1 /* ssl/s3_srvr.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
124 /* ====================================================================
125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
142 * to make use of the Contribution.
144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
153 #include "ssl_locl.h"
154 #include "kssl_lcl.h"
155 #include "../crypto/constant_time_locl.h"
156 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
157 #include <openssl/rand.h>
158 #include <openssl/objects.h>
159 #include <openssl/evp.h>
160 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
161 #include <openssl/x509.h>
162 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
163 # include <openssl/dh.h>
165 #include <openssl/bn.h>
166 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
167 # include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
169 #include <openssl/md5.h>
171 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD
172 static const SSL_METHOD
*ssl3_get_server_method(int ver
);
174 static const SSL_METHOD
*ssl3_get_server_method(int ver
)
176 if (ver
== SSL3_VERSION
)
177 return (SSLv3_server_method());
182 IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method
,
184 ssl_undefined_function
, ssl3_get_server_method
)
186 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
187 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL
*s
, int *al
)
189 int ret
= SSL_ERROR_NONE
;
191 *al
= SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME
;
193 if ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kSRP
) &&
194 (s
->srp_ctx
.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback
!= NULL
)) {
195 if (s
->srp_ctx
.login
== NULL
) {
197 * RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp
201 *al
= SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY
;
203 ret
= SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s
, al
);
210 int ssl3_accept(SSL
*s
)
213 unsigned long alg_k
, Time
= (unsigned long)time(NULL
);
214 void (*cb
) (const SSL
*ssl
, int type
, int val
) = NULL
;
216 int new_state
, state
, skip
= 0;
218 RAND_add(&Time
, sizeof(Time
), 0);
222 if (s
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
223 cb
= s
->info_callback
;
224 else if (s
->ctx
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
225 cb
= s
->ctx
->info_callback
;
227 /* init things to blank */
229 if (!SSL_in_init(s
) || SSL_in_before(s
)) {
234 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
236 * If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we already got and
237 * don't await it anymore, because Heartbeats don't make sense during
240 if (s
->tlsext_hb_pending
) {
241 s
->tlsext_hb_pending
= 0;
250 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE
:
252 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
256 case SSL_ST_BEFORE
| SSL_ST_ACCEPT
:
257 case SSL_ST_OK
| SSL_ST_ACCEPT
:
261 cb(s
, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START
, 1);
263 if ((s
->version
>> 8) != 3) {
264 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
268 if (!ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_VERSION
, 0, s
->version
, NULL
)) {
269 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT
, SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW
);
273 s
->type
= SSL_ST_ACCEPT
;
275 if (s
->init_buf
== NULL
) {
276 if ((buf
= BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL
) {
280 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf
, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
)) {
288 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s
)) {
294 s
->s3
->flags
&= ~TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY
;
295 s
->s3
->flags
&= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK
;
297 * Should have been reset by ssl3_get_finished, too.
299 s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
= 0;
301 if (s
->state
!= SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE
) {
303 * Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that the
304 * output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
306 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s
, 1)) {
311 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s
);
312 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A
;
313 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_accept
++;
314 } else if (!s
->s3
->send_connection_binding
&&
316 SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION
)) {
318 * Server attempting to renegotiate with client that doesn't
319 * support secure renegotiation.
321 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT
,
322 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED
);
323 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
328 * s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE, we will just send a
331 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_accept_renegotiate
++;
332 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A
;
336 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A
:
337 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B
:
340 ret
= ssl3_send_hello_request(s
);
343 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C
;
344 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH
;
347 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s
);
350 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C
:
351 s
->state
= SSL_ST_OK
;
354 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A
:
355 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B
:
356 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C
:
358 ret
= ssl3_get_client_hello(s
);
361 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
362 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D
;
363 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D
:
366 if ((ret
= ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s
, &al
)) < 0) {
368 * callback indicates firther work to be done
370 s
->rwstate
= SSL_X509_LOOKUP
;
373 if (ret
!= SSL_ERROR_NONE
) {
374 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
376 * This is not really an error but the only means to for
377 * a client to detect whether srp is supported.
379 if (al
!= TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY
)
380 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT
, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
);
381 ret
= SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL
;
389 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A
;
393 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A
:
394 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B
:
395 ret
= ssl3_send_server_hello(s
);
398 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
400 if (s
->tlsext_ticket_expected
)
401 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A
;
403 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A
;
407 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A
;
410 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A
;
414 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A
:
415 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B
:
416 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
417 /* normal PSK or KRB5 or SRP */
420 new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aNULL
| SSL_aKRB5
|
422 && !(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kPSK
)) {
423 ret
= ssl3_send_server_certificate(s
);
426 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
427 if (s
->tlsext_status_expected
)
428 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A
;
430 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A
;
433 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A
;
439 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A
;
444 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A
:
445 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B
:
446 alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
449 * clear this, it may get reset by
450 * send_server_key_exchange
452 s
->s3
->tmp
.use_rsa_tmp
= 0;
455 * only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or RSA but we have a
456 * sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For
457 * ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if
458 * the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases,
459 * the server certificate contains the server's public key for
464 * PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if
467 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
468 || ((alg_k
& SSL_kPSK
) && s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
)
470 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
471 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
472 || (alg_k
& SSL_kSRP
)
474 || (alg_k
& SSL_kDHE
)
475 || (alg_k
& SSL_kECDHE
)
476 || ((alg_k
& SSL_kRSA
)
477 && (s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
].privatekey
== NULL
478 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
)
479 && EVP_PKEY_size(s
->cert
->pkeys
480 [SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
].privatekey
) *
481 8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
)
486 ret
= ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s
);
492 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A
;
496 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A
:
497 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B
:
498 if ( /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
499 !(s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
) ||
501 * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert
502 * during re-negotiation:
504 ((s
->session
->peer
!= NULL
) &&
505 (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE
)) ||
507 * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see
508 * section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in
511 ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aNULL
) &&
513 * ... except when the application insists on
514 * verification (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts
517 !(s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT
)) ||
519 * never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites
521 (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aKRB5
) ||
522 /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
523 (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aSRP
)
525 * With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests
528 || (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kPSK
)) {
529 /* no cert request */
531 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
= 0;
532 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A
;
533 if (s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
)
534 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
))
537 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
= 1;
538 ret
= ssl3_send_certificate_request(s
);
541 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A
;
546 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A
:
547 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B
:
548 ret
= ssl3_send_server_done(s
);
551 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
= SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A
;
552 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH
;
556 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH
:
559 * This code originally checked to see if any data was pending
560 * using BIO_CTRL_INFO and then flushed. This caused problems as
561 * documented in PR#1939. The proposed fix doesn't completely
562 * resolve this issue as buggy implementations of
563 * BIO_CTRL_PENDING still exist. So instead we just flush
567 s
->rwstate
= SSL_WRITING
;
568 if (BIO_flush(s
->wbio
) <= 0) {
572 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
574 s
->state
= s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
;
577 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A
:
578 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B
:
579 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
) {
580 ret
= ssl3_get_client_certificate(s
);
585 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A
;
588 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A
:
589 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B
:
590 ret
= ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s
);
595 * For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH
596 * pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is
597 * not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses
598 * its key from the certificate for key exchange.
600 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
601 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
;
603 if (s
->s3
->next_proto_neg_seen
)
604 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A
;
606 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
;
609 } else if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
610 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A
;
612 if (!s
->session
->peer
)
614 if (!s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
) {
615 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
619 * For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer. If we support
620 * extms we've done this already.
622 if (!(s
->s3
->flags
& SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS
)) {
623 s
->s3
->flags
|= TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE
;
624 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
))
631 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A
;
635 * We need to get hashes here so if there is a client cert,
636 * it can be verified FIXME - digest processing for
637 * CertificateVerify should be generalized. But it is next
640 if (s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
)
641 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
))
643 for (dgst_num
= 0; dgst_num
< SSL_MAX_DIGEST
; dgst_num
++)
644 if (s
->s3
->handshake_dgst
[dgst_num
]) {
647 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->cert_verify_mac(s
,
656 EVP_MD_CTX_size(s
->s3
->handshake_dgst
[dgst_num
]);
666 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A
:
667 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B
:
669 * This *should* be the first time we enable CCS, but be
670 * extra careful about surrounding code changes. We need
671 * to set this here because we don't know if we're
672 * expecting a CertificateVerify or not.
