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1 /* ssl/s3_srvr.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
3 * All rights reserved.
4 *
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8 *
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15 *
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22 *
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25 * are met:
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40 *
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
51 * SUCH DAMAGE.
52 *
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
57 */
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
60 *
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
63 * are met:
64 *
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
67 *
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
71 * distribution.
72 *
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
77 *
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
82 *
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
86 *
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
88 * acknowledgment:
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
91 *
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
105 *
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
109 *
110 */
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
113 *
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
116 *
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
119 *
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
122 *
123 */
124 /* ====================================================================
125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
126 *
127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
129 * license.
130 *
131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
134 *
135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
138 *
139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
142 * to make use of the Contribution.
143 *
144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
148 * OTHERWISE.
149 */
150
151 #define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
152 #define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
153
154 #include <stdio.h>
155 #include "ssl_locl.h"
156 #include "kssl_lcl.h"
157 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
158 #include <openssl/rand.h>
159 #include <openssl/objects.h>
160 #include <openssl/evp.h>
161 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
162 #include <openssl/x509.h>
163 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
164 #include <openssl/dh.h>
165 #endif
166 #include <openssl/bn.h>
167 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
168 #include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
169 #endif
170 #include <openssl/md5.h>
171
172 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver);
173
174 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)
175 {
176 if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
177 return(SSLv3_server_method());
178 else
179 return(NULL);
180 }
181
182 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
183 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al)
184 {
185 int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE;
186
187 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
188
189 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
190 (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL))
191 {
192 if(s->srp_ctx.login == NULL)
193 {
194 /* RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject,
195 we do so if There is no srp login name */
196 ret = SSL3_AL_FATAL;
197 *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
198 }
199 else
200 {
201 ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s,al);
202 }
203 }
204 return ret;
205 }
206 #endif
207
208 IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method,
209 ssl3_accept,
210 ssl_undefined_function,
211 ssl3_get_server_method)
212
213 int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
214 {
215 BUF_MEM *buf;
216 unsigned long alg_k,Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
217 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
218 int ret= -1;
219 int new_state,state,skip=0;
220
221 RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0);
222 ERR_clear_error();
223 clear_sys_error();
224
225 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
226 cb=s->info_callback;
227 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
228 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
229
230 /* init things to blank */
231 s->in_handshake++;
232 if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s);
233
234 if (s->cert == NULL)
235 {
236 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
237 return(-1);
238 }
239
240 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
241 /* If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we
242 * already got and don't await it anymore, because
243 * Heartbeats don't make sense during handshakes anyway.
244 */
245 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
246 {
247 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
248 s->tlsext_hb_seq++;
249 }
250 #endif
251
252 for (;;)
253 {
254 state=s->state;
255
256 switch (s->state)
257 {
258 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
259 s->renegotiate=1;
260 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
261
262 case SSL_ST_BEFORE:
263 case SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
264 case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
265 case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
266
267 s->server=1;
268 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1);
269
270 if ((s->version>>8) != 3)
271 {
272 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
273 return -1;
274 }
275 s->type=SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
276
277 if (s->init_buf == NULL)
278 {
279 if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)
280 {
281 ret= -1;
282 goto end;
283 }
284 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH))
285 {
286 ret= -1;
287 goto end;
288 }
289 s->init_buf=buf;
290 }
291
292 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
293 {
294 ret= -1;
295 goto end;
296 }
297
298 s->init_num=0;
299 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE;
300 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY;
301
302 if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE)
303 {
304 /* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that
305 * the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
306 */
307 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) { ret= -1; goto end; }
308
309 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
310 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
311 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
312 }
313 else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
314 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
315 {
316 /* Server attempting to renegotiate with
317 * client that doesn't support secure
318 * renegotiation.
319 */
320 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
321 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
322 ret = -1;
323 goto end;
324 }
325 else
326 {
327 /* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE,
328 * we will just send a HelloRequest */
329 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
330 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
331 }
332 break;
333
334 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
335 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
336
337 s->shutdown=0;
338 ret=ssl3_send_hello_request(s);
339 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
340 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
341 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
342 s->init_num=0;
343
344 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
345 break;
346
347 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
348 s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
349 break;
350
351 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
352 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
353 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
354
355 ret=ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
356 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
357 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
358 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D;
359 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D:
360 {
361 int al;
362 if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s,&al)) < 0)
363 {
364 /* callback indicates firther work to be done */
365 s->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
366 goto end;
367 }
368 if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE)
369 {
370 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
371 /* This is not really an error but the only means to
372 for a client to detect whether srp is supported. */
373 if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY)
374 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
375 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
376 ret= -1;
377 goto end;
378 }
379 }
380 #endif
381
382 s->renegotiate = 2;
383 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
384 s->init_num=0;
385 break;
386
387 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
388 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
389 ret=ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
390 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
391 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
392 if (s->hit)
393 {
394 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
395 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
396 else
397 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
398 }
399 #else
400 if (s->hit)
401 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
402 #endif
403 else
404 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
405 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA_A;
406 #else
407 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
408 #endif
409 s->init_num = 0;
410 break;
411
412 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
413 case SSL3_ST_SW_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA_A:
414 case SSL3_ST_SW_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA_B:
415 ret = tls1_send_server_supplemental_data(s, &skip);
416 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
417
418 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
419 s->init_num = 0;
420 break;
421 #endif
422
423 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
424 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
425 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
426 /* normal PSK or KRB5 or SRP */
427 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
428 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)
429 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5))
430 {
431 ret=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
432 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
433 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
434 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
435 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
436 else
437 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
438 }
439 else
440 {
441 skip = 1;
442 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
443 }
444 #else
445 }
446 else
447 skip=1;
448
449 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
450 #endif
451 s->init_num=0;
452 break;
453
454 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
455 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
456 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
457
458 /* clear this, it may get reset by
459 * send_server_key_exchange */
460 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA)
461 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
462 && !(alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
463 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
464 )
465 /* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key
466 * even when forbidden by protocol specs
467 * (handshake may fail as clients are not required to
468 * be able to handle this) */
469 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
470 else
471 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0;
472
473
474 /* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or
475 * RSA but we have a sign only certificate
476 *
477 * PSK: may send PSK identity hints
478 *
479 * For ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange
480 * message only if the cipher suite is either
481 * ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, the
482 * server certificate contains the server's
483 * public key for key exchange.
484 */
485 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp
486 /* PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity
487 * hint if provided */
488 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
489 || ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
490 #endif
491 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
492 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
493 || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
494 #endif
495 || (alg_k & SSL_kDHE)
496 || (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE)
497 || ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
498 && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
499 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
500 && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
501 )
502 )
503 )
504 )
505 {
506 ret=ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);
507 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
508 }
509 else
510 skip=1;
511
512 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
513 s->init_num=0;
514 break;
515
516 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
517 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
518 if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
519 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
520 /* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set,
521 * don't request cert during re-negotiation: */
522 ((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
523 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
524 /* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites
525 * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts
526 * and in RFC 2246): */
527 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) &&
528 /* ... except when the application insists on verification
529 * (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */
530 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
531 /* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */
532 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5)
533 /* With normal PSK Certificates and
534 * Certificate Requests are omitted */
535 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
536 {
537 /* no cert request */
538 skip=1;
539 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=0;
540 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
541 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
542 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
543 return -1;
544 }
545 else
546 {
547 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=1;
548 ret=ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
549 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
550 #ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
551 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
552 #else
553 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
554 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
555 #endif
556 s->init_num=0;
557 }
558 break;
559
560 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
561 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
562 ret=ssl3_send_server_done(s);
563 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
564 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
565 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
566 s->init_num=0;
567 break;
568
569 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
570
571 /* This code originally checked to see if
572 * any data was pending using BIO_CTRL_INFO
573 * and then flushed. This caused problems
574 * as documented in PR#1939. The proposed
575 * fix doesn't completely resolve this issue
576 * as buggy implementations of BIO_CTRL_PENDING
577 * still exist. So instead we just flush
578 * unconditionally.
