1 /* ssl/s3_srvr.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
124 /* ====================================================================
125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
142 * to make use of the Contribution.
144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
151 #define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
152 #define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
155 #include <openssl/crypto.h>
156 #include "ssl_locl.h"
157 #include "kssl_lcl.h"
158 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
159 #include <openssl/rand.h>
160 #include <openssl/objects.h>
161 #include <openssl/evp.h>
162 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
163 #include <openssl/x509.h>
164 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
165 #include <openssl/dh.h>
167 #include <openssl/bn.h>
168 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
169 #include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
171 #include <openssl/md5.h>
173 static const SSL_METHOD
*ssl3_get_server_method(int ver
);
175 static const SSL_METHOD
*ssl3_get_server_method(int ver
)
177 if (ver
== SSL3_VERSION
)
178 return(SSLv3_server_method());
183 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
184 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL
*s
,int *al
)
186 int ret
= SSL_ERROR_NONE
;
188 *al
= SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME
;
190 if ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kSRP
) &&
191 (s
->srp_ctx
.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback
!= NULL
))
193 if(s
->srp_ctx
.login
== NULL
)
195 /* RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject,
196 we do so if There is no srp login name */
198 *al
= SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY
;
202 ret
= SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s
,al
);
209 IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method
,
211 ssl_undefined_function
,
212 ssl3_get_server_method
)
214 int ssl3_accept(SSL
*s
)
217 unsigned long alg_k
,Time
=(unsigned long)time(NULL
);
218 void (*cb
)(const SSL
*ssl
,int type
,int val
)=NULL
;
220 int new_state
,state
,skip
=0;
222 RAND_add(&Time
,sizeof(Time
),0);
226 if (s
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
228 else if (s
->ctx
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
229 cb
=s
->ctx
->info_callback
;
231 /* init things to blank */
233 if (!SSL_in_init(s
) || SSL_in_before(s
)) SSL_clear(s
);
237 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT
,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET
);
241 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
242 /* If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we
243 * already got and don't await it anymore, because
244 * Heartbeats don't make sense during handshakes anyway.
246 if (s
->tlsext_hb_pending
)
248 s
->tlsext_hb_pending
= 0;
259 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE
:
261 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
265 case SSL_ST_BEFORE
|SSL_ST_ACCEPT
:
266 case SSL_ST_OK
|SSL_ST_ACCEPT
:
269 if (cb
!= NULL
) cb(s
,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START
,1);
271 if ((s
->version
>>8) != 3)
273 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
276 s
->type
=SSL_ST_ACCEPT
;
278 if (s
->init_buf
== NULL
)
280 if ((buf
=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL
)
285 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf
,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
))
293 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s
))
300 s
->s3
->flags
&= ~SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE
;
302 if (s
->state
!= SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE
)
304 /* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that
305 * the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
307 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s
,1)) { ret
= -1; goto end
; }
309 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s
);
310 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A
;
311 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_accept
++;
313 else if (!s
->s3
->send_connection_binding
&&
314 !(s
->options
& SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION
))
316 /* Server attempting to renegotiate with
317 * client that doesn't support secure
320 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT
, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED
);
321 ssl3_send_alert(s
,SSL3_AL_FATAL
,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
327 /* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE,
328 * we will just send a HelloRequest */
329 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_accept_renegotiate
++;
330 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A
;
334 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A
:
335 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B
:
338 ret
=ssl3_send_hello_request(s
);
339 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
340 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C
;
341 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH
;
344 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s
);
347 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C
:
351 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A
:
352 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B
:
353 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C
:
355 if (s
->rwstate
!= SSL_X509_LOOKUP
)
357 ret
=ssl3_get_client_hello(s
);
358 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
360 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
363 if ((ret
= ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s
,&al
)) < 0)
365 /* callback indicates firther work to be done */
366 s
->rwstate
=SSL_X509_LOOKUP
;
369 if (ret
!= SSL_ERROR_NONE
)
371 ssl3_send_alert(s
,SSL3_AL_FATAL
,al
);
372 /* This is not really an error but the only means to
373 for a client to detect whether srp is supported. */
374 if (al
!= TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY
)
375 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT
,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
);
376 ret
= SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL
;
384 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A
;
388 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A
:
389 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B
:
390 ret
=ssl3_send_server_hello(s
);
391 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
392 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
395 if (s
->tlsext_ticket_expected
)
396 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A
;
398 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A
;
402 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A
;
405 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A
;
409 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A
:
410 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B
:
411 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
412 /* normal PSK or KRB5 or SRP */
413 if (!(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aNULL
)
414 && !(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kPSK
)
415 && !(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aKRB5
))
417 ret
=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s
);
418 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
419 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
420 if (s
->tlsext_status_expected
)
421 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A
;
423 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A
;
428 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A
;
435 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A
;
440 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A
:
441 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B
:
442 alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
444 /* clear this, it may get reset by
445 * send_server_key_exchange */
446 if ((s
->options
& SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA
)
447 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
448 && !(alg_k
& SSL_kKRB5
)
449 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
451 /* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key
452 * even when forbidden by protocol specs
453 * (handshake may fail as clients are not required to
454 * be able to handle this) */
455 s
->s3
->tmp
.use_rsa_tmp
=1;
457 s
->s3
->tmp
.use_rsa_tmp
=0;
460 /* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or
461 * RSA but we have a sign only certificate
463 * PSK: may send PSK identity hints
465 * For ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange
466 * message only if the cipher suite is either
467 * ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, the
468 * server certificate contains the server's
469 * public key for key exchange.
471 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.use_rsa_tmp
472 /* PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity
473 * hint if provided */
474 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
475 || ((alg_k
& SSL_kPSK
) && s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
)
477 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
478 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
479 || (alg_k
& SSL_kSRP
)
481 || (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHr
|SSL_kDHd
|SSL_kEDH
))
482 || (alg_k
& SSL_kEECDH
)
483 || ((alg_k
& SSL_kRSA
)
484 && (s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
].privatekey
== NULL
485 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
)
486 && EVP_PKEY_size(s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
].privatekey
)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
)
492 ret
=ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s
);
493 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
498 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A
;
502 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A
:
503 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B
:
504 if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
505 !(s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
) ||
506 /* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set,
507 * don't request cert during re-negotiation: */
508 ((s
->session
->peer
!= NULL
) &&
509 (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE
)) ||
510 /* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites
511 * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts
512 * and in RFC 2246): */
513 ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aNULL
) &&
514 /* ... except when the application insists on verification
515 * (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */
516 !(s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT
)) ||
517 /* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */
518 (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aKRB5
)
519 /* With normal PSK Certificates and
520 * Certificate Requests are omitted */
521 || (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kPSK
))
523 /* no cert request */
525 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
=0;
526 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A
;
527 if (s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
)
528 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
))
533 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
=1;
534 ret
=ssl3_send_certificate_request(s
);
535 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
536 #ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
537 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A
;
539 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH
;
540 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A
;
546 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A
:
547 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B
:
548 ret
=ssl3_send_server_done(s
);
549 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
550 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A
;
551 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH
;
555 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH
:
557 /* This code originally checked to see if
558 * any data was pending using BIO_CTRL_INFO
559 * and then flushed. This caused problems
560 * as documented in PR#1939. The proposed
561 * fix doesn't completely resolve this issue
562 * as buggy implementations of BIO_CTRL_PENDING
563 * still exist. So instead we just flush
567 s
->rwstate
=SSL_WRITING
;
568 if (BIO_flush(s
->wbio
) <= 0)
573 s
->rwstate
=SSL_NOTHING
;
575 s
->state
=s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
;
578 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A
:
579 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B
:
580 /* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */
581 ret
= ssl3_check_client_hello(s
);
585 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C
;
587 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
)
589 ret
=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s
);
590 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
593 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A
;
597 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A
:
598 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B
:
599 ret
=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s
);
604 /* For the ECDH ciphersuites when
605 * the client sends its ECDH pub key in
606 * a certificate, the CertificateVerify
607 * message is not sent.