674 if (!s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
)
675 s
->s3
->flags
|= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK
;
676 /* we should decide if we expected this one */
677 ret
= ssl3_get_cert_verify(s
);
681 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
682 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
;
684 if (s
->s3
->next_proto_neg_seen
)
685 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A
;
687 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
;
692 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
693 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A
:
694 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B
:
696 * Enable CCS for resumed handshakes with NPN.
697 * In a full handshake with NPN, we end up here through
698 * SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B, where SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK was
699 * already set. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make
700 * sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates.
701 * s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is
702 * processed in s3_pkt.c, and remains set until
703 * the client's Finished message is read.
705 if (!s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
)
706 s
->s3
->flags
|= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK
;
708 ret
= ssl3_get_next_proto(s
);
712 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
;
716 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
:
717 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B
:
719 * Enable CCS for resumed handshakes without NPN.
720 * In a full handshake, we end up here through
721 * SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B, where SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK was
722 * already set. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make
723 * sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates.
724 * s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is
725 * processed in s3_pkt.c, and remains set until
726 * the client's Finished message is read.
728 if (!s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
)
729 s
->s3
->flags
|= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK
;
730 ret
= ssl3_get_finished(s
, SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
,
731 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B
);
735 s
->state
= SSL_ST_OK
;
736 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
737 else if (s
->tlsext_ticket_expected
)
738 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A
;
741 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A
;
745 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
746 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A
:
747 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B
:
748 ret
= ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s
);
751 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A
;
755 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A
:
756 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B
:
757 ret
= ssl3_send_cert_status(s
);
760 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A
;
766 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A
:
767 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B
:
769 s
->session
->cipher
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
;
770 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->setup_key_block(s
)) {
775 ret
= ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s
,
777 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B
);
781 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A
;
784 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
785 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE
))
793 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A
:
794 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B
:
795 ret
= ssl3_send_finished(s
,
796 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A
,
797 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B
,
799 ssl3_enc
->server_finished_label
,
801 ssl3_enc
->server_finished_label_len
);
804 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH
;
806 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
807 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
= SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
;
809 if (s
->s3
->next_proto_neg_seen
) {
810 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
= SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A
;
812 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
= SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
;
815 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
= SSL_ST_OK
;
820 /* clean a few things up */
821 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s
);
823 BUF_MEM_free(s
->init_buf
);
826 /* remove buffering on output */
827 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s
);
831 if (s
->renegotiate
== 2) { /* skipped if we just sent a
836 ssl_update_cache(s
, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER
);
838 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_accept_good
++;
840 s
->handshake_func
= ssl3_accept
;
843 cb(s
, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE
, 1);
851 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT
, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE
);
857 if (!s
->s3
->tmp
.reuse_message
&& !skip
) {
859 if ((ret
= BIO_flush(s
->wbio
)) <= 0)
863 if ((cb
!= NULL
) && (s
->state
!= state
)) {
864 new_state
= s
->state
;
866 cb(s
, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP
, 1);
867 s
->state
= new_state
;
873 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
877 cb(s
, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT
, ret
);
881 int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL
*s
)
884 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A
) {
885 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s
, SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST
, 0)) {
886 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_HELLO_REQUEST
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
889 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B
;
892 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
893 return ssl_do_write(s
);
896 int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL
*s
)
898 int i
, j
, ok
, al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ret
= -1;
899 unsigned int cookie_len
;
902 unsigned char *p
, *d
;
904 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
906 SSL_COMP
*comp
= NULL
;
908 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *ciphers
= NULL
;
910 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C
&& !s
->first_packet
)
914 * We do this so that we will respond with our native type. If we are
915 * TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1, This down
916 * switching should be handled by a different method. If we are SSLv3, we
917 * will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with TLSv1.
919 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A
) {
920 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B
;
923 n
= s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
924 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B
,
925 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C
,
926 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
927 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
, &ok
);
932 d
= p
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
935 * 2 bytes for client version, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE bytes for random, 1 byte
936 * for session id length
938 if (n
< 2 + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
+ 1) {
939 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
940 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
945 * use version from inside client hello, not from record header (may
946 * differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph)
948 s
->client_version
= (((int)p
[0]) << 8) | (int)p
[1];
951 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) ? (s
->client_version
> s
->version
&&
952 s
->method
->version
!= DTLS_ANY_VERSION
)
953 : (s
->client_version
< s
->version
)) {
954 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER
);
955 if ((s
->client_version
>> 8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR
&&
956 !s
->enc_write_ctx
&& !s
->write_hash
) {
958 * similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version
961 s
->version
= s
->client_version
;
963 al
= SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
968 * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one, just
969 * return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet. So check
972 if (SSL_get_options(s
) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE
) {
973 unsigned int session_length
, cookie_length
;
975 session_length
= *(p
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
977 if (p
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
+ session_length
+ 1 >= d
+ n
) {
978 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
979 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
982 cookie_length
= *(p
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
+ session_length
+ 1);
984 if (cookie_length
== 0)
988 /* load the client random */
989 memcpy(s
->s3
->client_random
, p
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
990 p
+= SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
;
992 /* get the session-id */
996 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
997 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1003 * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in
1004 * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally
1005 * ignore resumption requests with flag
1006 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
1007 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on this
1008 * for security won't even compile against older library versions).
1009 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to
1010 * request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains
1011 * unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the
1012 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be ignored.
1015 && (s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
))) {
1016 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s
, 1))
1019 i
= ssl_get_prev_session(s
, p
, j
, d
+ n
);
1021 * Only resume if the session's version matches the negotiated
1023 * RFC 5246 does not provide much useful advice on resumption
1024 * with a different protocol version. It doesn't forbid it but
1025 * the sanity of such behaviour would be questionable.
1026 * In practice, clients do not accept a version mismatch and
1027 * will abort the handshake with an error.
1029 if (i
== 1 && s
->version
== s
->session
->ssl_version
) { /* previous
1036 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s
, 1))
1043 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1045 if (p
+ 1 > d
+ n
) {
1046 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1047 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1050 cookie_len
= *(p
++);
1052 if (p
+ cookie_len
> d
+ n
) {
1053 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1054 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1059 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
1060 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
1061 * does not cause an overflow.
1063 if (cookie_len
> sizeof(s
->d1
->rcvd_cookie
)) {
1065 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1066 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH
);
1070 /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
1071 if ((SSL_get_options(s
) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE
) && cookie_len
> 0) {
1072 memcpy(s
->d1
->rcvd_cookie
, p
, cookie_len
);
1074 if (s
->ctx
->app_verify_cookie_cb
!= NULL
) {
1075 if (s
->ctx
->app_verify_cookie_cb(s
, s
->d1
->rcvd_cookie
,
1077 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1078 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1079 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH
);
1082 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1084 /* default verification */
1085 else if (memcmp(s
->d1
->rcvd_cookie
, s
->d1
->cookie
,
1086 s
->d1
->cookie_len
) != 0) {
1087 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1088 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH
);
1091 /* Set to -2 so if successful we return 2 */
1096 if (s
->method
->version
== DTLS_ANY_VERSION
) {
1097 /* Select version to use */
1098 if (s
->client_version
<= DTLS1_2_VERSION
&&
1099 !(s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2
)) {
1100 s
->version
= DTLS1_2_VERSION
;
1101 s
->method
= DTLSv1_2_server_method();
1102 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
1103 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1104 SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE
);
1105 s
->version
= s
->client_version
;
1106 al
= SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
1108 } else if (s
->client_version
<= DTLS1_VERSION
&&
1109 !(s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1
)) {
1110 s
->version
= DTLS1_VERSION
;
1111 s
->method
= DTLSv1_server_method();
1113 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1114 SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER
);
1115 s
->version
= s
->client_version
;
1116 al
= SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
1119 s
->session
->ssl_version
= s
->version
;
1123 if (p
+ 2 > d
+ n
) {
1124 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1125 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1129 if ((i
== 0) && (j
!= 0)) {
1130 /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */
1131 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1132 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED
);
1136 /* i bytes of cipher data + 1 byte for compression length later */
1137 if ((p
+ i
+ 1) > (d
+ n
)) {
1138 /* not enough data */
1139 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1140 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1143 if ((i
> 0) && (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s
, p
, i
, &(ciphers
))
1149 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
1150 if ((s
->hit
) && (i
> 0)) {
1152 id
= s
->session
->cipher
->id
;
1155 fprintf(stderr
, "client sent %d ciphers\n",
1156 sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers
));
1158 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers
); i
++) {
1159 c
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers
, i
);
1161 fprintf(stderr
, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1162 i
, sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers
), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c
));
1170 * Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade attack:
1174 if (j
== 0 && (s
->options
& SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG
)
1175 && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers
) == 1)) {
1177 * Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used
1178 * cipher may not be in the current list, the client instead
1179 * might be trying to continue using a cipher that before wasn't
1180 * chosen due to server preferences. We'll have to reject the
1181 * connection if the cipher is not enabled, though.
