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Fix crash in dtls1_get_record whilst in the listen state where you get two
[thirdparty/openssl.git] / ssl / s3_pkt.c
1 /* ssl/s3_pkt.c */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
3 * All rights reserved.
4 *
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8 *
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15 *
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22 *
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25 * are met:
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40 *
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
51 * SUCH DAMAGE.
52 *
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
57 */
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
60 *
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
63 * are met:
64 *
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
67 *
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
71 * distribution.
72 *
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
77 *
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
82 *
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
86 *
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
88 * acknowledgment:
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
91 *
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
105 *
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
109 *
110 */
111
112 #include <stdio.h>
113 #include <limits.h>
114 #include <errno.h>
115 #define USE_SOCKETS
116 #include "ssl_locl.h"
117 #include <openssl/evp.h>
118 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
119 #include <openssl/rand.h>
120
121 #ifndef EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
122 # define EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK 0
123 #endif
124
125 #if defined(OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT) || \
126 !( defined(AES_ASM) && ( \
127 defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) || \
128 defined(_M_AMD64) || defined(_M_X64) || \
129 defined(__INTEL__) ) \
130 )
131 # undef EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
132 # define EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK 0
133 #endif
134
135 static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
136 unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment);
137 static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s);
138
139 int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, int n, int max, int extend)
140 {
141 /* If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase
142 * packet by another n bytes.
143 * The packet will be in the sub-array of s->s3->rbuf.buf specified
144 * by s->packet and s->packet_length.
145 * (If s->read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may be stored in rbuf
146 * [plus s->packet_length bytes if extend == 1].)
147 */
148 int i,len,left;
149 long align=0;
150 unsigned char *pkt;
151 SSL3_BUFFER *rb;
152
153 if (n <= 0) return n;
154
155 rb = &(s->s3->rbuf);
156 if (rb->buf == NULL)
157 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
158 return -1;
159
160 left = rb->left;
161 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
162 align = (long)rb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
163 align = (-align)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1);
164 #endif
165
166 if (!extend)
167 {
168 /* start with empty packet ... */
169 if (left == 0)
170 rb->offset = align;
171 else if (align != 0 && left >= SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
172 {
173 /* check if next packet length is large
174 * enough to justify payload alignment... */
175 pkt = rb->buf + rb->offset;
176 if (pkt[0] == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
177 && (pkt[3]<<8|pkt[4]) >= 128)
178 {
179 /* Note that even if packet is corrupted
180 * and its length field is insane, we can
181 * only be led to wrong decision about
182 * whether memmove will occur or not.
183 * Header values has no effect on memmove
184 * arguments and therefore no buffer
185 * overrun can be triggered. */
186 memmove (rb->buf+align,pkt,left);
187 rb->offset = align;
188 }
189 }
190 s->packet = rb->buf + rb->offset;
191 s->packet_length = 0;
192 /* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */
193 }
194
195 /* For DTLS/UDP reads should not span multiple packets
196 * because the read operation returns the whole packet
197 * at once (as long as it fits into the buffer). */
198 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
199 {
200 if (left == 0 && extend)
201 return 0;
202 if (left > 0 && n > left)
203 n = left;
204 }
205
206 /* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */
207 if (left >= n)
208 {
209 s->packet_length+=n;
210 rb->left=left-n;
211 rb->offset+=n;
212 return(n);
213 }
214
215 /* else we need to read more data */
216
217 len = s->packet_length;
218 pkt = rb->buf+align;
219 /* Move any available bytes to front of buffer:
220 * 'len' bytes already pointed to by 'packet',
221 * 'left' extra ones at the end */
222 if (s->packet != pkt) /* len > 0 */
223 {
224 memmove(pkt, s->packet, len+left);
225 s->packet = pkt;
226 rb->offset = len + align;
227 }
228
229 if (n > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset)) /* does not happen */
230 {
231 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
232 return -1;
233 }
234
235 if (!s->read_ahead)
236 /* ignore max parameter */
237 max = n;
238 else
239 {
240 if (max < n)
241 max = n;
242 if (max > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset))
243 max = rb->len - rb->offset;
244 }
245
246 while (left < n)
247 {
248 /* Now we have len+left bytes at the front of s->s3->rbuf.buf
249 * and need to read in more until we have len+n (up to
250 * len+max if possible) */
251
252 clear_sys_error();
253 if (s->rbio != NULL)
254 {
255 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
256 i=BIO_read(s->rbio,pkt+len+left, max-left);
257 }
258 else
259 {
260 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N,SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET);
261 i = -1;
262 }
263
264 if (i <= 0)
265 {
266 rb->left = left;
267 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS &&
268 !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
269 if (len+left == 0)
270 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
271 return(i);
272 }
273 left+=i;
274 /* reads should *never* span multiple packets for DTLS because
275 * the underlying transport protocol is message oriented as opposed
276 * to byte oriented as in the TLS case. */
277 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
278 {
279 if (n > left)
280 n = left; /* makes the while condition false */
281 }
282 }
283
284 /* done reading, now the book-keeping */
285 rb->offset += n;
286 rb->left = left - n;
287 s->packet_length += n;
288 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
289 return(n);
290 }
291
292 /* MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS defines the number of consecutive, empty records that will
293 * be processed per call to ssl3_get_record. Without this limit an attacker
294 * could send empty records at a faster rate than we can process and cause
295 * ssl3_get_record to loop forever. */
296 #define MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS 32
297
298 /*-
299 * Call this to get a new input record.
300 * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error
301 * or non-blocking IO.
