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Fix warnings.
[thirdparty/openssl.git] / ssl / s3_pkt.c
1 /* ssl/s3_pkt.c */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
3 * All rights reserved.
4 *
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8 *
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15 *
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22 *
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25 * are met:
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40 *
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
51 * SUCH DAMAGE.
52 *
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
57 */
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
60 *
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
63 * are met:
64 *
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
67 *
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
71 * distribution.
72 *
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
77 *
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
82 *
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
86 *
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
88 * acknowledgment:
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
91 *
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
105 *
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
109 *
110 */
111
112 #include <stdio.h>
113 #include <errno.h>
114 #define USE_SOCKETS
115 #include "ssl_locl.h"
116 #include <openssl/evp.h>
117 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
118 #include <openssl/rand.h>
119
120 #ifndef EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
121 # define EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK 0
122 #endif
123
124 #if defined(OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT) || \
125 !( defined(AES_ASM) && ( \
126 defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) || \
127 defined(_M_AMD64) || defined(_M_X64) || \
128 defined(__INTEL__) ) \
129 )
130 # undef EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
131 # define EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK 0
132 #endif
133
134 static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
135 unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment);
136 static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s);
137
138 int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, int n, int max, int extend)
139 {
140 /* If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase
141 * packet by another n bytes.
142 * The packet will be in the sub-array of s->s3->rbuf.buf specified
143 * by s->packet and s->packet_length.
144 * (If s->read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may be stored in rbuf
145 * [plus s->packet_length bytes if extend == 1].)
146 */
147 int i,len,left;
148 long align=0;
149 unsigned char *pkt;
150 SSL3_BUFFER *rb;
151
152 if (n <= 0) return n;
153
154 rb = &(s->s3->rbuf);
155 if (rb->buf == NULL)
156 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
157 return -1;
158
159 left = rb->left;
160 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
161 align = (long)rb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
162 align = (-align)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1);
163 #endif
164
165 if (!extend)
166 {
167 /* start with empty packet ... */
168 if (left == 0)
169 rb->offset = align;
170 else if (align != 0 && left >= SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
171 {
172 /* check if next packet length is large
173 * enough to justify payload alignment... */
174 pkt = rb->buf + rb->offset;
175 if (pkt[0] == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
176 && (pkt[3]<<8|pkt[4]) >= 128)
177 {
178 /* Note that even if packet is corrupted
179 * and its length field is insane, we can
180 * only be led to wrong decision about
181 * whether memmove will occur or not.
182 * Header values has no effect on memmove
183 * arguments and therefore no buffer
184 * overrun can be triggered. */
185 memmove (rb->buf+align,pkt,left);
186 rb->offset = align;
187 }
188 }
189 s->packet = rb->buf + rb->offset;
190 s->packet_length = 0;
191 /* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */
192 }
193
194 /* For DTLS/UDP reads should not span multiple packets
195 * because the read operation returns the whole packet
196 * at once (as long as it fits into the buffer). */
197 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
198 {
199 if (left > 0 && n > left)
200 n = left;
201 }
202
203 /* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */
204 if (left >= n)
205 {
206 s->packet_length+=n;
207 rb->left=left-n;
208 rb->offset+=n;
209 return(n);
210 }
211
212 /* else we need to read more data */
213
214 len = s->packet_length;
215 pkt = rb->buf+align;
216 /* Move any available bytes to front of buffer:
217 * 'len' bytes already pointed to by 'packet',
218 * 'left' extra ones at the end */
219 if (s->packet != pkt) /* len > 0 */
220 {
221 memmove(pkt, s->packet, len+left);
222 s->packet = pkt;
223 rb->offset = len + align;
224 }
225
226 if (n > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset)) /* does not happen */
227 {
228 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
229 return -1;
230 }
231
232 if (!s->read_ahead)
233 /* ignore max parameter */
234 max = n;
235 else
236 {
237 if (max < n)
238 max = n;
239 if (max > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset))
240 max = rb->len - rb->offset;
241 }
242
243 while (left < n)
244 {
245 /* Now we have len+left bytes at the front of s->s3->rbuf.buf
246 * and need to read in more until we have len+n (up to
247 * len+max if possible) */
248
249 clear_sys_error();
250 if (s->rbio != NULL)
251 {
252 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
253 i=BIO_read(s->rbio,pkt+len+left, max-left);
254 }
255 else
256 {
257 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N,SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET);
258 i = -1;
259 }
260
261 if (i <= 0)
262 {
263 rb->left = left;
264 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS &&
265 !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
266 if (len+left == 0)
267 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
268 return(i);
269 }
270 left+=i;
271 /* reads should *never* span multiple packets for DTLS because
272 * the underlying transport protocol is message oriented as opposed
273 * to byte oriented as in the TLS case. */
274 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
275 {
276 if (n > left)
277 n = left; /* makes the while condition false */
278 }
279 }
280
281 /* done reading, now the book-keeping */
282 rb->offset += n;
283 rb->left = left - n;
284 s->packet_length += n;
285 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
286 return(n);
287 }
288
289 /* MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS defines the number of consecutive, empty records that will
290 * be processed per call to ssl3_get_record. Without this limit an attacker
291 * could send empty records at a faster rate than we can process and cause
292 * ssl3_get_record to loop forever. */
293 #define MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS 32
294
295 /* Call this to get a new input record.
296 * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error
297 * or non-blocking IO.
