1 /* ssl/s3_srvr.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
124 /* ====================================================================
125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
142 * to make use of the Contribution.
144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
151 #define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
152 #define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
155 #include "ssl_locl.h"
156 #include "kssl_lcl.h"
157 #include "../crypto/constant_time_locl.h"
158 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
159 #include <openssl/rand.h>
160 #include <openssl/objects.h>
161 #include <openssl/evp.h>
162 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
163 #include <openssl/x509.h>
164 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
165 # include <openssl/dh.h>
167 #include <openssl/bn.h>
168 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
169 # include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
171 #include <openssl/md5.h>
173 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD
174 static const SSL_METHOD
*ssl3_get_server_method(int ver
);
176 static const SSL_METHOD
*ssl3_get_server_method(int ver
)
178 if (ver
== SSL3_VERSION
)
179 return (SSLv3_server_method());
184 IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method
,
186 ssl_undefined_function
, ssl3_get_server_method
)
188 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
189 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL
*s
, int *al
)
191 int ret
= SSL_ERROR_NONE
;
193 *al
= SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME
;
195 if ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kSRP
) &&
196 (s
->srp_ctx
.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback
!= NULL
)) {
197 if (s
->srp_ctx
.login
== NULL
) {
199 * RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp
203 *al
= SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY
;
205 ret
= SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s
, al
);
212 int ssl3_accept(SSL
*s
)
215 unsigned long alg_k
, Time
= (unsigned long)time(NULL
);
216 void (*cb
) (const SSL
*ssl
, int type
, int val
) = NULL
;
218 int new_state
, state
, skip
= 0;
220 RAND_add(&Time
, sizeof(Time
), 0);
224 if (s
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
225 cb
= s
->info_callback
;
226 else if (s
->ctx
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
227 cb
= s
->ctx
->info_callback
;
229 /* init things to blank */
231 if (!SSL_in_init(s
) || SSL_in_before(s
))
234 if (s
->cert
== NULL
) {
235 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT
, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET
);
238 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
240 * If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we already got and
241 * don't await it anymore, because Heartbeats don't make sense during
244 if (s
->tlsext_hb_pending
) {
245 s
->tlsext_hb_pending
= 0;
254 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE
:
256 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
260 case SSL_ST_BEFORE
| SSL_ST_ACCEPT
:
261 case SSL_ST_OK
| SSL_ST_ACCEPT
:
265 cb(s
, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START
, 1);
267 if ((s
->version
>> 8) != 3) {
268 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
271 s
->type
= SSL_ST_ACCEPT
;
273 if (s
->init_buf
== NULL
) {
274 if ((buf
= BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL
) {
278 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf
, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
)) {
286 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s
)) {
292 s
->s3
->flags
&= ~TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY
;
293 s
->s3
->flags
&= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK
;
295 * Should have been reset by ssl3_get_finished, too.
297 s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
= 0;
299 if (s
->state
!= SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE
) {
301 * Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that the
302 * output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
304 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s
, 1)) {
309 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s
);
310 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A
;
311 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_accept
++;
312 } else if (!s
->s3
->send_connection_binding
&&
314 SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION
)) {
316 * Server attempting to renegotiate with client that doesn't
317 * support secure renegotiation.
319 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT
,
320 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED
);
321 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
326 * s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE, we will just send a
329 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_accept_renegotiate
++;
330 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A
;
334 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A
:
335 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B
:
338 ret
= ssl3_send_hello_request(s
);
341 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C
;
342 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH
;
345 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s
);
348 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C
:
349 s
->state
= SSL_ST_OK
;
352 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A
:
353 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B
:
354 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C
:
357 ret
= ssl3_get_client_hello(s
);
360 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
361 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D
;
362 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D
:
365 if ((ret
= ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s
, &al
)) < 0) {
367 * callback indicates firther work to be done
369 s
->rwstate
= SSL_X509_LOOKUP
;
372 if (ret
!= SSL_ERROR_NONE
) {
373 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
375 * This is not really an error but the only means to for
376 * a client to detect whether srp is supported.
378 if (al
!= TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY
)
379 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT
, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
);
380 ret
= SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL
;
388 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A
;
392 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A
:
393 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B
:
394 ret
= ssl3_send_server_hello(s
);
397 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
399 if (s
->tlsext_ticket_expected
)
400 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A
;
402 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A
;
406 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A
;
409 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A
;
413 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A
:
414 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B
:
415 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
416 /* normal PSK or KRB5 or SRP */
419 new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aNULL
| SSL_aKRB5
|
421 && !(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kPSK
)) {
422 ret
= ssl3_send_server_certificate(s
);
425 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
426 if (s
->tlsext_status_expected
)
427 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A
;
429 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A
;
432 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A
;
438 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A
;
443 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A
:
444 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B
:
445 alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
448 * clear this, it may get reset by
449 * send_server_key_exchange
451 s
->s3
->tmp
.use_rsa_tmp
= 0;
454 * only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or RSA but we have a
455 * sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For
456 * ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if
457 * the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases,
458 * the server certificate contains the server's public key for
463 * PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if
466 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
467 || ((alg_k
& SSL_kPSK
) && s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
)
469 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
470 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
471 || (alg_k
& SSL_kSRP
)
473 || (alg_k
& SSL_kEDH
)
474 || (alg_k
& SSL_kEECDH
)
475 || ((alg_k
& SSL_kRSA
)
476 && (s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
].privatekey
== NULL
477 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
)
478 && EVP_PKEY_size(s
->cert
->
480 [SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
].privatekey
) *
481 8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
)
486 ret
= ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s
);
492 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A
;
496 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A
:
497 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B
:
498 if ( /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
499 !(s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
) ||
501 * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert
502 * during re-negotiation:
504 ((s
->session
->peer
!= NULL
) &&
505 (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE
)) ||
507 * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see
508 * section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in
511 ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aNULL
) &&
513 * ... except when the application insists on
514 * verification (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts
517 !(s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT
)) ||
519 * never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites
521 (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aKRB5
) ||
522 /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
523 (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aSRP
)
525 * With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests
528 || (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kPSK
)) {
529 /* no cert request */
531 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
= 0;
532 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A
;
533 if (s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
)
534 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
))
537 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
= 1;
538 ret
= ssl3_send_certificate_request(s
);
541 #ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
542 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A
;
544 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH
;
545 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
= SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A
;
551 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A
:
552 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B
:
553 ret
= ssl3_send_server_done(s
);
556 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
= SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A
;
557 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH
;
561 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH
:
564 * This code originally checked to see if any data was pending
565 * using BIO_CTRL_INFO and then flushed. This caused problems as
566 * documented in PR#1939. The proposed fix doesn't completely
567 * resolve this issue as buggy implementations of
568 * BIO_CTRL_PENDING still exist. So instead we just flush
572 s
->rwstate
= SSL_WRITING
;
573 if (BIO_flush(s
->wbio
) <= 0) {
577 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
579 s
->state
= s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
;
582 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A
:
583 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B
:
584 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
) {
585 ret
= ssl3_get_client_certificate(s
);
590 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A
;
593 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A
:
594 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B
:
595 ret
= ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s
);
600 * For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH
601 * pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is
602 * not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses
603 * its key from the certificate for key exchange.
605 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
606 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
;
608 if (s
->s3
->next_proto_neg_seen
)
609 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A
;
611 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
;
614 } else if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
615 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A
;
617 if (!s
->session
->peer
)
620 * For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer at this point and
621 * digest cached records.