1183 c
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers
, 0);
1184 if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s
), c
) >= 0) {
1185 s
->session
->cipher
= c
;
1192 * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked
1195 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1196 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1197 SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING
);
1204 if ((p
+ i
) > (d
+ n
)) {
1205 /* not enough data */
1206 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1207 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1210 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1213 for (j
= 0; j
< i
; j
++) {
1221 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1222 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED
);
1225 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1226 /* TLS extensions */
1227 if (s
->version
>= SSL3_VERSION
) {
1228 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s
, &p
, d
, n
)) {
1229 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT
);
1235 * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake
1236 * for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before
1237 * calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket
1238 * processing to use it in key derivation.
1242 pos
= s
->s3
->server_random
;
1243 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s
, 1, pos
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) <= 0) {
1248 if (!s
->hit
&& s
->version
>= TLS1_VERSION
&& s
->tls_session_secret_cb
) {
1249 SSL_CIPHER
*pref_cipher
= NULL
;
1251 s
->session
->master_key_length
= sizeof(s
->session
->master_key
);
1252 if (s
->tls_session_secret_cb(s
, s
->session
->master_key
,
1253 &s
->session
->master_key_length
, ciphers
,
1255 s
->tls_session_secret_cb_arg
)) {
1257 s
->session
->ciphers
= ciphers
;
1258 s
->session
->verify_result
= X509_V_OK
;
1262 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1264 pref_cipher
? pref_cipher
: ssl3_choose_cipher(s
,
1269 if (pref_cipher
== NULL
) {
1270 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1271 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER
);
1275 s
->session
->cipher
= pref_cipher
;
1278 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s
->cipher_list
);
1280 if (s
->cipher_list_by_id
)
1281 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s
->cipher_list_by_id
);
1283 s
->cipher_list
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s
->session
->ciphers
);
1284 s
->cipher_list_by_id
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s
->session
->ciphers
);
1290 * Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1291 * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
1292 * algorithms from the client, starting at q.
1294 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
= NULL
;
1295 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1296 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1297 if (s
->session
->compress_meth
!= 0) {
1298 int m
, comp_id
= s
->session
->compress_meth
;
1299 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1300 /* Can't disable compression */
1301 if (!ssl_allow_compression(s
)) {
1302 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1303 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION
);
1306 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1307 for (m
= 0; m
< sk_SSL_COMP_num(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
); m
++) {
1308 comp
= sk_SSL_COMP_value(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
, m
);
1309 if (comp_id
== comp
->id
) {
1310 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
= comp
;
1314 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
== NULL
) {
1315 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1316 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM
);
1319 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1320 for (m
= 0; m
< i
; m
++) {
1321 if (q
[m
] == comp_id
)
1325 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1326 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1327 SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING
);
1332 else if (ssl_allow_compression(s
) && s
->ctx
->comp_methods
) {
1333 /* See if we have a match */
1334 int m
, nn
, o
, v
, done
= 0;
1336 nn
= sk_SSL_COMP_num(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
);
1337 for (m
= 0; m
< nn
; m
++) {
1338 comp
= sk_SSL_COMP_value(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
, m
);
1340 for (o
= 0; o
< i
; o
++) {
1350 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
= comp
;
1356 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1357 * using compression.
1359 if (s
->session
->compress_meth
!= 0) {
1360 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION
);
1366 * Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher
1370 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1371 s
->session
->compress_meth
= 0;
1373 s
->session
->compress_meth
= (comp
== NULL
) ? 0 : comp
->id
;
1375 if (s
->session
->ciphers
!= NULL
)
1376 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s
->session
->ciphers
);
1377 s
->session
->ciphers
= ciphers
;
1378 if (ciphers
== NULL
) {
1379 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1380 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED
);
1384 if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s
)) {
1385 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
);
1388 /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
1390 if (s
->cert
->cert_cb
) {
1391 int rv
= s
->cert
->cert_cb(s
, s
->cert
->cert_cb_arg
);
1393 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1394 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR
);
1398 s
->rwstate
= SSL_X509_LOOKUP
;
1401 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
1403 c
= ssl3_choose_cipher(s
, s
->session
->ciphers
, SSL_get_ciphers(s
));
1406 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1407 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER
);
1410 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
= c
;
1411 /* check whether we should disable session resumption */
1412 if (s
->not_resumable_session_cb
!= NULL
)
1413 s
->session
->not_resumable
= s
->not_resumable_session_cb(s
,
1414 ((c
->algorithm_mkey
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kECDHE
))
1416 if (s
->session
->not_resumable
)
1417 /* do not send a session ticket */
1418 s
->tlsext_ticket_expected
= 0;
1420 /* Session-id reuse */
1421 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
= s
->session
->cipher
;
1424 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
) || !(s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
)) {
1425 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
))
1430 * we now have the following setup.
1432 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
1433 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
1434 * compression - basically ignored right now
1435 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1436 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1437 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1438 * s->s3->tmp.new_cipher- the new cipher to use.
1441 /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */
1442 if (s
->version
>= SSL3_VERSION
) {
1443 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s
) <= 0) {
1444 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
);
1453 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1456 if (ciphers
!= NULL
)
1457 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers
);
1458 return ret
< 0 ? -1 : ret
;
1461 int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL
*s
)
1464 unsigned char *p
, *d
;
1469 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A
) {
1470 buf
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
1471 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1472 p
= s
->s3
->server_random
;
1473 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s
, 1, p
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) <= 0)
1476 /* Do the message type and length last */
1477 d
= p
= ssl_handshake_start(s
);
1479 *(p
++) = s
->version
>> 8;
1480 *(p
++) = s
->version
& 0xff;
1483 memcpy(p
, s
->s3
->server_random
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
1484 p
+= SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
;
1487 * There are several cases for the session ID to send
1488 * back in the server hello:
1489 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
1490 * we send back the old session ID.
