2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
124 /* ====================================================================
125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
142 * to make use of the Contribution.
144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
151 #define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
152 #define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
155 #include "ssl_locl.h"
156 #include "kssl_lcl.h"
157 #include "../crypto/constant_time_locl.h"
158 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
159 #include <openssl/rand.h>
160 #include <openssl/objects.h>
161 #include <openssl/evp.h>
162 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
163 #include <openssl/x509.h>
164 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
165 # include <openssl/dh.h>
167 #include <openssl/bn.h>
168 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
169 # include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
171 #include <openssl/md5.h>
173 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD
174 static const SSL_METHOD
*ssl3_get_server_method(int ver
);
176 static const SSL_METHOD
*ssl3_get_server_method(int ver
)
178 if (ver
== SSL3_VERSION
)
179 return (SSLv3_server_method());
184 IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method
,
186 ssl_undefined_function
, ssl3_get_server_method
)
188 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
189 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL
*s
, int *al
)
191 int ret
= SSL_ERROR_NONE
;
193 *al
= SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME
;
195 if ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kSRP
) &&
196 (s
->srp_ctx
.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback
!= NULL
)) {
197 if (s
->srp_ctx
.login
== NULL
) {
199 * RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp
203 *al
= SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY
;
205 ret
= SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s
, al
);
212 int ssl3_accept(SSL
*s
)
215 unsigned long alg_k
, Time
= (unsigned long)time(NULL
);
216 void (*cb
) (const SSL
*ssl
, int type
, int val
) = NULL
;
218 int new_state
, state
, skip
= 0;
220 RAND_add(&Time
, sizeof(Time
), 0);
224 if (s
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
225 cb
= s
->info_callback
;
226 else if (s
->ctx
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
227 cb
= s
->ctx
->info_callback
;
229 /* init things to blank */
231 if (!SSL_in_init(s
) || SSL_in_before(s
))
234 if (s
->cert
== NULL
) {
235 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT
, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET
);
238 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
240 * If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we already got and
241 * don't await it anymore, because Heartbeats don't make sense during
244 if (s
->tlsext_hb_pending
) {
245 s
->tlsext_hb_pending
= 0;
254 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE
:
256 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
260 case SSL_ST_BEFORE
| SSL_ST_ACCEPT
:
261 case SSL_ST_OK
| SSL_ST_ACCEPT
:
265 cb(s
, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START
, 1);
267 if ((s
->version
>> 8) != 3) {
268 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
269 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
272 s
->type
= SSL_ST_ACCEPT
;
274 if (s
->init_buf
== NULL
) {
275 if ((buf
= BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL
) {
277 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
280 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf
, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
)) {
283 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
289 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s
)) {
291 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
296 s
->s3
->flags
&= ~SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE
;
297 s
->s3
->flags
&= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK
;
299 * Should have been reset by ssl3_get_finished, too.
301 s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
= 0;
303 if (s
->state
!= SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE
) {
305 * Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that the
306 * output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
308 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s
, 1)) {
310 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
314 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s
);
315 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A
;
316 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_accept
++;
317 } else if (!s
->s3
->send_connection_binding
&&
319 SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION
)) {
321 * Server attempting to renegotiate with client that doesn't
322 * support secure renegotiation.
324 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT
,
325 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED
);
326 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
328 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
332 * s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE, we will just send a
335 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_accept_renegotiate
++;
336 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A
;
340 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A
:
341 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B
:
344 ret
= ssl3_send_hello_request(s
);
347 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C
;
348 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH
;
351 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s
);
354 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C
:
355 s
->state
= SSL_ST_OK
;
358 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A
:
359 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B
:
360 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C
:
363 if (s
->rwstate
!= SSL_X509_LOOKUP
) {
364 ret
= ssl3_get_client_hello(s
);
368 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
371 if ((ret
= ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s
, &al
)) < 0) {
373 * callback indicates firther work to be done
375 s
->rwstate
= SSL_X509_LOOKUP
;
378 if (ret
!= SSL_ERROR_NONE
) {
379 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
381 * This is not really an error but the only means to for
382 * a client to detect whether srp is supported.
384 if (al
!= TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY
)
385 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT
, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
);
387 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
394 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A
;
398 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A
:
399 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B
:
400 ret
= ssl3_send_server_hello(s
);
403 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
405 if (s
->tlsext_ticket_expected
)
406 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A
;
408 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A
;
412 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A
;
415 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A
;
419 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A
:
420 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B
:
421 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
422 /* normal PSK or KRB5 or SRP */
425 new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aNULL
| SSL_aKRB5
|
427 && !(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kPSK
)) {
428 ret
= ssl3_send_server_certificate(s
);
431 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
432 if (s
->tlsext_status_expected
)
433 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A
;
435 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A
;
438 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A
;
444 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A
;
449 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A
:
450 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B
:
451 alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
454 * clear this, it may get reset by
455 * send_server_key_exchange
457 s
->s3
->tmp
.use_rsa_tmp
= 0;
460 * only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or RSA but we have a
461 * sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For
462 * ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if
463 * the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases,
464 * the server certificate contains the server's public key for
469 * PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if
472 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
473 || ((alg_k
& SSL_kPSK
) && s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
)
475 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
476 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
477 || (alg_k
& SSL_kSRP
)
479 || (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHr
| SSL_kDHd
| SSL_kEDH
))
480 || (alg_k
& SSL_kEECDH
)
481 || ((alg_k
& SSL_kRSA
)
482 && (s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
].privatekey
== NULL
483 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
)
484 && EVP_PKEY_size(s
->cert
->pkeys
485 [SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
].privatekey
) *
486 8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
)
491 ret
= ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s
);
497 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A
;
501 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A
:
502 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B
:
503 if ( /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
504 !(s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
) ||
506 * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert
507 * during re-negotiation:
509 ((s
->session
->peer
!= NULL
) &&
510 (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE
)) ||
512 * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see
513 * section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in
516 ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aNULL
) &&
518 * ... except when the application insists on
519 * verification (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts
522 !(s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT
)) ||
524 * never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites
526 (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aKRB5
) ||
527 /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
528 (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aSRP
)
530 * With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests
533 || (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kPSK
)) {
534 /* no cert request */
536 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
= 0;
537 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A
;
538 if (s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
) {
539 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
)) {
540 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
545 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
= 1;
546 ret
= ssl3_send_certificate_request(s
);
549 #ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
550 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A
;
552 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH
;
553 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
= SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A
;
559 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A
:
560 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B
:
561 ret
= ssl3_send_server_done(s
);
564 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
= SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A
;
565 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH
;
569 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH
:
572 * This code originally checked to see if any data was pending
573 * using BIO_CTRL_INFO and then flushed. This caused problems as
574 * documented in PR#1939. The proposed fix doesn't completely
575 * resolve this issue as buggy implementations of
576 * BIO_CTRL_PENDING still exist. So instead we just flush
580 s
->rwstate
= SSL_WRITING
;
581 if (BIO_flush(s
->wbio
) <= 0) {
585 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
587 s
->state
= s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
;
590 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A
:
591 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B
:
592 /* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */
593 ret
= ssl3_check_client_hello(s
);
597 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C
;
599 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
) {
600 ret
= ssl3_get_client_certificate(s
);
605 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A
;
609 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A
:
610 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B
:
611 ret
= ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s
);
616 * For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH
617 * pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is
618 * not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses
619 * its key from the certificate for key exchange.
621 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
622 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
;
624 if (s
->s3
->next_proto_neg_seen
)
625 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A
;
627 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
;
630 } else if (TLS1_get_version(s
) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
) {
631 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A
;
633 if (!s
->session
->peer
)
636 * For TLS v1.2 freeze the handshake buffer at this point and
637 * digest cached records.
