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Make OPENSSL_NO_COMP compile again.
[thirdparty/openssl.git] / ssl / s3_srvr.c
1 /* ssl/s3_srvr.c */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
3 * All rights reserved.
4 *
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8 *
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15 *
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22 *
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25 * are met:
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40 *
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
51 * SUCH DAMAGE.
52 *
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
57 */
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
60 *
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
63 * are met:
64 *
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
67 *
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
71 * distribution.
72 *
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
77 *
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
82 *
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
86 *
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
88 * acknowledgment:
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
91 *
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
105 *
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
109 *
110 */
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
113 *
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
116 *
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
119 *
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
122 *
123 */
124
125 #define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
126 #define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
127
128 #include <stdio.h>
129 #include "ssl_locl.h"
130 #include "kssl_lcl.h"
131 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
132 #include <openssl/rand.h>
133 #include <openssl/objects.h>
134 #include <openssl/evp.h>
135 #include <openssl/x509.h>
136 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
137 #include <openssl/dh.h>
138 #endif
139 #include <openssl/bn.h>
140 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
141 #include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
142 #endif
143 #include <openssl/md5.h>
144
145 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver);
146
147 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
148 static int nid2curve_id(int nid);
149 #endif
150
151 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)
152 {
153 if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
154 return(SSLv3_server_method());
155 else
156 return(NULL);
157 }
158
159 IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method,
160 ssl3_accept,
161 ssl_undefined_function,
162 ssl3_get_server_method)
163
164 int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
165 {
166 BUF_MEM *buf;
167 unsigned long l,Time=time(NULL);
168 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
169 long num1;
170 int ret= -1;
171 int new_state,state,skip=0;
172
173 RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0);
174 ERR_clear_error();
175 clear_sys_error();
176
177 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
178 cb=s->info_callback;
179 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
180 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
181
182 /* init things to blank */
183 s->in_handshake++;
184 if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s);
185
186 if (s->cert == NULL)
187 {
188 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
189 return(-1);
190 }
191
192 for (;;)
193 {
194 state=s->state;
195
196 switch (s->state)
197 {
198 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
199 s->new_session=1;
200 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
201
202 case SSL_ST_BEFORE:
203 case SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
204 case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
205 case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
206
207 s->server=1;
208 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1);
209
210 if ((s->version>>8) != 3)
211 {
212 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
213 return -1;
214 }
215 s->type=SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
216
217 if (s->init_buf == NULL)
218 {
219 if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)
220 {
221 ret= -1;
222 goto end;
223 }
224 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH))
225 {
226 ret= -1;
227 goto end;
228 }
229 s->init_buf=buf;
230 }
231
232 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
233 {
234 ret= -1;
235 goto end;
236 }
237
238 s->init_num=0;
239
240 if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE)
241 {
242 /* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that
243 * the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
244 */
245 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) { ret= -1; goto end; }
246
247 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
248 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
249 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
250 }
251 else
252 {
253 /* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE,
254 * we will just send a HelloRequest */
255 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
256 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
257 }
258 break;
259
260 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
261 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
262
263 s->shutdown=0;
264 ret=ssl3_send_hello_request(s);
265 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
266 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
267 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
268 s->init_num=0;
269
270 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
271 break;
272
273 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
274 s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
275 break;
276
277 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
278 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
279 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
280
281 s->shutdown=0;
282 ret=ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
283 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
284 s->new_session = 2;
285 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
286 s->init_num=0;
287 break;
288
289 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
290 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
291 ret=ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
292 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
293
294 if (s->hit)
295 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
296 else
297 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
298 s->init_num=0;
299 break;
300
301 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
302 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
303 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH */
304 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aNULL))
305 {
306 ret=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
307 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
308 }
309 else
310 skip=1;
311 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
312 s->init_num=0;
313 break;
314
315 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
316 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
317 l=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms;
318
319 /* clear this, it may get reset by
320 * send_server_key_exchange */
321 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA)
322 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
323 && !(l & SSL_KRB5)
324 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
325 )
326 /* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key
327 * even when forbidden by protocol specs
328 * (handshake may fail as clients are not required to
329 * be able to handle this) */
330 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
331 else
332 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0;
333
334
335 /* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or
336 * RSA but we have a sign only certificate
337 *
338 * For ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange
339 * message only if the cipher suite is either
340 * ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, the
341 * server certificate contains the server's
342 * public key for key exchange.
343 */
344 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp
345 || (l & SSL_kECDHE)
346 || (l & (SSL_DH|SSL_kFZA))
347 || ((l & SSL_kRSA)
348 && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
349 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
350 && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
351 )
352 )
353 )
354 )
355 {
356 ret=ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);
357 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
358 }
359 else
360 skip=1;
361
362 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
363 s->init_num=0;
364 break;
365
366 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
367 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
368 if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
369 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
370 /* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set,
371 * don't request cert during re-negotiation: */
372 ((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
373 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
374 /* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites
375 * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts
376 * and in RFC 2246): */
377 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aNULL) &&
378 /* ... except when the application insists on verification
379 * (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */
380 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
381 /* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */
382 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aKRB5))
383 {
384 /* no cert request */
385 skip=1;
386 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=0;
387 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
388 }
389 else
390 {
391 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=1;
392 ret=ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
393 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
394 #ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
395 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
396 #else
397 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
398 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
399 #endif
400 s->init_num=0;
401 }
402 break;
403
404 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
405 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
406 ret=ssl3_send_server_done(s);
407 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
408 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
409 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
410 s->init_num=0;
411 break;
412
413 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
414 /* number of bytes to be flushed */
415 num1=BIO_ctrl(s->wbio,BIO_CTRL_INFO,0,NULL);
416 if (num1 > 0)
417 {
418 s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
419 num1=BIO_flush(s->wbio);
420 if (num1 <= 0) { ret= -1; goto end; }
421 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
422 }
423
424 s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state;
425 break;
426
427 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
428 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
429 /* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */
430 ret = ssl3_check_client_hello(s);
431 if (ret <= 0)
432 goto end;
433 if (ret == 2)
434 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C;
435 else {
436 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
437 {
438 ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
439 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
440 }
441 s->init_num=0;
442 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
443 }
444 break;
445
446 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
447 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
448 ret=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
449 if (ret <= 0)
450 goto end;
451 if (ret == 2)
452 {
453 /* For the ECDH ciphersuites when
454 * the client sends its ECDH pub key in
455 * a certificate, the CertificateVerify
456 * message is not sent.
