2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
124 /* ====================================================================
125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
142 * to make use of the Contribution.
144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
151 #define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
152 #define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
155 #include "ssl_locl.h"
156 #include "kssl_lcl.h"
157 #include "../crypto/constant_time_locl.h"
158 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
159 #include <openssl/rand.h>
160 #include <openssl/objects.h>
161 #include <openssl/evp.h>
162 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
163 #include <openssl/x509.h>
164 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
165 # include <openssl/dh.h>
167 #include <openssl/bn.h>
168 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
169 # include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
171 #include <openssl/md5.h>
173 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD
174 static const SSL_METHOD
*ssl3_get_server_method(int ver
);
176 static const SSL_METHOD
*ssl3_get_server_method(int ver
)
178 if (ver
== SSL3_VERSION
)
179 return (SSLv3_server_method());
184 IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method
,
186 ssl_undefined_function
, ssl3_get_server_method
)
188 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
189 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL
*s
, int *al
)
191 int ret
= SSL_ERROR_NONE
;
193 *al
= SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME
;
195 if ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kSRP
) &&
196 (s
->srp_ctx
.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback
!= NULL
)) {
197 if (s
->srp_ctx
.login
== NULL
) {
199 * RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp
203 *al
= SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY
;
205 ret
= SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s
, al
);
212 int ssl3_accept(SSL
*s
)
215 unsigned long alg_k
, Time
= (unsigned long)time(NULL
);
216 void (*cb
) (const SSL
*ssl
, int type
, int val
) = NULL
;
218 int new_state
, state
, skip
= 0;
220 RAND_add(&Time
, sizeof(Time
), 0);
224 if (s
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
225 cb
= s
->info_callback
;
226 else if (s
->ctx
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
227 cb
= s
->ctx
->info_callback
;
229 /* init things to blank */
231 if (!SSL_in_init(s
) || SSL_in_before(s
))
234 if (s
->cert
== NULL
) {
235 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT
, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET
);
238 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
240 * If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we already got and
241 * don't await it anymore, because Heartbeats don't make sense during
244 if (s
->tlsext_hb_pending
) {
245 s
->tlsext_hb_pending
= 0;
254 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE
:
256 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
260 case SSL_ST_BEFORE
| SSL_ST_ACCEPT
:
261 case SSL_ST_OK
| SSL_ST_ACCEPT
:
265 cb(s
, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START
, 1);
267 if ((s
->version
>> 8) != 3) {
268 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
269 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
272 s
->type
= SSL_ST_ACCEPT
;
274 if (s
->init_buf
== NULL
) {
275 if ((buf
= BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL
) {
277 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
280 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf
, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
)) {
283 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
289 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s
)) {
291 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
296 s
->s3
->flags
&= ~SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE
;
297 s
->s3
->flags
&= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK
;
299 * Should have been reset by ssl3_get_finished, too.
301 s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
= 0;
303 if (s
->state
!= SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE
) {
305 * Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that the
306 * output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
308 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s
, 1)) {
310 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
314 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s
);
315 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A
;
316 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_accept
++;
317 } else if (!s
->s3
->send_connection_binding
&&
319 SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION
)) {
321 * Server attempting to renegotiate with client that doesn't
322 * support secure renegotiation.
324 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT
,
325 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED
);
326 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
328 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
332 * s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE, we will just send a
335 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_accept_renegotiate
++;
336 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A
;
340 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A
:
341 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B
:
344 ret
= ssl3_send_hello_request(s
);
347 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C
;
348 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH
;
351 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s
);
354 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C
:
355 s
->state
= SSL_ST_OK
;
358 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A
:
359 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B
:
360 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C
:
363 if (s
->rwstate
!= SSL_X509_LOOKUP
) {
364 ret
= ssl3_get_client_hello(s
);
368 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
371 if ((ret
= ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s
, &al
)) < 0) {
373 * callback indicates firther work to be done
375 s
->rwstate
= SSL_X509_LOOKUP
;
378 if (ret
!= SSL_ERROR_NONE
) {
379 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
381 * This is not really an error but the only means to for
382 * a client to detect whether srp is supported.
384 if (al
!= TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY
)
385 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT
, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
);
387 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
394 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A
;
398 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A
:
399 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B
:
400 ret
= ssl3_send_server_hello(s
);
403 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
405 if (s
->tlsext_ticket_expected
)
406 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A
;
408 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A
;
412 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A
;
415 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A
;
419 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A
:
420 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B
:
421 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
422 /* normal PSK or KRB5 or SRP */
425 new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aNULL
| SSL_aKRB5
|
427 && !(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kPSK
)) {
428 ret
= ssl3_send_server_certificate(s
);
431 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
432 if (s
->tlsext_status_expected
)
433 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A
;
435 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A
;
438 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A
;
444 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A
;
449 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A
:
450 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B
:
451 alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
454 * clear this, it may get reset by
455 * send_server_key_exchange
457 s
->s3
->tmp
.use_rsa_tmp
= 0;
460 * only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or RSA but we have a
461 * sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For
462 * ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if
463 * the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases,
464 * the server certificate contains the server's public key for
469 * PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if
472 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
473 || ((alg_k
& SSL_kPSK
) && s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
)
475 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
476 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
477 || (alg_k
& SSL_kSRP
)
479 || (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHr
| SSL_kDHd
| SSL_kEDH
))
480 || (alg_k
& SSL_kEECDH
)
481 || ((alg_k
& SSL_kRSA
)
482 && (s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
].privatekey
== NULL
483 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
)
484 && EVP_PKEY_size(s
->cert
->pkeys
485 [SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
].privatekey
) *
486 8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
)
491 ret
= ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s
);
497 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A
;
501 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A
:
502 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B
:
503 if ( /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
504 !(s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
) ||
506 * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert
507 * during re-negotiation:
509 ((s
->session
->peer
!= NULL
) &&
510 (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE
)) ||
512 * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see
513 * section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in
516 ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aNULL
) &&
518 * ... except when the application insists on
519 * verification (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts
522 !(s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT
)) ||
524 * never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites
526 (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aKRB5
) ||
527 /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
528 (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aSRP
)
530 * With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests
533 || (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kPSK
)) {
534 /* no cert request */
536 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
= 0;
537 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A
;
538 if (s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
) {
539 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
)) {
540 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
545 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
= 1;
546 ret
= ssl3_send_certificate_request(s
);
549 #ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
550 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A
;
552 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH
;
553 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
= SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A
;
559 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A
:
560 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B
:
561 ret
= ssl3_send_server_done(s
);
564 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
= SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A
;
565 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH
;
569 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH
:
572 * This code originally checked to see if any data was pending
573 * using BIO_CTRL_INFO and then flushed. This caused problems as
574 * documented in PR#1939. The proposed fix doesn't completely
575 * resolve this issue as buggy implementations of
576 * BIO_CTRL_PENDING still exist. So instead we just flush
580 s
->rwstate
= SSL_WRITING
;
581 if (BIO_flush(s
->wbio
) <= 0) {
585 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
587 s
->state
= s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
;
590 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A
:
591 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B
:
592 /* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */
593 ret
= ssl3_check_client_hello(s
);
597 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C
;
599 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
) {
600 ret
= ssl3_get_client_certificate(s
);
605 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A
;
609 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A
:
610 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B
:
611 ret
= ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s
);
616 * For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH
617 * pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is
618 * not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses
619 * its key from the certificate for key exchange.
621 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
622 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
;
624 if (s
->s3
->next_proto_neg_seen
)
625 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A
;
627 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
;
630 } else if (TLS1_get_version(s
) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
) {
631 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A
;
633 if (!s
->session
->peer
)
636 * For TLS v1.2 freeze the handshake buffer at this point and
637 * digest cached records.
