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updates for draft-ietf-tls-ecc-03.txt
[thirdparty/openssl.git] / ssl / s3_srvr.c
1 /* ssl/s3_srvr.c */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
3 * All rights reserved.
4 *
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8 *
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15 *
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22 *
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25 * are met:
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40 *
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
51 * SUCH DAMAGE.
52 *
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
57 */
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2003 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
60 *
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
63 * are met:
64 *
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
67 *
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
71 * distribution.
72 *
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
77 *
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
82 *
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
86 *
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
88 * acknowledgment:
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
91 *
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
105 *
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
109 *
110 */
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
113 *
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
116 *
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
119 *
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
122 *
123 */
124
125 #define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
126 #define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
127
128 #include <stdio.h>
129 #include "ssl_locl.h"
130 #include "kssl_lcl.h"
131 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
132 #include <openssl/rand.h>
133 #include <openssl/objects.h>
134 #include <openssl/evp.h>
135 #include <openssl/x509.h>
136 #include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
137 #include <openssl/md5.h>
138 #include "cryptlib.h"
139
140 static SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver);
141 static int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s);
142 static int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s);
143 static int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s);
144 static int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s);
145 static int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s);
146 static int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s);
147 static int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s);
148 static int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s);
149 static int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s);
150 static int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s);
151
152 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
153 static int nid2curve_id(int nid);
154 #endif
155
156 static SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)
157 {
158 if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
159 return(SSLv3_server_method());
160 else
161 return(NULL);
162 }
163
164 SSL_METHOD *SSLv3_server_method(void)
165 {
166 static int init=1;
167 static SSL_METHOD SSLv3_server_data;
168
169 if (init)
170 {
171 CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_METHOD);
172
173 if (init)
174 {
175 memcpy((char *)&SSLv3_server_data,(char *)sslv3_base_method(),
176 sizeof(SSL_METHOD));
177 SSLv3_server_data.ssl_accept=ssl3_accept;
178 SSLv3_server_data.get_ssl_method=ssl3_get_server_method;
179 init=0;
180 }
181
182 CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_METHOD);
183 }
184 return(&SSLv3_server_data);
185 }
186
187 int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
188 {
189 BUF_MEM *buf;
190 unsigned long l,Time=time(NULL);
191 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
192 long num1;
193 int ret= -1;
194 int new_state,state,skip=0;
195
196 RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0);
197 ERR_clear_error();
198 clear_sys_error();
199
200 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
201 cb=s->info_callback;
202 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
203 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
204
205 /* init things to blank */
206 s->in_handshake++;
207 if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s);
208
209 if (s->cert == NULL)
210 {
211 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
212 return(-1);
213 }
214
215 for (;;)
216 {
217 state=s->state;
218
219 switch (s->state)
220 {
221 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
222 s->new_session=1;
223 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
224
225 case SSL_ST_BEFORE:
226 case SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
227 case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
228 case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
229
230 s->server=1;
231 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1);
232
233 if ((s->version>>8) != 3)
234 {
235 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
236 return -1;
237 }
238 s->type=SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
239
240 if (s->init_buf == NULL)
241 {
242 if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)
243 {
244 ret= -1;
245 goto end;
246 }
247 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH))
248 {
249 ret= -1;
250 goto end;
251 }
252 s->init_buf=buf;
253 }
254
255 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
256 {
257 ret= -1;
258 goto end;
259 }
260
261 s->init_num=0;
262
263 if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE)
264 {
265 /* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that
266 * the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
267 */
268 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) { ret= -1; goto end; }
269
270 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
271 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
272 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
273 }
274 else
275 {
276 /* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE,
277 * we will just send a HelloRequest */
278 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
279 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
280 }
281 break;
282
283 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
284 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
285
286 s->shutdown=0;
287 ret=ssl3_send_hello_request(s);
288 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
289 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
290 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
291 s->init_num=0;
292
293 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
294 break;
295
296 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
297 s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
298 break;
299
300 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
301 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
302 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
303
304 s->shutdown=0;
305 ret=ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
306 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
307 s->new_session = 2;
308 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
309 s->init_num=0;
310 break;
311
312 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
313 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
314 ret=ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
315 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
316
317 if (s->hit)
318 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
319 else
320 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
321 s->init_num=0;
322 break;
323
324 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
325 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
326 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH */
327 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aNULL))
328 {
329 ret=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
330 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
331 }
332 else
333 skip=1;
334 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
335 s->init_num=0;
336 break;
337
338 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
339 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
340 l=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms;
341
342 /* clear this, it may get reset by
343 * send_server_key_exchange */
344 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA)
345 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
346 && !(l & SSL_KRB5)
347 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
348 )
349 /* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key
350 * even when forbidden by protocol specs
351 * (handshake may fail as clients are not required to
352 * be able to handle this) */
353 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
354 else
355 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0;
356
357
358 /* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or
359 * RSA but we have a sign only certificate
360 *
361 * For ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange
362 * message only if the cipher suite is either
363 * ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, the
364 * server certificate contains the server's
365 * public key for key exchange.
