1 /* ssl/s3_srvr.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
124 /* ====================================================================
125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
142 * to make use of the Contribution.
144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
151 #define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
152 #define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
155 #include "ssl_locl.h"
156 #include "kssl_lcl.h"
157 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
158 #include <openssl/rand.h>
159 #include <openssl/objects.h>
160 #include <openssl/evp.h>
161 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
162 #include <openssl/x509.h>
163 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
164 #include <openssl/dh.h>
166 #include <openssl/bn.h>
167 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
168 #include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
170 #include <openssl/md5.h>
172 static const SSL_METHOD
*ssl3_get_server_method(int ver
);
174 static const SSL_METHOD
*ssl3_get_server_method(int ver
)
176 if (ver
== SSL3_VERSION
)
177 return(SSLv3_server_method());
182 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
183 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL
*s
, int *al
)
185 int ret
= SSL_ERROR_NONE
;
187 *al
= SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME
;
189 if ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kSRP
) &&
190 (s
->srp_ctx
.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback
!= NULL
))
192 if(s
->srp_ctx
.login
== NULL
)
194 /* RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject,
195 we do so if There is no srp login name */
197 *al
= SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY
;
201 ret
= SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s
,al
);
208 IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method
,
210 ssl_undefined_function
,
211 ssl3_get_server_method
)
213 int ssl3_accept(SSL
*s
)
216 unsigned long alg_k
,Time
=(unsigned long)time(NULL
);
217 void (*cb
)(const SSL
*ssl
,int type
,int val
)=NULL
;
219 int new_state
,state
,skip
=0;
221 RAND_add(&Time
,sizeof(Time
),0);
225 if (s
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
227 else if (s
->ctx
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
228 cb
=s
->ctx
->info_callback
;
230 /* init things to blank */
232 if (!SSL_in_init(s
) || SSL_in_before(s
)) SSL_clear(s
);
236 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT
,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET
);
240 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
241 /* If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we
242 * already got and don't await it anymore, because
243 * Heartbeats don't make sense during handshakes anyway.
245 if (s
->tlsext_hb_pending
)
247 s
->tlsext_hb_pending
= 0;
258 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE
:
260 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
264 case SSL_ST_BEFORE
|SSL_ST_ACCEPT
:
265 case SSL_ST_OK
|SSL_ST_ACCEPT
:
268 if (cb
!= NULL
) cb(s
,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START
,1);
270 if ((s
->version
>>8) != 3)
272 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
275 s
->type
=SSL_ST_ACCEPT
;
277 if (s
->init_buf
== NULL
)
279 if ((buf
=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL
)
284 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf
,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
))
292 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s
))
299 s
->s3
->flags
&= ~SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE
;
300 s
->s3
->flags
&= ~TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY
;
302 if (s
->state
!= SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE
)
304 /* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that
305 * the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
307 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s
,1)) { ret
= -1; goto end
; }
309 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s
);
310 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A
;
311 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_accept
++;
313 else if (!s
->s3
->send_connection_binding
&&
314 !(s
->options
& SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION
))
316 /* Server attempting to renegotiate with
317 * client that doesn't support secure
320 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT
, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED
);
321 ssl3_send_alert(s
,SSL3_AL_FATAL
,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
327 /* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE,
328 * we will just send a HelloRequest */
329 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_accept_renegotiate
++;
330 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A
;
334 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A
:
335 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B
:
338 ret
=ssl3_send_hello_request(s
);
339 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
340 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C
;
341 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH
;
344 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s
);
347 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C
:
351 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A
:
352 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B
:
353 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C
:
355 if (s
->rwstate
!= SSL_X509_LOOKUP
)
357 ret
=ssl3_get_client_hello(s
);
358 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
360 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
363 if ((ret
= ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s
,&al
)) < 0)
365 /* callback indicates firther work to be done */
366 s
->rwstate
=SSL_X509_LOOKUP
;
369 if (ret
!= SSL_ERROR_NONE
)
371 ssl3_send_alert(s
,SSL3_AL_FATAL
,al
);
372 /* This is not really an error but the only means to
373 for a client to detect whether srp is supported. */
374 if (al
!= TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY
)
375 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT
,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
);
376 ret
= SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL
;
384 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A
;
388 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A
:
389 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B
:
390 ret
=ssl3_send_server_hello(s
);
391 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
392 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
395 if (s
->tlsext_ticket_expected
)
396 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A
;
398 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A
;
402 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A
;
405 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
406 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA_A
;
408 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A
;
413 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
414 case SSL3_ST_SW_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA_A
:
415 case SSL3_ST_SW_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA_B
:
416 /* We promised to send an audit proof in the hello. */
417 if (s
->s3
->tlsext_authz_promised_to_client
)
419 ret
= tls1_send_server_supplemental_data(s
);
420 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
425 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A
;
430 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A
:
431 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B
:
432 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
433 /* normal PSK or KRB5 or SRP */
434 if (!(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aNULL
)
435 && !(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kPSK
)
436 && !(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aKRB5
))
438 ret
=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s
);
439 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
440 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
441 if (s
->tlsext_status_expected
)
442 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A
;
444 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A
;
449 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A
;
456 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A
;
461 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A
:
462 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B
:
463 alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
465 /* clear this, it may get reset by
466 * send_server_key_exchange */
467 if ((s
->options
& SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA
)
468 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
469 && !(alg_k
& SSL_kKRB5
)
470 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
472 /* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key
473 * even when forbidden by protocol specs
474 * (handshake may fail as clients are not required to
475 * be able to handle this) */
476 s
->s3
->tmp
.use_rsa_tmp
=1;
478 s
->s3
->tmp
.use_rsa_tmp
=0;
481 /* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or
482 * RSA but we have a sign only certificate
484 * PSK: may send PSK identity hints
486 * For ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange
487 * message only if the cipher suite is either
488 * ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, the
489 * server certificate contains the server's
490 * public key for key exchange.
492 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.use_rsa_tmp
493 /* PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity
494 * hint if provided */
495 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
496 || ((alg_k
& SSL_kPSK
) && s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
)
498 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
499 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
500 || (alg_k
& SSL_kSRP
)
502 || (alg_k
& SSL_kEDH
)
503 || (alg_k
& SSL_kEECDH
)
504 || ((alg_k
& SSL_kRSA
)
505 && (s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
].privatekey
== NULL
506 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
)
507 && EVP_PKEY_size(s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
].privatekey
)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
)
513 ret
=ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s
);
514 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
519 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A
;
523 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A
:
524 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B
:
525 if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
526 !(s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
) ||
527 /* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set,
528 * don't request cert during re-negotiation: */
529 ((s
->session
->peer
!= NULL
) &&
530 (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE
)) ||
531 /* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites
532 * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts
533 * and in RFC 2246): */
534 ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aNULL
) &&
535 /* ... except when the application insists on verification
536 * (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */
537 !(s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT
)) ||
538 /* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */
539 (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aKRB5
)
540 /* With normal PSK Certificates and
541 * Certificate Requests are omitted */
542 || (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kPSK
))
544 /* no cert request */
546 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
=0;
547 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A
;
548 if (s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
)
549 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
))
554 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
=1;
555 ret
=ssl3_send_certificate_request(s
);
556 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
557 #ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
558 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A
;
560 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH
;
561 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A
;
567 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A
:
568 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B
:
569 ret
=ssl3_send_server_done(s
);
570 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
571 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A
;
572 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH
;
576 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH
:
578 /* This code originally checked to see if
579 * any data was pending using BIO_CTRL_INFO
580 * and then flushed. This caused problems
581 * as documented in PR#1939. The proposed
582 * fix doesn't completely resolve this issue
583 * as buggy implementations of BIO_CTRL_PENDING
584 * still exist. So instead we just flush
588 s
->rwstate
=SSL_WRITING
;
589 if (BIO_flush(s
->wbio
) <= 0)
594 s
->rwstate
=SSL_NOTHING
;
596 s
->state
=s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
;
599 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A
:
600 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B
:
601 /* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */
602 ret
= ssl3_check_client_hello(s
);
606 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C
;
608 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
)
610 ret
=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s
);
611 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
614 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A
;
618 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A
:
619 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B
:
620 ret
=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s
);
625 /* For the ECDH ciphersuites when
626 * the client sends its ECDH pub key in
627 * a certificate, the CertificateVerify
628 * message is not sent.