639 if (!s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
) {
640 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
641 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
644 s
->s3
->flags
|= TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE
;
645 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
)) {
646 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
653 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A
;
657 * We need to get hashes here so if there is a client cert,
658 * it can be verified FIXME - digest processing for
659 * CertificateVerify should be generalized. But it is next
662 if (s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
) {
663 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
)) {
664 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
668 for (dgst_num
= 0; dgst_num
< SSL_MAX_DIGEST
; dgst_num
++)
669 if (s
->s3
->handshake_dgst
[dgst_num
]) {
672 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->cert_verify_mac(s
,
681 EVP_MD_CTX_size(s
->s3
->handshake_dgst
[dgst_num
]);
683 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
692 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A
:
693 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B
:
694 ret
= ssl3_get_cert_verify(s
);
698 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
699 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
;
701 if (s
->s3
->next_proto_neg_seen
)
702 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A
;
704 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
;
709 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
710 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A
:
711 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B
:
713 * Enable CCS for NPN. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make
714 * sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates. This *should* be the
715 * first time we have received one - but we check anyway to be
717 * s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is
718 * processed in s3_pkt.c, and remains set until
719 * the client's Finished message is read.
721 if (!s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
)
722 s
->s3
->flags
|= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK
;
724 ret
= ssl3_get_next_proto(s
);
728 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
;
732 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
:
733 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B
:
735 * Enable CCS for handshakes without NPN. In NPN the CCS flag has
736 * already been set. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make
737 * sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates.
738 * s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is
739 * processed in s3_pkt.c, and remains set until
740 * the client's Finished message is read.
742 if (!s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
)
743 s
->s3
->flags
|= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK
;
744 ret
= ssl3_get_finished(s
, SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
,
745 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B
);
749 s
->state
= SSL_ST_OK
;
750 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
751 else if (s
->tlsext_ticket_expected
)
752 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A
;
755 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A
;
759 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
760 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A
:
761 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B
:
762 ret
= ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s
);
765 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A
;
769 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A
:
770 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B
:
771 ret
= ssl3_send_cert_status(s
);
774 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A
;
780 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A
:
781 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B
:
783 s
->session
->cipher
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
;
784 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->setup_key_block(s
)) {
786 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
790 ret
= ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s
,
792 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B
);
796 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A
;
799 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
800 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE
))
803 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
809 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A
:
810 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B
:
811 ret
= ssl3_send_finished(s
,
812 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A
,
813 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B
,
815 ssl3_enc
->server_finished_label
,
817 ssl3_enc
->server_finished_label_len
);
820 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH
;
822 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
823 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
= SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
;
825 if (s
->s3
->next_proto_neg_seen
) {
826 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
= SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A
;
828 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
= SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
;
831 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
= SSL_ST_OK
;
836 /* clean a few things up */
837 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s
);
839 BUF_MEM_free(s
->init_buf
);
842 /* remove buffering on output */
843 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s
);
847 if (s
->renegotiate
== 2) { /* skipped if we just sent a
852 ssl_update_cache(s
, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER
);
854 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_accept_good
++;
856 s
->handshake_func
= ssl3_accept
;
859 cb(s
, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE
, 1);
868 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT
, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE
);
874 if (!s
->s3
->tmp
.reuse_message
&& !skip
) {
876 if ((ret
= BIO_flush(s
->wbio
)) <= 0)
880 if ((cb
!= NULL
) && (s
->state
!= state
)) {
881 new_state
= s
->state
;
883 cb(s
, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP
, 1);
884 s
->state
= new_state
;
890 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
894 cb(s
, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT
, ret
);
898 int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL
*s
)
902 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A
) {
903 p
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
904 *(p
++) = SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST
;
909 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B
;
910 /* number of bytes to write */
915 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
916 return (ssl3_do_write(s
, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
));
919 int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL
*s
)
925 * this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message,
926 * so permit appropriate message length
928 n
= s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
931 -1, s
->max_cert_list
, &ok
);
934 s
->s3
->tmp
.reuse_message
= 1;
935 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
== SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO
) {
937 * We only allow the client to restart the handshake once per
940 if (s
->s3
->flags
& SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE
) {
941 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CLIENT_HELLO
,
942 SSL_R_MULTIPLE_SGC_RESTARTS
);
946 * Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake,
947 * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.)
949 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
950 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
!= NULL
) {
951 DH_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
);
952 s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
= NULL
;
955 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
956 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.ecdh
!= NULL
) {
957 EC_KEY_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.ecdh
);
958 s
->s3
->tmp
.ecdh
= NULL
;
961 s
->s3
->flags
|= SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE
;
967 int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL
*s
)
969 int i
, j
, ok
, al
, ret
= -1, cookie_valid
= 0;
970 unsigned int cookie_len
;
973 unsigned char *p
, *d
, *q
;
975 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
976 SSL_COMP
*comp
= NULL
;
978 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *ciphers
= NULL
;
981 * We do this so that we will respond with our native type. If we are
982 * TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1, This down
983 * switching should be handled by a different method. If we are SSLv3, we
984 * will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with TLSv1.
986 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A
) {
987 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B
;
990 n
= s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
991 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B
,
992 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C
,
993 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
994 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
, &ok
);
999 d
= p
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
1002 * 2 bytes for client version, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE bytes for random, 1 byte
1003 * for session id length
1005 if (n
< 2 + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
+ 1) {
1006 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1007 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1012 * use version from inside client hello, not from record header (may
1013 * differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph)
1015 s
->client_version
= (((int)p
[0]) << 8) | (int)p
[1];
1018 if ((s
->version
== DTLS1_VERSION
&& s
->client_version
> s
->version
) ||
1019 (s
->version
!= DTLS1_VERSION
&& s
->client_version
< s
->version
)) {
1020 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER
);
1021 if ((s
->client_version
>> 8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR
&&
1022 !s
->enc_write_ctx
&& !s
->write_hash
) {
1024 * similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version
1027 s
->version
= s
->client_version
;
1029 al
= SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
1034 * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one, just
1035 * return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet. So check
1038 if (SSL_get_options(s
) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE
) {
1039 unsigned int session_length
, cookie_length
;
1041 session_length
= *(p
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
1043 if (p
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
+ session_length
+ 1 >= d
+ n
) {
1044 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1045 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1048 cookie_length
= *(p
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
+ session_length
+ 1);
1050 if (cookie_length
== 0)
1054 /* load the client random */
1055 memcpy(s
->s3
->client_random
, p
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
1056 p
+= SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
;
1058 /* get the session-id */
1061 if (p
+ j
> d
+ n
) {
1062 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1063 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1069 * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in
1070 * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally
1071 * ignore resumption requests with flag
1072 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
1073 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on this
1074 * for security won't even compile against older library versions).
1075 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to
1076 * request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains
1077 * unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the
1078 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be ignored.
1081 && (s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
))) {
1082 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s
, 1))
1085 i
= ssl_get_prev_session(s
, p
, j
, d
+ n
);
1087 * Only resume if the session's version matches the negotiated
1089 * RFC 5246 does not provide much useful advice on resumption
1090 * with a different protocol version. It doesn't forbid it but
1091 * the sanity of such behaviour would be questionable.
1092 * In practice, clients do not accept a version mismatch and
1093 * will abort the handshake with an error.
1095 if (i
== 1 && s
->version
== s
->session
->ssl_version
) { /* previous
1102 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s
, 1))
1109 if (s
->version
== DTLS1_VERSION
|| s
->version
== DTLS1_BAD_VER
) {
1111 if (p
+ 1 > d
+ n
) {
1112 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1113 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1116 cookie_len
= *(p
++);
1118 if (p
+ cookie_len
> d
+ n
) {
1119 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1120 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1125 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
1126 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
1127 * does not cause an overflow.
