1 /* ssl/s3_srvr.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
124 /* ====================================================================
125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
142 * to make use of the Contribution.
144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
151 #define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
152 #define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
155 #include "ssl_locl.h"
156 #include "kssl_lcl.h"
157 #include "../crypto/constant_time_locl.h"
158 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
159 #include <openssl/rand.h>
160 #include <openssl/objects.h>
161 #include <openssl/evp.h>
162 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
163 #include <openssl/x509.h>
164 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
165 #include <openssl/dh.h>
167 #include <openssl/bn.h>
168 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
169 #include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
171 #include <openssl/md5.h>
173 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD
174 static const SSL_METHOD
*ssl3_get_server_method(int ver
);
176 static const SSL_METHOD
*ssl3_get_server_method(int ver
)
178 if (ver
== SSL3_VERSION
)
179 return(SSLv3_server_method());
184 IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method
,
186 ssl_undefined_function
,
187 ssl3_get_server_method
)
190 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
191 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL
*s
, int *al
)
193 int ret
= SSL_ERROR_NONE
;
195 *al
= SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME
;
197 if ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kSRP
) &&
198 (s
->srp_ctx
.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback
!= NULL
))
200 if(s
->srp_ctx
.login
== NULL
)
202 /* RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject,
203 we do so if There is no srp login name */
205 *al
= SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY
;
209 ret
= SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s
,al
);
216 int ssl3_accept(SSL
*s
)
219 unsigned long alg_k
,Time
=(unsigned long)time(NULL
);
220 void (*cb
)(const SSL
*ssl
,int type
,int val
)=NULL
;
222 int new_state
,state
,skip
=0;
224 RAND_add(&Time
,sizeof(Time
),0);
228 if (s
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
230 else if (s
->ctx
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
231 cb
=s
->ctx
->info_callback
;
233 /* init things to blank */
235 if (!SSL_in_init(s
) || SSL_in_before(s
)) SSL_clear(s
);
239 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT
,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET
);
243 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
244 /* If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we
245 * already got and don't await it anymore, because
246 * Heartbeats don't make sense during handshakes anyway.
248 if (s
->tlsext_hb_pending
)
250 s
->tlsext_hb_pending
= 0;
261 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE
:
263 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
267 case SSL_ST_BEFORE
|SSL_ST_ACCEPT
:
268 case SSL_ST_OK
|SSL_ST_ACCEPT
:
271 if (cb
!= NULL
) cb(s
,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START
,1);
273 if ((s
->version
>>8) != 3)
275 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
279 if (!ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_VERSION
, 0,
282 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT
, SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW
);
286 s
->type
=SSL_ST_ACCEPT
;
288 if (s
->init_buf
== NULL
)
290 if ((buf
=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL
)
295 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf
,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
))
303 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s
))
310 s
->s3
->flags
&= ~SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE
;
311 s
->s3
->flags
&= ~TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY
;
312 s
->s3
->flags
&= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK
;
313 /* Should have been reset by ssl3_get_finished, too. */
314 s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
= 0;
316 if (s
->state
!= SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE
)
318 /* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that
319 * the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
321 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s
,1)) { ret
= -1; goto end
; }
323 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s
);
324 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A
;
325 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_accept
++;
327 else if (!s
->s3
->send_connection_binding
&&
328 !(s
->options
& SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION
))
330 /* Server attempting to renegotiate with
331 * client that doesn't support secure
334 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT
, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED
);
335 ssl3_send_alert(s
,SSL3_AL_FATAL
,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
341 /* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE,
342 * we will just send a HelloRequest */
343 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_accept_renegotiate
++;
344 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A
;
348 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A
:
349 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B
:
352 ret
=ssl3_send_hello_request(s
);
353 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
354 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C
;
355 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH
;
358 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s
);
361 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C
:
365 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A
:
366 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B
:
367 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C
:
369 ret
=ssl3_get_client_hello(s
);
370 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
371 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
372 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D
;
373 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D
:
376 if ((ret
= ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s
,&al
)) < 0)
378 /* callback indicates firther work to be done */
379 s
->rwstate
=SSL_X509_LOOKUP
;
382 if (ret
!= SSL_ERROR_NONE
)
384 ssl3_send_alert(s
,SSL3_AL_FATAL
,al
);
385 /* This is not really an error but the only means to
386 for a client to detect whether srp is supported. */
387 if (al
!= TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY
)
388 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT
,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
);
389 ret
= SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL
;
397 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A
;
401 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A
:
402 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B
:
403 ret
=ssl3_send_server_hello(s
);
404 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
405 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
408 if (s
->tlsext_ticket_expected
)
409 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A
;
411 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A
;
415 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A
;
418 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A
;
422 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A
:
423 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B
:
424 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
425 /* normal PSK or KRB5 or SRP */
426 if (!(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aNULL
|SSL_aKRB5
|SSL_aSRP
))
427 && !(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kPSK
))
429 ret
=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s
);
430 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
431 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
432 if (s
->tlsext_status_expected
)
433 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A
;
435 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A
;
440 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A
;
447 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A
;
452 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A
:
453 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B
:
454 alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
456 /* clear this, it may get reset by
457 * send_server_key_exchange */
458 if ((s
->options
& SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA
)
459 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
460 && !(alg_k
& SSL_kKRB5
)
461 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
463 /* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key
464 * even when forbidden by protocol specs
465 * (handshake may fail as clients are not required to
466 * be able to handle this) */
467 s
->s3
->tmp
.use_rsa_tmp
=1;
469 s
->s3
->tmp
.use_rsa_tmp
=0;
472 /* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or
473 * RSA but we have a sign only certificate
475 * PSK: may send PSK identity hints
477 * For ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange
478 * message only if the cipher suite is either
479 * ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, the
480 * server certificate contains the server's
481 * public key for key exchange.
483 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.use_rsa_tmp
484 /* PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity
485 * hint if provided */
486 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
487 || ((alg_k
& SSL_kPSK
) && s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
)
489 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
490 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
491 || (alg_k
& SSL_kSRP
)
493 || (alg_k
& SSL_kDHE
)
494 || (alg_k
& SSL_kECDHE
)
495 || ((alg_k
& SSL_kRSA
)
496 && (s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
].privatekey
== NULL
497 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
)
498 && EVP_PKEY_size(s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
].privatekey
)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
)
504 ret
=ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s
);
505 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
510 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A
;
514 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A
:
515 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B
:
516 if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
517 !(s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
) ||
518 /* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set,
519 * don't request cert during re-negotiation: */
520 ((s
->session
->peer
!= NULL
) &&
521 (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE
)) ||
522 /* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites
523 * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts
524 * and in RFC 2246): */
525 ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aNULL
) &&
526 /* ... except when the application insists on verification
527 * (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */
528 !(s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT
)) ||
529 /* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */
530 (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aKRB5
) ||
531 /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
532 (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aSRP
)
533 /* With normal PSK Certificates and
534 * Certificate Requests are omitted */
535 || (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kPSK
))
537 /* no cert request */
539 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
=0;
540 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A
;
541 if (s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
)
542 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
))
547 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
=1;
548 ret
=ssl3_send_certificate_request(s
);
549 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
550 #ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
551 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A
;
553 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH
;
554 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A
;
560 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A
:
561 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B
:
562 ret
=ssl3_send_server_done(s
);
563 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
564 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A
;
565 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH
;
569 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH
:
571 /* This code originally checked to see if
572 * any data was pending using BIO_CTRL_INFO
573 * and then flushed. This caused problems
574 * as documented in PR#1939. The proposed
575 * fix doesn't completely resolve this issue
576 * as buggy implementations of BIO_CTRL_PENDING
577 * still exist. So instead we just flush
581 s
->rwstate
=SSL_WRITING
;
582 if (BIO_flush(s
->wbio
) <= 0)
587 s
->rwstate
=SSL_NOTHING
;
589 s
->state
=s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
;
592 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A
:
593 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B
:
594 /* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */
595 ret
= ssl3_check_client_hello(s
);
599 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C
;
601 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
)
603 ret
=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s
);
604 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
607 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A
;
611 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A
:
612 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B
:
613 ret
=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s
);
618 /* For the ECDH ciphersuites when
619 * the client sends its ECDH pub key in
620 * a certificate, the CertificateVerify
621 * message is not sent.