366 */
367 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp
368 || (l & SSL_kECDHE)
369 || (l & (SSL_DH|SSL_kFZA))
370 || ((l & SSL_kRSA)
371 && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
372 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
373 && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
374 )
375 )
376 )
377 )
378 {
379 ret=ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);
380 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
381 }
382 else
383 skip=1;
384
385 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
386 s->init_num=0;
387 break;
388
389 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
390 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
391 if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
392 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
393 /* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set,
394 * don't request cert during re-negotiation: */
395 ((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
396 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
397 /* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites
398 * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts
399 * and in RFC 2246): */
400 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aNULL) &&
401 /* ... except when the application insists on verification
402 * (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */
403 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
404 /* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */
405 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aKRB5))
406 {
407 /* no cert request */
408 skip=1;
409 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=0;
410 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
411 }
412 else
413 {
414 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=1;
415 ret=ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
416 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
417 #ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
418 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
419 #else
420 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
421 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
422 #endif
423 s->init_num=0;
424 }
425 break;
426
427 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
428 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
429 ret=ssl3_send_server_done(s);
430 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
431 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
432 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
433 s->init_num=0;
434 break;
435
436 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
437 /* number of bytes to be flushed */
438 num1=BIO_ctrl(s->wbio,BIO_CTRL_INFO,0,NULL);
439 if (num1 > 0)
440 {
441 s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
442 num1=BIO_flush(s->wbio);
443 if (num1 <= 0) { ret= -1; goto end; }
444 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
445 }
446
447 s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state;
448 break;
449
450 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
451 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
452 /* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */
453 ret = ssl3_check_client_hello(s);
454 if (ret <= 0)
455 goto end;
456 if (ret == 2)
457 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C;
458 else {
459 /* could be sent for a DH cert, even if we
460 * have not asked for it :-) */
461 ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
462 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
463 s->init_num=0;
464 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
465 }
466 break;
467
468 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
469 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
470 ret=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
471 if (ret <= 0)
472 goto end;
473 if (ret == 2)
474 {
475 /* For the ECDH ciphersuites when
476 * the client sends its ECDH pub key in
477 * a certificate, the CertificateVerify
478 * message is not sent.
479 */
480 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
481 s->init_num = 0;
482 }
483 else
484 {
485 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
486 s->init_num=0;
487
488 /* We need to get hashes here so if there is
489 * a client cert, it can be verified
490 */
491 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
492 &(s->s3->finish_dgst1),
493 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[0]));
494 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
495 &(s->s3->finish_dgst2),
496 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]));
497 }
498 break;
499
500 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
501 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
502
503 /* we should decide if we expected this one */
504 ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
505 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
506
507 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
508 s->init_num=0;
509 break;
510
511 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
512 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
513 ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
514 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
515 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
516 if (s->hit)
517 s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
518 else
519 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
520 s->init_num=0;
521 break;
522
523 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
524 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
525
526 s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
527 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
528 { ret= -1; goto end; }
529
530 ret=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
531 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
532
533 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
534 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
535 s->init_num=0;
536
537 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
538 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
539 {
540 ret= -1;
541 goto end;
542 }
543
544 break;
545
546 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
547 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
548 ret=ssl3_send_finished(s,
549 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
550 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
551 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
552 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
553 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
554 if (s->hit)
555 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
556 else
557 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK;
558 s->init_num=0;
559 break;
560
561 case SSL_ST_OK:
562 /* clean a few things up */
563 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
564
565 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
566 s->init_buf=NULL;
567
568 /* remove buffering on output */
569 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
570
571 s->init_num=0;
572
573 if (s->new_session == 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
574 {
575 /* actually not necessarily a 'new' session unless
576 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is set */
577
578 s->new_session=0;
579
580 ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
581
582 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
583 /* s->server=1; */
584 s->handshake_func=ssl3_accept;
585
586 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1);
587 }
588
589 ret = 1;
590 goto end;
591 /* break; */
592
593 default:
594 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
595 ret= -1;
596 goto end;
597 /* break; */
598 }
599
600 if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip)
601 {
602 if (s->debug)
603 {
604 if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
605 goto end;
606 }
607
608
609 if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state))
610 {
611 new_state=s->state;
612 s->state=state;
613 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP,1);
614 s->state=new_state;
615 }
616 }
617 skip=0;
618 }
619 end:
620 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
621
622 s->in_handshake--;
623 if (cb != NULL)
624 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT,ret);
625 return(ret);
626 }
627
628 static int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
629 {
630 unsigned char *p;
631
632 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A)
633 {
634 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
635 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST;
636 *(p++)=0;
637 *(p++)=0;
638 *(p++)=0;
639
640 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
641 /* number of bytes to write */
642 s->init_num=4;
643 s->init_off=0;
644 }
645
646 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
647 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
648 }
649
650 static int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s)
651 {
652 int ok;
653 long n;
654
655 /* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message,
656 * so permit appropriate message length */
657 n=ssl3_get_message(s,
658 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A,
659 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B,
660 -1,
661 s->max_cert_list,
662 &ok);
663 if (!ok) return((int)n);
664 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
665 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)
666 {
667 /* Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake,
668 * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.)
669 * I hope that tmp.dh is the only thing that may need to be cleared
670 * when a handshake is not completed ... */
671 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
672 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
673 {
674 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
675 s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
676 }
677 #endif
678 return 2;
679 }
680 return 1;
681 }
682
683 static int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
684 {
685 int i,j,ok,al,ret= -1;
686 long n;
687 unsigned long id;
688 unsigned char *p,*d,*q;
689 SSL_CIPHER *c;
690 SSL_COMP *comp=NULL;
691 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers=NULL;
692
693 /* We do this so that we will respond with our native type.
694 * If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1,
695 * This down switching should be handled by a different method.
696 * If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with
697 * TLSv1.
698 */
699 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
700 {
701 s->first_packet=1;
702 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
703 }
704 n=ssl3_get_message(s,
705 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
706 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C,
707 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,
708 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
709 &ok);
710
711 if (!ok) return((int)n);
712 d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
713
714 /* use version from inside client hello, not from record header
715 * (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */
716 s->client_version=(((int)p[0])<<8)|(int)p[1];
717 p+=2;
718
719 if (s->client_version < s->version)
720 {
721 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
722 if ((s->client_version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
723 {
724 /* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
725 s->version = s->client_version;
726 }
727 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
728 goto f_err;
729 }
730
731 /* load the client random */
732 memcpy(s->s3->client_random,p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
733 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
734
735 /* get the session-id */
736 j= *(p++);
737
738 s->hit=0;
739 /* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow session reuse during renegotiation
740 * (i.e. when s->new_session is true), option
741 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is new with 0.9.7.