457 */
458 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
459 s->init_num = 0;
460 }
461 else
462 {
463 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
464 s->init_num=0;
465
466 /* We need to get hashes here so if there is
467 * a client cert, it can be verified
468 */
469 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
470 &(s->s3->finish_dgst1),
471 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[0]));
472 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
473 &(s->s3->finish_dgst2),
474 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]));
475 }
476 break;
477
478 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
479 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
480
481 /* we should decide if we expected this one */
482 ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
483 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
484
485 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
486 s->init_num=0;
487 break;
488
489 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
490 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
491 ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
492 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
493 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
494 if (s->hit)
495 s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
496 else
497 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
498 s->init_num=0;
499 break;
500
501 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
502 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
503
504 s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
505 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
506 { ret= -1; goto end; }
507
508 ret=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
509 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
510
511 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
512 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
513 s->init_num=0;
514
515 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
516 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
517 {
518 ret= -1;
519 goto end;
520 }
521
522 break;
523
524 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
525 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
526 ret=ssl3_send_finished(s,
527 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
528 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
529 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
530 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
531 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
532 if (s->hit)
533 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
534 else
535 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK;
536 s->init_num=0;
537 break;
538
539 case SSL_ST_OK:
540 /* clean a few things up */
541 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
542
543 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
544 s->init_buf=NULL;
545
546 /* remove buffering on output */
547 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
548
549 s->init_num=0;
550
551 if (s->new_session == 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
552 {
553 /* actually not necessarily a 'new' session unless
554 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is set */
555
556 s->new_session=0;
557
558 ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
559
560 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
561 /* s->server=1; */
562 s->handshake_func=ssl3_accept;
563
564 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1);
565 }
566
567 ret = 1;
568 goto end;
569 /* break; */
570
571 default:
572 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
573 ret= -1;
574 goto end;
575 /* break; */
576 }
577
578 if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip)
579 {
580 if (s->debug)
581 {
582 if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
583 goto end;
584 }
585
586
587 if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state))
588 {
589 new_state=s->state;
590 s->state=state;
591 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP,1);
592 s->state=new_state;
593 }
594 }
595 skip=0;
596 }
597 end:
598 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
599
600 s->in_handshake--;
601 if (cb != NULL)
602 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT,ret);
603 return(ret);
604 }
605
606 int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
607 {
608 unsigned char *p;
609
610 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A)
611 {
612 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
613 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST;
614 *(p++)=0;
615 *(p++)=0;
616 *(p++)=0;
617
618 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
619 /* number of bytes to write */
620 s->init_num=4;
621 s->init_off=0;
622 }
623
624 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
625 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
626 }
627
628 int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s)
629 {
630 int ok;
631 long n;
632
633 /* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message,
634 * so permit appropriate message length */
635 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
636 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A,
637 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B,
638 -1,
639 s->max_cert_list,
640 &ok);
641 if (!ok) return((int)n);
642 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
643 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)
644 {
645 /* Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake,
646 * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.)
647 * I hope that tmp.dh is the only thing that may need to be cleared
648 * when a handshake is not completed ... */
649 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
650 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
651 {
652 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
653 s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
654 }
655 #endif
656 return 2;
657 }
658 return 1;
659 }
660
661 int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
662 {
663 int i,j,ok,al,ret= -1;
664 unsigned int cookie_len;
665 long n;
666 unsigned long id;
667 unsigned char *p,*d,*q;
668 SSL_CIPHER *c;
669 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
670 SSL_COMP *comp=NULL;
671 #endif
672 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers=NULL;
673
674 /* We do this so that we will respond with our native type.
675 * If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1,
676 * This down switching should be handled by a different method.
677 * If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with
678 * TLSv1.
679 */
680 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
681 {
682 s->first_packet=1;
683 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
684 }
685 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
686 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
687 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C,
688 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,
689 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
690 &ok);
691
692 if (!ok) return((int)n);
693 d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
694
695 /* use version from inside client hello, not from record header
696 * (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */
697 s->client_version=(((int)p[0])<<8)|(int)p[1];
698 p+=2;
699
700 if (s->client_version < s->version)
701 {
702 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
703 if ((s->client_version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
704 {
705 /* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
706 s->version = s->client_version;
707 }
708 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
709 goto f_err;
710 }
711
712 /* load the client random */
713 memcpy(s->s3->client_random,p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
714 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
715
716 /* get the session-id */
717 j= *(p++);
718
719 s->hit=0;
720 /* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow session reuse during renegotiation
721 * (i.e. when s->new_session is true), option
722 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is new with 0.9.7.
723 * Maybe this optional behaviour should always have been the default,
724 * but we cannot safely change the default behaviour (or new applications
725 * might be written that become totally unsecure when compiled with
726 * an earlier library version)
727 */
728 if (j == 0 || (s->new_session && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION)))
729 {
730 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
731 goto err;
732 }
733 else
734 {
735 i=ssl_get_prev_session(s,p,j);
736 if (i == 1)
737 { /* previous session */
738 s->hit=1;
739 }
740 else if (i == -1)
741 goto err;
742 else /* i == 0 */
743 {
744 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
745 goto err;
746 }
747 }
748
749 p+=j;
750
751 if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION)
752 {
753 /* cookie stuff */
754 cookie_len = *(p++);
755
756 if ( (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) &&
757 s->d1->send_cookie == 0)
758 {
759 /* HelloVerifyMessage has already been sent */
760 if ( cookie_len != s->d1->cookie_len)
761 {
762 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
763 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
764 goto f_err;
765 }
766 }
767
768 /*
769 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
770 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
771 * does not cause an overflow.