1491 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
1492 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
1493 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
1494 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
1496 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
1497 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
1498 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
1499 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
1502 if (s
->session
->not_resumable
||
1503 (!(s
->ctx
->session_cache_mode
& SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER
)
1505 s
->session
->session_id_length
= 0;
1507 sl
= s
->session
->session_id_length
;
1508 if (sl
> (int)sizeof(s
->session
->session_id
)) {
1509 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1513 memcpy(p
, s
->session
->session_id
, sl
);
1516 /* put the cipher */
1517 i
= ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
, p
);
1520 /* put the compression method */
1521 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1524 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
== NULL
)
1527 *(p
++) = s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
->id
;
1529 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1530 if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s
) <= 0) {
1531 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT
);
1535 ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s
, p
, buf
+ SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
,
1537 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1538 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1544 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s
, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO
, l
)) {
1545 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1548 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B
;
1551 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
1552 return ssl_do_write(s
);
1555 int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL
*s
)
1558 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A
) {
1559 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s
, SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE
, 0)) {
1560 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_DONE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1563 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B
;
1566 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
1567 return ssl_do_write(s
);
1570 int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL
*s
)
1572 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1576 unsigned char md_buf
[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
+ SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
];
1579 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1580 DH
*dh
= NULL
, *dhp
;
1582 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1583 EC_KEY
*ecdh
= NULL
, *ecdhp
;
1584 unsigned char *encodedPoint
= NULL
;
1587 BN_CTX
*bn_ctx
= NULL
;
1590 const EVP_MD
*md
= NULL
;
1591 unsigned char *p
, *d
;
1601 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx
);
1602 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A
) {
1603 type
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
1608 r
[0] = r
[1] = r
[2] = r
[3] = NULL
;
1610 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1611 if (type
& SSL_kRSA
) {
1612 rsa
= cert
->rsa_tmp
;
1613 if ((rsa
== NULL
) && (s
->cert
->rsa_tmp_cb
!= NULL
)) {
1614 rsa
= s
->cert
->rsa_tmp_cb(s
,
1615 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->
1617 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s
->s3
->
1620 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1621 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1622 SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY
);
1626 cert
->rsa_tmp
= rsa
;
1629 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1630 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1631 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY
);
1636 s
->s3
->tmp
.use_rsa_tmp
= 1;
1639 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1640 if (type
& SSL_kDHE
) {
1641 if (s
->cert
->dh_tmp_auto
) {
1642 dhp
= ssl_get_auto_dh(s
);
1644 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1645 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1646 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1651 if ((dhp
== NULL
) && (s
->cert
->dh_tmp_cb
!= NULL
))
1652 dhp
= s
->cert
->dh_tmp_cb(s
,
1653 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->
1655 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s
->s3
->
1658 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1659 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1660 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY
);
1663 if (!ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH
,
1664 DH_security_bits(dhp
), 0, dhp
)) {
1665 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1666 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1667 SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL
);
1670 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
!= NULL
) {
1671 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1672 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1676 if (s
->cert
->dh_tmp_auto
)
1678 else if ((dh
= DHparams_dup(dhp
)) == NULL
) {
1679 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_DH_LIB
);
1684 if ((dhp
->pub_key
== NULL
||
1685 dhp
->priv_key
== NULL
||
1686 (s
->options
& SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE
))) {
1687 if (!DH_generate_key(dh
)) {
1688 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_DH_LIB
);
1692 dh
->pub_key
= BN_dup(dhp
->pub_key
);
1693 dh
->priv_key
= BN_dup(dhp
->priv_key
);
1694 if ((dh
->pub_key
== NULL
) || (dh
->priv_key
== NULL
)) {
1695 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_DH_LIB
);
1704 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1705 if (type
& SSL_kECDHE
) {
1706 const EC_GROUP
*group
;
1708 ecdhp
= cert
->ecdh_tmp
;
1709 if (s
->cert
->ecdh_tmp_auto
) {
1710 /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
1711 int nid
= tls1_shared_curve(s
, -2);
1712 if (nid
!= NID_undef
)
1713 ecdhp
= EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid
);
1714 } else if ((ecdhp
== NULL
) && s
->cert
->ecdh_tmp_cb
) {
1715 ecdhp
= s
->cert
->ecdh_tmp_cb(s
,
1716 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->
1718 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s
->
1719 s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
));
1721 if (ecdhp
== NULL
) {
1722 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1723 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1724 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY
);
1728 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.ecdh
!= NULL
) {
1729 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1730 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1734 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
1735 if (ecdhp
== NULL
) {
1736 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB
);
1739 if (s
->cert
->ecdh_tmp_auto
)
1741 else if ((ecdh
= EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp
)) == NULL
) {
1742 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB
);
1746 s
->s3
->tmp
.ecdh
= ecdh
;
1747 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh
) == NULL
) ||
1748 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh
) == NULL
) ||
1749 (s
->options
& SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE
)) {
1750 if (!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh
)) {
1751 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1757 if (((group
= EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh
)) == NULL
) ||
1758 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh
) == NULL
) ||
1759 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh
) == NULL
)) {
1760 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB
);
1764 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
) &&
1765 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group
) > 163)) {
1766 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1767 SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER
);
1772 * XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH keys over named
1773 * (not generic) curves. For supported named curves, curve_id is
1777 tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group
)))
1779 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1780 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE
);
1785 * Encode the public key. First check the size of encoding and
1786 * allocate memory accordingly.
1788 encodedlen
= EC_POINT_point2oct(group
,
1789 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh
),
1790 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED
,
1793 encodedPoint
= (unsigned char *)
1794 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen
* sizeof(unsigned char));
1795 bn_ctx
= BN_CTX_new();
1796 if ((encodedPoint
== NULL
) || (bn_ctx
== NULL
)) {
1797 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1798 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1802 encodedlen
= EC_POINT_point2oct(group
,
1803 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh
),
1804 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED
,
1805 encodedPoint
, encodedlen
, bn_ctx
);
1807 if (encodedlen
== 0) {
1808 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB
);
1812 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx
);
1816 * XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves in
1817 * ECDH ephemeral key exchanges. In this situation, we need four
1818 * additional bytes to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
1824 * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we
1825 * can set these to NULLs
1832 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1833 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1834 if (type
& SSL_kPSK
) {
1836 * reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint
1838 n
+= 2 + strlen(s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
);
1840 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1841 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1842 if (type
& SSL_kSRP
) {
1843 if ((s
->srp_ctx
.N
== NULL
) ||
1844 (s
->srp_ctx
.g
== NULL
) ||
1845 (s
->srp_ctx
.s
== NULL
) || (s
->srp_ctx
.B
== NULL
)) {
1846 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1847 SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM
);
1850 r
[0] = s
->srp_ctx
.N
;
1851 r
[1] = s
->srp_ctx
.g
;
1852 r
[2] = s
->srp_ctx
.s
;
1853 r
[3] = s
->srp_ctx
.B
;
1857 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1858 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1859 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE
);
1862 for (i
= 0; i
< 4 && r
[i
] != NULL
; i
++) {
1863 nr
[i
] = BN_num_bytes(r
[i
]);
1864 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1865 if ((i
== 2) && (type
& SSL_kSRP
))
1872 if (!(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aNULL
| SSL_aSRP
))
1873 && !(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kPSK
)) {
1874 if ((pkey
= ssl_get_sign_pkey(s
, s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
, &md
))
1876 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1879 kn
= EVP_PKEY_size(pkey
);
1885 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf
, n
+ SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s
) + kn
)) {
1886 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_LIB_BUF
);
1889 d
= p
= ssl_handshake_start(s
);
1891 for (i
= 0; i
< 4 && r
[i
] != NULL
; i
++) {
1892 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1893 if ((i
== 2) && (type
& SSL_kSRP
)) {
1903 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1904 if (type
& SSL_kECDHE
) {
1906 * XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves. In
1907 * this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has: [1 byte
1908 * CurveType], [2 byte CurveName] [1 byte length of encoded
1909 * point], followed by the actual encoded point itself
1911 *p
= NAMED_CURVE_TYPE
;
1919 memcpy((unsigned char *)p
,
1920 (unsigned char *)encodedPoint
, encodedlen
);
1921 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint
);
1922 encodedPoint
= NULL
;
1927 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1928 if (type
& SSL_kPSK
) {
1929 /* copy PSK identity hint */
1930 s2n(strlen(s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
), p
);
1931 strncpy((char *)p
, s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
,
1932 strlen(s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
));
1933 p
+= strlen(s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
);
1940 * n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4]) and p
1941 * points to the space at the end.