608 * Also for GOST ciphersuites when
609 * the client uses its key from the certificate
612 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
613 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
;
615 if (s
->s3
->next_proto_neg_seen
)
616 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A
;
618 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
;
622 else if (TLS1_get_version(s
) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
)
624 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A
;
626 if (!s
->session
->peer
)
628 /* For TLS v1.2 freeze the handshake buffer
629 * at this point and digest cached records.
631 if (!s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
)
633 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT
,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
636 s
->s3
->flags
|= TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE
;
637 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
))
645 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A
;
648 /* We need to get hashes here so if there is
649 * a client cert, it can be verified
650 * FIXME - digest processing for CertificateVerify
651 * should be generalized. But it is next step
653 if (s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
)
654 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
))
656 for (dgst_num
=0; dgst_num
<SSL_MAX_DIGEST
;dgst_num
++)
657 if (s
->s3
->handshake_dgst
[dgst_num
])
661 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->cert_verify_mac(s
,EVP_MD_CTX_type(s
->s3
->handshake_dgst
[dgst_num
]),&(s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_verify_md
[offset
]));
662 dgst_size
=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s
->s3
->handshake_dgst
[dgst_num
]);
673 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A
:
674 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B
:
676 /* we should decide if we expected this one */
677 ret
=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s
);
678 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
680 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
681 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
;
683 if (s
->s3
->next_proto_neg_seen
)
684 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A
;
686 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
;
691 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
692 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A
:
693 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B
:
694 ret
=ssl3_get_next_proto(s
);
695 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
697 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
;
701 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
:
702 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B
:
703 ret
=ssl3_get_finished(s
,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
,
704 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B
);
705 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
708 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
709 else if (s
->tlsext_ticket_expected
)
710 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A
;
713 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A
;
717 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
718 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A
:
719 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B
:
720 ret
=ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s
);
721 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
722 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A
;
726 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A
:
727 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B
:
728 ret
=ssl3_send_cert_status(s
);
729 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
730 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A
;
736 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A
:
737 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B
:
739 s
->session
->cipher
=s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
;
740 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->setup_key_block(s
))
741 { ret
= -1; goto end
; }
743 ret
=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s
,
744 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A
,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B
);
746 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
747 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A
;
750 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
751 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE
))
759 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A
:
760 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B
:
761 ret
=ssl3_send_finished(s
,
762 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A
,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B
,
763 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->server_finished_label
,
764 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->server_finished_label_len
);
765 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
766 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH
;
769 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
770 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
;
772 if (s
->s3
->next_proto_neg_seen
)
773 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A
;
775 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
;
779 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
=SSL_ST_OK
;
784 /* clean a few things up */
785 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s
);
787 BUF_MEM_free(s
->init_buf
);
790 /* remove buffering on output */
791 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s
);
795 if (s
->renegotiate
== 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
800 ssl_update_cache(s
,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER
);
802 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_accept_good
++;
804 s
->handshake_func
=ssl3_accept
;
806 if (cb
!= NULL
) cb(s
,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE
,1);
814 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT
,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE
);
820 if (!s
->s3
->tmp
.reuse_message
&& !skip
)
824 if ((ret
=BIO_flush(s
->wbio
)) <= 0)
829 if ((cb
!= NULL
) && (s
->state
!= state
))
833 cb(s
,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP
,1);
840 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
844 cb(s
,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT
,ret
);
848 int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL
*s
)
852 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A
)
854 p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
855 *(p
++)=SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST
;
860 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B
;
861 /* number of bytes to write */
866 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
867 return(ssl3_do_write(s
,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
));
870 int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL
*s
)
875 /* We only allow the client to restart the handshake once per
877 if (s
->s3
->flags
& SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE
)
879 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_MULTIPLE_SGC_RESTARTS
);
883 /* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message,
884 * so permit appropriate message length */
885 n
=s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
891 if (!ok
) return((int)n
);
892 s
->s3
->tmp
.reuse_message
= 1;
893 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
== SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO
)
895 /* Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake,
896 * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.) */
897 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
898 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
!= NULL
)
900 DH_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
);
901 s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
= NULL
;
904 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
905 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.ecdh
!= NULL
)
907 EC_KEY_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.ecdh
);
908 s
->s3
->tmp
.ecdh
= NULL
;
911 s
->s3
->flags
|= SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE
;
917 int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL
*s
)
919 int i
,j
,ok
,al
,ret
= -1;
920 unsigned int cookie_len
;
923 unsigned char *p
,*d
,*q
;
925 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
928 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *ciphers
=NULL
;
930 /* We do this so that we will respond with our native type.
931 * If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1,
932 * This down switching should be handled by a different method.
933 * If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with
936 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A
939 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B
;
942 n
=s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
943 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B
,
944 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C
,
945 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
946 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
,
949 if (!ok
) return((int)n
);
951 d
=p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
953 /* use version from inside client hello, not from record header
954 * (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */
955 s
->client_version
=(((int)p
[0])<<8)|(int)p
[1];
958 if ((s
->version
== DTLS1_VERSION
&& s
->client_version
> s
->version
) ||
959 (s
->version
!= DTLS1_VERSION
&& s
->client_version
< s
->version
))
961 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER
);
962 if ((s
->client_version
>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR
)
964 /* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
965 s
->version
= s
->client_version
;
967 al
= SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
971 /* If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't
972 * contain one, just return since we do not want to
973 * allocate any memory yet. So check cookie length...
975 if (SSL_get_options(s
) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE
)
977 unsigned int session_length
, cookie_length
;
979 session_length
= *(p
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
980 cookie_length
= *(p
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
+ session_length
+ 1);
982 if (cookie_length
== 0)
986 /* load the client random */
987 memcpy(s
->s3
->client_random
,p
,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
990 /* get the session-id */
994 /* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in renegotiation.
995 * 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally ignore resumption requests
996 * with flag SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
997 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on this for security
998 * won't even compile against older library versions).
1000 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to request
1001 * renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains unset): for servers,
1002 * this essentially just means that the SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1003 * setting will be ignored.
1005 if ((s
->new_session
&& (s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
)))
1007 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s
,1))
1012 i
=ssl_get_prev_session(s
, p
, j
, d
+ n
);
1014 { /* previous session */
1021 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s
,1))
1028 if (s
->version
== DTLS1_VERSION
|| s
->version
== DTLS1_BAD_VER
)
1031 cookie_len
= *(p
++);
1034 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
1035 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
1036 * does not cause an overflow.