298 * When it finishes, one packet has been decoded and can be found in
299 * ssl->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
300 * ssl->s3->rrec.data, - data
301 * ssl->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes
302 */
303 /* used only by ssl3_read_bytes */
304 static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s)
305 {
306 int ssl_major,ssl_minor,al;
307 int enc_err,n,i,ret= -1;
308 SSL3_RECORD *rr;
309 SSL_SESSION *sess;
310 unsigned char *p;
311 unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
312 short version;
313 unsigned mac_size;
314 size_t extra;
315 unsigned empty_record_count = 0;
316
317 rr= &(s->s3->rrec);
318 sess=s->session;
319
320 if (s->options & SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER)
321 extra=SSL3_RT_MAX_EXTRA;
322 else
323 extra=0;
324 if (extra && !s->s3->init_extra)
325 {
326 /* An application error: SLS_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER
327 * set after ssl3_setup_buffers() was done */
328 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
329 return -1;
330 }
331
332 again:
333 /* check if we have the header */
334 if ( (s->rstate != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) ||
335 (s->packet_length < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH))
336 {
337 n=ssl3_read_n(s, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s->s3->rbuf.len, 0);
338 if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking */
339 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_BODY;
340
341 p=s->packet;
342 if (s->msg_callback)
343 s->msg_callback(0, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, p, 5, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
344
345 /* Pull apart the header into the SSL3_RECORD */
346 rr->type= *(p++);
347 ssl_major= *(p++);
348 ssl_minor= *(p++);
349 version=(ssl_major<<8)|ssl_minor;
350 n2s(p,rr->length);
351 #if 0
352 fprintf(stderr, "Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr->type, rr->length);
353 #endif
354
355 /* Lets check version */
356 if (!s->first_packet)
357 {
358 if (version != s->version)
359 {
360 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
361 if ((s->version & 0xFF00) == (version & 0xFF00) && !s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash)
362 /* Send back error using their minor version number :-) */
363 s->version = (unsigned short)version;
364 al=SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
365 goto f_err;
366 }
367 }
368
369 if ((version>>8) != SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
370 {
371 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
372 goto err;
373 }
374
375 if (rr->length > s->s3->rbuf.len - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
376 {
377 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
378 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
379 goto f_err;
380 }
381
382 /* now s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */
383 }
384
385 /* s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */
386
387 if (rr->length > s->packet_length-SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
388 {
389 /* now s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */
390 i=rr->length;
391 n=ssl3_read_n(s,i,i,1);
392 if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking io */
393 /* now n == rr->length,
394 * and s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length */
395 }
396
397 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; /* set state for later operations */
398
399 /* At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length,
400 * and we have that many bytes in s->packet
401 */
402 rr->input= &(s->packet[SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]);
403
404 /* ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr'
405 * rr->input points at rr->length bytes, which
406 * need to be copied into rr->data by either
407 * the decryption or by the decompression
408 * When the data is 'copied' into the rr->data buffer,
409 * rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer */
410
411 /* We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ]
412 * rr->length bytes of encrypted compressed stuff. */
413
414 /* check is not needed I believe */
415 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH+extra)
416 {
417 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
418 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
419 goto f_err;
420 }
421
422 /* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */
423 rr->data=rr->input;
424 rr->orig_len=rr->length;
425 /* If in encrypt-then-mac mode calculate mac from encrypted record.
426 * All the details below are public so no timing details can leak.
427 */
428 if (SSL_USE_ETM(s) && s->read_hash)
429 {
430 unsigned char *mac;
431 mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
432 OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
433 if (rr->length < mac_size)
434 {
435 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
436 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
437 goto f_err;
438 }
439 rr->length -= mac_size;
440 mac = rr->data + rr->length;
441 i=s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,md,0 /* not send */);
442 if (i < 0 || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0)
443 {
444 al=SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC;
445 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
446 goto f_err;
447 }
448 }
449
450 enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,0);
451 /* enc_err is:
452 * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid.
453 * 1: if the padding is valid
454 * -1: if the padding is invalid */
455 if (enc_err == 0)
456 {
457 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED;
458 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_BLOCK_CIPHER_PAD_IS_WRONG);
459 goto f_err;
460 }
461
462 #ifdef TLS_DEBUG
463 printf("dec %d\n",rr->length);
464 { unsigned int z; for (z=0; z<rr->length; z++) printf("%02X%c",rr->data[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
465 printf("\n");
466 #endif
467
468 /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */
469 if ((sess != NULL) &&
470 (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) &&
471 (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL) && !SSL_USE_ETM(s))
472 {
473 /* s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */
474 unsigned char *mac = NULL;
475 unsigned char mac_tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
476 mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
477 OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
478
479 /* orig_len is the length of the record before any padding was
480 * removed. This is public information, as is the MAC in use,
481 * therefore we can safely process the record in a different
482 * amount of time if it's too short to possibly contain a MAC.
483 */
484 if (rr->orig_len < mac_size ||
485 /* CBC records must have a padding length byte too. */
486 (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
487 rr->orig_len < mac_size+1))
488 {
489 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
490 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
491 goto f_err;
492 }
493
494 if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
495 {
496 /* We update the length so that the TLS header bytes
497 * can be constructed correctly but we need to extract
498 * the MAC in constant time from within the record,
499 * without leaking the contents of the padding bytes.