1129 if (cookie_len
> sizeof(s
->d1
->rcvd_cookie
)) {
1131 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1132 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH
);
1136 /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
1137 if ((SSL_get_options(s
) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE
) && cookie_len
> 0) {
1138 memcpy(s
->d1
->rcvd_cookie
, p
, cookie_len
);
1140 if (s
->ctx
->app_verify_cookie_cb
!= NULL
) {
1141 if (s
->ctx
->app_verify_cookie_cb(s
, s
->d1
->rcvd_cookie
,
1143 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1144 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1145 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH
);
1148 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1150 /* default verification */
1151 else if (memcmp(s
->d1
->rcvd_cookie
, s
->d1
->cookie
,
1152 s
->d1
->cookie_len
) != 0) {
1153 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1154 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH
);
1163 if (p
+ 2 > d
+ n
) {
1164 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1165 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1171 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1172 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED
);
1176 /* i bytes of cipher data + 1 byte for compression length later */
1177 if ((p
+ i
+ 1) > (d
+ n
)) {
1178 /* not enough data */
1179 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1180 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1183 if (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s
, p
, i
, &(ciphers
)) == NULL
) {
1188 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
1191 id
= s
->session
->cipher
->id
;
1194 fprintf(stderr
, "client sent %d ciphers\n",
1195 sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers
));
1197 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers
); i
++) {
1198 c
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers
, i
);
1200 fprintf(stderr
, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1201 i
, sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers
), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c
));
1209 * Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade attack:
1213 if (j
== 0 && (s
->options
& SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG
)
1214 && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers
) == 1)) {
1216 * Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used
1217 * cipher may not be in the current list, the client instead
1218 * might be trying to continue using a cipher that before wasn't
1219 * chosen due to server preferences. We'll have to reject the
1220 * connection if the cipher is not enabled, though.
1222 c
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers
, 0);
1223 if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s
), c
) >= 0) {
1224 s
->session
->cipher
= c
;
1231 * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked
1234 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1235 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1236 SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING
);
1243 if ((p
+ i
) > (d
+ n
)) {
1244 /* not enough data */
1245 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1246 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1250 for (j
= 0; j
< i
; j
++) {
1258 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1259 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED
);
1262 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1263 /* TLS extensions */
1264 if (s
->version
>= SSL3_VERSION
) {
1265 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s
, &p
, d
+ n
, &al
)) {
1266 /* 'al' set by ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext */
1267 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT
);
1271 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s
) <= 0) {
1272 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
);
1277 * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake
1278 * for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before
1279 * calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket
1280 * processing to use it in key derivation.
1284 pos
= s
->s3
->server_random
;
1285 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s
, 1, pos
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) <= 0) {
1286 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1291 if (!s
->hit
&& s
->version
>= TLS1_VERSION
&& s
->tls_session_secret_cb
) {
1292 SSL_CIPHER
*pref_cipher
= NULL
;
1294 s
->session
->master_key_length
= sizeof(s
->session
->master_key
);
1295 if (s
->tls_session_secret_cb(s
, s
->session
->master_key
,
1296 &s
->session
->master_key_length
, ciphers
,
1298 s
->tls_session_secret_cb_arg
)) {
1300 s
->session
->ciphers
= ciphers
;
1301 s
->session
->verify_result
= X509_V_OK
;
1305 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1307 pref_cipher
? pref_cipher
: ssl3_choose_cipher(s
,
1312 if (pref_cipher
== NULL
) {
1313 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1314 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER
);
1318 s
->session
->cipher
= pref_cipher
;
1321 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s
->cipher_list
);
1323 if (s
->cipher_list_by_id
)
1324 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s
->cipher_list_by_id
);
1326 s
->cipher_list
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s
->session
->ciphers
);
1327 s
->cipher_list_by_id
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s
->session
->ciphers
);
1333 * Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1334 * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
1335 * algorithms from the client, starting at q.
1337 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
= NULL
;
1338 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1339 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1340 if (s
->session
->compress_meth
!= 0) {
1341 int m
, comp_id
= s
->session
->compress_meth
;
1342 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1343 /* Can't disable compression */
1344 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION
) {
1345 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1346 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1347 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION
);
1350 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1351 for (m
= 0; m
< sk_SSL_COMP_num(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
); m
++) {
1352 comp
= sk_SSL_COMP_value(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
, m
);
1353 if (comp_id
== comp
->id
) {
1354 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
= comp
;
1358 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
== NULL
) {
1359 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1360 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1361 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM
);
1364 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1365 for (m
= 0; m
< i
; m
++) {
1366 if (q
[m
] == comp_id
)
1370 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1371 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1372 SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING
);
1377 else if (!(s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION
) && s
->ctx
->comp_methods
) {
1378 /* See if we have a match */
1379 int m
, nn
, o
, v
, done
= 0;
1381 nn
= sk_SSL_COMP_num(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
);
1382 for (m
= 0; m
< nn
; m
++) {
1383 comp
= sk_SSL_COMP_value(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
, m
);
1385 for (o
= 0; o
< i
; o
++) {
1395 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
= comp
;
1401 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1402 * using compression.
1404 if (s
->session
->compress_meth
!= 0) {
1405 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1406 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION
);
1412 * Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher
1416 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1417 s
->session
->compress_meth
= 0;
1419 s
->session
->compress_meth
= (comp
== NULL
) ? 0 : comp
->id
;
1421 if (s
->session
->ciphers
!= NULL
)
1422 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s
->session
->ciphers
);
1423 s
->session
->ciphers
= ciphers
;
1424 if (ciphers
== NULL
) {
1425 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1426 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1430 c
= ssl3_choose_cipher(s
, s
->session
->ciphers
, SSL_get_ciphers(s
));
1433 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1434 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER
);
1437 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
= c
;
1439 /* Session-id reuse */
1440 #ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
1441 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *sk
;
1442 SSL_CIPHER
*nc
= NULL
;
1443 SSL_CIPHER
*ec
= NULL
;
1445 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG
) {
1446 sk
= s
->session
->ciphers
;
1447 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk
); i
++) {
1448 c
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk
, i
);
1449 if (c
->algorithm_enc
& SSL_eNULL
)
1451 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c
))
1455 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
= nc
;
1456 else if (ec
!= NULL
)
1457 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
= ec
;
1459 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
= s
->session
->cipher
;
1462 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
= s
->session
->cipher
;
1465 if (TLS1_get_version(s
) < TLS1_2_VERSION
1466 || !(s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
)) {
1467 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
)) {
1468 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1474 * we now have the following setup.
1476 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
1477 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
1478 * compression - basically ignored right now
1479 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1480 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1481 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1482 * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
1485 /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */
1486 if (s
->version
>= SSL3_VERSION
) {
1487 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s
) <= 0) {
1488 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
);
1493 ret
= cookie_valid
? 2 : 1;
1496 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1498 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
1501 if (ciphers
!= NULL
)
1502 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers
);
1506 int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL
*s
)
1509 unsigned char *p
, *d
;
1513 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A
) {
1514 buf
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
1515 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1516 p
= s
->s3
->server_random
;
1517 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s
, 1, p
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) <= 0) {
1518 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
1522 /* Do the message type and length last */
1525 *(p
++) = s
->version
>> 8;
1526 *(p
++) = s
->version
& 0xff;
1529 memcpy(p
, s
->s3
->server_random
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
1530 p
+= SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
;
1533 * There are several cases for the session ID to send
1534 * back in the server hello:
1535 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
1536 * we send back the old session ID.
