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Implement FIPS_mode and FIPS_mode_set
[thirdparty/openssl.git] / ssl / s3_srvr.c
1 /* ssl/s3_srvr.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
3 * All rights reserved.
4 *
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8 *
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15 *
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22 *
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25 * are met:
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40 *
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
51 * SUCH DAMAGE.
52 *
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
57 */
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
60 *
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
63 * are met:
64 *
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
67 *
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
71 * distribution.
72 *
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
77 *
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
82 *
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
86 *
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
88 * acknowledgment:
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
91 *
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
105 *
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
109 *
110 */
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
113 *
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
116 *
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
119 *
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
122 *
123 */
124 /* ====================================================================
125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
126 *
127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
129 * license.
130 *
131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
134 *
135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
138 *
139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
142 * to make use of the Contribution.
143 *
144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
148 * OTHERWISE.
149 */
150
151 #define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
152 #define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
153
154 #include <stdio.h>
155 #include <openssl/crypto.h>
156 #include "ssl_locl.h"
157 #include "kssl_lcl.h"
158 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
159 #include <openssl/rand.h>
160 #include <openssl/objects.h>
161 #include <openssl/evp.h>
162 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
163 #include <openssl/x509.h>
164 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
165 #include <openssl/dh.h>
166 #endif
167 #include <openssl/bn.h>
168 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
169 #include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
170 #endif
171 #include <openssl/md5.h>
172
173 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver);
174
175 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)
176 {
177 if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
178 return(SSLv3_server_method());
179 else
180 return(NULL);
181 }
182
183 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
184 static int SSL_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s,int *ad)
185 {
186 int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE;
187
188 *ad = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
189
190 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
191 (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL))
192 {
193 if(s->srp_ctx.login == NULL)
194 {
195 /* There isn't any srp login extension !!! */
196 ret = SSL3_AL_WARNING;
197 *ad = SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME;
198 }
199 else
200 {
201 ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s,ad);
202 }
203 }
204 return ret;
205 }
206 #endif
207
208 IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method,
209 ssl3_accept,
210 ssl_undefined_function,
211 ssl3_get_server_method)
212
213 int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
214 {
215 BUF_MEM *buf;
216 unsigned long alg_k,Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
217 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
218 int ret= -1;
219 int new_state,state,skip=0;
220 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
221 int srp_no_username =0;
222 #endif
223
224 RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0);
225 ERR_clear_error();
226 clear_sys_error();
227
228 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
229 cb=s->info_callback;
230 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
231 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
232
233 /* init things to blank */
234 s->in_handshake++;
235 if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s);
236
237 if (s->cert == NULL)
238 {
239 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
240 return(-1);
241 }
242
243 for (;;)
244 {
245 state=s->state;
246
247 switch (s->state)
248 {
249 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
250 s->renegotiate=1;
251 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
252
253 case SSL_ST_BEFORE:
254 case SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
255 case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
256 case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
257
258 s->server=1;
259 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1);
260
261 if ((s->version>>8) != 3)
262 {
263 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
264 return -1;
265 }
266 s->type=SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
267
268 if (s->init_buf == NULL)
269 {
270 if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)
271 {
272 ret= -1;
273 goto end;
274 }
275 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH))
276 {
277 ret= -1;
278 goto end;
279 }
280 s->init_buf=buf;
281 }
282
283 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
284 {
285 ret= -1;
286 goto end;
287 }
288
289 s->init_num=0;
290
291 if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE)
292 {
293 /* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that
294 * the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
295 */
296 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) { ret= -1; goto end; }
297
298 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
299 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
300 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
301 }
302 else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
303 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
304 {
305 /* Server attempting to renegotiate with
306 * client that doesn't support secure
307 * renegotiation.
308 */
309 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
310 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
311 ret = -1;
312 goto end;
313 }
314 else
315 {
316 /* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE,
317 * we will just send a HelloRequest */
318 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
319 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
320 }
321 break;
322
323 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
324 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
325
326 s->shutdown=0;
327 ret=ssl3_send_hello_request(s);
328 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
329 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
330 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
331 s->init_num=0;
332
333 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
334 break;
335
336 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
337 s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
338 break;
339
340 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
341 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
342 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
343 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
344 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_SRP_USERNAME:
345 #endif
346
347 s->shutdown=0;
348 ret=ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
349 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
350 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
351 {
352 int extension_error = 0,al;
353
354 if ((al = SSL_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s,&extension_error)) != SSL_ERROR_NONE)
355 {
356 ssl3_send_alert(s,al,extension_error);
357 if (extension_error == SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME)
358 {
359 if (srp_no_username) goto end;
360 ERR_clear_error();
361 srp_no_username = 1;
362 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_SRP_USERNAME;
363 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1);
364 if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0) goto end;
365 s->init_num=0;
366 break;
367 }
368 ret = -1;
369 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
370 goto end;
371 }
372 }
373 #endif
374
375 s->renegotiate = 2;
376 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
377 s->init_num=0;
378 break;
379
380 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
381 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
382 ret=ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
383 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
384 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
385 if (s->hit)
386 {
387 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
388 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
389 else
390 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
391 }
392 #else
393 if (s->hit)
394 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
395 #endif
396 else
397 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
398 s->init_num=0;
399 break;
400
401 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
402 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
403 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
404 /* normal PSK or KRB5 or SRP */
405 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
406 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)
407 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5))
408 {
409 ret=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
410 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
411 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
412 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
413 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
414 else
415 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
416 }
417 else
418 {
419 skip = 1;
420 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
421 }
422 #else
423 }
424 else
425 skip=1;
426
427 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
428 #endif
429 s->init_num=0;
430 break;
431
432 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
433 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
434 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
435
436 /* clear this, it may get reset by
437 * send_server_key_exchange */
438 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA)
439 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
440 && !(alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
441 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
442 )
443 /* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key
444 * even when forbidden by protocol specs
445 * (handshake may fail as clients are not required to
446 * be able to handle this) */
447 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
448 else
449 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0;
450
451
452 /* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or
453 * RSA but we have a sign only certificate
454 *
455 * PSK: may send PSK identity hints
456 *
457 * For ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange
458 * message only if the cipher suite is either
459 * ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, the
460 * server certificate contains the server's
461 * public key for key exchange.
462 */
463 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp
464 /* PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity
465 * hint if provided */
466 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
467 || ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
468 #endif
469 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
470 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
471 || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
472 #endif
473 || (alg_k & (SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd|SSL_kEDH))
474 || (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
475 || ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
476 && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
477 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
478 && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
479 )
480 )
481 )
482 )
483 {
484 ret=ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);
485 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
486 }
487 else
488 skip=1;
489
490 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
491 s->init_num=0;
492 break;
493
494 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
495 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
496 if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
497 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
498 /* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set,
499 * don't request cert during re-negotiation: */
500 ((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
501 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
502 /* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites
503 * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts
504 * and in RFC 2246): */
505 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) &&
506 /* ... except when the application insists on verification
507 * (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */
508 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
509 /* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */
510 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5)
511 /* With normal PSK Certificates and
512 * Certificate Requests are omitted */
513 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
514 {
515 /* no cert request */
516 skip=1;
517 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=0;
518 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
519 }
520 else
521 {
522 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=1;
523 ret=ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
524 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
525 #ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
526 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
527 #else
528 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
529 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
530 #endif
531 s->init_num=0;
532 }
533 break;
534
535 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
536 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
537 ret=ssl3_send_server_done(s);
538 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
539 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
540 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
541 s->init_num=0;
542 break;
543
544 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
545
546 /* This code originally checked to see if
547 * any data was pending using BIO_CTRL_INFO
548 * and then flushed. This caused problems
549 * as documented in PR#1939. The proposed
550 * fix doesn't completely resolve this issue
551 * as buggy implementations of BIO_CTRL_PENDING
552 * still exist. So instead we just flush
553 * unconditionally.