622 * Also for GOST ciphersuites when
623 * the client uses its key from the certificate
626 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
627 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
;
629 if (s
->s3
->next_proto_neg_seen
)
630 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A
;
632 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
;
636 else if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
))
638 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A
;
640 if (!s
->session
->peer
)
642 /* For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer
643 * at this point and digest cached records.
645 if (!s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
)
647 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT
,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
650 s
->s3
->flags
|= TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE
;
651 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
))
659 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A
;
662 /* We need to get hashes here so if there is
663 * a client cert, it can be verified
664 * FIXME - digest processing for CertificateVerify
665 * should be generalized. But it is next step
667 if (s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
)
668 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
))
670 for (dgst_num
=0; dgst_num
<SSL_MAX_DIGEST
;dgst_num
++)
671 if (s
->s3
->handshake_dgst
[dgst_num
])
675 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->cert_verify_mac(s
,EVP_MD_CTX_type(s
->s3
->handshake_dgst
[dgst_num
]),&(s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_verify_md
[offset
]));
676 dgst_size
=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s
->s3
->handshake_dgst
[dgst_num
]);
687 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A
:
688 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B
:
690 * This *should* be the first time we enable CCS, but be
691 * extra careful about surrounding code changes. We need
692 * to set this here because we don't know if we're
693 * expecting a CertificateVerify or not.
695 if (!s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
)
696 s
->s3
->flags
|= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK
;
697 /* we should decide if we expected this one */
698 ret
=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s
);
699 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
701 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
702 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
;
704 if (s
->s3
->next_proto_neg_seen
)
705 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A
;
707 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
;
712 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
713 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A
:
714 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B
:
716 * Enable CCS for resumed handshakes with NPN.
717 * In a full handshake with NPN, we end up here through
718 * SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B, where SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK was
719 * already set. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make
720 * sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates.
721 * s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is
722 * processed in s3_pkt.c, and remains set until
723 * the client's Finished message is read.
725 if (!s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
)
726 s
->s3
->flags
|= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK
;
728 ret
=ssl3_get_next_proto(s
);
729 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
731 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
;
735 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
:
736 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B
:
738 * Enable CCS for resumed handshakes without NPN.
739 * In a full handshake, we end up here through
740 * SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B, where SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK was
741 * already set. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make
742 * sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates.
743 * s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is
744 * processed in s3_pkt.c, and remains set until
745 * the client's Finished message is read.
747 if (!s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
)
748 s
->s3
->flags
|= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK
;
749 ret
=ssl3_get_finished(s
,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
,
750 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B
);
751 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
754 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
755 else if (s
->tlsext_ticket_expected
)
756 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A
;
759 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A
;
763 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
764 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A
:
765 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B
:
766 ret
=ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s
);
767 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
768 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A
;
772 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A
:
773 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B
:
774 ret
=ssl3_send_cert_status(s
);
775 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
776 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A
;
782 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A
:
783 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B
:
785 s
->session
->cipher
=s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
;
786 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->setup_key_block(s
))
787 { ret
= -1; goto end
; }
789 ret
=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s
,
790 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A
,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B
);
792 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
793 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A
;
796 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
797 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE
))
805 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A
:
806 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B
:
807 ret
=ssl3_send_finished(s
,
808 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A
,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B
,
809 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->server_finished_label
,
810 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->server_finished_label_len
);
811 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
812 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH
;
815 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
816 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
;
818 if (s
->s3
->next_proto_neg_seen
)
820 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A
;
823 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
;
827 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
=SSL_ST_OK
;
832 /* clean a few things up */
833 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s
);
835 BUF_MEM_free(s
->init_buf
);
838 /* remove buffering on output */
839 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s
);
843 if (s
->renegotiate
== 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
848 ssl_update_cache(s
,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER
);
850 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_accept_good
++;
852 s
->handshake_func
=ssl3_accept
;
854 if (cb
!= NULL
) cb(s
,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE
,1);
862 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT
,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE
);
868 if (!s
->s3
->tmp
.reuse_message
&& !skip
)
872 if ((ret
=BIO_flush(s
->wbio
)) <= 0)
877 if ((cb
!= NULL
) && (s
->state
!= state
))
881 cb(s
,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP
,1);
888 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
892 cb(s
,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT
,ret
);
896 int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL
*s
)
899 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A
)
901 ssl_set_handshake_header(s
, SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST
, 0);
902 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B
;
905 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
906 return ssl_do_write(s
);
909 int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL
*s
)
914 /* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message,
915 * so permit appropriate message length */
916 n
=s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
922 if (!ok
) return((int)n
);
923 s
->s3
->tmp
.reuse_message
= 1;
924 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
== SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO
)
926 /* We only allow the client to restart the handshake once per
928 if (s
->s3
->flags
& SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE
)
930 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_MULTIPLE_SGC_RESTARTS
);
933 /* Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake,
934 * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.) */
935 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
936 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
!= NULL
)
938 DH_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
);
939 s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
= NULL
;
942 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
943 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.ecdh
!= NULL
)
945 EC_KEY_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.ecdh
);
946 s
->s3
->tmp
.ecdh
= NULL
;
949 s
->s3
->flags
|= SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE
;
955 int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL
*s
)
957 int i
,j
,ok
,al
=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,ret
= -1;
958 unsigned int cookie_len
;
963 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
967 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *ciphers
=NULL
;
969 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C
&& !s
->first_packet
)
972 /* We do this so that we will respond with our native type.
973 * If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1,
974 * This down switching should be handled by a different method.
975 * If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with
978 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A
981 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B
;
984 n
=s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
985 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B
,
986 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C
,
987 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
988 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
,
991 if (!ok
) return((int)n
);
993 d
=p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
995 /* use version from inside client hello, not from record header
996 * (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */
997 s
->client_version
=(((int)p
[0])<<8)|(int)p
[1];
1000 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) ? (s
->client_version
> s
->version
&&
1001 s
->method
->version
!= DTLS_ANY_VERSION
)
1002 : (s
->client_version
< s
->version
))
1004 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER
);
1005 if ((s
->client_version
>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR
&&
1006 !s
->enc_write_ctx
&& !s
->write_hash
)
1008 /* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
1009 s
->version
= s
->client_version
;
1011 al
= SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
1015 /* If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't
1016 * contain one, just return since we do not want to
1017 * allocate any memory yet. So check cookie length...
1019 if (SSL_get_options(s
) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE
)
1021 unsigned int session_length
, cookie_length
;
1023 session_length
= *(p
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
1024 cookie_length
= *(p
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
+ session_length
+ 1);
1026 if (cookie_length
== 0)
1030 /* load the client random */
1031 memcpy(s
->s3
->client_random
,p
,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
1032 p
+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
;
1034 /* get the session-id */
1038 /* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in renegotiation.
1039 * 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally ignore resumption requests
1040 * with flag SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
1041 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on this for security
1042 * won't even compile against older library versions).
1044 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to request
1045 * renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains unset): for servers,
1046 * this essentially just means that the SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1047 * setting will be ignored.
1049 if ((s
->new_session
&& (s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
)))
1051 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s
,1))
1056 i
=ssl_get_prev_session(s
, p
, j
, d
+ n
);
1058 { /* previous session */
1065 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s
,1))
1075 cookie_len
= *(p
++);
1078 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
1079 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
1080 * does not cause an overflow.