629 * Also for GOST ciphersuites when
630 * the client uses its key from the certificate
633 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
634 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
;
636 if (s
->s3
->next_proto_neg_seen
)
637 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A
;
639 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
;
643 else if (TLS1_get_version(s
) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
)
645 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A
;
647 if (!s
->session
->peer
)
649 /* For TLS v1.2 freeze the handshake buffer
650 * at this point and digest cached records.
652 if (!s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
)
654 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT
,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
657 s
->s3
->flags
|= TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE
;
658 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
))
666 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A
;
669 /* We need to get hashes here so if there is
670 * a client cert, it can be verified
671 * FIXME - digest processing for CertificateVerify
672 * should be generalized. But it is next step
674 if (s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
)
675 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
))
677 for (dgst_num
=0; dgst_num
<SSL_MAX_DIGEST
;dgst_num
++)
678 if (s
->s3
->handshake_dgst
[dgst_num
])
682 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->cert_verify_mac(s
,EVP_MD_CTX_type(s
->s3
->handshake_dgst
[dgst_num
]),&(s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_verify_md
[offset
]));
683 dgst_size
=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s
->s3
->handshake_dgst
[dgst_num
]);
694 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A
:
695 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B
:
697 /* we should decide if we expected this one */
698 ret
=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s
);
699 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
701 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
702 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
;
704 if (s
->s3
->next_proto_neg_seen
)
705 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A
;
707 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
;
712 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
713 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A
:
714 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B
:
715 ret
=ssl3_get_next_proto(s
);
716 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
718 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
;
722 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
:
723 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B
:
724 ret
=ssl3_get_finished(s
,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
,
725 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B
);
726 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
729 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
730 else if (s
->tlsext_ticket_expected
)
731 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A
;
734 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A
;
738 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
739 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A
:
740 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B
:
741 ret
=ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s
);
742 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
743 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A
;
747 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A
:
748 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B
:
749 ret
=ssl3_send_cert_status(s
);
750 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
751 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A
;
757 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A
:
758 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B
:
760 s
->session
->cipher
=s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
;
761 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->setup_key_block(s
))
762 { ret
= -1; goto end
; }
764 ret
=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s
,
765 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A
,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B
);
767 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
768 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A
;
771 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
772 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE
))
780 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A
:
781 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B
:
782 ret
=ssl3_send_finished(s
,
783 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A
,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B
,
784 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->server_finished_label
,
785 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->server_finished_label_len
);
786 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
787 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH
;
790 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
791 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
;
793 if (s
->s3
->next_proto_neg_seen
)
794 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A
;
796 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
;
800 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
=SSL_ST_OK
;
805 /* clean a few things up */
806 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s
);
808 BUF_MEM_free(s
->init_buf
);
811 /* remove buffering on output */
812 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s
);
816 if (s
->renegotiate
== 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
821 ssl_update_cache(s
,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER
);
823 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_accept_good
++;
825 s
->handshake_func
=ssl3_accept
;
827 if (cb
!= NULL
) cb(s
,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE
,1);
835 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT
,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE
);
841 if (!s
->s3
->tmp
.reuse_message
&& !skip
)
845 if ((ret
=BIO_flush(s
->wbio
)) <= 0)
850 if ((cb
!= NULL
) && (s
->state
!= state
))
854 cb(s
,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP
,1);
861 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
865 cb(s
,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT
,ret
);
869 int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL
*s
)
873 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A
)
875 p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
876 *(p
++)=SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST
;
881 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B
;
882 /* number of bytes to write */
887 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
888 return(ssl3_do_write(s
,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
));
891 int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL
*s
)
896 /* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message,
897 * so permit appropriate message length */
898 n
=s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
904 if (!ok
) return((int)n
);
905 s
->s3
->tmp
.reuse_message
= 1;
906 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
== SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO
)
908 /* We only allow the client to restart the handshake once per
910 if (s
->s3
->flags
& SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE
)
912 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_MULTIPLE_SGC_RESTARTS
);
915 /* Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake,
916 * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.) */
917 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
918 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
!= NULL
)
920 DH_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
);
921 s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
= NULL
;
924 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
925 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.ecdh
!= NULL
)
927 EC_KEY_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.ecdh
);
928 s
->s3
->tmp
.ecdh
= NULL
;
931 s
->s3
->flags
|= SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE
;
937 int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL
*s
)
939 int i
,j
,ok
,al
=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,ret
= -1;
940 unsigned int cookie_len
;
943 unsigned char *p
,*d
,*q
;
945 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
948 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *ciphers
=NULL
;
950 /* We do this so that we will respond with our native type.
951 * If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1,
952 * This down switching should be handled by a different method.
953 * If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with
956 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A
959 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B
;
962 n
=s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
963 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B
,
964 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C
,
965 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
966 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
,
969 if (!ok
) return((int)n
);
971 d
=p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
973 /* use version from inside client hello, not from record header
974 * (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */
975 s
->client_version
=(((int)p
[0])<<8)|(int)p
[1];
978 if ((s
->version
== DTLS1_VERSION
&& s
->client_version
> s
->version
) ||
979 (s
->version
!= DTLS1_VERSION
&& s
->client_version
< s
->version
))
981 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER
);
982 if ((s
->client_version
>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR
)
984 /* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
985 s
->version
= s
->client_version
;
987 al
= SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
991 /* If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't
992 * contain one, just return since we do not want to
993 * allocate any memory yet. So check cookie length...
995 if (SSL_get_options(s
) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE
)
997 unsigned int session_length
, cookie_length
;
999 session_length
= *(p
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
1000 cookie_length
= *(p
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
+ session_length
+ 1);
1002 if (cookie_length
== 0)
1006 /* load the client random */
1007 memcpy(s
->s3
->client_random
,p
,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
1008 p
+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
;
1010 /* get the session-id */
1014 /* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in renegotiation.
1015 * 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally ignore resumption requests
1016 * with flag SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
1017 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on this for security
1018 * won't even compile against older library versions).
1020 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to request
1021 * renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains unset): for servers,
1022 * this essentially just means that the SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1023 * setting will be ignored.
1025 if ((s
->new_session
&& (s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
)))
1027 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s
,1))
1032 i
=ssl_get_prev_session(s
, p
, j
, d
+ n
);
1034 { /* previous session */
1041 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s
,1))
1048 if (s
->version
== DTLS1_VERSION
|| s
->version
== DTLS1_BAD_VER
)
1051 cookie_len
= *(p
++);
1054 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
1055 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
1056 * does not cause an overflow.
1058 if ( cookie_len
> sizeof(s
->d1
->rcvd_cookie
))
1061 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1062 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH
);
1066 /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
1067 if ((SSL_get_options(s
) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE
) &&
1070 memcpy(s
->d1
->rcvd_cookie
, p
, cookie_len
);
1072 if ( s
->ctx
->app_verify_cookie_cb
!= NULL
)
1074 if ( s
->ctx
->app_verify_cookie_cb(s
, s
->d1
->rcvd_cookie
,
1077 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1078 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1079 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH
);
1082 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1084 else if ( memcmp(s
->d1
->rcvd_cookie
, s
->d1
->cookie
,
1085 s
->d1
->cookie_len
) != 0) /* default verification */
1087 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1088 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1089 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH
);
1100 if ((i
== 0) && (j
!= 0))
1102 /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */
1103 al
=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1104 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED
);
1109 /* not enough data */
1110 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1111 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1114 if ((i
> 0) && (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s
,p
,i
,&(ciphers
))
1121 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
1122 if ((s
->hit
) && (i
> 0))
1125 id
=s
->session
->cipher
->id
;
1128 printf("client sent %d ciphers\n",sk_num(ciphers
));
1130 for (i
=0; i
<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers
); i
++)
1132 c
=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers
,i
);
1134 printf("client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1135 i
,sk_num(ciphers
),SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c
));
1143 /* Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade
1144 * attack: CVE-2010-4180.