579 */
580
581 s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
582 if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0)
583 {
584 ret= -1;
585 goto end;
586 }
587 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
588
589 s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state;
590 break;
591 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
592 case SSL3_ST_SR_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA_A:
593 case SSL3_ST_SR_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA_B:
594 ret=tls1_get_client_supplemental_data(s);
595 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
596 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
597 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
598 s->init_num=0;
599 break;
600 #endif
601 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
602 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
603 /* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */
604 ret = ssl3_check_client_hello(s);
605 if (ret <= 0)
606 goto end;
607 if (ret == 2)
608 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C;
609 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
610 else if (ret == 3)
611 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA_A;
612 #endif
613 else {
614 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
615 {
616 ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
617 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
618 }
619 s->init_num=0;
620 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
621 }
622 break;
623
624 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
625 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
626 ret=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
627 if (ret <= 0)
628 goto end;
629 if (ret == 2)
630 {
631 /* For the ECDH ciphersuites when
632 * the client sends its ECDH pub key in
633 * a certificate, the CertificateVerify
634 * message is not sent.
635 * Also for GOST ciphersuites when
636 * the client uses its key from the certificate
637 * for key exchange.
638 */
639 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
640 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
641 #else
642 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
643 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
644 else
645 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
646 #endif
647 s->init_num = 0;
648 }
649 else if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
650 {
651 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
652 s->init_num=0;
653 if (!s->session->peer)
654 break;
655 /* For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer
656 * at this point and digest cached records.
657 */
658 if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer)
659 {
660 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
661 return -1;
662 }
663 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
664 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
665 return -1;
666 }
667 else
668 {
669 int offset=0;
670 int dgst_num;
671
672 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
673 s->init_num=0;
674
675 /* We need to get hashes here so if there is
676 * a client cert, it can be verified
677 * FIXME - digest processing for CertificateVerify
678 * should be generalized. But it is next step
679 */
680 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
681 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
682 return -1;
683 for (dgst_num=0; dgst_num<SSL_MAX_DIGEST;dgst_num++)
684 if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num])
685 {
686 int dgst_size;
687
688 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,EVP_MD_CTX_type(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]),&(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[offset]));
689 dgst_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]);
690 if (dgst_size < 0)
691 {
692 ret = -1;
693 goto end;
694 }
695 offset+=dgst_size;
696 }
697 }
698 break;
699
700 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
701 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
702
703 /* we should decide if we expected this one */
704 ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
705 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
706
707 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
708 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
709 #else
710 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
711 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
712 else
713 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
714 #endif
715 s->init_num=0;
716 break;
717
718 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
719 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A:
720 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B:
721 ret=ssl3_get_next_proto(s);
722 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
723 s->init_num = 0;
724 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
725 break;
726 #endif
727
728 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
729 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
730 ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
731 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
732 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
733 if (s->hit)
734 s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
735 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
736 else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
737 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
738 #endif
739 else
740 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
741 s->init_num=0;
742 break;
743
744 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
745 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
746 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
747 ret=ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s);
748 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
749 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
750 s->init_num=0;
751 break;
752
753 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A:
754 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B:
755 ret=ssl3_send_cert_status(s);
756 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
757 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
758 s->init_num=0;
759 break;
760
761 #endif
762
763 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
764 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
765
766 s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
767 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
768 { ret= -1; goto end; }
769
770 ret=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
771 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
772
773 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
774 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
775 s->init_num=0;
776
777 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
778 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
779 {
780 ret= -1;
781 goto end;
782 }
783
784 break;
785
786 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
787 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
788 ret=ssl3_send_finished(s,
789 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
790 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
791 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
792 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
793 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
794 if (s->hit)
795 {
796 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
797 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
798 #else
799 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
800 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
801 else
802 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
803 #endif
804 }
805 else
806 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK;
807 s->init_num=0;
808 break;
809
810 case SSL_ST_OK:
811 /* clean a few things up */
812 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
813
814 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
815 s->init_buf=NULL;
816
817 /* remove buffering on output */
818 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
819
820 s->init_num=0;
821
822 if (s->renegotiate == 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
823 {
824 s->renegotiate=0;
825 s->new_session=0;
826
827 ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
828
829 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
830 /* s->server=1; */
831 s->handshake_func=ssl3_accept;
832
833 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1);
834 }
835
836 ret = 1;
837 goto end;
838 /* break; */
839
840 default:
841 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
842 ret= -1;
843 goto end;
844 /* break; */
845 }
846
847 if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip)
848 {
849 if (s->debug)
850 {
851 if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
852 goto end;
853 }
854
855
856 if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state))
857 {
858 new_state=s->state;
859 s->state=state;
860 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP,1);
861 s->state=new_state;
862 }
863 }
864 skip=0;
865 }
866 end:
867 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
868
869 s->in_handshake--;
870 if (cb != NULL)
871 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT,ret);
872 return(ret);
873 }
874
875 int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
876 {
877
878 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A)
879 {
880 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST, 0);
881 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
882 }
883
884 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
885 return ssl_do_write(s);
886 }
887
888 int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s)
889 {
890 int ok;
891 long n;
892
893 /* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message,
894 * so permit appropriate message length */
895 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
896 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A,
897 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B,
898 -1,
899 s->max_cert_list,
900 &ok);
901 if (!ok) return((int)n);
902 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
903 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
904 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA)
905 return 3;
906 #endif
907 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)
908 {
909 /* We only allow the client to restart the handshake once per
910 * negotiation. */
911 if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE)
912 {
913 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_MULTIPLE_SGC_RESTARTS);
914 return -1;
915 }
916 /* Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake,
917 * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.) */
918 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
919 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
920 {
921 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
922 s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
923 }
924 #endif
925 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
926 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
927 {
928 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
929 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
930 }
931 #endif
932 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE;
933 return 2;
934 }
935 return 1;
936 }
937
938 int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
939 {
940 int i,j,ok,al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,ret= -1;
941 unsigned int cookie_len;
942 long n;
943 unsigned long id;
944 unsigned char *p,*d;
945 SSL_CIPHER *c;
946 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
947 unsigned char *q;
948 SSL_COMP *comp=NULL;
949 #endif
950 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers=NULL;
951
952 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C && !s->first_packet)
953 goto retry_cert;
954
955 /* We do this so that we will respond with our native type.
956 * If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1,
957 * This down switching should be handled by a different method.
958 * If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with
959 * TLSv1.
960 */
961 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A
962 )
963 {
964 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
965 }
966 s->first_packet=1;
967 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
968 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
969 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C,
970 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,
971 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
972 &ok);
973
974 if (!ok) return((int)n);
975 s->first_packet=0;
976 d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
977
978 /* use version from inside client hello, not from record header
979 * (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */
980 s->client_version=(((int)p[0])<<8)|(int)p[1];
981 p+=2;
982
983 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) ? (s->client_version > s->version &&
984 s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION)
985 : (s->client_version < s->version))
986 {
987 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
988 if ((s->client_version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR &&
989 !s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash)
990 {
991 /* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
992 s->version = s->client_version;
993 }
994 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
995 goto f_err;
996 }
997
998 /* If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't
999 * contain one, just return since we do not want to
1000 * allocate any memory yet. So check cookie length...
1001 */
1002 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE)
1003 {
1004 unsigned int session_length, cookie_length;
1005
1006 session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1007 cookie_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1);
1008
1009 if (cookie_length == 0)
1010 return 1;
1011 }
1012
1013 /* load the client random */
1014 memcpy(s->s3->client_random,p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1015 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1016
1017 /* get the session-id */
1018 j= *(p++);
1019
1020 s->hit=0;
1021 /* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in renegotiation.
1022 * 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally ignore resumption requests
1023 * with flag SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
1024 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on this for security
1025 * won't even compile against older library versions).