1082 if ( cookie_len
> sizeof(s
->d1
->rcvd_cookie
))
1085 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1086 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH
);
1090 /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
1091 if ((SSL_get_options(s
) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE
) &&
1094 memcpy(s
->d1
->rcvd_cookie
, p
, cookie_len
);
1096 if ( s
->ctx
->app_verify_cookie_cb
!= NULL
)
1098 if ( s
->ctx
->app_verify_cookie_cb(s
, s
->d1
->rcvd_cookie
,
1101 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1102 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1103 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH
);
1106 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1108 else if ( memcmp(s
->d1
->rcvd_cookie
, s
->d1
->cookie
,
1109 s
->d1
->cookie_len
) != 0) /* default verification */
1111 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1112 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1113 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH
);
1116 /* Set to -2 so if successful we return 2 */
1121 if (s
->method
->version
== DTLS_ANY_VERSION
)
1123 /* Select version to use */
1124 if (s
->client_version
<= DTLS1_2_VERSION
&&
1125 !(s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2
))
1127 s
->version
= DTLS1_2_VERSION
;
1128 s
->method
= DTLSv1_2_server_method();
1130 else if (tls1_suiteb(s
))
1132 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE
);
1133 s
->version
= s
->client_version
;
1134 al
= SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
1137 else if (s
->client_version
<= DTLS1_VERSION
&&
1138 !(s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1
))
1140 s
->version
= DTLS1_VERSION
;
1141 s
->method
= DTLSv1_server_method();
1145 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER
);
1146 s
->version
= s
->client_version
;
1147 al
= SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
1150 s
->session
->ssl_version
= s
->version
;
1155 if ((i
== 0) && (j
!= 0))
1157 /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */
1158 al
=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1159 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED
);
1164 /* not enough data */
1165 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1166 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1169 if ((i
> 0) && (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s
,p
,i
,&(ciphers
))
1176 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
1177 if ((s
->hit
) && (i
> 0))
1180 id
=s
->session
->cipher
->id
;
1183 printf("client sent %d ciphers\n",sk_num(ciphers
));
1185 for (i
=0; i
<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers
); i
++)
1187 c
=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers
,i
);
1189 printf("client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1190 i
,sk_num(ciphers
),SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c
));
1198 /* Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade
1199 * attack: CVE-2010-4180.
1202 if (j
== 0 && (s
->options
& SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG
) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers
) == 1))
1204 /* Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used cipher may
1205 * not be in the current list, the client instead might be trying to
1206 * continue using a cipher that before wasn't chosen due to server
1207 * preferences. We'll have to reject the connection if the cipher is not
1208 * enabled, though. */
1209 c
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers
, 0);
1210 if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s
), c
) >= 0)
1212 s
->session
->cipher
= c
;
1219 /* we need to have the cipher in the cipher
1220 * list if we are asked to reuse it */
1221 al
=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1222 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING
);
1231 /* not enough data */
1232 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1233 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1236 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1241 if (p
[j
] == 0) break;
1248 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1249 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED
);
1253 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1255 if (s
->version
>= SSL3_VERSION
)
1257 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s
,&p
,d
,n
))
1259 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT
);
1264 /* Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this
1265 * handshake for not reused session only. We need to generate
1266 * server_random before calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow
1267 * SessionTicket processing to use it in key derivation. */
1270 pos
=s
->s3
->server_random
;
1271 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s
, 1, pos
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) <= 0)
1277 if (!s
->hit
&& s
->version
>= TLS1_VERSION
&& s
->tls_session_secret_cb
)
1279 SSL_CIPHER
*pref_cipher
=NULL
;
1281 s
->session
->master_key_length
=sizeof(s
->session
->master_key
);
1282 if(s
->tls_session_secret_cb(s
, s
->session
->master_key
, &s
->session
->master_key_length
,
1283 ciphers
, &pref_cipher
, s
->tls_session_secret_cb_arg
))
1286 s
->session
->ciphers
=ciphers
;
1287 s
->session
->verify_result
=X509_V_OK
;
1291 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1292 pref_cipher
=pref_cipher
? pref_cipher
: ssl3_choose_cipher(s
, s
->session
->ciphers
, SSL_get_ciphers(s
));
1293 if (pref_cipher
== NULL
)
1295 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1296 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER
);
1300 s
->session
->cipher
=pref_cipher
;
1303 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s
->cipher_list
);
1305 if (s
->cipher_list_by_id
)
1306 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s
->cipher_list_by_id
);
1308 s
->cipher_list
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s
->session
->ciphers
);
1309 s
->cipher_list_by_id
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s
->session
->ciphers
);
1314 /* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1315 * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
1316 * algorithms from the client, starting at q. */
1317 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
=NULL
;
1318 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1319 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1320 if (s
->session
->compress_meth
!= 0)
1322 int m
, comp_id
= s
->session
->compress_meth
;
1323 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1324 /* Can't disable compression */
1325 if (!ssl_allow_compression(s
))
1327 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION
);
1330 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1331 for (m
= 0; m
< sk_SSL_COMP_num(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
); m
++)
1333 comp
=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
,m
);
1334 if (comp_id
== comp
->id
)
1336 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
=comp
;
1340 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
== NULL
)
1342 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM
);
1345 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1346 for (m
= 0; m
< i
; m
++)
1348 if (q
[m
] == comp_id
)
1353 al
=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1354 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING
);
1360 else if (ssl_allow_compression(s
) && s
->ctx
->comp_methods
)
1361 { /* See if we have a match */
1362 int m
,nn
,o
,v
,done
=0;
1364 nn
=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
);
1365 for (m
=0; m
<nn
; m
++)
1367 comp
=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
,m
);
1380 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
=comp
;
1385 /* If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1386 * using compression.
1388 if (s
->session
->compress_meth
!= 0)
1390 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION
);
1395 /* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must
1400 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1401 s
->session
->compress_meth
=0;
1403 s
->session
->compress_meth
=(comp
== NULL
)?0:comp
->id
;
1405 if (s
->session
->ciphers
!= NULL
)
1406 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s
->session
->ciphers
);
1407 s
->session
->ciphers
=ciphers
;
1408 if (ciphers
== NULL
)
1410 al
=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1411 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED
);
1415 if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s
))
1417 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
);
1420 /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
1422 if (s
->cert
->cert_cb
)
1424 int rv
= s
->cert
->cert_cb(s
, s
->cert
->cert_cb_arg
);
1427 al
=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1428 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR
);
1433 s
->rwstate
=SSL_X509_LOOKUP
;
1436 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
1438 c
=ssl3_choose_cipher(s
,s
->session
->ciphers
,
1439 SSL_get_ciphers(s
));
1443 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1444 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER
);
1447 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
=c
;
1448 /* check whether we should disable session resumption */
1449 if (s
->not_resumable_session_cb
!= NULL
)
1450 s
->session
->not_resumable
=s
->not_resumable_session_cb(s
,
1451 ((c
->algorithm_mkey
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kECDHE
)) != 0));
1452 if (s
->session
->not_resumable
)
1453 /* do not send a session ticket */
1454 s
->tlsext_ticket_expected
= 0;
1458 /* Session-id reuse */
1459 #ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
1460 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *sk
;
1461 SSL_CIPHER
*nc
=NULL
;
1462 SSL_CIPHER
*ec
=NULL
;
1464 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG
)
1466 sk
=s
->session
->ciphers
;
1467 for (i
=0; i
<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk
); i
++)
1469 c
=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk
,i
);
1470 if (c
->algorithm_enc
& SSL_eNULL
)
1472 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c
))
1476 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
=nc
;
1477 else if (ec
!= NULL
)
1478 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
=ec
;
1480 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
=s
->session
->cipher
;
1484 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
=s
->session
->cipher
;
1487 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
) || !(s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
))
1489 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
))
1493 /* we now have the following setup.
1495 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
1496 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
1497 * compression - basically ignored right now
1498 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1499 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1500 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1501 * s->s3->tmp.new_cipher- the new cipher to use.
