1 /* ssl/s3_srvr.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
124 /* ====================================================================
125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
142 * to make use of the Contribution.
144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
151 #define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
152 #define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
155 #include "ssl_locl.h"
156 #include "kssl_lcl.h"
157 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
158 #include <openssl/rand.h>
159 #include <openssl/objects.h>
160 #include <openssl/evp.h>
161 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
162 #include <openssl/x509.h>
163 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
164 #include <openssl/dh.h>
166 #include <openssl/bn.h>
167 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
168 #include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
170 #include <openssl/md5.h>
172 static const SSL_METHOD
*ssl3_get_server_method(int ver
);
174 static const SSL_METHOD
*ssl3_get_server_method(int ver
)
176 if (ver
== SSL3_VERSION
)
177 return(SSLv3_server_method());
182 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
183 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL
*s
, int *al
)
185 int ret
= SSL_ERROR_NONE
;
187 *al
= SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME
;
189 if ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kSRP
) &&
190 (s
->srp_ctx
.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback
!= NULL
))
192 if(s
->srp_ctx
.login
== NULL
)
194 /* RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject,
195 we do so if There is no srp login name */
197 *al
= SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY
;
201 ret
= SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s
,al
);
208 IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method
,
210 ssl_undefined_function
,
211 ssl3_get_server_method
)
213 int ssl3_accept(SSL
*s
)
216 unsigned long alg_k
,Time
=(unsigned long)time(NULL
);
217 void (*cb
)(const SSL
*ssl
,int type
,int val
)=NULL
;
219 int new_state
,state
,skip
=0;
221 RAND_add(&Time
,sizeof(Time
),0);
225 if (s
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
227 else if (s
->ctx
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
228 cb
=s
->ctx
->info_callback
;
230 /* init things to blank */
232 if (!SSL_in_init(s
) || SSL_in_before(s
)) SSL_clear(s
);
236 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT
,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET
);
240 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
241 /* If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we
242 * already got and don't await it anymore, because
243 * Heartbeats don't make sense during handshakes anyway.
245 if (s
->tlsext_hb_pending
)
247 s
->tlsext_hb_pending
= 0;
258 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE
:
260 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
264 case SSL_ST_BEFORE
|SSL_ST_ACCEPT
:
265 case SSL_ST_OK
|SSL_ST_ACCEPT
:
268 if (cb
!= NULL
) cb(s
,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START
,1);
270 if ((s
->version
>>8) != 3)
272 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
275 s
->type
=SSL_ST_ACCEPT
;
277 if (s
->init_buf
== NULL
)
279 if ((buf
=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL
)
284 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf
,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
))
292 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s
))
299 s
->s3
->flags
&= ~SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE
;
300 s
->s3
->flags
&= ~TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY
;
302 if (s
->state
!= SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE
)
304 /* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that
305 * the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
307 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s
,1)) { ret
= -1; goto end
; }
309 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s
);
310 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A
;
311 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_accept
++;
313 else if (!s
->s3
->send_connection_binding
&&
314 !(s
->options
& SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION
))
316 /* Server attempting to renegotiate with
317 * client that doesn't support secure
320 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT
, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED
);
321 ssl3_send_alert(s
,SSL3_AL_FATAL
,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
327 /* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE,
328 * we will just send a HelloRequest */
329 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_accept_renegotiate
++;
330 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A
;
334 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A
:
335 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B
:
338 ret
=ssl3_send_hello_request(s
);
339 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
340 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C
;
341 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH
;
344 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s
);
347 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C
:
351 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A
:
352 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B
:
353 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C
:
355 if (s
->rwstate
!= SSL_X509_LOOKUP
)
357 ret
=ssl3_get_client_hello(s
);
358 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
360 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
363 if ((ret
= ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s
,&al
)) < 0)
365 /* callback indicates firther work to be done */
366 s
->rwstate
=SSL_X509_LOOKUP
;
369 if (ret
!= SSL_ERROR_NONE
)
371 ssl3_send_alert(s
,SSL3_AL_FATAL
,al
);
372 /* This is not really an error but the only means to
373 for a client to detect whether srp is supported. */
374 if (al
!= TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY
)
375 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT
,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
);
376 ret
= SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL
;
384 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A
;
388 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A
:
389 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B
:
390 ret
=ssl3_send_server_hello(s
);
391 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
392 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
395 if (s
->tlsext_ticket_expected
)
396 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A
;
398 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A
;
402 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A
;
405 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
406 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA_A
;
408 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A
;
413 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
414 case SSL3_ST_SW_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA_A
:
415 case SSL3_ST_SW_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA_B
:
416 /* We promised to send an audit proof in the hello. */
417 if (s
->s3
->tlsext_authz_promised_to_client
)
419 ret
= tls1_send_server_supplemental_data(s
);
420 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
425 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A
;
430 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A
:
431 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B
:
432 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
433 /* normal PSK or KRB5 or SRP */
434 if (!(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aNULL
)
435 && !(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kPSK
)
436 && !(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aKRB5
))
438 ret
=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s
);
439 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
440 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
441 if (s
->tlsext_status_expected
)
442 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A
;
444 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A
;
449 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A
;
456 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A
;
461 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A
:
462 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B
:
463 alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
465 /* clear this, it may get reset by
466 * send_server_key_exchange */
467 if ((s
->options
& SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA
)
468 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
469 && !(alg_k
& SSL_kKRB5
)
470 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
472 /* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key
473 * even when forbidden by protocol specs
474 * (handshake may fail as clients are not required to
475 * be able to handle this) */
476 s
->s3
->tmp
.use_rsa_tmp
=1;
478 s
->s3
->tmp
.use_rsa_tmp
=0;
481 /* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or
482 * RSA but we have a sign only certificate
484 * PSK: may send PSK identity hints
486 * For ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange
487 * message only if the cipher suite is either
488 * ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, the
489 * server certificate contains the server's
490 * public key for key exchange.
492 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.use_rsa_tmp
493 /* PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity
494 * hint if provided */
495 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
496 || ((alg_k
& SSL_kPSK
) && s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
)
498 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
499 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
500 || (alg_k
& SSL_kSRP
)
502 || (alg_k
& SSL_kEDH
)
503 || (alg_k
& SSL_kEECDH
)
504 || ((alg_k
& SSL_kRSA
)
505 && (s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
].privatekey
== NULL
506 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
)
507 && EVP_PKEY_size(s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
].privatekey
)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
)
513 ret
=ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s
);
514 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
519 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A
;
523 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A
:
524 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B
:
525 if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
526 !(s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
) ||
527 /* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set,
528 * don't request cert during re-negotiation: */
529 ((s
->session
->peer
!= NULL
) &&
530 (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE
)) ||
531 /* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites
532 * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts
533 * and in RFC 2246): */
534 ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aNULL
) &&
535 /* ... except when the application insists on verification
536 * (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */
537 !(s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT
)) ||
538 /* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */
539 (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aKRB5
)
540 /* With normal PSK Certificates and
541 * Certificate Requests are omitted */
542 || (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kPSK
))
544 /* no cert request */
546 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
=0;
547 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A
;
548 if (s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
)
549 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
))
554 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
=1;
555 ret
=ssl3_send_certificate_request(s
);
556 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
557 #ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
558 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A
;
560 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH
;
561 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A
;
567 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A
:
568 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B
:
569 ret
=ssl3_send_server_done(s
);
570 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
571 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A
;
572 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH
;
576 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH
:
578 /* This code originally checked to see if
579 * any data was pending using BIO_CTRL_INFO
580 * and then flushed. This caused problems
581 * as documented in PR#1939. The proposed
582 * fix doesn't completely resolve this issue
583 * as buggy implementations of BIO_CTRL_PENDING
584 * still exist. So instead we just flush
588 s
->rwstate
=SSL_WRITING
;
589 if (BIO_flush(s
->wbio
) <= 0)
594 s
->rwstate
=SSL_NOTHING
;
596 s
->state
=s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
;
599 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A
:
600 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B
:
601 /* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */
602 ret
= ssl3_check_client_hello(s
);
606 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C
;
608 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
)
610 ret
=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s
);
611 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
614 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A
;
618 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A
:
619 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B
:
620 ret
=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s
);
625 /* For the ECDH ciphersuites when
626 * the client sends its ECDH pub key in
627 * a certificate, the CertificateVerify
628 * message is not sent.
