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[thirdparty/openssl.git] / ssl / s3_srvr.c
1 /* ssl/s3_srvr.c */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
3 * All rights reserved.
4 *
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8 *
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15 *
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22 *
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25 * are met:
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40 *
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
51 * SUCH DAMAGE.
52 *
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
57 */
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
60 *
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
63 * are met:
64 *
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
67 *
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
71 * distribution.
72 *
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
77 *
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
82 *
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
86 *
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
88 * acknowledgment:
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
91 *
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
105 *
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
109 *
110 */
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
113 *
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
116 *
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
119 *
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
122 *
123 */
124
125 #define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
126 #define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
127
128 #include <stdio.h>
129 #include "ssl_locl.h"
130 #include "kssl_lcl.h"
131 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
132 #include <openssl/rand.h>
133 #include <openssl/objects.h>
134 #include <openssl/evp.h>
135 #include <openssl/x509.h>
136 #include <openssl/dh.h>
137 #include <openssl/bn.h>
138 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
139 #include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
140 #endif
141 #include <openssl/md5.h>
142
143 static SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver);
144
145 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
146 static int nid2curve_id(int nid);
147 #endif
148
149 static SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)
150 {
151 if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
152 return(SSLv3_server_method());
153 else
154 return(NULL);
155 }
156
157 SSL_METHOD *SSLv3_server_method(void)
158 {
159 static int init=1;
160 static SSL_METHOD SSLv3_server_data;
161
162 if (init)
163 {
164 CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_METHOD);
165
166 if (init)
167 {
168 memcpy((char *)&SSLv3_server_data,(char *)sslv3_base_method(),
169 sizeof(SSL_METHOD));
170 SSLv3_server_data.ssl_accept=ssl3_accept;
171 SSLv3_server_data.get_ssl_method=ssl3_get_server_method;
172 init=0;
173 }
174
175 CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_METHOD);
176 }
177 return(&SSLv3_server_data);
178 }
179
180 int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
181 {
182 BUF_MEM *buf;
183 unsigned long l,Time=time(NULL);
184 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
185 long num1;
186 int ret= -1;
187 int new_state,state,skip=0;
188
189 RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0);
190 ERR_clear_error();
191 clear_sys_error();
192
193 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
194 cb=s->info_callback;
195 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
196 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
197
198 /* init things to blank */
199 s->in_handshake++;
200 if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s);
201
202 if (s->cert == NULL)
203 {
204 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
205 return(-1);
206 }
207
208 for (;;)
209 {
210 state=s->state;
211
212 switch (s->state)
213 {
214 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
215 s->new_session=1;
216 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
217
218 case SSL_ST_BEFORE:
219 case SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
220 case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
221 case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
222
223 s->server=1;
224 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1);
225
226 if ((s->version>>8) != 3)
227 {
228 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
229 return -1;
230 }
231 s->type=SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
232
233 if (s->init_buf == NULL)
234 {
235 if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)
236 {
237 ret= -1;
238 goto end;
239 }
240 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH))
241 {
242 ret= -1;
243 goto end;
244 }
245 s->init_buf=buf;
246 }
247
248 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
249 {
250 ret= -1;
251 goto end;
252 }
253
254 s->init_num=0;
255
256 if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE)
257 {
258 /* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that
259 * the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
260 */
261 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) { ret= -1; goto end; }
262
263 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
264 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
265 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
266 }
267 else
268 {
269 /* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE,
270 * we will just send a HelloRequest */
271 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
272 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
273 }
274 break;
275
276 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
277 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
278
279 s->shutdown=0;
280 ret=ssl3_send_hello_request(s);
281 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
282 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
283 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
284 s->init_num=0;
285
286 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
287 break;
288
289 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
290 s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
291 break;
292
293 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
294 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
295 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
296
297 s->shutdown=0;
298 ret=ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
299 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
300 s->new_session = 2;
301 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
302 s->init_num=0;
303 break;
304
305 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
306 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
307 ret=ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
308 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
309
310 if (s->hit)
311 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
312 else
313 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
314 s->init_num=0;
315 break;
316
317 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
318 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
319 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH */
320 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aNULL))
321 {
322 ret=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
323 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
324 }
325 else
326 skip=1;
327 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
328 s->init_num=0;
329 break;
330
331 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
332 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
333 l=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms;
334
335 /* clear this, it may get reset by
336 * send_server_key_exchange */
337 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA)
338 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
339 && !(l & SSL_KRB5)
340 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
341 )
342 /* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key
343 * even when forbidden by protocol specs
344 * (handshake may fail as clients are not required to
345 * be able to handle this) */
346 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
347 else
348 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0;
349
350
351 /* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or
352 * RSA but we have a sign only certificate
353 *
354 * For ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange
355 * message only if the cipher suite is either
356 * ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, the
357 * server certificate contains the server's
358 * public key for key exchange.
359 */
360 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp
361 || (l & SSL_kECDHE)
362 || (l & (SSL_DH|SSL_kFZA))
363 || ((l & SSL_kRSA)
364 && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
365 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
366 && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
367 )
368 )
369 )
370 )
371 {
372 ret=ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);
373 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
374 }
375 else
376 skip=1;
377
378 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
379 s->init_num=0;
380 break;
381
382 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
383 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
384 if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
385 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
386 /* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set,
387 * don't request cert during re-negotiation: */
388 ((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
389 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
390 /* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites
391 * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts
392 * and in RFC 2246): */
393 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aNULL) &&
394 /* ... except when the application insists on verification
395 * (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */
396 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
397 /* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */
398 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aKRB5))
399 {
400 /* no cert request */
401 skip=1;
402 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=0;
403 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
404 }
405 else
406 {
407 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=1;
408 ret=ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
409 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
410 #ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
411 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
412 #else
413 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
414 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
415 #endif
416 s->init_num=0;
417 }
418 break;
419
420 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
421 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
422 ret=ssl3_send_server_done(s);
423 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
424 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
425 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
426 s->init_num=0;
427 break;
428
429 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
430 /* number of bytes to be flushed */
431 num1=BIO_ctrl(s->wbio,BIO_CTRL_INFO,0,NULL);
432 if (num1 > 0)
433 {
434 s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
435 num1=BIO_flush(s->wbio);
436 if (num1 <= 0) { ret= -1; goto end; }
437 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
438 }
439
440 s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state;
441 break;
442
443 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
444 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
445 /* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */
446 ret = ssl3_check_client_hello(s);
447 if (ret <= 0)
448 goto end;
449 if (ret == 2)
450 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C;
451 else {
452 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
453 {
454 ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
455 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
456 }
457 s->init_num=0;
458 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
459 }
460 break;
461
462 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
463 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
464 ret=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
465 if (ret <= 0)
466 goto end;
467 if (ret == 2)
468 {
469 /* For the ECDH ciphersuites when
470 * the client sends its ECDH pub key in
471 * a certificate, the CertificateVerify
472 * message is not sent.