742 * Maybe this optional behaviour should always have been the default,
743 * but we cannot safely change the default behaviour (or new applications
744 * might be written that become totally unsecure when compiled with
745 * an earlier library version)
746 */
747 if (j == 0 || (s->new_session && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION)))
748 {
749 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
750 goto err;
751 }
752 else
753 {
754 i=ssl_get_prev_session(s,p,j);
755 if (i == 1)
756 { /* previous session */
757 s->hit=1;
758 }
759 else if (i == -1)
760 goto err;
761 else /* i == 0 */
762 {
763 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
764 goto err;
765 }
766 }
767
768 p+=j;
769 n2s(p,i);
770 if ((i == 0) && (j != 0))
771 {
772 /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */
773 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
774 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
775 goto f_err;
776 }
777 if ((p+i) >= (d+n))
778 {
779 /* not enough data */
780 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
781 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
782 goto f_err;
783 }
784 if ((i > 0) && (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s,p,i,&(ciphers))
785 == NULL))
786 {
787 goto err;
788 }
789 p+=i;
790
791 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
792 if ((s->hit) && (i > 0))
793 {
794 j=0;
795 id=s->session->cipher->id;
796
797 #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
798 printf("client sent %d ciphers\n",sk_num(ciphers));
799 #endif
800 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++)
801 {
802 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers,i);
803 #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
804 printf("client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
805 i,sk_num(ciphers),SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
806 #endif
807 if (c->id == id)
808 {
809 j=1;
810 break;
811 }
812 }
813 if (j == 0)
814 {
815 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1))
816 {
817 /* Very bad for multi-threading.... */
818 s->session->cipher=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers,
819 0);
820 }
821 else
822 {
823 /* we need to have the cipher in the cipher
824 * list if we are asked to reuse it */
825 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
826 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
827 goto f_err;
828 }
829 }
830 }
831
832 /* compression */
833 i= *(p++);
834 if ((p+i) > (d+n))
835 {
836 /* not enough data */
837 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
838 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
839 goto f_err;
840 }
841 q=p;
842 for (j=0; j<i; j++)
843 {
844 if (p[j] == 0) break;
845 }
846
847 p+=i;
848 if (j >= i)
849 {
850 /* no compress */
851 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
852 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
853 goto f_err;
854 }
855
856 /* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
857 * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
858 * algorithms from the client, starting at q. */
859 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=NULL;
860 if (s->ctx->comp_methods != NULL)
861 { /* See if we have a match */
862 int m,nn,o,v,done=0;
863
864 nn=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
865 for (m=0; m<nn; m++)
866 {
867 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
868 v=comp->id;
869 for (o=0; o<i; o++)
870 {
871 if (v == q[o])
872 {
873 done=1;
874 break;
875 }
876 }
877 if (done) break;
878 }
879 if (done)
880 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
881 else
882 comp=NULL;
883 }
884
885 /* TLS does not mind if there is extra stuff */
886 #if 0 /* SSL 3.0 does not mind either, so we should disable this test
887 * (was enabled in 0.9.6d through 0.9.6j and 0.9.7 through 0.9.7b,
888 * in earlier SSLeay/OpenSSL releases this test existed but was buggy) */
889 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
890 {
891 if (p < (d+n))
892 {
893 /* wrong number of bytes,
894 * there could be more to follow */
895 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
896 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
897 goto f_err;
898 }
899 }
900 #endif
901
902 /* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must
903 * pick a cipher */
904
905 if (!s->hit)
906 {
907 s->session->compress_meth=(comp == NULL)?0:comp->id;
908 if (s->session->ciphers != NULL)
909 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
910 s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
911 if (ciphers == NULL)
912 {
913 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
914 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED);
915 goto f_err;
916 }
917 ciphers=NULL;
918 c=ssl3_choose_cipher(s,s->session->ciphers,
919 SSL_get_ciphers(s));
920
921 if (c == NULL)
922 {
923 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
924 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
925 goto f_err;
926 }
927 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=c;
928 }
929 else
930 {
931 /* Session-id reuse */
932 #ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
933 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
934 SSL_CIPHER *nc=NULL;
935 SSL_CIPHER *ec=NULL;
936
937 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG)
938 {
939 sk=s->session->ciphers;
940 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++)
941 {
942 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,i);
943 if (c->algorithms & SSL_eNULL)
944 nc=c;
945 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c))
946 ec=c;
947 }
948 if (nc != NULL)
949 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=nc;
950 else if (ec != NULL)
951 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=ec;
952 else
953 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
954 }
955 else
956 #endif
957 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
958 }
959
960 /* we now have the following setup.
961 * client_random
962 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
963 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
964 * compression - basically ignored right now
965 * ssl version is set - sslv3
966 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
967 * s->hit - session reuse flag
968 * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
969 */
970
971 ret=1;
972 if (0)
973 {
974 f_err:
975 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
976 }
977 err:
978 if (ciphers != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
979 return(ret);
980 }
981
982 static int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
983 {
984 unsigned char *buf;
985 unsigned char *p,*d;
986 int i,sl;
987 unsigned long l,Time;
988
989 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A)
990 {
991 buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
992 p=s->s3->server_random;
993 Time=time(NULL); /* Time */
994 l2n(Time,p);
995 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-sizeof(Time));
996 /* Do the message type and length last */
997 d=p= &(buf[4]);
998
999 *(p++)=s->version>>8;
1000 *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
1001
1002 /* Random stuff */
1003 memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1004 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1005
1006 /* now in theory we have 3 options to sending back the
1007 * session id. If it is a re-use, we send back the
1008 * old session-id, if it is a new session, we send
1009 * back the new session-id or we send back a 0 length
1010 * session-id if we want it to be single use.
1011 * Currently I will not implement the '0' length session-id
1012 * 12-Jan-98 - I'll now support the '0' length stuff.