302 * When it finishes, one packet has been decoded and can be found in
303 * ssl->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
304 * ssl->s3->rrec.data, - data
305 * ssl->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes
306 */
307 /* used only by ssl3_read_bytes */
308 static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s)
309 {
310 int ssl_major,ssl_minor,al;
311 int enc_err,n,i,ret= -1;
312 SSL3_RECORD *rr;
313 SSL_SESSION *sess;
314 unsigned char *p;
315 unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
316 short version;
317 unsigned mac_size;
318 size_t extra;
319 unsigned empty_record_count = 0;
320
321 rr= &(s->s3->rrec);
322 sess=s->session;
323
324 if (s->options & SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER)
325 extra=SSL3_RT_MAX_EXTRA;
326 else
327 extra=0;
328 if (extra && !s->s3->init_extra)
329 {
330 /* An application error: SLS_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER
331 * set after ssl3_setup_buffers() was done */
332 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
333 return -1;
334 }
335
336 again:
337 /* check if we have the header */
338 if ( (s->rstate != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) ||
339 (s->packet_length < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH))
340 {
341 n=ssl3_read_n(s, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s->s3->rbuf.len, 0);
342 if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking */
343 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_BODY;
344
345 p=s->packet;
346 if (s->msg_callback)
347 s->msg_callback(0, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, p, 5, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
348
349 /* Pull apart the header into the SSL3_RECORD */
350 rr->type= *(p++);
351 ssl_major= *(p++);
352 ssl_minor= *(p++);
353 version=(ssl_major<<8)|ssl_minor;
354 n2s(p,rr->length);
355 #if 0
356 fprintf(stderr, "Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr->type, rr->length);
357 #endif
358
359 /* Lets check version */
360 if (!s->first_packet)
361 {
362 if (version != s->version)
363 {
364 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
365 if ((s->version & 0xFF00) == (version & 0xFF00) && !s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash)
366 /* Send back error using their minor version number :-) */
367 s->version = (unsigned short)version;
368 al=SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
369 goto f_err;
370 }
371 }
372
373 if ((version>>8) != SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
374 {
375 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
376 goto err;
377 }
378
379 if (rr->length > s->s3->rbuf.len - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
380 {
381 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
382 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
383 goto f_err;
384 }
385
386 /* now s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */
387 }
388
389 /* s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */
390
391 if (rr->length > s->packet_length-SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
392 {
393 /* now s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */
394 i=rr->length;
395 n=ssl3_read_n(s,i,i,1);
396 if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking io */
397 /* now n == rr->length,
398 * and s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length */
399 }
400
401 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; /* set state for later operations */
402
403 /* At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length,
404 * and we have that many bytes in s->packet
405 */
406 rr->input= &(s->packet[SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]);
407
408 /* ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr'
409 * rr->input points at rr->length bytes, which
410 * need to be copied into rr->data by either
411 * the decryption or by the decompression
412 * When the data is 'copied' into the rr->data buffer,
413 * rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer */
414
415 /* We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ]
416 * rr->length bytes of encrypted compressed stuff. */
417
418 /* check is not needed I believe */
419 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH+extra)
420 {
421 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
422 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
423 goto f_err;
424 }
425
426 /* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */
427 rr->data=rr->input;
428 rr->orig_len=rr->length;
429 /* If in encrypt-then-mac mode calculate mac from encrypted record.
430 * All the details below are public so no timing details can leak.
431 */
432 if (SSL_USE_ETM(s) && s->read_hash)
433 {
434 unsigned char *mac;
435 mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
436 OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
437 if (rr->length < mac_size)
438 {
439 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
440 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
441 goto f_err;
442 }
443 rr->length -= mac_size;
444 mac = rr->data + rr->length;
445 i=s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,md,0 /* not send */);
446 if (i < 0 || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0)
447 {
448 al=SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC;
449 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
450 goto f_err;
451 }
452 }
453
454 enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,0);
455 /*-
456 * enc_err is:
457 * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid.
458 * 1: if the padding is valid
459 * -1: if the padding is invalid
460 */
461 if (enc_err == 0)
462 {
463 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED;
464 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_BLOCK_CIPHER_PAD_IS_WRONG);
465 goto f_err;
466 }
467
468 #ifdef TLS_DEBUG
469 printf("dec %d\n",rr->length);
470 { unsigned int z; for (z=0; z<rr->length; z++) printf("%02X%c",rr->data[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
471 printf("\n");
472 #endif
473
474 /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */
475 if ((sess != NULL) &&
476 (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) &&
477 (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL) && !SSL_USE_ETM(s))
478 {
479 /* s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */
480 unsigned char *mac = NULL;
481 unsigned char mac_tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
482 mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
483 OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
484
485 /* orig_len is the length of the record before any padding was
486 * removed. This is public information, as is the MAC in use,
487 * therefore we can safely process the record in a different
488 * amount of time if it's too short to possibly contain a MAC.
489 */
490 if (rr->orig_len < mac_size ||
491 /* CBC records must have a padding length byte too. */
492 (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
493 rr->orig_len < mac_size+1))
494 {
495 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
496 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
497 goto f_err;
498 }
499
500 if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
501 {
502 /* We update the length so that the TLS header bytes
503 * can be constructed correctly but we need to extract
504 * the MAC in constant time from within the record,
505 * without leaking the contents of the padding bytes.