1504 /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */
1505 if (s
->version
>= SSL3_VERSION
)
1507 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s
) <= 0)
1509 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
);
1514 if (ret
< 0) ret
=-ret
;
1518 ssl3_send_alert(s
,SSL3_AL_FATAL
,al
);
1521 if (ciphers
!= NULL
) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers
);
1522 return ret
< 0 ? -1 : ret
;
1525 int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL
*s
)
1528 unsigned char *p
,*d
;
1533 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A
)
1535 buf
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
1536 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1537 p
=s
->s3
->server_random
;
1538 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s
, 1, p
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) <= 0)
1541 /* Do the message type and length last */
1542 d
=p
= ssl_handshake_start(s
);
1544 *(p
++)=s
->version
>>8;
1545 *(p
++)=s
->version
&0xff;
1548 memcpy(p
,s
->s3
->server_random
,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
1549 p
+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
;
1551 /* There are several cases for the session ID to send
1552 * back in the server hello:
1553 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
1554 * we send back the old session ID.
1555 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
1556 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
1557 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
1558 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
1560 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
1561 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
1562 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
1563 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
1566 if (s
->session
->not_resumable
||
1567 (!(s
->ctx
->session_cache_mode
& SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER
)
1569 s
->session
->session_id_length
=0;
1571 sl
=s
->session
->session_id_length
;
1572 if (sl
> (int)sizeof(s
->session
->session_id
))
1574 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1578 memcpy(p
,s
->session
->session_id
,sl
);
1581 /* put the cipher */
1582 i
=ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
,p
);
1585 /* put the compression method */
1586 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1589 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
== NULL
)
1592 *(p
++)=s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
->id
;
1594 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1595 if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s
) <= 0)
1597 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO
,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT
);
1600 if ((p
= ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s
, p
, buf
+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
, &al
)) == NULL
)
1602 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1603 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO
,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1609 ssl_set_handshake_header(s
, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO
, l
);
1610 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B
;
1613 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
1614 return ssl_do_write(s
);
1617 int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL
*s
)
1620 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A
)
1622 ssl_set_handshake_header(s
, SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE
, 0);
1623 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B
;
1626 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
1627 return ssl_do_write(s
);
1630 int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL
*s
)
1632 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1636 unsigned char md_buf
[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
];
1639 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1642 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1643 EC_KEY
*ecdh
=NULL
, *ecdhp
;
1644 unsigned char *encodedPoint
= NULL
;
1647 BN_CTX
*bn_ctx
= NULL
;
1650 const EVP_MD
*md
= NULL
;
1651 unsigned char *p
,*d
;
1661 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx
);
1662 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A
)
1664 type
=s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
1669 r
[0]=r
[1]=r
[2]=r
[3]=NULL
;
1671 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1672 if (type
& SSL_kRSA
)
1675 if ((rsa
== NULL
) && (s
->cert
->rsa_tmp_cb
!= NULL
))
1677 rsa
=s
->cert
->rsa_tmp_cb(s
,
1678 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
),
1679 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
));
1682 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1683 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY
);
1691 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1692 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY
);
1697 s
->s3
->tmp
.use_rsa_tmp
=1;
1701 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1702 if (type
& SSL_kDHE
)
1704 if (s
->cert
->dh_tmp_auto
)
1706 dhp
= ssl_get_auto_dh(s
);
1709 al
=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1710 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1716 if ((dhp
== NULL
) && (s
->cert
->dh_tmp_cb
!= NULL
))
1717 dhp
=s
->cert
->dh_tmp_cb(s
,
1718 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
),
1719 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
));
1722 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1723 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY
);
1726 if (!ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH
,
1727 DH_security_bits(dhp
), 0, dhp
))
1729 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1730 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL
);
1733 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
!= NULL
)
1735 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1739 if (s
->cert
->dh_tmp_auto
)
1741 else if ((dh
=DHparams_dup(dhp
)) == NULL
)
1743 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_DH_LIB
);
1748 if ((dhp
->pub_key
== NULL
||
1749 dhp
->priv_key
== NULL
||
1750 (s
->options
& SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE
)))
1752 if(!DH_generate_key(dh
))
1754 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1761 dh
->pub_key
=BN_dup(dhp
->pub_key
);
1762 dh
->priv_key
=BN_dup(dhp
->priv_key
);
1763 if ((dh
->pub_key
== NULL
) ||
1764 (dh
->priv_key
== NULL
))
1766 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_DH_LIB
);
1776 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1777 if (type
& SSL_kECDHE
)
1779 const EC_GROUP
*group
;
1781 ecdhp
=cert
->ecdh_tmp
;
1782 if (s
->cert
->ecdh_tmp_auto
)
1784 /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
1785 int nid
= tls1_shared_curve(s
, -2);
1786 if (nid
!= NID_undef
)
1787 ecdhp
= EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid
);
1789 else if ((ecdhp
== NULL
) && s
->cert
->ecdh_tmp_cb
)
1791 ecdhp
=s
->cert
->ecdh_tmp_cb(s
,
1792 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
),
1793 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
));
1797 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1798 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY
);
1802 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.ecdh
!= NULL
)
1804 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1808 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
1811 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB
);
1814 if (s
->cert
->ecdh_tmp_auto
)
1816 else if ((ecdh
= EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp
)) == NULL
)
1818 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB
);
1822 s
->s3
->tmp
.ecdh
=ecdh
;
1823 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh
) == NULL
) ||
1824 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh
) == NULL
) ||
1825 (s
->options
& SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE
))
1827 if(!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh
))
1829 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB
);
1834 if (((group
= EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh
)) == NULL
) ||
1835 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh
) == NULL
) ||
1836 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh
) == NULL
))
1838 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB
);
1842 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
) &&
1843 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group
) > 163))
1845 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER
);
1849 /* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH
1850 * keys over named (not generic) curves. For
1851 * supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero.
1854 tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group
)))
1857 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE
);
1861 /* Encode the public key.
1862 * First check the size of encoding and
1863 * allocate memory accordingly.
1865 encodedlen
= EC_POINT_point2oct(group
,
1866 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh
),
1867 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED
,
1870 encodedPoint
= (unsigned char *)
1871 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen
*sizeof(unsigned char));
1872 bn_ctx
= BN_CTX_new();
1873 if ((encodedPoint
== NULL
) || (bn_ctx
== NULL
))
1875 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1880 encodedlen
= EC_POINT_point2oct(group
,
1881 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh
),
1882 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED
,
1883 encodedPoint
, encodedlen
, bn_ctx
);
1885 if (encodedlen
== 0)
1887 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB
);
1891 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx
); bn_ctx
=NULL
;
1893 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not
1894 * generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges.
1895 * In this situation, we need four additional bytes
1896 * to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
1901 /* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message
1902 * explicitly so we can set these to NULLs
1910 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
1911 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1912 if (type
& SSL_kPSK
)
1914 /* reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint*/
1915 n
+=2+strlen(s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
);
1918 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1919 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1920 if (type
& SSL_kSRP
)
1922 if ((s
->srp_ctx
.N
== NULL
) ||
1923 (s
->srp_ctx
.g
== NULL
) ||
1924 (s
->srp_ctx
.s
== NULL
) ||
1925 (s
->srp_ctx
.B
== NULL
))
1927 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM
);
1938 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1939 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE
);
1942 for (i
=0; i
< 4 && r
[i
] != NULL
; i
++)
1944 nr
[i
]=BN_num_bytes(r
[i
]);
1945 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1946 if ((i
== 2) && (type
& SSL_kSRP
))
1953 if (!(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aNULL
|SSL_aSRP
))
1954 && !(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kPSK
))
1956 if ((pkey
=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s
,s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
,&md
))
1959 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1962 kn
=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey
);
1970 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf
,n
+SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s
)+kn
))
1972 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_LIB_BUF
);
1975 d
= p
= ssl_handshake_start(s
);
1977 for (i
=0; i
< 4 && r
[i
] != NULL
; i
++)
1979 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1980 if ((i
== 2) && (type
& SSL_kSRP
))
1992 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1993 if (type
& SSL_kECDHE
)
1995 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves.