629 * Also for GOST ciphersuites when
630 * the client uses its key from the certificate
633 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
634 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
;
636 if (s
->s3
->next_proto_neg_seen
)
637 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A
;
639 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
;
643 else if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
))
645 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A
;
647 if (!s
->session
->peer
)
649 /* For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer
650 * at this point and digest cached records.
652 if (!s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
)
654 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT
,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
657 s
->s3
->flags
|= TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE
;
658 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
))
666 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A
;
669 /* We need to get hashes here so if there is
670 * a client cert, it can be verified
671 * FIXME - digest processing for CertificateVerify
672 * should be generalized. But it is next step
674 if (s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
)
675 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
))
677 for (dgst_num
=0; dgst_num
<SSL_MAX_DIGEST
;dgst_num
++)
678 if (s
->s3
->handshake_dgst
[dgst_num
])
682 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->cert_verify_mac(s
,EVP_MD_CTX_type(s
->s3
->handshake_dgst
[dgst_num
]),&(s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_verify_md
[offset
]));
683 dgst_size
=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s
->s3
->handshake_dgst
[dgst_num
]);
694 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A
:
695 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B
:
697 /* we should decide if we expected this one */
698 ret
=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s
);
699 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
701 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
702 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
;
704 if (s
->s3
->next_proto_neg_seen
)
705 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A
;
707 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
;
712 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
713 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A
:
714 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B
:
715 ret
=ssl3_get_next_proto(s
);
716 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
718 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
;
722 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
:
723 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B
:
724 ret
=ssl3_get_finished(s
,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
,
725 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B
);
726 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
729 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
730 else if (s
->tlsext_ticket_expected
)
731 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A
;
734 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A
;
738 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
739 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A
:
740 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B
:
741 ret
=ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s
);
742 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
743 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A
;
747 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A
:
748 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B
:
749 ret
=ssl3_send_cert_status(s
);
750 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
751 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A
;
757 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A
:
758 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B
:
760 s
->session
->cipher
=s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
;
761 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->setup_key_block(s
))
762 { ret
= -1; goto end
; }
764 ret
=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s
,
765 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A
,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B
);
767 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
768 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A
;
771 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
772 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE
))
780 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A
:
781 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B
:
782 ret
=ssl3_send_finished(s
,
783 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A
,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B
,
784 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->server_finished_label
,
785 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->server_finished_label_len
);
786 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
787 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH
;
790 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
791 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
;
793 if (s
->s3
->next_proto_neg_seen
)
794 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A
;
796 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
;
800 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
=SSL_ST_OK
;
805 /* clean a few things up */
806 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s
);
808 BUF_MEM_free(s
->init_buf
);
811 /* remove buffering on output */
812 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s
);
816 if (s
->renegotiate
== 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
821 ssl_update_cache(s
,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER
);
823 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_accept_good
++;
825 s
->handshake_func
=ssl3_accept
;
827 if (cb
!= NULL
) cb(s
,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE
,1);
835 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT
,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE
);
841 if (!s
->s3
->tmp
.reuse_message
&& !skip
)
845 if ((ret
=BIO_flush(s
->wbio
)) <= 0)
850 if ((cb
!= NULL
) && (s
->state
!= state
))
854 cb(s
,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP
,1);
861 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
865 cb(s
,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT
,ret
);
869 int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL
*s
)
872 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A
)
874 ssl_set_handshake_header(s
, SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST
, 0);
875 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B
;
878 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
879 return ssl_do_write(s
);
882 int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL
*s
)
887 /* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message,
888 * so permit appropriate message length */
889 n
=s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
895 if (!ok
) return((int)n
);
896 s
->s3
->tmp
.reuse_message
= 1;
897 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
== SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO
)
899 /* We only allow the client to restart the handshake once per
901 if (s
->s3
->flags
& SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE
)
903 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_MULTIPLE_SGC_RESTARTS
);
906 /* Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake,
907 * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.) */
908 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
909 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
!= NULL
)
911 DH_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
);
912 s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
= NULL
;
915 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
916 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.ecdh
!= NULL
)
918 EC_KEY_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.ecdh
);
919 s
->s3
->tmp
.ecdh
= NULL
;
922 s
->s3
->flags
|= SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE
;
928 int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL
*s
)
930 int i
,j
,ok
,al
=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,ret
= -1;
931 unsigned int cookie_len
;
936 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
940 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *ciphers
=NULL
;
942 /* We do this so that we will respond with our native type.
943 * If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1,
944 * This down switching should be handled by a different method.
945 * If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with
948 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A
951 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B
;
954 n
=s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
955 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B
,
956 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C
,
957 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
958 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
,
961 if (!ok
) return((int)n
);
963 d
=p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
965 /* use version from inside client hello, not from record header
966 * (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */
967 s
->client_version
=(((int)p
[0])<<8)|(int)p
[1];
970 if ((SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && s
->client_version
> s
->version
971 && s
->method
->version
!= DTLS_ANY_VERSION
) ||
972 (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && s
->client_version
< s
->version
))
974 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER
);
975 if ((s
->client_version
>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR
)
977 /* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
978 s
->version
= s
->client_version
;
980 al
= SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
984 /* If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't
985 * contain one, just return since we do not want to
986 * allocate any memory yet. So check cookie length...
988 if (SSL_get_options(s
) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE
)
990 unsigned int session_length
, cookie_length
;
992 session_length
= *(p
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
993 cookie_length
= *(p
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
+ session_length
+ 1);
995 if (cookie_length
== 0)
999 /* load the client random */
1000 memcpy(s
->s3
->client_random
,p
,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
1001 p
+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
;
1003 /* get the session-id */
1007 /* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in renegotiation.
1008 * 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally ignore resumption requests
1009 * with flag SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
1010 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on this for security
1011 * won't even compile against older library versions).
1013 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to request
1014 * renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains unset): for servers,
1015 * this essentially just means that the SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1016 * setting will be ignored.
1018 if ((s
->new_session
&& (s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
)))
1020 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s
,1))
1025 i
=ssl_get_prev_session(s
, p
, j
, d
+ n
);
1027 { /* previous session */
1034 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s
,1))
1044 cookie_len
= *(p
++);
1047 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
1048 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
1049 * does not cause an overflow.