623 if (!s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
) {
624 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
627 s
->s3
->flags
|= TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE
;
628 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
))
634 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A
;
638 * We need to get hashes here so if there is a client cert,
639 * it can be verified FIXME - digest processing for
640 * CertificateVerify should be generalized. But it is next
643 if (s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
)
644 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
))
646 for (dgst_num
= 0; dgst_num
< SSL_MAX_DIGEST
; dgst_num
++)
647 if (s
->s3
->handshake_dgst
[dgst_num
]) {
650 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->cert_verify_mac(s
,
659 EVP_MD_CTX_size(s
->s3
->handshake_dgst
[dgst_num
]);
669 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A
:
670 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B
:
672 * This *should* be the first time we enable CCS, but be
673 * extra careful about surrounding code changes. We need
674 * to set this here because we don't know if we're
675 * expecting a CertificateVerify or not.
677 if (!s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
)
678 s
->s3
->flags
|= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK
;
679 /* we should decide if we expected this one */
680 ret
= ssl3_get_cert_verify(s
);
684 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
685 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
;
687 if (s
->s3
->next_proto_neg_seen
)
688 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A
;
690 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
;
695 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
696 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A
:
697 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B
:
699 * Enable CCS for resumed handshakes with NPN.
700 * In a full handshake with NPN, we end up here through
701 * SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B, where SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK was
702 * already set. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make
703 * sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates.
704 * s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is
705 * processed in s3_pkt.c, and remains set until
706 * the client's Finished message is read.
708 if (!s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
)
709 s
->s3
->flags
|= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK
;
711 ret
= ssl3_get_next_proto(s
);
715 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
;
719 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
:
720 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B
:
722 * Enable CCS for resumed handshakes without NPN.
723 * In a full handshake, we end up here through
724 * SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B, where SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK was
725 * already set. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make
726 * sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates.
727 * s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is
728 * processed in s3_pkt.c, and remains set until
729 * the client's Finished message is read.
731 if (!s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
)
732 s
->s3
->flags
|= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK
;
733 ret
= ssl3_get_finished(s
, SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
,
734 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B
);
738 s
->state
= SSL_ST_OK
;
739 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
740 else if (s
->tlsext_ticket_expected
)
741 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A
;
744 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A
;
748 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
749 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A
:
750 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B
:
751 ret
= ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s
);
754 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A
;
758 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A
:
759 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B
:
760 ret
= ssl3_send_cert_status(s
);
763 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A
;
769 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A
:
770 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B
:
772 s
->session
->cipher
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
;
773 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->setup_key_block(s
)) {
778 ret
= ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s
,
780 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B
);
784 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A
;
787 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
788 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE
))
796 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A
:
797 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B
:
798 ret
= ssl3_send_finished(s
,
799 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A
,
800 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B
,
802 ssl3_enc
->server_finished_label
,
804 ssl3_enc
->server_finished_label_len
);
807 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH
;
809 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
810 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
= SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
;
812 if (s
->s3
->next_proto_neg_seen
) {
813 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
= SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A
;
815 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
= SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
;
818 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
= SSL_ST_OK
;
823 /* clean a few things up */
824 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s
);
826 BUF_MEM_free(s
->init_buf
);
829 /* remove buffering on output */
830 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s
);
834 if (s
->renegotiate
== 2) { /* skipped if we just sent a
839 ssl_update_cache(s
, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER
);
841 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_accept_good
++;
843 s
->handshake_func
= ssl3_accept
;
846 cb(s
, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE
, 1);
854 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT
, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE
);
860 if (!s
->s3
->tmp
.reuse_message
&& !skip
) {
862 if ((ret
= BIO_flush(s
->wbio
)) <= 0)
866 if ((cb
!= NULL
) && (s
->state
!= state
)) {
867 new_state
= s
->state
;
869 cb(s
, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP
, 1);
870 s
->state
= new_state
;
876 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
880 cb(s
, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT
, ret
);
884 int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL
*s
)
887 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A
) {
888 ssl_set_handshake_header(s
, SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST
, 0);
889 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B
;
892 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
893 return ssl_do_write(s
);
896 int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL
*s
)
898 int i
, j
, ok
, al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ret
= -1;
899 unsigned int cookie_len
;
902 unsigned char *p
, *d
;
904 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
906 SSL_COMP
*comp
= NULL
;
908 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *ciphers
= NULL
;
910 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C
&& !s
->first_packet
)
914 * We do this so that we will respond with our native type. If we are
915 * TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1, This down
916 * switching should be handled by a different method. If we are SSLv3, we
917 * will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with TLSv1.
919 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A
) {
920 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B
;
923 n
= s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
924 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B
,
925 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C
,
926 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
927 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
, &ok
);
932 d
= p
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
935 * use version from inside client hello, not from record header (may
936 * differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph)
938 s
->client_version
= (((int)p
[0]) << 8) | (int)p
[1];
941 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) ? (s
->client_version
> s
->version
&&
942 s
->method
->version
!= DTLS_ANY_VERSION
)
943 : (s
->client_version
< s
->version
)) {
944 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER
);
945 if ((s
->client_version
>> 8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR
&&
946 !s
->enc_write_ctx
&& !s
->write_hash
) {
948 * similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version
951 s
->version
= s
->client_version
;
953 al
= SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
958 * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one, just
959 * return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet. So check
962 if (SSL_get_options(s
) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE
) {
963 unsigned int session_length
, cookie_length
;
965 session_length
= *(p
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
966 cookie_length
= *(p
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
+ session_length
+ 1);
968 if (cookie_length
== 0)
972 /* load the client random */
973 memcpy(s
->s3
->client_random
, p
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
974 p
+= SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
;
976 /* get the session-id */
981 * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in
982 * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally
983 * ignore resumption requests with flag
984 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
985 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on this
986 * for security won't even compile against older library versions).
987 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to
988 * request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains
989 * unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the
990 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be ignored.
993 && (s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
))) {
994 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s
, 1))
997 i
= ssl_get_prev_session(s
, p
, j
, d
+ n
);
999 * Only resume if the session's version matches the negotiated
1001 * RFC 5246 does not provide much useful advice on resumption
1002 * with a different protocol version. It doesn't forbid it but
1003 * the sanity of such behaviour would be questionable.
1004 * In practice, clients do not accept a version mismatch and
1005 * will abort the handshake with an error.
1007 if (i
== 1 && s
->version
== s
->session
->ssl_version
) { /* previous
1014 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s
, 1))
1021 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1023 cookie_len
= *(p
++);
1026 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
1027 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
1028 * does not cause an overflow.
1030 if (cookie_len
> sizeof(s
->d1
->rcvd_cookie
)) {
1032 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1033 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH
);
1037 /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
1038 if ((SSL_get_options(s
) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE
) && cookie_len
> 0) {
1039 memcpy(s
->d1
->rcvd_cookie
, p
, cookie_len
);
1041 if (s
->ctx
->app_verify_cookie_cb
!= NULL
) {
1042 if (s
->ctx
->app_verify_cookie_cb(s
, s
->d1
->rcvd_cookie
,
1044 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1045 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1046 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH
);
1049 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1051 /* default verification */
1052 else if (memcmp(s
->d1
->rcvd_cookie
, s
->d1
->cookie
,
1053 s
->d1
->cookie_len
) != 0) {
1054 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1055 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH
);
1058 /* Set to -2 so if successful we return 2 */
1063 if (s
->method
->version
== DTLS_ANY_VERSION
) {
1064 /* Select version to use */
1065 if (s
->client_version
<= DTLS1_2_VERSION
&&
1066 !(s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2
)) {
1067 s
->version
= DTLS1_2_VERSION
;
1068 s
->method
= DTLSv1_2_server_method();
1069 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
1070 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1071 SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE
);
1072 s
->version
= s
->client_version
;
1073 al
= SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
1075 } else if (s
->client_version
<= DTLS1_VERSION
&&
1076 !(s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1
)) {
1077 s
->version
= DTLS1_VERSION
;
1078 s
->method
= DTLSv1_server_method();
1080 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1081 SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER
);
1082 s
->version
= s
->client_version
;
1083 al
= SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
1086 s
->session
->ssl_version
= s
->version
;
1091 if ((i
== 0) && (j
!= 0)) {
1092 /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */
1093 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1094 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED
);
1097 if ((p
+ i
) >= (d
+ n
)) {
1098 /* not enough data */
1099 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1100 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1103 if ((i
> 0) && (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s
, p
, i
, &(ciphers
))
1109 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
1110 if ((s
->hit
) && (i
> 0)) {
1112 id
= s
->session
->cipher
->id
;
1115 fprintf(stderr
, "client sent %d ciphers\n",
1116 sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers
));
1118 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers
); i
++) {
1119 c
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers
, i
);
1121 fprintf(stderr
, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1122 i
, sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers
), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c
));
1130 * Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade attack:
1134 if (j
== 0 && (s
->options
& SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG
)
1135 && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers
) == 1)) {
1137 * Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used
1138 * cipher may not be in the current list, the client instead
1139 * might be trying to continue using a cipher that before wasn't
1140 * chosen due to server preferences. We'll have to reject the
1141 * connection if the cipher is not enabled, though.