1537 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
1538 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
1539 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
1540 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
1542 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
1543 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
1544 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
1545 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
1548 if (!(s
->ctx
->session_cache_mode
& SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER
)
1550 s
->session
->session_id_length
= 0;
1552 sl
= s
->session
->session_id_length
;
1553 if (sl
> (int)sizeof(s
->session
->session_id
)) {
1554 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1555 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
1559 memcpy(p
, s
->session
->session_id
, sl
);
1562 /* put the cipher */
1563 i
= ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
, p
);
1566 /* put the compression method */
1567 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1570 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
== NULL
)
1573 *(p
++) = s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
->id
;
1575 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1576 if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s
) <= 0) {
1577 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT
);
1578 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
1582 ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s
, p
,
1583 buf
+ SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
)) ==
1585 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1586 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
1593 *(d
++) = SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO
;
1596 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B
;
1597 /* number of bytes to write */
1598 s
->init_num
= p
- buf
;
1602 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
1603 return (ssl3_do_write(s
, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
));
1606 int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL
*s
)
1610 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A
) {
1611 p
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
1614 *(p
++) = SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE
;
1619 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B
;
1620 /* number of bytes to write */
1625 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
1626 return (ssl3_do_write(s
, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
));
1629 int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL
*s
)
1631 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1635 unsigned char md_buf
[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
+ SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
];
1638 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1639 DH
*dh
= NULL
, *dhp
;
1641 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1642 EC_KEY
*ecdh
= NULL
, *ecdhp
;
1643 unsigned char *encodedPoint
= NULL
;
1646 BN_CTX
*bn_ctx
= NULL
;
1649 const EVP_MD
*md
= NULL
;
1650 unsigned char *p
, *d
;
1660 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx
);
1661 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A
) {
1662 type
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
1667 r
[0] = r
[1] = r
[2] = r
[3] = NULL
;
1669 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1670 if (type
& SSL_kRSA
) {
1671 rsa
= cert
->rsa_tmp
;
1672 if ((rsa
== NULL
) && (s
->cert
->rsa_tmp_cb
!= NULL
)) {
1673 rsa
= s
->cert
->rsa_tmp_cb(s
,
1674 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->
1676 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s
->s3
->
1679 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1680 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1681 SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY
);
1685 cert
->rsa_tmp
= rsa
;
1688 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1689 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1690 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY
);
1695 s
->s3
->tmp
.use_rsa_tmp
= 1;
1698 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1699 if (type
& SSL_kEDH
) {
1701 if ((dhp
== NULL
) && (s
->cert
->dh_tmp_cb
!= NULL
))
1702 dhp
= s
->cert
->dh_tmp_cb(s
,
1703 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->
1705 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s
->s3
->
1708 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1709 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1710 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY
);
1714 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
!= NULL
) {
1715 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1716 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1720 if ((dh
= DHparams_dup(dhp
)) == NULL
) {
1721 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_DH_LIB
);
1726 if ((dhp
->pub_key
== NULL
||
1727 dhp
->priv_key
== NULL
||
1728 (s
->options
& SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE
))) {
1729 if (!DH_generate_key(dh
)) {
1730 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_DH_LIB
);
1734 dh
->pub_key
= BN_dup(dhp
->pub_key
);
1735 dh
->priv_key
= BN_dup(dhp
->priv_key
);
1736 if ((dh
->pub_key
== NULL
) || (dh
->priv_key
== NULL
)) {
1737 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_DH_LIB
);
1746 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1747 if (type
& SSL_kEECDH
) {
1748 const EC_GROUP
*group
;
1750 ecdhp
= cert
->ecdh_tmp
;
1751 if ((ecdhp
== NULL
) && (s
->cert
->ecdh_tmp_cb
!= NULL
)) {
1752 ecdhp
= s
->cert
->ecdh_tmp_cb(s
,
1753 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->
1755 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s
->
1756 s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
));
1758 if (ecdhp
== NULL
) {
1759 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1760 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1761 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY
);
1765 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.ecdh
!= NULL
) {
1766 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1767 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1771 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
1772 if (ecdhp
== NULL
) {
1773 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB
);
1776 if ((ecdh
= EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp
)) == NULL
) {
1777 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB
);
1781 s
->s3
->tmp
.ecdh
= ecdh
;
1782 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh
) == NULL
) ||
1783 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh
) == NULL
) ||
1784 (s
->options
& SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE
)) {
1785 if (!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh
)) {
1786 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1792 if (((group
= EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh
)) == NULL
) ||
1793 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh
) == NULL
) ||
1794 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh
) == NULL
)) {
1795 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB
);
1799 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
) &&
1800 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group
) > 163)) {
1801 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1802 SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER
);
1807 * XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH keys over named
1808 * (not generic) curves. For supported named curves, curve_id is
1812 tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group
)))
1814 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1815 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE
);
1820 * Encode the public key. First check the size of encoding and
1821 * allocate memory accordingly.
1823 encodedlen
= EC_POINT_point2oct(group
,
1824 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh
),
1825 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED
,
1828 encodedPoint
= (unsigned char *)
1829 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen
* sizeof(unsigned char));
1830 bn_ctx
= BN_CTX_new();
1831 if ((encodedPoint
== NULL
) || (bn_ctx
== NULL
)) {
1832 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1833 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1837 encodedlen
= EC_POINT_point2oct(group
,
1838 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh
),
1839 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED
,
1840 encodedPoint
, encodedlen
, bn_ctx
);
1842 if (encodedlen
== 0) {
1843 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB
);
1847 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx
);
1851 * XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves in
1852 * ECDH ephemeral key exchanges. In this situation, we need four
1853 * additional bytes to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
1859 * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we
1860 * can set these to NULLs
1867 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
1868 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1869 if (type
& SSL_kPSK
) {
1871 * reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint
1873 n
+= 2 + strlen(s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
);
1875 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1876 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1877 if (type
& SSL_kSRP
) {
1878 if ((s
->srp_ctx
.N
== NULL
) ||
1879 (s
->srp_ctx
.g
== NULL
) ||
1880 (s
->srp_ctx
.s
== NULL
) || (s
->srp_ctx
.B
== NULL
)) {
1881 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1882 SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM
);
1885 r
[0] = s
->srp_ctx
.N
;
1886 r
[1] = s
->srp_ctx
.g
;
1887 r
[2] = s
->srp_ctx
.s
;
1888 r
[3] = s
->srp_ctx
.B
;
1892 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1893 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1894 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE
);
1897 for (i
= 0; i
< 4 && r
[i
] != NULL
; i
++) {
1898 nr
[i
] = BN_num_bytes(r
[i
]);
1899 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1900 if ((i
== 2) && (type
& SSL_kSRP
))
1907 if (!(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aNULL
| SSL_aSRP
))
1908 && !(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kPSK
)) {
1909 if ((pkey
= ssl_get_sign_pkey(s
, s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
, &md
))
1911 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1914 kn
= EVP_PKEY_size(pkey
);
1920 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf
, n
+ 4 + kn
)) {
1921 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_LIB_BUF
);
1924 d
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
1927 for (i
= 0; i
< 4 && r
[i
] != NULL
; i
++) {
1928 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1929 if ((i
== 2) && (type
& SSL_kSRP
)) {
1939 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1940 if (type
& SSL_kEECDH
) {
1942 * XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves. In
1943 * this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has: [1 byte
1944 * CurveType], [2 byte CurveName] [1 byte length of encoded
1945 * point], followed by the actual encoded point itself
1947 *p
= NAMED_CURVE_TYPE
;
1955 memcpy((unsigned char *)p
,
1956 (unsigned char *)encodedPoint
, encodedlen
);
1957 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint
);
1958 encodedPoint
= NULL
;
1963 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1964 if (type
& SSL_kPSK
) {
1965 /* copy PSK identity hint */
1966 s2n(strlen(s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
), p
);
1967 strncpy((char *)p
, s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
,
1968 strlen(s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
));
1969 p
+= strlen(s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
);
1976 * n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4]) and p
1977 * points to the space at the end.