1013 */
1014 if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER))
1015 s->session->session_id_length=0;
1016
1017 sl=s->session->session_id_length;
1018 if (sl > sizeof s->session->session_id)
1019 {
1020 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1021 return -1;
1022 }
1023 *(p++)=sl;
1024 memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,sl);
1025 p+=sl;
1026
1027 /* put the cipher */
1028 i=ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,p);
1029 p+=i;
1030
1031 /* put the compression method */
1032 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1033 *(p++)=0;
1034 else
1035 *(p++)=s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
1036
1037 /* do the header */
1038 l=(p-d);
1039 d=buf;
1040 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO;
1041 l2n3(l,d);
1042
1043 s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B;
1044 /* number of bytes to write */
1045 s->init_num=p-buf;
1046 s->init_off=0;
1047 }
1048
1049 /* SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B */
1050 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1051 }
1052
1053 static int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)
1054 {
1055 unsigned char *p;
1056
1057 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A)
1058 {
1059 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1060
1061 /* do the header */
1062 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
1063 *(p++)=0;
1064 *(p++)=0;
1065 *(p++)=0;
1066
1067 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
1068 /* number of bytes to write */
1069 s->init_num=4;
1070 s->init_off=0;
1071 }
1072
1073 /* SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B */
1074 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1075 }
1076
1077 static int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1078 {
1079 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1080 unsigned char *q;
1081 int j,num;
1082 RSA *rsa;
1083 unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
1084 unsigned int u;
1085 #endif
1086 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1087 DH *dh=NULL,*dhp;
1088 #endif
1089 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1090 EC_KEY *ecdh=NULL, *ecdhp;
1091 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1092 int encodedlen = 0;
1093 int curve_id = 0;
1094 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1095 #endif
1096 EVP_PKEY *pkey;
1097 unsigned char *p,*d;
1098 int al,i;
1099 unsigned long type;
1100 int n;
1101 CERT *cert;
1102 BIGNUM *r[4];
1103 int nr[4],kn;
1104 BUF_MEM *buf;
1105 EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
1106
1107 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
1108 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A)
1109 {
1110 type=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_MKEY_MASK;
1111 cert=s->cert;
1112
1113 buf=s->init_buf;
1114
1115 r[0]=r[1]=r[2]=r[3]=NULL;
1116 n=0;
1117 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1118 if (type & SSL_kRSA)
1119 {
1120 rsa=cert->rsa_tmp;
1121 if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL))
1122 {
1123 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s,
1124 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1125 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1126 if(rsa == NULL)
1127 {
1128 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1129 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1130 goto f_err;
1131 }
1132 RSA_up_ref(rsa);
1133 cert->rsa_tmp=rsa;
1134 }
1135 if (rsa == NULL)
1136 {
1137 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1138 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1139 goto f_err;
1140 }
1141 r[0]=rsa->n;
1142 r[1]=rsa->e;
1143 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
1144 }
1145 else
1146 #endif
1147 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1148 if (type & SSL_kEDH)
1149 {
1150 dhp=cert->dh_tmp;
1151 if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1152 dhp=s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s,
1153 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1154 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1155 if (dhp == NULL)
1156 {
1157 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1158 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1159 goto f_err;
1160 }
1161
1162 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
1163 {
1164 DH_free(dh);
1165 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1166 goto err;
1167 }
1168
1169 if ((dh=DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL)
1170 {
1171 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1172 goto err;
1173 }
1174
1175 s->s3->tmp.dh=dh;
1176 if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL ||
1177 dhp->priv_key == NULL ||
1178 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE)))
1179 {
1180 if(!DH_generate_key(dh))
1181 {
1182 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1183 ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1184 goto err;
1185 }
1186 }
1187 else
1188 {
1189 dh->pub_key=BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
1190 dh->priv_key=BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
1191 if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) ||
1192 (dh->priv_key == NULL))
1193 {
1194 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1195 goto err;
1196 }
1197 }
1198 r[0]=dh->p;
1199 r[1]=dh->g;
1200 r[2]=dh->pub_key;
1201 }
1202 else
1203 #endif
1204 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1205 if (type & SSL_kECDHE)
1206 {
1207 ecdhp=cert->ecdh_tmp;
1208 if ((ecdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1209 {
1210 ecdhp=s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s,
1211 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1212 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1213 }
1214 if (ecdhp == NULL)
1215 {
1216 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1217 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
1218 goto f_err;
1219 }
1220
1221 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
1222 {
1223 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
1224 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1225 goto err;
1226 }
1227
1228 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
1229 if (ecdhp == NULL)
1230 {
1231 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1232 goto err;
1233 }
1234 if (!EC_KEY_up_ref(ecdhp))
1235 {
1236 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1237 goto err;
1238 }
1239 ecdh = ecdhp;
1240
1241 s->s3->tmp.ecdh=ecdh;
1242 if ((ecdh->pub_key == NULL) ||
1243 (ecdh->priv_key == NULL) ||
1244 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE))
1245 {
1246 if(!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh))
1247 {
1248 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1249 goto err;
1250 }
1251 }
1252
1253 if ((ecdh->group == NULL) ||
1254 (ecdh->pub_key == NULL) ||
1255 (ecdh->priv_key == NULL))
1256 {
1257 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1258 goto err;
1259 }
1260
1261 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
1262 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(ecdh->group) > 163))
1263 {
1264 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
1265 goto err;
1266 }
1267
1268 /* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH
1269 * keys over named (not generic) curves. For
1270 * supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero.
1271 */
1272 if ((curve_id =
1273 nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_nid(ecdh->group)))
1274 == 0)
1275 {
1276 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
1277 goto err;
1278 }
1279
1280 /* Encode the public key.
1281 * First check the size of encoding and
1282 * allocate memory accordingly.
1283 */
1284 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(ecdh->group,
1285 ecdh->pub_key,
1286 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1287 NULL, 0, NULL);
1288
1289 encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
1290 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen*sizeof(unsigned char));
1291 bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
1292 if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL))
1293 {
1294 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1295 goto err;
1296 }
1297
1298
1299 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(ecdh->group,
1300 ecdh->pub_key,
1301 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1302 encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
1303
1304 if (encodedlen == 0)
1305 {
1306 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1307 goto err;
1308 }
1309
1310 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); bn_ctx=NULL;
1311
1312 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not
1313 * generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges.
1314 * In this situation, we need three additional bytes
1315 * to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
1316 * structure.