1026 *
1027 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to request
1028 * renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains unset): for servers,
1029 * this essentially just means that the SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1030 * setting will be ignored.
1031 */
1032 if ((s->new_session && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION)))
1033 {
1034 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
1035 goto err;
1036 }
1037 else
1038 {
1039 i=ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n);
1040 if (i == 1)
1041 { /* previous session */
1042 s->hit=1;
1043 }
1044 else if (i == -1)
1045 goto err;
1046 else /* i == 0 */
1047 {
1048 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
1049 goto err;
1050 }
1051 }
1052
1053 p+=j;
1054
1055 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
1056 {
1057 /* cookie stuff */
1058 cookie_len = *(p++);
1059
1060 /*
1061 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
1062 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
1063 * does not cause an overflow.
1064 */
1065 if ( cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie))
1066 {
1067 /* too much data */
1068 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1069 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1070 goto f_err;
1071 }
1072
1073 /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
1074 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) &&
1075 cookie_len > 0)
1076 {
1077 memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len);
1078
1079 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL)
1080 {
1081 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie,
1082 cookie_len) == 0)
1083 {
1084 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1085 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1086 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1087 goto f_err;
1088 }
1089 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1090 }
1091 else if ( memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
1092 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) /* default verification */
1093 {
1094 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1095 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1096 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1097 goto f_err;
1098 }
1099 /* Set to -2 so if successful we return 2 */
1100 ret = -2;
1101 }
1102
1103 p += cookie_len;
1104 if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION)
1105 {
1106 /* Select version to use */
1107 if (s->client_version <= DTLS1_2_VERSION &&
1108 !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2))
1109 {
1110 s->version = DTLS1_2_VERSION;
1111 s->method = DTLSv1_2_server_method();
1112 }
1113 else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
1114 {
1115 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE);
1116 s->version = s->client_version;
1117 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1118 goto f_err;
1119 }
1120 else if (s->client_version <= DTLS1_VERSION &&
1121 !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1))
1122 {
1123 s->version = DTLS1_VERSION;
1124 s->method = DTLSv1_server_method();
1125 }
1126 else
1127 {
1128 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
1129 s->version = s->client_version;
1130 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1131 goto f_err;
1132 }
1133 s->session->ssl_version = s->version;
1134 }
1135 }
1136
1137 n2s(p,i);
1138 if ((i == 0) && (j != 0))
1139 {
1140 /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */
1141 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1142 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
1143 goto f_err;
1144 }
1145 if ((p+i) >= (d+n))
1146 {
1147 /* not enough data */
1148 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1149 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1150 goto f_err;
1151 }
1152 if ((i > 0) && (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s,p,i,&(ciphers))
1153 == NULL))
1154 {
1155 goto err;
1156 }
1157 p+=i;
1158
1159 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
1160 if ((s->hit) && (i > 0))
1161 {
1162 j=0;
1163 id=s->session->cipher->id;
1164
1165 #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
1166 printf("client sent %d ciphers\n",sk_num(ciphers));
1167 #endif
1168 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++)
1169 {
1170 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers,i);
1171 #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
1172 printf("client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1173 i,sk_num(ciphers),SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
1174 #endif
1175 if (c->id == id)
1176 {
1177 j=1;
1178 break;
1179 }
1180 }
1181 /* Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade
1182 * attack: CVE-2010-4180.
1183 */
1184 #if 0
1185 if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1))
1186 {
1187 /* Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used cipher may
1188 * not be in the current list, the client instead might be trying to
1189 * continue using a cipher that before wasn't chosen due to server
1190 * preferences. We'll have to reject the connection if the cipher is not
1191 * enabled, though. */
1192 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0);
1193 if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0)
1194 {
1195 s->session->cipher = c;
1196 j = 1;
1197 }
1198 }
1199 #endif
1200 if (j == 0)
1201 {
1202 /* we need to have the cipher in the cipher
1203 * list if we are asked to reuse it */
1204 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1205 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
1206 goto f_err;
1207 }
1208 }
1209
1210 /* compression */
1211 i= *(p++);
1212 if ((p+i) > (d+n))
1213 {
1214 /* not enough data */
1215 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1216 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1217 goto f_err;
1218 }
1219 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1220 q=p;
1221 #endif
1222 for (j=0; j<i; j++)
1223 {
1224 if (p[j] == 0) break;
1225 }
1226
1227 p+=i;
1228 if (j >= i)
1229 {
1230 /* no compress */
1231 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1232 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
1233 goto f_err;
1234 }
1235
1236 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1237 /* TLS extensions*/
1238 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION)
1239 {
1240 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s,&p,d,n))
1241 {
1242 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
1243 goto err;
1244 }
1245 }
1246
1247 /* Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this
1248 * handshake for not reused session only. We need to generate
1249 * server_random before calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow
1250 * SessionTicket processing to use it in key derivation. */
1251 {
1252 unsigned char *pos;
1253 pos=s->s3->server_random;
1254 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0)
1255 {
1256 goto f_err;
1257 }
1258 }
1259
1260 if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb)
1261 {
1262 SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher=NULL;
1263
1264 s->session->master_key_length=sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1265 if(s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key, &s->session->master_key_length,
1266 ciphers, &pref_cipher, s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg))
1267 {
1268 s->hit=1;
1269 s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
1270 s->session->verify_result=X509_V_OK;
1271
1272 ciphers=NULL;
1273
1274 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1275 pref_cipher=pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1276 if (pref_cipher == NULL)
1277 {
1278 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1279 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1280 goto f_err;
1281 }
1282
1283 s->session->cipher=pref_cipher;
1284
1285 if (s->cipher_list)
1286 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
1287
1288 if (s->cipher_list_by_id)
1289 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
1290
1291 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1292 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1293 }
1294 }
1295 #endif
1296
1297 /* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1298 * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
1299 * algorithms from the client, starting at q. */
1300 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=NULL;
1301 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1302 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1303 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0)
1304 {
1305 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
1306 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1307 /* Can't disable compression */
1308 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION)
1309 {
1310 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1311 goto f_err;
1312 }
1313 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1314 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++)
1315 {
1316 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
1317 if (comp_id == comp->id)
1318 {
1319 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
1320 break;
1321 }
1322 }
1323 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1324 {
1325 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1326 goto f_err;
1327 }
1328 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1329 for (m = 0; m < i; m++)
1330 {
1331 if (q[m] == comp_id)
1332 break;
1333 }
1334 if (m >= i)
1335 {
1336 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1337 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
1338 goto f_err;
1339 }
1340 }
1341 else if (s->hit)
1342 comp = NULL;
1343 else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) && s->ctx->comp_methods)
1344 { /* See if we have a match */
1345 int m,nn,o,v,done=0;
1346
1347 nn=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1348 for (m=0; m<nn; m++)
1349 {
1350 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
1351 v=comp->id;
1352 for (o=0; o<i; o++)
1353 {
1354 if (v == q[o])
1355 {
1356 done=1;
1357 break;
1358 }
1359 }
1360 if (done) break;
1361 }
1362 if (done)
1363 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
1364 else
1365 comp=NULL;
1366 }
1367 #else
1368 /* If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1369 * using compression.