639 if (!s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
) {
640 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
641 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
644 s
->s3
->flags
|= TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE
;
645 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
)) {
646 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
653 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A
;
657 * We need to get hashes here so if there is a client cert,
658 * it can be verified FIXME - digest processing for
659 * CertificateVerify should be generalized. But it is next
662 if (s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
) {
663 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
)) {
664 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
668 for (dgst_num
= 0; dgst_num
< SSL_MAX_DIGEST
; dgst_num
++)
669 if (s
->s3
->handshake_dgst
[dgst_num
]) {
672 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->cert_verify_mac(s
,
681 EVP_MD_CTX_size(s
->s3
->handshake_dgst
[dgst_num
]);
683 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
692 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A
:
693 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B
:
694 ret
= ssl3_get_cert_verify(s
);
698 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
699 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
;
701 if (s
->s3
->next_proto_neg_seen
)
702 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A
;
704 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
;
709 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
710 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A
:
711 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B
:
713 * Enable CCS for NPN. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make
714 * sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates. This *should* be the
715 * first time we have received one - but we check anyway to be
717 * s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is
718 * processed in s3_pkt.c, and remains set until
719 * the client's Finished message is read.
721 if (!s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
)
722 s
->s3
->flags
|= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK
;
724 ret
= ssl3_get_next_proto(s
);
728 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
;
732 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
:
733 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B
:
735 * Enable CCS for handshakes without NPN. In NPN the CCS flag has
736 * already been set. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make
737 * sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates.
738 * s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is
739 * processed in s3_pkt.c, and remains set until
740 * the client's Finished message is read.
742 if (!s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
)
743 s
->s3
->flags
|= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK
;
744 ret
= ssl3_get_finished(s
, SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
,
745 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B
);
749 s
->state
= SSL_ST_OK
;
750 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
751 else if (s
->tlsext_ticket_expected
)
752 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A
;
755 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A
;
759 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
760 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A
:
761 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B
:
762 ret
= ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s
);
765 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A
;
769 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A
:
770 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B
:
771 ret
= ssl3_send_cert_status(s
);
774 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A
;
780 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A
:
781 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B
:
783 s
->session
->cipher
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
;
784 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->setup_key_block(s
)) {
786 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
790 ret
= ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s
,
792 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B
);
796 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A
;
799 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
800 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE
))
803 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
809 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A
:
810 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B
:
811 ret
= ssl3_send_finished(s
,
812 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A
,
813 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B
,
815 ssl3_enc
->server_finished_label
,
817 ssl3_enc
->server_finished_label_len
);
820 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH
;
822 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
823 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
= SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
;
825 if (s
->s3
->next_proto_neg_seen
) {
826 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
= SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A
;
828 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
= SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
;
831 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
= SSL_ST_OK
;
836 /* clean a few things up */
837 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s
);
839 BUF_MEM_free(s
->init_buf
);
842 /* remove buffering on output */
843 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s
);
847 if (s
->renegotiate
== 2) { /* skipped if we just sent a
852 ssl_update_cache(s
, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER
);
854 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_accept_good
++;
856 s
->handshake_func
= ssl3_accept
;
859 cb(s
, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE
, 1);
868 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT
, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE
);
874 if (!s
->s3
->tmp
.reuse_message
&& !skip
) {
876 if ((ret
= BIO_flush(s
->wbio
)) <= 0)
880 if ((cb
!= NULL
) && (s
->state
!= state
)) {
881 new_state
= s
->state
;
883 cb(s
, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP
, 1);
884 s
->state
= new_state
;
890 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
894 cb(s
, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT
, ret
);
898 int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL
*s
)
902 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A
) {
903 p
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
904 *(p
++) = SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST
;
909 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B
;
910 /* number of bytes to write */
915 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
916 return (ssl3_do_write(s
, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
));
919 int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL
*s
)
925 * this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message,
926 * so permit appropriate message length
928 n
= s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
931 -1, s
->max_cert_list
, &ok
);
934 s
->s3
->tmp
.reuse_message
= 1;
935 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
== SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO
) {
937 * We only allow the client to restart the handshake once per
940 if (s
->s3
->flags
& SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE
) {
941 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CLIENT_HELLO
,
942 SSL_R_MULTIPLE_SGC_RESTARTS
);
946 * Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake,
947 * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.)
949 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
950 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
!= NULL
) {
951 DH_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
);
952 s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
= NULL
;
955 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
956 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.ecdh
!= NULL
) {
957 EC_KEY_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.ecdh
);
958 s
->s3
->tmp
.ecdh
= NULL
;
961 s
->s3
->flags
|= SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE
;
967 int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL
*s
)
969 int i
, j
, ok
, al
, ret
= -1, cookie_valid
= 0;
970 unsigned int cookie_len
;
973 unsigned char *p
, *d
, *q
;
975 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
976 SSL_COMP
*comp
= NULL
;
978 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *ciphers
= NULL
;
981 * We do this so that we will respond with our native type. If we are
982 * TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1, This down
983 * switching should be handled by a different method. If we are SSLv3, we
984 * will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with TLSv1.
986 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A
) {
987 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B
;
990 n
= s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
991 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B
,
992 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C
,
993 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
994 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
, &ok
);
999 d
= p
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
1002 * 2 bytes for client version, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE bytes for random, 1 byte
1003 * for session id length
1005 if (n
< 2 + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
+ 1) {
1006 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1007 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1012 * use version from inside client hello, not from record header (may
1013 * differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph)
1015 s
->client_version
= (((int)p
[0]) << 8) | (int)p
[1];
1018 if ((s
->version
== DTLS1_VERSION
&& s
->client_version
> s
->version
) ||
1019 (s
->version
!= DTLS1_VERSION
&& s
->client_version
< s
->version
)) {
1020 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER
);
1021 if ((s
->client_version
>> 8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR
&&
1022 !s
->enc_write_ctx
&& !s
->write_hash
) {
1024 * similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version
1027 s
->version
= s
->client_version
;
1029 al
= SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
1034 * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one, just
1035 * return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet. So check
1038 if (SSL_get_options(s
) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE
) {
1039 unsigned int session_length
, cookie_length
;
1041 session_length
= *(p
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
1043 if (p
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
+ session_length
+ 1 >= d
+ n
) {
1044 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1045 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1048 cookie_length
= *(p
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
+ session_length
+ 1);
1050 if (cookie_length
== 0)
1054 /* load the client random */
1055 memcpy(s
->s3
->client_random
, p
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
1056 p
+= SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
;
1058 /* get the session-id */
1061 if (p
+ j
> d
+ n
) {
1062 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1063 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1067 if ((j
< 0) || (j
> SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH
)) {
1068 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1069 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1075 * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in
1076 * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally
1077 * ignore resumption requests with flag
1078 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
1079 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on this
1080 * for security won't even compile against older library versions).
1081 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to
1082 * request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains
1083 * unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the
1084 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be ignored.
1087 && (s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
))) {
1088 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s
, 1))
1091 i
= ssl_get_prev_session(s
, p
, j
, d
+ n
);
1093 * Only resume if the session's version matches the negotiated
1095 * RFC 5246 does not provide much useful advice on resumption
1096 * with a different protocol version. It doesn't forbid it but
1097 * the sanity of such behaviour would be questionable.
1098 * In practice, clients do not accept a version mismatch and
1099 * will abort the handshake with an error.
1101 if (i
== 1 && s
->version
== s
->session
->ssl_version
) { /* previous
1108 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s
, 1))
1115 if (s
->version
== DTLS1_VERSION
|| s
->version
== DTLS1_BAD_VER
) {
1117 if (p
+ 1 > d
+ n
) {
1118 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1119 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1122 cookie_len
= *(p
++);
1124 if (p
+ cookie_len
> d
+ n
) {
1125 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1126 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1131 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
1132 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
1133 * does not cause an overflow.