1147 if (j
== 0 && (s
->options
& SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG
) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers
) == 1))
1149 /* Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used cipher may
1150 * not be in the current list, the client instead might be trying to
1151 * continue using a cipher that before wasn't chosen due to server
1152 * preferences. We'll have to reject the connection if the cipher is not
1153 * enabled, though. */
1154 c
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers
, 0);
1155 if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s
), c
) >= 0)
1157 s
->session
->cipher
= c
;
1164 /* we need to have the cipher in the cipher
1165 * list if we are asked to reuse it */
1166 al
=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1167 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING
);
1176 /* not enough data */
1177 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1178 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1184 if (p
[j
] == 0) break;
1191 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1192 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED
);
1196 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1198 if (s
->version
>= SSL3_VERSION
)
1200 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s
,&p
,d
,n
))
1202 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT
);
1207 /* Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this
1208 * handshake for not reused session only. We need to generate
1209 * server_random before calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow
1210 * SessionTicket processing to use it in key derivation. */
1214 Time
=(unsigned long)time(NULL
); /* Time */
1215 pos
=s
->s3
->server_random
;
1217 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(pos
,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
-4) <= 0)
1223 if (!s
->hit
&& s
->version
>= TLS1_VERSION
&& s
->tls_session_secret_cb
)
1225 SSL_CIPHER
*pref_cipher
=NULL
;
1227 s
->session
->master_key_length
=sizeof(s
->session
->master_key
);
1228 if(s
->tls_session_secret_cb(s
, s
->session
->master_key
, &s
->session
->master_key_length
,
1229 ciphers
, &pref_cipher
, s
->tls_session_secret_cb_arg
))
1232 s
->session
->ciphers
=ciphers
;
1233 s
->session
->verify_result
=X509_V_OK
;
1237 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1238 pref_cipher
=pref_cipher
? pref_cipher
: ssl3_choose_cipher(s
, s
->session
->ciphers
, SSL_get_ciphers(s
));
1239 if (pref_cipher
== NULL
)
1241 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1242 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER
);
1246 s
->session
->cipher
=pref_cipher
;
1249 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s
->cipher_list
);
1251 if (s
->cipher_list_by_id
)
1252 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s
->cipher_list_by_id
);
1254 s
->cipher_list
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s
->session
->ciphers
);
1255 s
->cipher_list_by_id
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s
->session
->ciphers
);
1260 /* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1261 * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
1262 * algorithms from the client, starting at q. */
1263 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
=NULL
;
1264 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1265 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1266 if (s
->session
->compress_meth
!= 0)
1268 int m
, comp_id
= s
->session
->compress_meth
;
1269 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1270 /* Can't disable compression */
1271 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION
)
1273 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION
);
1276 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1277 for (m
= 0; m
< sk_SSL_COMP_num(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
); m
++)
1279 comp
=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
,m
);
1280 if (comp_id
== comp
->id
)
1282 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
=comp
;
1286 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
== NULL
)
1288 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM
);
1291 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1292 for (m
= 0; m
< i
; m
++)
1294 if (q
[m
] == comp_id
)
1299 al
=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1300 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING
);
1306 else if (!(s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION
) && s
->ctx
->comp_methods
)
1307 { /* See if we have a match */
1308 int m
,nn
,o
,v
,done
=0;
1310 nn
=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
);
1311 for (m
=0; m
<nn
; m
++)
1313 comp
=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
,m
);
1326 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
=comp
;
1331 /* If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1332 * using compression.
1334 if (s
->session
->compress_meth
!= 0)
1336 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION
);
1341 /* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must
1346 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1347 s
->session
->compress_meth
=0;
1349 s
->session
->compress_meth
=(comp
== NULL
)?0:comp
->id
;
1351 if (s
->session
->ciphers
!= NULL
)
1352 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s
->session
->ciphers
);
1353 s
->session
->ciphers
=ciphers
;
1354 if (ciphers
== NULL
)
1356 al
=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1357 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED
);
1361 c
=ssl3_choose_cipher(s
,s
->session
->ciphers
,
1362 SSL_get_ciphers(s
));
1366 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1367 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER
);
1370 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
=c
;
1371 /* check whether we should disable session resumption */
1372 if (s
->not_resumable_session_cb
!= NULL
)
1373 s
->session
->not_resumable
=s
->not_resumable_session_cb(s
,
1374 ((c
->algorithm_mkey
& (SSL_kEDH
| SSL_kEECDH
)) != 0));
1375 if (s
->session
->not_resumable
)
1376 /* do not send a session ticket */
1377 s
->tlsext_ticket_expected
= 0;
1381 /* Session-id reuse */
1382 #ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
1383 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *sk
;
1384 SSL_CIPHER
*nc
=NULL
;
1385 SSL_CIPHER
*ec
=NULL
;
1387 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG
)
1389 sk
=s
->session
->ciphers
;
1390 for (i
=0; i
<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk
); i
++)
1392 c
=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk
,i
);
1393 if (c
->algorithm_enc
& SSL_eNULL
)
1395 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c
))
1399 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
=nc
;
1400 else if (ec
!= NULL
)
1401 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
=ec
;
1403 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
=s
->session
->cipher
;
1407 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
=s
->session
->cipher
;
1410 if (TLS1_get_version(s
) < TLS1_2_VERSION
|| !(s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
))
1412 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
))
1416 /* we now have the following setup.
1418 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
1419 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
1420 * compression - basically ignored right now
1421 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1422 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1423 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1424 * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
1431 ssl3_send_alert(s
,SSL3_AL_FATAL
,al
);
1434 if (ciphers
!= NULL
) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers
);
1438 int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL
*s
)
1441 unsigned char *p
,*d
;
1444 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1448 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A
)
1450 buf
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
1451 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1452 p
=s
->s3
->server_random
;
1453 /* Generate server_random if it was not needed previously */
1454 Time
=(unsigned long)time(NULL
); /* Time */
1456 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p
,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
-4) <= 0)
1459 /* Do the message type and length last */
1462 *(p
++)=s
->version
>>8;
1463 *(p
++)=s
->version
&0xff;
1466 memcpy(p
,s
->s3
->server_random
,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
1467 p
+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
;
1469 /* There are several cases for the session ID to send
1470 * back in the server hello:
1471 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
1472 * we send back the old session ID.