1370 */
1371 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0)
1372 {
1373 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1374 goto f_err;
1375 }
1376 #endif
1377
1378 /* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must
1379 * pick a cipher */
1380
1381 if (!s->hit)
1382 {
1383 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1384 s->session->compress_meth=0;
1385 #else
1386 s->session->compress_meth=(comp == NULL)?0:comp->id;
1387 #endif
1388 if (s->session->ciphers != NULL)
1389 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
1390 s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
1391 if (ciphers == NULL)
1392 {
1393 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1394 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED);
1395 goto f_err;
1396 }
1397 ciphers=NULL;
1398 /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
1399 retry_cert:
1400 if (s->cert->cert_cb)
1401 {
1402 int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
1403 if (rv == 0)
1404 {
1405 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1406 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
1407 goto f_err;
1408 }
1409 if (rv < 0)
1410 {
1411 s->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
1412 return -1;
1413 }
1414 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1415 }
1416 c=ssl3_choose_cipher(s,s->session->ciphers,
1417 SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1418
1419 if (c == NULL)
1420 {
1421 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1422 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1423 goto f_err;
1424 }
1425 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=c;
1426 /* check whether we should disable session resumption */
1427 if (s->not_resumable_session_cb != NULL)
1428 s->session->not_resumable=s->not_resumable_session_cb(s,
1429 ((c->algorithm_mkey & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)) != 0));
1430 if (s->session->not_resumable)
1431 /* do not send a session ticket */
1432 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
1433 }
1434 else
1435 {
1436 /* Session-id reuse */
1437 #ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
1438 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1439 SSL_CIPHER *nc=NULL;
1440 SSL_CIPHER *ec=NULL;
1441
1442 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG)
1443 {
1444 sk=s->session->ciphers;
1445 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++)
1446 {
1447 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,i);
1448 if (c->algorithm_enc & SSL_eNULL)
1449 nc=c;
1450 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c))
1451 ec=c;
1452 }
1453 if (nc != NULL)
1454 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=nc;
1455 else if (ec != NULL)
1456 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=ec;
1457 else
1458 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1459 }
1460 else
1461 #endif
1462 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1463 }
1464
1465 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER))
1466 {
1467 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
1468 goto f_err;
1469 }
1470
1471 /* we now have the following setup.
1472 * client_random
1473 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
1474 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
1475 * compression - basically ignored right now
1476 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1477 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1478 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1479 * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
1480 */
1481
1482 /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */
1483 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION)
1484 {
1485 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s) <= 0)
1486 {
1487 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1488 goto err;
1489 }
1490 }
1491
1492 if (ret < 0) ret=-ret;
1493 if (0)
1494 {
1495 f_err:
1496 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1497 }
1498 err:
1499 if (ciphers != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1500 return ret < 0 ? -1 : ret;
1501 }
1502
1503 int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
1504 {
1505 unsigned char *buf;
1506 unsigned char *p,*d;
1507 int i,sl;
1508 int al = 0;
1509 unsigned long l;
1510
1511 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1512 {
1513 buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1514 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1515 p=s->s3->server_random;
1516 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0)
1517 return -1;
1518 #endif
1519 /* Do the message type and length last */
1520 d=p= ssl_handshake_start(s);
1521
1522 *(p++)=s->version>>8;
1523 *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
1524
1525 /* Random stuff */
1526 memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1527 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1528
1529 /* There are several cases for the session ID to send
1530 * back in the server hello:
1531 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
1532 * we send back the old session ID.
1533 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
1534 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
1535 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
1536 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
1537 * session ID.
1538 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
1539 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
1540 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
1541 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
1542 * to send back.
1543 */
1544 if (s->session->not_resumable ||
1545 (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
1546 && !s->hit))
1547 s->session->session_id_length=0;
1548
1549 sl=s->session->session_id_length;
1550 if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id))
1551 {
1552 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1553 return -1;
1554 }
1555 *(p++)=sl;
1556 memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,sl);
1557 p+=sl;
1558
1559 /* put the cipher */
1560 i=ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,p);
1561 p+=i;
1562
1563 /* put the compression method */
1564 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1565 *(p++)=0;
1566 #else
1567 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1568 *(p++)=0;
1569 else
1570 *(p++)=s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
1571 #endif
1572 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1573 if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
1574 {
1575 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
1576 return -1;
1577 }
1578 if ((p = ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &al)) == NULL)
1579 {
1580 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1581 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1582 return -1;
1583 }
1584 #endif
1585 /* do the header */
1586 l=(p-d);
1587 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO, l);
1588 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B;
1589 }
1590
1591 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
1592 return ssl_do_write(s);
1593 }
1594
1595 int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)
1596 {
1597
1598 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A)
1599 {
1600 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE, 0);
1601 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
1602 }
1603
1604 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
1605 return ssl_do_write(s);
1606 }
1607
1608 int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1609 {
1610 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1611 unsigned char *q;
1612 int j,num;
1613 RSA *rsa;
1614 unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
1615 unsigned int u;
1616 #endif
1617 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1618 DH *dh=NULL,*dhp;
1619 #endif
1620 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1621 EC_KEY *ecdh=NULL, *ecdhp;
1622 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1623 int encodedlen = 0;
1624 int curve_id = 0;
1625 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1626 #endif
1627 EVP_PKEY *pkey;
1628 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1629 unsigned char *p,*d;
1630 int al,i;
1631 unsigned long type;
1632 int n;
1633 CERT *cert;
1634 BIGNUM *r[4];
1635 int nr[4],kn;
1636 BUF_MEM *buf;
1637 EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
1638
1639 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
1640 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A)
1641 {
1642 type=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1643 cert=s->cert;
1644
1645 buf=s->init_buf;
1646
1647 r[0]=r[1]=r[2]=r[3]=NULL;
1648 n=0;
1649 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1650 if (type & SSL_kRSA)
1651 {
1652 rsa=cert->rsa_tmp;
1653 if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL))
1654 {
1655 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s,
1656 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1657 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1658 if(rsa == NULL)
1659 {
1660 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1661 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1662 goto f_err;
1663 }
1664 RSA_up_ref(rsa);
1665 cert->rsa_tmp=rsa;
1666 }
1667 if (rsa == NULL)
1668 {
1669 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1670 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1671 goto f_err;
1672 }
1673 r[0]=rsa->n;
1674 r[1]=rsa->e;
1675 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
1676 }
1677 else
1678 #endif
1679 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1680 if (type & SSL_kDHE)
1681 {
1682 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto)
1683 {
1684 dhp = ssl_get_auto_dh(s);
1685 if (dhp == NULL)
1686 {
1687 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1688 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1689 goto f_err;
1690 }
1691 }
1692 else
1693 dhp=cert->dh_tmp;
1694 if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1695 dhp=s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s,
1696 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1697 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1698 if (dhp == NULL)
1699 {
1700 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1701 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1702 goto f_err;
1703 }
1704
1705 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
1706 {
1707 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1708 goto err;
1709 }
1710
1711 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto)
1712 dh = dhp;
1713 else if ((dh=DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL)
1714 {
1715 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1716 goto err;
1717 }
1718
1719 s->s3->tmp.dh=dh;
1720 if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL ||
1721 dhp->priv_key == NULL ||
1722 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE)))
1723 {
1724 if(!DH_generate_key(dh))
1725 {
1726 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1727 ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1728 goto err;
1729 }
1730 }
1731 else
1732 {
1733 dh->pub_key=BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
1734 dh->priv_key=BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
1735 if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) ||
1736 (dh->priv_key == NULL))
1737 {
1738 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1739 goto err;
1740 }
1741 }
1742 r[0]=dh->p;
1743 r[1]=dh->g;
1744 r[2]=dh->pub_key;
1745 }
1746 else
1747 #endif
1748 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1749 if (type & SSL_kECDHE)
1750 {
1751 const EC_GROUP *group;
1752
1753 ecdhp=cert->ecdh_tmp;
1754 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
1755 {
1756 /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
1757 int nid = tls1_shared_curve(s, -2);
1758 if (nid != NID_undef)
1759 ecdhp = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid);
1760 }
1761 else if ((ecdhp == NULL) && s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
1762 {
1763 ecdhp=s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s,
1764 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1765 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1766 }
1767 if (ecdhp == NULL)
1768 {
1769 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1770 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
1771 goto f_err;
1772 }
1773
1774 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
1775 {
1776 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1777 goto err;
1778 }
1779
1780 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
1781 if (ecdhp == NULL)
1782 {
1783 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1784 goto err;
1785 }
1786 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
1787 ecdh = ecdhp;
1788 else if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp)) == NULL)
1789 {
1790 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1791 goto err;
1792 }
1793
1794 s->s3->tmp.ecdh=ecdh;
1795 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1796 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1797 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE))
1798 {
1799 if(!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh))
1800 {
1801 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1802 goto err;
1803 }
1804 }
1805
1806 if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||
1807 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1808 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL))
1809 {
1810 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1811 goto err;
1812 }
1813
1814 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
1815 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163))
1816 {
1817 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
1818 goto err;
1819 }
1820
1821 /* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH
1822 * keys over named (not generic) curves. For
1823 * supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero.