554 */
555
556 s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
557 if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0)
558 {
559 ret= -1;
560 goto end;
561 }
562 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
563
564 s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state;
565 break;
566
567 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
568 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
569 /* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */
570 ret = ssl3_check_client_hello(s);
571 if (ret <= 0)
572 goto end;
573 if (ret == 2)
574 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C;
575 else {
576 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
577 {
578 ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
579 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
580 }
581 s->init_num=0;
582 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
583 }
584 break;
585
586 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
587 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
588 ret=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
589 if (ret <= 0)
590 goto end;
591 if (ret == 2)
592 {
593 /* For the ECDH ciphersuites when
594 * the client sends its ECDH pub key in
595 * a certificate, the CertificateVerify
596 * message is not sent.
597 * Also for GOST ciphersuites when
598 * the client uses its key from the certificate
599 * for key exchange.
600 */
601 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
602 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
603 #else
604 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
605 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
606 else
607 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
608 #endif
609 s->init_num = 0;
610 }
611 else
612 {
613 int offset=0;
614 int dgst_num;
615
616 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
617 s->init_num=0;
618
619 /* We need to get hashes here so if there is
620 * a client cert, it can be verified
621 * FIXME - digest processing for CertificateVerify
622 * should be generalized. But it is next step
623 */
624 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
625 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
626 return -1;
627 for (dgst_num=0; dgst_num<SSL_MAX_DIGEST;dgst_num++)
628 if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num])
629 {
630 int dgst_size;
631
632 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,EVP_MD_CTX_type(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]),&(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[offset]));
633 dgst_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]);
634 if (dgst_size < 0)
635 {
636 ret = -1;
637 goto end;
638 }
639 offset+=dgst_size;
640 }
641 }
642 break;
643
644 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
645 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
646
647 /* we should decide if we expected this one */
648 ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
649 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
650
651 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
652 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
653 #else
654 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
655 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
656 else
657 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
658 #endif
659 s->init_num=0;
660 break;
661
662 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
663 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A:
664 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B:
665 ret=ssl3_get_next_proto(s);
666 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
667 s->init_num = 0;
668 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
669 break;
670 #endif
671
672 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
673 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
674 ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
675 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
676 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
677 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
678 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
679 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
680 else if (s->hit)
681 s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
682 #else
683 if (s->hit)
684 s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
685 #endif
686 else
687 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
688 s->init_num=0;
689 break;
690
691 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
692 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
693 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
694 ret=ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s);
695 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
696 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
697 s->init_num=0;
698 break;
699
700 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A:
701 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B:
702 ret=ssl3_send_cert_status(s);
703 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
704 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
705 s->init_num=0;
706 break;
707
708 #endif
709
710 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
711 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
712
713 s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
714 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
715 { ret= -1; goto end; }
716
717 ret=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
718 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
719
720 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
721 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
722 s->init_num=0;
723
724 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
725 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
726 {
727 ret= -1;
728 goto end;
729 }
730
731 break;
732
733 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
734 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
735 ret=ssl3_send_finished(s,
736 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
737 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
738 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
739 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
740 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
741 if (s->hit)
742 {
743 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
744 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
745 #else
746 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
747 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
748 else
749 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
750 #endif
751 }
752 else
753 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK;
754 s->init_num=0;
755 break;
756
757 case SSL_ST_OK:
758 /* clean a few things up */
759 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
760
761 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
762 s->init_buf=NULL;
763
764 /* remove buffering on output */
765 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
766
767 s->init_num=0;
768
769 if (s->renegotiate == 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
770 {
771 /* actually not necessarily a 'new' session unless
772 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is set */
773
774 s->renegotiate=0;
775 s->new_session=0;
776
777 ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
778
779 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
780 /* s->server=1; */
781 s->handshake_func=ssl3_accept;
782
783 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1);
784 }
785
786 ret = 1;
787 goto end;
788 /* break; */
789
790 default:
791 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
792 ret= -1;
793 goto end;
794 /* break; */
795 }
796
797 if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip)
798 {
799 if (s->debug)
800 {
801 if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
802 goto end;
803 }
804
805
806 if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state))
807 {
808 new_state=s->state;
809 s->state=state;
810 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP,1);
811 s->state=new_state;
812 }
813 }
814 skip=0;
815 }
816 end:
817 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
818
819 s->in_handshake--;
820 if (cb != NULL)
821 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT,ret);
822 return(ret);
823 }
824
825 int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
826 {
827 unsigned char *p;
828
829 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A)
830 {
831 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
832 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST;
833 *(p++)=0;
834 *(p++)=0;
835 *(p++)=0;
836
837 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
838 /* number of bytes to write */
839 s->init_num=4;
840 s->init_off=0;
841 }
842
843 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
844 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
845 }
846
847 int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s)
848 {
849 int ok;
850 long n;
851
852 /* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message,
853 * so permit appropriate message length */
854 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
855 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A,
856 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B,
857 -1,
858 s->max_cert_list,
859 &ok);
860 if (!ok) return((int)n);
861 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
862 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)
863 {
864 /* Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake,
865 * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.)
866 * I hope that tmp.dh is the only thing that may need to be cleared
867 * when a handshake is not completed ... */
868 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
869 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
870 {
871 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
872 s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
873 }
874 #endif
875 return 2;
876 }
877 return 1;
878 }
879
880 int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
881 {
882 int i,j,ok,al,ret= -1;
883 unsigned int cookie_len;
884 long n;
885 unsigned long id;
886 unsigned char *p,*d,*q;
887 SSL_CIPHER *c;
888 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
889 SSL_COMP *comp=NULL;
890 #endif
891 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers=NULL;
892
893 /* We do this so that we will respond with our native type.
894 * If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1,
895 * This down switching should be handled by a different method.
896 * If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with
897 * TLSv1.
898 */
899 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A
900 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
901 || (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_SRP_USERNAME)
902 #endif
903 )
904 {
905 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
906 }
907 s->first_packet=1;
908 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
909 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
910 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C,
911 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,
912 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
913 &ok);
914
915 if (!ok) return((int)n);
916 s->first_packet=0;
917 d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
918
919 /* use version from inside client hello, not from record header
920 * (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */
921 s->client_version=(((int)p[0])<<8)|(int)p[1];
922 p+=2;
923
924 if ((s->version == DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version > s->version) ||
925 (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version < s->version))
926 {
927 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
928 if ((s->client_version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
929 {
930 /* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
931 s->version = s->client_version;
932 }
933 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
934 goto f_err;
935 }
936
937 /* If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't
938 * contain one, just return since we do not want to
939 * allocate any memory yet. So check cookie length...
940 */
941 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE)
942 {
943 unsigned int session_length, cookie_length;
944
945 session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
946 cookie_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1);
947
948 if (cookie_length == 0)
949 return 1;
950 }
951
952 /* load the client random */
953 memcpy(s->s3->client_random,p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
954 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
955
956 /* get the session-id */
957 j= *(p++);
958
959 s->hit=0;
960 /* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow session reuse during renegotiation
961 * (i.e. when s->new_session is true), option
962 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is new with 0.9.7.
963 * Maybe this optional behaviour should always have been the default,
964 * but we cannot safely change the default behaviour (or new applications
965 * might be written that become totally unsecure when compiled with
966 * an earlier library version)
967 */
968 if ((s->new_session && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION)))
969 {
970 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
971 goto err;
972 }
973 else
974 {
975 i=ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n);
976 if (i == 1)
977 { /* previous session */
978 s->hit=1;
979 }
980 else if (i == -1)
981 goto err;
982 else /* i == 0 */
983 {
984 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
985 goto err;
986 }
987 }
988
989 p+=j;
990
991 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
992 {
993 /* cookie stuff */
994 cookie_len = *(p++);
995
996 /*
997 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
998 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
999 * does not cause an overflow.