1038 if ( cookie_len
> sizeof(s
->d1
->rcvd_cookie
))
1041 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1042 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH
);
1046 /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
1047 if ((SSL_get_options(s
) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE
) &&
1050 memcpy(s
->d1
->rcvd_cookie
, p
, cookie_len
);
1052 if ( s
->ctx
->app_verify_cookie_cb
!= NULL
)
1054 if ( s
->ctx
->app_verify_cookie_cb(s
, s
->d1
->rcvd_cookie
,
1057 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1058 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1059 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH
);
1062 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1064 else if ( memcmp(s
->d1
->rcvd_cookie
, s
->d1
->cookie
,
1065 s
->d1
->cookie_len
) != 0) /* default verification */
1067 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1068 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1069 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH
);
1080 if ((i
== 0) && (j
!= 0))
1082 /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */
1083 al
=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1084 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED
);
1089 /* not enough data */
1090 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1091 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1094 if ((i
> 0) && (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s
,p
,i
,&(ciphers
))
1101 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
1102 if ((s
->hit
) && (i
> 0))
1105 id
=s
->session
->cipher
->id
;
1108 printf("client sent %d ciphers\n",sk_num(ciphers
));
1110 for (i
=0; i
<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers
); i
++)
1112 c
=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers
,i
);
1114 printf("client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1115 i
,sk_num(ciphers
),SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c
));
1123 /* Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade
1124 * attack: CVE-2010-4180.
1127 if (j
== 0 && (s
->options
& SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG
) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers
) == 1))
1129 /* Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used cipher may
1130 * not be in the current list, the client instead might be trying to
1131 * continue using a cipher that before wasn't chosen due to server
1132 * preferences. We'll have to reject the connection if the cipher is not
1133 * enabled, though. */
1134 c
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers
, 0);
1135 if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s
), c
) >= 0)
1137 s
->session
->cipher
= c
;
1144 /* we need to have the cipher in the cipher
1145 * list if we are asked to reuse it */
1146 al
=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1147 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING
);
1156 /* not enough data */
1157 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1158 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1164 if (p
[j
] == 0) break;
1171 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1172 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED
);
1176 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1178 if (s
->version
>= SSL3_VERSION
)
1180 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s
,&p
,d
,n
, &al
))
1182 /* 'al' set by ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext */
1183 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT
);
1187 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(s
) <= 0) {
1188 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
);
1192 /* Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this
1193 * handshake for not reused session only. We need to generate
1194 * server_random before calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow
1195 * SessionTicket processing to use it in key derivation. */
1199 Time
=(unsigned long)time(NULL
); /* Time */
1200 pos
=s
->s3
->server_random
;
1202 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(pos
,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
-4) <= 0)
1204 al
=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1209 if (!s
->hit
&& s
->version
>= TLS1_VERSION
&& s
->tls_session_secret_cb
)
1211 SSL_CIPHER
*pref_cipher
=NULL
;
1213 s
->session
->master_key_length
=sizeof(s
->session
->master_key
);
1214 if(s
->tls_session_secret_cb(s
, s
->session
->master_key
, &s
->session
->master_key_length
,
1215 ciphers
, &pref_cipher
, s
->tls_session_secret_cb_arg
))
1218 s
->session
->ciphers
=ciphers
;
1219 s
->session
->verify_result
=X509_V_OK
;
1223 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1224 pref_cipher
=pref_cipher
? pref_cipher
: ssl3_choose_cipher(s
, s
->session
->ciphers
, SSL_get_ciphers(s
));
1225 if (pref_cipher
== NULL
)
1227 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1228 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER
);
1232 s
->session
->cipher
=pref_cipher
;
1235 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s
->cipher_list
);
1237 if (s
->cipher_list_by_id
)
1238 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s
->cipher_list_by_id
);
1240 s
->cipher_list
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s
->session
->ciphers
);
1241 s
->cipher_list_by_id
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s
->session
->ciphers
);
1246 /* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1247 * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
1248 * algorithms from the client, starting at q. */
1249 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
=NULL
;
1250 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1251 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1252 if (s
->session
->compress_meth
!= 0)
1254 int m
, comp_id
= s
->session
->compress_meth
;
1255 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1256 /* Can't disable compression */
1257 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION
)
1259 al
=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1260 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION
);
1263 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1264 for (m
= 0; m
< sk_SSL_COMP_num(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
); m
++)
1266 comp
=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
,m
);
1267 if (comp_id
== comp
->id
)
1269 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
=comp
;
1273 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
== NULL
)
1275 al
=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1276 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM
);
1279 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1280 for (m
= 0; m
< i
; m
++)
1282 if (q
[m
] == comp_id
)
1287 al
=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1288 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING
);
1294 else if (!(s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION
) && s
->ctx
->comp_methods
)
1295 { /* See if we have a match */
1296 int m
,nn
,o
,v
,done
=0;
1298 nn
=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
);
1299 for (m
=0; m
<nn
; m
++)
1301 comp
=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
,m
);
1314 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
=comp
;
1319 /* If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1320 * using compression.
1322 if (s
->session
->compress_meth
!= 0)
1324 al
=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1325 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION
);
1330 /* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must
1335 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1336 s
->session
->compress_meth
=0;
1338 s
->session
->compress_meth
=(comp
== NULL
)?0:comp
->id
;
1340 if (s
->session
->ciphers
!= NULL
)
1341 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s
->session
->ciphers
);
1342 s
->session
->ciphers
=ciphers
;
1343 if (ciphers
== NULL
)
1345 al
=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1346 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED
);
1350 c
=ssl3_choose_cipher(s
,s
->session
->ciphers
,
1351 SSL_get_ciphers(s
));
1355 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1356 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER
);
1359 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
=c
;
1360 /* check whether we should disable session resumption */
1361 if (s
->not_resumable_session_cb
!= NULL
)
1362 s
->session
->not_resumable
=s
->not_resumable_session_cb(s
,
1363 ((c
->algorithm_mkey
& (SSL_kEDH
| SSL_kEECDH
)) != 0));
1364 if (s
->session
->not_resumable
)
1365 /* do not send a session ticket */
1366 s
->tlsext_ticket_expected
= 0;
1370 /* Session-id reuse */
1371 #ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
1372 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *sk
;
1373 SSL_CIPHER
*nc
=NULL
;
1374 SSL_CIPHER
*ec
=NULL
;
1376 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG
)
1378 sk
=s
->session
->ciphers
;
1379 for (i
=0; i
<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk
); i
++)
1381 c
=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk
,i
);
1382 if (c
->algorithm_enc
& SSL_eNULL
)
1384 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c
))
1388 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
=nc
;
1389 else if (ec
!= NULL
)
1390 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
=ec
;
1392 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
=s
->session
->cipher
;
1396 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
=s
->session
->cipher
;
1399 if (TLS1_get_version(s
) < TLS1_2_VERSION
|| !(s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
))
1401 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
))
1405 /* we now have the following setup.
1407 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
1408 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
1409 * compression - basically ignored right now
1410 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1411 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1412 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1413 * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
1420 ssl3_send_alert(s
,SSL3_AL_FATAL
,al
);
1423 if (ciphers
!= NULL
) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers
);
1427 int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL
*s
)
1430 unsigned char *p
,*d
;
1433 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1437 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A
)
1439 buf
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
1440 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1441 p
=s
->s3
->server_random
;
1442 /* Generate server_random if it was not needed previously */
1443 Time
=(unsigned long)time(NULL
); /* Time */
1445 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p
,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
-4) <= 0)
1448 /* Do the message type and length last */
1451 *(p
++)=s
->version
>>8;
1452 *(p
++)=s
->version
&0xff;
1455 memcpy(p
,s
->s3
->server_random
,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
1456 p
+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
;
1458 /* There are several cases for the session ID to send
1459 * back in the server hello:
1460 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
1461 * we send back the old session ID.