1979 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1980 if (pkey
->type
== EVP_PKEY_RSA
1981 && TLS1_get_version(s
) < TLS1_2_VERSION
) {
1984 for (num
= 2; num
> 0; num
--) {
1985 EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx
,
1986 EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW
);
1987 if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx
,
1988 (num
== 2) ? s
->ctx
->md5
1991 || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx
, &(s
->s3
->client_random
[0]),
1992 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) <= 0
1993 || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx
, &(s
->s3
->server_random
[0]),
1994 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) <= 0
1995 || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx
, &(d
[4]), n
) <= 0
1996 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx
, q
,
1997 (unsigned int *)&i
) <= 0) {
1998 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2000 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2006 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1
, md_buf
, j
,
2007 &(p
[2]), &u
, pkey
->pkey
.rsa
) <= 0) {
2008 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_LIB_RSA
);
2017 * For TLS1.2 and later send signature algorithm
2019 if (TLS1_get_version(s
) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
) {
2020 if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p
, pkey
, md
)) {
2021 /* Should never happen */
2022 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2023 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2024 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2030 fprintf(stderr
, "Using hash %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md
));
2032 if (EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx
, md
, NULL
) <= 0
2033 || EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx
, &(s
->s3
->client_random
[0]),
2034 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) <= 0
2035 || EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx
, &(s
->s3
->server_random
[0]),
2036 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) <= 0
2037 || EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx
, &(d
[4]), n
) <= 0
2038 || EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx
, &(p
[2]),
2039 (unsigned int *)&i
, pkey
) <= 0) {
2040 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_LIB_EVP
);
2041 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2046 if (TLS1_get_version(s
) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
)
2049 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
2050 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2051 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2052 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE
);
2057 *(d
++) = SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
;
2061 * we should now have things packed up, so lets send it off
2063 s
->init_num
= n
+ 4;
2067 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B
;
2068 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx
);
2069 return (ssl3_do_write(s
, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
));
2071 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
2073 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2074 if (encodedPoint
!= NULL
)
2075 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint
);
2076 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx
);
2078 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx
);
2079 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
2083 int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL
*s
)
2085 unsigned char *p
, *d
;
2086 int i
, j
, nl
, off
, n
;
2087 STACK_OF(X509_NAME
) *sk
= NULL
;
2091 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A
) {
2094 d
= p
= (unsigned char *)&(buf
->data
[4]);
2096 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
2098 n
= ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s
, p
);
2103 if (TLS1_get_version(s
) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
) {
2104 nl
= tls12_get_req_sig_algs(s
, p
+ 2);
2114 sk
= SSL_get_client_CA_list(s
);
2117 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_NAME_num(sk
); i
++) {
2118 name
= sk_X509_NAME_value(sk
, i
);
2119 j
= i2d_X509_NAME(name
, NULL
);
2120 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf
, 4 + n
+ j
+ 2)) {
2121 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2125 p
= (unsigned char *)&(buf
->data
[4 + n
]);
2126 if (!(s
->options
& SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG
)) {
2128 i2d_X509_NAME(name
, &p
);
2133 i2d_X509_NAME(name
, &p
);
2142 /* else no CA names */
2143 p
= (unsigned char *)&(buf
->data
[4 + off
]);
2146 d
= (unsigned char *)buf
->data
;
2147 *(d
++) = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
;
2151 * we should now have things packed up, so lets send it off
2154 s
->init_num
= n
+ 4;
2156 #ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
2157 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf
, s
->init_num
+ 4)) {
2158 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, ERR_R_BUF_LIB
);
2161 p
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
+ s
->init_num
;
2164 *(p
++) = SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE
;
2171 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B
;
2174 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
2175 return (ssl3_do_write(s
, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
));
2177 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
2181 int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL
*s
)
2185 unsigned long alg_k
;
2187 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2189 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
2191 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2195 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2197 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2199 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2200 EC_KEY
*srvr_ecdh
= NULL
;
2201 EVP_PKEY
*clnt_pub_pkey
= NULL
;
2202 EC_POINT
*clnt_ecpoint
= NULL
;
2203 BN_CTX
*bn_ctx
= NULL
;
2206 n
= s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
2207 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A
,
2208 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B
,
2209 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, 2048, &ok
);
2213 p
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
2215 alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
2217 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2218 if (alg_k
& SSL_kRSA
) {
2219 unsigned char rand_premaster_secret
[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
];
2221 unsigned char decrypt_good
, version_good
;
2224 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
2225 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.use_rsa_tmp
) {
2226 if ((s
->cert
!= NULL
) && (s
->cert
->rsa_tmp
!= NULL
))
2227 rsa
= s
->cert
->rsa_tmp
;
2229 * Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should be sent already
2232 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2233 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2234 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY
);
2239 pkey
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
].privatekey
;
2240 if ((pkey
== NULL
) ||
2241 (pkey
->type
!= EVP_PKEY_RSA
) || (pkey
->pkey
.rsa
== NULL
)) {
2242 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2243 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2244 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE
);
2247 rsa
= pkey
->pkey
.rsa
;
2250 /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */
2251 if (s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
&& s
->version
!= DTLS1_BAD_VER
) {
2254 if (!(s
->options
& SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG
)) {
2255 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2256 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2257 SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG
);
2266 * Reject overly short RSA ciphertext because we want to be sure
2267 * that the buffer size makes it safe to iterate over the entire
2268 * size of a premaster secret (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). The
2269 * actual expected size is larger due to RSA padding, but the
2270 * bound is sufficient to be safe.
2272 if (n
< SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
) {
2273 al
= SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
2274 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2275 SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG
);
2280 * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of
2281 * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246,
2282 * section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of the TLS RFC and
2283 * generates a random premaster secret for the case that the decrypt
2284 * fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1
2288 * should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure.
2290 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(rand_premaster_secret
,
2291 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret
)) <= 0)
2294 RSA_private_decrypt((int)n
, p
, p
, rsa
, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING
);
2298 * decrypt_len should be SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH. decrypt_good will
2299 * be 0xff if so and zero otherwise.
2302 constant_time_eq_int_8(decrypt_len
, SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
);
2305 * If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct then
2306 * version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero. The
2307 * Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2308 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version number
2309 * check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks are done in
2310 * constant time and are treated like any other decryption error.
2313 constant_time_eq_8(p
[0], (unsigned)(s
->client_version
>> 8));
2315 constant_time_eq_8(p
[1], (unsigned)(s
->client_version
& 0xff));
2318 * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2319 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2320 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2321 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
2322 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
2323 * protocol version. If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such
2326 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG
) {
2327 unsigned char workaround_good
;
2329 constant_time_eq_8(p
[0], (unsigned)(s
->version
>> 8));
2331 constant_time_eq_8(p
[1], (unsigned)(s
->version
& 0xff));
2332 version_good
|= workaround_good
;
2336 * Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good to
2337 * remain non-zero (0xff).
2339 decrypt_good
&= version_good
;
2342 * Now copy rand_premaster_secret over from p using
2343 * decrypt_good_mask. If decryption failed, then p does not
2344 * contain valid plaintext, however, a check above guarantees
2345 * it is still sufficiently large to read from.
2347 for (j
= 0; j
< sizeof(rand_premaster_secret
); j
++) {
2348 p
[j
] = constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good
, p
[j
],
2349 rand_premaster_secret
[j
]);
2352 s
->session
->master_key_length
=
2353 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
2355 session
->master_key
,
2358 (rand_premaster_secret
));
2359 OPENSSL_cleanse(p
, sizeof(rand_premaster_secret
));
2362 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2363 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kEDH
| SSL_kDHr
| SSL_kDHd
)) {
2366 if (!(s
->options
& SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG
)) {
2367 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2368 SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG
);
2376 if (n
== 0L) { /* the parameters are in the cert */
2377 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2378 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2379 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_DH_CERTS
);
2382 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
== NULL
) {
2383 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2384 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2385 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY
);
2388 dh_srvr
= s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
;
2391 pub
= BN_bin2bn(p
, i
, NULL
);
2393 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BN_LIB
);
2397 i
= DH_compute_key(p
, pub
, dh_srvr
);
2400 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_DH_LIB
);
2405 DH_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
);
2406 s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
= NULL
;
2410 s
->session
->master_key_length
=
2411 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
2413 session
->master_key
,
2415 OPENSSL_cleanse(p
, i
);
2418 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2419 if (alg_k
& SSL_kKRB5
) {
2420 krb5_error_code krb5rc
;
2421 krb5_data enc_ticket
;
2422 krb5_data authenticator
;
2424 KSSL_CTX
*kssl_ctx
= s
->kssl_ctx
;
2425 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx
;
2426 const EVP_CIPHER
*enc
= NULL
;
2427 unsigned char iv
[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH
];
2428 unsigned char pms
[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
+ EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH
];
2430 krb5_timestamp authtime
= 0;
2431 krb5_ticket_times ttimes
;
2434 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx
);
2437 kssl_ctx
= kssl_ctx_new();
2440 enc_ticket
.length
= i
;
2442 if (n
< (long)(enc_ticket
.length
+ 6)) {
2443 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2444 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2448 enc_ticket
.data
= (char *)p
;
2449 p
+= enc_ticket
.length
;
2452 authenticator
.length
= i
;
2454 if (n
< (long)(enc_ticket
.length
+ authenticator
.length
+ 6)) {
2455 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2456 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2460 authenticator
.data
= (char *)p
;
2461 p
+= authenticator
.length
;
2465 enc_pms
.data
= (char *)p
;
2466 p
+= enc_pms
.length
;
2469 * Note that the length is checked again below, ** after decryption
2471 if (enc_pms
.length
> sizeof pms
) {
2472 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2473 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2477 if (n
!= (long)(enc_ticket
.length
+ authenticator
.length
+
2478 enc_pms
.length
+ 6)) {
2479 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2480 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2484 if ((krb5rc
= kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx
, &enc_ticket
, &ttimes
,
2487 fprintf(stderr
, "kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
2488 krb5rc
, kssl_err
.reason
);
2490 fprintf(stderr
, "kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err
.text
);
2491 # endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2492 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, kssl_err
.reason
);
2497 * Note: no authenticator is not considered an error, ** but will
2498 * return authtime == 0.