1135 if (cookie_len
> sizeof(s
->d1
->rcvd_cookie
)) {
1137 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1138 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH
);
1142 /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
1143 if ((SSL_get_options(s
) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE
) && cookie_len
> 0) {
1144 memcpy(s
->d1
->rcvd_cookie
, p
, cookie_len
);
1146 if (s
->ctx
->app_verify_cookie_cb
!= NULL
) {
1147 if (s
->ctx
->app_verify_cookie_cb(s
, s
->d1
->rcvd_cookie
,
1149 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1150 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1151 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH
);
1154 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1156 /* default verification */
1157 else if (memcmp(s
->d1
->rcvd_cookie
, s
->d1
->cookie
,
1158 s
->d1
->cookie_len
) != 0) {
1159 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1160 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH
);
1169 if (p
+ 2 > d
+ n
) {
1170 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1171 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1177 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1178 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED
);
1182 /* i bytes of cipher data + 1 byte for compression length later */
1183 if ((p
+ i
+ 1) > (d
+ n
)) {
1184 /* not enough data */
1185 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1186 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1189 if (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s
, p
, i
, &(ciphers
)) == NULL
) {
1194 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
1197 id
= s
->session
->cipher
->id
;
1200 fprintf(stderr
, "client sent %d ciphers\n",
1201 sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers
));
1203 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers
); i
++) {
1204 c
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers
, i
);
1206 fprintf(stderr
, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1207 i
, sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers
), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c
));
1215 * Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade attack:
1219 if (j
== 0 && (s
->options
& SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG
)
1220 && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers
) == 1)) {
1222 * Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used
1223 * cipher may not be in the current list, the client instead
1224 * might be trying to continue using a cipher that before wasn't
1225 * chosen due to server preferences. We'll have to reject the
1226 * connection if the cipher is not enabled, though.
1228 c
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers
, 0);
1229 if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s
), c
) >= 0) {
1230 s
->session
->cipher
= c
;
1237 * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked
1240 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1241 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1242 SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING
);
1249 if ((p
+ i
) > (d
+ n
)) {
1250 /* not enough data */
1251 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1252 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1256 for (j
= 0; j
< i
; j
++) {
1264 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1265 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED
);
1268 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1269 /* TLS extensions */
1270 if (s
->version
>= SSL3_VERSION
) {
1271 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s
, &p
, d
+ n
, &al
)) {
1272 /* 'al' set by ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext */
1273 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT
);
1277 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s
) <= 0) {
1278 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
);
1283 * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake
1284 * for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before
1285 * calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket
1286 * processing to use it in key derivation.
1290 pos
= s
->s3
->server_random
;
1291 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s
, 1, pos
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) <= 0) {
1292 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1297 if (!s
->hit
&& s
->version
>= TLS1_VERSION
&& s
->tls_session_secret_cb
) {
1298 SSL_CIPHER
*pref_cipher
= NULL
;
1300 s
->session
->master_key_length
= sizeof(s
->session
->master_key
);
1301 if (s
->tls_session_secret_cb(s
, s
->session
->master_key
,
1302 &s
->session
->master_key_length
, ciphers
,
1304 s
->tls_session_secret_cb_arg
)) {
1306 s
->session
->ciphers
= ciphers
;
1307 s
->session
->verify_result
= X509_V_OK
;
1311 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1313 pref_cipher
? pref_cipher
: ssl3_choose_cipher(s
,
1318 if (pref_cipher
== NULL
) {
1319 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1320 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER
);
1324 s
->session
->cipher
= pref_cipher
;
1327 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s
->cipher_list
);
1329 if (s
->cipher_list_by_id
)
1330 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s
->cipher_list_by_id
);
1332 s
->cipher_list
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s
->session
->ciphers
);
1333 s
->cipher_list_by_id
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s
->session
->ciphers
);
1339 * Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1340 * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
1341 * algorithms from the client, starting at q.
1343 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
= NULL
;
1344 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1345 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1346 if (s
->session
->compress_meth
!= 0) {
1347 int m
, comp_id
= s
->session
->compress_meth
;
1348 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1349 /* Can't disable compression */
1350 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION
) {
1351 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1352 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1353 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION
);
1356 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1357 for (m
= 0; m
< sk_SSL_COMP_num(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
); m
++) {
1358 comp
= sk_SSL_COMP_value(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
, m
);
1359 if (comp_id
== comp
->id
) {
1360 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
= comp
;
1364 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
== NULL
) {
1365 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1366 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1367 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM
);
1370 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1371 for (m
= 0; m
< i
; m
++) {
1372 if (q
[m
] == comp_id
)
1376 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1377 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1378 SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING
);
1383 else if (!(s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION
) && s
->ctx
->comp_methods
) {
1384 /* See if we have a match */
1385 int m
, nn
, o
, v
, done
= 0;
1387 nn
= sk_SSL_COMP_num(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
);
1388 for (m
= 0; m
< nn
; m
++) {
1389 comp
= sk_SSL_COMP_value(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
, m
);
1391 for (o
= 0; o
< i
; o
++) {
1401 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
= comp
;
1407 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1408 * using compression.
1410 if (s
->session
->compress_meth
!= 0) {
1411 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1412 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION
);
1418 * Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher
1422 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1423 s
->session
->compress_meth
= 0;
1425 s
->session
->compress_meth
= (comp
== NULL
) ? 0 : comp
->id
;
1427 if (s
->session
->ciphers
!= NULL
)
1428 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s
->session
->ciphers
);
1429 s
->session
->ciphers
= ciphers
;
1430 if (ciphers
== NULL
) {
1431 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1432 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1436 c
= ssl3_choose_cipher(s
, s
->session
->ciphers
, SSL_get_ciphers(s
));
1439 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1440 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER
);
1443 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
= c
;
1445 /* Session-id reuse */
1446 #ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
1447 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *sk
;
1448 SSL_CIPHER
*nc
= NULL
;
1449 SSL_CIPHER
*ec
= NULL
;
1451 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG
) {
1452 sk
= s
->session
->ciphers
;
1453 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk
); i
++) {
1454 c
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk
, i
);
1455 if (c
->algorithm_enc
& SSL_eNULL
)
1457 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c
))
1461 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
= nc
;
1462 else if (ec
!= NULL
)
1463 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
= ec
;
1465 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
= s
->session
->cipher
;
1468 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
= s
->session
->cipher
;
1471 if (TLS1_get_version(s
) < TLS1_2_VERSION
1472 || !(s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
)) {
1473 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
)) {
1474 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1480 * we now have the following setup.
1482 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
1483 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
1484 * compression - basically ignored right now
1485 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1486 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1487 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1488 * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
1491 /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */
1492 if (s
->version
>= SSL3_VERSION
) {
1493 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s
) <= 0) {
1494 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
);
1499 ret
= cookie_valid
? 2 : 1;
1502 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1504 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
1507 if (ciphers
!= NULL
)
1508 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers
);
1512 int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL
*s
)
1515 unsigned char *p
, *d
;
1519 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A
) {
1520 buf
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
1521 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1522 p
= s
->s3
->server_random
;
1523 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s
, 1, p
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) <= 0) {
1524 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
1528 /* Do the message type and length last */
1531 *(p
++) = s
->version
>> 8;
1532 *(p
++) = s
->version
& 0xff;
1535 memcpy(p
, s
->s3
->server_random
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
1536 p
+= SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
;
1539 * There are several cases for the session ID to send
1540 * back in the server hello:
1541 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
1542 * we send back the old session ID.