1996 * In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has:
1997 * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
1998 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by
1999 * the actual encoded point itself
2001 *p
= NAMED_CURVE_TYPE
;
2009 memcpy((unsigned char*)p
,
2010 (unsigned char *)encodedPoint
,
2012 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint
);
2013 encodedPoint
= NULL
;
2018 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2019 if (type
& SSL_kPSK
)
2021 /* copy PSK identity hint */
2022 s2n(strlen(s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
), p
);
2023 strncpy((char *)p
, s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
, strlen(s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
));
2024 p
+=strlen(s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
);
2031 /* n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4])
2032 * and p points to the space at the end. */
2033 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2034 if (pkey
->type
== EVP_PKEY_RSA
&& !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
))
2038 for (num
=2; num
> 0; num
--)
2040 EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx
,
2041 EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW
);
2042 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx
,(num
== 2)
2043 ?s
->ctx
->md5
:s
->ctx
->sha1
, NULL
);
2044 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx
,&(s
->s3
->client_random
[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
2045 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx
,&(s
->s3
->server_random
[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
2046 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx
,d
,n
);
2047 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx
,q
,
2048 (unsigned int *)&i
);
2052 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1
, md_buf
, j
,
2053 &(p
[2]), &u
, pkey
->pkey
.rsa
) <= 0)
2055 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_LIB_RSA
);
2065 /* send signature algorithm */
2066 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
))
2068 if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p
, pkey
, md
))
2070 /* Should never happen */
2071 al
=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2072 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2078 fprintf(stderr
, "Using hash %s\n",
2081 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx
, md
, NULL
);
2082 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx
,&(s
->s3
->client_random
[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
2083 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx
,&(s
->s3
->server_random
[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
2084 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx
,d
,n
);
2085 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx
,&(p
[2]),
2086 (unsigned int *)&i
,pkey
))
2088 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_LIB_EVP
);
2093 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
))
2098 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
2099 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2100 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE
);
2105 ssl_set_handshake_header(s
, SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, n
);
2108 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B
;
2109 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx
);
2110 return ssl_do_write(s
);
2112 ssl3_send_alert(s
,SSL3_AL_FATAL
,al
);
2114 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2115 if (encodedPoint
!= NULL
) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint
);
2116 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx
);
2118 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx
);
2122 int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL
*s
)
2124 unsigned char *p
,*d
;
2126 STACK_OF(X509_NAME
) *sk
=NULL
;
2130 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A
)
2134 d
=p
=ssl_handshake_start(s
);
2136 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
2138 n
=ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s
,p
);
2143 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
))
2145 const unsigned char *psigs
;
2146 unsigned char *etmp
= p
;
2147 nl
= tls12_get_psigalgs(s
, &psigs
);
2148 /* Skip over length for now */
2150 nl
= tls12_copy_sigalgs(s
, p
, psigs
, nl
);
2151 /* Now fill in length */
2161 sk
=SSL_get_client_CA_list(s
);
2165 for (i
=0; i
<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk
); i
++)
2167 name
=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk
,i
);
2168 j
=i2d_X509_NAME(name
,NULL
);
2169 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf
,SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s
)+n
+j
+2))
2171 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,ERR_R_BUF_LIB
);
2174 p
= ssl_handshake_start(s
) + n
;
2175 if (!(s
->options
& SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG
))
2178 i2d_X509_NAME(name
,&p
);
2185 i2d_X509_NAME(name
,&p
);
2186 j
-=2; s2n(j
,d
); j
+=2;
2192 /* else no CA names */
2193 p
= ssl_handshake_start(s
) + off
;
2196 ssl_set_handshake_header(s
, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, n
);
2198 #ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
2199 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s
))
2201 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf
, s
->init_num
+ 4))
2203 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,ERR_R_BUF_LIB
);
2206 p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
+ s
->init_num
;
2208 *(p
++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE
;
2216 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B
;
2219 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
2220 return ssl_do_write(s
);
2225 int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL
*s
)
2229 unsigned long alg_k
;
2231 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2233 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
=NULL
;
2235 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2237 DH
*dh_srvr
, *dh_clnt
= NULL
;
2239 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2241 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2243 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2244 EC_KEY
*srvr_ecdh
= NULL
;
2245 EVP_PKEY
*clnt_pub_pkey
= NULL
;
2246 EC_POINT
*clnt_ecpoint
= NULL
;
2247 BN_CTX
*bn_ctx
= NULL
;
2250 n
=s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
2251 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A
,
2252 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B
,
2253 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2257 if (!ok
) return((int)n
);
2258 p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
2260 alg_k
=s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
2262 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2263 if (alg_k
& SSL_kRSA
)
2265 unsigned char rand_premaster_secret
[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
];
2267 unsigned char decrypt_good
, version_good
;
2269 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
2270 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.use_rsa_tmp
)
2272 if ((s
->cert
!= NULL
) && (s
->cert
->rsa_tmp
!= NULL
))
2273 rsa
=s
->cert
->rsa_tmp
;
2274 /* Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should
2275 * be sent already */
2278 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2279 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY
);
2286 pkey
=s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
].privatekey
;
2287 if ( (pkey
== NULL
) ||
2288 (pkey
->type
!= EVP_PKEY_RSA
) ||
2289 (pkey
->pkey
.rsa
== NULL
))
2291 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2292 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE
);
2298 /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */
2299 if (s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
&& s
->version
!= DTLS1_BAD_VER
)
2304 if (!(s
->options
& SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG
))
2306 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG
);
2316 /* We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because
2317 * of Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see
2318 * RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of
2319 * the TLS RFC and generates a random premaster secret for the
2320 * case that the decrypt fails. See
2321 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1 */
2323 /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure. */
2324 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(rand_premaster_secret
,
2325 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret
)) <= 0)
2327 decrypt_len
= RSA_private_decrypt((int)n
,p
,p
,rsa
,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING
);
2330 /* decrypt_len should be SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH.
2331 * decrypt_good will be 0xff if so and zero otherwise. */
2332 decrypt_good
= constant_time_eq_int_8(decrypt_len
, SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
);
2334 /* If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct
2335 * then version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero.