1000 */
1001 if ( cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie))
1002 {
1003 /* too much data */
1004 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1005 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1006 goto f_err;
1007 }
1008
1009 /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
1010 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) &&
1011 cookie_len > 0)
1012 {
1013 memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len);
1014
1015 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL)
1016 {
1017 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie,
1018 cookie_len) == 0)
1019 {
1020 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1021 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1022 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1023 goto f_err;
1024 }
1025 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1026 }
1027 else if ( memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
1028 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) /* default verification */
1029 {
1030 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1031 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1032 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1033 goto f_err;
1034 }
1035
1036 ret = 2;
1037 }
1038
1039 p += cookie_len;
1040 }
1041
1042 n2s(p,i);
1043 if ((i == 0) && (j != 0))
1044 {
1045 /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */
1046 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1047 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
1048 goto f_err;
1049 }
1050 if ((p+i) >= (d+n))
1051 {
1052 /* not enough data */
1053 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1054 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1055 goto f_err;
1056 }
1057 if ((i > 0) && (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s,p,i,&(ciphers))
1058 == NULL))
1059 {
1060 goto err;
1061 }
1062 p+=i;
1063
1064 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
1065 if ((s->hit) && (i > 0))
1066 {
1067 j=0;
1068 id=s->session->cipher->id;
1069
1070 #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
1071 printf("client sent %d ciphers\n",sk_num(ciphers));
1072 #endif
1073 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++)
1074 {
1075 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers,i);
1076 #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
1077 printf("client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1078 i,sk_num(ciphers),SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
1079 #endif
1080 if (c->id == id)
1081 {
1082 j=1;
1083 break;
1084 }
1085 }
1086 /* Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade
1087 * attack: CVE-2010-4180.
1088 */
1089 #if 0
1090 if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1))
1091 {
1092 /* Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used cipher may
1093 * not be in the current list, the client instead might be trying to
1094 * continue using a cipher that before wasn't chosen due to server
1095 * preferences. We'll have to reject the connection if the cipher is not
1096 * enabled, though. */
1097 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0);
1098 if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0)
1099 {
1100 s->session->cipher = c;
1101 j = 1;
1102 }
1103 }
1104 #endif
1105 if (j == 0)
1106 {
1107 /* we need to have the cipher in the cipher
1108 * list if we are asked to reuse it */
1109 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1110 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
1111 goto f_err;
1112 }
1113 }
1114
1115 /* compression */
1116 i= *(p++);
1117 if ((p+i) > (d+n))
1118 {
1119 /* not enough data */
1120 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1121 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1122 goto f_err;
1123 }
1124 q=p;
1125 for (j=0; j<i; j++)
1126 {
1127 if (p[j] == 0) break;
1128 }
1129
1130 p+=i;
1131 if (j >= i)
1132 {
1133 /* no compress */
1134 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1135 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
1136 goto f_err;
1137 }
1138
1139 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1140 /* TLS extensions*/
1141 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION)
1142 {
1143 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s,&p,d,n, &al))
1144 {
1145 /* 'al' set by ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext */
1146 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
1147 goto f_err;
1148 }
1149 }
1150 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
1151 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1152 goto err;
1153 }
1154
1155 /* Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this
1156 * handshake for not reused session only. We need to generate
1157 * server_random before calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow
1158 * SessionTicket processing to use it in key derivation. */
1159 {
1160 unsigned long Time;
1161 unsigned char *pos;
1162 Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); /* Time */
1163 pos=s->s3->server_random;
1164 l2n(Time,pos);
1165 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(pos,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0)
1166 {
1167 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1168 goto f_err;
1169 }
1170 }
1171
1172 if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb)
1173 {
1174 SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher=NULL;
1175
1176 s->session->master_key_length=sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1177 if(s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key, &s->session->master_key_length,
1178 ciphers, &pref_cipher, s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg))
1179 {
1180 s->hit=1;
1181 s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
1182 s->session->verify_result=X509_V_OK;
1183
1184 ciphers=NULL;
1185
1186 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1187 pref_cipher=pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1188 if (pref_cipher == NULL)
1189 {
1190 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1191 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1192 goto f_err;
1193 }
1194
1195 s->session->cipher=pref_cipher;
1196
1197 if (s->cipher_list)
1198 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
1199
1200 if (s->cipher_list_by_id)
1201 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
1202
1203 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1204 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1205 }
1206 }
1207 #endif
1208
1209 /* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1210 * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
1211 * algorithms from the client, starting at q. */
1212 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=NULL;
1213 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1214 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1215 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0)
1216 {
1217 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
1218 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1219 /* Can't disable compression */
1220 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION)
1221 {
1222 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1223 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1224 goto f_err;
1225 }
1226 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1227 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++)
1228 {
1229 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
1230 if (comp_id == comp->id)
1231 {
1232 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
1233 break;
1234 }
1235 }
1236 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1237 {
1238 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1239 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1240 goto f_err;
1241 }
1242 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1243 for (m = 0; m < i; m++)
1244 {
1245 if (q[m] == comp_id)
1246 break;
1247 }
1248 if (m >= i)
1249 {
1250 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1251 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
1252 goto f_err;
1253 }
1254 }
1255 else if (s->hit)
1256 comp = NULL;
1257 else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) && s->ctx->comp_methods)
1258 { /* See if we have a match */
1259 int m,nn,o,v,done=0;
1260
1261 nn=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1262 for (m=0; m<nn; m++)
1263 {
1264 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
1265 v=comp->id;
1266 for (o=0; o<i; o++)
1267 {
1268 if (v == q[o])
1269 {
1270 done=1;
1271 break;
1272 }
1273 }
1274 if (done) break;
1275 }
1276 if (done)
1277 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
1278 else
1279 comp=NULL;
1280 }
1281 #else
1282 /* If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1283 * using compression.
1284 */
1285 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0)
1286 {
1287 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1288 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1289 goto f_err;
1290 }
1291 #endif
1292
1293 /* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must
1294 * pick a cipher */
1295
1296 if (!s->hit)
1297 {
1298 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1299 s->session->compress_meth=0;
1300 #else
1301 s->session->compress_meth=(comp == NULL)?0:comp->id;
1302 #endif
1303 if (s->session->ciphers != NULL)
1304 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
1305 s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
1306 if (ciphers == NULL)
1307 {
1308 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1309 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED);
1310 goto f_err;
1311 }
1312 ciphers=NULL;
1313 c=ssl3_choose_cipher(s,s->session->ciphers,
1314 SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1315
1316 if (c == NULL)
1317 {
1318 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1319 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1320 goto f_err;
1321 }
1322 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=c;
1323 /* check whether we should disable session resumption */
1324 if (s->not_resumable_session_cb != NULL)
1325 s->session->not_resumable=s->not_resumable_session_cb(s,
1326 ((c->algorithm_mkey & (SSL_kEDH | SSL_kEECDH)) != 0));
1327 if (s->session->not_resumable)
1328 /* do not send a session ticket */
1329 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
1330 }
1331 else
1332 {
1333 /* Session-id reuse */
1334 #ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
1335 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1336 SSL_CIPHER *nc=NULL;
1337 SSL_CIPHER *ec=NULL;
1338
1339 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG)
1340 {
1341 sk=s->session->ciphers;
1342 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++)
1343 {
1344 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,i);
1345 if (c->algorithm_enc & SSL_eNULL)
1346 nc=c;
1347 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c))
1348 ec=c;
1349 }
1350 if (nc != NULL)
1351 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=nc;
1352 else if (ec != NULL)
1353 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=ec;
1354 else
1355 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1356 }
1357 else
1358 #endif
1359 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1360 }
1361
1362 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
1363 goto f_err;
1364
1365 /* we now have the following setup.
1366 * client_random
1367 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
1368 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
1369 * compression - basically ignored right now
1370 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1371 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1372 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1373 * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
1374 */
1375
1376 if (ret < 0) ret=1;
1377 if (0)
1378 {
1379 f_err:
1380 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1381 }
1382 err:
1383 if (ciphers != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1384 return(ret);
1385 }
1386
1387 int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
1388 {
1389 unsigned char *buf;
1390 unsigned char *p,*d;
1391 int i,sl;
1392 unsigned long l;
1393 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1394 unsigned long Time;
1395 #endif
1396
1397 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1398 {
1399 buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1400 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1401 p=s->s3->server_random;
1402 /* Generate server_random if it was not needed previously */
1403 Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); /* Time */
1404 l2n(Time,p);
1405 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0)
1406 return -1;
1407 #endif
1408 /* Do the message type and length last */
1409 d=p= &(buf[4]);
1410
1411 *(p++)=s->version>>8;
1412 *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
1413
1414 /* Random stuff */
1415 memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1416 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1417
1418 /* now in theory we have 3 options to sending back the
1419 * session id. If it is a re-use, we send back the
1420 * old session-id, if it is a new session, we send
1421 * back the new session-id or we send back a 0 length
1422 * session-id if we want it to be single use.