1543 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
1544 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
1545 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
1546 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
1548 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
1549 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
1550 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
1551 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
1554 if (!(s
->ctx
->session_cache_mode
& SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER
)
1556 s
->session
->session_id_length
= 0;
1558 sl
= s
->session
->session_id_length
;
1559 if (sl
> (int)sizeof(s
->session
->session_id
)) {
1560 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1561 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
1565 memcpy(p
, s
->session
->session_id
, sl
);
1568 /* put the cipher */
1569 i
= ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
, p
);
1572 /* put the compression method */
1573 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1576 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
== NULL
)
1579 *(p
++) = s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
->id
;
1581 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1582 if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s
) <= 0) {
1583 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT
);
1584 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
1588 ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s
, p
,
1589 buf
+ SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
)) ==
1591 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1592 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
1599 *(d
++) = SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO
;
1602 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B
;
1603 /* number of bytes to write */
1604 s
->init_num
= p
- buf
;
1608 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
1609 return (ssl3_do_write(s
, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
));
1612 int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL
*s
)
1616 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A
) {
1617 p
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
1620 *(p
++) = SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE
;
1625 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B
;
1626 /* number of bytes to write */
1631 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
1632 return (ssl3_do_write(s
, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
));
1635 int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL
*s
)
1637 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1641 unsigned char md_buf
[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
+ SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
];
1644 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1645 DH
*dh
= NULL
, *dhp
;
1647 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1648 EC_KEY
*ecdh
= NULL
, *ecdhp
;
1649 unsigned char *encodedPoint
= NULL
;
1652 BN_CTX
*bn_ctx
= NULL
;
1655 const EVP_MD
*md
= NULL
;
1656 unsigned char *p
, *d
;
1666 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx
);
1667 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A
) {
1668 type
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
1673 r
[0] = r
[1] = r
[2] = r
[3] = NULL
;
1675 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1676 if (type
& SSL_kRSA
) {
1677 rsa
= cert
->rsa_tmp
;
1678 if ((rsa
== NULL
) && (s
->cert
->rsa_tmp_cb
!= NULL
)) {
1679 rsa
= s
->cert
->rsa_tmp_cb(s
,
1680 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->
1682 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s
->s3
->
1685 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1686 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1687 SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY
);
1691 cert
->rsa_tmp
= rsa
;
1694 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1695 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1696 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY
);
1701 s
->s3
->tmp
.use_rsa_tmp
= 1;
1704 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1705 if (type
& SSL_kEDH
) {
1707 if ((dhp
== NULL
) && (s
->cert
->dh_tmp_cb
!= NULL
))
1708 dhp
= s
->cert
->dh_tmp_cb(s
,
1709 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->
1711 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s
->s3
->
1714 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1715 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1716 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY
);
1720 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
!= NULL
) {
1721 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1722 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1726 if ((dh
= DHparams_dup(dhp
)) == NULL
) {
1727 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_DH_LIB
);
1732 if (!DH_generate_key(dh
)) {
1733 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_DH_LIB
);
1741 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1742 if (type
& SSL_kEECDH
) {
1743 const EC_GROUP
*group
;
1745 ecdhp
= cert
->ecdh_tmp
;
1746 if ((ecdhp
== NULL
) && (s
->cert
->ecdh_tmp_cb
!= NULL
)) {
1747 ecdhp
= s
->cert
->ecdh_tmp_cb(s
,
1748 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->
1750 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s
->
1751 s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
));
1753 if (ecdhp
== NULL
) {
1754 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1755 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1756 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY
);
1760 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.ecdh
!= NULL
) {
1761 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1762 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1766 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
1767 if (ecdhp
== NULL
) {
1768 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB
);
1771 if ((ecdh
= EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp
)) == NULL
) {
1772 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB
);
1776 s
->s3
->tmp
.ecdh
= ecdh
;
1777 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh
) == NULL
) ||
1778 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh
) == NULL
) ||
1779 (s
->options
& SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE
)) {
1780 if (!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh
)) {
1781 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1787 if (((group
= EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh
)) == NULL
) ||
1788 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh
) == NULL
) ||
1789 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh
) == NULL
)) {
1790 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB
);
1794 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
) &&
1795 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group
) > 163)) {
1796 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1797 SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER
);
1802 * XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH keys over named
1803 * (not generic) curves. For supported named curves, curve_id is
1807 tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group
)))
1809 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1810 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE
);
1815 * Encode the public key. First check the size of encoding and
1816 * allocate memory accordingly.
1818 encodedlen
= EC_POINT_point2oct(group
,
1819 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh
),
1820 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED
,
1823 encodedPoint
= (unsigned char *)
1824 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen
* sizeof(unsigned char));
1825 bn_ctx
= BN_CTX_new();
1826 if ((encodedPoint
== NULL
) || (bn_ctx
== NULL
)) {
1827 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1828 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1832 encodedlen
= EC_POINT_point2oct(group
,
1833 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh
),
1834 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED
,
1835 encodedPoint
, encodedlen
, bn_ctx
);
1837 if (encodedlen
== 0) {
1838 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB
);
1842 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx
);
1846 * XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves in
1847 * ECDH ephemeral key exchanges. In this situation, we need four
1848 * additional bytes to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
1854 * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we
1855 * can set these to NULLs
1862 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
1863 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1864 if (type
& SSL_kPSK
) {
1866 * reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint
1868 n
+= 2 + strlen(s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
);
1870 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1871 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1872 if (type
& SSL_kSRP
) {
1873 if ((s
->srp_ctx
.N
== NULL
) ||
1874 (s
->srp_ctx
.g
== NULL
) ||
1875 (s
->srp_ctx
.s
== NULL
) || (s
->srp_ctx
.B
== NULL
)) {
1876 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1877 SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM
);
1880 r
[0] = s
->srp_ctx
.N
;
1881 r
[1] = s
->srp_ctx
.g
;
1882 r
[2] = s
->srp_ctx
.s
;
1883 r
[3] = s
->srp_ctx
.B
;
1887 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1888 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1889 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE
);
1892 for (i
= 0; i
< 4 && r
[i
] != NULL
; i
++) {
1893 nr
[i
] = BN_num_bytes(r
[i
]);
1894 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1895 if ((i
== 2) && (type
& SSL_kSRP
))
1902 if (!(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aNULL
| SSL_aSRP
))
1903 && !(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kPSK
)) {
1904 if ((pkey
= ssl_get_sign_pkey(s
, s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
, &md
))
1906 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1909 kn
= EVP_PKEY_size(pkey
);
1915 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf
, n
+ 4 + kn
)) {
1916 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_LIB_BUF
);
1919 d
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
1922 for (i
= 0; i
< 4 && r
[i
] != NULL
; i
++) {
1923 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1924 if ((i
== 2) && (type
& SSL_kSRP
)) {
1934 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1935 if (type
& SSL_kEECDH
) {
1937 * XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves. In
1938 * this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has: [1 byte
1939 * CurveType], [2 byte CurveName] [1 byte length of encoded
1940 * point], followed by the actual encoded point itself
1942 *p
= NAMED_CURVE_TYPE
;
1950 memcpy((unsigned char *)p
,
1951 (unsigned char *)encodedPoint
, encodedlen
);
1952 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint
);
1953 encodedPoint
= NULL
;
1958 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1959 if (type
& SSL_kPSK
) {
1960 /* copy PSK identity hint */
1961 s2n(strlen(s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
), p
);
1962 strncpy((char *)p
, s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
,
1963 strlen(s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
));
1964 p
+= strlen(s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
);
1971 * n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4]) and p
1972 * points to the space at the end.
