
1472 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1473 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
1474
1475 if (cb != NULL)
1476 {
1477 j=(s->s3->send_alert[0]<<8)|s->s3->send_alert[1];
1478 cb(s,SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT,j);
1479 }
1480 }
1481 return(i);
1482 }
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