1423 * Currently I will not implement the '0' length session-id
1424 * 12-Jan-98 - I'll now support the '0' length stuff.
1425 *
1426 * We also have an additional case where stateless session
1427 * resumption is successful: we always send back the old
1428 * session id. In this case s->hit is non zero: this can
1429 * only happen if stateless session resumption is succesful
1430 * if session caching is disabled so existing functionality
1431 * is unaffected.
1432 */
1433 if (s->session->not_resumable ||
1434 (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
1435 && !s->hit))
1436 s->session->session_id_length=0;
1437
1438 sl=s->session->session_id_length;
1439 if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id))
1440 {
1441 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1442 return -1;
1443 }
1444 *(p++)=sl;
1445 memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,sl);
1446 p+=sl;
1447
1448 /* put the cipher */
1449 i=ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,p);
1450 p+=i;
1451
1452 /* put the compression method */
1453 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1454 *(p++)=0;
1455 #else
1456 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1457 *(p++)=0;
1458 else
1459 *(p++)=s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
1460 #endif
1461 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1462 if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
1463 {
1464 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
1465 return -1;
1466 }
1467 if ((p = ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) == NULL)
1468 {
1469 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1470 return -1;
1471 }
1472 #endif
1473 /* do the header */
1474 l=(p-d);
1475 d=buf;
1476 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO;
1477 l2n3(l,d);
1478
1479 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B;
1480 /* number of bytes to write */
1481 s->init_num=p-buf;
1482 s->init_off=0;
1483 }
1484
1485 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
1486 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1487 }
1488
1489 int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)
1490 {
1491 unsigned char *p;
1492
1493 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A)
1494 {
1495 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1496
1497 /* do the header */
1498 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
1499 *(p++)=0;
1500 *(p++)=0;
1501 *(p++)=0;
1502
1503 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
1504 /* number of bytes to write */
1505 s->init_num=4;
1506 s->init_off=0;
1507 }
1508
1509 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
1510 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1511 }
1512
1513 int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1514 {
1515 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1516 unsigned char *q;
1517 int j,num;
1518 RSA *rsa;
1519 unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
1520 unsigned int u;
1521 #endif
1522 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1523 DH *dh=NULL,*dhp;
1524 #endif
1525 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1526 EC_KEY *ecdh=NULL, *ecdhp;
1527 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1528 int encodedlen = 0;
1529 int curve_id = 0;
1530 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1531 #endif
1532 EVP_PKEY *pkey;
1533 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1534 unsigned char *p,*d;
1535 int al,i;
1536 unsigned long type;
1537 int n;
1538 CERT *cert;
1539 BIGNUM *r[4];
1540 int nr[4],kn;
1541 BUF_MEM *buf;
1542 EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
1543
1544 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
1545 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A)
1546 {
1547 type=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1548 cert=s->cert;
1549
1550 buf=s->init_buf;
1551
1552 r[0]=r[1]=r[2]=r[3]=NULL;
1553 n=0;
1554 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1555 if (type & SSL_kRSA)
1556 {
1557 rsa=cert->rsa_tmp;
1558 if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL))
1559 {
1560 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s,
1561 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1562 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1563 if(rsa == NULL)
1564 {
1565 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1566 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1567 goto f_err;
1568 }
1569 RSA_up_ref(rsa);
1570 cert->rsa_tmp=rsa;
1571 }
1572 if (rsa == NULL)
1573 {
1574 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1575 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1576 goto f_err;
1577 }
1578 r[0]=rsa->n;
1579 r[1]=rsa->e;
1580 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
1581 }
1582 else
1583 #endif
1584 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1585 if (type & SSL_kEDH)
1586 {
1587 dhp=cert->dh_tmp;
1588 if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1589 dhp=s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s,
1590 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1591 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1592 if (dhp == NULL)
1593 {
1594 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1595 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1596 goto f_err;
1597 }
1598
1599 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
1600 {
1601 DH_free(dh);
1602 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1603 goto err;
1604 }
1605
1606 if ((dh=DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL)
1607 {
1608 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1609 goto err;
1610 }
1611
1612 s->s3->tmp.dh=dh;
1613 if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL ||
1614 dhp->priv_key == NULL ||
1615 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE)))
1616 {
1617 if(!DH_generate_key(dh))
1618 {
1619 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1620 ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1621 goto err;
1622 }
1623 }
1624 else
1625 {
1626 dh->pub_key=BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
1627 dh->priv_key=BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
1628 if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) ||
1629 (dh->priv_key == NULL))
1630 {
1631 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1632 goto err;
1633 }
1634 }
1635 r[0]=dh->p;
1636 r[1]=dh->g;
1637 r[2]=dh->pub_key;
1638 }
1639 else
1640 #endif
1641 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1642 if (type & SSL_kEECDH)
1643 {
1644 const EC_GROUP *group;
1645
1646 ecdhp=cert->ecdh_tmp;
1647 if ((ecdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1648 {
1649 ecdhp=s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s,
1650 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1651 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1652 }
1653 if (ecdhp == NULL)
1654 {
1655 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1656 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
1657 goto f_err;
1658 }
1659
1660 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
1661 {
1662 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
1663 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1664 goto err;
1665 }
1666
1667 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
1668 if (ecdhp == NULL)
1669 {
1670 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1671 goto err;
1672 }
1673 if (!EC_KEY_up_ref(ecdhp))
1674 {
1675 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1676 goto err;
1677 }
1678 ecdh = ecdhp;
1679
1680 s->s3->tmp.ecdh=ecdh;
1681 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1682 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1683 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE))
1684 {
1685 if(!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh))
1686 {
1687 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1688 goto err;
1689 }
1690 }
1691
1692 if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||
1693 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1694 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL))
1695 {
1696 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1697 goto err;
1698 }
1699
1700 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
1701 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163))
1702 {
1703 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
1704 goto err;
1705 }
1706
1707 /* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH
1708 * keys over named (not generic) curves. For
1709 * supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero.
1710 */
1711 if ((curve_id =
1712 tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)))
1713 == 0)
1714 {
1715 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
1716 goto err;
1717 }
1718
1719 /* Encode the public key.
1720 * First check the size of encoding and
1721 * allocate memory accordingly.
1722 */
1723 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1724 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1725 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1726 NULL, 0, NULL);
1727
1728 encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
1729 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen*sizeof(unsigned char));
1730 bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
1731 if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL))
1732 {
1733 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1734 goto err;
1735 }
1736
1737
1738 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1739 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1740 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1741 encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
1742
1743 if (encodedlen == 0)
1744 {
1745 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1746 goto err;
1747 }
1748
1749 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); bn_ctx=NULL;
1750
1751 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not
1752 * generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges.
1753 * In this situation, we need four additional bytes
1754 * to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
1755 * structure.