1051 if ( cookie_len
> sizeof(s
->d1
->rcvd_cookie
))
1054 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1055 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH
);
1059 /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
1060 if ((SSL_get_options(s
) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE
) &&
1063 memcpy(s
->d1
->rcvd_cookie
, p
, cookie_len
);
1065 if ( s
->ctx
->app_verify_cookie_cb
!= NULL
)
1067 if ( s
->ctx
->app_verify_cookie_cb(s
, s
->d1
->rcvd_cookie
,
1070 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1071 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1072 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH
);
1075 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1077 else if ( memcmp(s
->d1
->rcvd_cookie
, s
->d1
->cookie
,
1078 s
->d1
->cookie_len
) != 0) /* default verification */
1080 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1081 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1082 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH
);
1085 /* Set to -2 so if successful we return 2 */
1090 if (s
->method
->version
== DTLS_ANY_VERSION
)
1092 /* Select version to use */
1093 if (s
->client_version
<= DTLS1_2_VERSION
&&
1094 !(s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2
))
1096 s
->version
= DTLS1_2_VERSION
;
1097 s
->method
= DTLSv1_2_server_method();
1099 else if (tls1_suiteb(s
))
1101 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE
);
1102 s
->version
= s
->client_version
;
1103 al
= SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
1106 else if (s
->client_version
<= DTLS1_VERSION
&&
1107 !(s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1
))
1109 s
->version
= DTLS1_VERSION
;
1110 s
->method
= DTLSv1_server_method();
1114 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER
);
1115 s
->version
= s
->client_version
;
1116 al
= SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
1119 s
->session
->ssl_version
= s
->version
;
1124 if ((i
== 0) && (j
!= 0))
1126 /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */
1127 al
=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1128 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED
);
1133 /* not enough data */
1134 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1135 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1138 if ((i
> 0) && (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s
,p
,i
,&(ciphers
))
1145 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
1146 if ((s
->hit
) && (i
> 0))
1149 id
=s
->session
->cipher
->id
;
1152 printf("client sent %d ciphers\n",sk_num(ciphers
));
1154 for (i
=0; i
<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers
); i
++)
1156 c
=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers
,i
);
1158 printf("client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1159 i
,sk_num(ciphers
),SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c
));
1167 /* Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade
1168 * attack: CVE-2010-4180.
1171 if (j
== 0 && (s
->options
& SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG
) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers
) == 1))
1173 /* Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used cipher may
1174 * not be in the current list, the client instead might be trying to
1175 * continue using a cipher that before wasn't chosen due to server
1176 * preferences. We'll have to reject the connection if the cipher is not
1177 * enabled, though. */
1178 c
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers
, 0);
1179 if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s
), c
) >= 0)
1181 s
->session
->cipher
= c
;
1188 /* we need to have the cipher in the cipher
1189 * list if we are asked to reuse it */
1190 al
=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1191 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING
);
1200 /* not enough data */
1201 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1202 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1205 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1210 if (p
[j
] == 0) break;
1217 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1218 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED
);
1222 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1224 if (s
->version
>= SSL3_VERSION
)
1226 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s
,&p
,d
,n
))
1228 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT
);
1233 /* Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this
1234 * handshake for not reused session only. We need to generate
1235 * server_random before calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow
1236 * SessionTicket processing to use it in key derivation. */
1240 Time
=(unsigned long)time(NULL
); /* Time */
1241 pos
=s
->s3
->server_random
;
1243 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(pos
,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
-4) <= 0)
1249 if (!s
->hit
&& s
->version
>= TLS1_VERSION
&& s
->tls_session_secret_cb
)
1251 SSL_CIPHER
*pref_cipher
=NULL
;
1253 s
->session
->master_key_length
=sizeof(s
->session
->master_key
);
1254 if(s
->tls_session_secret_cb(s
, s
->session
->master_key
, &s
->session
->master_key_length
,
1255 ciphers
, &pref_cipher
, s
->tls_session_secret_cb_arg
))
1258 s
->session
->ciphers
=ciphers
;
1259 s
->session
->verify_result
=X509_V_OK
;
1263 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1264 pref_cipher
=pref_cipher
? pref_cipher
: ssl3_choose_cipher(s
, s
->session
->ciphers
, SSL_get_ciphers(s
));
1265 if (pref_cipher
== NULL
)
1267 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1268 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER
);
1272 s
->session
->cipher
=pref_cipher
;
1275 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s
->cipher_list
);
1277 if (s
->cipher_list_by_id
)
1278 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s
->cipher_list_by_id
);
1280 s
->cipher_list
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s
->session
->ciphers
);
1281 s
->cipher_list_by_id
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s
->session
->ciphers
);
1286 /* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1287 * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
1288 * algorithms from the client, starting at q. */
1289 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
=NULL
;
1290 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1291 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1292 if (s
->session
->compress_meth
!= 0)
1294 int m
, comp_id
= s
->session
->compress_meth
;
1295 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1296 /* Can't disable compression */
1297 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION
)
1299 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION
);
1302 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1303 for (m
= 0; m
< sk_SSL_COMP_num(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
); m
++)
1305 comp
=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
,m
);
1306 if (comp_id
== comp
->id
)
1308 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
=comp
;
1312 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
== NULL
)
1314 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM
);
1317 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1318 for (m
= 0; m
< i
; m
++)
1320 if (q
[m
] == comp_id
)
1325 al
=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1326 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING
);
1332 else if (!(s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION
) && s
->ctx
->comp_methods
)
1333 { /* See if we have a match */
1334 int m
,nn
,o
,v
,done
=0;
1336 nn
=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
);
1337 for (m
=0; m
<nn
; m
++)
1339 comp
=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
,m
);
1352 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
=comp
;
1357 /* If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1358 * using compression.
1360 if (s
->session
->compress_meth
!= 0)
1362 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION
);
1367 /* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must
1372 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1373 s
->session
->compress_meth
=0;
1375 s
->session
->compress_meth
=(comp
== NULL
)?0:comp
->id
;
1377 if (s
->session
->ciphers
!= NULL
)
1378 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s
->session
->ciphers
);
1379 s
->session
->ciphers
=ciphers
;
1380 if (ciphers
== NULL
)
1382 al
=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1383 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED
);
1387 /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
1388 if (s
->cert
->cert_cb
1389 && s
->cert
->cert_cb(s
, s
->cert
->cert_cb_arg
) <= 0)
1391 al
=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1392 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR
);
1395 c
=ssl3_choose_cipher(s
,s
->session
->ciphers
,
1396 SSL_get_ciphers(s
));
1400 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1401 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER
);
1404 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
=c
;
1405 /* check whether we should disable session resumption */
1406 if (s
->not_resumable_session_cb
!= NULL
)
1407 s
->session
->not_resumable
=s
->not_resumable_session_cb(s
,
1408 ((c
->algorithm_mkey
& (SSL_kEDH
| SSL_kEECDH
)) != 0));
1409 if (s
->session
->not_resumable
)
1410 /* do not send a session ticket */
1411 s
->tlsext_ticket_expected
= 0;
1415 /* Session-id reuse */
1416 #ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
1417 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *sk
;
1418 SSL_CIPHER
*nc
=NULL
;
1419 SSL_CIPHER
*ec
=NULL
;
1421 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG
)
1423 sk
=s
->session
->ciphers
;
1424 for (i
=0; i
<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk
); i
++)
1426 c
=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk
,i
);
1427 if (c
->algorithm_enc
& SSL_eNULL
)
1429 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c
))
1433 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
=nc
;
1434 else if (ec
!= NULL
)
1435 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
=ec
;
1437 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
=s
->session
->cipher
;
1441 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
=s
->session
->cipher
;
1444 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
) || !(s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
))
1446 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
))
1450 /* we now have the following setup.
1452 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
1453 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
1454 * compression - basically ignored right now
1455 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1456 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1457 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1458 * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
1461 /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */
1462 if (s
->version
>= SSL3_VERSION
)
1464 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s
) <= 0)
1466 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
);
1471 if (ret
< 0) ret
=-ret
;
1475 ssl3_send_alert(s
,SSL3_AL_FATAL
,al
);
1478 if (ciphers
!= NULL
) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers
);
1479 return ret
< 0 ? -1 : ret
;
1482 int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL
*s
)
1485 unsigned char *p
,*d
;
1488 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1492 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A
)
1494 buf
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
1495 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1496 p
=s
->s3
->server_random
;
1497 /* Generate server_random if it was not needed previously */
1498 Time
=(unsigned long)time(NULL
); /* Time */
1500 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p
,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
-4) <= 0)
1503 /* Do the message type and length last */
1504 d
=p
= ssl_handshake_start(s
);
1506 *(p
++)=s
->version
>>8;
1507 *(p
++)=s
->version
&0xff;
1510 memcpy(p
,s
->s3
->server_random
,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
1511 p
+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
;
1513 /* There are several cases for the session ID to send
1514 * back in the server hello:
1515 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
1516 * we send back the old session ID.