2500 if ((krb5rc
= kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx
, &authenticator
,
2501 &authtime
, &kssl_err
)) != 0) {
2503 fprintf(stderr
, "kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
2504 krb5rc
, kssl_err
.reason
);
2506 fprintf(stderr
, "kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err
.text
);
2507 # endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2508 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, kssl_err
.reason
);
2512 if ((krb5rc
= kssl_validate_times(authtime
, &ttimes
)) != 0) {
2513 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, krb5rc
);
2517 kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx
);
2518 # endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2520 enc
= kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx
->enctype
);
2524 memset(iv
, 0, sizeof iv
); /* per RFC 1510 */
2526 if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx
, enc
, NULL
, kssl_ctx
->key
, iv
)) {
2527 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2528 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
2531 if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx
, pms
, &outl
,
2532 (unsigned char *)enc_pms
.data
, enc_pms
.length
))
2534 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2535 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
2539 if (outl
> SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
) {
2540 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2541 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2545 if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx
, &(pms
[outl
]), &padl
)) {
2546 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2547 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
2552 if (outl
> SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
) {
2553 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2554 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2558 if (!((pms
[0] == (s
->client_version
>> 8))
2559 && (pms
[1] == (s
->client_version
& 0xff)))) {
2561 * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as
2562 * the ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely,
2563 * the protocol does not offer such protection for DH
2564 * ciphersuites). However, buggy clients exist that send random
2565 * bytes instead of the protocol version. If
2566 * SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients.
2567 * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos
2570 if (!(s
->options
& SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG
)) {
2571 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2572 SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
2578 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx
);
2580 s
->session
->master_key_length
=
2581 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
2583 session
->master_key
,
2586 if (kssl_ctx
->client_princ
) {
2587 size_t len
= strlen(kssl_ctx
->client_princ
);
2588 if (len
< SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH
) {
2589 s
->session
->krb5_client_princ_len
= len
;
2590 memcpy(s
->session
->krb5_client_princ
, kssl_ctx
->client_princ
,
2595 /*- Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
2596 * but it caused problems for apache.
2597 * kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
2598 * if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
2602 OPENSSL_cleanse(pms
, sizeof(pms
));
2606 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2608 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2609 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kEECDH
| SSL_kECDHr
| SSL_kECDHe
)) {
2613 const EC_GROUP
*group
;
2614 const BIGNUM
*priv_key
;
2616 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
2617 if ((srvr_ecdh
= EC_KEY_new()) == NULL
) {
2618 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2622 /* Let's get server private key and group information */
2623 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kECDHr
| SSL_kECDHe
)) {
2624 /* use the certificate */
2625 tkey
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_ECC
].privatekey
->pkey
.ec
;
2628 * use the ephermeral values we saved when generating the
2629 * ServerKeyExchange msg.
2631 tkey
= s
->s3
->tmp
.ecdh
;
2634 group
= EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey
);
2635 priv_key
= EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey
);
2637 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh
, group
) ||
2638 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh
, priv_key
)) {
2639 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EC_LIB
);
2643 /* Let's get client's public key */
2644 if ((clnt_ecpoint
= EC_POINT_new(group
)) == NULL
) {
2645 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2650 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
2652 if (alg_k
& SSL_kEECDH
) {
2653 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2654 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2655 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY
);
2658 if (((clnt_pub_pkey
= X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
))
2659 == NULL
) || (clnt_pub_pkey
->type
!= EVP_PKEY_EC
)) {
2661 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication
2662 * using ECDH certificates so this branch (n == 0L) of the
2663 * code is never executed. When that support is added, we
2664 * ought to ensure the key received in the certificate is
2665 * authorized for key agreement. ECDH_compute_key implicitly
2666 * checks that the two ECDH shares are for the same group.
2668 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2669 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2670 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS
);
2674 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint
,
2675 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey
->
2677 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EC_LIB
);
2680 ret
= 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
2683 * Get client's public key from encoded point in the
2684 * ClientKeyExchange message.
2686 if ((bn_ctx
= BN_CTX_new()) == NULL
) {
2687 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2688 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2692 /* Get encoded point length */
2696 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EC_LIB
);
2699 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group
, clnt_ecpoint
, p
, i
, bn_ctx
) == 0) {
2700 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EC_LIB
);
2704 * p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer currently, so set it
2707 p
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
2710 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
2711 field_size
= EC_GROUP_get_degree(group
);
2712 if (field_size
<= 0) {
2713 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB
);
2716 i
= ECDH_compute_key(p
, (field_size
+ 7) / 8, clnt_ecpoint
, srvr_ecdh
,
2719 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB
);
2723 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey
);
2724 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint
);
2725 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh
);
2726 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx
);
2727 EC_KEY_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.ecdh
);
2728 s
->s3
->tmp
.ecdh
= NULL
;
2730 /* Compute the master secret */
2731 s
->session
->master_key_length
=
2732 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
2734 session
->master_key
,
2737 OPENSSL_cleanse(p
, i
);
2741 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2742 if (alg_k
& SSL_kPSK
) {
2743 unsigned char *t
= NULL
;
2744 unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms
[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
* 2 + 4];
2745 unsigned int pre_ms_len
= 0, psk_len
= 0;
2747 char tmp_id
[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
+ 1];
2749 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2753 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2756 if (i
> PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
) {
2757 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2758 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2761 if (s
->psk_server_callback
== NULL
) {
2762 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2763 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB
);
2768 * Create guaranteed NULL-terminated identity string for the callback
2770 memcpy(tmp_id
, p
, i
);
2771 memset(tmp_id
+ i
, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
+ 1 - i
);
2772 psk_len
= s
->psk_server_callback(s
, tmp_id
,
2774 sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms
));
2775 OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_id
, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
+ 1);
2777 if (psk_len
> PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
) {
2778 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2780 } else if (psk_len
== 0) {
2782 * PSK related to the given identity not found
2784 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2785 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND
);
2786 al
= SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY
;
2790 /* create PSK pre_master_secret */
2791 pre_ms_len
= 2 + psk_len
+ 2 + psk_len
;
2793 memmove(psk_or_pre_ms
+ psk_len
+ 4, psk_or_pre_ms
, psk_len
);
2795 memset(t
, 0, psk_len
);
2799 if (s
->session
->psk_identity
!= NULL
)
2800 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->psk_identity
);
2801 s
->session
->psk_identity
= BUF_strndup((char *)p
, i
);
2802 if (s
->session
->psk_identity
== NULL
) {
2803 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2807 if (s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
!= NULL
)
2808 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
);
2809 s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
= BUF_strdup(s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
);
2810 if (s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
!= NULL
&&
2811 s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
== NULL
) {
2812 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2816 s
->session
->master_key_length
=
2817 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
2819 session
->master_key
,
2824 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms
, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms
));
2829 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2830 if (alg_k
& SSL_kSRP
) {
2835 if (param_len
> n
) {
2836 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2837 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2838 SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH
);
2841 if (!(s
->srp_ctx
.A
= BN_bin2bn(p
, i
, NULL
))) {
2842 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
2845 if (BN_ucmp(s
->srp_ctx
.A
, s
->srp_ctx
.N
) >= 0
2846 || BN_is_zero(s
->srp_ctx
.A
)) {
2847 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
2848 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2849 SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS
);
2852 if (s
->session
->srp_username
!= NULL
)
2853 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->srp_username
);
2854 s
->session
->srp_username
= BUF_strdup(s
->srp_ctx
.login
);
2855 if (s
->session
->srp_username
== NULL
) {
2856 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2860 if ((s
->session
->master_key_length
=
2861 SRP_generate_server_master_secret(s
,
2862 s
->session
->master_key
)) < 0) {
2863 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2869 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
2870 if (alg_k
& SSL_kGOST
) {
2872 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pkey_ctx
;
2873 EVP_PKEY
*client_pub_pkey
= NULL
, *pk
= NULL
;
2874 unsigned char premaster_secret
[32], *start
;
2875 size_t outlen
= 32, inlen
;
2876 unsigned long alg_a
;
2880 /* Get our certificate private key */
2881 alg_a
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
;
2882 if (alg_a
& SSL_aGOST94
)
2883 pk
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_GOST94
].privatekey
;
2884 else if (alg_a
& SSL_aGOST01
)
2885 pk
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_GOST01
].privatekey
;
2887 pkey_ctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk
, NULL
);
2888 if (pkey_ctx
== NULL
) {
2889 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2890 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2893 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx
) <= 0) {
2894 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2898 * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
2899 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
2900 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a
2901 * client certificate for authorization only.