1756 */
1757 n = 4 + encodedlen;
1758
1759 /* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message
1760 * explicitly so we can set these to NULLs
1761 */
1762 r[0]=NULL;
1763 r[1]=NULL;
1764 r[2]=NULL;
1765 r[3]=NULL;
1766 }
1767 else
1768 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
1769 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1770 if (type & SSL_kPSK)
1771 {
1772 /* reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint*/
1773 n+=2+strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1774 }
1775 else
1776 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1777 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1778 if (type & SSL_kSRP)
1779 {
1780 if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
1781 (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
1782 (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) ||
1783 (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL))
1784 {
1785 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
1786 goto err;
1787 }
1788 r[0]=s->srp_ctx.N;
1789 r[1]=s->srp_ctx.g;
1790 r[2]=s->srp_ctx.s;
1791 r[3]=s->srp_ctx.B;
1792 }
1793 else
1794 #endif
1795 {
1796 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1797 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
1798 goto f_err;
1799 }
1800 for (i=0; r[i] != NULL && i<4; i++)
1801 {
1802 nr[i]=BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
1803 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1804 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
1805 n+=1+nr[i];
1806 else
1807 #endif
1808 n+=2+nr[i];
1809 }
1810
1811 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
1812 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
1813 {
1814 if ((pkey=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s,s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,&md))
1815 == NULL)
1816 {
1817 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1818 goto f_err;
1819 }
1820 kn=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1821 }
1822 else
1823 {
1824 pkey=NULL;
1825 kn=0;
1826 }
1827
1828 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,n+4+kn))
1829 {
1830 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_BUF);
1831 goto err;
1832 }
1833 d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1834 p= &(d[4]);
1835
1836 for (i=0; r[i] != NULL && i<4; i++)
1837 {
1838 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1839 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
1840 {
1841 *p = nr[i];
1842 p++;
1843 }
1844 else
1845 #endif
1846 s2n(nr[i],p);
1847 BN_bn2bin(r[i],p);
1848 p+=nr[i];
1849 }
1850
1851 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1852 if (type & SSL_kEECDH)
1853 {
1854 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves.
1855 * In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has:
1856 * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
1857 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by
1858 * the actual encoded point itself
1859 */
1860 *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
1861 p += 1;
1862 *p = 0;
1863 p += 1;
1864 *p = curve_id;
1865 p += 1;
1866 *p = encodedlen;
1867 p += 1;
1868 memcpy((unsigned char*)p,
1869 (unsigned char *)encodedPoint,
1870 encodedlen);
1871 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1872 encodedPoint = NULL;
1873 p += encodedlen;
1874 }
1875 #endif
1876
1877 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1878 if (type & SSL_kPSK)
1879 {
1880 /* copy PSK identity hint */
1881 s2n(strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint), p);
1882 strncpy((char *)p, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint, strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint));
1883 p+=strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1884 }
1885 #endif
1886
1887 /* not anonymous */
1888 if (pkey != NULL)
1889 {
1890 /* n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4])
1891 * and p points to the space at the end. */
1892 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1893 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA
1894 && s->version < TLS1_2_VERSION)
1895 {
1896 q=md_buf;
1897 j=0;
1898 for (num=2; num > 0; num--)
1899 {
1900 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2)
1901 ?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
1902 EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx,
1903 EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
1904 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1905 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1906 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1907 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q,
1908 (unsigned int *)&i);
1909 q+=i;
1910 j+=i;
1911 }
1912 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,
1913 &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0)
1914 {
1915 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_RSA);
1916 goto err;
1917 }
1918 s2n(u,p);
1919 n+=u+2;
1920 }
1921 else
1922 #endif
1923 if (md)
1924 {
1925 /* For TLS1.2 and later send signature
1926 * algorithm */
1927 if (s->version >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
1928 {
1929 if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md))
1930 {
1931 /* Should never happen */
1932 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1933 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1934 goto f_err;
1935 }
1936 p+=2;
1937 }
1938 #ifdef SSL_DEBUG
1939 fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n",
1940 EVP_MD_name(md));
1941 #endif
1942 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL);
1943 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1944 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1945 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1946 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
1947 (unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
1948 {
1949 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_EVP);
1950 goto err;
1951 }
1952 s2n(i,p);
1953 n+=i+2;
1954 if (s->version >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
1955 n+= 2;
1956 }
1957 else
1958 {
1959 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
1960 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1961 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
1962 goto f_err;
1963 }
1964 }
1965
1966 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE;
1967 l2n3(n,d);
1968
1969 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
1970 * it off */
1971 s->init_num=n+4;
1972 s->init_off=0;
1973 }
1974
1975 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
1976 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
1977 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1978 f_err:
1979 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1980 err:
1981 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1982 if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1983 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
1984 #endif
1985 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
1986 return(-1);
1987 }
1988
1989 int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
1990 {
1991 unsigned char *p,*d;
1992 int i,j,nl,off,n;
1993 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk=NULL;
1994 X509_NAME *name;
1995 BUF_MEM *buf;
1996
1997 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A)
1998 {
1999 buf=s->init_buf;
2000
2001 d=p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4]);
2002
2003 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
2004 p++;
2005 n=ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s,p);
2006 d[0]=n;
2007 p+=n;
2008 n++;
2009
2010 off=n;
2011 p+=2;
2012 n+=2;
2013
2014 sk=SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
2015 nl=0;
2016 if (sk != NULL)
2017 {
2018 for (i=0; i<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++)
2019 {
2020 name=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i);
2021 j=i2d_X509_NAME(name,NULL);
2022 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,4+n+j+2))
2023 {
2024 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
2025 goto err;
2026 }
2027 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+n]);
2028 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG))
2029 {
2030 s2n(j,p);
2031 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
2032 n+=2+j;
2033 nl+=2+j;
2034 }
2035 else
2036 {
2037 d=p;
2038 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
2039 j-=2; s2n(j,d); j+=2;
2040 n+=j;
2041 nl+=j;
2042 }
2043 }
2044 }
2045 /* else no CA names */
2046 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+off]);
2047 s2n(nl,p);
2048
2049 d=(unsigned char *)buf->data;
2050 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
2051 l2n3(n,d);
2052
2053 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
2054 * it off */
2055
2056 s->init_num=n+4;
2057 s->init_off=0;
2058 #ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
2059 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num;
2060
2061 /* do the header */
2062 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
2063 *(p++)=0;
2064 *(p++)=0;
2065 *(p++)=0;
2066 s->init_num += 4;
2067 #endif
2068
2069 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
2070 }
2071
2072 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
2073 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
2074 err:
2075 return(-1);
2076 }
2077
2078 int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
2079 {
2080 int i,al,ok;
2081 long n;
2082 unsigned long alg_k;
2083 unsigned char *p;
2084 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2085 RSA *rsa=NULL;
2086 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
2087 #endif
2088 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2089 BIGNUM *pub=NULL;
2090 DH *dh_srvr;
2091 #endif
2092 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2093 KSSL_ERR kssl_err;
2094 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2095
2096 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2097 EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;
2098 EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
2099 EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
2100 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
2101 #endif
2102
2103 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2104 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
2105 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B,
2106 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2107 2048, /* ??? */
2108 &ok);
2109
2110 if (!ok) return((int)n);
2111 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2112
2113 alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2114
2115 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2116 if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
2117 {
2118 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
2119 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp)
2120 {
2121 if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL))
2122 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp;
2123 /* Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should
2124 * be sent already */
2125 if (rsa == NULL)
2126 {
2127 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2128 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY);
2129 goto f_err;
2130
2131 }
2132 }
2133 else
2134 {
2135 pkey=s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey;
2136 if ( (pkey == NULL) ||
2137 (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) ||
2138 (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL))
2139 {
2140 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2141 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2142 goto f_err;
2143 }
2144 rsa=pkey->pkey.rsa;
2145 }
2146
2147 /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */
2148 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
2149 {
2150 n2s(p,i);
2151 if (n != i+2)
2152 {
2153 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG))
2154 {
2155 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2156 goto err;
2157 }
2158 else
2159 p-=2;
2160 }
2161 else
2162 n=i;
2163 }
2164
2165 i=RSA_private_decrypt((int)n,p,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
2166
2167 al = -1;
2168
2169 if (i != SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2170 {
2171 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2172 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); */
2173 }
2174
2175 if ((al == -1) && !((p[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
2176 {
2177 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2178 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2179 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2180 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
2181 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
2182 * protocol version.