2336 * The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2337 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version
2338 * number check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks
2339 * are done in constant time and are treated like any other
2340 * decryption error. */
2341 version_good
= constant_time_eq_8(p
[0], (unsigned)(s
->client_version
>>8));
2342 version_good
&= constant_time_eq_8(p
[1], (unsigned)(s
->client_version
&0xff));
2344 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as
2345 * the ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks
2346 * (strangely, the protocol does not offer such protection for
2347 * DH ciphersuites). However, buggy clients exist that send the
2348 * negotiated protocol version instead if the server does not
2349 * support the requested protocol version. If
2350 * SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. */
2351 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG
)
2353 unsigned char workaround_good
;
2354 workaround_good
= constant_time_eq_8(p
[0], (unsigned)(s
->version
>>8));
2355 workaround_good
&= constant_time_eq_8(p
[1], (unsigned)(s
->version
&0xff));
2356 version_good
|= workaround_good
;
2359 /* Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good
2360 * to remain non-zero (0xff). */
2361 decrypt_good
&= version_good
;
2363 /* Now copy rand_premaster_secret over p using
2364 * decrypt_good_mask. */
2365 for (i
= 0; i
< (int) sizeof(rand_premaster_secret
); i
++)
2367 p
[i
] = constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good
, p
[i
],
2368 rand_premaster_secret
[i
]);
2371 s
->session
->master_key_length
=
2372 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
2373 s
->session
->master_key
,
2375 OPENSSL_cleanse(p
,i
);
2379 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2380 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHE
|SSL_kDHr
|SSL_kDHd
))
2383 EVP_PKEY
*skey
= NULL
;
2390 if (!(s
->options
& SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG
))
2392 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG
);
2401 if (alg_k
& SSL_kDHr
)
2402 idx
= SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA
;
2403 else if (alg_k
& SSL_kDHd
)
2404 idx
= SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA
;
2407 skey
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[idx
].privatekey
;
2408 if ((skey
== NULL
) ||
2409 (skey
->type
!= EVP_PKEY_DH
) ||
2410 (skey
->pkey
.dh
== NULL
))
2412 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2413 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE
);
2416 dh_srvr
= skey
->pkey
.dh
;
2418 else if (s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
== NULL
)
2420 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2421 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY
);
2425 dh_srvr
=s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
;
2429 /* Get pubkey from cert */
2430 EVP_PKEY
*clkey
=X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
2433 if (EVP_PKEY_cmp_parameters(clkey
, skey
) == 1)
2434 dh_clnt
= EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(clkey
);
2436 if (dh_clnt
== NULL
)
2438 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2439 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY
);
2442 EVP_PKEY_free(clkey
);
2443 pub
= dh_clnt
->pub_key
;
2446 pub
=BN_bin2bn(p
,i
,NULL
);
2449 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_BN_LIB
);
2453 i
=DH_compute_key(p
,pub
,dh_srvr
);
2457 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_DH_LIB
);
2462 DH_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
);
2469 s
->session
->master_key_length
=
2470 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
2471 s
->session
->master_key
,p
,i
);
2472 OPENSSL_cleanse(p
,i
);
2478 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2479 if (alg_k
& SSL_kKRB5
)
2481 krb5_error_code krb5rc
;
2482 krb5_data enc_ticket
;
2483 krb5_data authenticator
;
2485 KSSL_CTX
*kssl_ctx
= s
->kssl_ctx
;
2486 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx
;
2487 const EVP_CIPHER
*enc
= NULL
;
2488 unsigned char iv
[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH
];
2489 unsigned char pms
[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
2490 + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH
];
2492 krb5_timestamp authtime
= 0;
2493 krb5_ticket_times ttimes
;
2495 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx
);
2497 if (!kssl_ctx
) kssl_ctx
= kssl_ctx_new();
2500 enc_ticket
.length
= i
;
2502 if (n
< (long)(enc_ticket
.length
+ 6))
2504 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2505 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2509 enc_ticket
.data
= (char *)p
;
2510 p
+=enc_ticket
.length
;
2513 authenticator
.length
= i
;
2515 if (n
< (long)(enc_ticket
.length
+ authenticator
.length
+ 6))
2517 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2518 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2522 authenticator
.data
= (char *)p
;
2523 p
+=authenticator
.length
;
2527 enc_pms
.data
= (char *)p
;
2530 /* Note that the length is checked again below,
2533 if(enc_pms
.length
> sizeof pms
)
2535 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2536 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2540 if (n
!= (long)(enc_ticket
.length
+ authenticator
.length
+
2541 enc_pms
.length
+ 6))
2543 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2544 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2548 if ((krb5rc
= kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx
, &enc_ticket
, &ttimes
,
2552 printf("kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
2553 krb5rc
, kssl_err
.reason
);
2555 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err
.text
);
2556 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2557 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2562 /* Note: no authenticator is not considered an error,
2563 ** but will return authtime == 0.
2565 if ((krb5rc
= kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx
, &authenticator
,
2566 &authtime
, &kssl_err
)) != 0)
2569 printf("kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
2570 krb5rc
, kssl_err
.reason
);
2572 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err
.text
);
2573 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2574 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2579 if ((krb5rc
= kssl_validate_times(authtime
, &ttimes
)) != 0)
2581 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, krb5rc
);
2586 kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx
);
2587 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2589 enc
= kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx
->enctype
);
2593 memset(iv
, 0, sizeof iv
); /* per RFC 1510 */
2595 if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx
,enc
,NULL
,kssl_ctx
->key
,iv
))
2597 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2598 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
2601 if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx
, pms
,&outl
,
2602 (unsigned char *)enc_pms
.data
, enc_pms
.length
))
2604 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2605 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
2608 if (outl
> SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
)
2610 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2611 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2614 if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx
,&(pms
[outl
]),&padl
))
2616 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2617 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
2621 if (outl
> SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
)
2623 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2624 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2627 if (!((pms
[0] == (s
->client_version
>>8)) && (pms
[1] == (s
->client_version
& 0xff))))
2629 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2630 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2631 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2632 * However, buggy clients exist that send random bytes instead of
2633 * the protocol version.
2634 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients.
2635 * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos cipher)
2637 if (!(s
->options
& SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG
))
2639 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2640 SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
2645 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx
);
2647 s
->session
->master_key_length
=
2648 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
2649 s
->session
->master_key
, pms
, outl
);
2651 if (kssl_ctx
->client_princ
)
2653 size_t len
= strlen(kssl_ctx
->client_princ
);
2654 if ( len
< SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH
)
2656 s
->session
->krb5_client_princ_len
= len
;
2657 memcpy(s
->session
->krb5_client_princ
,kssl_ctx
->client_princ
,len
);
2662 /* Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
2663 ** but it caused problems for apache.
2664 ** kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
2665 ** if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
2669 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2671 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2672 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kECDHE
|SSL_kECDHr
|SSL_kECDHe
))
2677 const EC_GROUP
*group
;
2678 const BIGNUM
*priv_key
;
2680 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
2681 if ((srvr_ecdh
= EC_KEY_new()) == NULL
)
2683 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2684 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2688 /* Let's get server private key and group information */
2689 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kECDHr
|SSL_kECDHe
))
2691 /* use the certificate */
2692 tkey
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_ECC
].privatekey
->pkey
.ec
;
2696 /* use the ephermeral values we saved when
2697 * generating the ServerKeyExchange msg.
2699 tkey
= s
->s3
->tmp
.ecdh
;
2702 group
= EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey
);
2703 priv_key
= EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey
);
2705 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh
, group
) ||
2706 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh
, priv_key
))
2708 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2713 /* Let's get client's public key */
2714 if ((clnt_ecpoint
= EC_POINT_new(group
)) == NULL
)
2716 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2717 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2723 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
2725 if (alg_k
& SSL_kECDHE
)
2727 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2728 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY
);
2731 if (((clnt_pub_pkey
=X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
))
2733 (clnt_pub_pkey
->type
!= EVP_PKEY_EC
))
2735 /* XXX: For now, we do not support client
2736 * authentication using ECDH certificates
2737 * so this branch (n == 0L) of the code is
2738 * never executed. When that support is
2739 * added, we ought to ensure the key
2740 * received in the certificate is
2741 * authorized for key agreement.
2742 * ECDH_compute_key implicitly checks that
2743 * the two ECDH shares are for the same
2746 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2747 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2748 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS
);
2752 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint
,
2753 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey
->pkey
.ec
)) == 0)
2755 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2759 ret
= 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
2763 /* Get client's public key from encoded point
2764 * in the ClientKeyExchange message.