1143 c
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers
, 0);
1144 if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s
), c
) >= 0) {
1145 s
->session
->cipher
= c
;
1152 * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked
1155 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1156 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1157 SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING
);
1164 if ((p
+ i
) > (d
+ n
)) {
1165 /* not enough data */
1166 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1167 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1170 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1173 for (j
= 0; j
< i
; j
++) {
1181 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1182 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED
);
1185 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1186 /* TLS extensions */
1187 if (s
->version
>= SSL3_VERSION
) {
1188 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s
, &p
, d
, n
)) {
1189 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT
);
1195 * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake
1196 * for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before
1197 * calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket
1198 * processing to use it in key derivation.
1202 pos
= s
->s3
->server_random
;
1203 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s
, 1, pos
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) <= 0) {
1208 if (!s
->hit
&& s
->version
>= TLS1_VERSION
&& s
->tls_session_secret_cb
) {
1209 SSL_CIPHER
*pref_cipher
= NULL
;
1211 s
->session
->master_key_length
= sizeof(s
->session
->master_key
);
1212 if (s
->tls_session_secret_cb(s
, s
->session
->master_key
,
1213 &s
->session
->master_key_length
, ciphers
,
1215 s
->tls_session_secret_cb_arg
)) {
1217 s
->session
->ciphers
= ciphers
;
1218 s
->session
->verify_result
= X509_V_OK
;
1222 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1224 pref_cipher
? pref_cipher
: ssl3_choose_cipher(s
,
1229 if (pref_cipher
== NULL
) {
1230 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1231 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER
);
1235 s
->session
->cipher
= pref_cipher
;
1238 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s
->cipher_list
);
1240 if (s
->cipher_list_by_id
)
1241 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s
->cipher_list_by_id
);
1243 s
->cipher_list
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s
->session
->ciphers
);
1244 s
->cipher_list_by_id
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s
->session
->ciphers
);
1250 * Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1251 * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
1252 * algorithms from the client, starting at q.
1254 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
= NULL
;
1255 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1256 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1257 if (s
->session
->compress_meth
!= 0) {
1258 int m
, comp_id
= s
->session
->compress_meth
;
1259 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1260 /* Can't disable compression */
1261 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION
) {
1262 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1263 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION
);
1266 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1267 for (m
= 0; m
< sk_SSL_COMP_num(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
); m
++) {
1268 comp
= sk_SSL_COMP_value(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
, m
);
1269 if (comp_id
== comp
->id
) {
1270 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
= comp
;
1274 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
== NULL
) {
1275 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1276 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM
);
1279 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1280 for (m
= 0; m
< i
; m
++) {
1281 if (q
[m
] == comp_id
)
1285 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1286 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1287 SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING
);
1292 else if (!(s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION
) && s
->ctx
->comp_methods
) {
1293 /* See if we have a match */
1294 int m
, nn
, o
, v
, done
= 0;
1296 nn
= sk_SSL_COMP_num(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
);
1297 for (m
= 0; m
< nn
; m
++) {
1298 comp
= sk_SSL_COMP_value(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
, m
);
1300 for (o
= 0; o
< i
; o
++) {
1310 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
= comp
;
1316 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1317 * using compression.
1319 if (s
->session
->compress_meth
!= 0) {
1320 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION
);
1326 * Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher
1330 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1331 s
->session
->compress_meth
= 0;
1333 s
->session
->compress_meth
= (comp
== NULL
) ? 0 : comp
->id
;
1335 if (s
->session
->ciphers
!= NULL
)
1336 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s
->session
->ciphers
);
1337 s
->session
->ciphers
= ciphers
;
1338 if (ciphers
== NULL
) {
1339 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1340 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED
);
1344 if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s
)) {
1345 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
);
1348 /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
1350 if (s
->cert
->cert_cb
) {
1351 int rv
= s
->cert
->cert_cb(s
, s
->cert
->cert_cb_arg
);
1353 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1354 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR
);
1358 s
->rwstate
= SSL_X509_LOOKUP
;
1361 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
1363 c
= ssl3_choose_cipher(s
, s
->session
->ciphers
, SSL_get_ciphers(s
));
1366 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1367 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER
);
1370 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
= c
;
1372 /* Session-id reuse */
1373 #ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
1374 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *sk
;
1375 SSL_CIPHER
*nc
= NULL
;
1376 SSL_CIPHER
*ec
= NULL
;
1378 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG
) {
1379 sk
= s
->session
->ciphers
;
1380 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk
); i
++) {
1381 c
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk
, i
);
1382 if (c
->algorithm_enc
& SSL_eNULL
)
1384 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c
))
1388 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
= nc
;
1389 else if (ec
!= NULL
)
1390 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
= ec
;
1392 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
= s
->session
->cipher
;
1395 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
= s
->session
->cipher
;
1398 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
) || !(s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
)) {
1399 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
))
1404 * we now have the following setup.
1406 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
1407 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
1408 * compression - basically ignored right now
1409 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1410 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1411 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1412 * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
1415 /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */
1416 if (s
->version
>= SSL3_VERSION
) {
1417 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s
) <= 0) {
1418 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
);
1427 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1430 if (ciphers
!= NULL
)
1431 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers
);
1432 return ret
< 0 ? -1 : ret
;
1435 int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL
*s
)
1438 unsigned char *p
, *d
;
1443 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A
) {
1444 buf
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
1445 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1446 p
= s
->s3
->server_random
;
1447 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s
, 1, p
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) <= 0)
1450 /* Do the message type and length last */
1451 d
= p
= ssl_handshake_start(s
);
1453 *(p
++) = s
->version
>> 8;
1454 *(p
++) = s
->version
& 0xff;
1457 memcpy(p
, s
->s3
->server_random
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
1458 p
+= SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
;
1461 * There are several cases for the session ID to send
1462 * back in the server hello:
1463 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
1464 * we send back the old session ID.