1974 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1975 if (pkey
->type
== EVP_PKEY_RSA
1976 && TLS1_get_version(s
) < TLS1_2_VERSION
) {
1979 for (num
= 2; num
> 0; num
--) {
1980 EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx
,
1981 EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW
);
1982 if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx
,
1983 (num
== 2) ? s
->ctx
->md5
1986 || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx
, &(s
->s3
->client_random
[0]),
1987 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) <= 0
1988 || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx
, &(s
->s3
->server_random
[0]),
1989 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) <= 0
1990 || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx
, &(d
[4]), n
) <= 0
1991 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx
, q
,
1992 (unsigned int *)&i
) <= 0) {
1993 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1995 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2001 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1
, md_buf
, j
,
2002 &(p
[2]), &u
, pkey
->pkey
.rsa
) <= 0) {
2003 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_LIB_RSA
);
2012 * For TLS1.2 and later send signature algorithm
2014 if (TLS1_get_version(s
) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
) {
2015 if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p
, pkey
, md
)) {
2016 /* Should never happen */
2017 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2018 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2019 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2025 fprintf(stderr
, "Using hash %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md
));
2027 if (EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx
, md
, NULL
) <= 0
2028 || EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx
, &(s
->s3
->client_random
[0]),
2029 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) <= 0
2030 || EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx
, &(s
->s3
->server_random
[0]),
2031 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) <= 0
2032 || EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx
, &(d
[4]), n
) <= 0
2033 || EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx
, &(p
[2]),
2034 (unsigned int *)&i
, pkey
) <= 0) {
2035 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_LIB_EVP
);
2036 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2041 if (TLS1_get_version(s
) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
)
2044 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
2045 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2046 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2047 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE
);
2052 *(d
++) = SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
;
2056 * we should now have things packed up, so lets send it off
2058 s
->init_num
= n
+ 4;
2062 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B
;
2063 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx
);
2064 return (ssl3_do_write(s
, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
));
2066 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
2068 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2069 if (encodedPoint
!= NULL
)
2070 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint
);
2071 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx
);
2073 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx
);
2074 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
2078 int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL
*s
)
2080 unsigned char *p
, *d
;
2081 int i
, j
, nl
, off
, n
;
2082 STACK_OF(X509_NAME
) *sk
= NULL
;
2086 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A
) {
2089 d
= p
= (unsigned char *)&(buf
->data
[4]);
2091 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
2093 n
= ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s
, p
);
2098 if (TLS1_get_version(s
) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
) {
2099 nl
= tls12_get_req_sig_algs(s
, p
+ 2);
2109 sk
= SSL_get_client_CA_list(s
);
2112 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_NAME_num(sk
); i
++) {
2113 name
= sk_X509_NAME_value(sk
, i
);
2114 j
= i2d_X509_NAME(name
, NULL
);
2115 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf
, 4 + n
+ j
+ 2)) {
2116 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2120 p
= (unsigned char *)&(buf
->data
[4 + n
]);
2121 if (!(s
->options
& SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG
)) {
2123 i2d_X509_NAME(name
, &p
);
2128 i2d_X509_NAME(name
, &p
);
2137 /* else no CA names */
2138 p
= (unsigned char *)&(buf
->data
[4 + off
]);
2141 d
= (unsigned char *)buf
->data
;
2142 *(d
++) = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
;
2146 * we should now have things packed up, so lets send it off
2149 s
->init_num
= n
+ 4;
2151 #ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
2152 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf
, s
->init_num
+ 4)) {
2153 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, ERR_R_BUF_LIB
);
2156 p
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
+ s
->init_num
;
2159 *(p
++) = SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE
;
2166 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B
;
2169 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
2170 return (ssl3_do_write(s
, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
));
2172 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
2176 int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL
*s
)
2180 unsigned long alg_k
;
2182 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2184 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
2186 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2190 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2192 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2194 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2195 EC_KEY
*srvr_ecdh
= NULL
;
2196 EVP_PKEY
*clnt_pub_pkey
= NULL
;
2197 EC_POINT
*clnt_ecpoint
= NULL
;
2198 BN_CTX
*bn_ctx
= NULL
;
2201 n
= s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
2202 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A
,
2203 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B
,
2204 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, 2048, &ok
);
2208 p
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
2210 alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
2212 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2213 if (alg_k
& SSL_kRSA
) {
2214 unsigned char rand_premaster_secret
[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
];
2216 unsigned char decrypt_good
, version_good
;
2219 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
2220 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.use_rsa_tmp
) {
2221 if ((s
->cert
!= NULL
) && (s
->cert
->rsa_tmp
!= NULL
))
2222 rsa
= s
->cert
->rsa_tmp
;
2224 * Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should be sent already
2227 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2228 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2229 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY
);
2234 pkey
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
].privatekey
;
2235 if ((pkey
== NULL
) ||
2236 (pkey
->type
!= EVP_PKEY_RSA
) || (pkey
->pkey
.rsa
== NULL
)) {
2237 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2238 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2239 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE
);
2242 rsa
= pkey
->pkey
.rsa
;
2245 /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */
2246 if (s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
&& s
->version
!= DTLS1_BAD_VER
) {
2249 if (!(s
->options
& SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG
)) {
2250 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2251 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2252 SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG
);
2261 * Reject overly short RSA ciphertext because we want to be sure
2262 * that the buffer size makes it safe to iterate over the entire
2263 * size of a premaster secret (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). The
2264 * actual expected size is larger due to RSA padding, but the
2265 * bound is sufficient to be safe.
2267 if (n
< SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
) {
2268 al
= SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
2269 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2270 SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG
);
2275 * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of
2276 * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246,
2277 * section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of the TLS RFC and
2278 * generates a random premaster secret for the case that the decrypt
2279 * fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1
2283 * should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure.
2285 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(rand_premaster_secret
,
2286 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret
)) <= 0)
2289 RSA_private_decrypt((int)n
, p
, p
, rsa
, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING
);
2293 * decrypt_len should be SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH. decrypt_good will
2294 * be 0xff if so and zero otherwise.
2297 constant_time_eq_int_8(decrypt_len
, SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
);
2300 * If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct then
2301 * version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero. The
2302 * Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2303 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version number
2304 * check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks are done in
2305 * constant time and are treated like any other decryption error.
2308 constant_time_eq_8(p
[0], (unsigned)(s
->client_version
>> 8));
2310 constant_time_eq_8(p
[1], (unsigned)(s
->client_version
& 0xff));
2313 * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2314 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2315 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2316 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
2317 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
2318 * protocol version. If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such
2321 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG
) {
2322 unsigned char workaround_good
;
2324 constant_time_eq_8(p
[0], (unsigned)(s
->version
>> 8));
2326 constant_time_eq_8(p
[1], (unsigned)(s
->version
& 0xff));
2327 version_good
|= workaround_good
;
2331 * Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good to
2332 * remain non-zero (0xff).
2334 decrypt_good
&= version_good
;
2337 * Now copy rand_premaster_secret over from p using
2338 * decrypt_good_mask. If decryption failed, then p does not
2339 * contain valid plaintext, however, a check above guarantees
2340 * it is still sufficiently large to read from.
2342 for (j
= 0; j
< sizeof(rand_premaster_secret
); j
++) {
2343 p
[j
] = constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good
, p
[j
],
2344 rand_premaster_secret
[j
]);
2347 s
->session
->master_key_length
=
2348 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
2350 session
->master_key
,
2353 (rand_premaster_secret
));
2354 OPENSSL_cleanse(p
, sizeof(rand_premaster_secret
));
2357 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2358 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kEDH
| SSL_kDHr
| SSL_kDHd
)) {
2361 if (!(s
->options
& SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG
)) {
2362 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2363 SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG
);
2371 if (n
== 0L) { /* the parameters are in the cert */
2372 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2373 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2374 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_DH_CERTS
);
2377 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
== NULL
) {
2378 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2379 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2380 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY
);
2383 dh_srvr
= s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
;
2386 pub
= BN_bin2bn(p
, i
, NULL
);
2388 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BN_LIB
);
2392 i
= DH_compute_key(p
, pub
, dh_srvr
);
2395 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_DH_LIB
);
2400 DH_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
);
2401 s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
= NULL
;
2405 s
->session
->master_key_length
=
2406 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
2408 session
->master_key
,
2410 OPENSSL_cleanse(p
, i
);
2413 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2414 if (alg_k
& SSL_kKRB5
) {
2415 krb5_error_code krb5rc
;
2416 krb5_data enc_ticket
;
2417 krb5_data authenticator
;
2419 KSSL_CTX
*kssl_ctx
= s
->kssl_ctx
;
2420 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx
;
2421 const EVP_CIPHER
*enc
= NULL
;
2422 unsigned char iv
[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH
];
2423 unsigned char pms
[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
+ EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH
];
2425 krb5_timestamp authtime
= 0;
2426 krb5_ticket_times ttimes
;
2429 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx
);
2432 kssl_ctx
= kssl_ctx_new();
2435 enc_ticket
.length
= i
;
2437 if (n
< (long)(enc_ticket
.length
+ 6)) {
2438 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2439 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2443 enc_ticket
.data
= (char *)p
;
2444 p
+= enc_ticket
.length
;
2447 authenticator
.length
= i
;
2449 if (n
< (long)(enc_ticket
.length
+ authenticator
.length
+ 6)) {
2450 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2451 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2455 authenticator
.data
= (char *)p
;
2456 p
+= authenticator
.length
;
2460 enc_pms
.data
= (char *)p
;
2461 p
+= enc_pms
.length
;
2464 * Note that the length is checked again below, ** after decryption
2466 if (enc_pms
.length
> sizeof pms
) {
2467 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2468 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2472 if (n
!= (long)(enc_ticket
.length
+ authenticator
.length
+
2473 enc_pms
.length
+ 6)) {
2474 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2475 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2479 if ((krb5rc
= kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx
, &enc_ticket
, &ttimes
,
2482 fprintf(stderr
, "kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
2483 krb5rc
, kssl_err
.reason
);
2485 fprintf(stderr
, "kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err
.text
);
2486 # endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2487 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, kssl_err
.reason
);
2492 * Note: no authenticator is not considered an error, ** but will
2493 * return authtime == 0.