1517 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
1518 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
1519 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
1520 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
1522 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
1523 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
1524 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
1525 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
1528 if (s
->session
->not_resumable
||
1529 (!(s
->ctx
->session_cache_mode
& SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER
)
1531 s
->session
->session_id_length
=0;
1533 sl
=s
->session
->session_id_length
;
1534 if (sl
> (int)sizeof(s
->session
->session_id
))
1536 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1540 memcpy(p
,s
->session
->session_id
,sl
);
1543 /* put the cipher */
1544 i
=ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
,p
);
1547 /* put the compression method */
1548 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1551 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
== NULL
)
1554 *(p
++)=s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
->id
;
1556 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1557 if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s
) <= 0)
1559 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO
,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT
);
1562 if ((p
= ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s
, p
, buf
+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
)) == NULL
)
1564 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO
,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1570 ssl_set_handshake_header(s
, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO
, l
);
1571 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B
;
1574 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
1575 return ssl_do_write(s
);
1578 int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL
*s
)
1581 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A
)
1583 ssl_set_handshake_header(s
, SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE
, 0);
1584 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B
;
1587 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
1588 return ssl_do_write(s
);
1591 int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL
*s
)
1593 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1597 unsigned char md_buf
[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
];
1600 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1603 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1604 EC_KEY
*ecdh
=NULL
, *ecdhp
;
1605 unsigned char *encodedPoint
= NULL
;
1608 BN_CTX
*bn_ctx
= NULL
;
1611 const EVP_MD
*md
= NULL
;
1612 unsigned char *p
,*d
;
1622 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx
);
1623 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A
)
1625 type
=s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
1630 r
[0]=r
[1]=r
[2]=r
[3]=NULL
;
1632 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1633 if (type
& SSL_kRSA
)
1636 if ((rsa
== NULL
) && (s
->cert
->rsa_tmp_cb
!= NULL
))
1638 rsa
=s
->cert
->rsa_tmp_cb(s
,
1639 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
),
1640 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
));
1643 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1644 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY
);
1652 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1653 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY
);
1658 s
->s3
->tmp
.use_rsa_tmp
=1;
1662 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1663 if (type
& SSL_kEDH
)
1666 if ((dhp
== NULL
) && (s
->cert
->dh_tmp_cb
!= NULL
))
1667 dhp
=s
->cert
->dh_tmp_cb(s
,
1668 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
),
1669 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
));
1672 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1673 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY
);
1677 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
!= NULL
)
1679 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1683 if ((dh
=DHparams_dup(dhp
)) == NULL
)
1685 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_DH_LIB
);
1690 if ((dhp
->pub_key
== NULL
||
1691 dhp
->priv_key
== NULL
||
1692 (s
->options
& SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE
)))
1694 if(!DH_generate_key(dh
))
1696 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1703 dh
->pub_key
=BN_dup(dhp
->pub_key
);
1704 dh
->priv_key
=BN_dup(dhp
->priv_key
);
1705 if ((dh
->pub_key
== NULL
) ||
1706 (dh
->priv_key
== NULL
))
1708 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_DH_LIB
);
1718 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1719 if (type
& SSL_kEECDH
)
1721 const EC_GROUP
*group
;
1723 ecdhp
=cert
->ecdh_tmp
;
1724 if (s
->cert
->ecdh_tmp_auto
)
1726 /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
1727 int nid
= tls1_shared_curve(s
, -2);
1728 if (nid
!= NID_undef
)
1729 ecdhp
= EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid
);
1731 else if ((ecdhp
== NULL
) && s
->cert
->ecdh_tmp_cb
)
1733 ecdhp
=s
->cert
->ecdh_tmp_cb(s
,
1734 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
),
1735 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
));
1739 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1740 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY
);
1744 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.ecdh
!= NULL
)
1746 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1750 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
1753 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB
);
1756 if (s
->cert
->ecdh_tmp_auto
)
1758 else if ((ecdh
= EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp
)) == NULL
)
1760 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB
);
1764 s
->s3
->tmp
.ecdh
=ecdh
;
1765 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh
) == NULL
) ||
1766 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh
) == NULL
) ||
1767 (s
->options
& SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE
))
1769 if(!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh
))
1771 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB
);
1776 if (((group
= EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh
)) == NULL
) ||
1777 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh
) == NULL
) ||
1778 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh
) == NULL
))
1780 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB
);
1784 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
) &&
1785 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group
) > 163))
1787 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER
);
1791 /* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH
1792 * keys over named (not generic) curves. For
1793 * supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero.
1796 tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group
)))
1799 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE
);
1803 /* Encode the public key.
1804 * First check the size of encoding and
1805 * allocate memory accordingly.
1807 encodedlen
= EC_POINT_point2oct(group
,
1808 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh
),
1809 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED
,
1812 encodedPoint
= (unsigned char *)
1813 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen
*sizeof(unsigned char));
1814 bn_ctx
= BN_CTX_new();
1815 if ((encodedPoint
== NULL
) || (bn_ctx
== NULL
))
1817 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1822 encodedlen
= EC_POINT_point2oct(group
,
1823 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh
),
1824 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED
,
1825 encodedPoint
, encodedlen
, bn_ctx
);
1827 if (encodedlen
== 0)
1829 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB
);
1833 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx
); bn_ctx
=NULL
;
1835 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not
1836 * generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges.
1837 * In this situation, we need four additional bytes
1838 * to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
1843 /* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message
1844 * explicitly so we can set these to NULLs
1852 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
1853 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1854 if (type
& SSL_kPSK
)
1856 /* reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint*/
1857 n
+=2+strlen(s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
);
1860 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1861 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1862 if (type
& SSL_kSRP
)
1864 if ((s
->srp_ctx
.N
== NULL
) ||
1865 (s
->srp_ctx
.g
== NULL
) ||
1866 (s
->srp_ctx
.s
== NULL
) ||
1867 (s
->srp_ctx
.B
== NULL
))
1869 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM
);
1880 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1881 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE
);
1884 for (i
=0; r
[i
] != NULL
&& i
<4; i
++)
1886 nr
[i
]=BN_num_bytes(r
[i
]);
1887 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1888 if ((i
== 2) && (type
& SSL_kSRP
))
1895 if (!(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aNULL
)
1896 && !(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kPSK
))
1898 if ((pkey
=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s
,s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
,&md
))
1901 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1904 kn
=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey
);
1912 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf
,n
+SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s
)+kn
))
1914 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_LIB_BUF
);
1917 d
= p
= ssl_handshake_start(s
);
1919 for (i
=0; r
[i
] != NULL
&& i
<4; i
++)
1921 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1922 if ((i
== 2) && (type
& SSL_kSRP
))
1934 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1935 if (type
& SSL_kEECDH
)
1937 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves.