1824 */
1825 if ((curve_id =
1826 tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)))
1827 == 0)
1828 {
1829 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
1830 goto err;
1831 }
1832
1833 /* Encode the public key.
1834 * First check the size of encoding and
1835 * allocate memory accordingly.
1836 */
1837 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1838 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1839 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1840 NULL, 0, NULL);
1841
1842 encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
1843 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen*sizeof(unsigned char));
1844 bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
1845 if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL))
1846 {
1847 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1848 goto err;
1849 }
1850
1851
1852 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1853 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1854 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1855 encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
1856
1857 if (encodedlen == 0)
1858 {
1859 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1860 goto err;
1861 }
1862
1863 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); bn_ctx=NULL;
1864
1865 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not
1866 * generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges.
1867 * In this situation, we need four additional bytes
1868 * to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
1869 * structure.
1870 */
1871 n = 4 + encodedlen;
1872
1873 /* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message
1874 * explicitly so we can set these to NULLs
1875 */
1876 r[0]=NULL;
1877 r[1]=NULL;
1878 r[2]=NULL;
1879 r[3]=NULL;
1880 }
1881 else
1882 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
1883 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1884 if (type & SSL_kPSK)
1885 {
1886 /* reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint*/
1887 n+=2+strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1888 }
1889 else
1890 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1891 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1892 if (type & SSL_kSRP)
1893 {
1894 if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
1895 (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
1896 (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) ||
1897 (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL))
1898 {
1899 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
1900 goto err;
1901 }
1902 r[0]=s->srp_ctx.N;
1903 r[1]=s->srp_ctx.g;
1904 r[2]=s->srp_ctx.s;
1905 r[3]=s->srp_ctx.B;
1906 }
1907 else
1908 #endif
1909 {
1910 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1911 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
1912 goto f_err;
1913 }
1914 for (i=0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++)
1915 {
1916 nr[i]=BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
1917 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1918 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
1919 n+=1+nr[i];
1920 else
1921 #endif
1922 n+=2+nr[i];
1923 }
1924
1925 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
1926 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
1927 {
1928 if ((pkey=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s,s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,&md))
1929 == NULL)
1930 {
1931 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1932 goto f_err;
1933 }
1934 kn=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1935 }
1936 else
1937 {
1938 pkey=NULL;
1939 kn=0;
1940 }
1941
1942 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,n+SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s)+kn))
1943 {
1944 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_BUF);
1945 goto err;
1946 }
1947 d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
1948
1949 for (i=0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++)
1950 {
1951 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1952 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
1953 {
1954 *p = nr[i];
1955 p++;
1956 }
1957 else
1958 #endif
1959 s2n(nr[i],p);
1960 BN_bn2bin(r[i],p);
1961 p+=nr[i];
1962 }
1963
1964 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1965 if (type & SSL_kECDHE)
1966 {
1967 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves.
1968 * In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has:
1969 * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
1970 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by
1971 * the actual encoded point itself
1972 */
1973 *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
1974 p += 1;
1975 *p = 0;
1976 p += 1;
1977 *p = curve_id;
1978 p += 1;
1979 *p = encodedlen;
1980 p += 1;
1981 memcpy((unsigned char*)p,
1982 (unsigned char *)encodedPoint,
1983 encodedlen);
1984 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1985 encodedPoint = NULL;
1986 p += encodedlen;
1987 }
1988 #endif
1989
1990 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1991 if (type & SSL_kPSK)
1992 {
1993 /* copy PSK identity hint */
1994 s2n(strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint), p);
1995 strncpy((char *)p, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint, strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint));
1996 p+=strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1997 }
1998 #endif
1999
2000 /* not anonymous */
2001 if (pkey != NULL)
2002 {
2003 /* n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4])
2004 * and p points to the space at the end. */
2005 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2006 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2007 {
2008 q=md_buf;
2009 j=0;
2010 for (num=2; num > 0; num--)
2011 {
2012 EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx,
2013 EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
2014 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2)
2015 ?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
2016 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
2017 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
2018 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,d,n);
2019 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q,
2020 (unsigned int *)&i);
2021 q+=i;
2022 j+=i;
2023 }
2024 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,
2025 &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0)
2026 {
2027 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_RSA);
2028 goto err;
2029 }
2030 s2n(u,p);
2031 n+=u+2;
2032 }
2033 else
2034 #endif
2035 if (md)
2036 {
2037 /* send signature algorithm */
2038 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2039 {
2040 if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md))
2041 {
2042 /* Should never happen */
2043 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2044 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2045 goto f_err;
2046 }
2047 p+=2;
2048 }
2049 #ifdef SSL_DEBUG
2050 fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n",
2051 EVP_MD_name(md));
2052 #endif
2053 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL);
2054 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
2055 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
2056 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,d,n);
2057 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
2058 (unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
2059 {
2060 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_EVP);
2061 goto err;
2062 }
2063 s2n(i,p);
2064 n+=i+2;
2065 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2066 n+= 2;
2067 }
2068 else
2069 {
2070 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
2071 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2072 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
2073 goto f_err;
2074 }
2075 }
2076
2077 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, n);
2078 }
2079
2080 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
2081 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
2082 return ssl_do_write(s);
2083 f_err:
2084 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2085 err:
2086 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2087 if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2088 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2089 #endif
2090 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
2091 return(-1);
2092 }
2093
2094 int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
2095 {
2096 unsigned char *p,*d;
2097 int i,j,nl,off,n;
2098 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk=NULL;
2099 X509_NAME *name;
2100 BUF_MEM *buf;
2101
2102 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A)
2103 {
2104 buf=s->init_buf;
2105
2106 d=p=ssl_handshake_start(s);
2107
2108 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
2109 p++;
2110 n=ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s,p);
2111 d[0]=n;
2112 p+=n;
2113 n++;
2114
2115 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2116 {
2117 const unsigned char *psigs;
2118 nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &psigs);
2119 s2n(nl, p);
2120 memcpy(p, psigs, nl);
2121 p += nl;
2122 n += nl + 2;
2123 }
2124
2125 off=n;
2126 p+=2;
2127 n+=2;
2128
2129 sk=SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
2130 nl=0;
2131 if (sk != NULL)
2132 {
2133 for (i=0; i<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++)
2134 {
2135 name=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i);
2136 j=i2d_X509_NAME(name,NULL);
2137 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s)+n+j+2))
2138 {
2139 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
2140 goto err;
2141 }
2142 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + n;
2143 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG))
2144 {
2145 s2n(j,p);
2146 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
2147 n+=2+j;
2148 nl+=2+j;
2149 }
2150 else
2151 {
2152 d=p;
2153 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
2154 j-=2; s2n(j,d); j+=2;
2155 n+=j;
2156 nl+=j;
2157 }
2158 }
2159 }
2160 /* else no CA names */
2161 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + off;
2162 s2n(nl,p);
2163
2164 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, n);
2165
2166 #ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
2167 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
2168 {
2169 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num;
2170 /* do the header */
2171 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
2172 *(p++)=0;
2173 *(p++)=0;
2174 *(p++)=0;
2175 s->init_num += 4;
2176 }
2177 #endif
2178
2179 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
2180 }
2181
2182 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
2183 return ssl_do_write(s);
2184 err:
2185 return(-1);
2186 }
2187
2188 int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
2189 {
2190 int i,al,ok;
2191 long n;
2192 unsigned long alg_k;
2193 unsigned char *p;
2194 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2195 RSA *rsa=NULL;
2196 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
2197 #endif
2198 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2199 BIGNUM *pub=NULL;
2200 DH *dh_srvr, *dh_clnt = NULL;
2201 #endif
2202 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2203 KSSL_ERR kssl_err;
2204 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2205
2206 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2207 EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;
2208 EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
2209 EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
2210 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
2211 #endif
2212
2213 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2214 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
2215 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B,
2216 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2217 2048, /* ??? */
2218 &ok);
2219
2220 if (!ok) return((int)n);
2221 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2222
2223 alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2224
2225 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2226 if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
2227 {
2228 unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
2229 int decrypt_len, decrypt_good_mask;
2230 unsigned char version_good;
2231
2232 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
2233 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp)
2234 {
2235 if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL))
2236 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp;
2237 /* Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should
2238 * be sent already */
2239 if (rsa == NULL)
2240 {
2241 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2242 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY);
2243 goto f_err;
2244
2245 }
2246 }
2247 else
2248 {
2249 pkey=s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey;
2250 if ( (pkey == NULL) ||
2251 (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) ||
2252 (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL))
2253 {
2254 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2255 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2256 goto f_err;
2257 }
2258 rsa=pkey->pkey.rsa;
2259 }
2260
2261 /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */
2262 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
2263 {
2264 n2s(p,i);
2265 if (n != i+2)
2266 {
2267 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG))
2268 {
2269 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2270 goto err;
2271 }
2272 else
2273 p-=2;
2274 }
2275 else
2276 n=i;
2277 }
2278
2279 /* We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because
2280 * of Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see
2281 * RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of
2282 * the TLS RFC and generates a random premaster secret for the
2283 * case that the decrypt fails. See
2284 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1 */
2285
2286 /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure. */
2287 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(rand_premaster_secret,
2288 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0)
2289 goto err;
2290 decrypt_len = RSA_private_decrypt((int)n,p,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
2291 ERR_clear_error();
2292
2293 /* decrypt_len should be SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH.