1465 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
1466 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
1467 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
1468 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
1470 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
1471 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
1472 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
1473 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
1476 if (!(s
->ctx
->session_cache_mode
& SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER
)
1478 s
->session
->session_id_length
= 0;
1480 sl
= s
->session
->session_id_length
;
1481 if (sl
> (int)sizeof(s
->session
->session_id
)) {
1482 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1486 memcpy(p
, s
->session
->session_id
, sl
);
1489 /* put the cipher */
1490 i
= ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
, p
);
1493 /* put the compression method */
1494 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1497 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
== NULL
)
1500 *(p
++) = s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
->id
;
1502 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1503 if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s
) <= 0) {
1504 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT
);
1508 ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s
, p
, buf
+ SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
,
1510 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1511 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1517 ssl_set_handshake_header(s
, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO
, l
);
1518 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B
;
1521 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
1522 return ssl_do_write(s
);
1525 int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL
*s
)
1528 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A
) {
1529 ssl_set_handshake_header(s
, SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE
, 0);
1530 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B
;
1533 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
1534 return ssl_do_write(s
);
1537 int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL
*s
)
1539 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1543 unsigned char md_buf
[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
+ SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
];
1546 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1547 DH
*dh
= NULL
, *dhp
;
1549 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1550 EC_KEY
*ecdh
= NULL
, *ecdhp
;
1551 unsigned char *encodedPoint
= NULL
;
1554 BN_CTX
*bn_ctx
= NULL
;
1557 const EVP_MD
*md
= NULL
;
1558 unsigned char *p
, *d
;
1568 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx
);
1569 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A
) {
1570 type
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
1575 r
[0] = r
[1] = r
[2] = r
[3] = NULL
;
1577 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1578 if (type
& SSL_kRSA
) {
1579 rsa
= cert
->rsa_tmp
;
1580 if ((rsa
== NULL
) && (s
->cert
->rsa_tmp_cb
!= NULL
)) {
1581 rsa
= s
->cert
->rsa_tmp_cb(s
,
1582 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->
1584 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s
->s3
->
1587 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1588 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1589 SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY
);
1593 cert
->rsa_tmp
= rsa
;
1596 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1597 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1598 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY
);
1603 s
->s3
->tmp
.use_rsa_tmp
= 1;
1606 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1607 if (type
& SSL_kEDH
) {
1609 if ((dhp
== NULL
) && (s
->cert
->dh_tmp_cb
!= NULL
))
1610 dhp
= s
->cert
->dh_tmp_cb(s
,
1611 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->
1613 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s
->s3
->
1616 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1617 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1618 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY
);
1622 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
!= NULL
) {
1623 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1624 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1628 if ((dh
= DHparams_dup(dhp
)) == NULL
) {
1629 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_DH_LIB
);
1634 if ((dhp
->pub_key
== NULL
||
1635 dhp
->priv_key
== NULL
||
1636 (s
->options
& SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE
))) {
1637 if (!DH_generate_key(dh
)) {
1638 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_DH_LIB
);
1642 dh
->pub_key
= BN_dup(dhp
->pub_key
);
1643 dh
->priv_key
= BN_dup(dhp
->priv_key
);
1644 if ((dh
->pub_key
== NULL
) || (dh
->priv_key
== NULL
)) {
1645 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_DH_LIB
);
1654 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1655 if (type
& SSL_kEECDH
) {
1656 const EC_GROUP
*group
;
1658 ecdhp
= cert
->ecdh_tmp
;
1659 if (s
->cert
->ecdh_tmp_auto
) {
1660 /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
1661 int nid
= tls1_shared_curve(s
, -2);
1662 if (nid
!= NID_undef
)
1663 ecdhp
= EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid
);
1664 } else if ((ecdhp
== NULL
) && s
->cert
->ecdh_tmp_cb
) {
1665 ecdhp
= s
->cert
->ecdh_tmp_cb(s
,
1666 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->
1668 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s
->
1669 s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
));
1671 if (ecdhp
== NULL
) {
1672 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1673 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1674 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY
);
1678 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.ecdh
!= NULL
) {
1679 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1680 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1684 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
1685 if (ecdhp
== NULL
) {
1686 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB
);
1689 if (s
->cert
->ecdh_tmp_auto
)
1691 else if ((ecdh
= EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp
)) == NULL
) {
1692 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB
);
1696 s
->s3
->tmp
.ecdh
= ecdh
;
1697 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh
) == NULL
) ||
1698 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh
) == NULL
) ||
1699 (s
->options
& SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE
)) {
1700 if (!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh
)) {
1701 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1707 if (((group
= EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh
)) == NULL
) ||
1708 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh
) == NULL
) ||
1709 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh
) == NULL
)) {
1710 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB
);
1714 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
) &&
1715 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group
) > 163)) {
1716 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1717 SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER
);
1722 * XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH keys over named
1723 * (not generic) curves. For supported named curves, curve_id is
1727 tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group
)))
1729 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1730 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE
);
1735 * Encode the public key. First check the size of encoding and
1736 * allocate memory accordingly.
1738 encodedlen
= EC_POINT_point2oct(group
,
1739 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh
),
1740 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED
,
1743 encodedPoint
= (unsigned char *)
1744 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen
* sizeof(unsigned char));
1745 bn_ctx
= BN_CTX_new();
1746 if ((encodedPoint
== NULL
) || (bn_ctx
== NULL
)) {
1747 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1748 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1752 encodedlen
= EC_POINT_point2oct(group
,
1753 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh
),
1754 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED
,
1755 encodedPoint
, encodedlen
, bn_ctx
);
1757 if (encodedlen
== 0) {
1758 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB
);
1762 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx
);
1766 * XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves in
1767 * ECDH ephemeral key exchanges. In this situation, we need four
1768 * additional bytes to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
1774 * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we
1775 * can set these to NULLs
1782 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
1783 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1784 if (type
& SSL_kPSK
) {
1786 * reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint
1788 n
+= 2 + strlen(s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
);
1790 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1791 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1792 if (type
& SSL_kSRP
) {
1793 if ((s
->srp_ctx
.N
== NULL
) ||
1794 (s
->srp_ctx
.g
== NULL
) ||
1795 (s
->srp_ctx
.s
== NULL
) || (s
->srp_ctx
.B
== NULL
)) {
1796 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1797 SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM
);
1800 r
[0] = s
->srp_ctx
.N
;
1801 r
[1] = s
->srp_ctx
.g
;
1802 r
[2] = s
->srp_ctx
.s
;
1803 r
[3] = s
->srp_ctx
.B
;
1807 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1808 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1809 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE
);
1812 for (i
= 0; i
< 4 && r
[i
] != NULL
; i
++) {
1813 nr
[i
] = BN_num_bytes(r
[i
]);
1814 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1815 if ((i
== 2) && (type
& SSL_kSRP
))
1822 if (!(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aNULL
| SSL_aSRP
))
1823 && !(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kPSK
)) {
1824 if ((pkey
= ssl_get_sign_pkey(s
, s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
, &md
))
1826 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1829 kn
= EVP_PKEY_size(pkey
);
1835 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf
, n
+ SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s
) + kn
)) {
1836 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_LIB_BUF
);
1839 d
= p
= ssl_handshake_start(s
);
1841 for (i
= 0; i
< 4 && r
[i
] != NULL
; i
++) {
1842 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1843 if ((i
== 2) && (type
& SSL_kSRP
)) {
1853 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1854 if (type
& SSL_kEECDH
) {
1856 * XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves. In
1857 * this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has: [1 byte
1858 * CurveType], [2 byte CurveName] [1 byte length of encoded
1859 * point], followed by the actual encoded point itself
1861 *p
= NAMED_CURVE_TYPE
;
1869 memcpy((unsigned char *)p
,
1870 (unsigned char *)encodedPoint
, encodedlen
);
1871 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint
);
1872 encodedPoint
= NULL
;
1877 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1878 if (type
& SSL_kPSK
) {
1879 /* copy PSK identity hint */
1880 s2n(strlen(s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
), p
);
1881 strncpy((char *)p
, s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
,
1882 strlen(s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
));
1883 p
+= strlen(s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
);
1890 * n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4]) and p
1891 * points to the space at the end.