2903 client_pub_pkey
= X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
2904 if (client_pub_pkey
) {
2905 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx
, client_pub_pkey
) <= 0)
2908 /* Decrypt session key */
2910 ((const unsigned char **)&p
, &Tlen
, &Ttag
, &Tclass
,
2911 n
) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED
|| Ttag
!= V_ASN1_SEQUENCE
2912 || Tclass
!= V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL
) {
2913 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2914 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
2919 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt
2920 (pkey_ctx
, premaster_secret
, &outlen
, start
, inlen
) <= 0) {
2921 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2922 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
2925 /* Generate master secret */
2926 s
->session
->master_key_length
=
2927 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
2929 session
->master_key
,
2930 premaster_secret
, 32);
2931 OPENSSL_cleanse(premaster_secret
, sizeof(premaster_secret
));
2932 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2933 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
2934 (pkey_ctx
, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY
, 2, NULL
) > 0)
2939 EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey
);
2940 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx
);
2946 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2947 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE
);
2953 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
2954 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_SRP)
2957 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2958 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey
);
2959 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint
);
2960 if (srvr_ecdh
!= NULL
)
2961 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh
);
2962 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx
);
2964 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
2968 int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL
*s
)
2970 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
2972 int al
, ok
, ret
= 0;
2976 const EVP_MD
*md
= NULL
;
2978 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx
);
2981 * We should only process a CertificateVerify message if we have received
2982 * a Certificate from the client. If so then |s->session->peer| will be non
2983 * NULL. In some instances a CertificateVerify message is not required even
2984 * if the peer has sent a Certificate (e.g. such as in the case of static
2985 * DH). In that case the ClientKeyExchange processing will skip the
2986 * CertificateVerify state so we should not arrive here.
2988 if (s
->session
->peer
== NULL
) {
2993 n
= s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
2994 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A
,
2995 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B
,
2996 SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY
,
2997 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
, &ok
);
3002 peer
= s
->session
->peer
;
3003 pkey
= X509_get_pubkey(peer
);
3004 type
= X509_certificate_type(peer
, pkey
);
3006 if (!(type
& EVP_PKT_SIGN
)) {
3007 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,
3008 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE
);
3009 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
3013 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
3014 p
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
3015 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
3017 * If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare signature without
3020 if (n
== 64 && (pkey
->type
== NID_id_GostR3410_94
||
3021 pkey
->type
== NID_id_GostR3410_2001
)) {
3024 if (TLS1_get_version(s
) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
) {
3025 int sigalg
= tls12_get_sigid(pkey
);
3026 /* Should never happen */
3028 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3029 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3032 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
3033 if (sigalg
!= (int)p
[1]) {
3034 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,
3035 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
3036 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
3039 md
= tls12_get_hash(p
[0]);
3041 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST
);
3042 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
3046 fprintf(stderr
, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md
));
3054 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3055 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
3059 j
= EVP_PKEY_size(pkey
);
3060 if ((i
> j
) || (n
> j
) || (n
<= 0)) {
3061 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE
);
3062 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
3066 if (TLS1_get_version(s
) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
) {
3069 hdatalen
= BIO_get_mem_data(s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
, &hdata
);
3070 if (hdatalen
<= 0) {
3071 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3072 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3076 fprintf(stderr
, "Using TLS 1.2 with client verify alg %s\n",
3079 if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&mctx
, md
, NULL
)
3080 || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(&mctx
, hdata
, hdatalen
)) {
3081 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
3082 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3086 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&mctx
, p
, i
, pkey
) <= 0) {
3087 al
= SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
3088 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE
);
3092 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3093 if (pkey
->type
== EVP_PKEY_RSA
) {
3094 i
= RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1
, s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_verify_md
,
3095 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
+ SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
, p
, i
,
3098 al
= SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
3099 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT
);
3103 al
= SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
3104 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE
);
3109 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3110 if (pkey
->type
== EVP_PKEY_DSA
) {
3111 j
= DSA_verify(pkey
->save_type
,
3112 &(s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_verify_md
[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
]),
3113 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
, p
, i
, pkey
->pkey
.dsa
);
3116 al
= SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
3117 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
, SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE
);
3122 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3123 if (pkey
->type
== EVP_PKEY_EC
) {
3124 j
= ECDSA_verify(pkey
->save_type
,
3125 &(s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_verify_md
[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
]),
3126 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
, p
, i
, pkey
->pkey
.ec
);
3129 al
= SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
3130 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
, SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE
);
3135 if (pkey
->type
== NID_id_GostR3410_94
3136 || pkey
->type
== NID_id_GostR3410_2001
) {
3137 unsigned char signature
[64];
3139 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey
, NULL
);
3141 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3142 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3145 if (EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx
) <= 0) {
3146 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
3147 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3148 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3152 fprintf(stderr
, "GOST signature length is %d", i
);
3154 for (idx
= 0; idx
< 64; idx
++) {
3155 signature
[63 - idx
] = p
[idx
];
3157 j
= EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx
, signature
, 64, s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_verify_md
,
3159 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
3161 al
= SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
3162 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
, SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE
);
3166 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3167 al
= SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE
;
3174 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
3175 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
3178 if (s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
) {
3179 BIO_free(s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
);
3180 s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
= NULL
;
3181 s
->s3
->flags
&= ~TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE
;
3183 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx
);
3184 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey
);
3188 int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL
*s
)
3190 int i
, ok
, al
, ret
= -1;
3192 unsigned long l
, nc
, llen
, n
;
3193 const unsigned char *p
, *q
;
3195 STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
= NULL
;
3197 n
= s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
3200 -1, s
->max_cert_list
, &ok
);
3205 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
== SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
) {
3206 if ((s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
) &&
3207 (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT
)) {
3208 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3209 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE
);
3210 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
3214 * If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list
3216 if ((s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
) && s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
) {
3217 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3218 SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST
);
3219 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
3222 s
->s3
->tmp
.reuse_message
= 1;
3226 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
!= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
) {
3227 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
3228 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE
);
3231 p
= d
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
3233 if ((sk
= sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL
) {
3234 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3239 if (llen
+ 3 != n
) {
3240 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
3241 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3244 for (nc
= 0; nc
< llen
;) {
3246 if ((l
+ nc
+ 3) > llen
) {
3247 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
3248 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3249 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3254 x
= d2i_X509(NULL
, &p
, l
);
3256 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB
);
3260 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
3261 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3262 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3265 if (!sk_X509_push(sk