1473 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
1474 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
1475 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
1476 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
1478 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
1479 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
1480 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
1481 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
1484 if (s
->session
->not_resumable
||
1485 (!(s
->ctx
->session_cache_mode
& SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER
)
1487 s
->session
->session_id_length
=0;
1489 sl
=s
->session
->session_id_length
;
1490 if (sl
> (int)sizeof(s
->session
->session_id
))
1492 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1496 memcpy(p
,s
->session
->session_id
,sl
);
1499 /* put the cipher */
1500 i
=ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
,p
);
1503 /* put the compression method */
1504 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1507 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
== NULL
)
1510 *(p
++)=s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
->id
;
1512 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1513 if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s
) <= 0)
1515 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO
,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT
);
1518 if ((p
= ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s
, p
, buf
+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
)) == NULL
)
1520 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO
,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1527 *(d
++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO
;
1530 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B
;
1531 /* number of bytes to write */
1536 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
1537 return(ssl3_do_write(s
,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
));
1540 int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL
*s
)
1544 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A
)
1546 p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
1549 *(p
++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE
;
1554 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B
;
1555 /* number of bytes to write */
1560 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
1561 return(ssl3_do_write(s
,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
));
1564 int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL
*s
)
1566 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1570 unsigned char md_buf
[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
];
1573 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1576 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1577 EC_KEY
*ecdh
=NULL
, *ecdhp
;
1578 unsigned char *encodedPoint
= NULL
;
1581 BN_CTX
*bn_ctx
= NULL
;
1584 const EVP_MD
*md
= NULL
;
1585 unsigned char *p
,*d
;
1595 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx
);
1596 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A
)
1598 type
=s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
1603 r
[0]=r
[1]=r
[2]=r
[3]=NULL
;
1605 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1606 if (type
& SSL_kRSA
)
1609 if ((rsa
== NULL
) && (s
->cert
->rsa_tmp_cb
!= NULL
))
1611 rsa
=s
->cert
->rsa_tmp_cb(s
,
1612 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
),
1613 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
));
1616 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1617 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY
);
1625 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1626 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY
);
1631 s
->s3
->tmp
.use_rsa_tmp
=1;
1635 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1636 if (type
& SSL_kEDH
)
1639 if ((dhp
== NULL
) && (s
->cert
->dh_tmp_cb
!= NULL
))
1640 dhp
=s
->cert
->dh_tmp_cb(s
,
1641 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
),
1642 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
));
1645 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1646 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY
);
1650 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
!= NULL
)
1652 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1656 if ((dh
=DHparams_dup(dhp
)) == NULL
)
1658 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_DH_LIB
);
1663 if ((dhp
->pub_key
== NULL
||
1664 dhp
->priv_key
== NULL
||
1665 (s
->options
& SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE
)))
1667 if(!DH_generate_key(dh
))
1669 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1676 dh
->pub_key
=BN_dup(dhp
->pub_key
);
1677 dh
->priv_key
=BN_dup(dhp
->priv_key
);
1678 if ((dh
->pub_key
== NULL
) ||
1679 (dh
->priv_key
== NULL
))
1681 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_DH_LIB
);
1691 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1692 if (type
& SSL_kEECDH
)
1694 const EC_GROUP
*group
;
1696 ecdhp
=cert
->ecdh_tmp
;
1697 if (s
->cert
->ecdh_tmp_auto
)
1699 /* Get NID of first shared curve */
1700 int nid
= tls1_shared_curve(s
, 0);
1701 if (nid
!= NID_undef
)
1702 ecdhp
= EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid
);
1704 else if ((ecdhp
== NULL
) && s
->cert
->ecdh_tmp_cb
)
1706 ecdhp
=s
->cert
->ecdh_tmp_cb(s
,
1707 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
),
1708 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
));
1712 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1713 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY
);
1717 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.ecdh
!= NULL
)
1719 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1723 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
1726 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB
);
1729 if (s
->cert
->ecdh_tmp_auto
)
1731 else if ((ecdh
= EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp
)) == NULL
)
1733 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB
);
1737 s
->s3
->tmp
.ecdh
=ecdh
;
1738 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh
) == NULL
) ||
1739 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh
) == NULL
) ||
1740 (s
->options
& SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE
))
1742 if(!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh
))
1744 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB
);
1749 if (((group
= EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh
)) == NULL
) ||
1750 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh
) == NULL
) ||
1751 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh
) == NULL
))
1753 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB
);
1757 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
) &&
1758 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group
) > 163))
1760 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER
);
1764 /* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH
1765 * keys over named (not generic) curves. For
1766 * supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero.
1769 tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group
)))
1772 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE
);
1776 /* Encode the public key.
1777 * First check the size of encoding and
1778 * allocate memory accordingly.
1780 encodedlen
= EC_POINT_point2oct(group
,
1781 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh
),
1782 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED
,
1785 encodedPoint
= (unsigned char *)
1786 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen
*sizeof(unsigned char));
1787 bn_ctx
= BN_CTX_new();
1788 if ((encodedPoint
== NULL
) || (bn_ctx
== NULL
))
1790 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1795 encodedlen
= EC_POINT_point2oct(group
,
1796 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh
),
1797 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED
,
1798 encodedPoint
, encodedlen
, bn_ctx
);
1800 if (encodedlen
== 0)
1802 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB
);
1806 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx
); bn_ctx
=NULL
;
1808 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not
1809 * generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges.
1810 * In this situation, we need four additional bytes
1811 * to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
1816 /* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message
1817 * explicitly so we can set these to NULLs
1825 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
1826 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1827 if (type
& SSL_kPSK
)
1829 /* reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint*/
1830 n
+=2+strlen(s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
);
1833 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1834 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1835 if (type
& SSL_kSRP
)
1837 if ((s
->srp_ctx
.N
== NULL
) ||
1838 (s
->srp_ctx
.g
== NULL
) ||
1839 (s
->srp_ctx
.s
== NULL
) ||
1840 (s
->srp_ctx
.B
== NULL
))
1842 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM
);
1853 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1854 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE
);
1857 for (i
=0; r
[i
] != NULL
&& i
<4; i
++)
1859 nr
[i
]=BN_num_bytes(r
[i
]);
1860 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1861 if ((i
== 2) && (type
& SSL_kSRP
))
1868 if (!(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aNULL
)
1869 && !(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kPSK
))
1871 if ((pkey
=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s
,s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
,&md
))
1874 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1877 kn
=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey
);
1885 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf
,n
+4+kn
))
1887 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_LIB_BUF
);
1890 d
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
1893 for (i
=0; r
[i
] != NULL
&& i
<4; i
++)
1895 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1896 if ((i
== 2) && (type
& SSL_kSRP
))
1908 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1909 if (type
& SSL_kEECDH
)
1911 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves.