1893 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1894 if (pkey
->type
== EVP_PKEY_RSA
&& !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
1897 for (num
= 2; num
> 0; num
--) {
1898 EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx
,
1899 EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW
);
1900 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx
, (num
== 2)
1901 ? s
->ctx
->md5
: s
->ctx
->sha1
, NULL
);
1902 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx
, &(s
->s3
->client_random
[0]),
1904 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx
, &(s
->s3
->server_random
[0]),
1906 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx
, d
, n
);
1907 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx
, q
, (unsigned int *)&i
);
1911 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1
, md_buf
, j
,
1912 &(p
[2]), &u
, pkey
->pkey
.rsa
) <= 0) {
1913 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_LIB_RSA
);
1921 /* send signature algorithm */
1922 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
1923 if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p
, pkey
, md
)) {
1924 /* Should never happen */
1925 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1926 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1927 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1933 fprintf(stderr
, "Using hash %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md
));
1935 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx
, md
, NULL
);
1936 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx
, &(s
->s3
->client_random
[0]),
1938 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx
, &(s
->s3
->server_random
[0]),
1940 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx
, d
, n
);
1941 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx
, &(p
[2]),
1942 (unsigned int *)&i
, pkey
)) {
1943 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_LIB_EVP
);
1948 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
))
1951 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
1952 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1953 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1954 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE
);
1959 ssl_set_handshake_header(s
, SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, n
);
1962 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B
;
1963 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx
);
1964 return ssl_do_write(s
);
1966 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1968 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1969 if (encodedPoint
!= NULL
)
1970 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint
);
1971 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx
);
1973 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx
);
1977 int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL
*s
)
1979 unsigned char *p
, *d
;
1980 int i
, j
, nl
, off
, n
;
1981 STACK_OF(X509_NAME
) *sk
= NULL
;
1985 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A
) {
1988 d
= p
= ssl_handshake_start(s
);
1990 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
1992 n
= ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s
, p
);
1997 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
1998 const unsigned char *psigs
;
1999 nl
= tls12_get_psigalgs(s
, &psigs
);
2001 memcpy(p
, psigs
, nl
);
2010 sk
= SSL_get_client_CA_list(s
);
2013 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_NAME_num(sk
); i
++) {
2014 name
= sk_X509_NAME_value(sk
, i
);
2015 j
= i2d_X509_NAME(name
, NULL
);
2016 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean
2017 (buf
, SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s
) + n
+ j
+ 2)) {
2018 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2022 p
= ssl_handshake_start(s
) + n
;
2023 if (!(s
->options
& SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG
)) {
2025 i2d_X509_NAME(name
, &p
);
2030 i2d_X509_NAME(name
, &p
);
2039 /* else no CA names */
2040 p
= ssl_handshake_start(s
) + off
;
2043 ssl_set_handshake_header(s
, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, n
);
2045 #ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
2046 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
2047 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf
, s
->init_num
+ 4)) {
2048 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, ERR_R_BUF_LIB
);
2051 p
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
+ s
->init_num
;
2053 *(p
++) = SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE
;
2061 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B
;
2064 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
2065 return ssl_do_write(s
);
2070 int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL
*s
)
2074 unsigned long alg_k
;
2076 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2078 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
2080 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2082 DH
*dh_srvr
, *dh_clnt
= NULL
;
2084 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2086 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2088 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2089 EC_KEY
*srvr_ecdh
= NULL
;
2090 EVP_PKEY
*clnt_pub_pkey
= NULL
;
2091 EC_POINT
*clnt_ecpoint
= NULL
;
2092 BN_CTX
*bn_ctx
= NULL
;
2095 n
= s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
2096 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A
,
2097 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B
,
2098 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, 2048, &ok
);
2102 p
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
2104 alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
2106 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2107 if (alg_k
& SSL_kRSA
) {
2108 unsigned char rand_premaster_secret
[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
];
2110 unsigned char decrypt_good
, version_good
;
2113 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
2114 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.use_rsa_tmp
) {
2115 if ((s
->cert
!= NULL
) && (s
->cert
->rsa_tmp
!= NULL
))
2116 rsa
= s
->cert
->rsa_tmp
;
2118 * Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should be sent already
2121 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2122 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2123 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY
);
2128 pkey
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
].privatekey
;
2129 if ((pkey
== NULL
) ||
2130 (pkey
->type
!= EVP_PKEY_RSA
) || (pkey
->pkey
.rsa
== NULL
)) {
2131 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2132 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2133 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE
);
2136 rsa
= pkey
->pkey
.rsa
;
2139 /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */
2140 if (s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
&& s
->version
!= DTLS1_BAD_VER
) {
2143 if (!(s
->options
& SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG
)) {
2144 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2145 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2146 SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG
);
2155 * Reject overly short RSA ciphertext because we want to be sure
2156 * that the buffer size makes it safe to iterate over the entire
2157 * size of a premaster secret (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). The
2158 * actual expected size is larger due to RSA padding, but the
2159 * bound is sufficient to be safe.
2161 if (n
< SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
) {
2162 al
= SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
2163 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2164 SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG
);
2169 * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of
2170 * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246,
2171 * section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of the TLS RFC and
2172 * generates a random premaster secret for the case that the decrypt
2173 * fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1
2177 * should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure.
2179 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(rand_premaster_secret
,
2180 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret
)) <= 0)
2183 RSA_private_decrypt((int)n
, p
, p
, rsa
, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING
);
2187 * decrypt_len should be SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH. decrypt_good will
2188 * be 0xff if so and zero otherwise.
2191 constant_time_eq_int_8(decrypt_len
, SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
);
2194 * If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct then
2195 * version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero. The
2196 * Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2197 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version number
2198 * check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks are done in
2199 * constant time and are treated like any other decryption error.
2202 constant_time_eq_8(p
[0], (unsigned)(s
->client_version
>> 8));
2204 constant_time_eq_8(p
[1], (unsigned)(s
->client_version
& 0xff));
2207 * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2208 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2209 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2210 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
2211 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
2212 * protocol version. If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such
2215 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG
) {
2216 unsigned char workaround_good
;
2218 constant_time_eq_8(p
[0], (unsigned)(s
->version
>> 8));
2220 constant_time_eq_8(p
[1], (unsigned)(s
->version
& 0xff));
2221 version_good
|= workaround_good
;
2225 * Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good to
2226 * remain non-zero (0xff).
2228 decrypt_good
&= version_good
;
2231 * Now copy rand_premaster_secret over from p using
2232 * decrypt_good_mask. If decryption failed, then p does not
2233 * contain valid plaintext, however, a check above guarantees
2234 * it is still sufficiently large to read from.