473 */
474 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
475 s->init_num = 0;
476 }
477 else
478 {
479 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
480 s->init_num=0;
481
482 /* We need to get hashes here so if there is
483 * a client cert, it can be verified
484 */
485 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
486 &(s->s3->finish_dgst1),
487 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[0]));
488 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
489 &(s->s3->finish_dgst2),
490 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]));
491 }
492 break;
493
494 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
495 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
496
497 /* we should decide if we expected this one */
498 ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
499 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
500
501 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
502 s->init_num=0;
503 break;
504
505 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
506 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
507 ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
508 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
509 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
510 if (s->hit)
511 s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
512 else
513 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
514 s->init_num=0;
515 break;
516
517 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
518 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
519
520 s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
521 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
522 { ret= -1; goto end; }
523
524 ret=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
525 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
526
527 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
528 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
529 s->init_num=0;
530
531 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
532 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
533 {
534 ret= -1;
535 goto end;
536 }
537
538 break;
539
540 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
541 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
542 ret=ssl3_send_finished(s,
543 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
544 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
545 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
546 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
547 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
548 if (s->hit)
549 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
550 else
551 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK;
552 s->init_num=0;
553 break;
554
555 case SSL_ST_OK:
556 /* clean a few things up */
557 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
558
559 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
560 s->init_buf=NULL;
561
562 /* remove buffering on output */
563 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
564
565 s->init_num=0;
566
567 if (s->new_session == 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
568 {
569 /* actually not necessarily a 'new' session unless
570 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is set */
571
572 s->new_session=0;
573
574 ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
575
576 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
577 /* s->server=1; */
578 s->handshake_func=ssl3_accept;
579
580 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1);
581 }
582
583 ret = 1;
584 goto end;
585 /* break; */
586
587 default:
588 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
589 ret= -1;
590 goto end;
591 /* break; */
592 }
593
594 if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip)
595 {
596 if (s->debug)
597 {
598 if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
599 goto end;
600 }
601
602
603 if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state))
604 {
605 new_state=s->state;
606 s->state=state;
607 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP,1);
608 s->state=new_state;
609 }
610 }
611 skip=0;
612 }
613 end:
614 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
615
616 s->in_handshake--;
617 if (cb != NULL)
618 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT,ret);
619 return(ret);
620 }
621
622 int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
623 {
624 unsigned char *p;
625
626 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A)
627 {
628 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
629 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST;
630 *(p++)=0;
631 *(p++)=0;
632 *(p++)=0;
633
634 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
635 /* number of bytes to write */
636 s->init_num=4;
637 s->init_off=0;
638 }
639
640 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
641 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
642 }
643
644 int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s)
645 {
646 int ok;
647 long n;
648
649 /* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message,
650 * so permit appropriate message length */
651 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
652 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A,
653 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B,
654 -1,
655 s->max_cert_list,
656 &ok);
657 if (!ok) return((int)n);
658 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
659 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)
660 {
661 /* Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake,
662 * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.)
663 * I hope that tmp.dh is the only thing that may need to be cleared
664 * when a handshake is not completed ... */
665 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
666 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
667 {
668 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
669 s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
670 }
671 #endif
672 return 2;
673 }
674 return 1;
675 }
676
677 int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
678 {
679 int i,j,ok,al,ret= -1;
680 unsigned int cookie_len;
681 long n;
682 unsigned long id;
683 unsigned char *p,*d,*q;
684 SSL_CIPHER *c;
685 SSL_COMP *comp=NULL;
686 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers=NULL;
687
688 /* We do this so that we will respond with our native type.
689 * If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1,
690 * This down switching should be handled by a different method.
691 * If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with
692 * TLSv1.
693 */
694 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
695 {
696 s->first_packet=1;
697 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
698 }
699 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
700 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
701 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C,
702 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,
703 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
704 &ok);
705
706 if (!ok) return((int)n);
707 d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
708
709 /* use version from inside client hello, not from record header
710 * (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */
711 s->client_version=(((int)p[0])<<8)|(int)p[1];
712 p+=2;
713
714 if (s->client_version < s->version)
715 {
716 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
717 if ((s->client_version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
718 {
719 /* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
720 s->version = s->client_version;
721 }
722 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
723 goto f_err;
724 }
725
726 /* load the client random */
727 memcpy(s->s3->client_random,p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
728 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
729
730 /* get the session-id */
731 j= *(p++);
732
733 s->hit=0;
734 /* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow session reuse during renegotiation
735 * (i.e. when s->new_session is true), option
736 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is new with 0.9.7.
737 * Maybe this optional behaviour should always have been the default,
738 * but we cannot safely change the default behaviour (or new applications
739 * might be written that become totally unsecure when compiled with
740 * an earlier library version)
741 */
742 if (j == 0 || (s->new_session && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION)))
743 {
744 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
745 goto err;
746 }
747 else
748 {
749 i=ssl_get_prev_session(s,p,j);
750 if (i == 1)
751 { /* previous session */
752 s->hit=1;
753 }
754 else if (i == -1)
755 goto err;
756 else /* i == 0 */
757 {
758 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
759 goto err;
760 }
761 }
762
763 p+=j;
764
765 if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION)
766 {
767 /* cookie stuff */
768 cookie_len = *(p++);
769
770 if ( (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) &&
771 s->d1->send_cookie == 0)
772 {
773 /* HelloVerifyMessage has already been sent */
774 if ( cookie_len != s->d1->cookie_len)
775 {
776 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
777 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
778 goto f_err;
779 }
780 }
781
782 /*
783 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
784 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
785 * does not cause an overflow.