1462 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
1463 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
1464 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
1465 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
1467 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
1468 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
1469 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
1470 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
1473 if (s
->session
->not_resumable
||
1474 (!(s
->ctx
->session_cache_mode
& SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER
)
1476 s
->session
->session_id_length
=0;
1478 sl
=s
->session
->session_id_length
;
1479 if (sl
> (int)sizeof(s
->session
->session_id
))
1481 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1485 memcpy(p
,s
->session
->session_id
,sl
);
1488 /* put the cipher */
1489 i
=ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
,p
);
1492 /* put the compression method */
1493 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1496 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
== NULL
)
1499 *(p
++)=s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
->id
;
1501 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1502 if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s
) <= 0)
1504 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO
,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT
);
1507 if ((p
= ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s
, p
, buf
+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
)) == NULL
)
1509 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO
,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1516 *(d
++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO
;
1519 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B
;
1520 /* number of bytes to write */
1525 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
1526 return(ssl3_do_write(s
,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
));
1529 int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL
*s
)
1533 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A
)
1535 p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
1538 *(p
++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE
;
1543 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B
;
1544 /* number of bytes to write */
1549 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
1550 return(ssl3_do_write(s
,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
));
1553 int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL
*s
)
1555 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1559 unsigned char md_buf
[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
];
1562 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1565 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1566 EC_KEY
*ecdh
=NULL
, *ecdhp
;
1567 unsigned char *encodedPoint
= NULL
;
1570 BN_CTX
*bn_ctx
= NULL
;
1573 const EVP_MD
*md
= NULL
;
1574 unsigned char *p
,*d
;
1584 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx
);
1585 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A
)
1587 type
=s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
1592 r
[0]=r
[1]=r
[2]=r
[3]=NULL
;
1594 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1595 if (type
& SSL_kRSA
)
1598 if ((rsa
== NULL
) && (s
->cert
->rsa_tmp_cb
!= NULL
))
1600 rsa
=s
->cert
->rsa_tmp_cb(s
,
1601 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
),
1602 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
));
1605 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1606 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY
);
1614 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1615 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY
);
1620 s
->s3
->tmp
.use_rsa_tmp
=1;
1624 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1625 if (type
& SSL_kEDH
)
1628 if ((dhp
== NULL
) && (s
->cert
->dh_tmp_cb
!= NULL
))
1629 dhp
=s
->cert
->dh_tmp_cb(s
,
1630 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
),
1631 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
));
1634 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1635 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY
);
1639 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
!= NULL
)
1641 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1645 if ((dh
=DHparams_dup(dhp
)) == NULL
)
1647 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_DH_LIB
);
1652 if ((dhp
->pub_key
== NULL
||
1653 dhp
->priv_key
== NULL
||
1654 (s
->options
& SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE
)))
1656 if(!DH_generate_key(dh
))
1658 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1665 dh
->pub_key
=BN_dup(dhp
->pub_key
);
1666 dh
->priv_key
=BN_dup(dhp
->priv_key
);
1667 if ((dh
->pub_key
== NULL
) ||
1668 (dh
->priv_key
== NULL
))
1670 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_DH_LIB
);
1680 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1681 if (type
& SSL_kEECDH
)
1683 const EC_GROUP
*group
;
1685 ecdhp
=cert
->ecdh_tmp
;
1686 if ((ecdhp
== NULL
) && (s
->cert
->ecdh_tmp_cb
!= NULL
))
1688 ecdhp
=s
->cert
->ecdh_tmp_cb(s
,
1689 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
),
1690 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
));
1694 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1695 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY
);
1699 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.ecdh
!= NULL
)
1701 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1705 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
1708 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB
);
1711 if ((ecdh
= EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp
)) == NULL
)
1713 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB
);
1717 s
->s3
->tmp
.ecdh
=ecdh
;
1718 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh
) == NULL
) ||
1719 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh
) == NULL
) ||
1720 (s
->options
& SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE
))
1722 if(!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh
))
1724 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB
);
1729 if (((group
= EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh
)) == NULL
) ||
1730 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh
) == NULL
) ||
1731 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh
) == NULL
))
1733 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB
);
1737 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
) &&
1738 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group
) > 163))
1740 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER
);
1744 /* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH
1745 * keys over named (not generic) curves. For
1746 * supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero.
1749 tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group
)))
1752 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE
);
1756 /* Encode the public key.
1757 * First check the size of encoding and
1758 * allocate memory accordingly.
1760 encodedlen
= EC_POINT_point2oct(group
,
1761 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh
),
1762 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED
,
1765 encodedPoint
= (unsigned char *)
1766 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen
*sizeof(unsigned char));
1767 bn_ctx
= BN_CTX_new();
1768 if ((encodedPoint
== NULL
) || (bn_ctx
== NULL
))
1770 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1775 encodedlen
= EC_POINT_point2oct(group
,
1776 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh
),
1777 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED
,
1778 encodedPoint
, encodedlen
, bn_ctx
);
1780 if (encodedlen
== 0)
1782 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB
);
1786 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx
); bn_ctx
=NULL
;
1788 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not
1789 * generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges.
1790 * In this situation, we need four additional bytes
1791 * to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
1796 /* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message
1797 * explicitly so we can set these to NULLs
1805 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
1806 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1807 if (type
& SSL_kPSK
)
1809 /* reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint*/
1810 n
+=2+strlen(s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
);
1813 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1814 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1815 if (type
& SSL_kSRP
)
1817 if ((s
->srp_ctx
.N
== NULL
) ||
1818 (s
->srp_ctx
.g
== NULL
) ||
1819 (s
->srp_ctx
.s
== NULL
) ||
1820 (s
->srp_ctx
.B
== NULL
))
1822 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM
);
1833 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1834 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE
);
1837 for (i
=0; r
[i
] != NULL
&& i
<4; i
++)
1839 nr
[i
]=BN_num_bytes(r
[i
]);
1840 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1841 if ((i
== 2) && (type
& SSL_kSRP
))
1848 if (!(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aNULL
)
1849 && !(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kPSK
))
1851 if ((pkey
=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s
,s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
,&md
))
1854 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1857 kn
=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey
);
1865 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf
,n
+4+kn
))
1867 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_LIB_BUF
);
1870 d
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
1873 for (i
=0; r
[i
] != NULL
&& i
<4; i
++)
1875 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1876 if ((i
== 2) && (type
& SSL_kSRP
))
1888 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1889 if (type
& SSL_kEECDH
)
1891 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves.