2236 for (j
= 0; j
< sizeof(rand_premaster_secret
); j
++) {
2237 p
[j
] = constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good
, p
[j
],
2238 rand_premaster_secret
[j
]);
2241 s
->session
->master_key_length
=
2242 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
2244 session
->master_key
,
2247 (rand_premaster_secret
));
2248 OPENSSL_cleanse(p
, sizeof(rand_premaster_secret
));
2251 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2252 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kEDH
| SSL_kDHr
| SSL_kDHd
)) {
2254 EVP_PKEY
*skey
= NULL
;
2259 if (n
&& n
!= i
+ 2) {
2260 if (!(s
->options
& SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG
)) {
2261 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2262 SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG
);
2269 if (alg_k
& SSL_kDHr
)
2270 idx
= SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA
;
2271 else if (alg_k
& SSL_kDHd
)
2272 idx
= SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA
;
2274 skey
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[idx
].privatekey
;
2275 if ((skey
== NULL
) ||
2276 (skey
->type
!= EVP_PKEY_DH
) || (skey
->pkey
.dh
== NULL
)) {
2277 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2278 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2279 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE
);
2282 dh_srvr
= skey
->pkey
.dh
;
2283 } else if (s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
== NULL
) {
2284 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2285 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2286 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY
);
2289 dh_srvr
= s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
;
2292 /* Get pubkey from cert */
2293 EVP_PKEY
*clkey
= X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
2295 if (EVP_PKEY_cmp_parameters(clkey
, skey
) == 1)
2296 dh_clnt
= EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(clkey
);
2298 if (dh_clnt
== NULL
) {
2299 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2300 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2301 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY
);
2304 EVP_PKEY_free(clkey
);
2305 pub
= dh_clnt
->pub_key
;
2307 pub
= BN_bin2bn(p
, i
, NULL
);
2309 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BN_LIB
);
2313 i
= DH_compute_key(p
, pub
, dh_srvr
);
2316 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_DH_LIB
);
2321 DH_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
);
2322 s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
= NULL
;
2328 s
->session
->master_key_length
=
2329 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
2331 session
->master_key
,
2333 OPENSSL_cleanse(p
, i
);
2338 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2339 if (alg_k
& SSL_kKRB5
) {
2340 krb5_error_code krb5rc
;
2341 krb5_data enc_ticket
;
2342 krb5_data authenticator
;
2344 KSSL_CTX
*kssl_ctx
= s
->kssl_ctx
;
2345 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx
;
2346 const EVP_CIPHER
*enc
= NULL
;
2347 unsigned char iv
[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH
];
2348 unsigned char pms
[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
+ EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH
];
2350 krb5_timestamp authtime
= 0;
2351 krb5_ticket_times ttimes
;
2353 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx
);
2356 kssl_ctx
= kssl_ctx_new();
2359 enc_ticket
.length
= i
;
2361 if (n
< (long)(enc_ticket
.length
+ 6)) {
2362 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2363 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2367 enc_ticket
.data
= (char *)p
;
2368 p
+= enc_ticket
.length
;
2371 authenticator
.length
= i
;
2373 if (n
< (long)(enc_ticket
.length
+ authenticator
.length
+ 6)) {
2374 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2375 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2379 authenticator
.data
= (char *)p
;
2380 p
+= authenticator
.length
;
2384 enc_pms
.data
= (char *)p
;
2385 p
+= enc_pms
.length
;
2388 * Note that the length is checked again below, ** after decryption
2390 if (enc_pms
.length
> sizeof pms
) {
2391 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2392 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2396 if (n
!= (long)(enc_ticket
.length
+ authenticator
.length
+
2397 enc_pms
.length
+ 6)) {
2398 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2399 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2403 if ((krb5rc
= kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx
, &enc_ticket
, &ttimes
,
2406 fprintf(stderr
, "kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
2407 krb5rc
, kssl_err
.reason
);
2409 fprintf(stderr
, "kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err
.text
);
2410 # endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2411 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, kssl_err
.reason
);
2416 * Note: no authenticator is not considered an error, ** but will
2417 * return authtime == 0.
2419 if ((krb5rc
= kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx
, &authenticator
,
2420 &authtime
, &kssl_err
)) != 0) {
2422 fprintf(stderr
, "kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
2423 krb5rc
, kssl_err
.reason
);
2425 fprintf(stderr
, "kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err
.text
);
2426 # endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2427 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, kssl_err
.reason
);
2431 if ((krb5rc
= kssl_validate_times(authtime
, &ttimes
)) != 0) {
2432 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, krb5rc
);
2436 kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx
);
2437 # endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2439 enc
= kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx
->enctype
);
2443 memset(iv
, 0, sizeof iv
); /* per RFC 1510 */
2445 if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx
, enc
, NULL
, kssl_ctx
->key
, iv
)) {
2446 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2447 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
2450 if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx
, pms
, &outl
,
2451 (unsigned char *)enc_pms
.data
, enc_pms
.length
))
2453 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2454 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
2457 if (outl
> SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
) {
2458 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2459 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2462 if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx
, &(pms
[outl
]), &padl
)) {
2463 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2464 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
2468 if (outl
> SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
) {
2469 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2470 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2473 if (!((pms
[0] == (s
->client_version
>> 8))
2474 && (pms
[1] == (s
->client_version
& 0xff)))) {
2476 * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as
2477 * the ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely,
2478 * the protocol does not offer such protection for DH
2479 * ciphersuites). However, buggy clients exist that send random
2480 * bytes instead of the protocol version. If
2481 * SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients.
2482 * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos
2485 if (!(s
->options
& SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG
)) {
2486 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2487 SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
2492 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx
);
2494 s
->session
->master_key_length
=
2495 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
2497 session
->master_key
,
2500 if (kssl_ctx
->client_princ
) {
2501 size_t len
= strlen(kssl_ctx
->client_princ
);
2502 if (len
< SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH
) {
2503 s
->session
->krb5_client_princ_len
= len
;
2504 memcpy(s
->session
->krb5_client_princ
, kssl_ctx
->client_princ
,
2509 /*- Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
2510 * but it caused problems for apache.
2511 * kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
2512 * if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
2515 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2517 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2518 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kEECDH
| SSL_kECDHr
| SSL_kECDHe
)) {
2522 const EC_GROUP
*group
;
2523 const BIGNUM
*priv_key
;
2525 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
2526 if ((srvr_ecdh
= EC_KEY_new()) == NULL
) {
2527 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2531 /* Let's get server private key and group information */
2532 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kECDHr
| SSL_kECDHe
)) {
2533 /* use the certificate */
2534 tkey
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_ECC
].privatekey
->pkey
.ec
;
2537 * use the ephermeral values we saved when generating the
2538 * ServerKeyExchange msg.
2540 tkey
= s
->s3
->tmp
.ecdh
;
2543 group
= EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey
);
2544 priv_key
= EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey
);
2546 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh
, group
) ||
2547 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh
, priv_key
)) {
2548 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EC_LIB
);
2552 /* Let's get client's public key */
2553 if ((clnt_ecpoint
= EC_POINT_new(group
)) == NULL
) {
2554 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2559 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
2561 if (alg_k
& SSL_kEECDH
) {
2562 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2563 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2564 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY
);
2567 if (((clnt_pub_pkey
= X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
))
2568 == NULL
) || (clnt_pub_pkey
->type
!= EVP_PKEY_EC
)) {
2570 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication
2571 * using ECDH certificates so this branch (n == 0L) of the
2572 * code is never executed. When that support is added, we
2573 * ought to ensure the key received in the certificate is
2574 * authorized for key agreement. ECDH_compute_key implicitly
2575 * checks that the two ECDH shares are for the same group.
2577 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2578 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2579 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS
);
2583 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint
,
2584 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey
->
2586 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EC_LIB
);
2589 ret
= 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
2592 * Get client's public key from encoded point in the
2593 * ClientKeyExchange message.