500 * */
501 mac = mac_tmp;
502 ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, rr, mac_size);
503 rr->length -= mac_size;
504 }
505 else
506 {
507 /* In this case there's no padding, so |rec->orig_len|
508 * equals |rec->length| and we checked that there's
509 * enough bytes for |mac_size| above. */
510 rr->length -= mac_size;
511 mac = &rr->data[rr->length];
512 }
513
514 i=s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,md,0 /* not send */);
515 if (i < 0 || mac == NULL || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0)
516 enc_err = -1;
517 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+extra+mac_size)
518 enc_err = -1;
519 }
520
521 if (enc_err < 0)
522 {
523 /* A separate 'decryption_failed' alert was introduced with TLS 1.0,
524 * SSL 3.0 only has 'bad_record_mac'. But unless a decryption
525 * failure is directly visible from the ciphertext anyway,
526 * we should not reveal which kind of error occurred -- this
527 * might become visible to an attacker (e.g. via a logfile) */
528 al=SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC;
529 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
530 goto f_err;
531 }
532
533 /* r->length is now just compressed */
534 if (s->expand != NULL)
535 {
536 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+extra)
537 {
538 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
539 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
540 goto f_err;
541 }
542 if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s))
543 {
544 al=SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE;
545 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION);
546 goto f_err;
547 }
548 }
549
550 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH+extra)
551 {
552 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
553 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
554 goto f_err;
555 }
556
557 rr->off=0;
558 /* So at this point the following is true
559 * ssl->s3->rrec.type is the type of record
560 * ssl->s3->rrec.length == number of bytes in record
561 * ssl->s3->rrec.off == offset to first valid byte
562 * ssl->s3->rrec.data == where to take bytes from, increment
563 * after use :-).
564 */
565
566 /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */
567 s->packet_length=0;
568
569 /* just read a 0 length packet */
570 if (rr->length == 0)
571 {
572 empty_record_count++;
573 if (empty_record_count > MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS)
574 {
575 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
576 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_TOO_MANY_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS);
577 goto f_err;
578 }
579 goto again;
580 }
581
582 #if 0
583 fprintf(stderr, "Ultimate Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr->type, rr->length);
584 #endif
585
586 return(1);
587
588 f_err:
589 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
590 err:
591 return(ret);
592 }
593
594 int ssl3_do_uncompress(SSL *ssl)
595 {
596 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
597 int i;
598 SSL3_RECORD *rr;
599
600 rr= &(ssl->s3->rrec);
601 i=COMP_expand_block(ssl->expand,rr->comp,
602 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,rr->data,(int)rr->length);
603 if (i < 0)
604 return(0);
605 else
606 rr->length=i;
607 rr->data=rr->comp;
608 #endif
609 return(1);
610 }
611
612 int ssl3_do_compress(SSL *ssl)
613 {
614 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
615 int i;
616 SSL3_RECORD *wr;
617
618 wr= &(ssl->s3->wrec);
619 i=COMP_compress_block(ssl->compress,wr->data,
620 SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH,
621 wr->input,(int)wr->length);
622 if (i < 0)
623 return(0);
624 else
625 wr->length=i;
626
627 wr->input=wr->data;
628 #endif
629 return(1);
630 }
631
632 /* Call this to write data in records of type 'type'
633 * It will return <= 0 if not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
634 */
635 int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len)
636 {
637 const unsigned char *buf=buf_;
638 int tot;
639 unsigned int n,nw;
640 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
641 unsigned int max_send_fragment;
642 #endif
643 SSL3_BUFFER *wb=&(s->s3->wbuf);
644 int i;
645
646 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
647 tot=s->s3->wnum;
648 s->s3->wnum=0;
649
650 if (SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake)
651 {
652 i=s->handshake_func(s);
653 if (i < 0) return(i);
654 if (i == 0)
655 {
656 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
657 return -1;
658 }
659 }
660
661 /* first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written
662 * out. This will happen with non blocking IO */
663 if (wb->left != 0)
664 {
665 i = ssl3_write_pending(s,type,&buf[tot],s->s3->wpend_tot);
666 if (i<=0)
667 {
668 /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */
669 s->s3->wnum=tot;
670 return i;
671 }
672 tot += i; /* this might be last fragment */
673 }
674
675 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
676 /*
677 * Depending on platform multi-block can deliver several *times*
678 * better performance. Downside is that it has to allocate
679 * jumbo buffer to accomodate up to 8 records, but the
680 * compromise is considered worthy.