1317 */
1318 n = 3 + encodedlen;
1319
1320 /* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message
1321 * explicitly so we can set these to NULLs
1322 */
1323 r[0]=NULL;
1324 r[1]=NULL;
1325 r[2]=NULL;
1326 }
1327 else
1328 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
1329 {
1330 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1331 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
1332 goto f_err;
1333 }
1334 for (i=0; r[i] != NULL; i++)
1335 {
1336 nr[i]=BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
1337 n+=2+nr[i];
1338 }
1339
1340 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aNULL))
1341 {
1342 if ((pkey=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s,s->s3->tmp.new_cipher))
1343 == NULL)
1344 {
1345 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1346 goto f_err;
1347 }
1348 kn=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1349 }
1350 else
1351 {
1352 pkey=NULL;
1353 kn=0;
1354 }
1355
1356 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,n+4+kn))
1357 {
1358 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_BUF);
1359 goto err;
1360 }
1361 d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1362 p= &(d[4]);
1363
1364 for (i=0; r[i] != NULL; i++)
1365 {
1366 s2n(nr[i],p);
1367 BN_bn2bin(r[i],p);
1368 p+=nr[i];
1369 }
1370
1371 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1372 if (type & SSL_kECDHE)
1373 {
1374 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves.
1375 * In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has:
1376 * [1 byte CurveType], [1 byte CurveName]
1377 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by
1378 * the actual encoded point itself
1379 */
1380 *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
1381 p += 1;
1382 *p = curve_id;
1383 p += 1;
1384 *p = encodedlen;
1385 p += 1;
1386 memcpy((unsigned char*)p,
1387 (unsigned char *)encodedPoint,
1388 encodedlen);
1389 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1390 p += encodedlen;
1391 }
1392 #endif
1393
1394 /* not anonymous */
1395 if (pkey != NULL)
1396 {
1397 /* n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4])
1398 * and p points to the space at the end. */
1399 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1400 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
1401 {
1402 q=md_buf;
1403 j=0;
1404 for (num=2; num > 0; num--)
1405 {
1406 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2)
1407 ?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
1408 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1409 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1410 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1411 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q,
1412 (unsigned int *)&i);
1413 q+=i;
1414 j+=i;
1415 }
1416 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,
1417 &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0)
1418 {
1419 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_RSA);
1420 goto err;
1421 }
1422 s2n(u,p);
1423 n+=u+2;
1424 }
1425 else
1426 #endif
1427 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA)
1428 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
1429 {
1430 /* lets do DSS */
1431 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_dss1(), NULL);
1432 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1433 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1434 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1435 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
1436 (unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
1437 {
1438 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_DSA);
1439 goto err;
1440 }
1441 s2n(i,p);
1442 n+=i+2;
1443 }
1444 else
1445 #endif
1446 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA)
1447 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
1448 {
1449 /* let's do ECDSA */
1450 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_ecdsa(), NULL);
1451 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1452 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1453 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1454 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
1455 (unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
1456 {
1457 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_ECDSA);
1458 goto err;
1459 }
1460 s2n(i,p);
1461 n+=i+2;
1462 }
1463 else
1464 #endif
1465 {
1466 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
1467 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1468 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
1469 goto f_err;
1470 }
1471 }
1472
1473 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE;
1474 l2n3(n,d);
1475
1476 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
1477 * it off */
1478 s->init_num=n+4;
1479 s->init_off=0;
1480 }
1481
1482 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
1483 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
1484 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1485 f_err:
1486 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1487 err:
1488 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1489 if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1490 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
1491 #endif
1492 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
1493 return(-1);
1494 }
1495
1496 static int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
1497 {
1498 unsigned char *p,*d;
1499 int i,j,nl,off,n;
1500 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk=NULL;
1501 X509_NAME *name;
1502 BUF_MEM *buf;
1503
1504 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A)
1505 {
1506 buf=s->init_buf;
1507
1508 d=p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4]);
1509
1510 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
1511 p++;
1512 n=ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s,p);
1513 d[0]=n;
1514 p+=n;
1515 n++;
1516
1517 off=n;
1518 p+=2;
1519 n+=2;
1520
1521 sk=SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
1522 nl=0;
1523 if (sk != NULL)
1524 {
1525 for (i=0; i<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++)
1526 {
1527 name=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i);
1528 j=i2d_X509_NAME(name,NULL);
1529 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,4+n+j+2))
1530 {
1531 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
1532 goto err;
1533 }
1534 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+n]);
1535 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG))
1536 {
1537 s2n(j,p);
1538 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
1539 n+=2+j;
1540 nl+=2+j;
1541 }
1542 else
1543 {
1544 d=p;
1545 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
1546 j-=2; s2n(j,d); j+=2;
1547 n+=j;
1548 nl+=j;
1549 }
1550 }
1551 }
1552 /* else no CA names */
1553 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+off]);
1554 s2n(nl,p);
1555
1556 d=(unsigned char *)buf->data;
1557 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
1558 l2n3(n,d);
1559
1560 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
1561 * it off */
1562
1563 s->init_num=n+4;
1564 s->init_off=0;
1565 #ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
1566 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num;
1567
1568 /* do the header */
1569 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
1570 *(p++)=0;
1571 *(p++)=0;
1572 *(p++)=0;
1573 s->init_num += 4;
1574 #endif
1575
1576 }
1577
1578 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
1579 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1580 err:
1581 return(-1);
1582 }
1583
1584
1585 static const int KDF1_SHA1_len = 20;
1586 static void *KDF1_SHA1(void *in, size_t inlen, void *out, size_t outlen)
1587 {
1588 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
1589 if (outlen != SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH)
1590 return NULL;
1591 return SHA1(in, inlen, out);
1592 #else
1593 return NULL;
1594 #endif
1595 }
1596
1597 static int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1598 {
1599 int i,al,ok;
1600 long n;
1601 unsigned long l;
1602 unsigned char *p;
1603 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1604 RSA *rsa=NULL;
1605 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
1606 #endif
1607 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1608 BIGNUM *pub=NULL;
1609 DH *dh_srvr;
1610 #endif
1611 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1612 KSSL_ERR kssl_err;
1613 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
1614
1615 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1616 EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;
1617 EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
1618 EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
1619 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1620 #endif
1621
1622 n=ssl3_get_message(s,
1623 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
1624 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B,
1625 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1626 2048, /* ??? */
1627 &ok);
1628
1629 if (!ok) return((int)n);
1630 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
1631
1632 l=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms;
1633
1634 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1635 if (l & SSL_kRSA)
1636 {
1637 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
1638 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp)
1639 {
1640 if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL))
1641 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp;
1642 /* Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should
1643 * be sent already */
1644 if (rsa == NULL)
1645 {
1646 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1647 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY);
1648 goto f_err;
1649
1650 }
1651 }
1652 else
1653 {
1654 pkey=s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey;
1655 if ( (pkey == NULL) ||
1656 (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) ||
1657 (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL))
1658 {
1659 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1660 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
1661 goto f_err;
1662 }
1663 rsa=pkey->pkey.rsa;
1664 }
1665
1666 /* TLS */
1667 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION)
1668 {
1669 n2s(p,i);
1670 if (n != i+2)
1671 {
1672 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG))
1673 {
1674 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
1675 goto err;
1676 }
1677 else
1678 p-=2;
1679 }
1680 else
1681 n=i;
1682 }
1683
1684 i=RSA_private_decrypt((int)n,p,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
1685
1686 al = -1;
1687
1688 if (i != SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
1689 {
1690 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1691 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); */
1692 }
1693
1694 if ((al == -1) && !((p[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
1695 {
1696 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
1697 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
1698 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
1699 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
1700 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
1701 * protocol version.