1938 * In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has:
1939 * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
1940 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by
1941 * the actual encoded point itself
1943 *p
= NAMED_CURVE_TYPE
;
1951 memcpy((unsigned char*)p
,
1952 (unsigned char *)encodedPoint
,
1954 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint
);
1955 encodedPoint
= NULL
;
1960 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1961 if (type
& SSL_kPSK
)
1963 /* copy PSK identity hint */
1964 s2n(strlen(s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
), p
);
1965 strncpy((char *)p
, s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
, strlen(s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
));
1966 p
+=strlen(s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
);
1973 /* n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4])
1974 * and p points to the space at the end. */
1975 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1976 if (pkey
->type
== EVP_PKEY_RSA
&& !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
))
1980 for (num
=2; num
> 0; num
--)
1982 EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx
,
1983 EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW
);
1984 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx
,(num
== 2)
1985 ?s
->ctx
->md5
:s
->ctx
->sha1
, NULL
);
1986 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx
,&(s
->s3
->client_random
[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
1987 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx
,&(s
->s3
->server_random
[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
1988 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx
,d
,n
);
1989 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx
,q
,
1990 (unsigned int *)&i
);
1994 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1
, md_buf
, j
,
1995 &(p
[2]), &u
, pkey
->pkey
.rsa
) <= 0)
1997 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_LIB_RSA
);
2007 /* send signature algorithm */
2008 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
))
2010 if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p
, pkey
, md
))
2012 /* Should never happen */
2013 al
=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2014 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2020 fprintf(stderr
, "Using hash %s\n",
2023 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx
, md
, NULL
);
2024 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx
,&(s
->s3
->client_random
[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
2025 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx
,&(s
->s3
->server_random
[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
2026 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx
,d
,n
);
2027 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx
,&(p
[2]),
2028 (unsigned int *)&i
,pkey
))
2030 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_LIB_EVP
);
2035 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
))
2040 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
2041 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2042 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE
);
2047 ssl_set_handshake_header(s
, SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, n
);
2050 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B
;
2051 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx
);
2052 return ssl_do_write(s
);
2054 ssl3_send_alert(s
,SSL3_AL_FATAL
,al
);
2056 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2057 if (encodedPoint
!= NULL
) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint
);
2058 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx
);
2060 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx
);
2064 int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL
*s
)
2066 unsigned char *p
,*d
;
2068 STACK_OF(X509_NAME
) *sk
=NULL
;
2072 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A
)
2076 d
=p
=ssl_handshake_start(s
);
2078 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
2080 n
=ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s
,p
);
2085 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
))
2087 const unsigned char *psigs
;
2088 nl
= tls12_get_psigalgs(s
, &psigs
);
2090 memcpy(p
, psigs
, nl
);
2099 sk
=SSL_get_client_CA_list(s
);
2103 for (i
=0; i
<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk
); i
++)
2105 name
=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk
,i
);
2106 j
=i2d_X509_NAME(name
,NULL
);
2107 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf
,4+n
+j
+2))
2109 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,ERR_R_BUF_LIB
);
2112 p
=(unsigned char *)&(buf
->data
[4+n
]);
2113 if (!(s
->options
& SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG
))
2116 i2d_X509_NAME(name
,&p
);
2123 i2d_X509_NAME(name
,&p
);
2124 j
-=2; s2n(j
,d
); j
+=2;
2130 /* else no CA names */
2131 p
= ssl_handshake_start(s
) + off
;
2134 ssl_set_handshake_header(s
, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, n
);
2136 #ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
2137 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s
))
2139 p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
+ s
->init_num
;
2141 *(p
++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE
;
2149 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B
;
2152 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
2153 return ssl_do_write(s
);
2158 int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL
*s
)
2162 unsigned long alg_k
;
2164 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2166 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
=NULL
;
2168 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2170 DH
*dh_srvr
, *dh_clnt
= NULL
;
2172 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2174 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2176 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2177 EC_KEY
*srvr_ecdh
= NULL
;
2178 EVP_PKEY
*clnt_pub_pkey
= NULL
;
2179 EC_POINT
*clnt_ecpoint
= NULL
;
2180 BN_CTX
*bn_ctx
= NULL
;
2183 n
=s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
2184 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A
,
2185 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B
,
2186 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2190 if (!ok
) return((int)n
);
2191 p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
2193 alg_k
=s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
2195 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2196 if (alg_k
& SSL_kRSA
)
2198 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
2199 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.use_rsa_tmp
)
2201 if ((s
->cert
!= NULL
) && (s
->cert
->rsa_tmp
!= NULL
))
2202 rsa
=s
->cert
->rsa_tmp
;
2203 /* Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should
2204 * be sent already */
2207 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2208 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY
);
2215 pkey
=s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
].privatekey
;
2216 if ( (pkey
== NULL
) ||
2217 (pkey
->type
!= EVP_PKEY_RSA
) ||
2218 (pkey
->pkey
.rsa
== NULL
))
2220 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2221 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE
);
2227 /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */
2228 if (s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
&& s
->version
!= DTLS1_BAD_VER
)
2233 if (!(s
->options
& SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG
))
2235 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG
);
2245 i
=RSA_private_decrypt((int)n
,p
,p
,rsa
,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING
);
2249 if (i
!= SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
)
2251 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2252 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); */
2255 if ((al
== -1) && !((p
[0] == (s
->client_version
>>8)) && (p
[1] == (s
->client_version
& 0xff))))
2257 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2258 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2259 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2260 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
2261 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
2263 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. */
2264 if (!((s
->options
& SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG
) &&
2265 (p
[0] == (s
->version
>>8)) && (p
[1] == (s
->version
& 0xff))))
2267 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2268 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER); */
2270 /* The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2271 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version
2272 * number check as a "bad version oracle" -- an alert would
2273 * reveal that the plaintext corresponding to some ciphertext
2274 * made up by the adversary is properly formatted except
2275 * that the version number is wrong. To avoid such attacks,
2276 * we should treat this just like any other decryption error. */
2282 /* Some decryption failure -- use random value instead as countermeasure
2283 * against Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding
2284 * (see RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). */
2286 i
= SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
;
2287 p
[0] = s
->client_version
>> 8;
2288 p
[1] = s
->client_version
& 0xff;
2289 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p
+2, i
-2) <= 0) /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure */
2293 s
->session
->master_key_length
=
2294 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
2295 s
->session
->master_key
,
2297 OPENSSL_cleanse(p
,i
);
2301 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2302 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kEDH
|SSL_kDHr
|SSL_kDHd
))
2305 EVP_PKEY
*skey
= NULL
;
2312 if (!(s
->options
& SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG
))
2314 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG
);
2323 if (alg_k
& SSL_kDHr
)
2324 idx
= SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA
;
2325 else if (alg_k
& SSL_kDHd
)
2326 idx
= SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA
;
2329 skey
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[idx
].privatekey
;
2330 if ((skey
== NULL
) ||
2331 (skey
->type
!= EVP_PKEY_DH
) ||
2332 (skey
->pkey
.dh
== NULL
))
2334 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2335 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE
);
2338 dh_srvr
= skey
->pkey
.dh
;
2340 else if (s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
== NULL
)
2342 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2343 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY
);
2347 dh_srvr
=s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
;
2351 /* Get pubkey from cert */
2352 EVP_PKEY
*clkey
=X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
2355 if (EVP_PKEY_cmp_parameters(clkey
, skey
) == 1)
2356 dh_clnt
= EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(clkey
);
2358 if (dh_clnt
== NULL
)
2360 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2361 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY
);
2364 EVP_PKEY_free(clkey
);
2365 pub
= dh_clnt
->pub_key
;
2368 pub
=BN_bin2bn(p
,i
,NULL
);
2371 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_BN_LIB
);
2375 i
=DH_compute_key(p
,pub
,dh_srvr
);
2379 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_DH_LIB
);
2384 DH_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
);
2391 s
->session
->master_key_length
=
2392 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
2393 s
->session
->master_key
,p
,i
);
2394 OPENSSL_cleanse(p
,i
);
2400 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2401 if (alg_k
& SSL_kKRB5
)
2403 krb5_error_code krb5rc
;
2404 krb5_data enc_ticket
;
2405 krb5_data authenticator
;
2407 KSSL_CTX
*kssl_ctx
= s
->kssl_ctx
;
2408 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx
;
2409 const EVP_CIPHER
*enc
= NULL
;
2410 unsigned char iv
[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH
];
2411 unsigned char pms
[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
2412 + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH
];
2414 krb5_timestamp authtime
= 0;
2415 krb5_ticket_times ttimes
;
2417 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx
);
2419 if (!kssl_ctx
) kssl_ctx
= kssl_ctx_new();
2422 enc_ticket
.length
= i
;
2424 if (n
< (long)(enc_ticket
.length
+ 6))
2426 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2427 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2431 enc_ticket
.data
= (char *)p
;
2432 p
+=enc_ticket
.length
;
2435 authenticator
.length
= i
;
2437 if (n
< (long)(enc_ticket
.length
+ authenticator
.length
+ 6))
2439 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2440 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2444 authenticator
.data
= (char *)p
;
2445 p
+=authenticator
.length
;
2449 enc_pms
.data
= (char *)p
;
2452 /* Note that the length is checked again below,
2455 if(enc_pms
.length
> sizeof pms
)
2457 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2458 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2462 if (n
!= (long)(enc_ticket
.length
+ authenticator
.length
+
2463 enc_pms
.length
+ 6))
2465 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2466 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2470 if ((krb5rc
= kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx
, &enc_ticket
, &ttimes
,
2474 printf("kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
2475 krb5rc
, kssl_err
.reason
);
2477 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err
.text
);
2478 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2479 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2484 /* Note: no authenticator is not considered an error,
2485 ** but will return authtime == 0.