1892 * In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has:
1893 * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
1894 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by
1895 * the actual encoded point itself
1897 *p
= NAMED_CURVE_TYPE
;
1905 memcpy((unsigned char*)p
,
1906 (unsigned char *)encodedPoint
,
1908 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint
);
1909 encodedPoint
= NULL
;
1914 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1915 if (type
& SSL_kPSK
)
1917 /* copy PSK identity hint */
1918 s2n(strlen(s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
), p
);
1919 strncpy((char *)p
, s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
, strlen(s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
));
1920 p
+=strlen(s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
);
1927 /* n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4])
1928 * and p points to the space at the end. */
1929 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1930 if (pkey
->type
== EVP_PKEY_RSA
1931 && TLS1_get_version(s
) < TLS1_2_VERSION
)
1935 for (num
=2; num
> 0; num
--)
1937 EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx
,
1938 EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW
);
1939 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx
,(num
== 2)
1940 ?s
->ctx
->md5
:s
->ctx
->sha1
, NULL
);
1941 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx
,&(s
->s3
->client_random
[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
1942 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx
,&(s
->s3
->server_random
[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
1943 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx
,&(d
[4]),n
);
1944 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx
,q
,
1945 (unsigned int *)&i
);
1949 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1
, md_buf
, j
,
1950 &(p
[2]), &u
, pkey
->pkey
.rsa
) <= 0)
1952 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_LIB_RSA
);
1962 /* For TLS1.2 and later send signature
1964 if (TLS1_get_version(s
) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
)
1966 if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p
, pkey
, md
))
1968 /* Should never happen */
1969 al
=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1970 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1976 fprintf(stderr
, "Using hash %s\n",
1979 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx
, md
, NULL
);
1980 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx
,&(s
->s3
->client_random
[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
1981 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx
,&(s
->s3
->server_random
[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
1982 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx
,&(d
[4]),n
);
1983 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx
,&(p
[2]),
1984 (unsigned int *)&i
,pkey
))
1986 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_LIB_EVP
);
1991 if (TLS1_get_version(s
) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
)
1996 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
1997 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1998 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE
);
2003 *(d
++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
;
2006 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
2012 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B
;
2013 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx
);
2014 return(ssl3_do_write(s
,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
));
2016 ssl3_send_alert(s
,SSL3_AL_FATAL
,al
);
2018 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2019 if (encodedPoint
!= NULL
) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint
);
2020 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx
);
2022 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx
);
2026 int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL
*s
)
2028 unsigned char *p
,*d
;
2030 STACK_OF(X509_NAME
) *sk
=NULL
;
2034 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A
)
2038 d
=p
=(unsigned char *)&(buf
->data
[4]);
2040 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
2042 n
=ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s
,p
);
2047 if (TLS1_get_version(s
) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
)
2049 nl
= tls12_get_req_sig_algs(s
, p
+ 2);
2059 sk
=SSL_get_client_CA_list(s
);
2063 for (i
=0; i
<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk
); i
++)
2065 name
=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk
,i
);
2066 j
=i2d_X509_NAME(name
,NULL
);
2067 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf
,4+n
+j
+2))
2069 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,ERR_R_BUF_LIB
);
2072 p
=(unsigned char *)&(buf
->data
[4+n
]);
2073 if (!(s
->options
& SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG
))
2076 i2d_X509_NAME(name
,&p
);
2083 i2d_X509_NAME(name
,&p
);
2084 j
-=2; s2n(j
,d
); j
+=2;
2090 /* else no CA names */
2091 p
=(unsigned char *)&(buf
->data
[4+off
]);
2094 d
=(unsigned char *)buf
->data
;
2095 *(d
++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
;
2098 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
2103 #ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
2104 p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
+ s
->init_num
;
2107 *(p
++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE
;
2114 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B
;
2117 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
2118 return(ssl3_do_write(s
,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
));
2123 int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL
*s
)
2127 unsigned long alg_k
;
2129 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2131 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
=NULL
;
2133 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2137 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2139 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2141 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2142 EC_KEY
*srvr_ecdh
= NULL
;
2143 EVP_PKEY
*clnt_pub_pkey
= NULL
;
2144 EC_POINT
*clnt_ecpoint
= NULL
;
2145 BN_CTX
*bn_ctx
= NULL
;
2148 n
=s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
2149 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A
,
2150 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B
,
2151 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2155 if (!ok
) return((int)n
);
2156 p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
2158 alg_k
=s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
2160 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2161 if (alg_k
& SSL_kRSA
)
2163 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
2164 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.use_rsa_tmp
)
2166 if ((s
->cert
!= NULL
) && (s
->cert
->rsa_tmp
!= NULL
))
2167 rsa
=s
->cert
->rsa_tmp
;
2168 /* Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should
2169 * be sent already */
2172 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2173 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY
);
2180 pkey
=s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
].privatekey
;
2181 if ( (pkey
== NULL
) ||
2182 (pkey
->type
!= EVP_PKEY_RSA
) ||
2183 (pkey
->pkey
.rsa
== NULL
))
2185 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2186 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE
);
2192 /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */
2193 if (s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
&& s
->version
!= DTLS1_BAD_VER
)
2198 if (!(s
->options
& SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG
))
2200 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG
);
2210 i
=RSA_private_decrypt((int)n
,p
,p
,rsa
,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING
);
2214 if (i
!= SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
)
2216 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2217 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); */
2220 if ((al
== -1) && !((p
[0] == (s
->client_version
>>8)) && (p
[1] == (s
->client_version
& 0xff))))
2222 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2223 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2224 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2225 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
2226 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
2228 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. */
2229 if (!((s
->options
& SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG
) &&
2230 (p
[0] == (s
->version
>>8)) && (p
[1] == (s
->version
& 0xff))))
2232 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2233 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER); */
2235 /* The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2236 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version
2237 * number check as a "bad version oracle" -- an alert would
2238 * reveal that the plaintext corresponding to some ciphertext
2239 * made up by the adversary is properly formatted except
2240 * that the version number is wrong. To avoid such attacks,
2241 * we should treat this just like any other decryption error. */
2247 /* Some decryption failure -- use random value instead as countermeasure
2248 * against Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding
2249 * (see RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). */
2251 i
= SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
;
2252 p
[0] = s
->client_version
>> 8;
2253 p
[1] = s
->client_version
& 0xff;
2254 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p
+2, i
-2) <= 0) /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure */
2258 s
->session
->master_key_length
=
2259 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
2260 s
->session
->master_key
,
2262 OPENSSL_cleanse(p
,i
);
2266 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2267 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kEDH
|SSL_kDHr
|SSL_kDHd
))
2272 if (!(s
->options
& SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG
))
2274 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG
);
2284 if (n
== 0L) /* the parameters are in the cert */
2286 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2287 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_DH_CERTS
);
2292 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
== NULL
)
2294 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2295 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY
);
2299 dh_srvr
=s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
;
2302 pub
=BN_bin2bn(p
,i
,NULL
);
2305 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_BN_LIB
);
2309 i
=DH_compute_key(p
,pub
,dh_srvr
);
2313 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_DH_LIB
);
2317 DH_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
);
2322 s
->session
->master_key_length
=
2323 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
2324 s
->session
->master_key
,p
,i
);
2325 OPENSSL_cleanse(p
,i
);
2329 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2330 if (alg_k
& SSL_kKRB5
)
2332 krb5_error_code krb5rc
;
2333 krb5_data enc_ticket
;
2334 krb5_data authenticator
;
2336 KSSL_CTX
*kssl_ctx
= s
->kssl_ctx
;
2337 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx
;
2338 const EVP_CIPHER
*enc
= NULL
;
2339 unsigned char iv
[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH
];
2340 unsigned char pms
[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
2341 + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH
];
2343 krb5_timestamp authtime
= 0;
2344 krb5_ticket_times ttimes
;
2346 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx
);
2348 if (!kssl_ctx
) kssl_ctx
= kssl_ctx_new();
2351 enc_ticket
.length
= i
;
2353 if (n
< (long)(enc_ticket
.length
+ 6))
2355 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2356 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2360 enc_ticket
.data
= (char *)p
;
2361 p
+=enc_ticket
.length
;
2364 authenticator
.length
= i
;
2366 if (n
< (long)(enc_ticket
.length
+ authenticator
.length
+ 6))
2368 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2369 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2373 authenticator
.data
= (char *)p
;
2374 p
+=authenticator
.length
;
2378 enc_pms
.data
= (char *)p
;
2381 /* Note that the length is checked again below,
2384 if(enc_pms
.length
> sizeof pms
)
2386 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2387 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2391 if (n
!= (long)(enc_ticket
.length
+ authenticator
.length
+
2392 enc_pms
.length
+ 6))
2394 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2395 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2399 if ((krb5rc
= kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx
, &enc_ticket
, &ttimes
,
2403 printf("kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
2404 krb5rc
, kssl_err
.reason
);
2406 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err
.text
);
2407 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2408 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2413 /* Note: no authenticator is not considered an error,
2414 ** but will return authtime == 0.