506 * */
507 mac = mac_tmp;
508 ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, rr, mac_size);
509 rr->length -= mac_size;
510 }
511 else
512 {
513 /* In this case there's no padding, so |rec->orig_len|
514 * equals |rec->length| and we checked that there's
515 * enough bytes for |mac_size| above. */
516 rr->length -= mac_size;
517 mac = &rr->data[rr->length];
518 }
519
520 i=s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,md,0 /* not send */);
521 if (i < 0 || mac == NULL || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0)
522 enc_err = -1;
523 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+extra+mac_size)
524 enc_err = -1;
525 }
526
527 if (enc_err < 0)
528 {
529 /* A separate 'decryption_failed' alert was introduced with TLS 1.0,
530 * SSL 3.0 only has 'bad_record_mac'. But unless a decryption
531 * failure is directly visible from the ciphertext anyway,
532 * we should not reveal which kind of error occurred -- this
533 * might become visible to an attacker (e.g. via a logfile) */
534 al=SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC;
535 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
536 goto f_err;
537 }
538
539 /* r->length is now just compressed */
540 if (s->expand != NULL)
541 {
542 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+extra)
543 {
544 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
545 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
546 goto f_err;
547 }
548 if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s))
549 {
550 al=SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE;
551 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION);
552 goto f_err;
553 }
554 }
555
556 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH+extra)
557 {
558 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
559 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
560 goto f_err;
561 }
562
563 rr->off=0;
564 /*-
565 * So at this point the following is true
566 * ssl->s3->rrec.type is the type of record
567 * ssl->s3->rrec.length == number of bytes in record
568 * ssl->s3->rrec.off == offset to first valid byte
569 * ssl->s3->rrec.data == where to take bytes from, increment
570 * after use :-).
571 */
572
573 /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */
574 s->packet_length=0;
575
576 /* just read a 0 length packet */
577 if (rr->length == 0)
578 {
579 empty_record_count++;
580 if (empty_record_count > MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS)
581 {
582 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
583 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_SMALL);
584 goto f_err;
585 }
586 goto again;
587 }
588
589 #if 0
590 fprintf(stderr, "Ultimate Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr->type, rr->length);
591 #endif
592
593 return(1);
594
595 f_err:
596 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
597 err:
598 return(ret);
599 }
600
601 int ssl3_do_uncompress(SSL *ssl)
602 {
603 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
604 int i;
605 SSL3_RECORD *rr;
606
607 rr= &(ssl->s3->rrec);
608 i=COMP_expand_block(ssl->expand,rr->comp,
609 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,rr->data,(int)rr->length);
610 if (i < 0)
611 return(0);
612 else
613 rr->length=i;
614 rr->data=rr->comp;
615 #endif
616 return(1);
617 }
618
619 int ssl3_do_compress(SSL *ssl)
620 {
621 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
622 int i;
623 SSL3_RECORD *wr;
624
625 wr= &(ssl->s3->wrec);
626 i=COMP_compress_block(ssl->compress,wr->data,
627 SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH,
628 wr->input,(int)wr->length);
629 if (i < 0)
630 return(0);
631 else
632 wr->length=i;
633
634 wr->input=wr->data;
635 #endif
636 return(1);
637 }
638
639 /* Call this to write data in records of type 'type'
640 * It will return <= 0 if not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
641 */
642 int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len)
643 {
644 const unsigned char *buf=buf_;
645 int tot;
646 unsigned int n,nw;
647 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
648 unsigned int max_send_fragment;
649 #endif
650 SSL3_BUFFER *wb=&(s->s3->wbuf);
651 int i;
652 unsigned int u_len = (unsigned int)len;
653
654 if (len < 0)
655 {
656 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_NEGATIVE_LENGTH);
657 return -1;
658 }
659
660 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
661 OPENSSL_assert(s->s3->wnum <= INT_MAX);
662 tot=s->s3->wnum;
663 s->s3->wnum=0;
664
665 if (SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake)
666 {
667 i=s->handshake_func(s);
668 if (i < 0) return(i);
669 if (i == 0)
670 {
671 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
672 return -1;
673 }
674 }
675
676 /* ensure that if we end up with a smaller value of data to write
677 * out than the the original len from a write which didn't complete
678 * for non-blocking I/O and also somehow ended up avoiding
679 * the check for this in ssl3_write_pending/SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY as
680 * it must never be possible to end up with (len-tot) as a large
681 * number that will then promptly send beyond the end of the users
682 * buffer ... so we trap and report the error in a way the user
683 * will notice
684 */
685 if (len < tot)
686 {
687 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
688 return(-1);
689 }
690
691 /* first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written
692 * out. This will happen with non blocking IO */
693 if (wb->left != 0)
694 {
695 i = ssl3_write_pending(s,type,&buf[tot],s->s3->wpend_tot);
696 if (i<=0)
697 {
698 /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */
699 s->s3->wnum=tot;
700 return i;
701 }
702 tot += i; /* this might be last fragment */
703 }
704
705 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
706 /*
707 * Depending on platform multi-block can deliver several *times*
708 * better performance. Downside is that it has to allocate
709 * jumbo buffer to accomodate up to 8 records, but the
710 * compromise is considered worthy.