1943 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1944 if (pkey
->type
== EVP_PKEY_RSA
&& !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
1947 for (num
= 2; num
> 0; num
--) {
1948 EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx
,
1949 EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW
);
1950 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx
, (num
== 2)
1951 ? s
->ctx
->md5
: s
->ctx
->sha1
, NULL
);
1952 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx
, &(s
->s3
->client_random
[0]),
1954 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx
, &(s
->s3
->server_random
[0]),
1956 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx
, d
, n
);
1957 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx
, q
, (unsigned int *)&i
);
1961 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1
, md_buf
, j
,
1962 &(p
[2]), &u
, pkey
->pkey
.rsa
) <= 0) {
1963 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_LIB_RSA
);
1971 /* send signature algorithm */
1972 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
1973 if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p
, pkey
, md
)) {
1974 /* Should never happen */
1975 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1976 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1977 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1983 fprintf(stderr
, "Using hash %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md
));
1985 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx
, md
, NULL
);
1986 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx
, &(s
->s3
->client_random
[0]),
1988 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx
, &(s
->s3
->server_random
[0]),
1990 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx
, d
, n
);
1991 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx
, &(p
[2]),
1992 (unsigned int *)&i
, pkey
)) {
1993 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_LIB_EVP
);
1998 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
))
2001 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
2002 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2003 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2004 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE
);
2009 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s
, SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, n
)) {
2010 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2011 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2016 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B
;
2017 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx
);
2018 return ssl_do_write(s
);
2020 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
2022 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2023 if (encodedPoint
!= NULL
)
2024 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint
);
2025 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx
);
2027 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx
);
2031 int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL
*s
)
2033 unsigned char *p
, *d
;
2034 int i
, j
, nl
, off
, n
;
2035 STACK_OF(X509_NAME
) *sk
= NULL
;
2039 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A
) {
2042 d
= p
= ssl_handshake_start(s
);
2044 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
2046 n
= ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s
, p
);
2051 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
2052 const unsigned char *psigs
;
2053 unsigned char *etmp
= p
;
2054 nl
= tls12_get_psigalgs(s
, &psigs
);
2055 /* Skip over length for now */
2057 nl
= tls12_copy_sigalgs(s
, p
, psigs
, nl
);
2058 /* Now fill in length */
2068 sk
= SSL_get_client_CA_list(s
);
2071 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_NAME_num(sk
); i
++) {
2072 name
= sk_X509_NAME_value(sk
, i
);
2073 j
= i2d_X509_NAME(name
, NULL
);
2074 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean
2075 (buf
, SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s
) + n
+ j
+ 2)) {
2076 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2080 p
= ssl_handshake_start(s
) + n
;
2082 i2d_X509_NAME(name
, &p
);
2087 /* else no CA names */
2088 p
= ssl_handshake_start(s
) + off
;
2091 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s
, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, n
)) {
2092 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2096 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B
;
2099 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
2100 return ssl_do_write(s
);
2105 int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL
*s
)
2109 unsigned long alg_k
;
2111 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2113 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
2115 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2117 DH
*dh_srvr
, *dh_clnt
= NULL
;
2119 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2121 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2123 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2124 EC_KEY
*srvr_ecdh
= NULL
;
2125 EVP_PKEY
*clnt_pub_pkey
= NULL
;
2126 EC_POINT
*clnt_ecpoint
= NULL
;
2127 BN_CTX
*bn_ctx
= NULL
;
2130 n
= s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
2131 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A
,
2132 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B
,
2133 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, 2048, &ok
);
2137 p
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
2139 alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
2141 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2142 if (alg_k
& SSL_kRSA
) {
2143 unsigned char rand_premaster_secret
[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
];
2145 unsigned char decrypt_good
, version_good
;
2148 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
2149 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.use_rsa_tmp
) {
2150 if ((s
->cert
!= NULL
) && (s
->cert
->rsa_tmp
!= NULL
))
2151 rsa
= s
->cert
->rsa_tmp
;
2153 * Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should be sent already
2156 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2157 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2158 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY
);
2163 pkey
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
].privatekey
;
2164 if ((pkey
== NULL
) ||
2165 (pkey
->type
!= EVP_PKEY_RSA
) || (pkey
->pkey
.rsa
== NULL
)) {
2166 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2167 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2168 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE
);
2171 rsa
= pkey
->pkey
.rsa
;
2174 /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */
2175 if (s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
&& s
->version
!= DTLS1_BAD_VER
) {
2178 if (!(s
->options
& SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG
)) {
2179 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2180 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2181 SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG
);
2190 * Reject overly short RSA ciphertext because we want to be sure
2191 * that the buffer size makes it safe to iterate over the entire
2192 * size of a premaster secret (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). The
2193 * actual expected size is larger due to RSA padding, but the
2194 * bound is sufficient to be safe.
2196 if (n
< SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
) {
2197 al
= SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
2198 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2199 SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG
);
2204 * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of
2205 * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246,
2206 * section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of the TLS RFC and
2207 * generates a random premaster secret for the case that the decrypt
2208 * fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1
2211 if (RAND_bytes(rand_premaster_secret
,
2212 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret
)) <= 0)
2215 RSA_private_decrypt((int)n
, p
, p
, rsa
, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING
);
2219 * decrypt_len should be SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH. decrypt_good will
2220 * be 0xff if so and zero otherwise.
2223 constant_time_eq_int_8(decrypt_len
, SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
);
2226 * If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct then
2227 * version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero. The
2228 * Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2229 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version number
2230 * check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks are done in
2231 * constant time and are treated like any other decryption error.
2234 constant_time_eq_8(p
[0], (unsigned)(s
->client_version
>> 8));
2236 constant_time_eq_8(p
[1], (unsigned)(s
->client_version
& 0xff));
2239 * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2240 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2241 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2242 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
2243 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
2244 * protocol version. If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such
2247 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG
) {
2248 unsigned char workaround_good
;
2250 constant_time_eq_8(p
[0], (unsigned)(s
->version
>> 8));
2252 constant_time_eq_8(p
[1], (unsigned)(s
->version
& 0xff));
2253 version_good
|= workaround_good
;
2257 * Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good to
2258 * remain non-zero (0xff).
2260 decrypt_good
&= version_good
;
2263 * Now copy rand_premaster_secret over from p using
2264 * decrypt_good_mask. If decryption failed, then p does not
2265 * contain valid plaintext, however, a check above guarantees
2266 * it is still sufficiently large to read from.