786 */
787 if ( cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie))
788 {
789 /* too much data */
790 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
791 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
792 goto f_err;
793 }
794
795 /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
796 if ( (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) &&
797 cookie_len > 0)
798 {
799 memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len);
800
801 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL)
802 {
803 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie,
804 cookie_len) == 0)
805 {
806 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
807 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
808 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
809 goto f_err;
810 }
811 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
812 }
813 else if ( memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
814 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) /* default verification */
815 {
816 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
817 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
818 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
819 goto f_err;
820 }
821 }
822
823 p += cookie_len;
824 }
825
826 n2s(p,i);
827 if ((i == 0) && (j != 0))
828 {
829 /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */
830 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
831 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
832 goto f_err;
833 }
834 if ((p+i) >= (d+n))
835 {
836 /* not enough data */
837 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
838 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
839 goto f_err;
840 }
841 if ((i > 0) && (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s,p,i,&(ciphers))
842 == NULL))
843 {
844 goto err;
845 }
846 p+=i;
847
848 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
849 if ((s->hit) && (i > 0))
850 {
851 j=0;
852 id=s->session->cipher->id;
853
854 #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
855 printf("client sent %d ciphers\n",sk_num(ciphers));
856 #endif
857 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++)
858 {
859 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers,i);
860 #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
861 printf("client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
862 i,sk_num(ciphers),SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
863 #endif
864 if (c->id == id)
865 {
866 j=1;
867 break;
868 }
869 }
870 if (j == 0)
871 {
872 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1))
873 {
874 /* Very bad for multi-threading.... */
875 s->session->cipher=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0);
876 }
877 else
878 {
879 /* we need to have the cipher in the cipher
880 * list if we are asked to reuse it */
881 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
882 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
883 goto f_err;
884 }
885 }
886 }
887
888 /* compression */
889 i= *(p++);
890 if ((p+i) > (d+n))
891 {
892 /* not enough data */
893 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
894 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
895 goto f_err;
896 }
897 q=p;
898 for (j=0; j<i; j++)
899 {
900 if (p[j] == 0) break;
901 }
902
903 p+=i;
904 if (j >= i)
905 {
906 /* no compress */
907 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
908 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
909 goto f_err;
910 }
911
912 /* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
913 * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
914 * algorithms from the client, starting at q. */
915 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=NULL;
916 if (s->ctx->comp_methods != NULL)
917 { /* See if we have a match */
918 int m,nn,o,v,done=0;
919
920 nn=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
921 for (m=0; m<nn; m++)
922 {
923 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
924 v=comp->id;
925 for (o=0; o<i; o++)
926 {
927 if (v == q[o])
928 {
929 done=1;
930 break;
931 }
932 }
933 if (done) break;
934 }
935 if (done)
936 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
937 else
938 comp=NULL;
939 }
940
941 /* TLS does not mind if there is extra stuff */
942 #if 0 /* SSL 3.0 does not mind either, so we should disable this test
943 * (was enabled in 0.9.6d through 0.9.6j and 0.9.7 through 0.9.7b,
944 * in earlier SSLeay/OpenSSL releases this test existed but was buggy) */
945 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
946 {
947 if (p < (d+n))
948 {
949 /* wrong number of bytes,
950 * there could be more to follow */
951 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
952 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
953 goto f_err;
954 }
955 }
956 #endif
957
958 /* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must
959 * pick a cipher */
960
961 if (!s->hit)
962 {
963 s->session->compress_meth=(comp == NULL)?0:comp->id;
964 if (s->session->ciphers != NULL)
965 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
966 s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
967 if (ciphers == NULL)
968 {
969 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
970 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED);
971 goto f_err;
972 }
973 ciphers=NULL;
974 c=ssl3_choose_cipher(s,s->session->ciphers,
975 SSL_get_ciphers(s));
976
977 if (c == NULL)
978 {
979 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
980 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
981 goto f_err;
982 }
983 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=c;
984 }
985 else
986 {
987 /* Session-id reuse */
988 #ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
989 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
990 SSL_CIPHER *nc=NULL;
991 SSL_CIPHER *ec=NULL;
992
993 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG)
994 {
995 sk=s->session->ciphers;
996 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++)
997 {
998 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,i);
999 if (c->algorithms & SSL_eNULL)
1000 nc=c;
1001 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c))
1002 ec=c;
1003 }
1004 if (nc != NULL)
1005 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=nc;
1006 else if (ec != NULL)
1007 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=ec;
1008 else
1009 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1010 }
1011 else
1012 #endif
1013 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1014 }
1015
1016 /* we now have the following setup.
1017 * client_random
1018 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
1019 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
1020 * compression - basically ignored right now
1021 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1022 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1023 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1024 * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
1025 */
1026
1027 ret=1;
1028 if (0)
1029 {
1030 f_err:
1031 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1032 }
1033 err:
1034 if (ciphers != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1035 return(ret);
1036 }
1037
1038 int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
1039 {
1040 unsigned char *buf;
1041 unsigned char *p,*d;
1042 int i,sl;
1043 unsigned long l,Time;
1044
1045 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1046 {
1047 buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1048 p=s->s3->server_random;
1049 Time=time(NULL); /* Time */
1050 l2n(Time,p);
1051 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0)
1052 return -1;
1053 /* Do the message type and length last */
1054 d=p= &(buf[4]);
1055
1056 *(p++)=s->version>>8;
1057 *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
1058
1059 /* Random stuff */
1060 memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1061 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1062
1063 /* now in theory we have 3 options to sending back the
1064 * session id. If it is a re-use, we send back the
1065 * old session-id, if it is a new session, we send
1066 * back the new session-id or we send back a 0 length
1067 * session-id if we want it to be single use.
1068 * Currently I will not implement the '0' length session-id
1069 * 12-Jan-98 - I'll now support the '0' length stuff.