2183 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. */
2184 if (!((s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) &&
2185 (p[0] == (s->version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->version & 0xff))))
2186 {
2187 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2188 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER); */
2189
2190 /* The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2191 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version
2192 * number check as a "bad version oracle" -- an alert would
2193 * reveal that the plaintext corresponding to some ciphertext
2194 * made up by the adversary is properly formatted except
2195 * that the version number is wrong. To avoid such attacks,
2196 * we should treat this just like any other decryption error. */
2197 }
2198 }
2199
2200 if (al != -1)
2201 {
2202 /* Some decryption failure -- use random value instead as countermeasure
2203 * against Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding
2204 * (see RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). */
2205 ERR_clear_error();
2206 i = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2207 p[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
2208 p[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
2209 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p+2, i-2) <= 0) /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure */
2210 goto err;
2211 }
2212
2213 s->session->master_key_length=
2214 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2215 s->session->master_key,
2216 p,i);
2217 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
2218 }
2219 else
2220 #endif
2221 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2222 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
2223 {
2224 n2s(p,i);
2225 if (n != i+2)
2226 {
2227 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG))
2228 {
2229 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2230 goto err;
2231 }
2232 else
2233 {
2234 p-=2;
2235 i=(int)n;
2236 }
2237 }
2238
2239 if (n == 0L) /* the parameters are in the cert */
2240 {
2241 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2242 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_DH_CERTS);
2243 goto f_err;
2244 }
2245 else
2246 {
2247 if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL)
2248 {
2249 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2250 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2251 goto f_err;
2252 }
2253 else
2254 dh_srvr=s->s3->tmp.dh;
2255 }
2256
2257 pub=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL);
2258 if (pub == NULL)
2259 {
2260 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BN_LIB);
2261 goto err;
2262 }
2263
2264 i=DH_compute_key(p,pub,dh_srvr);
2265
2266 if (i <= 0)
2267 {
2268 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
2269 goto err;
2270 }
2271
2272 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
2273 s->s3->tmp.dh=NULL;
2274
2275 BN_clear_free(pub);
2276 pub=NULL;
2277 s->session->master_key_length=
2278 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2279 s->session->master_key,p,i);
2280 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
2281 }
2282 else
2283 #endif
2284 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2285 if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
2286 {
2287 krb5_error_code krb5rc;
2288 krb5_data enc_ticket;
2289 krb5_data authenticator;
2290 krb5_data enc_pms;
2291 KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
2292 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
2293 const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
2294 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
2295 unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
2296 + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
2297 int padl, outl;
2298 krb5_timestamp authtime = 0;
2299 krb5_ticket_times ttimes;
2300
2301 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
2302
2303 if (!kssl_ctx) kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
2304
2305 n2s(p,i);
2306 enc_ticket.length = i;
2307
2308 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + 6))
2309 {
2310 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2311 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2312 goto err;
2313 }
2314
2315 enc_ticket.data = (char *)p;
2316 p+=enc_ticket.length;
2317
2318 n2s(p,i);
2319 authenticator.length = i;
2320
2321 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 6))
2322 {
2323 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2324 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2325 goto err;
2326 }
2327
2328 authenticator.data = (char *)p;
2329 p+=authenticator.length;
2330
2331 n2s(p,i);
2332 enc_pms.length = i;
2333 enc_pms.data = (char *)p;
2334 p+=enc_pms.length;
2335
2336 /* Note that the length is checked again below,
2337 ** after decryption
2338 */
2339 if(enc_pms.length > sizeof pms)
2340 {
2341 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2342 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2343 goto err;
2344 }
2345
2346 if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length +
2347 enc_pms.length + 6))
2348 {
2349 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2350 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2351 goto err;
2352 }
2353
2354 if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes,
2355 &kssl_err)) != 0)
2356 {
2357 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
2358 printf("kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
2359 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2360 if (kssl_err.text)
2361 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2362 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2363 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2364 kssl_err.reason);
2365 goto err;
2366 }
2367
2368 /* Note: no authenticator is not considered an error,
2369 ** but will return authtime == 0.
2370 */
2371 if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator,
2372 &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0)
2373 {
2374 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
2375 printf("kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
2376 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2377 if (kssl_err.text)
2378 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2379 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2380 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2381 kssl_err.reason);
2382 goto err;
2383 }
2384
2385 if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0)
2386 {
2387 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc);
2388 goto err;
2389 }
2390
2391 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
2392 kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
2393 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2394
2395 enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
2396 if (enc == NULL)
2397 goto err;
2398
2399 memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
2400
2401 if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc,NULL,kssl_ctx->key,iv))
2402 {
2403 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2404 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2405 goto err;
2406 }
2407 if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms,&outl,
2408 (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length))
2409 {
2410 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2411 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2412 goto err;
2413 }
2414 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2415 {
2416 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2417 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2418 goto err;
2419 }
2420 if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx,&(pms[outl]),&padl))
2421 {
2422 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2423 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2424 goto err;
2425 }
2426 outl += padl;
2427 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2428 {
2429 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2430 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2431 goto err;
2432 }
2433 if (!((pms[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (pms[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
2434 {
2435 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2436 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2437 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2438 * However, buggy clients exist that send random bytes instead of
2439 * the protocol version.
2440 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients.
2441 * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos cipher)
2442 */
2443 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG))
2444 {
2445 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2446 SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2447 goto err;
2448 }
2449 }
2450
2451 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
2452
2453 s->session->master_key_length=
2454 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2455 s->session->master_key, pms, outl);
2456
2457 if (kssl_ctx->client_princ)
2458 {
2459 size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
2460 if ( len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH )
2461 {
2462 s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len;
2463 memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ,kssl_ctx->client_princ,len);
2464 }
2465 }
2466
2467
2468 /* Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
2469 ** but it caused problems for apache.
2470 ** kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
2471 ** if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
2472 */
2473 }
2474 else
2475 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2476
2477 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2478 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
2479 {
2480 int ret = 1;
2481 int field_size = 0;
2482 const EC_KEY *tkey;
2483 const EC_GROUP *group;
2484 const BIGNUM *priv_key;
2485
2486 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
2487 if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL)
2488 {
2489 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2490 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2491 goto err;
2492 }
2493
2494 /* Let's get server private key and group information */
2495 if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
2496 {
2497 /* use the certificate */
2498 tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec;
2499 }
2500 else
2501 {
2502 /* use the ephermeral values we saved when
2503 * generating the ServerKeyExchange msg.
2504 */
2505 tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh;
2506 }
2507
2508 group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
2509 priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
2510
2511 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) ||
2512 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key))
2513 {
2514 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2515 ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2516 goto err;
2517 }
2518
2519 /* Let's get client's public key */
2520 if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL)
2521 {
2522 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2523 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2524 goto err;
2525 }
2526
2527 if (n == 0L)
2528 {
2529 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
2530
2531 if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
2532 {
2533 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2534 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
2535 goto f_err;
2536 }
2537 if (((clnt_pub_pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer))
2538 == NULL) ||
2539 (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC))
2540 {
2541 /* XXX: For now, we do not support client
2542 * authentication using ECDH certificates
2543 * so this branch (n == 0L) of the code is
2544 * never executed. When that support is
2545 * added, we ought to ensure the key
2546 * received in the certificate is
2547 * authorized for key agreement.
2548 * ECDH_compute_key implicitly checks that
2549 * the two ECDH shares are for the same
2550 * group.
2551 */
2552 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2553 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2554 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS);
2555 goto f_err;
2556 }
2557
2558 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,
2559 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->pkey.ec)) == 0)
2560 {
2561 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2562 ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2563 goto err;
2564 }
2565 ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
2566 }
2567 else
2568 {
2569 /* Get client's public key from encoded point
2570 * in the ClientKeyExchange message.