772 */
773 if ( cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie))
774 {
775 /* too much data */
776 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
777 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
778 goto f_err;
779 }
780
781 /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
782 if ( (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) &&
783 cookie_len > 0)
784 {
785 memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len);
786
787 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL)
788 {
789 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie,
790 cookie_len) == 0)
791 {
792 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
793 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
794 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
795 goto f_err;
796 }
797 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
798 }
799 else if ( memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
800 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) /* default verification */
801 {
802 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
803 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
804 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
805 goto f_err;
806 }
807 }
808
809 p += cookie_len;
810 }
811
812 n2s(p,i);
813 if ((i == 0) && (j != 0))
814 {
815 /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */
816 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
817 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
818 goto f_err;
819 }
820 if ((p+i) >= (d+n))
821 {
822 /* not enough data */
823 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
824 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
825 goto f_err;
826 }
827 if ((i > 0) && (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s,p,i,&(ciphers))
828 == NULL))
829 {
830 goto err;
831 }
832 p+=i;
833
834 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
835 if ((s->hit) && (i > 0))
836 {
837 j=0;
838 id=s->session->cipher->id;
839
840 #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
841 printf("client sent %d ciphers\n",sk_num(ciphers));
842 #endif
843 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++)
844 {
845 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers,i);
846 #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
847 printf("client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
848 i,sk_num(ciphers),SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
849 #endif
850 if (c->id == id)
851 {
852 j=1;
853 break;
854 }
855 }
856 if (j == 0)
857 {
858 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1))
859 {
860 /* Very bad for multi-threading.... */
861 s->session->cipher=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0);
862 }
863 else
864 {
865 /* we need to have the cipher in the cipher
866 * list if we are asked to reuse it */
867 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
868 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
869 goto f_err;
870 }
871 }
872 }
873
874 /* compression */
875 i= *(p++);
876 if ((p+i) > (d+n))
877 {
878 /* not enough data */
879 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
880 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
881 goto f_err;
882 }
883 q=p;
884 for (j=0; j<i; j++)
885 {
886 if (p[j] == 0) break;
887 }
888
889 p+=i;
890 if (j >= i)
891 {
892 /* no compress */
893 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
894 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
895 goto f_err;
896 }
897
898 /* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
899 * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
900 * algorithms from the client, starting at q. */
901 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=NULL;
902 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
903 if (s->ctx->comp_methods != NULL)
904 { /* See if we have a match */
905 int m,nn,o,v,done=0;
906
907 nn=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
908 for (m=0; m<nn; m++)
909 {
910 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
911 v=comp->id;
912 for (o=0; o<i; o++)
913 {
914 if (v == q[o])
915 {
916 done=1;
917 break;
918 }
919 }
920 if (done) break;
921 }
922 if (done)
923 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
924 else
925 comp=NULL;
926 }
927 #endif
928
929 /* TLS does not mind if there is extra stuff */
930 #if 0 /* SSL 3.0 does not mind either, so we should disable this test
931 * (was enabled in 0.9.6d through 0.9.6j and 0.9.7 through 0.9.7b,
932 * in earlier SSLeay/OpenSSL releases this test existed but was buggy) */
933 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
934 {
935 if (p < (d+n))
936 {
937 /* wrong number of bytes,
938 * there could be more to follow */
939 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
940 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
941 goto f_err;
942 }
943 }
944 #endif
945
946 /* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must
947 * pick a cipher */
948
949 if (!s->hit)
950 {
951 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
952 s->session->compress_meth=0;
953 #else
954 s->session->compress_meth=(comp == NULL)?0:comp->id;
955 #endif
956 if (s->session->ciphers != NULL)
957 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
958 s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
959 if (ciphers == NULL)
960 {
961 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
962 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED);
963 goto f_err;
964 }
965 ciphers=NULL;
966 c=ssl3_choose_cipher(s,s->session->ciphers,
967 SSL_get_ciphers(s));
968
969 if (c == NULL)
970 {
971 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
972 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
973 goto f_err;
974 }
975 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=c;
976 }
977 else
978 {
979 /* Session-id reuse */
980 #ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
981 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
982 SSL_CIPHER *nc=NULL;
983 SSL_CIPHER *ec=NULL;
984
985 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG)
986 {
987 sk=s->session->ciphers;
988 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++)
989 {
990 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,i);
991 if (c->algorithms & SSL_eNULL)
992 nc=c;
993 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c))
994 ec=c;
995 }
996 if (nc != NULL)
997 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=nc;
998 else if (ec != NULL)
999 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=ec;
1000 else
1001 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1002 }
1003 else
1004 #endif
1005 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1006 }
1007
1008 /* we now have the following setup.
1009 * client_random
1010 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
1011 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
1012 * compression - basically ignored right now
1013 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1014 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1015 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1016 * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
1017 */
1018
1019 ret=1;
1020 if (0)
1021 {
1022 f_err:
1023 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1024 }
1025 err:
1026 if (ciphers != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1027 return(ret);
1028 }
1029
1030 int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
1031 {
1032 unsigned char *buf;
1033 unsigned char *p,*d;
1034 int i,sl;
1035 unsigned long l,Time;
1036
1037 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1038 {
1039 buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1040 p=s->s3->server_random;
1041 Time=time(NULL); /* Time */
1042 l2n(Time,p);
1043 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0)
1044 return -1;
1045 /* Do the message type and length last */
1046 d=p= &(buf[4]);
1047
1048 *(p++)=s->version>>8;
1049 *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
1050
1051 /* Random stuff */
1052 memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1053 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1054
1055 /* now in theory we have 3 options to sending back the
1056 * session id. If it is a re-use, we send back the
1057 * old session-id, if it is a new session, we send
1058 * back the new session-id or we send back a 0 length
1059 * session-id if we want it to be single use.
1060 * Currently I will not implement the '0' length session-id
1061 * 12-Jan-98 - I'll now support the '0' length stuff.