2416 if ((krb5rc
= kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx
, &authenticator
,
2417 &authtime
, &kssl_err
)) != 0)
2420 printf("kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
2421 krb5rc
, kssl_err
.reason
);
2423 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err
.text
);
2424 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2425 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2430 if ((krb5rc
= kssl_validate_times(authtime
, &ttimes
)) != 0)
2432 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, krb5rc
);
2437 kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx
);
2438 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2440 enc
= kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx
->enctype
);
2444 memset(iv
, 0, sizeof iv
); /* per RFC 1510 */
2446 if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx
,enc
,NULL
,kssl_ctx
->key
,iv
))
2448 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2449 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
2452 if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx
, pms
,&outl
,
2453 (unsigned char *)enc_pms
.data
, enc_pms
.length
))
2455 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2456 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
2459 if (outl
> SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
)
2461 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2462 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2465 if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx
,&(pms
[outl
]),&padl
))
2467 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2468 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
2472 if (outl
> SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
)
2474 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2475 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2478 if (!((pms
[0] == (s
->client_version
>>8)) && (pms
[1] == (s
->client_version
& 0xff))))
2480 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2481 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2482 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2483 * However, buggy clients exist that send random bytes instead of
2484 * the protocol version.
2485 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients.
2486 * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos cipher)
2488 if (!(s
->options
& SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG
))
2490 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2491 SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
2496 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx
);
2498 s
->session
->master_key_length
=
2499 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
2500 s
->session
->master_key
, pms
, outl
);
2502 if (kssl_ctx
->client_princ
)
2504 size_t len
= strlen(kssl_ctx
->client_princ
);
2505 if ( len
< SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH
)
2507 s
->session
->krb5_client_princ_len
= len
;
2508 memcpy(s
->session
->krb5_client_princ
,kssl_ctx
->client_princ
,len
);
2513 /* Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
2514 ** but it caused problems for apache.
2515 ** kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
2516 ** if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
2520 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2522 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2523 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kEECDH
|SSL_kECDHr
|SSL_kECDHe
))
2528 const EC_GROUP
*group
;
2529 const BIGNUM
*priv_key
;
2531 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
2532 if ((srvr_ecdh
= EC_KEY_new()) == NULL
)
2534 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2535 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2539 /* Let's get server private key and group information */
2540 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kECDHr
|SSL_kECDHe
))
2542 /* use the certificate */
2543 tkey
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_ECC
].privatekey
->pkey
.ec
;
2547 /* use the ephermeral values we saved when
2548 * generating the ServerKeyExchange msg.
2550 tkey
= s
->s3
->tmp
.ecdh
;
2553 group
= EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey
);
2554 priv_key
= EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey
);
2556 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh
, group
) ||
2557 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh
, priv_key
))
2559 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2564 /* Let's get client's public key */
2565 if ((clnt_ecpoint
= EC_POINT_new(group
)) == NULL
)
2567 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2568 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2574 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
2576 if (alg_k
& SSL_kEECDH
)
2578 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2579 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY
);
2582 if (((clnt_pub_pkey
=X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
))
2584 (clnt_pub_pkey
->type
!= EVP_PKEY_EC
))
2586 /* XXX: For now, we do not support client
2587 * authentication using ECDH certificates
2588 * so this branch (n == 0L) of the code is
2589 * never executed. When that support is
2590 * added, we ought to ensure the key
2591 * received in the certificate is
2592 * authorized for key agreement.
2593 * ECDH_compute_key implicitly checks that
2594 * the two ECDH shares are for the same
2597 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2598 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2599 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS
);
2603 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint
,
2604 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey
->pkey
.ec
)) == 0)
2606 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2610 ret
= 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
2614 /* Get client's public key from encoded point
2615 * in the ClientKeyExchange message.
2617 if ((bn_ctx
= BN_CTX_new()) == NULL
)
2619 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2620 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2624 /* Get encoded point length */
2629 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2633 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group
,
2634 clnt_ecpoint
, p
, i
, bn_ctx
) == 0)
2636 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2640 /* p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer
2641 * currently, so set it to the start
2643 p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
2646 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
2647 field_size
= EC_GROUP_get_degree(group
);
2648 if (field_size
<= 0)
2650 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2654 i
= ECDH_compute_key(p
, (field_size
+7)/8, clnt_ecpoint
, srvr_ecdh
, NULL
);
2657 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2662 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey
);
2663 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint
);
2664 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh
);
2665 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx
);
2666 EC_KEY_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.ecdh
);
2667 s
->s3
->tmp
.ecdh
= NULL
;
2669 /* Compute the master secret */
2670 s
->session
->master_key_length
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
-> \
2671 generate_master_secret(s
, s
->session
->master_key
, p
, i
);
2673 OPENSSL_cleanse(p
, i
);
2678 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2679 if (alg_k
& SSL_kPSK
)
2681 unsigned char *t
= NULL
;
2682 unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms
[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
*2+4];
2683 unsigned int pre_ms_len
= 0, psk_len
= 0;
2685 char tmp_id
[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
+1];
2687 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2692 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2693 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2696 if (i
> PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
)
2698 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2699 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2702 if (s
->psk_server_callback
== NULL
)
2704 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2705 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB
);
2709 /* Create guaranteed NULL-terminated identity
2710 * string for the callback */
2711 memcpy(tmp_id
, p
, i
);
2712 memset(tmp_id
+i
, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
+1-i
);
2713 psk_len
= s
->psk_server_callback(s
, tmp_id
,
2714 psk_or_pre_ms
, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms
));
2715 OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_id
, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
+1);
2717 if (psk_len
> PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
)
2719 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2720 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2723 else if (psk_len
== 0)
2725 /* PSK related to the given identity not found */
2726 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2727 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND
);
2728 al
=SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY
;
2732 /* create PSK pre_master_secret */
2733 pre_ms_len
=2+psk_len
+2+psk_len
;
2735 memmove(psk_or_pre_ms
+psk_len
+4, psk_or_pre_ms
, psk_len
);
2737 memset(t
, 0, psk_len
);
2741 if (s
->session
->psk_identity
!= NULL
)
2742 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->psk_identity
);
2743 s
->session
->psk_identity
= BUF_strdup((char *)p
);
2744 if (s
->session
->psk_identity
== NULL
)
2746 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2747 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2751 if (s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
!= NULL
)
2752 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
);
2753 s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
= BUF_strdup(s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
);
2754 if (s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
!= NULL
&&
2755 s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
== NULL
)
2757 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2758 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2762 s
->session
->master_key_length
=
2763 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
2764 s
->session
->master_key
, psk_or_pre_ms
, pre_ms_len
);
2767 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms
, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms
));
2773 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2774 if (alg_k
& SSL_kSRP
)
2782 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2783 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH
);
2786 if (!(s
->srp_ctx
.A
=BN_bin2bn(p
,i
,NULL
)))
2788 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
2791 if (s
->session
->srp_username
!= NULL
)
2792 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->srp_username