2294 * decrypt_good_mask will be zero if so and non-zero otherwise. */
2295 decrypt_good_mask = decrypt_len ^ SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2296
2297 /* If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct
2298 * then version_good will be zero. The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa
2299 * extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2300 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version
2301 * number check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks
2302 * are done in constant time and are treated like any other
2303 * decryption error. */
2304 version_good = p[0] ^ (s->client_version>>8);
2305 version_good |= p[1] ^ (s->client_version&0xff);
2306
2307 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as
2308 * the ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks
2309 * (strangely, the protocol does not offer such protection for
2310 * DH ciphersuites). However, buggy clients exist that send the
2311 * negotiated protocol version instead if the server does not
2312 * support the requested protocol version. If
2313 * SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. */
2314 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG)
2315 {
2316 unsigned char workaround_mask = version_good;
2317 unsigned char workaround;
2318
2319 /* workaround_mask will be 0xff if version_good is
2320 * non-zero (i.e. the version match failed). Otherwise
2321 * it'll be 0x00. */
2322 workaround_mask |= workaround_mask >> 4;
2323 workaround_mask |= workaround_mask >> 2;
2324 workaround_mask |= workaround_mask >> 1;
2325 workaround_mask = ~((workaround_mask & 1) - 1);
2326
2327 workaround = p[0] ^ (s->version>>8);
2328 workaround |= p[1] ^ (s->version&0xff);
2329
2330 /* If workaround_mask is 0xff (i.e. there was a version
2331 * mismatch) then we copy the value of workaround over
2332 * version_good. */
2333 version_good = (workaround & workaround_mask) |
2334 (version_good & ~workaround_mask);
2335 }
2336
2337 /* If any bits in version_good are set then they'll poision
2338 * decrypt_good_mask and cause rand_premaster_secret to be
2339 * used. */
2340 decrypt_good_mask |= version_good;
2341
2342 /* decrypt_good_mask will be zero iff decrypt_len ==
2343 * SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH and the version check passed. We
2344 * fold the bottom 32 bits of it with an OR so that the LSB
2345 * will be zero iff everything is good. This assumes that we'll
2346 * never decrypt a value > 2**31 bytes, which seems safe. */
2347 decrypt_good_mask |= decrypt_good_mask >> 16;
2348 decrypt_good_mask |= decrypt_good_mask >> 8;
2349 decrypt_good_mask |= decrypt_good_mask >> 4;
2350 decrypt_good_mask |= decrypt_good_mask >> 2;
2351 decrypt_good_mask |= decrypt_good_mask >> 1;
2352 /* Now select only the LSB and subtract one. If decrypt_len ==
2353 * SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH and the version check passed then
2354 * decrypt_good_mask will be all ones. Otherwise it'll be all
2355 * zeros. */
2356 decrypt_good_mask &= 1;
2357 decrypt_good_mask--;
2358
2359 /* Now copy rand_premaster_secret over p using
2360 * decrypt_good_mask. */
2361 for (i = 0; i < (int) sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); i++)
2362 {
2363 p[i] = (p[i] & decrypt_good_mask) |
2364 (rand_premaster_secret[i] & ~decrypt_good_mask);
2365 }
2366
2367 s->session->master_key_length=
2368 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2369 s->session->master_key,
2370 p,i);
2371 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
2372 }
2373 else
2374 #endif
2375 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2376 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
2377 {
2378 int idx = -1;
2379 EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL;
2380 if (n)
2381 n2s(p,i);
2382 else
2383 i = 0;
2384 if (n && n != i+2)
2385 {
2386 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG))
2387 {
2388 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2389 goto err;
2390 }
2391 else
2392 {
2393 p-=2;
2394 i=(int)n;
2395 }
2396 }
2397 if (alg_k & SSL_kDHr)
2398 idx = SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA;
2399 else if (alg_k & SSL_kDHd)
2400 idx = SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA;
2401 if (idx >= 0)
2402 {
2403 skey = s->cert->pkeys[idx].privatekey;
2404 if ((skey == NULL) ||
2405 (skey->type != EVP_PKEY_DH) ||
2406 (skey->pkey.dh == NULL))
2407 {
2408 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2409 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2410 goto f_err;
2411 }
2412 dh_srvr = skey->pkey.dh;
2413 }
2414 else if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL)
2415 {
2416 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2417 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2418 goto f_err;
2419 }
2420 else
2421 dh_srvr=s->s3->tmp.dh;
2422
2423 if (n == 0L)
2424 {
2425 /* Get pubkey from cert */
2426 EVP_PKEY *clkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2427 if (clkey)
2428 {
2429 if (EVP_PKEY_cmp_parameters(clkey, skey) == 1)
2430 dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(clkey);
2431 }
2432 if (dh_clnt == NULL)
2433 {
2434 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2435 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2436 goto f_err;
2437 }
2438 EVP_PKEY_free(clkey);
2439 pub = dh_clnt->pub_key;
2440 }
2441 else
2442 pub=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL);
2443 if (pub == NULL)
2444 {
2445 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BN_LIB);
2446 goto err;
2447 }
2448
2449 i=DH_compute_key(p,pub,dh_srvr);
2450
2451 if (i <= 0)
2452 {
2453 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
2454 BN_clear_free(pub);
2455 goto err;
2456 }
2457
2458 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
2459 s->s3->tmp.dh=NULL;
2460 if (dh_clnt)
2461 DH_free(dh_clnt);
2462 else
2463 BN_clear_free(pub);
2464 pub=NULL;
2465 s->session->master_key_length=
2466 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2467 s->session->master_key,p,i);
2468 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
2469 if (dh_clnt)
2470 return 2;
2471 }
2472 else
2473 #endif
2474 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2475 if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
2476 {
2477 krb5_error_code krb5rc;
2478 krb5_data enc_ticket;
2479 krb5_data authenticator;
2480 krb5_data enc_pms;
2481 KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
2482 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
2483 const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
2484 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
2485 unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
2486 + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
2487 int padl, outl;
2488 krb5_timestamp authtime = 0;
2489 krb5_ticket_times ttimes;
2490
2491 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
2492
2493 if (!kssl_ctx) kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
2494
2495 n2s(p,i);
2496 enc_ticket.length = i;
2497
2498 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + 6))
2499 {
2500 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2501 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2502 goto err;
2503 }
2504
2505 enc_ticket.data = (char *)p;
2506 p+=enc_ticket.length;
2507
2508 n2s(p,i);
2509 authenticator.length = i;
2510
2511 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 6))
2512 {
2513 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2514 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2515 goto err;
2516 }
2517
2518 authenticator.data = (char *)p;
2519 p+=authenticator.length;
2520
2521 n2s(p,i);
2522 enc_pms.length = i;
2523 enc_pms.data = (char *)p;
2524 p+=enc_pms.length;
2525
2526 /* Note that the length is checked again below,
2527 ** after decryption
2528 */
2529 if(enc_pms.length > sizeof pms)
2530 {
2531 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2532 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2533 goto err;
2534 }
2535
2536 if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length +
2537 enc_pms.length + 6))
2538 {
2539 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2540 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2541 goto err;
2542 }
2543
2544 if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes,
2545 &kssl_err)) != 0)
2546 {
2547 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
2548 printf("kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
2549 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2550 if (kssl_err.text)
2551 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2552 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2553 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2554 kssl_err.reason);
2555 goto err;
2556 }
2557
2558 /* Note: no authenticator is not considered an error,
2559 ** but will return authtime == 0.