681 */
682 if (type==SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
683 len >= 4*(max_send_fragment=s->max_send_fragment) &&
684 s->compress==NULL && s->msg_callback==NULL &&
685 !SSL_USE_ETM(s) && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s) &&
686 EVP_CIPHER_flags(s->enc_write_ctx->cipher)&EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK)
687 {
688 unsigned char aad[13];
689 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_PARAM mb_param;
690 int packlen;
691
692 /* minimize address aliasing conflicts */
693 if ((max_send_fragment&0xffff) == 0)
694 max_send_fragment -= 512;
695
696 if (tot==0 || wb->buf==NULL) /* allocate jumbo buffer */
697 {
698 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
699
700 packlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
701 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_MAX_BUFSIZE,
702 max_send_fragment,NULL);
703
704 if (len>=8*max_send_fragment) packlen *= 8;
705 else packlen *= 4;
706
707 wb->buf=OPENSSL_malloc(packlen);
708 wb->len=packlen;
709 }
710 else if (tot==len) /* done? */
711 {
712 OPENSSL_free(wb->buf); /* free jumbo buffer */
713 wb->buf = NULL;
714 return tot;
715 }
716
717 n=(len-tot);
718 for (;;)
719 {
720 if (n < 4*max_send_fragment)
721 {
722 OPENSSL_free(wb->buf); /* free jumbo buffer */
723 wb->buf = NULL;
724 break;
725 }
726
727 if (s->s3->alert_dispatch)
728 {
729 i=s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
730 if (i <= 0)
731 {
732 s->s3->wnum=tot;
733 return i;
734 }
735 }
736
737 if (n >= 8*max_send_fragment)
738 nw = max_send_fragment*(mb_param.interleave=8);
739 else
740 nw = max_send_fragment*(mb_param.interleave=4);
741
742 memcpy(aad,s->s3->write_sequence,8);
743 aad[8]=type;
744 aad[9]=(unsigned char)(s->version>>8);
745 aad[10]=(unsigned char)(s->version);
746 aad[11]=0;
747 aad[12]=0;
748 mb_param.out = NULL;
749 mb_param.inp = aad;
750 mb_param.len = nw;
751
752 packlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
753 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_AAD,
754 sizeof(mb_param),&mb_param);
755
756 if (packlen<=0 || packlen>wb->len) /* never happens */
757 {
758 OPENSSL_free(wb->buf); /* free jumbo buffer */
759 wb->buf = NULL;
760 break;
761 }
762
763 mb_param.out = wb->buf;
764 mb_param.inp = &buf[tot];
765 mb_param.len = nw;
766
767 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
768 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_ENCRYPT,
769 sizeof(mb_param),&mb_param);
770
771 s->s3->write_sequence[7] += mb_param.interleave;
772 if (s->s3->write_sequence[7] < mb_param.interleave)
773 {
774 int j=6;
775 while (j>=0 && (++s->s3->write_sequence[j--])==0) ;
776 }
777
778 wb->offset = 0;
779 wb->left = packlen;
780
781 s->s3->wpend_tot = nw;
782 s->s3->wpend_buf = &buf[tot];
783 s->s3->wpend_type= type;
784 s->s3->wpend_ret = nw;
785
786 i = ssl3_write_pending(s,type,&buf[tot],nw);
787 if (i<=0)
788 {
789 if (i<0)
790 {
791 OPENSSL_free(wb->buf);
792 wb->buf = NULL;
793 }
794 s->s3->wnum=tot;
795 return i;
796 }
797 if (i==(int)n)
798 {
799 OPENSSL_free(wb->buf); /* free jumbo buffer */
800 wb->buf = NULL;
801 return tot+i;
802 }
803 n-=i;
804 tot+=i;
805 }
806 }
807 else
808 #endif
809 if (tot==len) /* done? */
810 {
811 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS &&
812 !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
813 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
814
815 return tot;
816 }
817
818 n=(len-tot);
819 for (;;)
820 {
821 if (n > s->max_send_fragment)
822 nw=s->max_send_fragment;
823 else
824 nw=n;
825
826 i=do_ssl3_write(s, type, &(buf[tot]), nw, 0);
827 if (i <= 0)
828 {
829 /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */
830 s->s3->wnum=tot;
831 return i;
832 }
833
834 if ((i == (int)n) ||
835 (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
836 (s->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE)))
837 {
838 /* next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment
839 * in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness: */
840 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 0;
841
842 if ((i==(int)n) && s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS &&
843 !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
844 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
845
846 return tot+i;
847 }
848
849 n-=i;
850 tot+=i;
851 }
852 }
853
854 static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
855 unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment)
856 {
857 unsigned char *p,*plen;
858 int i,mac_size,clear=0;
859 int prefix_len=0;
860 int eivlen;
861 long align=0;
862 SSL3_RECORD *wr;
863 SSL3_BUFFER *wb=&(s->s3->wbuf);
864 SSL_SESSION *sess;
865
866 if (wb->buf == NULL)
867 if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s))
868 return -1;
869
870 /* first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written
871 * out. This will happen with non blocking IO */
872 if (wb->left != 0)
873 return(ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len));
874
875 /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
876 if (s->s3->alert_dispatch)
877 {
878 i=s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
879 if (i <= 0)
880 return(i);
881 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
882 }
883
884 if (len == 0 && !create_empty_fragment)
885 return 0;
886
887 wr= &(s->s3->wrec);
888 sess=s->session;
889
890 if ( (sess == NULL) ||
891 (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) ||
892 (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash) == NULL))
893 {
894 #if 1
895 clear=s->enc_write_ctx?0:1; /* must be AEAD cipher */
896 #else
897 clear=1;
898 #endif
899 mac_size=0;
900 }
901 else
902 {
903 mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
904 if (mac_size < 0)
905 goto err;
906 }
907
908 #if 0 && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
909 if (type==SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && s->compress==NULL &&
910 !SSL_USE_ETM(s) && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s) && /*!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) &&*/
911 EVP_CIPHER_flags(s->enc_write_ctx->cipher)&EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK)
912 do {
913 unsigned char aad[13];
914 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_PARAM mb_param = {NULL,aad,sizeof(aad),0};
915 int packlen;
916
917 memcpy(aad,s->s3->write_sequence,8);
918 aad[8]=type;
919 aad[9]=(unsigned char)(s->version>>8);
920 aad[10]=(unsigned char)(s->version);
921 aad[11]=(unsigned char)(len>>8);
922 aad[12]=(unsigned char)len;
923 packlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
924 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_AAD,
925 sizeof(mb_param),&mb_param);
926