1070 */
1071 if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER))
1072 s->session->session_id_length=0;
1073
1074 sl=s->session->session_id_length;
1075 if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id))
1076 {
1077 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1078 return -1;
1079 }
1080 *(p++)=sl;
1081 memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,sl);
1082 p+=sl;
1083
1084 /* put the cipher */
1085 i=ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,p);
1086 p+=i;
1087
1088 /* put the compression method */
1089 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1090 *(p++)=0;
1091 else
1092 *(p++)=s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
1093
1094 /* do the header */
1095 l=(p-d);
1096 d=buf;
1097 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO;
1098 l2n3(l,d);
1099
1100 s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B;
1101 /* number of bytes to write */
1102 s->init_num=p-buf;
1103 s->init_off=0;
1104 }
1105
1106 /* SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B */
1107 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1108 }
1109
1110 int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)
1111 {
1112 unsigned char *p;
1113
1114 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A)
1115 {
1116 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1117
1118 /* do the header */
1119 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
1120 *(p++)=0;
1121 *(p++)=0;
1122 *(p++)=0;
1123
1124 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
1125 /* number of bytes to write */
1126 s->init_num=4;
1127 s->init_off=0;
1128 }
1129
1130 /* SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B */
1131 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1132 }
1133
1134 int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1135 {
1136 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1137 unsigned char *q;
1138 int j,num;
1139 RSA *rsa;
1140 unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
1141 unsigned int u;
1142 #endif
1143 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1144 DH *dh=NULL,*dhp;
1145 #endif
1146 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1147 EC_KEY *ecdh=NULL, *ecdhp;
1148 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1149 int encodedlen = 0;
1150 int curve_id = 0;
1151 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1152 #endif
1153 EVP_PKEY *pkey;
1154 unsigned char *p,*d;
1155 int al,i;
1156 unsigned long type;
1157 int n;
1158 CERT *cert;
1159 BIGNUM *r[4];
1160 int nr[4],kn;
1161 BUF_MEM *buf;
1162 EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
1163
1164 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
1165 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A)
1166 {
1167 type=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_MKEY_MASK;
1168 cert=s->cert;
1169
1170 buf=s->init_buf;
1171
1172 r[0]=r[1]=r[2]=r[3]=NULL;
1173 n=0;
1174 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1175 if (type & SSL_kRSA)
1176 {
1177 rsa=cert->rsa_tmp;
1178 if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL))
1179 {
1180 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s,
1181 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1182 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1183 if(rsa == NULL)
1184 {
1185 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1186 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1187 goto f_err;
1188 }
1189 RSA_up_ref(rsa);
1190 cert->rsa_tmp=rsa;
1191 }
1192 if (rsa == NULL)
1193 {
1194 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1195 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1196 goto f_err;
1197 }
1198 r[0]=rsa->n;
1199 r[1]=rsa->e;
1200 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
1201 }
1202 else
1203 #endif
1204 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1205 if (type & SSL_kEDH)
1206 {
1207 dhp=cert->dh_tmp;
1208 if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1209 dhp=s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s,
1210 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1211 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1212 if (dhp == NULL)
1213 {
1214 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1215 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1216 goto f_err;
1217 }
1218
1219 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
1220 {
1221 DH_free(dh);
1222 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1223 goto err;
1224 }
1225
1226 if ((dh=DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL)
1227 {
1228 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1229 goto err;
1230 }
1231
1232 s->s3->tmp.dh=dh;
1233 if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL ||
1234 dhp->priv_key == NULL ||
1235 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE)))
1236 {
1237 if(!DH_generate_key(dh))
1238 {
1239 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1240 ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1241 goto err;
1242 }
1243 }
1244 else
1245 {
1246 dh->pub_key=BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
1247 dh->priv_key=BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
1248 if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) ||
1249 (dh->priv_key == NULL))
1250 {
1251 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1252 goto err;
1253 }
1254 }
1255 r[0]=dh->p;
1256 r[1]=dh->g;
1257 r[2]=dh->pub_key;
1258 }
1259 else
1260 #endif
1261 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1262 if (type & SSL_kECDHE)
1263 {
1264 const EC_GROUP *group;
1265
1266 ecdhp=cert->ecdh_tmp;
1267 if ((ecdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1268 {
1269 ecdhp=s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s,
1270 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1271 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1272 }
1273 if (ecdhp == NULL)
1274 {
1275 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1276 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
1277 goto f_err;
1278 }
1279
1280 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
1281 {
1282 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
1283 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1284 goto err;
1285 }
1286
1287 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
1288 if (ecdhp == NULL)
1289 {
1290 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1291 goto err;
1292 }
1293 if (!EC_KEY_up_ref(ecdhp))
1294 {
1295 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1296 goto err;
1297 }
1298 ecdh = ecdhp;
1299
1300 s->s3->tmp.ecdh=ecdh;
1301 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1302 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1303 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE))
1304 {
1305 if(!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh))
1306 {
1307 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1308 goto err;
1309 }
1310 }
1311
1312 if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||
1313 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1314 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL))
1315 {
1316 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1317 goto err;
1318 }
1319
1320 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
1321 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163))
1322 {
1323 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
1324 goto err;
1325 }
1326
1327 /* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH
1328 * keys over named (not generic) curves. For
1329 * supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero.
1330 */
1331 if ((curve_id =
1332 nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)))
1333 == 0)
1334 {
1335 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
1336 goto err;
1337 }
1338
1339 /* Encode the public key.
1340 * First check the size of encoding and
1341 * allocate memory accordingly.
1342 */
1343 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1344 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1345 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1346 NULL, 0, NULL);
1347
1348 encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
1349 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen*sizeof(unsigned char));
1350 bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
1351 if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL))
1352 {
1353 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1354 goto err;
1355 }
1356
1357
1358 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1359 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1360 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1361 encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
1362
1363 if (encodedlen == 0)
1364 {
1365 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1366 goto err;
1367 }
1368
1369 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); bn_ctx=NULL;
1370
1371 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not
1372 * generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges.
1373 * In this situation, we need three additional bytes
1374 * to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
1375 * structure.