711 */
712 if (type==SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
713 u_len >= 4*(max_send_fragment=s->max_send_fragment) &&
714 s->compress==NULL && s->msg_callback==NULL &&
715 !SSL_USE_ETM(s) && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s) &&
716 EVP_CIPHER_flags(s->enc_write_ctx->cipher)&EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK)
717 {
718 unsigned char aad[13];
719 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_PARAM mb_param;
720 int packlen;
721
722 /* minimize address aliasing conflicts */
723 if ((max_send_fragment&0xfff) == 0)
724 max_send_fragment -= 512;
725
726 if (tot==0 || wb->buf==NULL) /* allocate jumbo buffer */
727 {
728 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
729
730 packlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
731 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_MAX_BUFSIZE,
732 max_send_fragment,NULL);
733
734 if (u_len >= 8*max_send_fragment) packlen *= 8;
735 else packlen *= 4;
736
737 wb->buf=OPENSSL_malloc(packlen);
738 wb->len=packlen;
739 }
740 else if (tot==len) /* done? */
741 {
742 OPENSSL_free(wb->buf); /* free jumbo buffer */
743 wb->buf = NULL;
744 return tot;
745 }
746
747 n=(len-tot);
748 for (;;)
749 {
750 if (n < 4*max_send_fragment)
751 {
752 OPENSSL_free(wb->buf); /* free jumbo buffer */
753 wb->buf = NULL;
754 break;
755 }
756
757 if (s->s3->alert_dispatch)
758 {
759 i=s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
760 if (i <= 0)
761 {
762 s->s3->wnum=tot;
763 return i;
764 }
765 }
766
767 if (n >= 8*max_send_fragment)
768 nw = max_send_fragment*(mb_param.interleave=8);
769 else
770 nw = max_send_fragment*(mb_param.interleave=4);
771
772 memcpy(aad,s->s3->write_sequence,8);
773 aad[8]=type;
774 aad[9]=(unsigned char)(s->version>>8);
775 aad[10]=(unsigned char)(s->version);
776 aad[11]=0;
777 aad[12]=0;
778 mb_param.out = NULL;
779 mb_param.inp = aad;
780 mb_param.len = nw;
781
782 packlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
783 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_AAD,
784 sizeof(mb_param),&mb_param);
785
786 if (packlen<=0 || packlen>(int)wb->len) /* never happens */
787 {
788 OPENSSL_free(wb->buf); /* free jumbo buffer */
789 wb->buf = NULL;
790 break;
791 }
792
793 mb_param.out = wb->buf;
794 mb_param.inp = &buf[tot];
795 mb_param.len = nw;
796
797 if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
798 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_ENCRYPT,
799 sizeof(mb_param),&mb_param)<=0)
800 return -1;
801
802 s->s3->write_sequence[7] += mb_param.interleave;
803 if (s->s3->write_sequence[7] < mb_param.interleave)
804 {
805 int j=6;
806 while (j>=0 && (++s->s3->write_sequence[j--])==0) ;
807 }
808
809 wb->offset = 0;
810 wb->left = packlen;
811
812 s->s3->wpend_tot = nw;
813 s->s3->wpend_buf = &buf[tot];
814 s->s3->wpend_type= type;
815 s->s3->wpend_ret = nw;
816
817 i = ssl3_write_pending(s,type,&buf[tot],nw);
818 if (i<=0)
819 {
820 if (i<0)
821 {
822 OPENSSL_free(wb->buf);
823 wb->buf = NULL;
824 }
825 s->s3->wnum=tot;
826 return i;
827 }
828 if (i==(int)n)
829 {
830 OPENSSL_free(wb->buf); /* free jumbo buffer */
831 wb->buf = NULL;
832 return tot+i;
833 }
834 n-=i;
835 tot+=i;
836 }
837 }
838 else
839 #endif
840 if (tot==len) /* done? */
841 {
842 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS &&
843 !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
844 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
845
846 return tot;
847 }
848
849
850 n=(len-tot);
851 for (;;)
852 {
853 if (n > s->max_send_fragment)
854 nw=s->max_send_fragment;
855 else
856 nw=n;
857
858 i=do_ssl3_write(s, type, &(buf[tot]), nw, 0);
859 if (i <= 0)
860 {
861 /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */
862 s->s3->wnum=tot;
863 return i;
864 }
865
866 if ((i == (int)n) ||
867 (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
868 (s->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE)))
869 {
870 /* next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment
871 * in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness: */
872 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 0;
873
874 if ((i==(int)n) && s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS &&
875 !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
876 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
877
878 return tot+i;
879 }
880
881 n-=i;
882 tot+=i;
883 }
884 }
885
886 static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
887 unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment)
888 {
889 unsigned char *p,*plen;
890 int i,mac_size,clear=0;
891 int prefix_len=0;
892 int eivlen;
893 long align=0;
894 SSL3_RECORD *wr;
895 SSL3_BUFFER *wb=&(s->s3->wbuf);
896 SSL_SESSION *sess;
897
898
899 /* first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written
900 * out. This will happen with non blocking IO */
901 if (wb->left != 0)
902 return(ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len));
903
904 /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
905 if (s->s3->alert_dispatch)
906 {
907 i=s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
908 if (i <= 0)
909 return(i);
910 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
911 }
912
913 if (wb->buf == NULL)
914 if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s))
915 return -1;
916
917 if (len == 0 && !create_empty_fragment)
918 return 0;
919
920 wr= &(s->s3->wrec);
921 sess=s->session;
922
923 if ( (sess == NULL) ||
924 (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) ||
925 (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash) == NULL))
926 {
927 #if 1
928 clear=s->enc_write_ctx?0:1; /* must be AEAD cipher */
929 #else
930 clear=1;
931 #endif
932 mac_size=0;
933 }
934 else
935 {