2487 if ((krb5rc
= kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx
, &authenticator
,
2488 &authtime
, &kssl_err
)) != 0)
2491 printf("kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
2492 krb5rc
, kssl_err
.reason
);
2494 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err
.text
);
2495 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2496 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2501 if ((krb5rc
= kssl_validate_times(authtime
, &ttimes
)) != 0)
2503 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, krb5rc
);
2508 kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx
);
2509 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2511 enc
= kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx
->enctype
);
2515 memset(iv
, 0, sizeof iv
); /* per RFC 1510 */
2517 if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx
,enc
,NULL
,kssl_ctx
->key
,iv
))
2519 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2520 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
2523 if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx
, pms
,&outl
,
2524 (unsigned char *)enc_pms
.data
, enc_pms
.length
))
2526 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2527 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
2530 if (outl
> SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
)
2532 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2533 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2536 if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx
,&(pms
[outl
]),&padl
))
2538 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2539 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
2543 if (outl
> SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
)
2545 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2546 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2549 if (!((pms
[0] == (s
->client_version
>>8)) && (pms
[1] == (s
->client_version
& 0xff))))
2551 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2552 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2553 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2554 * However, buggy clients exist that send random bytes instead of
2555 * the protocol version.
2556 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients.
2557 * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos cipher)
2559 if (!(s
->options
& SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG
))
2561 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2562 SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
2567 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx
);
2569 s
->session
->master_key_length
=
2570 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
2571 s
->session
->master_key
, pms
, outl
);
2573 if (kssl_ctx
->client_princ
)
2575 size_t len
= strlen(kssl_ctx
->client_princ
);
2576 if ( len
< SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH
)
2578 s
->session
->krb5_client_princ_len
= len
;
2579 memcpy(s
->session
->krb5_client_princ
,kssl_ctx
->client_princ
,len
);
2584 /* Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
2585 ** but it caused problems for apache.
2586 ** kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
2587 ** if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
2591 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2593 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2594 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kEECDH
|SSL_kECDHr
|SSL_kECDHe
))
2599 const EC_GROUP
*group
;
2600 const BIGNUM
*priv_key
;
2602 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
2603 if ((srvr_ecdh
= EC_KEY_new()) == NULL
)
2605 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2606 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2610 /* Let's get server private key and group information */
2611 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kECDHr
|SSL_kECDHe
))
2613 /* use the certificate */
2614 tkey
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_ECC
].privatekey
->pkey
.ec
;
2618 /* use the ephermeral values we saved when
2619 * generating the ServerKeyExchange msg.
2621 tkey
= s
->s3
->tmp
.ecdh
;
2624 group
= EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey
);
2625 priv_key
= EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey
);
2627 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh
, group
) ||
2628 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh
, priv_key
))
2630 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2635 /* Let's get client's public key */
2636 if ((clnt_ecpoint
= EC_POINT_new(group
)) == NULL
)
2638 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2639 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2645 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
2647 if (alg_k
& SSL_kEECDH
)
2649 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2650 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY
);
2653 if (((clnt_pub_pkey
=X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
))
2655 (clnt_pub_pkey
->type
!= EVP_PKEY_EC
))
2657 /* XXX: For now, we do not support client
2658 * authentication using ECDH certificates
2659 * so this branch (n == 0L) of the code is
2660 * never executed. When that support is
2661 * added, we ought to ensure the key
2662 * received in the certificate is
2663 * authorized for key agreement.
2664 * ECDH_compute_key implicitly checks that
2665 * the two ECDH shares are for the same
2668 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2669 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2670 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS
);
2674 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint
,
2675 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey
->pkey
.ec
)) == 0)
2677 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2681 ret
= 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
2685 /* Get client's public key from encoded point
2686 * in the ClientKeyExchange message.
2688 if ((bn_ctx
= BN_CTX_new()) == NULL
)
2690 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2691 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2695 /* Get encoded point length */
2700 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2704 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group
,
2705 clnt_ecpoint
, p
, i
, bn_ctx
) == 0)
2707 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2711 /* p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer
2712 * currently, so set it to the start
2714 p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
2717 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
2718 field_size
= EC_GROUP_get_degree(group
);
2719 if (field_size
<= 0)
2721 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2725 i
= ECDH_compute_key(p
, (field_size
+7)/8, clnt_ecpoint
, srvr_ecdh
, NULL
);
2728 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2733 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey
);
2734 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint
);
2735 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh
);
2736 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx
);
2737 EC_KEY_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.ecdh
);
2738 s
->s3
->tmp
.ecdh
= NULL
;
2740 /* Compute the master secret */
2741 s
->session
->master_key_length
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
-> \
2742 generate_master_secret(s
, s
->session
->master_key
, p
, i
);
2744 OPENSSL_cleanse(p
, i
);
2749 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2750 if (alg_k
& SSL_kPSK
)
2752 unsigned char *t
= NULL
;
2753 unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms
[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
*2+4];
2754 unsigned int pre_ms_len
= 0, psk_len
= 0;
2756 char tmp_id
[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
+1];
2758 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2763 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2764 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2767 if (i
> PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
)
2769 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2770 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2773 if (s
->psk_server_callback
== NULL
)
2775 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2776 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB
);
2780 /* Create guaranteed NULL-terminated identity
2781 * string for the callback */
2782 memcpy(tmp_id
, p
, i
);
2783 memset(tmp_id
+i
, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
+1-i
);
2784 psk_len
= s
->psk_server_callback(s
, tmp_id
,
2785 psk_or_pre_ms
, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms
));
2786 OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_id
, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
+1);
2788 if (psk_len
> PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
)
2790 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2791 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2794 else if (psk_len
== 0)
2796 /* PSK related to the given identity not found */
2797 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2798 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND
);
2799 al
=SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY
;
2803 /* create PSK pre_master_secret */
2804 pre_ms_len
=2+psk_len
+2+psk_len
;
2806 memmove(psk_or_pre_ms
+psk_len
+4, psk_or_pre_ms
, psk_len
);
2808 memset(t
, 0, psk_len
);
2812 if (s
->session
->psk_identity
!= NULL
)
2813 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->psk_identity
);
2814 s
->session
->psk_identity
= BUF_strdup((char *)p
);
2815 if (s
->session
->psk_identity
== NULL
)
2817 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2818 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2822 if (s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
!= NULL
)
2823 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
);
2824 s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
= BUF_strdup(s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
);
2825 if (s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
!= NULL
&&
2826 s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
== NULL
)
2828 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2829 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2833 s
->session
->master_key_length
=
2834 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
2835 s
->session
->master_key
, psk_or_pre_ms
, pre_ms_len
);
2838 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms
, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms
));
2844 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2845 if (alg_k
& SSL_kSRP
)
2853 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2854 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH
);
2857 if (!(s
->srp_ctx
.A
=BN_bin2bn(p
,i
,NULL
)))
2859 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
2862 if (s
->session
->srp_username
!= NULL
)
2863 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->srp_username
);
2864 s
->session
->srp_username
= BUF_strdup(s
->srp_ctx
.login
);
2865 if (s
->session
->srp_username
== NULL
)
2867 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2868 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2872 if ((s
->session
->master_key_length
= SRP_generate_server_master_secret(s
,s
->session
->master_key
))<0)
2874 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2881 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
2882 if (alg_k