2595 if ((bn_ctx
= BN_CTX_new()) == NULL
) {
2596 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2597 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2601 /* Get encoded point length */
2605 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EC_LIB
);
2608 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group
, clnt_ecpoint
, p
, i
, bn_ctx
) == 0) {
2609 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EC_LIB
);
2613 * p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer currently, so set it
2616 p
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
2619 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
2620 field_size
= EC_GROUP_get_degree(group
);
2621 if (field_size
<= 0) {
2622 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB
);
2625 i
= ECDH_compute_key(p
, (field_size
+ 7) / 8, clnt_ecpoint
, srvr_ecdh
,
2628 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB
);
2632 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey
);
2633 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint
);
2634 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh
);
2635 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx
);
2636 EC_KEY_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.ecdh
);
2637 s
->s3
->tmp
.ecdh
= NULL
;
2639 /* Compute the master secret */
2640 s
->session
->master_key_length
=
2641 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
2643 session
->master_key
,
2646 OPENSSL_cleanse(p
, i
);
2650 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2651 if (alg_k
& SSL_kPSK
) {
2652 unsigned char *t
= NULL
;
2653 unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms
[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
* 2 + 4];
2654 unsigned int pre_ms_len
= 0, psk_len
= 0;
2656 char tmp_id
[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
+ 1];
2658 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2662 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2665 if (i
> PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
) {
2666 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2667 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2670 if (s
->psk_server_callback
== NULL
) {
2671 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2672 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB
);
2677 * Create guaranteed NULL-terminated identity string for the callback
2679 memcpy(tmp_id
, p
, i
);
2680 memset(tmp_id
+ i
, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
+ 1 - i
);
2681 psk_len
= s
->psk_server_callback(s
, tmp_id
,
2683 sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms
));
2684 OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_id
, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
+ 1);
2686 if (psk_len
> PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
) {
2687 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2689 } else if (psk_len
== 0) {
2691 * PSK related to the given identity not found
2693 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2694 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND
);
2695 al
= SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY
;
2699 /* create PSK pre_master_secret */
2700 pre_ms_len
= 2 + psk_len
+ 2 + psk_len
;
2702 memmove(psk_or_pre_ms
+ psk_len
+ 4, psk_or_pre_ms
, psk_len
);
2704 memset(t
, 0, psk_len
);
2708 if (s
->session
->psk_identity
!= NULL
)
2709 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->psk_identity
);
2710 s
->session
->psk_identity
= BUF_strdup((char *)p
);
2711 if (s
->session
->psk_identity
== NULL
) {
2712 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2716 if (s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
!= NULL
)
2717 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
);
2718 s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
= BUF_strdup(s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
);
2719 if (s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
!= NULL
&&
2720 s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
== NULL
) {
2721 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2725 s
->session
->master_key_length
=
2726 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
2728 session
->master_key
,
2733 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms
, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms
));
2738 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2739 if (alg_k
& SSL_kSRP
) {
2744 if (param_len
> n
) {
2745 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2746 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2747 SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH
);
2750 if (!(s
->srp_ctx
.A
= BN_bin2bn(p
, i
, NULL
))) {
2751 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
2754 if (BN_ucmp(s
->srp_ctx
.A
, s
->srp_ctx
.N
) >= 0
2755 || BN_is_zero(s
->srp_ctx
.A
)) {
2756 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
2757 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2758 SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS
);
2761 if (s
->session
->srp_username
!= NULL
)
2762 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->srp_username
);
2763 s
->session
->srp_username
= BUF_strdup(s
->srp_ctx
.login
);
2764 if (s
->session
->srp_username
== NULL
) {
2765 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2769 if ((s
->session
->master_key_length
=
2770 SRP_generate_server_master_secret(s
,
2771 s
->session
->master_key
)) < 0) {
2772 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2778 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
2779 if (alg_k
& SSL_kGOST
) {
2781 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pkey_ctx
;
2782 EVP_PKEY
*client_pub_pkey
= NULL
, *pk
= NULL
;
2783 unsigned char premaster_secret
[32], *start
;
2784 size_t outlen
= 32, inlen
;
2785 unsigned long alg_a
;
2789 /* Get our certificate private key */
2790 alg_a
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
;
2791 if (alg_a
& SSL_aGOST94
)
2792 pk
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_GOST94
].privatekey
;
2793 else if (alg_a
& SSL_aGOST01
)
2794 pk
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_GOST01
].privatekey
;
2796 pkey_ctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk
, NULL
);
2797 EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx
);
2799 * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
2800 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
2801 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a
2802 * client certificate for authorization only.
2804 client_pub_pkey
= X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
2805 if (client_pub_pkey
) {
2806 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx
, client_pub_pkey
) <= 0)
2809 /* Decrypt session key */
2811 ((const unsigned char **)&p
, &Tlen
, &Ttag
, &Tclass
,
2812 n
) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED
|| Ttag
!= V_ASN1_SEQUENCE
2813 || Tclass
!= V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL
) {
2814 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2815 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
2820 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt
2821 (pkey_ctx
, premaster_secret
, &outlen
, start
, inlen
) <= 0) {
2822 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2823 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
2826 /* Generate master secret */
2827 s
->session
->master_key_length
=
2828 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
2830 session
->master_key
,
2831 premaster_secret
, 32);
2832 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2833 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
2834 (pkey_ctx
, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY
, 2, NULL
) > 0)
2839 EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey
);
2840 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx
);
2846 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2847 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE
);
2853 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
2854 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_SRP)
2857 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2858 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey
);
2859 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint
);
2860 if (srvr_ecdh
!= NULL
)
2861 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh
);
2862 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx
);
2867 int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL
*s
)
2869 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
2871 int al
, ok
, ret
= 0;
2875 const EVP_MD
*md
= NULL
;
2877 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx
);
2879 n
= s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
2880 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A
,
2881 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B
,
2882 -1, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
, &ok
);
2887 if (s
->session
->peer
!= NULL
) {
2888 peer
= s
->session
->peer
;
2889 pkey
= X509_get_pubkey(peer
);
2890 type
= X509_certificate_type(peer
, pkey
);
2896 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
!= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY
) {
2897 s
->s3
->tmp
.reuse_message
= 1;
2899 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
2900 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
, SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE
);
2908 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
, SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED
);
2909 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
2913 if (!(type
& EVP_PKT_SIGN
)) {
2914 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,
2915 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE
);
2916 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
2920 if (s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
) {
2921 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY
);
2922 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
2926 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
2927 p
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
2928 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
2930 * If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare signature without
2933 if (n
== 64 && (pkey
->type
== NID_id_GostR3410_94
||
2934 pkey
->type
== NID_id_GostR3410_2001
)) {
2937 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
2938 int rv
= tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md
, s
, p
, pkey
);
2940 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2942 } else if (rv
== 0) {
2943 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2947 fprintf(stderr
, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md
));
2955 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2956 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2960 j
= EVP_PKEY_size(pkey
);
2961 if ((i
> j
) || (n
> j
) || (n
<= 0)) {
2962 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE
);
2963 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2967 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
2970 hdatalen
= BIO_get_mem_data(s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
, &hdata
);
2971 if (hdatalen
<= 0) {
2972 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2973 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2977 fprintf(stderr
, "Using TLS 1.2 with client verify alg %s\n",
2980 if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&mctx
, md
, NULL
)
2981 || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(&mctx
, hdata
, hdatalen
)) {
2982 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
2983 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2987 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&mctx
, p
, i
, pkey
) <= 0) {
2988 al
= SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
2989 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE
);
2993 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2994 if (pkey
->type
== EVP_PKEY_RSA
) {
2995 i
= RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1
, s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_verify_md
,
2996 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
+ SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
, p
, i
,
2999 al
= SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
3000 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT
);
3004 al
= SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
3005 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE
);
3010 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3011 if (pkey
->type
== EVP_PKEY_DSA
) {
3012 j
= DSA_verify(pkey
->save_type
,
3013 &(s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_verify_md
[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
]),
3014 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
, p
, i
, pkey
->pkey
.dsa
);
3017 al
= SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
3018 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
, SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE
);
3023 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3024 if (pkey
->type
== EVP_PKEY_EC
) {
3025 j
= ECDSA_verify(pkey
->save_type
,
3026 &(s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_verify_md
[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
]),
3027 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
, p
, i
, pkey
->pkey
.ec
);
3030 al
= SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
3031 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
, SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE
);
3036 if (pkey
->type
== NID_id_GostR3410_94
3037 || pkey
->type
== NID_id_GostR3410_2001
) {
3038 unsigned char signature