);
2793 s
->session
->srp_username
= BUF_strdup(s
->srp_ctx
.login
);
2794 if (s
->session
->srp_username
== NULL
)
2796 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2797 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2801 if ((s
->session
->master_key_length
= SRP_generate_server_master_secret(s
,s
->session
->master_key
))<0)
2803 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2810 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
2811 if (alg_k
& SSL_kGOST
)
2814 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pkey_ctx
;
2815 EVP_PKEY
*client_pub_pkey
= NULL
, *pk
= NULL
;
2816 unsigned char premaster_secret
[32], *start
;
2817 size_t outlen
=32, inlen
;
2818 unsigned long alg_a
;
2820 /* Get our certificate private key*/
2821 alg_a
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
;
2822 if (alg_a
& SSL_aGOST94
)
2823 pk
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_GOST94
].privatekey
;
2824 else if (alg_a
& SSL_aGOST01
)
2825 pk
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_GOST01
].privatekey
;
2827 pkey_ctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk
,NULL
);
2828 EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx
);
2829 /* If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
2830 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
2831 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use
2832 * a client certificate for authorization only. */
2833 client_pub_pkey
= X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
2834 if (client_pub_pkey
)
2836 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx
, client_pub_pkey
) <= 0)
2839 /* Decrypt session key */
2840 if ((*p
!=( V_ASN1_SEQUENCE
| V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED
)))
2842 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
2850 else if (p
[1] < 0x80)
2857 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
2860 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx
,premaster_secret
,&outlen
,start
,inlen
) <=0)
2863 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
2866 /* Generate master secret */
2867 s
->session
->master_key_length
=
2868 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
2869 s
->session
->master_key
,premaster_secret
,32);
2870 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2871 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx
, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY
, 2, NULL
) > 0)
2876 EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey
);
2877 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx
);
2885 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2886 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2887 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE
);
2893 ssl3_send_alert(s
,SSL3_AL_FATAL
,al
);
2894 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_SRP)
2897 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2898 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey
);
2899 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint
);
2900 if (srvr_ecdh
!= NULL
)
2901 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh
);
2902 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx
);
2907 int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL
*s
)
2909 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
=NULL
;
2915 const EVP_MD
*md
= NULL
;
2917 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx
);
2919 n
=s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
2920 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A
,
2921 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B
,
2926 if (!ok
) return((int)n
);
2928 if (s
->session
->peer
!= NULL
)
2930 peer
=s
->session
->peer
;
2931 pkey
=X509_get_pubkey(peer
);
2932 type
=X509_certificate_type(peer
,pkey
);
2940 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
!= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY
)
2942 s
->s3
->tmp
.reuse_message
=1;
2943 if ((peer
!= NULL
) && (type
| EVP_PKT_SIGN
))
2945 al
=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
2946 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE
);
2955 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED
);
2956 al
=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
2960 if (!(type
& EVP_PKT_SIGN
))
2962 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE
);
2963 al
=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
2967 if (s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
)
2969 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY
);
2970 al
=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
2974 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
2975 p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
2976 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
2977 /* If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare
2978 * signature without length field */
2979 if (n
==64 && (pkey
->type
==NID_id_GostR3410_94
||
2980 pkey
->type
== NID_id_GostR3410_2001
) )
2986 if (TLS1_get_version(s
) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
)
2988 int sigalg
= tls12_get_sigid(pkey
);
2989 /* Should never happen */
2992 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2993 al
=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2996 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
2997 if (sigalg
!= (int)p
[1])
2999 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
3000 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
3003 md
= tls12_get_hash(p
[0]);
3006 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST
);
3007 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
3011 fprintf(stderr
, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md
));
3020 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3021 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
3025 j
=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey
);
3026 if ((i
> j
) || (n
> j
) || (n
<= 0))
3028 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE
);
3029 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
3033 if (TLS1_get_version(s
) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
)
3037 hdatalen
= BIO_get_mem_data(s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
, &hdata
);
3040 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3041 al
=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3045 fprintf(stderr
, "Using TLS 1.2 with client verify alg %s\n",
3048 if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&mctx
, md
, NULL
)
3049 || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(&mctx
, hdata
, hdatalen
))
3051 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
3052 al
=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3056 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&mctx
, p
, i
, pkey
) <= 0)
3058 al
=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
3059 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE
);
3064 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3065 if (pkey
->type
== EVP_PKEY_RSA
)
3067 i
=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1
, s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_verify_md
,
3068 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
, p
, i
,
3072 al
=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
3073 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT
);
3078 al
=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
3079 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE
);
3085 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3086 if (pkey
->type
== EVP_PKEY_DSA
)
3088 j
=DSA_verify(pkey
->save_type
,
3089 &(s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_verify_md
[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
]),
3090 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
,p
,i
,pkey
->pkey
.dsa
);
3094 al
=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
3095 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE
);
3101 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3102 if (pkey
->type
== EVP_PKEY_EC
)
3104 j
=ECDSA_verify(pkey
->save_type
,
3105 &(s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_verify_md
[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
]),
3106 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
,p
,i
,pkey
->pkey
.ec
);
3110 al
=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
3111 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,
3112 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE
);
3118 if (pkey
->type
== NID_id_GostR3410_94
|| pkey
->type
== NID_id_GostR3410_2001
)
3119 { unsigned char signature
[64];
3121 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey
,NULL
);
3122 EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx
);
3124 fprintf(stderr
,"GOST signature length is %d",i
);
3126 for (idx
=0;idx
<64;idx
++) {
3127 signature
[63-idx
]=p
[idx
];
3129 j
=EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx
,signature
,64,s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_verify_md
,32);
3130 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
3133 al
=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
3134 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,
3135 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE
);
3141 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3142 al
=SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE
;
3151 ssl3_send_alert(s
,SSL3_AL_FATAL
,al
);
3154 if (s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
)
3156 BIO_free(s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
);
3157 s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
= NULL
;
3158 s
->s3
->flags
&= ~TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE
;
3160 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx
);
3161 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey
);
3165 int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL
*s
)
3167 int i
,ok
,al
,ret
= -1;
3169 unsigned long l
,nc
,llen
,n
;
3170 const unsigned char *p
,*q
;
3172 STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
=NULL
;
3174 n
=s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
3181 if (!ok
) return((int)n
);
3183 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
== SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
)
3185 if ( (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
) &&
3186 (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT
))
3188 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE
);
3189 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
3192 /* If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list */
3193 if ((s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
) && s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
)
3195 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST
);
3196 al
=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
3199 s
->s3
->tmp
.reuse_message
=1;
3203 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
!= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