2560 */
2561 if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator,
2562 &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0)
2563 {
2564 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
2565 printf("kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
2566 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2567 if (kssl_err.text)
2568 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2569 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2570 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2571 kssl_err.reason);
2572 goto err;
2573 }
2574
2575 if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0)
2576 {
2577 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc);
2578 goto err;
2579 }
2580
2581 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
2582 kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
2583 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2584
2585 enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
2586 if (enc == NULL)
2587 goto err;
2588
2589 memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
2590
2591 if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc,NULL,kssl_ctx->key,iv))
2592 {
2593 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2594 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2595 goto err;
2596 }
2597 if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms,&outl,
2598 (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length))
2599 {
2600 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2601 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2602 goto err;
2603 }
2604 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2605 {
2606 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2607 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2608 goto err;
2609 }
2610 if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx,&(pms[outl]),&padl))
2611 {
2612 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2613 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2614 goto err;
2615 }
2616 outl += padl;
2617 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2618 {
2619 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2620 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2621 goto err;
2622 }
2623 if (!((pms[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (pms[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
2624 {
2625 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2626 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2627 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2628 * However, buggy clients exist that send random bytes instead of
2629 * the protocol version.
2630 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients.
2631 * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos cipher)
2632 */
2633 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG))
2634 {
2635 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2636 SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2637 goto err;
2638 }
2639 }
2640
2641 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
2642
2643 s->session->master_key_length=
2644 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2645 s->session->master_key, pms, outl);
2646
2647 if (kssl_ctx->client_princ)
2648 {
2649 size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
2650 if ( len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH )
2651 {
2652 s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len;
2653 memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ,kssl_ctx->client_princ,len);
2654 }
2655 }
2656
2657
2658 /* Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
2659 ** but it caused problems for apache.
2660 ** kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
2661 ** if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
2662 */
2663 }
2664 else
2665 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2666
2667 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2668 if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
2669 {
2670 int ret = 1;
2671 int field_size = 0;
2672 const EC_KEY *tkey;
2673 const EC_GROUP *group;
2674 const BIGNUM *priv_key;
2675
2676 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
2677 if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL)
2678 {
2679 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2680 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2681 goto err;
2682 }
2683
2684 /* Let's get server private key and group information */
2685 if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
2686 {
2687 /* use the certificate */
2688 tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec;
2689 }
2690 else
2691 {
2692 /* use the ephermeral values we saved when
2693 * generating the ServerKeyExchange msg.
2694 */
2695 tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh;
2696 }
2697
2698 group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
2699 priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
2700
2701 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) ||
2702 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key))
2703 {
2704 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2705 ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2706 goto err;
2707 }
2708
2709 /* Let's get client's public key */
2710 if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL)
2711 {
2712 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2713 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2714 goto err;
2715 }
2716
2717 if (n == 0L)
2718 {
2719 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
2720
2721 if (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE)
2722 {
2723 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2724 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
2725 goto f_err;
2726 }
2727 if (((clnt_pub_pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer))
2728 == NULL) ||
2729 (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC))
2730 {
2731 /* XXX: For now, we do not support client
2732 * authentication using ECDH certificates
2733 * so this branch (n == 0L) of the code is
2734 * never executed. When that support is
2735 * added, we ought to ensure the key
2736 * received in the certificate is
2737 * authorized for key agreement.
2738 * ECDH_compute_key implicitly checks that
2739 * the two ECDH shares are for the same
2740 * group.
2741 */
2742 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2743 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2744 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS);
2745 goto f_err;
2746 }
2747
2748 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,
2749 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->pkey.ec)) == 0)
2750 {
2751 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2752 ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2753 goto err;
2754 }
2755 ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
2756 }
2757 else
2758 {
2759 /* Get client's public key from encoded point
2760 * in the ClientKeyExchange message.
2761 */
2762 if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
2763 {
2764 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2765 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2766 goto err;
2767 }
2768
2769 /* Get encoded point length */
2770 i = *p;
2771 p += 1;
2772 if (n != 1 + i)
2773 {
2774 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2775 ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2776 goto err;
2777 }
2778 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group,
2779 clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0)
2780 {
2781 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2782 ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2783 goto err;
2784 }
2785 /* p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer
2786 * currently, so set it to the start
2787 */
2788 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2789 }
2790
2791 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
2792 field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
2793 if (field_size <= 0)
2794 {
2795 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2796 ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
2797 goto err;
2798 }
2799 i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size+7)/8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh, NULL);
2800 if (i <= 0)
2801 {
2802 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2803 ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
2804 goto err;
2805 }
2806
2807 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2808 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2809 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2810 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2811 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
2812 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
2813
2814 /* Compute the master secret */
2815 s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc-> \
2816 generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, p, i);
2817
2818 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
2819 return (ret);
2820 }
2821 else
2822 #endif
2823 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2824 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK)
2825 {
2826 unsigned char *t = NULL;
2827 unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN*2+4];
2828 unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0;
2829 int psk_err = 1;
2830 char tmp_id[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1];
2831
2832 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2833
2834 n2s(p,i);
2835 if (n != i+2)
2836 {
2837 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2838 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2839 goto psk_err;
2840 }
2841 if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN)
2842 {
2843 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2844 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2845 goto psk_err;
2846 }
2847 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL)
2848 {
2849 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2850 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
2851 goto psk_err;
2852 }
2853
2854 /* Create guaranteed NULL-terminated identity
2855 * string for the callback */
2856 memcpy(tmp_id, p, i);
2857 memset(tmp_id+i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1-i);
2858 psk_len = s->psk_server_callback(s, tmp_id,
2859 psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2860 OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_id, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1);
2861
2862 if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN)
2863 {
2864 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2865 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2866 goto psk_err;
2867 }
2868 else if (psk_len == 0)
2869 {
2870 /* PSK related to the given identity not found */
2871 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2872 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2873 al=SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
2874 goto psk_err;
2875 }
2876
2877 /* create PSK pre_master_secret */
2878 pre_ms_len=2+psk_len+2+psk_len;
2879 t = psk_or_pre_ms;
2880 memmove(psk_or_pre_ms+psk_len+4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len);
2881 s2n(psk_len, t);
2882 memset(t, 0, psk_len);
2883 t+=psk_len;
2884 s2n(psk_len, t);
2885
2886 if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL)
2887 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2888 s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup((char *)p);
2889 if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL)
2890 {
2891 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2892 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2893 goto psk_err;
2894 }
2895
2896 if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
2897 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
2898 s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
2899 if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL &&
2900 s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
2901 {
2902 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2903 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2904 goto psk_err;
2905 }
2906