936 mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
937 if (mac_size < 0)
938 goto err;
939 }
940
941 #if 0 && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
942 if (type==SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && s->compress==NULL &&
943 !SSL_USE_ETM(s) && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s) && /*!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) &&*/
944 EVP_CIPHER_flags(s->enc_write_ctx->cipher)&EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK)
945 do {
946 unsigned char aad[13];
947 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_PARAM mb_param = {NULL,aad,sizeof(aad),0};
948 int packlen;
949
950 memcpy(aad,s->s3->write_sequence,8);
951 aad[8]=type;
952 aad[9]=(unsigned char)(s->version>>8);
953 aad[10]=(unsigned char)(s->version);
954 aad[11]=(unsigned char)(len>>8);
955 aad[12]=(unsigned char)len;
956 packlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
957 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_AAD,
958 sizeof(mb_param),&mb_param);
959
960 if (packlen==0 || packlen > wb->len) break;
961
962 mb_param.out = wb->buf;
963 mb_param.inp = buf;
964 mb_param.len = len;
965 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
966 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_ENCRYPT,
967 sizeof(mb_param),&mb_param);
968
969 s->s3->write_sequence[7] += mb_param.interleave;
970 if (s->s3->write_sequence[7] < mb_param.interleave)
971 {
972 int j=6;
973 while (j>=0 && (++s->s3->write_sequence[j--])==0) ;
974 }
975
976 wb->offset=0;
977 wb->left = packlen;
978
979 /* memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write retries later */
980 s->s3->wpend_tot=len;
981 s->s3->wpend_buf=buf;
982 s->s3->wpend_type=type;
983 s->s3->wpend_ret=len;
984
985 /* we now just need to write the buffer */
986 return ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len);
987 } while (0);
988 #endif
989
990 /* 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself */
991 if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done)
992 {
993 /* countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites
994 * (see http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) */
995
996 if (s->s3->need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
997 {
998 /* recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set;
999 * this prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment
1000 * (these 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later
1001 * together with the actual payload) */
1002 prefix_len = do_ssl3_write(s, type, buf, 0, 1);
1003 if (prefix_len <= 0)
1004 goto err;
1005
1006 if (prefix_len >
1007 (SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD))
1008 {
1009 /* insufficient space */
1010 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1011 goto err;
1012 }
1013 }
1014
1015 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1;
1016 }
1017
1018 if (create_empty_fragment)
1019 {
1020 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
1021 /* extra fragment would be couple of cipher blocks,
1022 * which would be multiple of SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD, so
1023 * if we want to align the real payload, then we can
1024 * just pretent we simply have two headers. */
1025 align = (long)wb->buf + 2*SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
1026 align = (-align)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1);
1027 #endif
1028 p = wb->buf + align;
1029 wb->offset = align;
1030 }
1031 else if (prefix_len)
1032 {
1033 p = wb->buf + wb->offset + prefix_len;
1034 }
1035 else
1036 {
1037 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
1038 align = (long)wb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
1039 align = (-align)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1);
1040 #endif
1041 p = wb->buf + align;
1042 wb->offset = align;
1043 }
1044
1045 /* write the header */
1046
1047 *(p++)=type&0xff;
1048 wr->type=type;
1049
1050 *(p++)=(s->version>>8);
1051 /* Some servers hang if iniatial client hello is larger than 256
1052 * bytes and record version number > TLS 1.0
1053 */
1054 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B
1055 && !s->renegotiate
1056 && TLS1_get_version(s) > TLS1_VERSION)
1057 *(p++) = 0x1;
1058 else
1059 *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
1060
1061 /* field where we are to write out packet length */
1062 plen=p;
1063 p+=2;
1064 /* Explicit IV length, block ciphers appropriate version flag */
1065 if (s->enc_write_ctx && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s))
1066 {
1067 int mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_write_ctx);
1068 if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
1069 {
1070 eivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(s->enc_write_ctx);
1071 if (eivlen <= 1)
1072 eivlen = 0;
1073 }
1074 /* Need explicit part of IV for GCM mode */
1075 else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE)
1076 eivlen = EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
1077 else
1078 eivlen = 0;
1079 }
1080 else
1081 eivlen = 0;
1082
1083 /* lets setup the record stuff. */
1084 wr->data=p + eivlen;
1085 wr->length=(int)len;
1086 wr->input=(unsigned char *)buf;
1087
1088 /* we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into
1089 * wr->data */
1090
1091 /* first we compress */
1092 if (s->compress != NULL)
1093 {
1094 if (!ssl3_do_compress(s))
1095 {
1096 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE);
1097 goto err;
1098 }
1099 }
1100 else
1101 {
1102 memcpy(wr->data,wr->input,wr->length);
1103 wr->input=wr->data;
1104 }
1105
1106 /* we should still have the output to wr->data and the input
1107 * from wr->input. Length should be wr->length.