1376 */
1377 n = 3 + encodedlen;
1378
1379 /* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message
1380 * explicitly so we can set these to NULLs
1381 */
1382 r[0]=NULL;
1383 r[1]=NULL;
1384 r[2]=NULL;
1385 }
1386 else
1387 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
1388 {
1389 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1390 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
1391 goto f_err;
1392 }
1393 for (i=0; r[i] != NULL; i++)
1394 {
1395 nr[i]=BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
1396 n+=2+nr[i];
1397 }
1398
1399 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aNULL))
1400 {
1401 if ((pkey=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s,s->s3->tmp.new_cipher))
1402 == NULL)
1403 {
1404 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1405 goto f_err;
1406 }
1407 kn=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1408 }
1409 else
1410 {
1411 pkey=NULL;
1412 kn=0;
1413 }
1414
1415 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,n+4+kn))
1416 {
1417 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_BUF);
1418 goto err;
1419 }
1420 d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1421 p= &(d[4]);
1422
1423 for (i=0; r[i] != NULL; i++)
1424 {
1425 s2n(nr[i],p);
1426 BN_bn2bin(r[i],p);
1427 p+=nr[i];
1428 }
1429
1430 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1431 if (type & SSL_kECDHE)
1432 {
1433 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves.
1434 * In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has:
1435 * [1 byte CurveType], [1 byte CurveName]
1436 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by
1437 * the actual encoded point itself
1438 */
1439 *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
1440 p += 1;
1441 *p = curve_id;
1442 p += 1;
1443 *p = encodedlen;
1444 p += 1;
1445 memcpy((unsigned char*)p,
1446 (unsigned char *)encodedPoint,
1447 encodedlen);
1448 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1449 p += encodedlen;
1450 }
1451 #endif
1452
1453 /* not anonymous */
1454 if (pkey != NULL)
1455 {
1456 /* n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4])
1457 * and p points to the space at the end. */
1458 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1459 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
1460 {
1461 q=md_buf;
1462 j=0;
1463 for (num=2; num > 0; num--)
1464 {
1465 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2)
1466 ?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
1467 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1468 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1469 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1470 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q,
1471 (unsigned int *)&i);
1472 q+=i;
1473 j+=i;
1474 }
1475 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,
1476 &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0)
1477 {
1478 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_RSA);
1479 goto err;
1480 }
1481 s2n(u,p);
1482 n+=u+2;
1483 }
1484 else
1485 #endif
1486 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA)
1487 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
1488 {
1489 /* lets do DSS */
1490 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_dss1(), NULL);
1491 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1492 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1493 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1494 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
1495 (unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
1496 {
1497 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_DSA);
1498 goto err;
1499 }
1500 s2n(i,p);
1501 n+=i+2;
1502 }
1503 else
1504 #endif
1505 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA)
1506 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
1507 {
1508 /* let's do ECDSA */
1509 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_ecdsa(), NULL);
1510 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1511 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1512 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1513 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
1514 (unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
1515 {
1516 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_ECDSA);
1517 goto err;
1518 }
1519 s2n(i,p);
1520 n+=i+2;
1521 }
1522 else
1523 #endif
1524 {
1525 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
1526 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1527 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
1528 goto f_err;
1529 }
1530 }
1531
1532 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE;
1533 l2n3(n,d);
1534
1535 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
1536 * it off */
1537 s->init_num=n+4;
1538 s->init_off=0;
1539 }
1540
1541 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
1542 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
1543 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1544 f_err:
1545 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1546 err:
1547 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1548 if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1549 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
1550 #endif
1551 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
1552 return(-1);
1553 }
1554
1555 int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
1556 {
1557 unsigned char *p,*d;
1558 int i,j,nl,off,n;
1559 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk=NULL;
1560 X509_NAME *name;
1561 BUF_MEM *buf;
1562
1563 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A)
1564 {
1565 buf=s->init_buf;
1566
1567 d=p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4]);
1568
1569 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
1570 p++;
1571 n=ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s,p);
1572 d[0]=n;
1573 p+=n;
1574 n++;
1575
1576 off=n;
1577 p+=2;
1578 n+=2;
1579
1580 sk=SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
1581 nl=0;
1582 if (sk != NULL)
1583 {
1584 for (i=0; i<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++)
1585 {
1586 name=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i);
1587 j=i2d_X509_NAME(name,NULL);
1588 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,4+n+j+2))
1589 {
1590 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
1591 goto err;
1592 }
1593 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+n]);
1594 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG))
1595 {
1596 s2n(j,p);
1597 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
1598 n+=2+j;
1599 nl+=2+j;
1600 }
1601 else
1602 {
1603 d=p;
1604 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
1605 j-=2; s2n(j,d); j+=2;
1606 n+=j;
1607 nl+=j;
1608 }
1609 }
1610 }
1611 /* else no CA names */
1612 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+off]);
1613 s2n(nl,p);
1614
1615 d=(unsigned char *)buf->data;
1616 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
1617 l2n3(n,d);
1618
1619 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
1620 * it off */
1621
1622 s->init_num=n+4;
1623 s->init_off=0;
1624 #ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
1625 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num;
1626
1627 /* do the header */
1628 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
1629 *(p++)=0;
1630 *(p++)=0;
1631 *(p++)=0;
1632 s->init_num += 4;
1633 #endif
1634
1635 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
1636 }
1637
1638 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
1639 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1640 err:
1641 return(-1);
1642 }
1643
1644
1645 static const int KDF1_SHA1_len = 20;
1646 static void *KDF1_SHA1(const void *in, size_t inlen, void *out, size_t *outlen)
1647 {
1648 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
1649 if (*outlen < SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH)
1650 return NULL;
1651 else
1652 *outlen = SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH;
1653 return SHA1(in, inlen, out);
1654 #else
1655 return NULL;
1656 #endif
1657 }
1658
1659 int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1660 {
1661 int i,al,ok;
1662 long n;
1663 unsigned long l;
1664 unsigned char *p;
1665 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1666 RSA *rsa=NULL;
1667 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
1668 #endif
1669 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1670 BIGNUM *pub=NULL;
1671 DH *dh_srvr;
1672 #endif
1673 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1674 KSSL_ERR kssl_err;
1675 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
1676
1677 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1678 EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;
1679 EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
1680 EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
1681 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1682 #endif
1683
1684 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
1685 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
1686 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B,
1687 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1688 2048, /* ??? */
1689 &ok);
1690
1691 if (!ok) return((int)n);
1692 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
1693
1694 l=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms;
1695
1696 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1697 if (l & SSL_kRSA)
1698 {
1699 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
1700 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp)
1701 {
1702 if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL))
1703 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp;
1704 /* Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should
1705 * be sent already */
1706 if (rsa == NULL)
1707 {
1708 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1709 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY);
1710 goto f_err;
1711
1712 }
1713 }
1714 else
1715 {
1716 pkey=s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey;
1717 if ( (pkey == NULL) ||
1718 (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) ||
1719 (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL))
1720 {
1721 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1722 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
1723 goto f_err;
1724 }
1725 rsa=pkey->pkey.rsa;
1726 }
1727
1728 /* TLS */
1729 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION)
1730 {
1731 n2s(p,i);
1732 if (n != i+2)
1733 {
1734 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG))
1735 {
1736 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
1737 goto err;
1738 }
1739 else
1740 p-=2;
1741 }
1742 else
1743 n=i;
1744 }
1745
1746 i=RSA_private_decrypt((int)n,p,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
1747
1748 al = -1;
1749
1750 if (i != SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
1751 {
1752 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1753 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); */
1754 }
1755
1756 if ((al == -1) && !((p[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
1757 {
1758 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
1759 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
1760 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
1761 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
1762 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
1763 * protocol version.