1062 */
1063 if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER))
1064 s->session->session_id_length=0;
1065
1066 sl=s->session->session_id_length;
1067 if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id))
1068 {
1069 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1070 return -1;
1071 }
1072 *(p++)=sl;
1073 memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,sl);
1074 p+=sl;
1075
1076 /* put the cipher */
1077 i=ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,p);
1078 p+=i;
1079
1080 /* put the compression method */
1081 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1082 *(p++)=0;
1083 #else
1084 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1085 *(p++)=0;
1086 else
1087 *(p++)=s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
1088 #endif
1089
1090 /* do the header */
1091 l=(p-d);
1092 d=buf;
1093 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO;
1094 l2n3(l,d);
1095
1096 s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B;
1097 /* number of bytes to write */
1098 s->init_num=p-buf;
1099 s->init_off=0;
1100 }
1101
1102 /* SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B */
1103 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1104 }
1105
1106 int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)
1107 {
1108 unsigned char *p;
1109
1110 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A)
1111 {
1112 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1113
1114 /* do the header */
1115 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
1116 *(p++)=0;
1117 *(p++)=0;
1118 *(p++)=0;
1119
1120 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
1121 /* number of bytes to write */
1122 s->init_num=4;
1123 s->init_off=0;
1124 }
1125
1126 /* SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B */
1127 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1128 }
1129
1130 int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1131 {
1132 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1133 unsigned char *q;
1134 int j,num;
1135 RSA *rsa;
1136 unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
1137 unsigned int u;
1138 #endif
1139 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1140 DH *dh=NULL,*dhp;
1141 #endif
1142 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1143 EC_KEY *ecdh=NULL, *ecdhp;
1144 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1145 int encodedlen = 0;
1146 int curve_id = 0;
1147 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1148 #endif
1149 EVP_PKEY *pkey;
1150 unsigned char *p,*d;
1151 int al,i;
1152 unsigned long type;
1153 int n;
1154 CERT *cert;
1155 BIGNUM *r[4];
1156 int nr[4],kn;
1157 BUF_MEM *buf;
1158 EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
1159
1160 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
1161 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A)
1162 {
1163 type=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_MKEY_MASK;
1164 cert=s->cert;
1165
1166 buf=s->init_buf;
1167
1168 r[0]=r[1]=r[2]=r[3]=NULL;
1169 n=0;
1170 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1171 if (type & SSL_kRSA)
1172 {
1173 rsa=cert->rsa_tmp;
1174 if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL))
1175 {
1176 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s,
1177 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1178 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1179 if(rsa == NULL)
1180 {
1181 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1182 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1183 goto f_err;
1184 }
1185 RSA_up_ref(rsa);
1186 cert->rsa_tmp=rsa;
1187 }
1188 if (rsa == NULL)
1189 {
1190 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1191 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1192 goto f_err;
1193 }
1194 r[0]=rsa->n;
1195 r[1]=rsa->e;
1196 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
1197 }
1198 else
1199 #endif
1200 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1201 if (type & SSL_kEDH)
1202 {
1203 dhp=cert->dh_tmp;
1204 if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1205 dhp=s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s,
1206 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1207 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1208 if (dhp == NULL)
1209 {
1210 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1211 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1212 goto f_err;
1213 }
1214
1215 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
1216 {
1217 DH_free(dh);
1218 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1219 goto err;
1220 }
1221
1222 if ((dh=DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL)
1223 {
1224 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1225 goto err;
1226 }
1227
1228 s->s3->tmp.dh=dh;
1229 if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL ||
1230 dhp->priv_key == NULL ||
1231 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE)))
1232 {
1233 if(!DH_generate_key(dh))
1234 {
1235 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1236 ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1237 goto err;
1238 }
1239 }
1240 else
1241 {
1242 dh->pub_key=BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
1243 dh->priv_key=BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
1244 if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) ||
1245 (dh->priv_key == NULL))
1246 {
1247 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1248 goto err;
1249 }
1250 }
1251 r[0]=dh->p;
1252 r[1]=dh->g;
1253 r[2]=dh->pub_key;
1254 }
1255 else
1256 #endif
1257 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1258 if (type & SSL_kECDHE)
1259 {
1260 const EC_GROUP *group;
1261
1262 ecdhp=cert->ecdh_tmp;
1263 if ((ecdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1264 {
1265 ecdhp=s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s,
1266 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1267 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1268 }
1269 if (ecdhp == NULL)
1270 {
1271 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1272 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
1273 goto f_err;
1274 }
1275
1276 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
1277 {
1278 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
1279 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1280 goto err;
1281 }
1282
1283 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
1284 if (ecdhp == NULL)
1285 {
1286 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1287 goto err;
1288 }
1289 if (!EC_KEY_up_ref(ecdhp))
1290 {
1291 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1292 goto err;
1293 }
1294 ecdh = ecdhp;
1295
1296 s->s3->tmp.ecdh=ecdh;
1297 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1298 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1299 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE))
1300 {
1301 if(!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh))
1302 {
1303 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1304 goto err;
1305 }
1306 }
1307
1308 if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||
1309 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1310 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL))
1311 {
1312 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1313 goto err;
1314 }
1315
1316 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
1317 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163))
1318 {
1319 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
1320 goto err;
1321 }
1322
1323 /* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH
1324 * keys over named (not generic) curves. For
1325 * supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero.
1326 */
1327 if ((curve_id =
1328 nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)))
1329 == 0)
1330 {
1331 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
1332 goto err;
1333 }
1334
1335 /* Encode the public key.
1336 * First check the size of encoding and
1337 * allocate memory accordingly.
1338 */
1339 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1340 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1341 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1342 NULL, 0, NULL);
1343
1344 encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
1345 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen*sizeof(unsigned char));
1346 bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
1347 if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL))
1348 {
1349 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1350 goto err;
1351 }
1352
1353
1354 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1355 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1356 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1357 encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
1358
1359 if (encodedlen == 0)
1360 {
1361 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1362 goto err;
1363 }
1364
1365 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); bn_ctx=NULL;
1366
1367 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not
1368 * generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges.
1369 * In this situation, we need three additional bytes
1370 * to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
1371 * structure.