1702 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. */
1703 if (!((s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) &&
1704 (p[0] == (s->version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->version & 0xff))))
1705 {
1706 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1707 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER); */
1708
1709 /* The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
1710 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version
1711 * number check as a "bad version oracle" -- an alert would
1712 * reveal that the plaintext corresponding to some ciphertext
1713 * made up by the adversary is properly formatted except
1714 * that the version number is wrong. To avoid such attacks,
1715 * we should treat this just like any other decryption error. */
1716 }
1717 }
1718
1719 if (al != -1)
1720 {
1721 /* Some decryption failure -- use random value instead as countermeasure
1722 * against Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding
1723 * (see RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). */
1724 ERR_clear_error();
1725 i = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
1726 p[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
1727 p[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
1728 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p+2, i-2); /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure */
1729 }
1730
1731 s->session->master_key_length=
1732 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
1733 s->session->master_key,
1734 p,i);
1735 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
1736 }
1737 else
1738 #endif
1739 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1740 if (l & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
1741 {
1742 n2s(p,i);
1743 if (n != i+2)
1744 {
1745 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG))
1746 {
1747 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
1748 goto err;
1749 }
1750 else
1751 {
1752 p-=2;
1753 i=(int)n;
1754 }
1755 }
1756
1757 if (n == 0L) /* the parameters are in the cert */
1758 {
1759 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1760 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_DH_CERTS);
1761 goto f_err;
1762 }
1763 else
1764 {
1765 if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL)
1766 {
1767 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1768 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1769 goto f_err;
1770 }
1771 else
1772 dh_srvr=s->s3->tmp.dh;
1773 }
1774
1775 pub=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL);
1776 if (pub == NULL)
1777 {
1778 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BN_LIB);
1779 goto err;
1780 }
1781
1782 i=DH_compute_key(p,pub,dh_srvr);
1783
1784 if (i <= 0)
1785 {
1786 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1787 goto err;
1788 }
1789
1790 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
1791 s->s3->tmp.dh=NULL;
1792
1793 BN_clear_free(pub);
1794 pub=NULL;
1795 s->session->master_key_length=
1796 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
1797 s->session->master_key,p,i);
1798 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
1799 }
1800 else
1801 #endif
1802 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1803 if (l & SSL_kKRB5)
1804 {
1805 krb5_error_code krb5rc;
1806 krb5_data enc_ticket;
1807 krb5_data authenticator;
1808 krb5_data enc_pms;
1809 KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
1810 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
1811 EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
1812 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
1813 unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
1814 + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
1815 int padl, outl;
1816 krb5_timestamp authtime = 0;
1817 krb5_ticket_times ttimes;
1818
1819 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
1820
1821 if (!kssl_ctx) kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
1822
1823 n2s(p,i);
1824 enc_ticket.length = i;
1825 enc_ticket.data = (char *)p;
1826 p+=enc_ticket.length;
1827
1828 n2s(p,i);
1829 authenticator.length = i;
1830 authenticator.data = (char *)p;
1831 p+=authenticator.length;
1832
1833 n2s(p,i);
1834 enc_pms.length = i;
1835 enc_pms.data = (char *)p;
1836 p+=enc_pms.length;
1837
1838 /* Note that the length is checked again below,
1839 ** after decryption
1840 */
1841 if(enc_pms.length > sizeof pms)
1842 {
1843 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1844 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1845 goto err;
1846 }
1847
1848 if (n != enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length +
1849 enc_pms.length + 6)
1850 {
1851 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1852 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1853 goto err;
1854 }
1855
1856 if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes,
1857 &kssl_err)) != 0)
1858 {
1859 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
1860 printf("kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
1861 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
1862 if (kssl_err.text)
1863 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
1864 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
1865 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1866 kssl_err.reason);
1867 goto err;
1868 }
1869
1870 /* Note: no authenticator is not considered an error,
1871 ** but will return authtime == 0.
1872 */
1873 if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator,
1874 &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0)
1875 {
1876 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
1877 printf("kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
1878 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
1879 if (kssl_err.text)
1880 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
1881 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
1882 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1883 kssl_err.reason);
1884 goto err;
1885 }
1886
1887 if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0)
1888 {
1889 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc);
1890 goto err;
1891 }
1892
1893 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
1894 kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
1895 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
1896
1897 enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
1898 if (enc == NULL)
1899 goto err;
1900
1901 memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
1902
1903 if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc,NULL,kssl_ctx->key,iv))
1904 {
1905 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1906 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
1907 goto err;
1908 }
1909 if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms,&outl,
1910 (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length))
1911 {
1912 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1913 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
1914 goto err;
1915 }
1916 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
1917 {
1918 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1919 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1920 goto err;
1921 }
1922 if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx,&(pms[outl]),&padl))
1923 {
1924 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1925 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
1926 goto err;
1927 }
1928 outl += padl;
1929 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
1930 {
1931 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1932 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1933 goto err;
1934 }
1935 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
1936
1937 s->session->master_key_length=
1938 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
1939 s->session->master_key, pms, outl);
1940
1941 if (kssl_ctx->client_princ)
1942 {
1943 int len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
1944 if ( len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH )
1945 {
1946 s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len;
1947 memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ,kssl_ctx->client_princ,len);
1948 }
1949 }
1950
1951
1952 /* Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
1953 ** but it caused problems for apache.