, x
)) {
3266 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3273 if (sk_X509_num(sk
) <= 0) {
3274 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3275 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
) {
3276 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
3277 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3278 SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED
);
3281 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3282 else if ((s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
) &&
3283 (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT
)) {
3284 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3285 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE
);
3286 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
3289 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
3290 if (s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
&& !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
)) {
3291 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3295 i
= ssl_verify_cert_chain(s
, sk
);
3297 al
= ssl_verify_alarm_type(s
->verify_result
);
3298 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3299 SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_RETURNED
);
3304 if (s
->session
->peer
!= NULL
) /* This should not be needed */
3305 X509_free(s
->session
->peer
);
3306 s
->session
->peer
= sk_X509_shift(sk
);
3307 s
->session
->verify_result
= s
->verify_result
;
3310 * With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL when we
3313 if (s
->session
->sess_cert
== NULL
) {
3314 s
->session
->sess_cert
= ssl_sess_cert_new();
3315 if (s
->session
->sess_cert
== NULL
) {
3316 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3320 if (s
->session
->sess_cert
->cert_chain
!= NULL
)
3321 sk_X509_pop_free(s
->session
->sess_cert
->cert_chain
, X509_free
);
3322 s
->session
->sess_cert
->cert_chain
= sk
;
3324 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own
3325 * certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c
3333 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
3335 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
3341 sk_X509_pop_free(sk
, X509_free
);
3345 int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL
*s
)
3350 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A
) {
3351 x
= ssl_get_server_send_cert(s
);
3353 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
3354 if ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
!= SSL_aKRB5
) ||
3355 (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kKRB5
)) {
3356 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
3357 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3358 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
3363 l
= ssl3_output_cert_chain(s
, x
);
3365 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3366 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
3369 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B
;
3370 s
->init_num
= (int)l
;
3374 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
3375 return (ssl3_do_write(s
, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
));
3378 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
3379 /* send a new session ticket (not necessarily for a new session) */
3380 int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL
*s
)
3382 unsigned char *senc
= NULL
;
3386 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A
) {
3387 unsigned char *p
, *macstart
;
3388 const unsigned char *const_p
;
3389 int len
, slen_full
, slen
;
3392 SSL_CTX
*tctx
= s
->initial_ctx
;
3393 unsigned char iv
[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH
];
3394 unsigned char key_name
[16];
3396 /* get session encoding length */
3397 slen_full
= i2d_SSL_SESSION(s
->session
, NULL
);
3399 * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too
3402 if (slen_full
== 0 || slen_full
> 0xFF00) {
3403 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
3406 senc
= OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full
);
3408 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
3412 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx
);
3413 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx
);
3416 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s
->session
, &p
))
3420 * create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up
3423 sess
= d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL
, &const_p
, slen_full
);
3426 sess
->session_id_length
= 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
3428 slen
= i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess
, NULL
);
3429 if (slen
== 0 || slen
> slen_full
) { /* shouldn't ever happen */
3430 SSL_SESSION_free(sess
);
3434 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess
, &p
)) {
3435 SSL_SESSION_free(sess
);
3438 SSL_SESSION_free(sess
);
3441 * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3442 * follows 1 (size of message name) + 3 (message length
3443 * bytes) + 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
3444 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
3445 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
3446 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
3448 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s
->init_buf
,
3449 26 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH
+ EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH
+
3450 EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
+ slen
))
3453 p
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
3455 *(p
++) = SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET
;
3456 /* Skip message length for now */
3459 * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does
3460 * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx.
3462 if (tctx
->tlsext_ticket_key_cb
) {
3463 if (tctx
->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s
, key_name
, iv
, &ctx
,
3467 if (RAND_bytes(iv
, 16) <= 0)
3469 if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx
, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL
,
3470 tctx
->tlsext_tick_aes_key
, iv
))
3472 if (!HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx
, tctx
->tlsext_tick_hmac_key
, 16,
3473 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL
))
3475 memcpy(key_name
, tctx
->tlsext_tick_key_name
, 16);
3479 * Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only): We leave this unspecified
3480 * for resumed session (for simplicity), and guess that tickets for
3481 * new sessions will live as long as their sessions.
3483 l2n(s
->hit
? 0 : s
->session
->timeout
, p
);
3485 /* Skip ticket length for now */
3487 /* Output key name */
3489 memcpy(p
, key_name
, 16);
3492 memcpy(p
, iv
, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx
));
3493 p
+= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx
);
3494 /* Encrypt session data */
3495 if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx
, p
, &len
, senc
, slen
))
3498 if (!EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx
, p
, &len
))
3502 if (!HMAC_Update(&hctx
, macstart
, p
- macstart
))
3504 if (!HMAC_Final(&hctx
, p
, &hlen
))
3507 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx
);
3508 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx
);
3511 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
3513 len
= p
- (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
3514 p
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
+ 1;
3515 l2n3(len
- 4, p
); /* Message length */
3517 s2n(len
- 10, p
); /* Ticket length */
3519 /* number of bytes to write */
3521 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B
;
3526 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
3527 return (ssl3_do_write(s
, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
));
3531 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx
);
3532 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx
);
3533 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
3537 int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL
*s
)
3539 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A
) {
3542 * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3543 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
3544 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
3547 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s
->init_buf
, 8 + s
->tlsext_ocsp_resplen
)) {
3548 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
3552 p
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
3555 *(p
++) = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS
;
3556 /* message length */
3557 l2n3(s
->tlsext_ocsp_resplen
+ 4, p
);
3559 *(p
++) = s
->tlsext_status_type
;
3560 /* length of OCSP response */
3561 l2n3(s
->tlsext_ocsp_resplen
, p
);
3562 /* actual response */
3563 memcpy(p
, s
->tlsext_ocsp_resp
, s
->tlsext_ocsp_resplen
);
3564 /* number of bytes to write */
3565 s
->init_num
= 8 + s
->tlsext_ocsp_resplen
;
3566 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B
;
3570 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
3571 return (ssl3_do_write(s
, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
));
3574 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3576 * ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message.
3577 * It sets the next_proto member in s if found
3579 int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL
*s
)
3582 int proto_len
, padding_len
;
3584 const unsigned char *p
;
3587 * Clients cannot send a NextProtocol message if we didn't see the
3588 * extension in their ClientHello
3590 if (!s
->s3
->next_proto_neg_seen
) {
3591 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO
,
3592 SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION
);
3593 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
3597 /* See the payload format below */
3598 n
= s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
3599 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A
,
3600 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B
,
3601 SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO
, 514, &ok
);
3607 * s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received in
3608 * this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset by
3609 * ssl3_get_finished).
3611 if (!s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
) {
3612 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO
, SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS
);
3613 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
3618 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
3619 return 0; /* The body must be > 1 bytes long */
3622 p
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
3625 * The payload looks like:
3627 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
3628 * uint8 padding_len;
3629 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
3632 if (proto_len
+ 2 > s
->init_num
) {
3633 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
3636 padding_len
= p
[proto_len
+ 1];
3637 if (proto_len
+ padding_len
+ 2 != s
->init_num
) {
3638 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
3642 s
->next_proto_negotiated
= OPENSSL_malloc(proto_len
);
3643 if (!s
->next_proto_negotiated
) {
3644 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3645 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
3648 memcpy(s
->next_proto_negotiated
, p
+ 1, proto_len
);
3649 s
->next_proto_negotiated_len
= proto_len
;