2571 */
2572 if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
2573 {
2574 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2575 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2576 goto err;
2577 }
2578
2579 /* Get encoded point length */
2580 i = *p;
2581 p += 1;
2582 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group,
2583 clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0)
2584 {
2585 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2586 ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2587 goto err;
2588 }
2589 /* p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer
2590 * currently, so set it to the start
2591 */
2592 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2593 }
2594
2595 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
2596 field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
2597 if (field_size <= 0)
2598 {
2599 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2600 ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
2601 goto err;
2602 }
2603 i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size+7)/8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh, NULL);
2604 if (i <= 0)
2605 {
2606 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2607 ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
2608 goto err;
2609 }
2610
2611 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2612 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2613 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2614 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2615 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
2616 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
2617
2618 /* Compute the master secret */
2619 s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc-> \
2620 generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, p, i);
2621
2622 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
2623 return (ret);
2624 }
2625 else
2626 #endif
2627 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2628 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK)
2629 {
2630 unsigned char *t = NULL;
2631 unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN*2+4];
2632 unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0;
2633 int psk_err = 1;
2634 char tmp_id[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1];
2635
2636 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2637
2638 n2s(p,i);
2639 if (n != i+2)
2640 {
2641 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2642 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2643 goto psk_err;
2644 }
2645 if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN)
2646 {
2647 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2648 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2649 goto psk_err;
2650 }
2651 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL)
2652 {
2653 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2654 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
2655 goto psk_err;
2656 }
2657
2658 /* Create guaranteed NULL-terminated identity
2659 * string for the callback */
2660 memcpy(tmp_id, p, i);
2661 memset(tmp_id+i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1-i);
2662 psk_len = s->psk_server_callback(s, tmp_id,
2663 psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2664 OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_id, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1);
2665
2666 if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN)
2667 {
2668 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2669 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2670 goto psk_err;
2671 }
2672 else if (psk_len == 0)
2673 {
2674 /* PSK related to the given identity not found */
2675 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2676 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2677 al=SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
2678 goto psk_err;
2679 }
2680
2681 /* create PSK pre_master_secret */
2682 pre_ms_len=2+psk_len+2+psk_len;
2683 t = psk_or_pre_ms;
2684 memmove(psk_or_pre_ms+psk_len+4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len);
2685 s2n(psk_len, t);
2686 memset(t, 0, psk_len);
2687 t+=psk_len;
2688 s2n(psk_len, t);
2689
2690 if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL)
2691 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2692 s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup((char *)p);
2693 if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL)
2694 {
2695 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2696 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2697 goto psk_err;
2698 }
2699
2700 if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
2701 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
2702 s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
2703 if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL &&
2704 s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
2705 {
2706 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2707 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2708 goto psk_err;
2709 }
2710
2711 s->session->master_key_length=
2712 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2713 s->session->master_key, psk_or_pre_ms, pre_ms_len);
2714 psk_err = 0;
2715 psk_err:
2716 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2717 if (psk_err != 0)
2718 goto f_err;
2719 }
2720 else
2721 #endif
2722 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2723 if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
2724 {
2725 int param_len;
2726
2727 n2s(p,i);
2728 param_len=i+2;
2729 if (param_len > n)
2730 {
2731 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2732 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
2733 goto f_err;
2734 }
2735 if (!(s->srp_ctx.A=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
2736 {
2737 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2738 goto err;
2739 }
2740 if (s->session->srp_username != NULL)
2741 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
2742 s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
2743 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL)
2744 {
2745 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2746 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2747 goto err;
2748 }
2749
2750 if ((s->session->master_key_length = SRP_generate_server_master_secret(s,s->session->master_key))<0)
2751 {
2752 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2753 goto err;
2754 }
2755
2756 p+=i;
2757 }
2758 else
2759 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
2760 if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST)
2761 {
2762 int ret = 0;
2763 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
2764 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
2765 unsigned char premaster_secret[32], *start;
2766 size_t outlen=32, inlen;
2767 unsigned long alg_a;
2768
2769 /* Get our certificate private key*/
2770 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2771 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST94)
2772 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST94].privatekey;
2773 else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01)
2774 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
2775
2776 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk,NULL);
2777 EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx);
2778 /* If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
2779 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
2780 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use
2781 * a client certificate for authorization only. */
2782 client_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2783 if (client_pub_pkey)
2784 {
2785 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
2786 ERR_clear_error();
2787 }
2788 /* Decrypt session key */
2789 if ((*p!=( V_ASN1_SEQUENCE| V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)))
2790 {
2791 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2792 goto gerr;
2793 }
2794 if (p[1] == 0x81)
2795 {
2796 start = p+3;
2797 inlen = p[2];
2798 }
2799 else if (p[1] < 0x80)
2800 {
2801 start = p+2;
2802 inlen = p[1];
2803 }
2804 else
2805 {
2806 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2807 goto gerr;
2808 }
2809 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx,premaster_secret,&outlen,start,inlen) <=0)
2810
2811 {
2812 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2813 goto gerr;
2814 }
2815 /* Generate master secret */
2816 s->session->master_key_length=
2817 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2818 s->session->master_key,premaster_secret,32);
2819 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2820 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
2821 ret = 2;
2822 else
2823 ret = 1;
2824 gerr:
2825 EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey);
2826 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2827 if (ret)
2828 return ret;
2829 else
2830 goto err;
2831 }
2832 else
2833 {
2834 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2835 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2836 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
2837 goto f_err;
2838 }
2839
2840 return(1);
2841 f_err:
2842 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2843 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_SRP)
2844 err:
2845 #endif
2846 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2847 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2848 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2849 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
2850 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2851 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2852 #endif
2853 return(-1);
2854 }
2855
2856 int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
2857 {
2858 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
2859 unsigned char *p;
2860 int al,ok,ret=0;
2861 long n;
2862 int type=0,i,j;
2863 X509 *peer;
2864
2865 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2866 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
2867 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,
2868 -1,
2869 514, /* 514? */
2870 &ok);
2871
2872 if (!ok) return((int)n);
2873
2874 if (s->session->peer != NULL)
2875 {
2876 peer=s->session->peer;
2877 pkey=X509_get_pubkey(peer);
2878 type=X509_certificate_type(peer,pkey);
2879 }
2880 else
2881 {
2882 peer=NULL;
2883 pkey=NULL;
2884 }
2885
2886 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY)
2887 {
2888 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
2889 if ((peer != NULL) && (type | EVP_PKT_SIGN))
2890 {
2891 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2892 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE);
2893 goto f_err;
2894 }
2895 ret=1;
2896 goto end;
2897 }
2898
2899 if (peer == NULL)
2900 {
2901 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED);
2902 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2903 goto f_err;
2904 }
2905
2906 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
2907 {
2908 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
2909 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2910 goto f_err;
2911 }
2912
2913 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
2914 {
2915 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
2916 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2917 goto f_err;
2918 }
2919
2920 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
2921 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2922 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
2923 /* If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare
2924 * signature without length field */
2925 if (n==64 && (pkey->type==NID_id_GostR3410_94 ||
2926 pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) )
2927 {
2928 i=64;
2929 }
2930 else
2931 {
2932 n2s(p,i);
2933 n-=2;
2934 if (i > n)
2935 {
2936 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2937 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2938 goto f_err;
2939 }
2940 }
2941 j=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
2942 if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0))
2943 {
2944 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
2945 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2946 goto f_err;
2947 }
2948
2949 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2950 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
2951 {
2952 i=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
2953 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i,
2954 pkey->pkey.rsa);
2955 if (i < 0)
2956 {
2957 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2958 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
2959 goto f_err;
2960 }
2961 if (i == 0)
2962 {
2963 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2964 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE);
2965 goto f_err;
2966 }
2967 }
2968 else
2969 #endif
2970 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2971 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
2972 {
2973 j=DSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
2974 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
2975 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.dsa);
2976 if (j <= 0)
2977 {
2978 /* bad signature */
2979 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2980 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE);
2981 goto f_err;
2982 }
2983 }
2984 else
2985 #endif
2986 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
2987 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
2988 {
2989 j=ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
2990 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
2991 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.ec);
2992 if (j <= 0)
2993 {
2994 /* bad signature */
2995 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2996 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
2997 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
2998 goto f_err;
2999 }
3000 }
3001 else
3002 #endif
3003 if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001)