1912 * In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has:
1913 * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
1914 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by
1915 * the actual encoded point itself
1917 *p
= NAMED_CURVE_TYPE
;
1925 memcpy((unsigned char*)p
,
1926 (unsigned char *)encodedPoint
,
1928 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint
);
1929 encodedPoint
= NULL
;
1934 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1935 if (type
& SSL_kPSK
)
1937 /* copy PSK identity hint */
1938 s2n(strlen(s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
), p
);
1939 strncpy((char *)p
, s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
, strlen(s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
));
1940 p
+=strlen(s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
);
1947 /* n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4])
1948 * and p points to the space at the end. */
1949 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1950 if (pkey
->type
== EVP_PKEY_RSA
1951 && TLS1_get_version(s
) < TLS1_2_VERSION
)
1955 for (num
=2; num
> 0; num
--)
1957 EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx
,
1958 EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW
);
1959 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx
,(num
== 2)
1960 ?s
->ctx
->md5
:s
->ctx
->sha1
, NULL
);
1961 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx
,&(s
->s3
->client_random
[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
1962 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx
,&(s
->s3
->server_random
[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
1963 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx
,&(d
[4]),n
);
1964 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx
,q
,
1965 (unsigned int *)&i
);
1969 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1
, md_buf
, j
,
1970 &(p
[2]), &u
, pkey
->pkey
.rsa
) <= 0)
1972 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_LIB_RSA
);
1982 /* For TLS1.2 and later send signature
1984 if (TLS1_get_version(s
) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
)
1986 if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p
, pkey
, md
))
1988 /* Should never happen */
1989 al
=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1990 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1996 fprintf(stderr
, "Using hash %s\n",
1999 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx
, md
, NULL
);
2000 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx
,&(s
->s3
->client_random
[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
2001 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx
,&(s
->s3
->server_random
[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
2002 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx
,&(d
[4]),n
);
2003 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx
,&(p
[2]),
2004 (unsigned int *)&i
,pkey
))
2006 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_LIB_EVP
);
2011 if (TLS1_get_version(s
) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
)
2016 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
2017 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2018 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE
);
2023 *(d
++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
;
2026 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
2032 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B
;
2033 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx
);
2034 return(ssl3_do_write(s
,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
));
2036 ssl3_send_alert(s
,SSL3_AL_FATAL
,al
);
2038 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2039 if (encodedPoint
!= NULL
) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint
);
2040 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx
);
2042 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx
);
2046 int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL
*s
)
2048 unsigned char *p
,*d
;
2050 STACK_OF(X509_NAME
) *sk
=NULL
;
2054 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A
)
2058 d
=p
=(unsigned char *)&(buf
->data
[4]);
2060 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
2062 n
=ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s
,p
);
2067 if (TLS1_get_version(s
) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
)
2069 nl
= tls12_get_sig_algs(s
, p
+ 2);
2079 sk
=SSL_get_client_CA_list(s
);
2083 for (i
=0; i
<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk
); i
++)
2085 name
=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk
,i
);
2086 j
=i2d_X509_NAME(name
,NULL
);
2087 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf
,4+n
+j
+2))
2089 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,ERR_R_BUF_LIB
);
2092 p
=(unsigned char *)&(buf
->data
[4+n
]);
2093 if (!(s
->options
& SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG
))
2096 i2d_X509_NAME(name
,&p
);
2103 i2d_X509_NAME(name
,&p
);
2104 j
-=2; s2n(j
,d
); j
+=2;
2110 /* else no CA names */
2111 p
=(unsigned char *)&(buf
->data
[4+off
]);
2114 d
=(unsigned char *)buf
->data
;
2115 *(d
++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
;
2118 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
2123 #ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
2124 p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
+ s
->init_num
;
2127 *(p
++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE
;
2134 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B
;
2137 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
2138 return(ssl3_do_write(s
,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
));
2143 int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL
*s
)
2147 unsigned long alg_k
;
2149 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2151 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
=NULL
;
2153 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2155 DH
*dh_srvr
, *dh_clnt
= NULL
;
2157 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2159 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2161 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2162 EC_KEY
*srvr_ecdh
= NULL
;
2163 EVP_PKEY
*clnt_pub_pkey
= NULL
;
2164 EC_POINT
*clnt_ecpoint
= NULL
;
2165 BN_CTX
*bn_ctx
= NULL
;
2168 n
=s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
2169 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A
,
2170 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B
,
2171 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2175 if (!ok
) return((int)n
);
2176 p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
2178 alg_k
=s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
2180 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2181 if (alg_k
& SSL_kRSA
)
2183 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
2184 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.use_rsa_tmp
)
2186 if ((s
->cert
!= NULL
) && (s
->cert
->rsa_tmp
!= NULL
))
2187 rsa
=s
->cert
->rsa_tmp
;
2188 /* Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should
2189 * be sent already */
2192 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2193 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY
);
2200 pkey
=s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
].privatekey
;
2201 if ( (pkey
== NULL
) ||
2202 (pkey
->type
!= EVP_PKEY_RSA
) ||
2203 (pkey
->pkey
.rsa
== NULL
))
2205 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2206 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE
);
2212 /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */
2213 if (s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
&& s
->version
!= DTLS1_BAD_VER
)
2218 if (!(s
->options
& SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG
))
2220 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG
);
2230 i
=RSA_private_decrypt((int)n
,p
,p
,rsa
,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING
);
2234 if (i
!= SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
)
2236 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2237 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); */
2240 if ((al
== -1) && !((p
[0] == (s
->client_version
>>8)) && (p
[1] == (s
->client_version
& 0xff))))
2242 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2243 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2244 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2245 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
2246 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
2248 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. */
2249 if (!((s
->options
& SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG
) &&
2250 (p
[0] == (s
->version
>>8)) && (p
[1] == (s
->version
& 0xff))))
2252 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2253 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER); */
2255 /* The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2256 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version
2257 * number check as a "bad version oracle" -- an alert would
2258 * reveal that the plaintext corresponding to some ciphertext
2259 * made up by the adversary is properly formatted except
2260 * that the version number is wrong. To avoid such attacks,
2261 * we should treat this just like any other decryption error. */
2267 /* Some decryption failure -- use random value instead as countermeasure
2268 * against Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding
2269 * (see RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). */
2271 i
= SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
;
2272 p
[0] = s
->client_version
>> 8;
2273 p
[1] = s
->client_version
& 0xff;
2274 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p
+2, i
-2) <= 0) /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure */
2278 s
->session
->master_key_length
=
2279 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
2280 s
->session
->master_key
,
2282 OPENSSL_cleanse(p
,i
);
2286 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2287 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kEDH
|SSL_kDHr
|SSL_kDHd
))
2290 EVP_PKEY
*skey
= NULL
;
2297 if (!(s
->options
& SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG
))
2299 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG
);
2308 if (alg_k
& SSL_kDHr
)
2309 idx
= SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA
;
2310 else if (alg_k
& SSL_kDHd
)
2311 idx
= SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA
;
2314 skey
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[idx
].privatekey
;
2315 if ((skey
== NULL
) ||
2316 (skey
->type
!= EVP_PKEY_DH
) ||
2317 (skey
->pkey
.dh
== NULL
))
2319 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2320 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE
);
2323 dh_srvr
= skey
->pkey
.dh
;
2325 else if (s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
== NULL
)
2327 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2328 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY
);
2332 dh_srvr
=s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
;
2336 /* Get pubkey from cert */
2337 EVP_PKEY
*clkey
=X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
2340 if (EVP_PKEY_cmp_parameters(clkey
, skey
) == 1)
2341 dh_clnt
= EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(clkey
);
2343 if (dh_clnt
== NULL
)
2345 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2346 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY
);
2349 EVP_PKEY_free(clkey
);
2350 pub
= dh_clnt
->pub_key
;
2353 pub
=BN_bin2bn(p
,i
,NULL
);
2356 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_BN_LIB
);
2360 i
=DH_compute_key(p
,pub
,dh_srvr
);
2364 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_DH_LIB
);
2369 DH_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
);
2376 s
->session
->master_key_length
=
2377 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
2378 s
->session
->master_key
,p
,i
);
2379 OPENSSL_cleanse(p
,i
);
2385 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2386 if (alg_k
& SSL_kKRB5
)
2388 krb5_error_code krb5rc
;
2389 krb5_data enc_ticket
;
2390 krb5_data authenticator
;
2392 KSSL_CTX
*kssl_ctx
= s
->kssl_ctx
;
2393 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx
;
2394 const EVP_CIPHER
*enc
= NULL
;
2395 unsigned char iv
[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH
];
2396 unsigned char pms
[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
2397 + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH
];
2399 krb5_timestamp authtime
= 0;
2400 krb5_ticket_times ttimes
;
2402 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx
);
2404 if (!kssl_ctx
) kssl_ctx
= kssl_ctx_new();
2407 enc_ticket
.length
= i
;
2409 if (n
< (long)(enc_ticket
.length
+ 6))
2411 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2412 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2416 enc_ticket
.data
= (char *)p
;
2417 p
+=enc_ticket
.length
;
2420 authenticator
.length
= i
;
2422 if (n
< (long)(enc_ticket
.length
+ authenticator
.length
+ 6))
2424 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2425 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2429 authenticator
.data
= (char *)p
;
2430 p
+=authenticator
.length
;
2434 enc_pms
.data
= (char *)p
;
2437 /* Note that the length is checked again below,
2440 if(enc_pms
.length
> sizeof pms
)
2442 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2443 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2447 if (n
!= (long)(enc_ticket
.length
+ authenticator
.length
+
2448 enc_pms
.length
+ 6))
2450 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2451 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2455 if ((krb5rc
= kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx
, &enc_ticket
, &ttimes
,
2459 printf("kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
2460 krb5rc
, kssl_err
.reason
);
2462 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err
.text
);
2463 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2464 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2469 /* Note: no authenticator is not considered an error,
2470 ** but will return authtime == 0.