1764 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. */
1765 if (!((s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) &&
1766 (p[0] == (s->version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->version & 0xff))))
1767 {
1768 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1769 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER); */
1770
1771 /* The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
1772 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version
1773 * number check as a "bad version oracle" -- an alert would
1774 * reveal that the plaintext corresponding to some ciphertext
1775 * made up by the adversary is properly formatted except
1776 * that the version number is wrong. To avoid such attacks,
1777 * we should treat this just like any other decryption error. */
1778 }
1779 }
1780
1781 if (al != -1)
1782 {
1783 /* Some decryption failure -- use random value instead as countermeasure
1784 * against Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding
1785 * (see RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). */
1786 ERR_clear_error();
1787 i = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
1788 p[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
1789 p[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
1790 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p+2, i-2) <= 0) /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure */
1791 goto err;
1792 }
1793
1794 s->session->master_key_length=
1795 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
1796 s->session->master_key,
1797 p,i);
1798 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
1799 }
1800 else
1801 #endif
1802 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1803 if (l & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
1804 {
1805 n2s(p,i);
1806 if (n != i+2)
1807 {
1808 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG))
1809 {
1810 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
1811 goto err;
1812 }
1813 else
1814 {
1815 p-=2;
1816 i=(int)n;
1817 }
1818 }
1819
1820 if (n == 0L) /* the parameters are in the cert */
1821 {
1822 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1823 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_DH_CERTS);
1824 goto f_err;
1825 }
1826 else
1827 {
1828 if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL)
1829 {
1830 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1831 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1832 goto f_err;
1833 }
1834 else
1835 dh_srvr=s->s3->tmp.dh;
1836 }
1837
1838 pub=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL);
1839 if (pub == NULL)
1840 {
1841 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BN_LIB);
1842 goto err;
1843 }
1844
1845 i=DH_compute_key(p,pub,dh_srvr);
1846
1847 if (i <= 0)
1848 {
1849 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1850 goto err;
1851 }
1852
1853 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
1854 s->s3->tmp.dh=NULL;
1855
1856 BN_clear_free(pub);
1857 pub=NULL;
1858 s->session->master_key_length=
1859 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
1860 s->session->master_key,p,i);
1861 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
1862 }
1863 else
1864 #endif
1865 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1866 if (l & SSL_kKRB5)
1867 {
1868 krb5_error_code krb5rc;
1869 krb5_data enc_ticket;
1870 krb5_data authenticator;
1871 krb5_data enc_pms;
1872 KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
1873 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
1874 EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
1875 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
1876 unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
1877 + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
1878 int padl, outl;
1879 krb5_timestamp authtime = 0;
1880 krb5_ticket_times ttimes;
1881
1882 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
1883
1884 if (!kssl_ctx) kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
1885
1886 n2s(p,i);
1887 enc_ticket.length = i;
1888
1889 if (n < enc_ticket.length + 6)
1890 {
1891 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1892 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1893 goto err;
1894 }
1895
1896 enc_ticket.data = (char *)p;
1897 p+=enc_ticket.length;
1898
1899 n2s(p,i);
1900 authenticator.length = i;
1901
1902 if (n < enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 6)
1903 {
1904 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1905 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1906 goto err;
1907 }
1908
1909 authenticator.data = (char *)p;
1910 p+=authenticator.length;
1911
1912 n2s(p,i);
1913 enc_pms.length = i;
1914 enc_pms.data = (char *)p;
1915 p+=enc_pms.length;
1916
1917 /* Note that the length is checked again below,
1918 ** after decryption
1919 */
1920 if(enc_pms.length > sizeof pms)
1921 {
1922 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1923 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1924 goto err;
1925 }
1926
1927 if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length +
1928 enc_pms.length + 6))
1929 {
1930 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1931 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1932 goto err;
1933 }
1934
1935 if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes,
1936 &kssl_err)) != 0)
1937 {
1938 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
1939 printf("kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
1940 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
1941 if (kssl_err.text)
1942 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
1943 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
1944 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1945 kssl_err.reason);
1946 goto err;
1947 }
1948
1949 /* Note: no authenticator is not considered an error,
1950 ** but will return authtime == 0.