& SSL_kGOST
)
2885 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pkey_ctx
;
2886 EVP_PKEY
*client_pub_pkey
= NULL
, *pk
= NULL
;
2887 unsigned char premaster_secret
[32], *start
;
2888 size_t outlen
=32, inlen
;
2889 unsigned long alg_a
;
2891 /* Get our certificate private key*/
2892 alg_a
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
;
2893 if (alg_a
& SSL_aGOST94
)
2894 pk
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_GOST94
].privatekey
;
2895 else if (alg_a
& SSL_aGOST01
)
2896 pk
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_GOST01
].privatekey
;
2898 pkey_ctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk
,NULL
);
2899 EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx
);
2900 /* If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
2901 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
2902 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use
2903 * a client certificate for authorization only. */
2904 client_pub_pkey
= X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
2905 if (client_pub_pkey
)
2907 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx
, client_pub_pkey
) <= 0)
2910 /* Decrypt session key */
2911 if ((*p
!=( V_ASN1_SEQUENCE
| V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED
)))
2913 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
2921 else if (p
[1] < 0x80)
2928 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
2931 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx
,premaster_secret
,&outlen
,start
,inlen
) <=0)
2934 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
2937 /* Generate master secret */
2938 s
->session
->master_key_length
=
2939 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
2940 s
->session
->master_key
,premaster_secret
,32);
2941 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2942 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx
, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY
, 2, NULL
) > 0)
2947 EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey
);
2948 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx
);
2956 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2957 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2958 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE
);
2964 ssl3_send_alert(s
,SSL3_AL_FATAL
,al
);
2965 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_SRP)
2968 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2969 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey
);
2970 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint
);
2971 if (srvr_ecdh
!= NULL
)
2972 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh
);
2973 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx
);
2978 int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL
*s
)
2980 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
=NULL
;
2986 const EVP_MD
*md
= NULL
;
2988 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx
);
2990 n
=s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
2991 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A
,
2992 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B
,
2994 516, /* Enough for 4096 bit RSA key with TLS v1.2 */
2997 if (!ok
) return((int)n
);
2999 if (s
->session
->peer
!= NULL
)
3001 peer
=s
->session
->peer
;
3002 pkey
=X509_get_pubkey(peer
);
3003 type
=X509_certificate_type(peer
,pkey
);
3011 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
!= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY
)
3013 s
->s3
->tmp
.reuse_message
=1;
3014 if ((peer
!= NULL
) && (type
& EVP_PKT_SIGN
))
3016 al
=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
3017 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE
);
3026 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED
);
3027 al
=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
3031 if (!(type
& EVP_PKT_SIGN
))
3033 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE
);
3034 al
=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
3038 if (s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
)
3040 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY
);
3041 al
=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
3045 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
3046 p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
3047 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
3048 /* If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare
3049 * signature without length field */
3050 if (n
==64 && (pkey
->type
==NID_id_GostR3410_94
||
3051 pkey
->type
== NID_id_GostR3410_2001
) )
3057 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
))
3059 int rv
= tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md
, s
, p
, pkey
);
3062 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3067 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
3071 fprintf(stderr
, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md
));
3080 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3081 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
3085 j
=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey
);
3086 if ((i
> j
) || (n
> j
) || (n
<= 0))
3088 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE
);
3089 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
3093 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
))
3097 hdatalen
= BIO_get_mem_data(s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
, &hdata
);
3100 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3101 al
=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3105 fprintf(stderr
, "Using TLS 1.2 with client verify alg %s\n",
3108 if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&mctx
, md
, NULL
)
3109 || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(&mctx
, hdata
, hdatalen
))
3111 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
3112 al
=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3116 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&mctx
, p
, i
, pkey
) <= 0)
3118 al
=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
3119 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE
);
3124 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3125 if (pkey
->type
== EVP_PKEY_RSA
)
3127 i
=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1
, s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_verify_md
,
3128 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
, p
, i
,
3132 al
=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
3133 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT
);
3138 al
=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
3139 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE
);
3145 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3146 if (pkey
->type
== EVP_PKEY_DSA
)
3148 j
=DSA_verify(pkey
->save_type
,
3149 &(s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_verify_md
[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
]),
3150 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
,p
,i
,pkey
->pkey
.dsa
);
3154 al
=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
3155 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE
);
3161 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3162 if (pkey
->type
== EVP_PKEY_EC
)
3164 j
=ECDSA_verify(pkey
->save_type
,
3165 &(s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_verify_md
[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
]),
3166 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
,p
,i
,pkey
->pkey
.ec
);
3170 al
=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
3171 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,
3172 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE
);
3178 if (pkey
->type
== NID_id_GostR3410_94
|| pkey
->type
== NID_id_GostR3410_2001
)
3179 { unsigned char signature
[64];
3181 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey
,NULL
);
3182 EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx
);
3184 fprintf(stderr
,"GOST signature length is %d",i
);
3186 for (idx
=0;idx
<64;idx
++) {
3187 signature
[63-idx
]=p
[idx
];
3189 j
=EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx
,signature
,64,s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_verify_md
,32);
3190 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
3193 al
=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
3194 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,
3195 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE
);
3201 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3202 al
=SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE
;
3211 ssl3_send_alert(s
,SSL3_AL_FATAL
,al
);
3214 if (s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
)
3216 BIO_free(s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
);
3217 s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
= NULL
;
3218 s
->s3
->flags
&= ~TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE
;
3220 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx
);
3221 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey
);
3225 int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL
*s
)
3227 int i
,ok
,al
,ret
= -1;
3229 unsigned long l
,nc
,llen
,n
;
3230 const unsigned char *p
,*q
;
3232 STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
=NULL
;
3234 n
=s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
3241 if (!ok
) return((int)n
);
3243 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
== SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
)
3245 if ( (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
) &&
3246 (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT
))
3248 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE
);
3249 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
3252 /* If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list */
3253 if ((s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
) && s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
)
3255 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST
);
3256 al
=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
3259 s
->s3
->tmp
.reuse_message
=1;
3263 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
!= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
)
3265 al
=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
3266 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE
);
3269 p
=d
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
3271 if ((sk
=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL
)
3273 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3280 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
3281 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3284 for (nc
=0; nc
<llen
; )
3287 if ((l
+nc
+3) > llen
)
3289 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
3290 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3295 x
=d2i_X509(NULL
,&p
,l
);
3298 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB
);
3303 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
3304 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3307 if (!sk_X509_push(sk
,x
))
3309 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3316 if (sk_X509_num(sk
) <= 0)
3318 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3319 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
)
3321 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
3322 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED
);
3325 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3326 else if ((s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