2268 for (j
= 0; j
< sizeof(rand_premaster_secret
); j
++) {
2269 p
[j
] = constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good
, p
[j
],
2270 rand_premaster_secret
[j
]);
2273 s
->session
->master_key_length
=
2274 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
2276 session
->master_key
,
2279 (rand_premaster_secret
));
2280 OPENSSL_cleanse(p
, sizeof(rand_premaster_secret
));
2281 if (s
->session
->master_key_length
< 0) {
2282 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2283 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2288 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2289 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kDHr
| SSL_kDHd
)) {
2291 EVP_PKEY
*skey
= NULL
;
2295 if (alg_k
& SSL_kDHE
) {
2296 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2297 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2298 SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG
);
2303 if (n
&& n
!= i
+ 2) {
2304 if (!(s
->options
& SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG
)) {
2305 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2306 SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG
);
2313 if (alg_k
& SSL_kDHr
)
2314 idx
= SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA
;
2315 else if (alg_k
& SSL_kDHd
)
2316 idx
= SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA
;
2318 skey
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[idx
].privatekey
;
2319 if ((skey
== NULL
) ||
2320 (skey
->type
!= EVP_PKEY_DH
) || (skey
->pkey
.dh
== NULL
)) {
2321 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2322 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2323 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE
);
2326 dh_srvr
= skey
->pkey
.dh
;
2327 } else if (s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
== NULL
) {
2328 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2329 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2330 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY
);
2333 dh_srvr
= s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
;
2336 /* Get pubkey from cert */
2337 EVP_PKEY
*clkey
= X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
2339 if (EVP_PKEY_cmp_parameters(clkey
, skey
) == 1)
2340 dh_clnt
= EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(clkey
);
2342 if (dh_clnt
== NULL
) {
2343 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2344 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2345 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY
);
2348 EVP_PKEY_free(clkey
);
2349 pub
= dh_clnt
->pub_key
;
2351 pub
= BN_bin2bn(p
, i
, NULL
);
2353 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BN_LIB
);
2357 i
= DH_compute_key(p
, pub
, dh_srvr
);
2360 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_DH_LIB
);
2365 DH_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
);
2366 s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
= NULL
;
2372 s
->session
->master_key_length
=
2373 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
2375 session
->master_key
,
2377 OPENSSL_cleanse(p
, i
);
2378 if (s
->session
->master_key_length
< 0) {
2379 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2380 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2387 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2388 if (alg_k
& SSL_kKRB5
) {
2389 krb5_error_code krb5rc
;
2390 krb5_data enc_ticket
;
2391 krb5_data authenticator
;
2393 KSSL_CTX
*kssl_ctx
= s
->kssl_ctx
;
2394 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx
;
2395 const EVP_CIPHER
*enc
= NULL
;
2396 unsigned char iv
[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH
];
2397 unsigned char pms
[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
+ EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH
];
2399 krb5_timestamp authtime
= 0;
2400 krb5_ticket_times ttimes
;
2402 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx
);
2405 kssl_ctx
= kssl_ctx_new();
2408 enc_ticket
.length
= i
;
2410 if (n
< (long)(enc_ticket
.length
+ 6)) {
2411 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2412 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2416 enc_ticket
.data
= (char *)p
;
2417 p
+= enc_ticket
.length
;
2420 authenticator
.length
= i
;
2422 if (n
< (long)(enc_ticket
.length
+ authenticator
.length
+ 6)) {
2423 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2424 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2428 authenticator
.data
= (char *)p
;
2429 p
+= authenticator
.length
;
2433 enc_pms
.data
= (char *)p
;
2434 p
+= enc_pms
.length
;
2437 * Note that the length is checked again below, ** after decryption
2439 if (enc_pms
.length
> sizeof pms
) {
2440 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2441 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2445 if (n
!= (long)(enc_ticket
.length
+ authenticator
.length
+
2446 enc_pms
.length
+ 6)) {
2447 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2448 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2452 if ((krb5rc
= kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx
, &enc_ticket
, &ttimes
,
2455 fprintf(stderr
, "kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
2456 krb5rc
, kssl_err
.reason
);
2458 fprintf(stderr
, "kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err
.text
);
2459 # endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2460 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, kssl_err
.reason
);
2465 * Note: no authenticator is not considered an error, ** but will
2466 * return authtime == 0.
2468 if ((krb5rc
= kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx
, &authenticator
,
2469 &authtime
, &kssl_err
)) != 0) {
2471 fprintf(stderr
, "kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
2472 krb5rc
, kssl_err
.reason
);
2474 fprintf(stderr
, "kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err
.text
);
2475 # endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2476 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, kssl_err
.reason
);
2480 if ((krb5rc
= kssl_validate_times(authtime
, &ttimes
)) != 0) {
2481 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, krb5rc
);
2485 kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx
);
2486 # endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2488 enc
= kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx
->enctype
);
2492 memset(iv
, 0, sizeof iv
); /* per RFC 1510 */
2494 if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx
, enc
, NULL
, kssl_ctx
->key
, iv
)) {
2495 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2496 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
2499 if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx
, pms
, &outl
,
2500 (unsigned char *)enc_pms
.data
, enc_pms
.length
))
2502 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2503 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
2506 if (outl
> SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
) {
2507 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2508 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2511 if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx
, &(pms
[outl
]), &padl
)) {
2512 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2513 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
2517 if (outl
> SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
) {
2518 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2519 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2522 if (!((pms
[0] == (s
->client_version
>> 8))
2523 && (pms
[1] == (s
->client_version
& 0xff)))) {
2525 * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as
2526 * the ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely,
2527 * the protocol does not offer such protection for DH
2528 * ciphersuites). However, buggy clients exist that send random
2529 * bytes instead of the protocol version. If
2530 * SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients.
2531 * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos
2534 if (!(s
->options
& SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG
)) {
2535 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2536 SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
2541 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx
);
2543 s
->session
->master_key_length
=
2544 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
2546 session
->master_key
,
2548 if (s
->session
->master_key_length
< 0) {
2549 al
= SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2550 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2554 if (kssl_ctx
->client_princ
) {
2555 size_t len
= strlen(kssl_ctx
->client_princ
);
2556 if (len
< SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH
) {
2557 s
->session
->krb5_client_princ_len
= len
;
2558 memcpy(s
->session
->krb5_client_princ
, kssl_ctx
->client_princ
,
2563 /*- Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
2564 * but it caused problems for apache.
2565 * kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
2566 * if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
2569 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2571 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2572 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kECDHr
| SSL_kECDHe
)) {
2576 const EC_GROUP
*group
;
2577 const BIGNUM
*priv_key
;
2579 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
2580 if ((srvr_ecdh
= EC_KEY_new()) == NULL
) {
2581 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2585 /* Let's get server private key and group information */
2586 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kECDHr
| SSL_kECDHe
)) {
2587 /* use the certificate */
2588 tkey
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_ECC
].privatekey
->pkey
.ec
;
2591 * use the ephermeral values we saved when generating the
2592 * ServerKeyExchange msg.
2594 tkey
= s
->s3
->tmp
.ecdh
;
2597 group
= EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey
);
2598 priv_key
= EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey
);
2600 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh
, group
) ||
2601 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh
, priv_key
)) {
2602 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EC_LIB
);
2606 /* Let's get client's public key */
2607 if ((clnt_ecpoint
= EC_POINT_new(group
)) == NULL
) {
2608 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2613 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
2615 if (alg_k
& SSL_kECDHE
) {
2616 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2617 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2618 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY
);
2621 if (((clnt_pub_pkey
= X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
))
2622 == NULL
) || (clnt_pub_pkey
->type
!= EVP_PKEY_EC
)) {
2624 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication
2625 * using ECDH certificates so this branch (n == 0L) of the
2626 * code is never executed. When that support is added, we
2627 * ought to ensure the key received in the certificate is
2628 * authorized for key agreement. ECDH_compute_key implicitly
2629 * checks that the two ECDH shares are for the same group.
2631 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2632 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2633 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS
);
2637 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint
,
2638 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey
->
2640 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EC_LIB
);
2643 ret
= 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
2646 * Get client's public key from encoded point in the
2647 * ClientKeyExchange message.