2495 if ((krb5rc
= kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx
, &authenticator
,
2496 &authtime
, &kssl_err
)) != 0) {
2498 fprintf(stderr
, "kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
2499 krb5rc
, kssl_err
.reason
);
2501 fprintf(stderr
, "kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err
.text
);
2502 # endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2503 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, kssl_err
.reason
);
2507 if ((krb5rc
= kssl_validate_times(authtime
, &ttimes
)) != 0) {
2508 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, krb5rc
);
2512 kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx
);
2513 # endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2515 enc
= kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx
->enctype
);
2519 memset(iv
, 0, sizeof iv
); /* per RFC 1510 */
2521 if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx
, enc
, NULL
, kssl_ctx
->key
, iv
)) {
2522 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2523 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
2526 if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx
, pms
, &outl
,
2527 (unsigned char *)enc_pms
.data
, enc_pms
.length
))
2529 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2530 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
2534 if (outl
> SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
) {
2535 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2536 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2540 if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx
, &(pms
[outl
]), &padl
)) {
2541 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2542 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
2547 if (outl
> SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
) {
2548 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2549 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2553 if (!((pms
[0] == (s
->client_version
>> 8))
2554 && (pms
[1] == (s
->client_version
& 0xff)))) {
2556 * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as
2557 * the ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely,
2558 * the protocol does not offer such protection for DH
2559 * ciphersuites). However, buggy clients exist that send random
2560 * bytes instead of the protocol version. If
2561 * SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients.
2562 * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos
2565 if (!(s
->options
& SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG
)) {
2566 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2567 SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
2573 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx
);
2575 s
->session
->master_key_length
=
2576 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
2578 session
->master_key
,
2581 if (kssl_ctx
->client_princ
) {
2582 size_t len
= strlen(kssl_ctx
->client_princ
);
2583 if (len
< SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH
) {
2584 s
->session
->krb5_client_princ_len
= len
;
2585 memcpy(s
->session
->krb5_client_princ
, kssl_ctx
->client_princ
,
2590 /*- Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
2591 * but it caused problems for apache.
2592 * kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
2593 * if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
2597 OPENSSL_cleanse(pms
, sizeof(pms
));
2601 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2603 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2604 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kEECDH
| SSL_kECDHr
| SSL_kECDHe
)) {
2608 const EC_GROUP
*group
;
2609 const BIGNUM
*priv_key
;
2611 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
2612 if ((srvr_ecdh
= EC_KEY_new()) == NULL
) {
2613 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2617 /* Let's get server private key and group information */
2618 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kECDHr
| SSL_kECDHe
)) {
2619 /* use the certificate */
2620 tkey
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_ECC
].privatekey
->pkey
.ec
;
2623 * use the ephermeral values we saved when generating the
2624 * ServerKeyExchange msg.
2626 tkey
= s
->s3
->tmp
.ecdh
;
2629 group
= EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey
);
2630 priv_key
= EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey
);
2632 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh
, group
) ||
2633 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh
, priv_key
)) {
2634 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EC_LIB
);
2638 /* Let's get client's public key */
2639 if ((clnt_ecpoint
= EC_POINT_new(group
)) == NULL
) {
2640 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2645 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
2647 if (alg_k
& SSL_kEECDH
) {
2648 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2649 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2650 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY
);
2653 if (((clnt_pub_pkey
= X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
))
2654 == NULL
) || (clnt_pub_pkey
->type
!= EVP_PKEY_EC
)) {
2656 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication
2657 * using ECDH certificates so this branch (n == 0L) of the
2658 * code is never executed. When that support is added, we
2659 * ought to ensure the key received in the certificate is
2660 * authorized for key agreement. ECDH_compute_key implicitly
2661 * checks that the two ECDH shares are for the same group.
2663 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2664 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2665 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS
);
2669 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint
,
2670 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey
->
2672 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EC_LIB
);
2675 ret
= 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
2678 * Get client's public key from encoded point in the
2679 * ClientKeyExchange message.
2681 if ((bn_ctx
= BN_CTX_new()) == NULL
) {
2682 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2683 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2687 /* Get encoded point length */
2691 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EC_LIB
);
2694 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group
, clnt_ecpoint
, p
, i
, bn_ctx
) == 0) {
2695 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EC_LIB
);
2699 * p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer currently, so set it
2702 p
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
2705 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
2706 field_size
= EC_GROUP_get_degree(group
);
2707 if (field_size
<= 0) {
2708 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB
);
2711 i
= ECDH_compute_key(p
, (field_size
+ 7) / 8, clnt_ecpoint
, srvr_ecdh
,
2714 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB
);
2718 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey
);
2719 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint
);
2720 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh
);
2721 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx
);
2722 EC_KEY_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.ecdh
);
2723 s
->s3
->tmp
.ecdh
= NULL
;
2725 /* Compute the master secret */
2726 s
->session
->master_key_length
=
2727 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
2729 session
->master_key
,
2732 OPENSSL_cleanse(p
, i
);
2736 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2737 if (alg_k
& SSL_kPSK
) {
2738 unsigned char *t
= NULL
;
2739 unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms
[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
* 2 + 4];
2740 unsigned int pre_ms_len
= 0, psk_len
= 0;
2742 char tmp_id
[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
+ 1];
2744 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2748 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2751 if (i
> PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
) {
2752 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2753 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2756 if (s
->psk_server_callback
== NULL
) {
2757 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2758 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB
);
2763 * Create guaranteed NULL-terminated identity string for the callback
2765 memcpy(tmp_id
, p
, i
);
2766 memset(tmp_id
+ i
, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
+ 1 - i
);
2767 psk_len
= s
->psk_server_callback(s
, tmp_id
,
2769 sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms
));
2770 OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_id
, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
+ 1);
2772 if (psk_len
> PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
) {
2773 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2775 } else if (psk_len
== 0) {
2777 * PSK related to the given identity not found
2779 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2780 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND
);
2781 al
= SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY
;
2785 /* create PSK pre_master_secret */
2786 pre_ms_len
= 2 + psk_len
+ 2 + psk_len
;
2788 memmove(psk_or_pre_ms
+ psk_len
+ 4, psk_or_pre_ms
, psk_len
);
2790 memset(t
, 0, psk_len
);
2794 if (s
->session
->psk_identity
!= NULL
)
2795 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->psk_identity
);
2796 s
->session
->psk_identity
= BUF_strndup((char *)p
, i
);
2797 if (s
->session
->psk_identity
== NULL
) {
2798 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2802 if (s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
!= NULL
)
2803 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
);
2804 s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
= BUF_strdup(s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
);
2805 if (s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
!= NULL
&&
2806 s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
== NULL
) {
2807 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2811 s
->session
->master_key_length
=
2812 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
2814 session
->master_key
,
2819 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms
, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms
));
2824 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2825 if (alg_k
& SSL_kSRP
) {
2830 if (param_len
> n
) {
2831 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2832 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2833 SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH
);
2836 if (!(s
->srp_ctx
.A
= BN_bin2bn(p
, i
, NULL
))) {
2837 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
2840 if (BN_ucmp(s
->srp_ctx
.A
, s
->srp_ctx
.N
) >= 0
2841 || BN_is_zero(s
->srp_ctx
.A
)) {
2842 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
2843 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2844 SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS
);
2847 if (s
->session
->srp_username
!= NULL
)
2848 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->srp_username
);
2849 s
->session
->srp_username
= BUF_strdup(s
->srp_ctx
.login
);
2850 if (s
->session
->srp_username
== NULL
) {
2851 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2855 if ((s
->session
->master_key_length
=
2856 SRP_generate_server_master_secret(s
,
2857 s
->session
->master_key
)) < 0) {
2858 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2864 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
2865 if (alg_k
& SSL_kGOST
) {
2867 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pkey_ctx
;
2868 EVP_PKEY
*client_pub_pkey
= NULL
, *pk
= NULL
;
2869 unsigned char premaster_secret
[32], *start
;
2870 size_t outlen
= 32, inlen
;
2871 unsigned long alg_a
;
2875 /* Get our certificate private key */
2876 alg_a
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
;
2877 if (alg_a
& SSL_aGOST94
)
2878 pk
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_GOST94
].privatekey
;
2879 else if (alg_a
& SSL_aGOST01
)
2880 pk
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_GOST01
].privatekey
;
2882 pkey_ctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk
, NULL
);
2883 if (pkey_ctx
== NULL
) {
2884 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2885 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2888 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx
) <= 0) {
2889 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2893 * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
2894 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
2895 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a
2896 * client certificate for authorization only.