2472 if ((krb5rc
= kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx
, &authenticator
,
2473 &authtime
, &kssl_err
)) != 0)
2476 printf("kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
2477 krb5rc
, kssl_err
.reason
);
2479 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err
.text
);
2480 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2481 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2486 if ((krb5rc
= kssl_validate_times(authtime
, &ttimes
)) != 0)
2488 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, krb5rc
);
2493 kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx
);
2494 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2496 enc
= kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx
->enctype
);
2500 memset(iv
, 0, sizeof iv
); /* per RFC 1510 */
2502 if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx
,enc
,NULL
,kssl_ctx
->key
,iv
))
2504 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2505 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
2508 if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx
, pms
,&outl
,
2509 (unsigned char *)enc_pms
.data
, enc_pms
.length
))
2511 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2512 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
2515 if (outl
> SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
)
2517 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2518 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2521 if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx
,&(pms
[outl
]),&padl
))
2523 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2524 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
2528 if (outl
> SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
)
2530 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2531 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2534 if (!((pms
[0] == (s
->client_version
>>8)) && (pms
[1] == (s
->client_version
& 0xff))))
2536 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2537 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2538 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2539 * However, buggy clients exist that send random bytes instead of
2540 * the protocol version.
2541 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients.
2542 * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos cipher)
2544 if (!(s
->options
& SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG
))
2546 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2547 SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
2552 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx
);
2554 s
->session
->master_key_length
=
2555 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
2556 s
->session
->master_key
, pms
, outl
);
2558 if (kssl_ctx
->client_princ
)
2560 size_t len
= strlen(kssl_ctx
->client_princ
);
2561 if ( len
< SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH
)
2563 s
->session
->krb5_client_princ_len
= len
;
2564 memcpy(s
->session
->krb5_client_princ
,kssl_ctx
->client_princ
,len
);
2569 /* Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
2570 ** but it caused problems for apache.
2571 ** kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
2572 ** if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
2576 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2578 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2579 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kEECDH
|SSL_kECDHr
|SSL_kECDHe
))
2584 const EC_GROUP
*group
;
2585 const BIGNUM
*priv_key
;
2587 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
2588 if ((srvr_ecdh
= EC_KEY_new()) == NULL
)
2590 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2591 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2595 /* Let's get server private key and group information */
2596 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kECDHr
|SSL_kECDHe
))
2598 /* use the certificate */
2599 tkey
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_ECC
].privatekey
->pkey
.ec
;
2603 /* use the ephermeral values we saved when
2604 * generating the ServerKeyExchange msg.
2606 tkey
= s
->s3
->tmp
.ecdh
;
2609 group
= EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey
);
2610 priv_key
= EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey
);
2612 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh
, group
) ||
2613 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh
, priv_key
))
2615 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2620 /* Let's get client's public key */
2621 if ((clnt_ecpoint
= EC_POINT_new(group
)) == NULL
)
2623 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2624 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2630 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
2632 if (alg_k
& SSL_kEECDH
)
2634 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2635 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY
);
2638 if (((clnt_pub_pkey
=X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
))
2640 (clnt_pub_pkey
->type
!= EVP_PKEY_EC
))
2642 /* XXX: For now, we do not support client
2643 * authentication using ECDH certificates
2644 * so this branch (n == 0L) of the code is
2645 * never executed. When that support is
2646 * added, we ought to ensure the key
2647 * received in the certificate is
2648 * authorized for key agreement.
2649 * ECDH_compute_key implicitly checks that
2650 * the two ECDH shares are for the same
2653 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2654 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2655 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS
);
2659 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint
,
2660 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey
->pkey
.ec
)) == 0)
2662 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2666 ret
= 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
2670 /* Get client's public key from encoded point
2671 * in the ClientKeyExchange message.
2673 if ((bn_ctx
= BN_CTX_new()) == NULL
)
2675 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2676 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2680 /* Get encoded point length */
2685 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2689 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group
,
2690 clnt_ecpoint
, p
, i
, bn_ctx
) == 0)
2692 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2696 /* p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer
2697 * currently, so set it to the start
2699 p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
2702 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
2703 field_size
= EC_GROUP_get_degree(group
);
2704 if (field_size
<= 0)
2706 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2710 i
= ECDH_compute_key(p
, (field_size
+7)/8, clnt_ecpoint
, srvr_ecdh
, NULL
);
2713 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2718 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey
);
2719 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint
);
2720 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh
);
2721 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx
);
2722 EC_KEY_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.ecdh
);
2723 s
->s3
->tmp
.ecdh
= NULL
;
2725 /* Compute the master secret */
2726 s
->session
->master_key_length
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
-> \
2727 generate_master_secret(s
, s
->session
->master_key
, p
, i
);
2729 OPENSSL_cleanse(p
, i
);
2734 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2735 if (alg_k
& SSL_kPSK
)
2737 unsigned char *t
= NULL
;
2738 unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms
[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
*2+4];
2739 unsigned int pre_ms_len
= 0, psk_len
= 0;
2741 char tmp_id
[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
+1];
2743 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2748 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2749 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2752 if (i
> PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
)
2754 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2755 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2758 if (s
->psk_server_callback
== NULL
)
2760 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2761 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB
);
2765 /* Create guaranteed NULL-terminated identity
2766 * string for the callback */
2767 memcpy(tmp_id
, p
, i
);
2768 memset(tmp_id
+i
, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
+1-i
);
2769 psk_len
= s
->psk_server_callback(s
, tmp_id
,
2770 psk_or_pre_ms
, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms
));
2771 OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_id
, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
+1);
2773 if (psk_len
> PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
)
2775 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2776 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2779 else if (psk_len
== 0)
2781 /* PSK related to the given identity not found */
2782 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2783 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND
);
2784 al
=SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY
;
2788 /* create PSK pre_master_secret */
2789 pre_ms_len
=2+psk_len
+2+psk_len
;
2791 memmove(psk_or_pre_ms
+psk_len
+4, psk_or_pre_ms
, psk_len
);
2793 memset(t
, 0, psk_len
);
2797 if (s
->session
->psk_identity
!= NULL
)
2798 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->psk_identity
);
2799 s
->session
->psk_identity
= BUF_strdup((char *)p
);
2800 if (s
->session
->psk_identity
== NULL
)
2802 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2803 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2807 if (s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
!= NULL
)
2808 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
);
2809 s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
= BUF_strdup(s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
);
2810 if (s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
!= NULL
&&
2811 s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
== NULL
)
2813 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2814 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2818 s
->session
->master_key_length
=
2819 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
2820 s
->session
->master_key
, psk_or_pre_ms
, pre_ms_len
);
2823 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms
, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms
));
2829 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2830 if (alg_k
& SSL_kSRP
)
2838 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2839 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH
);
2842 if (!(s
->srp_ctx
.A
=BN_bin2bn(p
,i
,NULL
)))
2844 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
2847 if (s
->session
->srp_username
!= NULL
)
2848 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->srp_username
);
2849 s
->session
->srp_username
= BUF_strdup(s
->srp_ctx
.login
);
2850 if (s
->session
->srp_username
== NULL
)
2852 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2853 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2857 if ((s
->session
->master_key_length
= SRP_generate_server_master_secret(s
,s
->session
->master_key
))<0)
2859 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2866 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
2867 if (alg_k
& SSL_kGOST
)
2870 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pkey_ctx
;
2871 EVP_PKEY
*client_pub_pkey
= NULL
, *pk
= NULL
;
2872 unsigned char premaster_secret
[32], *start
;
2873 size_t outlen
=32, inlen