1372 */
1373 n = 3 + encodedlen;
1374
1375 /* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message
1376 * explicitly so we can set these to NULLs
1377 */
1378 r[0]=NULL;
1379 r[1]=NULL;
1380 r[2]=NULL;
1381 }
1382 else
1383 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
1384 {
1385 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1386 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
1387 goto f_err;
1388 }
1389 for (i=0; r[i] != NULL; i++)
1390 {
1391 nr[i]=BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
1392 n+=2+nr[i];
1393 }
1394
1395 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aNULL))
1396 {
1397 if ((pkey=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s,s->s3->tmp.new_cipher))
1398 == NULL)
1399 {
1400 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1401 goto f_err;
1402 }
1403 kn=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1404 }
1405 else
1406 {
1407 pkey=NULL;
1408 kn=0;
1409 }
1410
1411 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,n+4+kn))
1412 {
1413 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_BUF);
1414 goto err;
1415 }
1416 d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1417 p= &(d[4]);
1418
1419 for (i=0; r[i] != NULL; i++)
1420 {
1421 s2n(nr[i],p);
1422 BN_bn2bin(r[i],p);
1423 p+=nr[i];
1424 }
1425
1426 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1427 if (type & SSL_kECDHE)
1428 {
1429 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves.
1430 * In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has:
1431 * [1 byte CurveType], [1 byte CurveName]
1432 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by
1433 * the actual encoded point itself
1434 */
1435 *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
1436 p += 1;
1437 *p = curve_id;
1438 p += 1;
1439 *p = encodedlen;
1440 p += 1;
1441 memcpy((unsigned char*)p,
1442 (unsigned char *)encodedPoint,
1443 encodedlen);
1444 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1445 p += encodedlen;
1446 }
1447 #endif
1448
1449 /* not anonymous */
1450 if (pkey != NULL)
1451 {
1452 /* n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4])
1453 * and p points to the space at the end. */
1454 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1455 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
1456 {
1457 q=md_buf;
1458 j=0;
1459 for (num=2; num > 0; num--)
1460 {
1461 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2)
1462 ?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
1463 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1464 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1465 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1466 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q,
1467 (unsigned int *)&i);
1468 q+=i;
1469 j+=i;
1470 }
1471 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,
1472 &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0)
1473 {
1474 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_RSA);
1475 goto err;
1476 }
1477 s2n(u,p);
1478 n+=u+2;
1479 }
1480 else
1481 #endif
1482 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA)
1483 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
1484 {
1485 /* lets do DSS */
1486 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_dss1(), NULL);
1487 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1488 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1489 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1490 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
1491 (unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
1492 {
1493 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_DSA);
1494 goto err;
1495 }
1496 s2n(i,p);
1497 n+=i+2;
1498 }
1499 else
1500 #endif
1501 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA)
1502 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
1503 {
1504 /* let's do ECDSA */
1505 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_ecdsa(), NULL);
1506 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1507 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1508 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1509 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
1510 (unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
1511 {
1512 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_ECDSA);
1513 goto err;
1514 }
1515 s2n(i,p);
1516 n+=i+2;
1517 }
1518 else
1519 #endif
1520 {
1521 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
1522 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1523 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
1524 goto f_err;
1525 }
1526 }
1527
1528 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE;
1529 l2n3(n,d);
1530
1531 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
1532 * it off */
1533 s->init_num=n+4;
1534 s->init_off=0;
1535 }
1536
1537 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
1538 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
1539 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1540 f_err:
1541 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1542 err:
1543 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1544 if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1545 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
1546 #endif
1547 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
1548 return(-1);
1549 }
1550
1551 int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
1552 {
1553 unsigned char *p,*d;
1554 int i,j,nl,off,n;
1555 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk=NULL;
1556 X509_NAME *name;
1557 BUF_MEM *buf;
1558
1559 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A)
1560 {
1561 buf=s->init_buf;
1562
1563 d=p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4]);
1564
1565 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
1566 p++;
1567 n=ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s,p);
1568 d[0]=n;
1569 p+=n;
1570 n++;
1571
1572 off=n;
1573 p+=2;
1574 n+=2;
1575
1576 sk=SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
1577 nl=0;
1578 if (sk != NULL)
1579 {
1580 for (i=0; i<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++)
1581 {
1582 name=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i);
1583 j=i2d_X509_NAME(name,NULL);
1584 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,4+n+j+2))
1585 {
1586 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
1587 goto err;
1588 }
1589 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+n]);
1590 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG))
1591 {
1592 s2n(j,p);
1593 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
1594 n+=2+j;
1595 nl+=2+j;
1596 }
1597 else
1598 {
1599 d=p;
1600 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
1601 j-=2; s2n(j,d); j+=2;
1602 n+=j;
1603 nl+=j;
1604 }
1605 }
1606 }
1607 /* else no CA names */
1608 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+off]);
1609 s2n(nl,p);
1610
1611 d=(unsigned char *)buf->data;
1612 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
1613 l2n3(n,d);
1614
1615 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
1616 * it off */
1617
1618 s->init_num=n+4;
1619 s->init_off=0;
1620 #ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
1621 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num;
1622
1623 /* do the header */
1624 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
1625 *(p++)=0;
1626 *(p++)=0;
1627 *(p++)=0;
1628 s->init_num += 4;
1629 #endif
1630
1631 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
1632 }
1633
1634 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
1635 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1636 err:
1637 return(-1);
1638 }
1639
1640
1641 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1642 static const int KDF1_SHA1_len = 20;
1643 static void *KDF1_SHA1(const void *in, size_t inlen, void *out, size_t *outlen)
1644 {
1645 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
1646 if (*outlen < SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH)
1647 return NULL;
1648 else
1649 *outlen = SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH;
1650 return SHA1(in, inlen, out);
1651 #else
1652 return NULL;
1653 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SHA */
1654 }
1655 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
1656
1657 int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1658 {
1659 int i,al,ok;
1660 long n;
1661 unsigned long l;
1662 unsigned char *p;
1663 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1664 RSA *rsa=NULL;
1665 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
1666 #endif
1667 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1668 BIGNUM *pub=NULL;
1669 DH *dh_srvr;
1670 #endif
1671 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1672 KSSL_ERR kssl_err;
1673 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
1674
1675 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1676 EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;
1677 EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
1678 EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
1679 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1680 #endif
1681
1682 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
1683 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
1684 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B,
1685 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1686 2048, /* ??? */
1687 &ok);
1688
1689 if (!ok) return((int)n);
1690 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
1691
1692 l=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms;
1693
1694 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1695 if (l & SSL_kRSA)
1696 {
1697 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
1698 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp)
1699 {
1700 if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL))
1701 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp;
1702 /* Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should
1703 * be sent already */
1704 if (rsa == NULL)
1705 {
1706 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1707 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY);
1708 goto f_err;
1709
1710 }
1711 }
1712 else
1713 {
1714 pkey=s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey;
1715 if ( (pkey == NULL) ||
1716 (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) ||
1717 (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL))
1718 {
1719 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1720 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
1721 goto f_err;
1722 }
1723 rsa=pkey->pkey.rsa;
1724 }
1725
1726 /* TLS */
1727 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION)
1728 {
1729 n2s(p,i);
1730 if (n != i+2)
1731 {
1732 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG))
1733 {
1734 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
1735 goto err;
1736 }
1737 else
1738 p-=2;
1739 }
1740 else
1741 n=i;
1742 }
1743
1744 i=RSA_private_decrypt((int)n,p,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
1745
1746 al = -1;
1747
1748 if (i != SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
1749 {
1750 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1751 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); */
1752 }
1753
1754 if ((al == -1) && !((p[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
1755 {
1756 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
1757 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
1758 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
1759 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
1760 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
1761 * protocol version.