2649 if ((bn_ctx
= BN_CTX_new()) == NULL
) {
2650 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2651 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2655 /* Get encoded point length */
2659 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EC_LIB
);
2662 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group
, clnt_ecpoint
, p
, i
, bn_ctx
) == 0) {
2663 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EC_LIB
);
2667 * p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer currently, so set it
2670 p
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
2673 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
2674 field_size
= EC_GROUP_get_degree(group
);
2675 if (field_size
<= 0) {
2676 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB
);
2679 i
= ECDH_compute_key(p
, (field_size
+ 7) / 8, clnt_ecpoint
, srvr_ecdh
,
2682 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB
);
2686 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey
);
2687 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint
);
2688 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh
);
2689 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx
);
2690 EC_KEY_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.ecdh
);
2691 s
->s3
->tmp
.ecdh
= NULL
;
2693 /* Compute the master secret */
2694 s
->session
->master_key_length
=
2695 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
2697 session
->master_key
,
2700 OPENSSL_cleanse(p
, i
);
2701 if (s
->session
->master_key_length
< 0) {
2702 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2703 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2709 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2710 if (alg_k
& SSL_kPSK
) {
2711 unsigned char *t
= NULL
;
2712 unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms
[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
* 2 + 4];
2713 unsigned int pre_ms_len
= 0, psk_len
= 0;
2715 char tmp_id
[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
+ 1];
2717 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2721 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2724 if (i
> PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
) {
2725 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2726 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2729 if (s
->psk_server_callback
== NULL
) {
2730 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2731 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB
);
2736 * Create guaranteed NULL-terminated identity string for the callback
2738 memcpy(tmp_id
, p
, i
);
2739 memset(tmp_id
+ i
, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
+ 1 - i
);
2740 psk_len
= s
->psk_server_callback(s
, tmp_id
,
2742 sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms
));
2743 OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_id
, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
+ 1);
2745 if (psk_len
> PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
) {
2746 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2748 } else if (psk_len
== 0) {
2750 * PSK related to the given identity not found
2752 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2753 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND
);
2754 al
= SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY
;
2758 /* create PSK pre_master_secret */
2759 pre_ms_len
= 2 + psk_len
+ 2 + psk_len
;
2761 memmove(psk_or_pre_ms
+ psk_len
+ 4, psk_or_pre_ms
, psk_len
);
2763 memset(t
, 0, psk_len
);
2767 if (s
->session
->psk_identity
!= NULL
)
2768 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->psk_identity
);
2769 s
->session
->psk_identity
= BUF_strdup((char *)p
);
2770 if (s
->session
->psk_identity
== NULL
) {
2771 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2775 if (s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
!= NULL
)
2776 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
);
2777 s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
= BUF_strdup(s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
);
2778 if (s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
!= NULL
&&
2779 s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
== NULL
) {
2780 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2784 s
->session
->master_key_length
=
2785 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
2787 session
->master_key
,
2790 if (s
->session
->master_key_length
< 0) {
2791 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2792 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2797 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms
, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms
));
2802 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2803 if (alg_k
& SSL_kSRP
) {
2808 if (param_len
> n
) {
2809 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2810 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2811 SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH
);
2814 if (!(s
->srp_ctx
.A
= BN_bin2bn(p
, i
, NULL
))) {
2815 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
2818 if (BN_ucmp(s
->srp_ctx
.A
, s
->srp_ctx
.N
) >= 0
2819 || BN_is_zero(s
->srp_ctx
.A
)) {
2820 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
2821 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2822 SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS
);
2825 if (s
->session
->srp_username
!= NULL
)
2826 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->srp_username
);
2827 s
->session
->srp_username
= BUF_strdup(s
->srp_ctx
.login
);
2828 if (s
->session
->srp_username
== NULL
) {
2829 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2833 if ((s
->session
->master_key_length
=
2834 SRP_generate_server_master_secret(s
,
2835 s
->session
->master_key
)) < 0) {
2836 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2842 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
2843 if (alg_k
& SSL_kGOST
) {
2845 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pkey_ctx
;
2846 EVP_PKEY
*client_pub_pkey
= NULL
, *pk
= NULL
;
2847 unsigned char premaster_secret
[32], *start
;
2848 size_t outlen
= 32, inlen
;
2849 unsigned long alg_a
;
2853 /* Get our certificate private key */
2854 alg_a
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
;
2855 if (alg_a
& SSL_aGOST94
)
2856 pk
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_GOST94
].privatekey
;
2857 else if (alg_a
& SSL_aGOST01
)
2858 pk
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_GOST01
].privatekey
;
2860 pkey_ctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk
, NULL
);
2861 EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx
);
2863 * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
2864 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
2865 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a
2866 * client certificate for authorization only.
2868 client_pub_pkey
= X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
2869 if (client_pub_pkey
) {
2870 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx
, client_pub_pkey
) <= 0)
2873 /* Decrypt session key */
2875 ((const unsigned char **)&p
, &Tlen
, &Ttag
, &Tclass
,
2876 n
) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED
|| Ttag
!= V_ASN1_SEQUENCE
2877 || Tclass
!= V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL
) {
2878 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2879 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
2884 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt
2885 (pkey_ctx
, premaster_secret
, &outlen
, start
, inlen
) <= 0) {
2886 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2887 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
2890 /* Generate master secret */
2891 s
->session
->master_key_length
=
2892 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
2894 session
->master_key
,
2895 premaster_secret
, 32);
2896 if (s
->session
->master_key_length
< 0) {
2897 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2898 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2901 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2902 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
2903 (pkey_ctx
, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY
, 2, NULL
) > 0)
2908 EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey
);
2909 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx
);
2914 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2915 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE
);
2921 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
2922 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_SRP)
2925 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2926 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey
);
2927 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint
);
2928 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh
);
2929 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx
);
2934 int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL
*s
)
2936 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
2938 int al
, ok
, ret
= 0;
2942 const EVP_MD
*md
= NULL
;
2944 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx
);
2946 n
= s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
2947 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A
,
2948 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B
,
2949 -1, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
, &ok
);
2954 if (s
->session
->peer
!= NULL
) {
2955 peer
= s
->session
->peer
;
2956 pkey
= X509_get_pubkey(peer
);
2957 type
= X509_certificate_type(peer
, pkey
);
2963 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
!= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY
) {
2964 s
->s3
->tmp
.reuse_message
= 1;
2966 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
2967 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
, SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE
);
2975 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
, SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED
);
2976 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
2980 if (!(type
& EVP_PKT_SIGN
)) {
2981 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,
2982 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE
);
2983 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
2987 if (s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
) {
2988 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY
);
2989 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
2993 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
2994 p
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
2995 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
2997 * If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare signature without
3000 if (n
== 64 && (pkey
->type
== NID_id_GostR3410_94
||
3001 pkey
->type
== NID_id_GostR3410_2001
)) {
3004 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
3005 int rv
= tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md
, s
, p
, pkey
);
3007 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3009 } else if (rv
== 0) {
3010 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
3014 fprintf(stderr
, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md
));
3022 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3023 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
3027 j
= EVP_PKEY_size(pkey
);
3028 if ((i
> j
) || (n
> j
) || (n
<= 0)) {
3029 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE
);
3030 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
3034 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
3037 hdatalen
= BIO_get_mem_data(s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
, &hdata
);
3038 if (hdatalen
<= 0) {
3039 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3040 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3044 fprintf(stderr
, "Using TLS 1.2 with client verify alg %s\n",
3047 if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&mctx
, md
, NULL
)
3048 || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(&mctx
, hdata
, hdatalen
)) {
3049 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
3050 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3054 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&mctx
, p
, i
, pkey
) <= 0) {
3055 al
= SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
3056 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE
);
3060 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3061 if (pkey
->type
== EVP_PKEY_RSA
) {
3062 i
= RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1
, s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_verify_md
,
3063 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
+ SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
, p
, i
,
3066 al
= SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
3067 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT
);
3071 al
= SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
3072 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE
);
3077 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3078 if (pkey
->type
== EVP_PKEY_DSA
) {
3079 j
= DSA_verify(pkey
->save_type
,
3080 &(s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_verify_md
[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
]),
3081 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
, p
, i
, pkey
->pkey
.dsa
);
3084 al
= SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
3085 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
, SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE
);
3090 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3091 if (pkey
->type
== EVP_PKEY_EC
) {
3092 j
= ECDSA_verify(pkey
->save_type
,
3093 &(s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_verify_md
[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
]),
3094 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
, p
, i
, pkey
->pkey
.ec
);
3097 al
= SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
3098 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
, SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE
);
3103 if (pkey
->type
== NID_id_GostR3410_94
3104 || pkey
->type
== NID_id_GostR3410_2001
) {
3105 unsigned char signature
[64];
3107 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey
, NULL
);
3108 EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx
);
3110 fprintf(stderr
, "GOST signature length is %d", i
);
3112 for (idx
= 0; idx
< 64; idx
++) {
3113 signature
[63 - idx
] = p
[idx
];
3115 j
= EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx
, signature
, 64, s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_verify_md
,
3117 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
3119 al
= SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
3120 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
, SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE
);
3124 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3125 al
= SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE
;
3132 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
3135 if (s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
) {
3136 BIO_free(s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
);
3137 s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
= NULL
;
3138 s
->s3
->flags
&= ~TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE
;
3140 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx
);
3141 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey
);
3145 int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL
*s
)
3147 int i
, ok
, al
, ret
= -1;
3149 unsigned long l
, nc
, llen
, n
;
3150 const unsigned char *p
, *q
;
3152 STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
= NULL
;
3154 n
= s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
3157 -1, s
->max_cert_list
, &ok
);
3162 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
== SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
) {
3163 if ((s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
) &&
3164 (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT
)) {
3165 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3166 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE
);
3167 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
3171 * If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list
3173 if ((s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
) && s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
) {
3174 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3175 SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST
);
3176 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
3179 s
->s3
->tmp
.reuse_message
= 1;
3183 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
!= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
) {
3184 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
3185 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE
);
3188 p
= d
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
3190 if ((sk
= sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL
) {
3191 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3196 if (llen
+ 3 != n
) {
3197 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
3198 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3201 for (nc
= 0; nc
< llen
;) {
3203 if ((l
+ nc
+ 3) > llen
) {
3204 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
3205 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3206 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3211 x
= d2i_X509(NULL
, &p
, l
);
3213 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB
);
3217 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
3218 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3219 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3222 if (!sk_X509_push(sk
, x
)) {
3223 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3230 if (sk_X509_num(sk
) <= 0) {
3231 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3232 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
) {
3233 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
3234 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3235 SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED
);
3238 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3239 else if ((s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
) &&
3240 (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT
)) {
3241 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3242 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE
);
3243 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
3246 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
3247 if (s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
&& !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
)) {
3248 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3253 i
= ssl_verify_cert_chain(s
, sk
);
3255 al
= ssl_verify_alarm_type(s
->verify_result
);
3256 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3257 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED
);
3261 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, i
);
3262 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
3265 pkey
= X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(sk
, 0));
3267 al
= SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
3268 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3269 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE
);
3272 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey
);
3275 if (s
->session
->peer
!= NULL
) /* This should not be needed */
3276 X509_free(s
->session
->peer
);
3277 s
->session
->peer
= sk_X509_shift(sk
);
3278 s
->session
->verify_result
= s
->verify_result
;
3281 * With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL when we
3284 if (s
->session
->sess_cert
== NULL
) {
3285 s
->session
->sess_cert
= ssl_sess_cert_new();
3286 if (s
->session
->sess_cert
== NULL
) {
3287 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3291 if (s
->session
->sess_cert
->cert_chain
!= NULL
)
3292 sk_X509_pop_free(s
->session
->sess_cert
->cert_chain
, X509_free
);
3293 s
->session
->sess_cert
->cert_chain
= sk
;
3295 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own
3296 * certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c
3304 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
3310 sk_X509_pop_free(sk
, X509_free
);
3314 int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL
*s
)
3318 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A
) {
3319 cpk
= ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s
);
3321 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
3322 if ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
!= SSL_aKRB5
) ||
3323 (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kKRB5
)) {
3324 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
3325 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3330 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s
, cpk
)) {
3331 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3334 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B
;
3337 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
3338 return ssl_do_write(s
);
3341 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
3342 /* send a new session ticket (not necessarily for a new session) */
3343 int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL
*s
)
3345 unsigned char *senc
= NULL
;
3349 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A
) {
3350 unsigned char *p
, *macstart
;
3351 const unsigned char *const_p
;
3352 int len
, slen_full
, slen
;
3355 SSL_CTX
*tctx
= s
->initial_ctx
;
3356 unsigned char iv
[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH
];
3357 unsigned char key_name
[16];
3359 /* get session encoding length */
3360 slen_full
= i2d_SSL_SESSION(s
->session
, NULL
);
3362 * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too
3365 if (slen_full
== 0 || slen_full
> 0xFF00)
3367 senc
= OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full
);
3371 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx
);
3372 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx
);
3375 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s
->session
, &p
))
3379 * create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up
3382 sess
= d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL
, &const_p
, slen_full
);
3385 sess
->session_id_length
= 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
3387 slen
= i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess
, NULL
);
3388 if (slen
== 0 || slen
> slen_full
) { /* shouldn't ever happen */
3389 SSL_SESSION_free(sess
);
3393 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess
, &p
)) {
3394 SSL_SESSION_free(sess
);
3397 SSL_SESSION_free(sess
);
3400 * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3401 * follows handshake_header_length +
3402 * 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
3403 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
3404 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
3405 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
3407 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s
->init_buf
,
3408 SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s
) + 22 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH
+
3409 EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH
+ EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
+ slen
))
3412 p
= ssl_handshake_start(s
);
3414 * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does
3415 * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx.
3417 if (tctx
->tlsext_ticket_key_cb
) {
3418 if (tctx
->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s
, key_name
, iv
, &ctx
,
3422 if (RAND_bytes(iv
, 16) <= 0)
3424 if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx
, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL
,
3425 tctx
->tlsext_tick_aes_key
, iv
))
3427 if (!HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx
, tctx
->tlsext_tick_hmac_key
, 16,
3428 EVP_sha256(), NULL
))
3430 memcpy(key_name
, tctx
->tlsext_tick_key_name
, 16);
3434 * Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only): We leave this unspecified
3435 * for resumed session (for simplicity), and guess that tickets for
3436 * new sessions will live as long as their sessions.
3438 l2n(s
->hit
? 0 : s
->session
->timeout
, p
);
3440 /* Skip ticket length for now */
3442 /* Output key name */
3444 memcpy(p
, key_name
, 16);
3447 memcpy(p
, iv
, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx
));
3448 p
+= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx
);
3449 /* Encrypt session data */
3450 if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx
, p
, &len
, senc
, slen
))
3453 if (!EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx
, p
, &len
))
3457 if (!HMAC_Update(&hctx
, macstart
, p
- macstart
))
3459 if (!HMAC_Final(&hctx
, p
, &hlen
))
3462 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx
);
3463 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx
);
3466 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
3468 len
= p
- ssl_handshake_start(s
);
3469 /* Skip ticket lifetime hint */
3470 p
= ssl_handshake_start(s
) + 4;
3472 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s
, SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET
, len
))
3474 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B
;
3478 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
3479 return ssl_do_write(s
);
3483 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx
);
3484 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx
);
3488 int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL
*s
)
3490 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A
) {
3493 * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3494 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
3495 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
3498 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s
->init_buf
, 8 + s
->tlsext_ocsp_resplen
))
3501 p
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
3504 *(p
++) = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS
;
3505 /* message length */
3506 l2n3(s
->tlsext_ocsp_resplen
+ 4, p
);
3508 *(p
++) = s
->tlsext_status_type
;
3509 /* length of OCSP response */
3510 l2n3(s
->tlsext_ocsp_resplen
, p
);
3511 /* actual response */
3512 memcpy(p
, s
->tlsext_ocsp_resp
, s
->tlsext_ocsp_resplen
);
3513 /* number of bytes to write */
3514 s
->init_num
= 8 + s
->tlsext_ocsp_resplen
;
3515 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B
;
3519 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
3520 return (ssl3_do_write(s
, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
));
3523 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3525 * ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message.
3526 * It sets the next_proto member in s if found
3528 int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL
*s
)
3531 int proto_len
, padding_len
;
3533 const unsigned char *p
;
3536 * Clients cannot send a NextProtocol message if we didn't see the
3537 * extension in their ClientHello
3539 if (!s
->s3
->next_proto_neg_seen
) {
3540 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO
,
3541 SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION
);
3545 /* See the payload format below */
3546 n
= s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
3547 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A
,
3548 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B
,
3549 SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO
, 514, &ok
);
3555 * s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received in
3556 * this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset by
3557 * ssl3_get_finished).
3559 if (!s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
) {
3560 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO
, SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS
);
3565 return 0; /* The body must be > 1 bytes long */
3567 p
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
3570 * The payload looks like:
3572 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
3573 * uint8 padding_len;
3574 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
3577 if (proto_len
+ 2 > s
->init_num
)
3579 padding_len
= p
[proto_len
+ 1];
3580 if (proto_len
+ padding_len
+ 2 != s
->init_num
)
3583 s
->next_proto_negotiated
= OPENSSL_malloc(proto_len
);
3584 if (!s
->next_proto_negotiated
) {
3585 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3588 memcpy(s
->next_proto_negotiated
, p
+ 1, proto_len
);
3589 s
->next_proto_negotiated_len
= proto_len
;