927 if (packlen==0 || packlen > wb->len) break;
928
929 mb_param.out = wb->buf;
930 mb_param.inp = buf;
931 mb_param.len = len;
932 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
933 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_ENCRYPT,
934 sizeof(mb_param),&mb_param);
935
936 s->s3->write_sequence[7] += mb_param.interleave;
937 if (s->s3->write_sequence[7] < mb_param.interleave)
938 {
939 int j=6;
940 while (j>=0 && (++s->s3->write_sequence[j--])==0) ;
941 }
942
943 wb->offset=0;
944 wb->left = packlen;
945
946 /* memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write retries later */
947 s->s3->wpend_tot=len;
948 s->s3->wpend_buf=buf;
949 s->s3->wpend_type=type;
950 s->s3->wpend_ret=len;
951
952 /* we now just need to write the buffer */
953 return ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len);
954 } while (0);
955 #endif
956
957 /* 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself */
958 if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done)
959 {
960 /* countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites
961 * (see http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) */
962
963 if (s->s3->need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
964 {
965 /* recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set;
966 * this prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment
967 * (these 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later
968 * together with the actual payload) */
969 prefix_len = do_ssl3_write(s, type, buf, 0, 1);
970 if (prefix_len <= 0)
971 goto err;
972
973 if (prefix_len >
974 (SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD))
975 {
976 /* insufficient space */
977 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
978 goto err;
979 }
980 }
981
982 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1;
983 }
984
985 if (create_empty_fragment)
986 {
987 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
988 /* extra fragment would be couple of cipher blocks,
989 * which would be multiple of SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD, so
990 * if we want to align the real payload, then we can
991 * just pretent we simply have two headers. */
992 align = (long)wb->buf + 2*SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
993 align = (-align)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1);
994 #endif
995 p = wb->buf + align;
996 wb->offset = align;
997 }
998 else if (prefix_len)
999 {
1000 p = wb->buf + wb->offset + prefix_len;
1001 }
1002 else
1003 {
1004 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
1005 align = (long)wb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
1006 align = (-align)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1);
1007 #endif
1008 p = wb->buf + align;
1009 wb->offset = align;
1010 }
1011
1012 /* write the header */
1013
1014 *(p++)=type&0xff;
1015 wr->type=type;
1016
1017 *(p++)=(s->version>>8);
1018 /* Some servers hang if iniatial client hello is larger than 256
1019 * bytes and record version number > TLS 1.0
1020 */
1021 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B
1022 && !s->renegotiate
1023 && TLS1_get_version(s) > TLS1_VERSION)
1024 *(p++) = 0x1;
1025 else
1026 *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
1027
1028 /* field where we are to write out packet length */
1029 plen=p;
1030 p+=2;
1031 /* Explicit IV length, block ciphers appropriate version flag */
1032 if (s->enc_write_ctx && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s))
1033 {
1034 int mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_write_ctx);
1035 if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
1036 {
1037 eivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(s->enc_write_ctx);
1038 if (eivlen <= 1)
1039 eivlen = 0;
1040 }
1041 /* Need explicit part of IV for GCM mode */
1042 else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE)
1043 eivlen = EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
1044 else
1045 eivlen = 0;
1046 }
1047 else
1048 eivlen = 0;
1049
1050 /* lets setup the record stuff. */
1051 wr->data=p + eivlen;
1052 wr->length=(int)len;
1053 wr->input=(unsigned char *)buf;
1054
1055 /* we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into
1056 * wr->data */
1057
1058 /* first we compress */
1059 if (s->compress != NULL)
1060 {
1061 if (!ssl3_do_compress(s))
1062 {
1063 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE);
1064 goto err;
1065 }
1066 }
1067 else
1068 {
1069 memcpy(wr->data,wr->input,wr->length);
1070 wr->input=wr->data;
1071 }
1072
1073 /* we should still have the output to wr->data and the input
1074 * from wr->input. Length should be wr->length.
1075 * wr->data still points in the wb->buf */
1076
1077 if (!SSL_USE_ETM(s) && mac_size != 0)
1078 {
1079 if (s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,&(p[wr->length + eivlen]),1) < 0)
1080 goto err;
1081 wr->length+=mac_size;
1082 }
1083
1084 wr->input=p;
1085 wr->data=p;
1086
1087 if (eivlen)
1088 {
1089 /* if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, eivlen) <= 0)
1090 goto err; */
1091 wr->length += eivlen;
1092 }
1093
1094 /* ssl3_enc can only have an error on read */
1095 s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,1);
1096
1097 if (SSL_USE_ETM(s) && mac_size != 0)
1098 {
1099 if (s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,p + wr->length,1) < 0)
1100 goto err;
1101 wr->length+=mac_size;
1102 }
1103
1104 /* record length after mac and block padding */
1105 s2n(wr->length,plen);
1106
1107 if (s->msg_callback)
1108 s->msg_callback(1, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, plen - 5, 5, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1109
1110 /* we should now have
1111 * wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is
1112 * wr->length long */
1113 wr->type=type; /* not needed but helps for debugging */
1114 wr->length+=SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
1115
1116 if (create_empty_fragment)
1117 {
1118 /* we are in a recursive call;
1119 * just return the length, don't write out anything here
1120 */
1121 return wr->length;
1122 }
1123
1124 /* now let's set up wb */
1125 wb->left = prefix_len + wr->length;
1126
1127 /* memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write retries later */
1128 s->s3->wpend_tot=len;
1129 s->s3->wpend_buf=buf;
1130 s->s3->wpend_type=type;
1131 s->s3->wpend_ret=len;
1132
1133 /* we now just need to write the buffer */
1134 return ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len);
1135 err:
1136 return -1;
1137 }
1138
1139 /* if s->s3->wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this */
1140 int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
1141 unsigned int len)
1142 {
1143 int i;
1144 SSL3_BUFFER *wb=&(s->s3->wbuf);