1108 * wr->data still points in the wb->buf */
1109
1110 if (!SSL_USE_ETM(s) && mac_size != 0)
1111 {
1112 if (s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,&(p[wr->length + eivlen]),1) < 0)
1113 goto err;
1114 wr->length+=mac_size;
1115 }
1116
1117 wr->input=p;
1118 wr->data=p;
1119
1120 if (eivlen)
1121 {
1122 /* if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, eivlen) <= 0)
1123 goto err; */
1124 wr->length += eivlen;
1125 }
1126
1127 if(s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,1)<1) goto err;
1128
1129 if (SSL_USE_ETM(s) && mac_size != 0)
1130 {
1131 if (s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,p + wr->length,1) < 0)
1132 goto err;
1133 wr->length+=mac_size;
1134 }
1135
1136 /* record length after mac and block padding */
1137 s2n(wr->length,plen);
1138
1139 if (s->msg_callback)
1140 s->msg_callback(1, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, plen - 5, 5, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1141
1142 /* we should now have
1143 * wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is
1144 * wr->length long */
1145 wr->type=type; /* not needed but helps for debugging */
1146 wr->length+=SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
1147
1148 if (create_empty_fragment)
1149 {
1150 /* we are in a recursive call;
1151 * just return the length, don't write out anything here
1152 */
1153 return wr->length;
1154 }
1155
1156 /* now let's set up wb */
1157 wb->left = prefix_len + wr->length;
1158
1159 /* memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write retries later */
1160 s->s3->wpend_tot=len;
1161 s->s3->wpend_buf=buf;
1162 s->s3->wpend_type=type;
1163 s->s3->wpend_ret=len;
1164
1165 /* we now just need to write the buffer */
1166 return ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len);
1167 err:
1168 return -1;
1169 }
1170
1171 /* if s->s3->wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this */
1172 int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
1173 unsigned int len)
1174 {
1175 int i;
1176 SSL3_BUFFER *wb=&(s->s3->wbuf);
1177
1178 /* XXXX */
1179 if ((s->s3->wpend_tot > (int)len)
1180 || ((s->s3->wpend_buf != buf) &&
1181 !(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER))
1182 || (s->s3->wpend_type != type))
1183 {
1184 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING,SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY);
1185 return(-1);
1186 }
1187
1188 for (;;)
1189 {
1190 clear_sys_error();
1191 if (s->wbio != NULL)
1192 {
1193 s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
1194 i=BIO_write(s->wbio,
1195 (char *)&(wb->buf[wb->offset]),
1196 (unsigned int)wb->left);
1197 }
1198 else
1199 {
1200 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING,SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET);
1201 i= -1;
1202 }
1203 if (i == wb->left)
1204 {
1205 wb->left=0;
1206 wb->offset+=i;
1207 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1208 return(s->s3->wpend_ret);
1209 }
1210 else if (i <= 0) {
1211 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION ||
1212 s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
1213 /* For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the whole
1214 point in using a datagram service */
1215 wb->left = 0;
1216 }
1217 return(i);
1218 }
1219 wb->offset+=i;
1220 wb->left-=i;
1221 }
1222 }
1223
1224 /*-
1225 * Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
1226 * 'type' is one of the following:
1227 *
1228 * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
1229 * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
1230 * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
1231 *
1232 * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
1233 * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
1234 *
1235 * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
1236 * Alert records (e.g. close_notify), ChangeCipherSpec records (not really
1237 * a surprise, but handled as if it were), or renegotiation requests.
1238 * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
1239 * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
1240 * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
1241 * Change cipher spec protocol
1242 * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
1243 * Alert protocol
1244 * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
1245 * Handshake protocol
1246 * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
1247 * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
1248 * here, anything else is handled by higher layers
1249 * Application data protocol
1250 * none of our business
1251 */
1252 int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek)
1253 {
1254 int al,i,j,ret;
1255 unsigned int n;
1256 SSL3_RECORD *rr;
1257 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type2,int val)=NULL;
1258
1259 if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL) /* Not initialized yet */
1260 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
1261 return(-1);
1262
1263 if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) && (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) ||
1264 (peek && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)))
1265 {
1266 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1267 return -1;
1268 }
1269
1270 if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
1271 /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
1272 {
1273 unsigned char *src = s->s3->handshake_fragment;
1274 unsigned char *dst = buf;
1275 unsigned int k;
1276
1277 /* peek == 0 */
1278 n = 0;
1279 while ((len > 0) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
1280 {
1281 *dst++ = *src++;
1282 len--; s->s3->handshake_fragment_len--;
1283 n++;
1284 }
1285 /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
1286 for (k = 0; k < s->s3->handshake_fragment_len; k++)
1287 s->s3->handshake_fragment[k] = *src++;
1288 return n;
1289 }
1290
1291 /* Now s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE. */
1292
1293 if (!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s))
1294 {
1295 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
1296 i=s->handshake_func(s);
1297 if (i < 0) return(i);
1298 if (i == 0)
1299 {
1300 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1301 return(-1);
1302 }
1303 }
1304 start:
1305 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1306
1307 /*-
1308 * s->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
1309 * s->s3->rrec.data, - data
1310 * s->s3->rrec.off, - offset into 'data' for next read
1311 * s->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes.
1312 */
1313 rr = &(s->s3->rrec);
1314
1315 /* get new packet if necessary */
1316 if ((rr->length == 0) || (s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY))
1317 {
1318 ret=ssl3_get_record(s);
1319 if (ret <= 0) return(ret);
1320 }
1321
1322 /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
1323
1324 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
1325 * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
1326 && (rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE))
1327 {
1328 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1329 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED);
1330 goto f_err;
1331 }
1332
1333 /* If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away
1334 * (even in 'peek' mode) */
1335 if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN)
1336 {
1337 rr->length=0;
1338 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1339 return(0);
1340 }
1341
1342
1343 if (type == rr->type) /* SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE */
1344 {
1345 /* make sure that we are not getting application data when we
1346 * are doing a handshake for the first time */
1347 if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
1348 (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL))
1349 {
1350 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1351 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE);
1352 goto f_err;
1353 }
1354
1355 if (len <= 0) return(len);
1356
1357 if ((unsigned int)len > rr->length)
1358 n = rr->length;
1359 else
1360 n = (unsigned int)len;
1361
1362 memcpy(buf,&(rr->data[rr->off]),n);
1363 if (!peek)
1364 {
1365 rr->length-=n;
1366 rr->off+=n;
1367 if (rr->length == 0)
1368 {
1369 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
1370 rr->off=0;
1371 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && s->s3->rbuf.left == 0)
1372 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
1373 }
1374 }
1375 return(n);
1376 }
1377
1378
1379 /* If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake
1380 * message, then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello). */
1381
1382 /* In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage,
1383 * fill that so that we can process the data at a fixed place.