) &&
3327 (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT
))
3329 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE
);
3330 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
3333 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
3334 if (s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
&& !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
))
3336 al
=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3342 i
=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s
,sk
);
3345 al
=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s
->verify_result
);
3346 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED
);
3351 if (s
->session
->peer
!= NULL
) /* This should not be needed */
3352 X509_free(s
->session
->peer
);
3353 s
->session
->peer
=sk_X509_shift(sk
);
3354 s
->session
->verify_result
= s
->verify_result
;
3356 /* With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL
3357 * when we arrive here. */
3358 if (s
->session
->sess_cert
== NULL
)
3360 s
->session
->sess_cert
= ssl_sess_cert_new();
3361 if (s
->session
->sess_cert
== NULL
)
3363 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3367 if (s
->session
->sess_cert
->cert_chain
!= NULL
)
3368 sk_X509_pop_free(s
->session
->sess_cert
->cert_chain
, X509_free
);
3369 s
->session
->sess_cert
->cert_chain
=sk
;
3370 /* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the
3371 * peer's own certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c */
3379 ssl3_send_alert(s
,SSL3_AL_FATAL
,al
);
3382 if (x
!= NULL
) X509_free(x
);
3383 if (sk
!= NULL
) sk_X509_pop_free(sk
,X509_free
);
3387 int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL
*s
)
3391 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A
)
3393 cpk
=ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s
);
3396 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
3397 if ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
!= SSL_aKRB5
) ||
3398 (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kKRB5
))
3400 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3405 ssl3_output_cert_chain(s
,cpk
);
3406 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B
;
3409 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
3410 return ssl_do_write(s
);
3413 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
3414 /* send a new session ticket (not necessarily for a new session) */
3415 int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL
*s
)
3417 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A
)
3419 unsigned char *p
, *senc
, *macstart
;
3420 const unsigned char *const_p
;
3421 int len
, slen_full
, slen
;
3426 SSL_CTX
*tctx
= s
->initial_ctx
;
3427 unsigned char iv
[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH
];
3428 unsigned char key_name
[16];
3430 /* get session encoding length */
3431 slen_full
= i2d_SSL_SESSION(s
->session
, NULL
);
3432 /* Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is
3435 if (slen_full
> 0xFF00)
3437 senc
= OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full
);
3441 i2d_SSL_SESSION(s
->session
, &p
);
3443 /* create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up */
3445 sess
= d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL
, &const_p
, slen_full
);
3451 sess
->session_id_length
= 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
3453 slen
= i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess
, NULL
);
3454 if (slen
> slen_full
) /* shouldn't ever happen */
3460 i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess
, &p
);
3461 SSL_SESSION_free(sess
);
3463 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3464 * follows handshake_header_length +
3465 * 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
3466 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
3467 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
3468 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
3470 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s
->init_buf
,
3471 SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s
) + 22 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH
+
3472 EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH
+ EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
+ slen
))
3474 p
= ssl_handshake_start(s
);
3475 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx
);
3476 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx
);
3477 /* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present
3478 * it does all the work otherwise use generated values
3481 if (tctx
->tlsext_ticket_key_cb
)
3483 if (tctx
->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s
, key_name
, iv
, &ctx
,
3492 RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv
, 16);
3493 EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx
, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL
,
3494 tctx
->tlsext_tick_aes_key
, iv
);
3495 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx
, tctx
->tlsext_tick_hmac_key
, 16,
3496 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL
);
3497 memcpy(key_name
, tctx
->tlsext_tick_key_name
, 16);
3500 /* Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only):
3501 * We leave this unspecified for resumed session (for simplicity),
3502 * and guess that tickets for new sessions will live as long
3503 * as their sessions. */
3504 l2n(s
->hit
? 0 : s
->session
->timeout
, p
);
3506 /* Skip ticket length for now */
3508 /* Output key name */
3510 memcpy(p
, key_name
, 16);
3513 memcpy(p
, iv
, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx
));
3514 p
+= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx
);
3515 /* Encrypt session data */
3516 EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx
, p
, &len
, senc
, slen
);
3518 EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx
, p
, &len
);
3520 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx
);
3522 HMAC_Update(&hctx
, macstart
, p
- macstart
);
3523 HMAC_Final(&hctx
, p
, &hlen
);
3524 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx
);
3527 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
3529 len
= p
- ssl_handshake_start(s
);
3530 ssl_set_handshake_header(s
, SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET
, len
);
3531 /* Skip ticket lifetime hint */
3532 p
= ssl_handshake_start(s
) + 4;
3534 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B
;
3538 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
3539 return ssl_do_write(s
);
3542 int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL
*s
)
3544 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A
)
3547 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3548 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
3549 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
3552 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s
->init_buf
, 8 + s
->tlsext_ocsp_resplen
))
3555 p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
3558 *(p
++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS
;
3559 /* message length */
3560 l2n3(s
->tlsext_ocsp_resplen
+ 4, p
);
3562 *(p
++)= s
->tlsext_status_type
;
3563 /* length of OCSP response */
3564 l2n3(s
->tlsext_ocsp_resplen
, p
);
3565 /* actual response */
3566 memcpy(p
, s
->tlsext_ocsp_resp
, s
->tlsext_ocsp_resplen
);
3567 /* number of bytes to write */
3568 s
->init_num
= 8 + s
->tlsext_ocsp_resplen
;
3569 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B
;
3573 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
3574 return(ssl3_do_write(s
,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
));
3577 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3578 /* ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message. It
3579 * sets the next_proto member in s if found */
3580 int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL
*s
)
3583 int proto_len
, padding_len
;
3585 const unsigned char *p
;
3587 /* Clients cannot send a NextProtocol message if we didn't see the
3588 * extension in their ClientHello */
3589 if (!s
->s3
->next_proto_neg_seen
)
3591 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO
,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION
);
3595 n
=s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
3596 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A
,
3597 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B
,
3599 514, /* See the payload format below */
3605 /* s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received
3606 * in this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset
3607 * by ssl3_get_finished). */
3608 if (!s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
)
3610 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO
,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS
);
3615 return 0; /* The body must be > 1 bytes long */
3617 p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
3619 /* The payload looks like:
3621 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
3622 * uint8 padding_len;
3623 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
3626 if (proto_len
+ 2 > s
->init_num
)
3628 padding_len
= p
[proto_len
+ 1];
3629 if (proto_len
+ padding_len
+ 2 != s
->init_num
)
3632 s
->next_proto_negotiated
= OPENSSL_malloc(proto_len
);
3633 if (!s
->next_proto_negotiated
)
3635 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO
,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3638 memcpy(s
->next_proto_negotiated
, p
+ 1, proto_len
);
3639 s
->next_proto_negotiated_len
= proto_len
;
3645 int tls1_send_server_supplemental_data(SSL
*s
)
3648 const unsigned char *authz
, *orig_authz
;
3650 size_t authz_length
, i
;
3652 if (s
->state
!= SSL3_ST_SW_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA_A
)
3653 return ssl3_do_write(s
, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
);
3655 orig_authz
= authz
= ssl_get_authz_data(s
, &authz_length
);
3658 /* This should never occur. */
3662 /* First we walk over the authz data to see how long the handshake
3663 * message will be. */
3664 for (i
= 0; i
< authz_length
; i
++)
3671 /* n2s increments authz by 2*/
3674 if (memchr(s
->s3
->tlsext_authz_client_types
,
3676 s
->s3
->tlsext_authz_client_types_len
) != NULL
)
3677 length
+= 1 /* authz type */ + 2 /* length */ + len
;
3683 length
+= 1 /* handshake type */ +
3684 3 /* handshake length */ +
3685 3 /* supplemental data length */ +
3686 2 /* supplemental entry type */ +
3687 2 /* supplemental entry length */;
3689 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(s
->init_buf
, length
))
3691 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SEND_SERVER_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA
,ERR_R_BUF_LIB
);
3695 p
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
3696 *(p
++) = SSL3_MT_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA
;
3697 /* Handshake length */
3698 l2n3(length
- 4, p
);
3699 /* Length of supplemental data */
3700 l2n3(length
- 7, p
);
3701 /* Supplemental data type */
3702 s2n(TLSEXT_SUPPLEMENTALDATATYPE_authz_data
, p
);
3704 s2n(length
- 11, p
);
3708 /* Walk over the authz again and append the selected elements. */
3709 for (i
= 0; i
< authz_length
; i
++)
3716 /* n2s increments authz by 2 */
3719 if (memchr(s
->s3
->tlsext_authz_client_types
,
3721 s
->s3
->tlsext_authz_client_types_len
) != NULL
)
3725 memcpy(p
, authz
, len
);
3733 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA_B
;
3734 s
->init_num
= length
;
3737 return ssl3_do_write(s
, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
);