1762 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. */
1763 if (!((s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) &&
1764 (p[0] == (s->version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->version & 0xff))))
1765 {
1766 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1767 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER); */
1768
1769 /* The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
1770 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version
1771 * number check as a "bad version oracle" -- an alert would
1772 * reveal that the plaintext corresponding to some ciphertext
1773 * made up by the adversary is properly formatted except
1774 * that the version number is wrong. To avoid such attacks,
1775 * we should treat this just like any other decryption error. */
1776 }
1777 }
1778
1779 if (al != -1)
1780 {
1781 /* Some decryption failure -- use random value instead as countermeasure
1782 * against Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding
1783 * (see RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). */
1784 ERR_clear_error();
1785 i = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
1786 p[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
1787 p[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
1788 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p+2, i-2) <= 0) /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure */
1789 goto err;
1790 }
1791
1792 s->session->master_key_length=
1793 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
1794 s->session->master_key,
1795 p,i);
1796 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
1797 }
1798 else
1799 #endif
1800 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1801 if (l & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
1802 {
1803 n2s(p,i);
1804 if (n != i+2)
1805 {
1806 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG))
1807 {
1808 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
1809 goto err;
1810 }
1811 else
1812 {
1813 p-=2;
1814 i=(int)n;
1815 }
1816 }
1817
1818 if (n == 0L) /* the parameters are in the cert */
1819 {
1820 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1821 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_DH_CERTS);
1822 goto f_err;
1823 }
1824 else
1825 {
1826 if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL)
1827 {
1828 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1829 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1830 goto f_err;
1831 }
1832 else
1833 dh_srvr=s->s3->tmp.dh;
1834 }
1835
1836 pub=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL);
1837 if (pub == NULL)
1838 {
1839 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BN_LIB);
1840 goto err;
1841 }
1842
1843 i=DH_compute_key(p,pub,dh_srvr);
1844
1845 if (i <= 0)
1846 {
1847 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1848 goto err;
1849 }
1850
1851 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
1852 s->s3->tmp.dh=NULL;
1853
1854 BN_clear_free(pub);
1855 pub=NULL;
1856 s->session->master_key_length=
1857 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
1858 s->session->master_key,p,i);
1859 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
1860 }
1861 else
1862 #endif
1863 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1864 if (l & SSL_kKRB5)
1865 {
1866 krb5_error_code krb5rc;
1867 krb5_data enc_ticket;
1868 krb5_data authenticator;
1869 krb5_data enc_pms;
1870 KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
1871 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
1872 EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
1873 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
1874 unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
1875 + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
1876 int padl, outl;
1877 krb5_timestamp authtime = 0;
1878 krb5_ticket_times ttimes;
1879
1880 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
1881
1882 if (!kssl_ctx) kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
1883
1884 n2s(p,i);
1885 enc_ticket.length = i;
1886
1887 if (n < enc_ticket.length + 6)
1888 {
1889 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1890 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1891 goto err;
1892 }
1893
1894 enc_ticket.data = (char *)p;
1895 p+=enc_ticket.length;
1896
1897 n2s(p,i);
1898 authenticator.length = i;
1899
1900 if (n < enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 6)
1901 {
1902 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1903 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1904 goto err;
1905 }
1906
1907 authenticator.data = (char *)p;
1908 p+=authenticator.length;
1909
1910 n2s(p,i);
1911 enc_pms.length = i;
1912 enc_pms.data = (char *)p;
1913 p+=enc_pms.length;
1914
1915 /* Note that the length is checked again below,
1916 ** after decryption
1917 */
1918 if(enc_pms.length > sizeof pms)
1919 {
1920 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1921 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1922 goto err;
1923 }
1924
1925 if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length +
1926 enc_pms.length + 6))
1927 {
1928 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1929 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1930 goto err;
1931 }
1932
1933 if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes,
1934 &kssl_err)) != 0)
1935 {
1936 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
1937 printf("kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
1938 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
1939 if (kssl_err.text)
1940 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
1941 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
1942 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1943 kssl_err.reason);
1944 goto err;
1945 }
1946
1947 /* Note: no authenticator is not considered an error,
1948 ** but will return authtime == 0.