[64];
3040 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey
, NULL
);
3041 EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx
);
3043 fprintf(stderr
, "GOST signature length is %d", i
);
3045 for (idx
= 0; idx
< 64; idx
++) {
3046 signature
[63 - idx
] = p
[idx
];
3048 j
= EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx
, signature
, 64, s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_verify_md
,
3050 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
3052 al
= SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
3053 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
, SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE
);
3057 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3058 al
= SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE
;
3065 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
3068 if (s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
) {
3069 BIO_free(s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
);
3070 s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
= NULL
;
3071 s
->s3
->flags
&= ~TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE
;
3073 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx
);
3074 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey
);
3078 int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL
*s
)
3080 int i
, ok
, al
, ret
= -1;
3082 unsigned long l
, nc
, llen
, n
;
3083 const unsigned char *p
, *q
;
3085 STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
= NULL
;
3087 n
= s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
3090 -1, s
->max_cert_list
, &ok
);
3095 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
== SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
) {
3096 if ((s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
) &&
3097 (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT
)) {
3098 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3099 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE
);
3100 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
3104 * If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list
3106 if ((s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
) && s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
) {
3107 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3108 SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST
);
3109 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
3112 s
->s3
->tmp
.reuse_message
= 1;
3116 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
!= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
) {
3117 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
3118 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE
);
3121 p
= d
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
3123 if ((sk
= sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL
) {
3124 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3129 if (llen
+ 3 != n
) {
3130 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
3131 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3134 for (nc
= 0; nc
< llen
;) {
3136 if ((l
+ nc
+ 3) > llen
) {
3137 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
3138 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3139 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3144 x
= d2i_X509(NULL
, &p
, l
);
3146 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB
);
3150 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
3151 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3152 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3155 if (!sk_X509_push(sk
, x
)) {
3156 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3163 if (sk_X509_num(sk
) <= 0) {
3164 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3165 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
) {
3166 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
3167 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3168 SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED
);
3171 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3172 else if ((s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
) &&
3173 (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT
)) {
3174 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3175 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE
);
3176 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
3179 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
3180 if (s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
&& !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
)) {
3181 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3185 i
= ssl_verify_cert_chain(s
, sk
);
3187 al
= ssl_verify_alarm_type(s
->verify_result
);
3188 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3189 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED
);
3194 if (s
->session
->peer
!= NULL
) /* This should not be needed */
3195 X509_free(s
->session
->peer
);
3196 s
->session
->peer
= sk_X509_shift(sk
);
3197 s
->session
->verify_result
= s
->verify_result
;
3200 * With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL when we
3203 if (s
->session
->sess_cert
== NULL
) {
3204 s
->session
->sess_cert
= ssl_sess_cert_new();
3205 if (s
->session
->sess_cert
== NULL
) {
3206 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3210 if (s
->session
->sess_cert
->cert_chain
!= NULL
)
3211 sk_X509_pop_free(s
->session
->sess_cert
->cert_chain
, X509_free
);
3212 s
->session
->sess_cert
->cert_chain
= sk
;
3214 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own
3215 * certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c
3223 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
3229 sk_X509_pop_free(sk
, X509_free
);
3233 int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL
*s
)
3237 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A
) {
3238 cpk
= ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s
);
3240 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
3241 if ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
!= SSL_aKRB5
) ||
3242 (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kKRB5
)) {
3243 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
3244 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3249 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s
, cpk
)) {
3250 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3253 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B
;
3256 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
3257 return ssl_do_write(s
);
3260 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
3261 /* send a new session ticket (not necessarily for a new session) */
3262 int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL
*s
)
3264 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A
) {
3265 unsigned char *p
, *senc
, *macstart
;
3266 const unsigned char *const_p
;
3267 int len
, slen_full
, slen
;
3272 SSL_CTX
*tctx
= s
->initial_ctx
;
3273 unsigned char iv
[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH
];
3274 unsigned char key_name
[16];
3276 /* get session encoding length */
3277 slen_full
= i2d_SSL_SESSION(s
->session
, NULL
);
3279 * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too
3282 if (slen_full
> 0xFF00)
3284 senc
= OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full
);
3288 i2d_SSL_SESSION(s
->session
, &p
);
3291 * create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up
3294 sess
= d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL
, &const_p
, slen_full
);
3299 sess
->session_id_length
= 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
3301 slen
= i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess
, NULL
);
3302 if (slen
> slen_full
) { /* shouldn't ever happen */
3307 i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess
, &p
);
3308 SSL_SESSION_free(sess
);
3311 * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3312 * follows handshake_header_length +
3313 * 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
3314 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
3315 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
3316 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
3318 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s
->init_buf
,
3319 SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s
) + 22 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH
+
3320 EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH
+ EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
+ slen
))
3322 p
= ssl_handshake_start(s
);
3323 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx
);
3324 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx
);
3326 * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does
3327 * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx.
3329 if (tctx
->tlsext_ticket_key_cb
) {
3330 if (tctx
->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s
, key_name
, iv
, &ctx
,
3336 RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv
, 16);
3337 EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx
, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL
,
3338 tctx
->tlsext_tick_aes_key
, iv
);
3339 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx
, tctx
->tlsext_tick_hmac_key
, 16,
3340 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL
);
3341 memcpy(key_name
, tctx
->tlsext_tick_key_name
, 16);
3345 * Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only): We leave this unspecified
3346 * for resumed session (for simplicity), and guess that tickets for
3347 * new sessions will live as long as their sessions.
3349 l2n(s
->hit
? 0 : s
->session
->timeout
, p
);
3351 /* Skip ticket length for now */
3353 /* Output key name */
3355 memcpy(p
, key_name
, 16);
3358 memcpy(p
, iv
, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx
));
3359 p
+= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx
);
3360 /* Encrypt session data */
3361 EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx
, p
, &len
, senc
, slen
);
3363 EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx
, p
, &len
);
3365 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx
);
3367 HMAC_Update(&hctx
, macstart
, p
- macstart
);
3368 HMAC_Final(&hctx
, p
, &hlen
);
3369 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx
);
3372 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
3374 len
= p
- ssl_handshake_start(s
);
3375 ssl_set_handshake_header(s
, SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET
, len
);
3376 /* Skip ticket lifetime hint */
3377 p
= ssl_handshake_start(s
) + 4;
3379 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B
;
3383 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
3384 return ssl_do_write(s
);
3387 int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL
*s
)
3389 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A
) {
3392 * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3393 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
3394 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
3397 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s
->init_buf
, 8 + s
->tlsext_ocsp_resplen
))
3400 p
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
3403 *(p
++) = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS
;
3404 /* message length */
3405 l2n3(s
->tlsext_ocsp_resplen
+ 4, p
);
3407 *(p
++) = s
->tlsext_status_type
;
3408 /* length of OCSP response */
3409 l2n3(s
->tlsext_ocsp_resplen
, p
);
3410 /* actual response */
3411 memcpy(p
, s
->tlsext_ocsp_resp
, s
->tlsext_ocsp_resplen
);
3412 /* number of bytes to write */
3413 s
->init_num
= 8 + s
->tlsext_ocsp_resplen
;
3414 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B
;
3418 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
3419 return (ssl3_do_write(s
, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
));
3422 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3424 * ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message.
3425 * It sets the next_proto member in s if found
3427 int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL
*s
)
3430 int proto_len
, padding_len
;
3432 const unsigned char *p
;
3435 * Clients cannot send a NextProtocol message if we didn't see the
3436 * extension in their ClientHello
3438 if (!s
->s3
->next_proto_neg_seen
) {
3439 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO
,
3440 SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION
);
3444 /* See the payload format below */
3445 n
= s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
3446 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A
,
3447 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B
,
3448 SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO
, 514, &ok
);
3454 * s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received in
3455 * this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset by
3456 * ssl3_get_finished).
3458 if (!s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
) {
3459 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO
, SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS
);
3464 return 0; /* The body must be > 1 bytes long */
3466 p
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
3469 * The payload looks like:
3471 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
3472 * uint8 padding_len;
3473 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
3476 if (proto_len
+ 2 > s
->init_num
)
3478 padding_len
= p
[proto_len
+ 1];
3479 if (proto_len
+ padding_len
+ 2 != s
->init_num
)
3482 s
->next_proto_negotiated
= OPENSSL_malloc(proto_len
);
3483 if (!s
->next_proto_negotiated
) {
3484 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3487 memcpy(s
->next_proto_negotiated
, p
+ 1, proto_len
);
3488 s
->next_proto_negotiated_len
= proto_len
;