;
2874 unsigned long alg_a
;
2876 /* Get our certificate private key*/
2877 alg_a
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
;
2878 if (alg_a
& SSL_aGOST94
)
2879 pk
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_GOST94
].privatekey
;
2880 else if (alg_a
& SSL_aGOST01
)
2881 pk
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_GOST01
].privatekey
;
2883 pkey_ctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk
,NULL
);
2884 EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx
);
2885 /* If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
2886 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
2887 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use
2888 * a client certificate for authorization only. */
2889 client_pub_pkey
= X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
2890 if (client_pub_pkey
)
2892 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx
, client_pub_pkey
) <= 0)
2895 /* Decrypt session key */
2896 if ((*p
!=( V_ASN1_SEQUENCE
| V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED
)))
2898 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
2906 else if (p
[1] < 0x80)
2913 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
2916 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx
,premaster_secret
,&outlen
,start
,inlen
) <=0)
2919 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
2922 /* Generate master secret */
2923 s
->session
->master_key_length
=
2924 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
2925 s
->session
->master_key
,premaster_secret
,32);
2926 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2927 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx
, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY
, 2, NULL
) > 0)
2932 EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey
);
2933 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx
);
2941 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2942 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2943 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE
);
2949 ssl3_send_alert(s
,SSL3_AL_FATAL
,al
);
2950 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_SRP)
2953 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2954 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey
);
2955 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint
);
2956 if (srvr_ecdh
!= NULL
)
2957 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh
);
2958 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx
);
2963 int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL
*s
)
2965 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
=NULL
;
2971 const EVP_MD
*md
= NULL
;
2973 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx
);
2975 n
=s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
2976 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A
,
2977 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B
,
2979 516, /* Enough for 4096 bit RSA key with TLS v1.2 */
2982 if (!ok
) return((int)n
);
2984 if (s
->session
->peer
!= NULL
)
2986 peer
=s
->session
->peer
;
2987 pkey
=X509_get_pubkey(peer
);
2988 type
=X509_certificate_type(peer
,pkey
);
2996 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
!= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY
)
2998 s
->s3
->tmp
.reuse_message
=1;
2999 if ((peer
!= NULL
) && (type
& EVP_PKT_SIGN
))
3001 al
=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
3002 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE
);
3011 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED
);
3012 al
=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
3016 if (!(type
& EVP_PKT_SIGN
))
3018 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE
);
3019 al
=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
3023 if (s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
)
3025 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY
);
3026 al
=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
3030 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
3031 p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
3032 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
3033 /* If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare
3034 * signature without length field */
3035 if (n
==64 && (pkey
->type
==NID_id_GostR3410_94
||
3036 pkey
->type
== NID_id_GostR3410_2001
) )
3042 if (TLS1_get_version(s
) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
)
3044 int sigalg
= tls12_get_sigid(pkey
);
3045 /* Should never happen */
3048 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3049 al
=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3052 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
3053 if (sigalg
!= (int)p
[1])
3055 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
3056 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
3059 md
= tls12_get_hash(p
[0]);
3062 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST
);
3063 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
3067 fprintf(stderr
, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md
));
3076 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3077 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
3081 j
=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey
);
3082 if ((i
> j
) || (n
> j
) || (n
<= 0))
3084 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE
);
3085 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
3089 if (TLS1_get_version(s
) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
)
3093 hdatalen
= BIO_get_mem_data(s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
, &hdata
);
3096 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3097 al
=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3101 fprintf(stderr
, "Using TLS 1.2 with client verify alg %s\n",
3104 if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&mctx
, md
, NULL
)
3105 || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(&mctx
, hdata
, hdatalen
))
3107 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
3108 al
=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3112 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&mctx
, p
, i
, pkey
) <= 0)
3114 al
=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
3115 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE
);
3120 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3121 if (pkey
->type
== EVP_PKEY_RSA
)
3123 i
=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1
, s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_verify_md
,
3124 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
, p
, i
,
3128 al
=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
3129 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT
);
3134 al
=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
3135 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE
);
3141 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3142 if (pkey
->type
== EVP_PKEY_DSA
)
3144 j
=DSA_verify(pkey
->save_type
,
3145 &(s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_verify_md
[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
]),
3146 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
,p
,i
,pkey
->pkey
.dsa
);
3150 al
=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
3151 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE
);
3157 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3158 if (pkey
->type
== EVP_PKEY_EC
)
3160 j
=ECDSA_verify(pkey
->save_type
,
3161 &(s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_verify_md
[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
]),
3162 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
,p
,i
,pkey
->pkey
.ec
);
3166 al
=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
3167 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,
3168 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE
);
3174 if (pkey
->type
== NID_id_GostR3410_94
|| pkey
->type
== NID_id_GostR3410_2001
)
3175 { unsigned char signature
[64];
3177 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey
,NULL
);
3178 EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx
);
3180 fprintf(stderr
,"GOST signature length is %d",i
);
3182 for (idx
=0;idx
<64;idx
++) {
3183 signature
[63-idx
]=p
[idx
];
3185 j
=EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx
,signature
,64,s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_verify_md
,32);
3186 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
3189 al
=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
3190 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,
3191 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE
);
3197 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3198 al
=SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE
;
3207 ssl3_send_alert(s
,SSL3_AL_FATAL
,al
);
3210 if (s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
)
3212 BIO_free(s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
);
3213 s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
= NULL
;
3214 s
->s3
->flags
&= ~TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE
;
3216 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx
);
3217 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey
);
3221 int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL
*s
)
3223 int i
,ok
,al
,ret
= -1;
3225 unsigned long l
,nc
,llen
,n
;
3226 const unsigned char *p
,*q
;
3228 STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
=NULL
;
3230 n
=s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
3237 if (!ok
) return((int)n
);
3239 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
== SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
)
3241 if ( (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
) &&
3242 (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT
))
3244 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE
);
3245 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
3248 /* If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list */
3249 if ((s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
) && s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
)
3251 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST
);
3252 al
=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
3255 s
->s3
->tmp
.reuse_message
=1;
3259 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
!= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
)
3261 al
=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
3262 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE
);
3265 p
=d
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
3267 if ((sk
=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL
)
3269 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3276 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
3277 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3280 for (nc
=0; nc
<llen
; )
3283 if ((l
+nc
+3) > llen
)
3285 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
3286 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3291 x
=d2i_X509(NULL
,&p
,l
);
3294 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB
);
3299 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
3300 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3303 if (!sk_X509_push(sk
,x
))
3305 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3312 if (sk_X509_num(sk
) <= 0)
3314 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3315 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
)
3317 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
3318 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED
);
3321 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3322 else if ((s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
) &&