1949 */
1950 if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator,
1951 &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0)
1952 {
1953 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
1954 printf("kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
1955 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
1956 if (kssl_err.text)
1957 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
1958 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
1959 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1960 kssl_err.reason);
1961 goto err;
1962 }
1963
1964 if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0)
1965 {
1966 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc);
1967 goto err;
1968 }
1969
1970 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
1971 kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
1972 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
1973
1974 enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
1975 if (enc == NULL)
1976 goto err;
1977
1978 memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
1979
1980 if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc,NULL,kssl_ctx->key,iv))
1981 {
1982 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1983 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
1984 goto err;
1985 }
1986 if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms,&outl,
1987 (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length))
1988 {
1989 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1990 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
1991 goto err;
1992 }
1993 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
1994 {
1995 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1996 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1997 goto err;
1998 }
1999 if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx,&(pms[outl]),&padl))
2000 {
2001 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2002 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2003 goto err;
2004 }
2005 outl += padl;
2006 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2007 {
2008 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2009 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2010 goto err;
2011 }
2012 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
2013
2014 s->session->master_key_length=
2015 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2016 s->session->master_key, pms, outl);
2017
2018 if (kssl_ctx->client_princ)
2019 {
2020 int len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
2021 if ( len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH )
2022 {
2023 s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len;
2024 memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ,kssl_ctx->client_princ,len);
2025 }
2026 }
2027
2028
2029 /* Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
2030 ** but it caused problems for apache.
2031 ** kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
2032 ** if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
2033 */
2034 }
2035 else
2036 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2037
2038 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2039 if ((l & SSL_kECDH) || (l & SSL_kECDHE))
2040 {
2041 int ret = 1;
2042 int field_size = 0;
2043 const EC_KEY *tkey;
2044 const EC_GROUP *group;
2045 const BIGNUM *priv_key;
2046
2047 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
2048 if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL)
2049 {
2050 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2051 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2052 goto err;
2053 }
2054
2055 /* Let's get server private key and group information */
2056 if (l & SSL_kECDH)
2057 {
2058 /* use the certificate */
2059 tkey = s->cert->key->privatekey->pkey.ec;
2060 }
2061 else
2062 {
2063 /* use the ephermeral values we saved when
2064 * generating the ServerKeyExchange msg.
2065 */
2066 tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh;
2067 }
2068
2069 group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
2070 priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
2071
2072 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) ||
2073 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key))
2074 {
2075 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2076 ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2077 goto err;
2078 }
2079
2080 /* Let's get client's public key */
2081 if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL)
2082 {
2083 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2084 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2085 goto err;
2086 }
2087
2088 if (n == 0L)
2089 {
2090 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
2091
2092 if (l & SSL_kECDHE)
2093 {
2094 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2095 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
2096 goto f_err;
2097 }
2098 if (((clnt_pub_pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer))
2099 == NULL) ||
2100 (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC))
2101 {
2102 /* XXX: For now, we do not support client
2103 * authentication using ECDH certificates
2104 * so this branch (n == 0L) of the code is
2105 * never executed. When that support is
2106 * added, we ought to ensure the key
2107 * received in the certificate is
2108 * authorized for key agreement.
2109 * ECDH_compute_key implicitly checks that
2110 * the two ECDH shares are for the same
2111 * group.
2112 */
2113 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2114 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2115 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS);
2116 goto f_err;
2117 }
2118
2119 EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,
2120 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->pkey.ec));
2121 ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
2122 }
2123 else
2124 {
2125 /* Get client's public key from encoded point
2126 * in the ClientKeyExchange message.
2127 */
2128 if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
2129 {
2130 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2131 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2132 goto err;
2133 }
2134
2135 /* Get encoded point length */
2136 i = *p;
2137 p += 1;
2138 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group,
2139 clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0)
2140 {
2141 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2142 ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2143 goto err;
2144 }
2145 /* p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer
2146 * currently, so set it to the start
2147 */
2148 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2149 }
2150
2151 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
2152 field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
2153 if (field_size <= 0)
2154 {
2155 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2156 ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
2157 goto err;
2158 }
2159 /* If field size is not more than 24 octets, then use SHA-1 hash of result;
2160 * otherwise, use result (see section 4.8 of draft-ietf-tls-ecc-03.txt;
2161 * this is new with this version of the Internet Draft).
2162 */
2163 if (field_size <= 24 * 8)
2164 i = ECDH_compute_key(p, KDF1_SHA1_len, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh, KDF1_SHA1);
2165 else
2166 i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size+7)/8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh, NULL);
2167 if (i <= 0)
2168 {
2169 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2170 ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
2171 goto err;
2172 }
2173
2174 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2175 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2176 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
2177 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2178 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2179
2180 /* Compute the master secret */
2181 s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc-> \
2182 generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, p, i);
2183
2184 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
2185 return (ret);
2186 }
2187 else
2188 #endif
2189 {
2190 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2191 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2192 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
2193 goto f_err;
2194 }
2195
2196 return(1);
2197 f_err:
2198 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2199 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH)
2200 err:
2201 #endif
2202 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2203 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2204 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2205 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
2206 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2207 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2208 #endif
2209 return(-1);
2210 }
2211
2212 int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
2213 {
2214 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
2215 unsigned char *p;
2216 int al,ok,ret=0;
2217 long n;
2218 int type=0,i,j;
2219 X509 *peer;
2220
2221 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2222 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
2223 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,
2224 -1,
2225 514, /* 514? */
2226 &ok);
2227
2228 if (!ok) return((int)n);
2229
2230 if (s->session->peer != NULL)
2231 {
2232 peer=s->session->peer;
2233 pkey=X509_get_pubkey(peer);
2234 type=X509_certificate_type(peer,pkey);
2235 }
2236 else
2237 {
2238 peer=NULL;
2239 pkey=NULL;
2240 }
2241
2242 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY)
2243 {
2244 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
2245 if ((peer != NULL) && (type | EVP_PKT_SIGN))
2246 {
2247 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2248 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE);
2249 goto f_err;
2250 }
2251 ret=1;
2252 goto end;
2253 }
2254
2255 if (peer == NULL)
2256 {
2257 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED);
2258 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2259 goto f_err;
2260 }
2261
2262 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
2263 {
2264 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
2265 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2266 goto f_err;
2267 }
2268
2269 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
2270 {