1145
1146 /* XXXX */
1147 if ((s->s3->wpend_tot > (int)len)
1148 || ((s->s3->wpend_buf != buf) &&
1149 !(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER))
1150 || (s->s3->wpend_type != type))
1151 {
1152 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING,SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY);
1153 return(-1);
1154 }
1155
1156 for (;;)
1157 {
1158 clear_sys_error();
1159 if (s->wbio != NULL)
1160 {
1161 s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
1162 i=BIO_write(s->wbio,
1163 (char *)&(wb->buf[wb->offset]),
1164 (unsigned int)wb->left);
1165 }
1166 else
1167 {
1168 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING,SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET);
1169 i= -1;
1170 }
1171 if (i == wb->left)
1172 {
1173 wb->left=0;
1174 wb->offset+=i;
1175 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1176 return(s->s3->wpend_ret);
1177 }
1178 else if (i <= 0) {
1179 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION ||
1180 s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
1181 /* For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the whole
1182 point in using a datagram service */
1183 wb->left = 0;
1184 }
1185 return(i);
1186 }
1187 wb->offset+=i;
1188 wb->left-=i;
1189 }
1190 }
1191
1192 /* Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
1193 * 'type' is one of the following:
1194 *
1195 * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
1196 * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
1197 * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
1198 *
1199 * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
1200 * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
1201 *
1202 * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
1203 * Alert records (e.g. close_notify), ChangeCipherSpec records (not really
1204 * a surprise, but handled as if it were), or renegotiation requests.
1205 * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
1206 * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
1207 * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
1208 * Change cipher spec protocol
1209 * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
1210 * Alert protocol
1211 * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
1212 * Handshake protocol
1213 * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
1214 * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
1215 * here, anything else is handled by higher layers
1216 * Application data protocol
1217 * none of our business
1218 */
1219 int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek)
1220 {
1221 int al,i,j,ret;
1222 unsigned int n;
1223 SSL3_RECORD *rr;
1224 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type2,int val)=NULL;
1225
1226 if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL) /* Not initialized yet */
1227 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
1228 return(-1);
1229
1230 if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) && (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && type) ||
1231 (peek && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)))
1232 {
1233 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1234 return -1;
1235 }
1236
1237 if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
1238 /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
1239 {
1240 unsigned char *src = s->s3->handshake_fragment;
1241 unsigned char *dst = buf;
1242 unsigned int k;
1243
1244 /* peek == 0 */
1245 n = 0;
1246 while ((len > 0) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
1247 {
1248 *dst++ = *src++;
1249 len--; s->s3->handshake_fragment_len--;
1250 n++;
1251 }
1252 /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
1253 for (k = 0; k < s->s3->handshake_fragment_len; k++)
1254 s->s3->handshake_fragment[k] = *src++;
1255 return n;
1256 }
1257
1258 /* Now s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE. */
1259
1260 if (!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s))
1261 {
1262 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
1263 i=s->handshake_func(s);
1264 if (i < 0) return(i);
1265 if (i == 0)
1266 {
1267 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1268 return(-1);
1269 }
1270 }
1271 start:
1272 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1273
1274 /* s->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
1275 * s->s3->rrec.data, - data
1276 * s->s3->rrec.off, - offset into 'data' for next read
1277 * s->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes. */
1278 rr = &(s->s3->rrec);
1279
1280 /* get new packet if necessary */
1281 if ((rr->length == 0) || (s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY))
1282 {
1283 ret=ssl3_get_record(s);
1284 if (ret <= 0) return(ret);
1285 }
1286
1287 /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
1288
1289 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
1290 * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
1291 && (rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE))
1292 {
1293 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1294 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED);
1295 goto f_err;
1296 }
1297
1298 /* If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away
1299 * (even in 'peek' mode) */
1300 if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN)
1301 {
1302 rr->length=0;
1303 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1304 return(0);
1305 }
1306
1307
1308 if (type == rr->type) /* SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE */
1309 {
1310 /* make sure that we are not getting application data when we
1311 * are doing a handshake for the first time */
1312 if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
1313 (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL))
1314 {
1315 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1316 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE);
1317 goto f_err;
1318 }
1319
1320 if (len <= 0) return(len);
1321
1322 if ((unsigned int)len > rr->length)
1323 n = rr->length;
1324 else
1325 n = (unsigned int)len;
1326
1327 memcpy(buf,&(rr->data[rr->off]),n);
1328 if (!peek)
1329 {
1330 rr->length-=n;
1331 rr->off+=n;
1332 if (rr->length == 0)
1333 {
1334 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
1335 rr->off=0;
1336 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS)
1337 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
1338 }
1339 }
1340 return(n);
1341 }
1342
1343
1344 /* If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake
1345 * message, then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello). */
1346
1347 /* In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage,
1348 * fill that so that we can process the data at a fixed place.