2766 if ((bn_ctx
= BN_CTX_new()) == NULL
)
2768 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2769 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2773 /* Get encoded point length */
2778 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2782 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group
,
2783 clnt_ecpoint
, p
, i
, bn_ctx
) == 0)
2785 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2789 /* p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer
2790 * currently, so set it to the start
2792 p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
2795 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
2796 field_size
= EC_GROUP_get_degree(group
);
2797 if (field_size
<= 0)
2799 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2803 i
= ECDH_compute_key(p
, (field_size
+7)/8, clnt_ecpoint
, srvr_ecdh
, NULL
);
2806 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2811 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey
);
2812 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint
);
2813 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh
);
2814 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx
);
2815 EC_KEY_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.ecdh
);
2816 s
->s3
->tmp
.ecdh
= NULL
;
2818 /* Compute the master secret */
2819 s
->session
->master_key_length
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
-> \
2820 generate_master_secret(s
, s
->session
->master_key
, p
, i
);
2822 OPENSSL_cleanse(p
, i
);
2827 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2828 if (alg_k
& SSL_kPSK
)
2830 unsigned char *t
= NULL
;
2831 unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms
[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
*2+4];
2832 unsigned int pre_ms_len
= 0, psk_len
= 0;
2834 char tmp_id
[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
+1];
2836 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2841 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2842 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2845 if (i
> PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
)
2847 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2848 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2851 if (s
->psk_server_callback
== NULL
)
2853 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2854 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB
);
2858 /* Create guaranteed NULL-terminated identity
2859 * string for the callback */
2860 memcpy(tmp_id
, p
, i
);
2861 memset(tmp_id
+i
, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
+1-i
);
2862 psk_len
= s
->psk_server_callback(s
, tmp_id
,
2863 psk_or_pre_ms
, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms
));
2864 OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_id
, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
+1);
2866 if (psk_len
> PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
)
2868 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2869 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2872 else if (psk_len
== 0)
2874 /* PSK related to the given identity not found */
2875 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2876 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND
);
2877 al
=SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY
;
2881 /* create PSK pre_master_secret */
2882 pre_ms_len
=2+psk_len
+2+psk_len
;
2884 memmove(psk_or_pre_ms
+psk_len
+4, psk_or_pre_ms
, psk_len
);
2886 memset(t
, 0, psk_len
);
2890 if (s
->session
->psk_identity
!= NULL
)
2891 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->psk_identity
);
2892 s
->session
->psk_identity
= BUF_strdup((char *)p
);
2893 if (s
->session
->psk_identity
== NULL
)
2895 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2896 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2900 if (s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
!= NULL
)
2901 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
);
2902 s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
= BUF_strdup(s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
);
2903 if (s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
!= NULL
&&
2904 s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
== NULL
)
2906 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2907 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2911 s
->session
->master_key_length
=
2912 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
2913 s
->session
->master_key
, psk_or_pre_ms
, pre_ms_len
);
2916 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms
, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms
));
2922 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2923 if (alg_k
& SSL_kSRP
)
2931 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2932 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH
);
2935 if (!(s
->srp_ctx
.A
=BN_bin2bn(p
,i
,NULL
)))
2937 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
2940 if (BN_ucmp(s
->srp_ctx
.A
, s
->srp_ctx
.N
) >= 0
2941 || BN_is_zero(s
->srp_ctx
.A
))
2943 al
=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
2944 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS
);
2947 if (s
->session
->srp_username
!= NULL
)
2948 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->srp_username
);
2949 s
->session
->srp_username
= BUF_strdup(s
->srp_ctx
.login
);
2950 if (s
->session
->srp_username
== NULL
)
2952 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2953 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2957 if ((s
->session
->master_key_length
= SRP_generate_server_master_secret(s
,s
->session
->master_key
))<0)
2959 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2966 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
2967 if (alg_k
& SSL_kGOST
)
2970 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pkey_ctx
;
2971 EVP_PKEY
*client_pub_pkey
= NULL
, *pk
= NULL
;
2972 unsigned char premaster_secret
[32], *start
;
2973 size_t outlen
=32, inlen
;
2974 unsigned long alg_a
;
2978 /* Get our certificate private key*/
2979 alg_a
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
;
2980 if (alg_a
& SSL_aGOST94
)
2981 pk
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_GOST94
].privatekey
;
2982 else if (alg_a
& SSL_aGOST01
)
2983 pk
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_GOST01
].privatekey
;
2985 pkey_ctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk
,NULL
);
2986 EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx
);
2987 /* If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
2988 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
2989 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use
2990 * a client certificate for authorization only. */
2991 client_pub_pkey
= X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
2992 if (client_pub_pkey
)
2994 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx
, client_pub_pkey
) <= 0)
2997 /* Decrypt session key */
2998 if (ASN1_get_object((const unsigned char **)&p
, &Tlen
, &Ttag
, &Tclass
, n
) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED
||
2999 Ttag
!= V_ASN1_SEQUENCE
||
3000 Tclass
!= V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL
)
3002 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
3007 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx
,premaster_secret
,&outlen
,start
,inlen
) <=0)
3010 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
3013 /* Generate master secret */
3014 s
->session
->master_key_length
=
3015 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
3016 s
->session
->master_key
,premaster_secret
,32);
3017 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
3018 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx
, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY
, 2, NULL
) > 0)
3023 EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey
);
3024 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx
);
3032 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
3033 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
3034 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE
);
3040 ssl3_send_alert(s
,SSL3_AL_FATAL
,al
);
3041 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_SRP)
3044 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
3045 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey
);
3046 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint
);
3047 if (srvr_ecdh
!= NULL
)
3048 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh
);
3049 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx
);
3054 int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL
*s
)
3056 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
=NULL
;
3062 const EVP_MD
*md
= NULL
;
3064 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx
);
3066 n
=s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
3067 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A
,
3068 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B
,
3070 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
,
3073 if (!ok
) return((int)n
);
3075 if (s
->session
->peer
!= NULL
)
3077 peer
=s
->session
->peer
;
3078 pkey
=X509_get_pubkey(peer
);
3079 type
=X509_certificate_type(peer
,pkey
);
3087 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
!= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY
)
3089 s
->s3
->tmp
.reuse_message
=1;
3090 if ((peer
!= NULL
) && (type
& EVP_PKT_SIGN
))
3092 al
=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
3093 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE
);
3102 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED
);
3103 al
=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
3107 if (!(type
& EVP_PKT_SIGN
))
3109 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE
);
3110 al
=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
3114 if (s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
)
3116 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY
);
3117 al
=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
3121 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
3122 p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
3123 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
3124 /* If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare
3125 * signature without length field */
3126 if (n
==64 && (pkey
->type
==NID_id_GostR3410_94
||
3127 pkey
->type
== NID_id_GostR3410_2001
) )
3133 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
))
3135 int rv
= tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md
, s
, p
, pkey
);
3138 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3143 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
3147 fprintf(stderr
, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md
));
3156 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3157 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
3161 j
=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey
);
3162 if ((i
> j
) || (n
> j
) || (n
<= 0))
3164 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE
);
3165 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
3169 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
))
3173 hdatalen
= BIO_get_mem_data(s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
, &hdata
);
3176 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3177 al
=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3181 fprintf(stderr
, "Using TLS 1.2 with client verify alg %s\n",
3184 if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&mctx
, md
, NULL
)
3185 || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(&mctx
, hdata
, hdatalen
))
3187 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
3188 al
=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3192 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&mctx
, p
, i
, pkey
) <= 0)
3194 al
=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
3195 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE
);
3200 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3201 if (pkey
->type
== EVP_PKEY_RSA
)
3203 i
=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1
, s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_verify_md
,
3204 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
, p
, i
,
3208 al
=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
3209 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT
);
3214 al
=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
3215 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE
);
3221 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3222 if (pkey
->type
== EVP_PKEY_DSA
)
3224 j
=DSA_verify(pkey
->save_type
,
3225 &(s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_verify_md
[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
]),
3226 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
,p
,i
,pkey
->pkey
.dsa
);
3230 al
=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
3231 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE
);
3237 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3238 if (pkey
->type
== EVP_PKEY_EC
)
3240 j
=ECDSA_verify(pkey
->save_type
,
3241 &(s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_verify_md
[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
]),
3242 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
,p
,i
,pkey
->pkey
.ec
);
3246 al
=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
3247 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,
3248 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE
);
3254 if (pkey
->type
== NID_id_GostR3410_94
|| pkey
->type
== NID_id_GostR3410_2001
)
3255 { unsigned char signature
[64];
3257 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey
,NULL
);
3258 EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx
);
3260 fprintf(stderr
,"GOST signature length is %d",i
);
3262 for (idx
=0;idx
<64;idx
++) {
3263 signature
[63-idx
]=p
[idx
];
3265 j
=EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx
,signature
,64,s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_verify_md
,32);
3266 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
3269 al
=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
3270 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,
3271 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE
);
3277 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3278 al
=SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE
;
3287 ssl3_send_alert(s
,SSL3_AL_FATAL
,al
);
3290 if (s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
)
3292 BIO_free(s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
);
3293 s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
= NULL
;
3294 s
->s3
->flags
&= ~TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE
;
3296 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx
);
3297 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey
);
3301 int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL
*s
)
3303 int i
,ok
,al
,ret
= -1;
3305 unsigned long l
,nc
,llen
,n
;
3306 const unsigned char *p
,*q
;
3308 STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
=NULL
;
3310 n
=s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
3317 if (!ok
) return((int)n
);
3319 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
== SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
)
3321 if ( (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
) &&
3322 (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT
))
3324 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE
);
3325 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
3328 /* If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list */
3329 if ((s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
) && s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
)
3331 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST
);
3332 al
=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
3335 s
->s3
->tmp
.reuse_message
=1;
3339 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
!= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
)
3341 al
=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
3342 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE
);
3345 p
=d
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
3347 if ((sk
=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL
)
3349 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3356 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
3357 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3360 for (nc
=0; nc
<llen
; )
3363 if ((l
+nc
+3) > llen
)
3365 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
3366 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3371 x
=d2i_X509(NULL
,&p
,l
);
3374 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB
);
3379 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
3380 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3383 if (!sk_X509_push(sk
,x
))
3385 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3392 if (sk_X509_num(sk
) <= 0)
3394 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3395 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
)
3397 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
3398 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED
);
3401 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3402 else if ((s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
) &&
3403 (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT
))
3405 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE
);
3406 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
3409 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
3410 if (s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
&& !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
))
3412 al
=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3419 i
=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s
,sk
);
3422 al
=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s
->verify_result
);
3423 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED
);
3428 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, i
);
3429 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
3432 pkey
= X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(sk
, 0));
3435 al
=SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
3436 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3437 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE
);
3440 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey
);
3443 if (s
->session
->peer
!= NULL
) /* This should not be needed */
3444 X509_free(s
->session
->peer
);
3445 s
->session
->peer
=sk_X509_shift(sk
);
3446 s
->session
->verify_result
= s
->verify_result
;
3448 /* With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL
3449 * when we arrive here. */
3450 if (s
->session
->sess_cert
== NULL
)
3452 s
->session
->sess_cert
= ssl_sess_cert_new();
3453 if (s
->session
->sess_cert
== NULL
)
3455 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3459 if (s
->session
->sess_cert
->cert_chain
!= NULL
)
3460 sk_X509_pop_free(s
->session
->sess_cert
->cert_chain
, X509_free
);
3461 s
->session
->sess_cert
->cert_chain
=sk
;
3462 /* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the
3463 * peer's own certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c */
3471 ssl3_send_alert(s
,SSL3_AL_FATAL
,al
);
3474 if (x
!= NULL
) X509_free(x
);
3475 if (sk
!= NULL
) sk_X509_pop_free(sk
,X509_free
);
3479 int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL
*s
)
3483 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A
)
3485 cpk
=ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s
);
3488 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
3489 if ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
!= SSL_aKRB5
) ||
3490 (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kKRB5
))
3492 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3497 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s
,cpk
))
3499 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3502 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B
;
3505 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
3506 return ssl_do_write(s
);
3509 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
3510 /* send a new session ticket (not necessarily for a new session) */
3511 int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL
*s
)
3513 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A
)
3515 unsigned char *p
, *senc
, *macstart
;
3516 const unsigned char *const_p
;
3517 int len
, slen_full
, slen
;
3522 SSL_CTX
*tctx
= s
->initial_ctx
;
3523 unsigned char iv
[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH
];
3524 unsigned char key_name
[16];
3526 /* get session encoding length */
3527 slen_full
= i2d_SSL_SESSION(s
->session
, NULL
);
3528 /* Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is
3531 if (slen_full
> 0xFF00)
3533 senc
= OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full
);
3537 i2d_SSL_SESSION(s
->session
, &p
);
3539 /* create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up */
3541 sess
= d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL
, &const_p
, slen_full
);
3547 sess
->session_id_length
= 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
3549 slen
= i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess
, NULL
);
3550 if (slen
> slen_full
) /* shouldn't ever happen */
3556 i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess
, &p
);
3557 SSL_SESSION_free(sess
);
3559 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3560 * follows handshake_header_length +
3561 * 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
3562 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
3563 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
3564 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
3566 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s
->init_buf
,
3567 SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s
) + 22 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH
+
3568 EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH
+ EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
+ slen
))
3570 p
= ssl_handshake_start(s
);
3571 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx
);
3572 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx
);
3573 /* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present
3574 * it does all the work otherwise use generated values
3577 if (tctx
->tlsext_ticket_key_cb
)
3579 if (tctx
->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s
, key_name
, iv
, &ctx
,
3588 RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv
, 16);
3589 EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx
, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL
,
3590 tctx
->tlsext_tick_aes_key
, iv
);
3591 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx
, tctx
->tlsext_tick_hmac_key
, 16,
3592 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL
);
3593 memcpy(key_name
, tctx
->tlsext_tick_key_name
, 16);
3596 /* Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only):
3597 * We leave this unspecified for resumed session (for simplicity),
3598 * and guess that tickets for new sessions will live as long
3599 * as their sessions. */
3600 l2n(s
->hit
? 0 : s
->session
->timeout
, p
);
3602 /* Skip ticket length for now */
3604 /* Output key name */
3606 memcpy(p
, key_name
, 16);
3609 memcpy(p
, iv
, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx
));
3610 p
+= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx
);
3611 /* Encrypt session data */
3612 EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx
, p
, &len
, senc
, slen
);
3614 EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx
, p
, &len
);
3616 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx
);
3618 HMAC_Update(&hctx
, macstart
, p
- macstart
);
3619 HMAC_Final(&hctx
, p
, &hlen
);
3620 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx
);
3623 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
3625 len
= p
- ssl_handshake_start(s
);
3626 ssl_set_handshake_header(s
, SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET
, len
);
3627 /* Skip ticket lifetime hint */
3628 p
= ssl_handshake_start(s
) + 4;
3630 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B
;
3634 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
3635 return ssl_do_write(s
);
3638 int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL
*s
)
3640 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A
)
3643 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3644 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
3645 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
3648 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s
->init_buf
, 8 + s
->tlsext_ocsp_resplen
))
3651 p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
3654 *(p
++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS
;
3655 /* message length */
3656 l2n3(s
->tlsext_ocsp_resplen
+ 4, p
);
3658 *(p
++)= s
->tlsext_status_type
;
3659 /* length of OCSP response */
3660 l2n3(s
->tlsext_ocsp_resplen
, p
);
3661 /* actual response */
3662 memcpy(p
, s
->tlsext_ocsp_resp
, s
->tlsext_ocsp_resplen
);
3663 /* number of bytes to write */
3664 s
->init_num
= 8 + s
->tlsext_ocsp_resplen
;
3665 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B
;
3669 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
3670 return(ssl3_do_write(s
,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
));
3673 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3674 /* ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message. It
3675 * sets the next_proto member in s if found */
3676 int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL
*s
)
3679 int proto_len
, padding_len
;
3681 const unsigned char *p
;
3683 /* Clients cannot send a NextProtocol message if we didn't see the
3684 * extension in their ClientHello */
3685 if (!s
->s3
->next_proto_neg_seen
)
3687 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO
,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION
);
3691 n
=s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
3692 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A
,
3693 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B
,
3695 514, /* See the payload format below */
3701 /* s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received
3702 * in this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset
3703 * by ssl3_get_finished). */
3704 if (!s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
)
3706 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO
,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS
);
3711 return 0; /* The body must be > 1 bytes long */
3713 p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
3715 /* The payload looks like:
3717 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
3718 * uint8 padding_len;
3719 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
3722 if (proto_len
+ 2 > s
->init_num
)
3724 padding_len
= p
[proto_len
+ 1];
3725 if (proto_len
+ padding_len
+ 2 != s
->init_num
)
3728 s
->next_proto_negotiated
= OPENSSL_malloc(proto_len
);
3729 if (!s
->next_proto_negotiated
)
3731 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO
,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3734 memcpy(s
->next_proto_negotiated
, p
+ 1, proto_len
);
3735 s
->next_proto_negotiated_len
= proto_len
;