2271 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
2272 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2273 goto f_err;
2274 }
2275
2276 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
2277 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2278 n2s(p,i);
2279 n-=2;
2280 if (i > n)
2281 {
2282 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2283 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2284 goto f_err;
2285 }
2286
2287 j=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
2288 if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0))
2289 {
2290 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
2291 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2292 goto f_err;
2293 }
2294
2295 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2296 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
2297 {
2298 i=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
2299 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i,
2300 pkey->pkey.rsa);
2301 if (i < 0)
2302 {
2303 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2304 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
2305 goto f_err;
2306 }
2307 if (i == 0)
2308 {
2309 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2310 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE);
2311 goto f_err;
2312 }
2313 }
2314 else
2315 #endif
2316 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2317 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
2318 {
2319 j=DSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
2320 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
2321 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.dsa);
2322 if (j <= 0)
2323 {
2324 /* bad signature */
2325 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2326 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE);
2327 goto f_err;
2328 }
2329 }
2330 else
2331 #endif
2332 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
2333 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
2334 {
2335 j=ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
2336 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
2337 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.ec);
2338 if (j <= 0)
2339 {
2340 /* bad signature */
2341 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2342 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
2343 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
2344 goto f_err;
2345 }
2346 }
2347 else
2348 #endif
2349 {
2350 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2351 al=SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
2352 goto f_err;
2353 }
2354
2355
2356 ret=1;
2357 if (0)
2358 {
2359 f_err:
2360 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2361 }
2362 end:
2363 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
2364 return(ret);
2365 }
2366
2367 int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
2368 {
2369 int i,ok,al,ret= -1;
2370 X509 *x=NULL;
2371 unsigned long l,nc,llen,n;
2372 const unsigned char *p,*q;
2373 unsigned char *d;
2374 STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL;
2375
2376 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2377 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A,
2378 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B,
2379 -1,
2380 s->max_cert_list,
2381 &ok);
2382
2383 if (!ok) return((int)n);
2384
2385 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE)
2386 {
2387 if ( (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
2388 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
2389 {
2390 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
2391 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2392 goto f_err;
2393 }
2394 /* If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list */
2395 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
2396 {
2397 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST);
2398 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2399 goto f_err;
2400 }
2401 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
2402 return(1);
2403 }
2404
2405 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE)
2406 {
2407 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2408 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
2409 goto f_err;
2410 }
2411 p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2412
2413 if ((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)
2414 {
2415 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2416 goto err;
2417 }
2418
2419 n2l3(p,llen);
2420 if (llen+3 != n)
2421 {
2422 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2423 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2424 goto f_err;
2425 }
2426 for (nc=0; nc<llen; )
2427 {
2428 n2l3(p,l);
2429 if ((l+nc+3) > llen)
2430 {
2431 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2432 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2433 goto f_err;
2434 }
2435
2436 q=p;
2437 x=d2i_X509(NULL,&p,l);
2438 if (x == NULL)
2439 {
2440 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
2441 goto err;
2442 }
2443 if (p != (q+l))
2444 {
2445 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2446 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2447 goto f_err;
2448 }
2449 if (!sk_X509_push(sk,x))
2450 {
2451 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2452 goto err;
2453 }
2454 x=NULL;
2455 nc+=l+3;
2456 }
2457
2458 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0)
2459 {
2460 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
2461 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
2462 {
2463 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2464 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
2465 goto f_err;
2466 }
2467 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
2468 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
2469 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
2470 {
2471 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
2472 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2473 goto f_err;
2474 }
2475 }
2476 else
2477 {
2478 i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk);
2479 if (!i)
2480 {
2481 al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
2482 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_RETURNED);
2483 goto f_err;
2484 }
2485 }
2486
2487 if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */
2488 X509_free(s->session->peer);
2489 s->session->peer=sk_X509_shift(sk);
2490 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
2491
2492 /* With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL
2493 * when we arrive here. */
2494 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
2495 {
2496 s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
2497 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
2498 {
2499 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2500 goto err;
2501 }
2502 }
2503 if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL)
2504 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free);
2505 s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain=sk;
2506 /* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the
2507 * peer's own certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c */
2508
2509 sk=NULL;
2510
2511 ret=1;
2512 if (0)
2513 {
2514 f_err:
2515 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2516 }
2517 err:
2518 if (x != NULL) X509_free(x);
2519 if (sk != NULL) sk_X509_pop_free(sk,X509_free);
2520 return(ret);
2521 }
2522
2523 int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
2524 {
2525 unsigned long l;
2526 X509 *x;
2527
2528 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A)
2529 {
2530 x=ssl_get_server_send_cert(s);
2531 if (x == NULL &&
2532 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
2533 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms
2534 & (SSL_MKEY_MASK|SSL_AUTH_MASK))
2535 != (SSL_aKRB5|SSL_kKRB5))
2536 {
2537 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2538 return(0);
2539 }
2540
2541 l=ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,x);
2542 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
2543 s->init_num=(int)l;
2544 s->init_off=0;
2545 }
2546
2547 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
2548 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
2549 }
2550
2551
2552 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2553 /* This is the complement of curve_id2nid in s3_clnt.c. */
2554 static int nid2curve_id(int nid)
2555 {
2556 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-01.txt (Mar 15, 2001)
2557 * (no changes in draft-ietf-tls-ecc-03.txt [June 2003]) */
2558 switch (nid) {
2559 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
2560 return 1;
2561 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
2562 return 2;
2563 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
2564 return 3;
2565 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
2566 return 4;
2567 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
2568 return 5;
2569 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
2570 return 6;
2571 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
2572 return 7;
2573 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
2574 return 8;
2575 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
2576 return 9;
2577 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
2578 return 10;
2579 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
2580 return 11;
2581 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
2582 return 12;
2583 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
2584 return 13;
2585 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
2586 return 14;
2587 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
2588 return 15;
2589 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
2590 return 16;
2591 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
2592 return 17;
2593 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
2594 return 18;
2595 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
2596 return 19;
2597 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
2598 return 20;
2599 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
2600 return 21;
2601 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
2602 return 22;
2603 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
2604 return 23;
2605 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
2606 return 24;
2607 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
2608 return 25;
2609 default:
2610 return 0;
2611 }
2612 }
2613 #endif
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