1349 */
1350 {
1351 unsigned int dest_maxlen = 0;
1352 unsigned char *dest = NULL;
1353 unsigned int *dest_len = NULL;
1354
1355 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
1356 {
1357 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->handshake_fragment;
1358 dest = s->s3->handshake_fragment;
1359 dest_len = &s->s3->handshake_fragment_len;
1360 }
1361 else if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT)
1362 {
1363 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->alert_fragment;
1364 dest = s->s3->alert_fragment;
1365 dest_len = &s->s3->alert_fragment_len;
1366 }
1367 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1368 else if (rr->type == TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT)
1369 {
1370 tls1_process_heartbeat(s);
1371
1372 /* Exit and notify application to read again */
1373 rr->length = 0;
1374 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
1375 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
1376 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
1377 return(-1);
1378 }
1379 #endif
1380
1381 if (dest_maxlen > 0)
1382 {
1383 n = dest_maxlen - *dest_len; /* available space in 'dest' */
1384 if (rr->length < n)
1385 n = rr->length; /* available bytes */
1386
1387 /* now move 'n' bytes: */
1388 while (n-- > 0)
1389 {
1390 dest[(*dest_len)++] = rr->data[rr->off++];
1391 rr->length--;
1392 }
1393
1394 if (*dest_len < dest_maxlen)
1395 goto start; /* fragment was too small */
1396 }
1397 }
1398
1399 /* s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
1400 * s->s3->alert_fragment_len == 2 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT.
1401 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.) */
1402
1403 /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */
1404 if ((!s->server) &&
1405 (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
1406 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) &&
1407 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL))
1408 {
1409 s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
1410
1411 if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment[1] != 0) ||
1412 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[2] != 0) ||
1413 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[3] != 0))
1414 {
1415 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1416 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST);
1417 goto f_err;
1418 }
1419
1420 if (s->msg_callback)
1421 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->s3->handshake_fragment, 4, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1422
1423 if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
1424 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) &&
1425 !s->s3->renegotiate)
1426 {
1427 ssl3_renegotiate(s);
1428 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s))
1429 {
1430 i=s->handshake_func(s);
1431 if (i < 0) return(i);
1432 if (i == 0)
1433 {
1434 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1435 return(-1);
1436 }
1437
1438 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY))
1439 {
1440 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */
1441 {
1442 BIO *bio;
1443 /* In the case where we try to read application data,
1444 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
1445 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
1446 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
1447 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
1448 bio=SSL_get_rbio(s);
1449 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1450 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1451 return(-1);
1452 }
1453 }
1454 }
1455 }
1456 /* we either finished a handshake or ignored the request,
1457 * now try again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for */
1458 goto start;
1459 }
1460 /* If we are a server and get a client hello when renegotiation isn't
1461 * allowed send back a no renegotiation alert and carry on.
1462 * WARNING: experimental code, needs reviewing (steve)
1463 */
1464 if (s->server &&
1465 SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
1466 !s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
1467 (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) &&
1468 (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
1469 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
1470 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL) &&
1471 !(s->ctx->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
1472
1473 {
1474 /*s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0;*/
1475 rr->length = 0;
1476 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1477 goto start;
1478 }
1479 if (s->s3->alert_fragment_len >= 2)
1480 {
1481 int alert_level = s->s3->alert_fragment[0];
1482 int alert_descr = s->s3->alert_fragment[1];
1483
1484 s->s3->alert_fragment_len = 0;
1485
1486 if (s->msg_callback)
1487 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->alert_fragment, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1488
1489 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1490 cb=s->info_callback;
1491 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1492 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
1493
1494 if (cb != NULL)
1495 {
1496 j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr;
1497 cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j);
1498 }
1499
1500 if (alert_level == 1) /* warning */
1501 {
1502 s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr;
1503 if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY)
1504 {
1505 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1506 return(0);
1507 }
1508 /* This is a warning but we receive it if we requested
1509 * renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with
1510 * a fatal alert because if application tried to
1511 * renegotiatie it presumably had a good reason and
1512 * expects it to succeed.
1513 *
1514 * In future we might have a renegotiation where we
1515 * don't care if the peer refused it where we carry on.
1516 */
1517 else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION)
1518 {
1519 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1520 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1521 goto f_err;
1522 }
1523 #ifdef SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME
1524 else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME)
1525 return(0);
1526 #endif
1527 }
1528 else if (alert_level == 2) /* fatal */
1529 {
1530 char tmp[16];
1531
1532 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1533 s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr;
1534 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr);
1535 BIO_snprintf(tmp,sizeof tmp,"%d",alert_descr);
1536 ERR_add_error_data(2,"SSL alert number ",tmp);
1537 s->shutdown|=SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1538 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session);
1539 return(0);
1540 }
1541 else
1542 {
1543 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1544 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
1545 goto f_err;
1546 }
1547
1548 goto start;
1549 }
1550
1551 if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) /* but we have not received a shutdown */
1552 {
1553 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1554 rr->length=0;
1555 return(0);
1556 }
1557
1558 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
1559 {
1560 /* 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, so we know
1561 * exactly what the record payload has to look like */
1562 if ( (rr->length != 1) || (rr->off != 0) ||
1563 (rr->data[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS))
1564 {
1565 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1566 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
1567 goto f_err;
1568 }
1569
1570 /* Check we have a cipher to change to */
1571 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL)
1572 {
1573 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1574 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1575 goto f_err;
1576 }
1577
1578 rr->length=0;
1579
1580 if (s->msg_callback)
1581 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, rr->data, 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1582
1583 s->s3->change_cipher_spec=1;
1584 if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s))
1585 goto err;
1586 else
1587 goto start;
1588 }
1589
1590 /* Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation) */
1591 if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) && !s->in_handshake)
1592 {
1593 if (((s->state&SSL_ST_MASK) == SSL_ST_OK) &&
1594 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS))
1595 {
1596 #if 0 /* worked only because C operator preferences are not as expected (and
1597 * because this is not really needed for clients except for detecting
1598 * protocol violations): */
1599 s->state=SSL_ST_BEFORE|(s->server)
1600 ?SSL_ST_ACCEPT
1601 :SSL_ST_CONNECT;
1602 #else
1603 s->state = s->server ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT;
1604 #endif
1605 s->renegotiate=1;
1606 s->new_session=1;
1607 }
1608 i=s->handshake_func(s);
1609 if (i < 0) return(i);
1610 if (i == 0)
1611 {
1612 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1613 return(-1);
1614 }
1615
1616 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY))
1617 {
1618 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */
1619 {
1620 BIO *bio;
1621 /* In the case where we try to read application data,
1622 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
1623 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
1624 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
1625 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
1626 bio=SSL_get_rbio(s);
1627 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1628 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1629 return(-1);
1630 }
1631 }
1632 goto start;
1633 }
1634
1635 switch (rr->type)
1636 {
1637 default:
1638 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS
1639 /* TLS up to v1.1 just ignores unknown message types:
1640 * TLS v1.2 give an unexpected message alert.