1384 */
1385 {
1386 unsigned int dest_maxlen = 0;
1387 unsigned char *dest = NULL;
1388 unsigned int *dest_len = NULL;
1389
1390 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
1391 {
1392 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->handshake_fragment;
1393 dest = s->s3->handshake_fragment;
1394 dest_len = &s->s3->handshake_fragment_len;
1395 }
1396 else if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT)
1397 {
1398 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->alert_fragment;
1399 dest = s->s3->alert_fragment;
1400 dest_len = &s->s3->alert_fragment_len;
1401 }
1402 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1403 else if (rr->type == TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT)
1404 {
1405 tls1_process_heartbeat(s);
1406
1407 /* Exit and notify application to read again */
1408 rr->length = 0;
1409 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
1410 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
1411 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
1412 return(-1);
1413 }
1414 #endif
1415
1416 if (dest_maxlen > 0)
1417 {
1418 n = dest_maxlen - *dest_len; /* available space in 'dest' */
1419 if (rr->length < n)
1420 n = rr->length; /* available bytes */
1421
1422 /* now move 'n' bytes: */
1423 while (n-- > 0)
1424 {
1425 dest[(*dest_len)++] = rr->data[rr->off++];
1426 rr->length--;
1427 }
1428
1429 if (*dest_len < dest_maxlen)
1430 goto start; /* fragment was too small */
1431 }
1432 }
1433
1434 /*-
1435 * s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
1436 * s->s3->alert_fragment_len == 2 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT.
1437 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.)
1438 */
1439
1440 /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */
1441 if ((!s->server) &&
1442 (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
1443 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) &&
1444 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL))
1445 {
1446 s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
1447
1448 if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment[1] != 0) ||
1449 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[2] != 0) ||
1450 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[3] != 0))
1451 {
1452 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1453 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST);
1454 goto f_err;
1455 }
1456
1457 if (s->msg_callback)
1458 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->s3->handshake_fragment, 4, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1459
1460 if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
1461 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) &&
1462 !s->s3->renegotiate)
1463 {
1464 ssl3_renegotiate(s);
1465 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s))
1466 {
1467 i=s->handshake_func(s);
1468 if (i < 0) return(i);
1469 if (i == 0)
1470 {
1471 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1472 return(-1);
1473 }
1474
1475 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY))
1476 {
1477 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */
1478 {
1479 BIO *bio;
1480 /* In the case where we try to read application data,
1481 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
1482 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
1483 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
1484 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
1485 bio=SSL_get_rbio(s);
1486 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1487 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1488 return(-1);
1489 }
1490 }
1491 }
1492 }
1493 /* we either finished a handshake or ignored the request,
1494 * now try again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for */
1495 goto start;
1496 }
1497 /* If we are a server and get a client hello when renegotiation isn't
1498 * allowed send back a no renegotiation alert and carry on.
1499 * WARNING: experimental code, needs reviewing (steve)
1500 */
1501 if (s->server &&
1502 SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
1503 !s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
1504 (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) &&
1505 (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
1506 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
1507 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL) &&
1508 !(s->ctx->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
1509
1510 {
1511 /*s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0;*/
1512 rr->length = 0;
1513 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1514 goto start;
1515 }
1516 if (s->s3->alert_fragment_len >= 2)
1517 {
1518 int alert_level = s->s3->alert_fragment[0];
1519 int alert_descr = s->s3->alert_fragment[1];
1520
1521 s->s3->alert_fragment_len = 0;
1522
1523 if (s->msg_callback)
1524 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->alert_fragment, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1525
1526 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1527 cb=s->info_callback;
1528 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1529 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
1530
1531 if (cb != NULL)
1532 {
1533 j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr;
1534 cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j);
1535 }
1536
1537 if (alert_level == 1) /* warning */
1538 {
1539 s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr;
1540 if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY)
1541 {
1542 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1543 return(0);
1544 }
1545 /* This is a warning but we receive it if we requested
1546 * renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with
1547 * a fatal alert because if application tried to
1548 * renegotiatie it presumably had a good reason and
1549 * expects it to succeed.
1550 *
1551 * In future we might have a renegotiation where we
1552 * don't care if the peer refused it where we carry on.
1553 */
1554 else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION)
1555 {
1556 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1557 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1558 goto f_err;
1559 }
1560 #ifdef SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME
1561 else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME)
1562 return(0);
1563 #endif
1564 }
1565 else if (alert_level == 2) /* fatal */
1566 {
1567 char tmp[16];
1568
1569 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1570 s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr;
1571 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr);
1572 BIO_snprintf(tmp,sizeof tmp,"%d",alert_descr);
1573 ERR_add_error_data(2,"SSL alert number ",tmp);
1574 s->shutdown|=SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1575 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session);
1576 return(0);
1577 }
1578 else
1579 {
1580 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1581 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
1582 goto f_err;
1583 }
1584
1585 goto start;
1586 }
1587
1588 if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) /* but we have not received a shutdown */
1589 {
1590 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1591 rr->length=0;
1592 return(0);
1593 }
1594
1595 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
1596 {
1597 /* 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, so we know
1598 * exactly what the record payload has to look like */
1599 if ( (rr->length != 1) || (rr->off != 0) ||
1600 (rr->data[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS))
1601 {
1602 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1603 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
1604 goto f_err;
1605 }
1606
1607 /* Check we have a cipher to change to */
1608 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL)
1609 {
1610 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1611 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1612 goto f_err;
1613 }
1614
1615 if (!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK))
1616 {
1617 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1618 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1619 goto f_err;
1620 }
1621
1622 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
1623
1624 rr->length=0;
1625
1626 if (s->msg_callback)
1627 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, rr->data, 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1628
1629 s->s3->change_cipher_spec=1;
1630 if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s))
1631 goto err;
1632 else
1633 goto start;
1634 }
1635
1636 /* Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation) */
1637 if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) && !s->in_handshake)
1638 {
1639 if (((s->state&SSL_ST_MASK) == SSL_ST_OK) &&
1640 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS))
1641 {
1642 #if 0 /* worked only because C operator preferences are not as expected (and
1643 * because this is not really needed for clients except for detecting
1644 * protocol violations): */
1645 s->state=SSL_ST_BEFORE|(s->server)
1646 ?SSL_ST_ACCEPT
1647 :SSL_ST_CONNECT;
1648 #else
1649 s->state = s->server ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT;
1650 #endif
1651 s->renegotiate=1;
1652 s->new_session=1;
1653 }
1654 i=s->handshake_func(s);
1655 if (i < 0) return(i);
1656 if (i == 0)
1657 {
1658 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1659 return(-1);
1660 }
1661
1662 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY))
1663 {
1664 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */
1665 {
1666 BIO *bio;
1667 /* In the case where we try to read application data,
1668 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
1669 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
1670 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
1671 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
1672 bio=SSL_get_rbio(s);
1673 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1674 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1675 return(-1);
1676 }
1677 }
1678 goto start;
1679 }
1680
1681 switch (rr->type)
1682 {
1683 default:
1684 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS
1685 /* TLS up to v1.1 just ignores unknown message types:
1686 * TLS v1.2 give an unexpected message alert.