1954 ** kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
1955 ** if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
1956 */
1957 }
1958 else
1959 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
1960
1961 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1962 if ((l & SSL_kECDH) || (l & SSL_kECDHE))
1963 {
1964 int ret = 1;
1965 int field_size = 0;
1966
1967 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
1968 if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL)
1969 {
1970 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1971 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1972 goto err;
1973 }
1974
1975 /* Let's get server private key and group information */
1976 if (l & SSL_kECDH)
1977 {
1978 /* use the certificate */
1979 srvr_ecdh->group = s->cert->key->privatekey-> \
1980 pkey.eckey->group;
1981 srvr_ecdh->priv_key = s->cert->key->privatekey-> \
1982 pkey.eckey->priv_key;
1983 }
1984 else
1985 {
1986 /* use the ephermeral values we saved when
1987 * generating the ServerKeyExchange msg.
1988 */
1989 srvr_ecdh->group = s->s3->tmp.ecdh->group;
1990 srvr_ecdh->priv_key = s->s3->tmp.ecdh->priv_key;
1991 }
1992
1993 /* Let's get client's public key */
1994 if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(srvr_ecdh->group))
1995 == NULL)
1996 {
1997 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1998 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1999 goto err;
2000 }
2001
2002 if (n == 0L)
2003 {
2004 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
2005
2006 if (l & SSL_kECDHE)
2007 {
2008 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2009 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
2010 goto f_err;
2011 }
2012 if (((clnt_pub_pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer))
2013 == NULL) ||
2014 (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC))
2015 {
2016 /* XXX: For now, we do not support client
2017 * authentication using ECDH certificates
2018 * so this branch (n == 0L) of the code is
2019 * never executed. When that support is
2020 * added, we ought to ensure the key
2021 * received in the certificate is
2022 * authorized for key agreement.
2023 * ECDH_compute_key implicitly checks that
2024 * the two ECDH shares are for the same
2025 * group.
2026 */
2027 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2028 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2029 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS);
2030 goto f_err;
2031 }
2032
2033 EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,
2034 clnt_pub_pkey->pkey.eckey->pub_key);
2035 ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
2036 }
2037 else
2038 {
2039 /* Get client's public key from encoded point
2040 * in the ClientKeyExchange message.
2041 */
2042 if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
2043 {
2044 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2045 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2046 goto err;
2047 }
2048
2049 /* Get encoded point length */
2050 i = *p;
2051 p += 1;
2052 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(srvr_ecdh->group,
2053 clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0)
2054 {
2055 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2056 ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2057 goto err;
2058 }
2059 /* p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer
2060 * currently, so set it to the start
2061 */
2062 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2063 }
2064
2065 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
2066 field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(srvr_ecdh->group);
2067 if (field_size <= 0)
2068 {
2069 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2070 ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
2071 goto err;
2072 }
2073 /* If field size is not more than 24 octets, then use SHA-1 hash of result;
2074 * otherwise, use result (see section 4.8 of draft-ietf-tls-ecc-03.txt;
2075 * this is new with this version of the Internet Draft).
2076 */
2077 if (field_size <= 24 * 8)
2078 i = ECDH_compute_key(p, KDF1_SHA1_len, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh, KDF1_SHA1);
2079 else
2080 i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size+7)/8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh, NULL);
2081 if (i <= 0)
2082 {
2083 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2084 ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
2085 goto err;
2086 }
2087
2088 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2089 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2090 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
2091 {
2092 srvr_ecdh->priv_key = NULL;
2093 srvr_ecdh->group = NULL;
2094 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2095 }
2096 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2097
2098 /* Compute the master secret */
2099 s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc-> \
2100 generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, p, i);
2101
2102 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
2103 return (ret);
2104 }
2105 else
2106 #endif
2107 {
2108 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2109 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2110 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
2111 goto f_err;
2112 }
2113
2114 return(1);
2115 f_err:
2116 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2117 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH)
2118 err:
2119 #endif
2120 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2121 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2122 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2123 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
2124 {
2125 srvr_ecdh->priv_key = NULL;
2126 srvr_ecdh->group = NULL;
2127 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2128 }
2129 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2130 #endif
2131 return(-1);
2132 }
2133
2134 static int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
2135 {
2136 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
2137 unsigned char *p;
2138 int al,ok,ret=0;
2139 long n;
2140 int type=0,i,j;
2141 X509 *peer;
2142
2143 n=ssl3_get_message(s,
2144 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
2145 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,
2146 -1,
2147 514, /* 514? */
2148 &ok);
2149
2150 if (!ok) return((int)n);
2151
2152 if (s->session->peer != NULL)
2153 {
2154 peer=s->session->peer;
2155 pkey=X509_get_pubkey(peer);
2156 type=X509_certificate_type(peer,pkey);
2157 }
2158 else
2159 {
2160 peer=NULL;
2161 pkey=NULL;
2162 }
2163
2164 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY)
2165 {
2166 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
2167 if ((peer != NULL) && (type | EVP_PKT_SIGN))
2168 {
2169 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2170 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE);
2171 goto f_err;
2172 }
2173 ret=1;
2174 goto end;
2175 }
2176
2177 if (peer == NULL)
2178 {
2179 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED);
2180 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2181 goto f_err;
2182 }
2183
2184 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
2185 {
2186 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
2187 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2188 goto f_err;
2189 }
2190
2191 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
2192 {
2193 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
2194 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2195 goto f_err;
2196 }
2197
2198 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
2199 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2200 n2s(p,i);
2201 n-=2;
2202 if (i > n)
2203 {
2204 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2205 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2206 goto f_err;
2207 }
2208
2209 j=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
2210 if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0))
2211 {
2212 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
2213 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2214 goto f_err;
2215 }
2216
2217 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2218 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
2219 {
2220 i=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
2221 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i,
2222 pkey->pkey.rsa);
2223 if (i < 0)
2224 {
2225 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2226 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
2227 goto f_err;
2228 }
2229 if (i == 0)
2230 {
2231 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2232 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE);
2233 goto f_err;
2234 }
2235 }
2236 else
2237 #endif
2238 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2239 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
2240 {
2241 j=DSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