3323 (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT
))
3325 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE
);
3326 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
3329 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
3330 if (s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
&& !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
))
3332 al
=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3338 i
=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s
,sk
);
3341 al
=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s
->verify_result
);
3342 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_RETURNED
);
3347 if (s
->session
->peer
!= NULL
) /* This should not be needed */
3348 X509_free(s
->session
->peer
);
3349 s
->session
->peer
=sk_X509_shift(sk
);
3350 s
->session
->verify_result
= s
->verify_result
;
3352 /* With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL
3353 * when we arrive here. */
3354 if (s
->session
->sess_cert
== NULL
)
3356 s
->session
->sess_cert
= ssl_sess_cert_new();
3357 if (s
->session
->sess_cert
== NULL
)
3359 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3363 if (s
->session
->sess_cert
->cert_chain
!= NULL
)
3364 sk_X509_pop_free(s
->session
->sess_cert
->cert_chain
, X509_free
);
3365 s
->session
->sess_cert
->cert_chain
=sk
;
3366 /* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the
3367 * peer's own certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c */
3375 ssl3_send_alert(s
,SSL3_AL_FATAL
,al
);
3378 if (x
!= NULL
) X509_free(x
);
3379 if (sk
!= NULL
) sk_X509_pop_free(sk
,X509_free
);
3383 int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL
*s
)
3388 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A
)
3390 cpk
=ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s
);
3393 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
3394 if ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
!= SSL_aKRB5
) ||
3395 (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kKRB5
))
3397 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3402 l
=ssl3_output_cert_chain(s
,cpk
);
3403 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B
;
3408 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
3409 return(ssl3_do_write(s
,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
));
3412 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
3413 /* send a new session ticket (not necessarily for a new session) */
3414 int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL
*s
)
3416 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A
)
3418 unsigned char *p
, *senc
, *macstart
;
3419 const unsigned char *const_p
;
3420 int len
, slen_full
, slen
;
3425 SSL_CTX
*tctx
= s
->initial_ctx
;
3426 unsigned char iv
[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH
];
3427 unsigned char key_name
[16];
3429 /* get session encoding length */
3430 slen_full
= i2d_SSL_SESSION(s
->session
, NULL
);
3431 /* Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is
3434 if (slen_full
> 0xFF00)
3436 senc
= OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full
);
3440 i2d_SSL_SESSION(s
->session
, &p
);
3442 /* create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up */
3444 sess
= d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL
, &const_p
, slen_full
);
3450 sess
->session_id_length
= 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
3452 slen
= i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess
, NULL
);
3453 if (slen
> slen_full
) /* shouldn't ever happen */
3459 i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess
, &p
);
3460 SSL_SESSION_free(sess
);
3462 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3463 * follows 1 (size of message name) + 3 (message length
3464 * bytes) + 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
3465 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
3466 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
3467 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
3469 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s
->init_buf
,
3470 26 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH
+ EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH
+
3471 EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
+ slen
))
3474 p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
3476 *(p
++)=SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET
;
3477 /* Skip message length for now */
3479 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx
);
3480 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx
);
3481 /* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present
3482 * it does all the work otherwise use generated values
3485 if (tctx
->tlsext_ticket_key_cb
)
3487 if (tctx
->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s
, key_name
, iv
, &ctx
,
3496 RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv
, 16);
3497 EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx
, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL
,
3498 tctx
->tlsext_tick_aes_key
, iv
);
3499 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx
, tctx
->tlsext_tick_hmac_key
, 16,
3500 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL
);
3501 memcpy(key_name
, tctx
->tlsext_tick_key_name
, 16);
3504 /* Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only):
3505 * We leave this unspecified for resumed session (for simplicity),
3506 * and guess that tickets for new sessions will live as long
3507 * as their sessions. */
3508 l2n(s
->hit
? 0 : s
->session
->timeout
, p
);
3510 /* Skip ticket length for now */
3512 /* Output key name */
3514 memcpy(p
, key_name
, 16);
3517 memcpy(p
, iv
, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx
));
3518 p
+= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx
);
3519 /* Encrypt session data */
3520 EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx
, p
, &len
, senc
, slen
);
3522 EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx
, p
, &len
);
3524 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx
);
3526 HMAC_Update(&hctx
, macstart
, p
- macstart
);
3527 HMAC_Final(&hctx
, p
, &hlen
);
3528 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx
);
3531 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
3533 len
= p
- (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
3534 p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
+ 1;
3535 l2n3(len
- 4, p
); /* Message length */
3537 s2n(len
- 10, p
); /* Ticket length */
3539 /* number of bytes to write */
3541 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B
;
3546 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
3547 return(ssl3_do_write(s
,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
));
3550 int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL
*s
)
3552 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A
)
3555 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3556 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
3557 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
3560 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s
->init_buf
, 8 + s
->tlsext_ocsp_resplen
))
3563 p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
3566 *(p
++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS
;
3567 /* message length */
3568 l2n3(s
->tlsext_ocsp_resplen
+ 4, p
);
3570 *(p
++)= s
->tlsext_status_type
;
3571 /* length of OCSP response */
3572 l2n3(s
->tlsext_ocsp_resplen
, p
);
3573 /* actual response */
3574 memcpy(p
, s
->tlsext_ocsp_resp
, s
->tlsext_ocsp_resplen
);
3575 /* number of bytes to write */
3576 s
->init_num
= 8 + s
->tlsext_ocsp_resplen
;
3577 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B
;
3581 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
3582 return(ssl3_do_write(s
,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
));
3585 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3586 /* ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message. It
3587 * sets the next_proto member in s if found */
3588 int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL
*s
)
3591 int proto_len
, padding_len
;
3593 const unsigned char *p
;
3595 /* Clients cannot send a NextProtocol message if we didn't see the
3596 * extension in their ClientHello */
3597 if (!s
->s3
->next_proto_neg_seen
)
3599 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO
,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION
);
3603 n
=s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
3604 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A
,
3605 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B
,
3607 514, /* See the payload format below */
3613 /* s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received
3614 * in this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset
3615 * by ssl3_get_finished). */
3616 if (!s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
)
3618 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO
,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS
);
3623 return 0; /* The body must be > 1 bytes long */
3625 p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
3627 /* The payload looks like:
3629 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
3630 * uint8 padding_len;
3631 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
3634 if (proto_len
+ 2 > s
->init_num
)
3636 padding_len
= p
[proto_len
+ 1];
3637 if (proto_len
+ padding_len
+ 2 != s
->init_num
)
3640 s
->next_proto_negotiated
= OPENSSL_malloc(proto_len
);
3641 if (!s
->next_proto_negotiated
)
3643 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO
,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3646 memcpy(s
->next_proto_negotiated
, p
+ 1, proto_len
);
3647 s
->next_proto_negotiated_len
= proto_len
;
3653 int tls1_send_server_supplemental_data(SSL
*s
)
3656 const unsigned char *authz
, *orig_authz
;
3658 size_t authz_length
, i
;
3660 if (s
->state
!= SSL3_ST_SW_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA_A
)
3661 return ssl3_do_write(s
, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
);
3663 orig_authz
= authz
= ssl_get_authz_data(s
, &authz_length
);
3666 /* This should never occur. */
3670 /* First we walk over the authz data to see how long the handshake
3671 * message will be. */
3672 for (i
= 0; i
< authz_length
; i
++)
3679 /* n2s increments authz by 2*/
3682 if (memchr(s
->s3
->tlsext_authz_client_types
,
3684 s
->s3
->tlsext_authz_client_types_len
) != NULL
)
3685 length
+= 1 /* authz type */ + 2 /* length */ + len
;
3691 length
+= 1 /* handshake type */ +
3692 3 /* handshake length */ +
3693 3 /* supplemental data length */ +
3694 2 /* supplemental entry type */ +
3695 2 /* supplemental entry length */;
3697 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(s
->init_buf
, length
))
3699 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SEND_SERVER_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA
,ERR_R_BUF_LIB
);
3703 p
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
3704 *(p
++) = SSL3_MT_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA
;
3705 /* Handshake length */
3706 l2n3(length
- 4, p
);
3707 /* Length of supplemental data */
3708 l2n3(length
- 7, p
);
3709 /* Supplemental data type */
3710 s2n(TLSEXT_SUPPLEMENTALDATATYPE_authz_data
, p
);
3712 s2n(length
- 11, p
);
3716 /* Walk over the authz again and append the selected elements. */
3717 for (i
= 0; i
< authz_length
; i
++)
3724 /* n2s increments authz by 2 */
3727 if (memchr(s
->s3
->tlsext_authz_client_types
,
3729 s
->s3
->tlsext_authz_client_types_len
) != NULL
)
3733 memcpy(p
, authz
, len
);
3741 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA_B
;
3742 s
->init_num
= length
;
3745 return ssl3_do_write(s
, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
);