1687 */
1688 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->version <= TLS1_1_VERSION)
1689 {
1690 rr->length = 0;
1691 goto start;
1692 }
1693 #endif
1694 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1695 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1696 goto f_err;
1697 case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
1698 case SSL3_RT_ALERT:
1699 case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:
1700 /* we already handled all of these, with the possible exception
1701 * of SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when s->in_handshake is set, but that
1702 * should not happen when type != rr->type */
1703 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1704 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1705 goto f_err;
1706 case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
1707 /* At this point, we were expecting handshake data,
1708 * but have application data. If the library was
1709 * running inside ssl3_read() (i.e. in_read_app_data
1710 * is set) and it makes sense to read application data
1711 * at this point (session renegotiation not yet started),
1712 * we will indulge it.
1713 */
1714 if (s->s3->in_read_app_data &&
1715 (s->s3->total_renegotiations != 0) &&
1716 ((
1717 (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) &&
1718 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) &&
1719 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1720 ) || (
1721 (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) &&
1722 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) &&
1723 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
1724 )
1725 ))
1726 {
1727 s->s3->in_read_app_data=2;
1728 return(-1);
1729 }
1730 else
1731 {
1732 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1733 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1734 goto f_err;
1735 }
1736 }
1737 /* not reached */
1738
1739 f_err:
1740 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1741 err:
1742 return(-1);
1743 }
1744
1745 int ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s)
1746 {
1747 int i;
1748 const char *sender;
1749 int slen;
1750
1751 if (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
1752 i=SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ;
1753 else
1754 i=SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ;
1755
1756 if (s->s3->tmp.key_block == NULL)
1757 {
1758 if (s->session == NULL || s->session->master_key_length == 0)
1759 {
1760 /* might happen if dtls1_read_bytes() calls this */
1761 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1762 return (0);
1763 }
1764
1765 s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
1766 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) return(0);
1767 }
1768
1769 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,i))
1770 return(0);
1771
1772 /* we have to record the message digest at
1773 * this point so we can get it before we read
1774 * the finished message */
1775 if (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT)
1776 {
1777 sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label;
1778 slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len;
1779 }
1780 else
1781 {
1782 sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label;
1783 slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len;
1784 }
1785
1786 i = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
1787 sender,slen,s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md);
1788 if (i == 0)
1789 {
1790 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1791 return 0;
1792 }
1793 s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = i;
1794
1795 return(1);
1796 }
1797
1798 int ssl3_send_alert(SSL *s, int level, int desc)
1799 {
1800 /* Map tls/ssl alert value to correct one */
1801 desc=s->method->ssl3_enc->alert_value(desc);
1802 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && desc == SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION)
1803 desc = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; /* SSL 3.0 does not have protocol_version alerts */
1804 if (desc < 0) return -1;
1805 /* If a fatal one, remove from cache */
1806 if ((level == SSL3_AL_FATAL) && (s->session != NULL))
1807 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session);
1808
1809 s->s3->alert_dispatch=1;
1810 s->s3->send_alert[0]=level;
1811 s->s3->send_alert[1]=desc;
1812 if (s->s3->wbuf.left == 0) /* data still being written out? */
1813 return s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
1814 /* else data is still being written out, we will get written
1815 * some time in the future */
1816 return -1;
1817 }
1818
1819 int ssl3_dispatch_alert(SSL *s)
1820 {
1821 int i,j;
1822 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
1823
1824 s->s3->alert_dispatch=0;
1825 i = do_ssl3_write(s, SSL3_RT_ALERT, &s->s3->send_alert[0], 2, 0);
1826 if (i <= 0)
1827 {
1828 s->s3->alert_dispatch=1;
1829 }
1830 else
1831 {
1832 /* Alert sent to BIO. If it is important, flush it now.
1833 * If the message does not get sent due to non-blocking IO,
1834 * we will not worry too much. */
1835 if (s->s3->send_alert[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL)
1836 (void)BIO_flush(s->wbio);
1837
1838 if (s->msg_callback)
1839 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->send_alert, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1840
1841 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1842 cb=s->info_callback;
1843 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1844 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
1845
1846 if (cb != NULL)
1847 {
1848 j=(s->s3->send_alert[0]<<8)|s->s3->send_alert[1];
1849 cb(s,SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT,j);
1850 }
1851 }
1852 return(i);
1853 }
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