1951 */
1952 if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator,
1953 &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0)
1954 {
1955 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
1956 printf("kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
1957 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
1958 if (kssl_err.text)
1959 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
1960 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
1961 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1962 kssl_err.reason);
1963 goto err;
1964 }
1965
1966 if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0)
1967 {
1968 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc);
1969 goto err;
1970 }
1971
1972 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
1973 kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
1974 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
1975
1976 enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
1977 if (enc == NULL)
1978 goto err;
1979
1980 memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
1981
1982 if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc,NULL,kssl_ctx->key,iv))
1983 {
1984 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1985 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
1986 goto err;
1987 }
1988 if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms,&outl,
1989 (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length))
1990 {
1991 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1992 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
1993 goto err;
1994 }
1995 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
1996 {
1997 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1998 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1999 goto err;
2000 }
2001 if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx,&(pms[outl]),&padl))
2002 {
2003 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2004 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2005 goto err;
2006 }
2007 outl += padl;
2008 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2009 {
2010 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2011 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2012 goto err;
2013 }
2014 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
2015
2016 s->session->master_key_length=
2017 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2018 s->session->master_key, pms, outl);
2019
2020 if (kssl_ctx->client_princ)
2021 {
2022 int len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
2023 if ( len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH )
2024 {
2025 s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len;
2026 memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ,kssl_ctx->client_princ,len);
2027 }
2028 }
2029
2030
2031 /* Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
2032 ** but it caused problems for apache.
2033 ** kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
2034 ** if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
2035 */
2036 }
2037 else
2038 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2039
2040 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2041 if ((l & SSL_kECDH) || (l & SSL_kECDHE))
2042 {
2043 int ret = 1;
2044 int field_size = 0;
2045 const EC_KEY *tkey;
2046 const EC_GROUP *group;
2047 const BIGNUM *priv_key;
2048
2049 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
2050 if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL)
2051 {
2052 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2053 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2054 goto err;
2055 }
2056
2057 /* Let's get server private key and group information */
2058 if (l & SSL_kECDH)
2059 {
2060 /* use the certificate */
2061 tkey = s->cert->key->privatekey->pkey.ec;
2062 }
2063 else
2064 {
2065 /* use the ephermeral values we saved when
2066 * generating the ServerKeyExchange msg.
2067 */
2068 tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh;
2069 }
2070
2071 group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
2072 priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
2073
2074 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) ||
2075 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key))
2076 {
2077 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2078 ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2079 goto err;
2080 }
2081
2082 /* Let's get client's public key */
2083 if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL)
2084 {
2085 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2086 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2087 goto err;
2088 }
2089
2090 if (n == 0L)
2091 {
2092 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
2093
2094 if (l & SSL_kECDHE)
2095 {
2096 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2097 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
2098 goto f_err;
2099 }
2100 if (((clnt_pub_pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer))
2101 == NULL) ||
2102 (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC))
2103 {
2104 /* XXX: For now, we do not support client
2105 * authentication using ECDH certificates
2106 * so this branch (n == 0L) of the code is
2107 * never executed. When that support is
2108 * added, we ought to ensure the key
2109 * received in the certificate is
2110 * authorized for key agreement.
2111 * ECDH_compute_key implicitly checks that
2112 * the two ECDH shares are for the same
2113 * group.
2114 */
2115 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2116 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2117 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS);
2118 goto f_err;
2119 }
2120
2121 EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,
2122 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->pkey.ec));
2123 ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
2124 }
2125 else
2126 {
2127 /* Get client's public key from encoded point
2128 * in the ClientKeyExchange message.
2129 */
2130 if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
2131 {
2132 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2133 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2134 goto err;
2135 }
2136
2137 /* Get encoded point length */
2138 i = *p;
2139 p += 1;
2140 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group,
2141 clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0)
2142 {
2143 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2144 ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2145 goto err;
2146 }
2147 /* p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer
2148 * currently, so set it to the start
2149 */
2150 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2151 }
2152
2153 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
2154 field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
2155 if (field_size <= 0)
2156 {
2157 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2158 ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
2159 goto err;
2160 }
2161 /* If field size is not more than 24 octets, then use SHA-1 hash of result;
2162 * otherwise, use result (see section 4.8 of draft-ietf-tls-ecc-03.txt;
2163 * this is new with this version of the Internet Draft).
2164 */
2165 if (field_size <= 24 * 8)
2166 i = ECDH_compute_key(p, KDF1_SHA1_len, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh, KDF1_SHA1);
2167 else
2168 i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size+7)/8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh, NULL);
2169 if (i <= 0)
2170 {
2171 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2172 ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
2173 goto err;
2174 }
2175
2176 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2177 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2178 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
2179 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2180 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2181
2182 /* Compute the master secret */
2183 s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc-> \
2184 generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, p, i);
2185
2186 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
2187 return (ret);
2188 }
2189 else
2190 #endif
2191 {
2192 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2193 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2194 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
2195 goto f_err;
2196 }
2197
2198 return(1);
2199 f_err:
2200 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2201 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH)
2202 err:
2203 #endif
2204 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2205 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2206 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2207 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
2208 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2209 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2210 #endif
2211 return(-1);
2212 }
2213
2214 int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
2215 {
2216 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
2217 unsigned char *p;
2218 int al,ok,ret=0;
2219 long n;
2220 int type=0,i,j;
2221 X509 *peer;
2222
2223 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2224 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
2225 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,
2226 -1,
2227 514, /* 514? */
2228 &ok);
2229
2230 if (!ok) return((int)n);
2231
2232 if (s->session->peer != NULL)
2233 {
2234 peer=s->session->peer;
2235 pkey=X509_get_pubkey(peer);
2236 type=X509_certificate_type(peer,pkey);
2237 }
2238 else
2239 {
2240 peer=NULL;
2241 pkey=NULL;
2242 }
2243
2244 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY)
2245 {
2246 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
2247 if ((peer != NULL) && (type | EVP_PKT_SIGN))
2248 {
2249 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2250 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE);
2251 goto f_err;
2252 }
2253 ret=1;
2254 goto end;
2255 }
2256
2257 if (peer == NULL)
2258 {
2259 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED);
2260 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2261 goto f_err;
2262 }
2263
2264 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
2265 {
2266 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
2267 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2268 goto f_err;
2269 }
2270
2271 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
2272 {