1641 */
1642 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->version <= TLS1_1_VERSION)
1643 {
1644 rr->length = 0;
1645 goto start;
1646 }
1647 #endif
1648 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1649 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1650 goto f_err;
1651 case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
1652 case SSL3_RT_ALERT:
1653 case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:
1654 /* we already handled all of these, with the possible exception
1655 * of SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when s->in_handshake is set, but that
1656 * should not happen when type != rr->type */
1657 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1658 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1659 goto f_err;
1660 case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
1661 /* At this point, we were expecting handshake data,
1662 * but have application data. If the library was
1663 * running inside ssl3_read() (i.e. in_read_app_data
1664 * is set) and it makes sense to read application data
1665 * at this point (session renegotiation not yet started),
1666 * we will indulge it.
1667 */
1668 if (s->s3->in_read_app_data &&
1669 (s->s3->total_renegotiations != 0) &&
1670 ((
1671 (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) &&
1672 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) &&
1673 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1674 ) || (
1675 (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) &&
1676 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) &&
1677 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
1678 )
1679 ))
1680 {
1681 s->s3->in_read_app_data=2;
1682 return(-1);
1683 }
1684 else
1685 {
1686 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1687 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1688 goto f_err;
1689 }
1690 }
1691 /* not reached */
1692
1693 f_err:
1694 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1695 err:
1696 return(-1);
1697 }
1698
1699 int ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s)
1700 {
1701 int i;
1702 const char *sender;
1703 int slen;
1704
1705 if (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
1706 i=SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ;
1707 else
1708 i=SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ;
1709
1710 if (s->s3->tmp.key_block == NULL)
1711 {
1712 if (s->session == NULL)
1713 {
1714 /* might happen if dtls1_read_bytes() calls this */
1715 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1716 return (0);
1717 }
1718
1719 s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
1720 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) return(0);
1721 }
1722
1723 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,i))
1724 return(0);
1725
1726 /* we have to record the message digest at
1727 * this point so we can get it before we read
1728 * the finished message */
1729 if (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT)
1730 {
1731 sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label;
1732 slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len;
1733 }
1734 else
1735 {
1736 sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label;
1737 slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len;
1738 }
1739
1740 i = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
1741 sender,slen,s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md);
1742 if (i == 0)
1743 {
1744 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1745 return 0;
1746 }
1747 s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = i;
1748
1749 return(1);
1750 }
1751
1752 int ssl3_send_alert(SSL *s, int level, int desc)
1753 {
1754 /* Map tls/ssl alert value to correct one */
1755 desc=s->method->ssl3_enc->alert_value(desc);
1756 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && desc == SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION)
1757 desc = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; /* SSL 3.0 does not have protocol_version alerts */
1758 if (desc < 0) return -1;
1759 /* If a fatal one, remove from cache */
1760 if ((level == 2) && (s->session != NULL))
1761 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session);
1762
1763 s->s3->alert_dispatch=1;
1764 s->s3->send_alert[0]=level;
1765 s->s3->send_alert[1]=desc;
1766 if (s->s3->wbuf.left == 0) /* data still being written out? */
1767 return s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
1768 /* else data is still being written out, we will get written
1769 * some time in the future */
1770 return -1;
1771 }
1772
1773 int ssl3_dispatch_alert(SSL *s)
1774 {
1775 int i,j;
1776 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
1777
1778 s->s3->alert_dispatch=0;
1779 i = do_ssl3_write(s, SSL3_RT_ALERT, &s->s3->send_alert[0], 2, 0);
1780 if (i <= 0)
1781 {
1782 s->s3->alert_dispatch=1;
1783 }
1784 else
1785 {
1786 /* Alert sent to BIO. If it is important, flush it now.
1787 * If the message does not get sent due to non-blocking IO,
1788 * we will not worry too much. */
1789 if (s->s3->send_alert[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL)
1790 (void)BIO_flush(s->wbio);
1791
1792 if (s->msg_callback)
1793 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->send_alert, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1794
1795 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1796 cb=s->info_callback;
1797 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1798 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
1799
1800 if (cb != NULL)
1801 {
1802 j=(s->s3->send_alert[0]<<8)|s->s3->send_alert[1];
1803 cb(s,SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT,j);
1804 }
1805 }
1806 return(i);
1807 }
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