2898 client_pub_pkey
= X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
2899 if (client_pub_pkey
) {
2900 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx
, client_pub_pkey
) <= 0)
2903 /* Decrypt session key */
2905 ((const unsigned char **)&p
, &Tlen
, &Ttag
, &Tclass
,
2906 n
) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED
|| Ttag
!= V_ASN1_SEQUENCE
2907 || Tclass
!= V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL
) {
2908 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2909 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
2914 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt
2915 (pkey_ctx
, premaster_secret
, &outlen
, start
, inlen
) <= 0) {
2916 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2917 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
2920 /* Generate master secret */
2921 s
->session
->master_key_length
=
2922 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
2924 session
->master_key
,
2925 premaster_secret
, 32);
2926 OPENSSL_cleanse(premaster_secret
, sizeof(premaster_secret
));
2927 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2928 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
2929 (pkey_ctx
, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY
, 2, NULL
) > 0)
2934 EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey
);
2935 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx
);
2941 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2942 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE
);
2948 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
2949 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_SRP)
2952 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2953 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey
);
2954 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint
);
2955 if (srvr_ecdh
!= NULL
)
2956 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh
);
2957 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx
);
2959 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
2963 int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL
*s
)
2965 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
2967 int al
, ok
, ret
= 0;
2971 const EVP_MD
*md
= NULL
;
2973 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx
);
2976 * We should only process a CertificateVerify message if we have received
2977 * a Certificate from the client. If so then |s->session->peer| will be non
2978 * NULL. In some instances a CertificateVerify message is not required even
2979 * if the peer has sent a Certificate (e.g. such as in the case of static
2980 * DH). In that case the ClientKeyExchange processing will skip the
2981 * CertificateVerify state so we should not arrive here.
2983 if (s
->session
->peer
== NULL
) {
2988 n
= s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
2989 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A
,
2990 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B
,
2991 SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY
,
2992 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
, &ok
);
2997 peer
= s
->session
->peer
;
2998 pkey
= X509_get_pubkey(peer
);
2999 type
= X509_certificate_type(peer
, pkey
);
3001 if (!(type
& EVP_PKT_SIGN
)) {
3002 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,
3003 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE
);
3004 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
3008 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
3009 p
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
3010 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
3012 * If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare signature without
3015 if (n
== 64 && (pkey
->type
== NID_id_GostR3410_94
||
3016 pkey
->type
== NID_id_GostR3410_2001
)) {
3019 if (TLS1_get_version(s
) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
) {
3020 int sigalg
= tls12_get_sigid(pkey
);
3021 /* Should never happen */
3023 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3024 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3027 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
3028 if (sigalg
!= (int)p
[1]) {
3029 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,
3030 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
3031 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
3034 md
= tls12_get_hash(p
[0]);
3036 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST
);
3037 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
3041 fprintf(stderr
, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md
));
3049 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3050 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
3054 j
= EVP_PKEY_size(pkey
);
3055 if ((i
> j
) || (n
> j
) || (n
<= 0)) {
3056 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE
);
3057 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
3061 if (TLS1_get_version(s
) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
) {
3064 hdatalen
= BIO_get_mem_data(s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
, &hdata
);
3065 if (hdatalen
<= 0) {
3066 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3067 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3071 fprintf(stderr
, "Using TLS 1.2 with client verify alg %s\n",
3074 if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&mctx
, md
, NULL
)
3075 || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(&mctx
, hdata
, hdatalen
)) {
3076 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
3077 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3081 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&mctx
, p
, i
, pkey
) <= 0) {
3082 al
= SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
3083 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE
);
3087 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3088 if (pkey
->type
== EVP_PKEY_RSA
) {
3089 i
= RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1
, s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_verify_md
,
3090 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
+ SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
, p
, i
,
3093 al
= SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
3094 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT
);
3098 al
= SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
3099 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE
);
3104 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3105 if (pkey
->type
== EVP_PKEY_DSA
) {
3106 j
= DSA_verify(pkey
->save_type
,
3107 &(s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_verify_md
[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
]),
3108 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
, p
, i
, pkey
->pkey
.dsa
);
3111 al
= SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
3112 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
, SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE
);
3117 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3118 if (pkey
->type
== EVP_PKEY_EC
) {
3119 j
= ECDSA_verify(pkey
->save_type
,
3120 &(s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_verify_md
[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
]),
3121 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
, p
, i
, pkey
->pkey
.ec
);
3124 al
= SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
3125 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
, SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE
);
3130 if (pkey
->type
== NID_id_GostR3410_94
3131 || pkey
->type
== NID_id_GostR3410_2001
) {
3132 unsigned char signature
[64];
3134 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey
, NULL
);
3136 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3137 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3140 if (EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx
) <= 0) {
3141 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
3142 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3143 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3147 fprintf(stderr
, "GOST signature length is %d", i
);
3149 for (idx
= 0; idx
< 64; idx
++) {
3150 signature
[63 - idx
] = p
[idx
];
3152 j
= EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx
, signature
, 64, s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_verify_md
,
3154 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
3156 al
= SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
3157 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
, SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE
);
3161 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3162 al
= SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE
;
3169 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
3170 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
3173 if (s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
) {
3174 BIO_free(s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
);
3175 s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
= NULL
;
3176 s
->s3
->flags
&= ~TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE
;
3178 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx
);
3179 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey
);
3183 int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL
*s
)
3185 int i
, ok
, al
, ret
= -1;
3187 unsigned long l
, nc
, llen
, n
;
3188 const unsigned char *p
, *q
;
3190 STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
= NULL
;
3192 n
= s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
3195 -1, s
->max_cert_list
, &ok
);
3200 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
== SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
) {
3201 if ((s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
) &&
3202 (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT
)) {
3203 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3204 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE
);
3205 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
3209 * If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list
3211 if ((s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
) && s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
) {
3212 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3213 SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST
);
3214 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
3217 s
->s3
->tmp
.reuse_message
= 1;
3221 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
!= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
) {
3222 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
3223 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE
);
3226 p
= d
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
3228 if ((sk
= sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL
) {
3229 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3234 if (llen
+ 3 != n
) {
3235 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
3236 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3239 for (nc
= 0; nc
< llen
;) {
3241 if ((l
+ nc
+ 3) > llen
) {
3242 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
3243 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3244 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3249 x
= d2i_X509(NULL
, &p
, l
);
3251 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB
);
3255 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
3256 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3257 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3260 if (!sk_X509_push(sk