2242 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
2243 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.dsa);
2244 if (j <= 0)
2245 {
2246 /* bad signature */
2247 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2248 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE);
2249 goto f_err;
2250 }
2251 }
2252 else
2253 #endif
2254 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
2255 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
2256 {
2257 j=ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
2258 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
2259 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.eckey);
2260 if (j <= 0)
2261 {
2262 /* bad signature */
2263 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2264 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
2265 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
2266 goto f_err;
2267 }
2268 }
2269 else
2270 #endif
2271 {
2272 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2273 al=SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
2274 goto f_err;
2275 }
2276
2277
2278 ret=1;
2279 if (0)
2280 {
2281 f_err:
2282 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2283 }
2284 end:
2285 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
2286 return(ret);
2287 }
2288
2289 static int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
2290 {
2291 int i,ok,al,ret= -1;
2292 X509 *x=NULL;
2293 unsigned long l,nc,llen,n;
2294 unsigned char *p,*d,*q;
2295 STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL;
2296
2297 n=ssl3_get_message(s,
2298 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A,
2299 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B,
2300 -1,
2301 s->max_cert_list,
2302 &ok);
2303
2304 if (!ok) return((int)n);
2305
2306 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE)
2307 {
2308 if ( (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
2309 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
2310 {
2311 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
2312 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2313 goto f_err;
2314 }
2315 /* If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list */
2316 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
2317 {
2318 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST);
2319 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2320 goto f_err;
2321 }
2322 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
2323 return(1);
2324 }
2325
2326 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE)
2327 {
2328 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2329 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
2330 goto f_err;
2331 }
2332 d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2333
2334 if ((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)
2335 {
2336 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2337 goto err;
2338 }
2339
2340 n2l3(p,llen);
2341 if (llen+3 != n)
2342 {
2343 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2344 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2345 goto f_err;
2346 }
2347 for (nc=0; nc<llen; )
2348 {
2349 n2l3(p,l);
2350 if ((l+nc+3) > llen)
2351 {
2352 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2353 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2354 goto f_err;
2355 }
2356
2357 q=p;
2358 x=d2i_X509(NULL,&p,l);
2359 if (x == NULL)
2360 {
2361 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
2362 goto err;
2363 }
2364 if (p != (q+l))
2365 {
2366 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2367 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2368 goto f_err;
2369 }
2370 if (!sk_X509_push(sk,x))
2371 {
2372 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2373 goto err;
2374 }
2375 x=NULL;
2376 nc+=l+3;
2377 }
2378
2379 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0)
2380 {
2381 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
2382 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
2383 {
2384 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2385 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
2386 goto f_err;
2387 }
2388 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
2389 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
2390 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
2391 {
2392 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
2393 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2394 goto f_err;
2395 }
2396 }
2397 else
2398 {
2399 i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk);
2400 if (!i)
2401 {
2402 al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
2403 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_RETURNED);
2404 goto f_err;
2405 }
2406 }
2407
2408 if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */
2409 X509_free(s->session->peer);
2410 s->session->peer=sk_X509_shift(sk);
2411 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
2412
2413 /* With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL
2414 * when we arrive here. */
2415 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
2416 {
2417 s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
2418 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
2419 {
2420 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2421 goto err;
2422 }
2423 }
2424 if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL)
2425 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free);
2426 s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain=sk;
2427 /* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the
2428 * peer's own certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c */
2429
2430 sk=NULL;
2431
2432 ret=1;
2433 if (0)
2434 {
2435 f_err:
2436 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2437 }
2438 err:
2439 if (x != NULL) X509_free(x);
2440 if (sk != NULL) sk_X509_pop_free(sk,X509_free);
2441 return(ret);
2442 }
2443
2444 int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
2445 {
2446 unsigned long l;
2447 X509 *x;
2448
2449 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A)
2450 {
2451 x=ssl_get_server_send_cert(s);
2452 if (x == NULL &&
2453 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
2454 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms
2455 & (SSL_MKEY_MASK|SSL_AUTH_MASK))
2456 != (SSL_aKRB5|SSL_kKRB5))
2457 {
2458 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2459 return(0);
2460 }
2461
2462 l=ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,x);
2463 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
2464 s->init_num=(int)l;
2465 s->init_off=0;
2466 }
2467
2468 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
2469 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
2470 }
2471
2472
2473 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2474 /* This is the complement of curve_id2nid in s3_clnt.c. */
2475 static int nid2curve_id(int nid)
2476 {
2477 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-01.txt (Mar 15, 2001)
2478 * (no changes in draft-ietf-tls-ecc-03.txt [June 2003]) */
2479 switch (nid) {
2480 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
2481 return 1;
2482 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
2483 return 2;
2484 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
2485 return 3;
2486 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
2487 return 4;
2488 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
2489 return 5;
2490 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
2491 return 6;
2492 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
2493 return 7;
2494 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
2495 return 8;
2496 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
2497 return 9;
2498 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
2499 return 10;
2500 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
2501 return 11;
2502 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
2503 return 12;
2504 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
2505 return 13;
2506 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
2507 return 14;
2508 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
2509 return 15;
2510 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
2511 return 16;
2512 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
2513 return 17;
2514 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
2515 return 18;
2516 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
2517 return 19;
2518 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
2519 return 20;
2520 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
2521 return 21;
2522 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
2523 return 22;
2524 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
2525 return 23;
2526 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
2527 return 24;
2528 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
2529 return 25;
2530 default:
2531 return 0;
2532 }
2533 }
2534 #endif
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