2273 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
2274 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2275 goto f_err;
2276 }
2277
2278 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
2279 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2280 n2s(p,i);
2281 n-=2;
2282 if (i > n)
2283 {
2284 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2285 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2286 goto f_err;
2287 }
2288
2289 j=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
2290 if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0))
2291 {
2292 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
2293 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2294 goto f_err;
2295 }
2296
2297 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2298 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
2299 {
2300 i=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
2301 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i,
2302 pkey->pkey.rsa);
2303 if (i < 0)
2304 {
2305 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2306 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
2307 goto f_err;
2308 }
2309 if (i == 0)
2310 {
2311 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2312 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE);
2313 goto f_err;
2314 }
2315 }
2316 else
2317 #endif
2318 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2319 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
2320 {
2321 j=DSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
2322 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
2323 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.dsa);
2324 if (j <= 0)
2325 {
2326 /* bad signature */
2327 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2328 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE);
2329 goto f_err;
2330 }
2331 }
2332 else
2333 #endif
2334 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
2335 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
2336 {
2337 j=ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
2338 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
2339 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.ec);
2340 if (j <= 0)
2341 {
2342 /* bad signature */
2343 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2344 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
2345 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
2346 goto f_err;
2347 }
2348 }
2349 else
2350 #endif
2351 {
2352 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2353 al=SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
2354 goto f_err;
2355 }
2356
2357
2358 ret=1;
2359 if (0)
2360 {
2361 f_err:
2362 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2363 }
2364 end:
2365 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
2366 return(ret);
2367 }
2368
2369 int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
2370 {
2371 int i,ok,al,ret= -1;
2372 X509 *x=NULL;
2373 unsigned long l,nc,llen,n;
2374 const unsigned char *p,*q;
2375 unsigned char *d;
2376 STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL;
2377
2378 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2379 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A,
2380 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B,
2381 -1,
2382 s->max_cert_list,
2383 &ok);
2384
2385 if (!ok) return((int)n);
2386
2387 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE)
2388 {
2389 if ( (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
2390 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
2391 {
2392 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
2393 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2394 goto f_err;
2395 }
2396 /* If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list */
2397 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
2398 {
2399 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST);
2400 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2401 goto f_err;
2402 }
2403 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
2404 return(1);
2405 }
2406
2407 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE)
2408 {
2409 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2410 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
2411 goto f_err;
2412 }
2413 p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2414
2415 if ((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)
2416 {
2417 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2418 goto err;
2419 }
2420
2421 n2l3(p,llen);
2422 if (llen+3 != n)
2423 {
2424 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2425 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2426 goto f_err;
2427 }
2428 for (nc=0; nc<llen; )
2429 {
2430 n2l3(p,l);
2431 if ((l+nc+3) > llen)
2432 {
2433 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2434 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2435 goto f_err;
2436 }
2437
2438 q=p;
2439 x=d2i_X509(NULL,&p,l);
2440 if (x == NULL)
2441 {
2442 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
2443 goto err;
2444 }
2445 if (p != (q+l))
2446 {
2447 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2448 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2449 goto f_err;
2450 }
2451 if (!sk_X509_push(sk,x))
2452 {
2453 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2454 goto err;
2455 }
2456 x=NULL;
2457 nc+=l+3;
2458 }
2459
2460 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0)
2461 {
2462 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
2463 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
2464 {
2465 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2466 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
2467 goto f_err;
2468 }
2469 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
2470 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
2471 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
2472 {
2473 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
2474 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2475 goto f_err;
2476 }
2477 }
2478 else
2479 {
2480 i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk);
2481 if (!i)
2482 {
2483 al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
2484 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_RETURNED);
2485 goto f_err;
2486 }
2487 }
2488
2489 if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */
2490 X509_free(s->session->peer);
2491 s->session->peer=sk_X509_shift(sk);
2492 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
2493
2494 /* With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL
2495 * when we arrive here. */
2496 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
2497 {
2498 s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
2499 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
2500 {
2501 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2502 goto err;
2503 }
2504 }
2505 if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL)
2506 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free);
2507 s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain=sk;
2508 /* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the
2509 * peer's own certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c */
2510
2511 sk=NULL;
2512
2513 ret=1;
2514 if (0)
2515 {
2516 f_err:
2517 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2518 }
2519 err:
2520 if (x != NULL) X509_free(x);
2521 if (sk != NULL) sk_X509_pop_free(sk,X509_free);
2522 return(ret);
2523 }
2524
2525 int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
2526 {
2527 unsigned long l;
2528 X509 *x;
2529
2530 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A)
2531 {
2532 x=ssl_get_server_send_cert(s);
2533 if (x == NULL &&
2534 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
2535 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms
2536 & (SSL_MKEY_MASK|SSL_AUTH_MASK))
2537 != (SSL_aKRB5|SSL_kKRB5))
2538 {
2539 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2540 return(0);
2541 }
2542
2543 l=ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,x);
2544 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
2545 s->init_num=(int)l;
2546 s->init_off=0;
2547 }
2548
2549 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
2550 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
2551 }
2552
2553
2554 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2555 /* This is the complement of curve_id2nid in s3_clnt.c. */
2556 static int nid2curve_id(int nid)
2557 {
2558 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-01.txt (Mar 15, 2001)
2559 * (no changes in draft-ietf-tls-ecc-03.txt [June 2003]) */
2560 switch (nid) {
2561 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
2562 return 1;
2563 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
2564 return 2;
2565 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
2566 return 3;
2567 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
2568 return 4;
2569 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
2570 return 5;
2571 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
2572 return 6;
2573 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
2574 return 7;
2575 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
2576 return 8;
2577 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
2578 return 9;
2579 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
2580 return 10;
2581 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
2582 return 11;
2583 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
2584 return 12;
2585 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
2586 return 13;
2587 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
2588 return 14;
2589 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
2590 return 15;
2591 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
2592 return 16;
2593 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
2594 return 17;
2595 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
2596 return 18;
2597 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
2598 return 19;
2599 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
2600 return 20;
2601 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
2602 return 21;
2603 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
2604 return 22;
2605 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
2606 return 23;
2607 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
2608 return 24;
2609 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
2610 return 25;
2611 default:
2612 return 0;
2613 }
2614 }
2615 #endif
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