)
3205 al
=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
3206 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE
);
3209 p
=d
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
3211 if ((sk
=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL
)
3213 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3220 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
3221 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3224 for (nc
=0; nc
<llen
; )
3227 if ((l
+nc
+3) > llen
)
3229 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
3230 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3235 x
=d2i_X509(NULL
,&p
,l
);
3238 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB
);
3243 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
3244 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3247 if (!sk_X509_push(sk
,x
))
3249 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3256 if (sk_X509_num(sk
) <= 0)
3258 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3259 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
)
3261 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
3262 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED
);
3265 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3266 else if ((s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
) &&
3267 (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT
))
3269 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE
);
3270 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
3273 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
3274 if (s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
&& !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
))
3276 al
=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3282 i
=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s
,sk
);
3285 al
=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s
->verify_result
);
3286 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_RETURNED
);
3291 if (s
->session
->peer
!= NULL
) /* This should not be needed */
3292 X509_free(s
->session
->peer
);
3293 s
->session
->peer
=sk_X509_shift(sk
);
3294 s
->session
->verify_result
= s
->verify_result
;
3296 /* With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL
3297 * when we arrive here. */
3298 if (s
->session
->sess_cert
== NULL
)
3300 s
->session
->sess_cert
= ssl_sess_cert_new();
3301 if (s
->session
->sess_cert
== NULL
)
3303 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3307 if (s
->session
->sess_cert
->cert_chain
!= NULL
)
3308 sk_X509_pop_free(s
->session
->sess_cert
->cert_chain
, X509_free
);
3309 s
->session
->sess_cert
->cert_chain
=sk
;
3310 /* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the
3311 * peer's own certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c */
3319 ssl3_send_alert(s
,SSL3_AL_FATAL
,al
);
3322 if (x
!= NULL
) X509_free(x
);
3323 if (sk
!= NULL
) sk_X509_pop_free(sk
,X509_free
);
3327 int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL
*s
)
3332 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A
)
3334 x
=ssl_get_server_send_cert(s
);
3337 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
3338 if ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
!= SSL_aKRB5
) ||
3339 (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kKRB5
))
3341 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3346 l
=ssl3_output_cert_chain(s
,x
);
3347 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B
;
3352 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
3353 return(ssl3_do_write(s
,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
));
3356 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
3357 /* send a new session ticket (not necessarily for a new session) */
3358 int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL
*s
)
3360 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A
)
3362 unsigned char *p
, *senc
, *macstart
;
3363 const unsigned char *const_p
;
3364 int len
, slen_full
, slen
;
3369 SSL_CTX
*tctx
= s
->initial_ctx
;
3370 unsigned char iv
[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH
];
3371 unsigned char key_name
[16];
3373 /* get session encoding length */
3374 slen_full
= i2d_SSL_SESSION(s
->session
, NULL
);
3375 /* Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is
3378 if (slen_full
> 0xFF00)
3380 senc
= OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full
);
3384 i2d_SSL_SESSION(s
->session
, &p
);
3386 /* create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up */
3388 sess
= d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL
, &const_p
, slen_full
);
3394 sess
->session_id_length
= 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
3396 slen
= i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess
, NULL
);
3397 if (slen
> slen_full
) /* shouldn't ever happen */
3403 i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess
, &p
);
3404 SSL_SESSION_free(sess
);
3406 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3407 * follows 1 (size of message name) + 3 (message length
3408 * bytes) + 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
3409 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
3410 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
3411 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
3413 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s
->init_buf
,
3414 26 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH
+ EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH
+
3415 EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
+ slen
))
3418 p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
3420 *(p
++)=SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET
;
3421 /* Skip message length for now */
3423 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx
);
3424 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx
);
3425 /* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present
3426 * it does all the work otherwise use generated values
3429 if (tctx
->tlsext_ticket_key_cb
)
3431 if (tctx
->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s
, key_name
, iv
, &ctx
,
3440 RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv
, 16);
3441 EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx
, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL
,
3442 tctx
->tlsext_tick_aes_key
, iv
);
3443 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx
, tctx
->tlsext_tick_hmac_key
, 16,
3444 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL
);
3445 memcpy(key_name
, tctx
->tlsext_tick_key_name
, 16);
3448 /* Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only):
3449 * We leave this unspecified for resumed session (for simplicity),
3450 * and guess that tickets for new sessions will live as long
3451 * as their sessions. */
3452 l2n(s
->hit
? 0 : s
->session
->timeout
, p
);
3454 /* Skip ticket length for now */
3456 /* Output key name */
3458 memcpy(p
, key_name
, 16);
3461 memcpy(p
, iv
, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx
));
3462 p
+= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx
);
3463 /* Encrypt session data */
3464 EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx
, p
, &len
, senc
, slen
);
3466 EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx
, p
, &len
);
3468 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx
);
3470 HMAC_Update(&hctx
, macstart
, p
- macstart
);
3471 HMAC_Final(&hctx
, p
, &hlen
);
3472 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx
);
3475 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
3477 len
= p
- (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
3478 p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
+ 1;
3479 l2n3(len
- 4, p
); /* Message length */
3481 s2n(len
- 10, p
); /* Ticket length */
3483 /* number of bytes to write */
3485 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B
;
3490 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
3491 return(ssl3_do_write(s
,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
));
3494 int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL
*s
)
3496 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A
)
3499 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3500 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
3501 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
3504 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s
->init_buf
, 8 + s
->tlsext_ocsp_resplen
))
3507 p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
3510 *(p
++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS
;
3511 /* message length */
3512 l2n3(s
->tlsext_ocsp_resplen
+ 4, p
);
3514 *(p
++)= s
->tlsext_status_type
;
3515 /* length of OCSP response */
3516 l2n3(s
->tlsext_ocsp_resplen
, p
);
3517 /* actual response */
3518 memcpy(p
, s
->tlsext_ocsp_resp
, s
->tlsext_ocsp_resplen
);
3519 /* number of bytes to write */
3520 s
->init_num
= 8 + s
->tlsext_ocsp_resplen
;
3521 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B
;
3525 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
3526 return(ssl3_do_write(s
,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
));
3529 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NPN
3530 /* ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message. It
3531 * sets the next_proto member in s if found */
3532 int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL
*s
)
3535 int proto_len
, padding_len
;
3537 const unsigned char *p
;
3539 /* Clients cannot send a NextProtocol message if we didn't see the
3540 * extension in their ClientHello */
3541 if (!s
->s3
->next_proto_neg_seen
)
3543 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO
,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION
);
3547 n
=s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
3548 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A
,
3549 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B
,
3551 514, /* See the payload format below */
3557 /* s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received
3558 * in this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset
3559 * by ssl3_get_finished). */
3560 if (!s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
)
3562 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO
,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS
);
3567 return 0; /* The body must be > 1 bytes long */
3569 p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
3571 /* The payload looks like:
3573 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
3574 * uint8 padding_len;
3575 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
3578 if (proto_len
+ 2 > s
->init_num
)
3580 padding_len
= p
[proto_len
+ 1];
3581 if (proto_len
+ padding_len
+ 2 != s
->init_num
)
3584 s
->next_proto_negotiated
= OPENSSL_malloc(proto_len
);
3585 if (!s
->next_proto_negotiated
)
3587 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO
,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3590 memcpy(s
->next_proto_negotiated
, p
+ 1, proto_len
);
3591 s
->next_proto_negotiated_len
= proto_len
;