, x
)) {
3261 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3268 if (sk_X509_num(sk
) <= 0) {
3269 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3270 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
) {
3271 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
3272 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3273 SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED
);
3276 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3277 else if ((s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
) &&
3278 (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT
)) {
3279 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3280 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE
);
3281 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
3284 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
3285 if (s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
&& !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
)) {
3286 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3290 i
= ssl_verify_cert_chain(s
, sk
);
3292 al
= ssl_verify_alarm_type(s
->verify_result
);
3293 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3294 SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_RETURNED
);
3299 if (s
->session
->peer
!= NULL
) /* This should not be needed */
3300 X509_free(s
->session
->peer
);
3301 s
->session
->peer
= sk_X509_shift(sk
);
3302 s
->session
->verify_result
= s
->verify_result
;
3305 * With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL when we
3308 if (s
->session
->sess_cert
== NULL
) {
3309 s
->session
->sess_cert
= ssl_sess_cert_new();
3310 if (s
->session
->sess_cert
== NULL
) {
3311 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3315 if (s
->session
->sess_cert
->cert_chain
!= NULL
)
3316 sk_X509_pop_free(s
->session
->sess_cert
->cert_chain
, X509_free
);
3317 s
->session
->sess_cert
->cert_chain
= sk
;
3319 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own
3320 * certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c
3328 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
3330 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
3336 sk_X509_pop_free(sk
, X509_free
);
3340 int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL
*s
)
3345 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A
) {
3346 x
= ssl_get_server_send_cert(s
);
3348 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
3349 if ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
!= SSL_aKRB5
) ||
3350 (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kKRB5
)) {
3351 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
3352 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3353 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
3358 l
= ssl3_output_cert_chain(s
, x
);
3360 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3361 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
3364 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B
;
3365 s
->init_num
= (int)l
;
3369 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
3370 return (ssl3_do_write(s
, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
));
3373 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
3374 /* send a new session ticket (not necessarily for a new session) */
3375 int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL
*s
)
3377 unsigned char *senc
= NULL
;
3381 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A
) {
3382 unsigned char *p
, *macstart
;
3383 const unsigned char *const_p
;
3384 int len
, slen_full
, slen
;
3387 SSL_CTX
*tctx
= s
->initial_ctx
;
3388 unsigned char iv
[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH
];
3389 unsigned char key_name
[16];
3391 /* get session encoding length */
3392 slen_full
= i2d_SSL_SESSION(s
->session
, NULL
);
3394 * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too
3397 if (slen_full
== 0 || slen_full
> 0xFF00) {
3398 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
3401 senc
= OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full
);
3403 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
3407 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx
);
3408 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx
);
3411 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s
->session
, &p
))
3415 * create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up
3418 sess
= d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL
, &const_p
, slen_full
);
3421 sess
->session_id_length
= 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
3423 slen
= i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess
, NULL
);
3424 if (slen
== 0 || slen
> slen_full
) { /* shouldn't ever happen */
3425 SSL_SESSION_free(sess
);
3429 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess
, &p
)) {
3430 SSL_SESSION_free(sess
);
3433 SSL_SESSION_free(sess
);
3436 * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3437 * follows 1 (size of message name) + 3 (message length
3438 * bytes) + 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
3439 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
3440 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
3441 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
3443 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s
->init_buf
,
3444 26 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH
+ EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH
+
3445 EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
+ slen
))
3448 p
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
3450 *(p
++) = SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET
;
3451 /* Skip message length for now */
3454 * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does
3455 * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx.
3457 if (tctx
->tlsext_ticket_key_cb
) {
3458 if (tctx
->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s
, key_name
, iv
, &ctx
,
3462 if (RAND_bytes(iv
, 16) <= 0)
3464 if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx
, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL
,
3465 tctx
->tlsext_tick_aes_key
, iv
))
3467 if (!HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx
, tctx
->tlsext_tick_hmac_key
, 16,
3468 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL
))
3470 memcpy(key_name
, tctx
->tlsext_tick_key_name
, 16);
3474 * Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only): We leave this unspecified
3475 * for resumed session (for simplicity), and guess that tickets for
3476 * new sessions will live as long as their sessions.
3478 l2n(s
->hit
? 0 : s
->session
->timeout
, p
);
3480 /* Skip ticket length for now */
3482 /* Output key name */
3484 memcpy(p
, key_name
, 16);
3487 memcpy(p
, iv
, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx
));
3488 p
+= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx
);
3489 /* Encrypt session data */
3490 if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx
, p
, &len
, senc
, slen
))
3493 if (!EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx
, p
, &len
))
3497 if (!HMAC_Update(&hctx
, macstart
, p
- macstart
))
3499 if (!HMAC_Final(&hctx
, p
, &hlen
))
3502 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx
);
3503 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx
);
3506 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
3508 len
= p
- (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
3509 p
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
+ 1;
3510 l2n3(len
- 4, p
); /* Message length */
3512 s2n(len
- 10, p
); /* Ticket length */
3514 /* number of bytes to write */
3516 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B
;
3521 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
3522 return (ssl3_do_write(s
, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
));
3526 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx
);
3527 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx
);
3528 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
3532 int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL
*s
)
3534 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A
) {
3537 * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3538 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
3539 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
3542 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s
->init_buf
, 8 + s
->tlsext_ocsp_resplen
)) {
3543 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
3547 p
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
3550 *(p
++) = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS
;
3551 /* message length */
3552 l2n3(s
->tlsext_ocsp_resplen
+ 4, p
);
3554 *(p
++) = s
->tlsext_status_type
;
3555 /* length of OCSP response */
3556 l2n3(s
->tlsext_ocsp_resplen
, p
);
3557 /* actual response */
3558 memcpy(p
, s
->tlsext_ocsp_resp
, s
->tlsext_ocsp_resplen
);
3559 /* number of bytes to write */
3560 s
->init_num
= 8 + s
->tlsext_ocsp_resplen
;
3561 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B
;
3565 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
3566 return (ssl3_do_write(s
, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
));
3569 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3571 * ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message.
3572 * It sets the next_proto member in s if found
3574 int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL
*s
)
3577 int proto_len
, padding_len
;
3579 const unsigned char *p
;
3582 * Clients cannot send a NextProtocol message if we didn't see the
3583 * extension in their ClientHello
3585 if (!s
->s3
->next_proto_neg_seen
) {
3586 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO
,
3587 SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION
);
3588 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
3592 /* See the payload format below */
3593 n
= s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
3594 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A
,
3595 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B
,
3596 SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO
, 514, &ok
);
3602 * s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received in
3603 * this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset by
3604 * ssl3_get_finished).
3606 if (!s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
) {
3607 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO
, SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS
);
3608 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
3613 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
3614 return 0; /* The body must be > 1 bytes long */
3617 p
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
3620 * The payload looks like:
3622 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
3623 * uint8 padding_len;
3624 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
3627 if (proto_len
+ 2 > s
->init_num
) {
3628 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
3631 padding_len
= p
[proto_len
+ 1];
3632 if (proto_len
+ padding_len
+ 2 != s
->init_num
) {
3633 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
3637 s
->next_proto_negotiated
= OPENSSL_malloc(proto_len
);
3638 if (!s
->next_proto_negotiated
) {
3639 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3640 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
3643 memcpy(s
->next_proto_negotiated
, p
+ 1, proto_len
);
3644 s
->next_proto_negotiated_len
= proto_len
;