3004 { unsigned char signature[64];
3005 int idx;
3006 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey,NULL);
3007 EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx);
3008 if (i!=64) {
3009 fprintf(stderr,"GOST signature length is %d",i);
3010 }
3011 for (idx=0;idx<64;idx++) {
3012 signature[63-idx]=p[idx];
3013 }
3014 j=EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx,signature,64,s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,32);
3015 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
3016 if (j<=0)
3017 {
3018 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3019 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
3020 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
3021 goto f_err;
3022 }
3023 }
3024 else
3025 {
3026 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3027 al=SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
3028 goto f_err;
3029 }
3030
3031
3032 ret=1;
3033 if (0)
3034 {
3035 f_err:
3036 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3037 }
3038 end:
3039 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3040 return(ret);
3041 }
3042
3043 int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
3044 {
3045 int i,ok,al,ret= -1;
3046 X509 *x=NULL;
3047 unsigned long l,nc,llen,n;
3048 const unsigned char *p,*q;
3049 unsigned char *d;
3050 STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL;
3051
3052 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3053 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A,
3054 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B,
3055 -1,
3056 s->max_cert_list,
3057 &ok);
3058
3059 if (!ok) return((int)n);
3060
3061 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE)
3062 {
3063 if ( (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3064 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
3065 {
3066 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3067 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3068 goto f_err;
3069 }
3070 /* If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list */
3071 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
3072 {
3073 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST);
3074 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3075 goto f_err;
3076 }
3077 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
3078 return(1);
3079 }
3080
3081 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE)
3082 {
3083 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3084 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
3085 goto f_err;
3086 }
3087 p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3088
3089 if ((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)
3090 {
3091 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3092 goto err;
3093 }
3094
3095 n2l3(p,llen);
3096 if (llen+3 != n)
3097 {
3098 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3099 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3100 goto f_err;
3101 }
3102 for (nc=0; nc<llen; )
3103 {
3104 n2l3(p,l);
3105 if ((l+nc+3) > llen)
3106 {
3107 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3108 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3109 goto f_err;
3110 }
3111
3112 q=p;
3113 x=d2i_X509(NULL,&p,l);
3114 if (x == NULL)
3115 {
3116 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
3117 goto err;
3118 }
3119 if (p != (q+l))
3120 {
3121 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3122 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3123 goto f_err;
3124 }
3125 if (!sk_X509_push(sk,x))
3126 {
3127 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3128 goto err;
3129 }
3130 x=NULL;
3131 nc+=l+3;
3132 }
3133
3134 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0)
3135 {
3136 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3137 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
3138 {
3139 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3140 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
3141 goto f_err;
3142 }
3143 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3144 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3145 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
3146 {
3147 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3148 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3149 goto f_err;
3150 }
3151 }
3152 else
3153 {
3154 i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk);
3155 if (i <= 0)
3156 {
3157 al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
3158 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_RETURNED);
3159 goto f_err;
3160 }
3161 }
3162
3163 if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */
3164 X509_free(s->session->peer);
3165 s->session->peer=sk_X509_shift(sk);
3166 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
3167
3168 /* With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL
3169 * when we arrive here. */
3170 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
3171 {
3172 s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
3173 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
3174 {
3175 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3176 goto err;
3177 }
3178 }
3179 if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL)
3180 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free);
3181 s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain=sk;
3182 /* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the
3183 * peer's own certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c */
3184
3185 sk=NULL;
3186
3187 ret=1;
3188 if (0)
3189 {
3190 f_err:
3191 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3192 }
3193 err:
3194 if (x != NULL) X509_free(x);
3195 if (sk != NULL) sk_X509_pop_free(sk,X509_free);
3196 return(ret);
3197 }
3198
3199 int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
3200 {
3201 unsigned long l;
3202 X509 *x;
3203
3204 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A)
3205 {
3206 x=ssl_get_server_send_cert(s);
3207 if (x == NULL)
3208 {
3209 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
3210 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aKRB5) ||
3211 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5))
3212 {
3213 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3214 return(0);
3215 }
3216 }
3217
3218 l=ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,x);
3219 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
3220 s->init_num=(int)l;
3221 s->init_off=0;
3222 }
3223
3224 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
3225 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3226 }
3227 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
3228 int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
3229 {
3230 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A)
3231 {
3232 unsigned char *p, *senc, *macstart;
3233 int len, slen;
3234 unsigned int hlen;
3235 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
3236 HMAC_CTX hctx;
3237 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3238 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
3239 unsigned char key_name[16];
3240
3241 /* get session encoding length */
3242 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
3243 /* Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is
3244 * too long
3245 */
3246 if (slen > 0xFF00)
3247 return -1;
3248 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3249 * follows 1 (size of message name) + 3 (message length
3250 * bytes) + 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
3251 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
3252 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
3253 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
3254 */
3255 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
3256 26 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH +
3257 EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
3258 return -1;
3259 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen);
3260 if (!senc)
3261 return -1;
3262 p = senc;
3263 i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p);
3264
3265 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3266 /* do the header */
3267 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET;
3268 /* Skip message length for now */
3269 p += 3;
3270 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3271 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3272 /* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present
3273 * it does all the work otherwise use generated values
3274 * from parent ctx.
3275 */
3276 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
3277 {
3278 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx,
3279 &hctx, 1) < 0)
3280 {
3281 OPENSSL_free(senc);
3282 return -1;
3283 }
3284 }
3285 else
3286 {
3287 RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, 16);
3288 EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3289 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv);
3290 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3291 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
3292 memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
3293 }
3294 l2n(s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint, p);
3295 /* Skip ticket length for now */
3296 p += 2;
3297 /* Output key name */
3298 macstart = p;
3299 memcpy(p, key_name, 16);
3300 p += 16;
3301 /* output IV */
3302 memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx));
3303 p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3304 /* Encrypt session data */
3305 EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen);
3306 p += len;
3307 EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len);
3308 p += len;
3309 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3310
3311 HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart);
3312 HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen);
3313 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3314
3315 p += hlen;
3316 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
3317 /* Total length */
3318 len = p - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3319 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + 1;
3320 l2n3(len - 4, p); /* Message length */
3321 p += 4;
3322 s2n(len - 10, p); /* Ticket length */
3323
3324 /* number of bytes to write */
3325 s->init_num= len;
3326 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
3327 s->init_off=0;
3328 OPENSSL_free(senc);
3329 }
3330
3331 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
3332 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3333 }
3334
3335 int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s)
3336 {
3337 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A)
3338 {
3339 unsigned char *p;
3340 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3341 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
3342 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
3343 * + (ocsp response)
3344 */
3345 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen))
3346 return -1;
3347
3348 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3349
3350 /* do the header */
3351 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
3352 /* message length */
3353 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p);
3354 /* status type */
3355 *(p++)= s->tlsext_status_type;
3356 /* length of OCSP response */
3357 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p);
3358 /* actual response */
3359 memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen);
3360 /* number of bytes to write */
3361 s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen;
3362 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B;
3363 s->init_off = 0;
3364 }
3365
3366 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
3367 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3368 }
3369
3370 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NPN
3371 /* ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message. It
3372 * sets the next_proto member in s if found */
3373 int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s)
3374 {
3375 int ok;
3376 int proto_len, padding_len;
3377 long n;
3378 const unsigned char *p;
3379
3380 /* Clients cannot send a NextProtocol message if we didn't see the
3381 * extension in their ClientHello */
3382 if (!s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
3383 {
3384 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION);
3385 return -1;
3386 }
3387
3388 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3389 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A,
3390 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B,
3391 SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO,
3392 514, /* See the payload format below */
3393 &ok);
3394
3395 if (!ok)
3396 return((int)n);
3397
3398 /* s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received
3399 * in this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset
3400 * by ssl3_get_finished). */
3401 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
3402 {
3403 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS);
3404 return -1;
3405 }
3406
3407 if (n < 2)
3408 return 0; /* The body must be > 1 bytes long */
3409
3410 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3411
3412 /* The payload looks like:
3413 * uint8 proto_len;
3414 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
3415 * uint8 padding_len;
3416 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
3417 */
3418 proto_len = p[0];
3419 if (proto_len + 2 > s->init_num)
3420 return 0;
3421 padding_len = p[proto_len + 1];
3422 if (proto_len + padding_len + 2 != s->init_num)
3423 return 0;
3424
3425 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(proto_len);
3426 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
3427 {
3428 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3429 return 0;
3430 }
3431 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, p + 1, proto_len);
3432 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = proto_len;
3433
3434 return 1;
3435 }
3436 # endif
3437 #endif
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