2907 s->session->master_key_length=
2908 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2909 s->session->master_key, psk_or_pre_ms, pre_ms_len);
2910 psk_err = 0;
2911 psk_err:
2912 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2913 if (psk_err != 0)
2914 goto f_err;
2915 }
2916 else
2917 #endif
2918 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2919 if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
2920 {
2921 int param_len;
2922
2923 n2s(p,i);
2924 param_len=i+2;
2925 if (param_len > n)
2926 {
2927 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2928 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
2929 goto f_err;
2930 }
2931 if (!(s->srp_ctx.A=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
2932 {
2933 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2934 goto err;
2935 }
2936 if (s->session->srp_username != NULL)
2937 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
2938 s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
2939 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL)
2940 {
2941 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2942 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2943 goto err;
2944 }
2945
2946 if ((s->session->master_key_length = SRP_generate_server_master_secret(s,s->session->master_key))<0)
2947 {
2948 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2949 goto err;
2950 }
2951
2952 p+=i;
2953 }
2954 else
2955 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
2956 if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST)
2957 {
2958 int ret = 0;
2959 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
2960 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
2961 unsigned char premaster_secret[32], *start;
2962 size_t outlen=32, inlen;
2963 unsigned long alg_a;
2964
2965 /* Get our certificate private key*/
2966 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2967 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST94)
2968 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST94].privatekey;
2969 else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01)
2970 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
2971
2972 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk,NULL);
2973 EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx);
2974 /* If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
2975 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
2976 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use
2977 * a client certificate for authorization only. */
2978 client_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2979 if (client_pub_pkey)
2980 {
2981 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
2982 ERR_clear_error();
2983 }
2984 /* Decrypt session key */
2985 if ((*p!=( V_ASN1_SEQUENCE| V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)))
2986 {
2987 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2988 goto gerr;
2989 }
2990 if (p[1] == 0x81)
2991 {
2992 start = p+3;
2993 inlen = p[2];
2994 }
2995 else if (p[1] < 0x80)
2996 {
2997 start = p+2;
2998 inlen = p[1];
2999 }
3000 else
3001 {
3002 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3003 goto gerr;
3004 }
3005 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx,premaster_secret,&outlen,start,inlen) <=0)
3006
3007 {
3008 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3009 goto gerr;
3010 }
3011 /* Generate master secret */
3012 s->session->master_key_length=
3013 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
3014 s->session->master_key,premaster_secret,32);
3015 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
3016 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
3017 ret = 2;
3018 else
3019 ret = 1;
3020 gerr:
3021 EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey);
3022 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3023 if (ret)
3024 return ret;
3025 else
3026 goto err;
3027 }
3028 else
3029 {
3030 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3031 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
3032 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
3033 goto f_err;
3034 }
3035
3036 return(1);
3037 f_err:
3038 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3039 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_SRP)
3040 err:
3041 #endif
3042 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
3043 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
3044 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
3045 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
3046 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
3047 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
3048 #endif
3049 return(-1);
3050 }
3051
3052 int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
3053 {
3054 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
3055 unsigned char *p;
3056 int al,ok,ret=0;
3057 long n;
3058 int type=0,i,j;
3059 X509 *peer;
3060 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
3061 EVP_MD_CTX mctx;
3062 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx);
3063
3064 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3065 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
3066 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,
3067 -1,
3068 516, /* Enough for 4096 bit RSA key with TLS v1.2 */
3069 &ok);
3070
3071 if (!ok) return((int)n);
3072
3073 if (s->session->peer != NULL)
3074 {
3075 peer=s->session->peer;
3076 pkey=X509_get_pubkey(peer);
3077 type=X509_certificate_type(peer,pkey);
3078 }
3079 else
3080 {
3081 peer=NULL;
3082 pkey=NULL;
3083 }
3084
3085 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY)
3086 {
3087 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
3088 if ((peer != NULL) && (type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
3089 {
3090 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3091 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE);
3092 goto f_err;
3093 }
3094 ret=1;
3095 goto end;
3096 }
3097
3098 if (peer == NULL)
3099 {
3100 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED);
3101 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3102 goto f_err;
3103 }
3104
3105 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
3106 {
3107 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
3108 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3109 goto f_err;
3110 }
3111
3112 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
3113 {
3114 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
3115 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3116 goto f_err;
3117 }
3118
3119 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
3120 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3121 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
3122 /* If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare
3123 * signature without length field */
3124 if (n==64 && (pkey->type==NID_id_GostR3410_94 ||
3125 pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) )
3126 {
3127 i=64;
3128 }
3129 else
3130 {
3131 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3132 {
3133 int rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, p, pkey);
3134 if (rv == -1)
3135 {
3136 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3137 goto f_err;
3138 }
3139 else if (rv == 0)
3140 {
3141 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3142 goto f_err;
3143 }
3144 #ifdef SSL_DEBUG
3145 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
3146 #endif
3147 p += 2;
3148 n -= 2;
3149 }
3150 n2s(p,i);
3151 n-=2;
3152 if (i > n)
3153 {
3154 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3155 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3156 goto f_err;
3157 }
3158 }
3159 j=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
3160 if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0))
3161 {
3162 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
3163 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3164 goto f_err;
3165 }
3166
3167 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3168 {
3169 long hdatalen = 0;
3170 void *hdata;
3171 hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
3172 if (hdatalen <= 0)
3173 {
3174 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3175 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3176 goto f_err;
3177 }
3178 #ifdef SSL_DEBUG
3179 fprintf(stderr, "Using TLS 1.2 with client verify alg %s\n",
3180 EVP_MD_name(md));
3181 #endif
3182 if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL)
3183 || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen))
3184 {
3185 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
3186 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3187 goto f_err;
3188 }
3189
3190 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&mctx, p , i, pkey) <= 0)
3191 {
3192 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3193 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
3194 goto f_err;
3195 }
3196 }
3197 else
3198 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3199 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
3200 {
3201 i=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
3202 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i,
3203 pkey->pkey.rsa);
3204 if (i < 0)
3205 {
3206 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3207 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
3208 goto f_err;
3209 }
3210 if (i == 0)
3211 {
3212 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3213 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE);
3214 goto f_err;
3215 }
3216 }
3217 else
3218 #endif
3219 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3220 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
3221 {
3222 j=DSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
3223 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3224 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.dsa);
3225 if (j <= 0)
3226 {
3227 /* bad signature */
3228 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3229 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE);
3230 goto f_err;
3231 }
3232 }
3233 else
3234 #endif
3235 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3236 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
3237 {
3238 j=ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
3239 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3240 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.ec);
3241 if (j <= 0)
3242 {
3243 /* bad signature */
3244 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3245 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
3246 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
3247 goto f_err;
3248 }
3249 }
3250 else
3251 #endif
3252 if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001)
3253 { unsigned char signature[64];
3254 int idx;
3255 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey,NULL);
3256 EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx);
3257 if (i!=64) {
3258 fprintf(stderr,"GOST signature length is %d",i);
3259 }
3260 for (idx=0;idx<64;idx++) {
3261 signature[63-idx]=p[idx];
3262 }
3263 j=EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx,signature,64,s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,32);
3264 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
3265 if (j<=0)
3266 {
3267 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3268 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
3269 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
3270 goto f_err;
3271 }
3272 }
3273 else
3274 {
3275 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3276 al=SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
3277 goto f_err;
3278 }
3279
3280
3281 ret=1;
3282 if (0)
3283 {
3284 f_err:
3285 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3286 }
3287 end:
3288 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
3289 {
3290 BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
3291 s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
3292 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
3293 }
3294 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
3295 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3296 return(ret);
3297 }
3298
3299 int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
3300 {
3301 int i,ok,al,ret= -1;
3302 X509 *x=NULL;
3303 unsigned long l,nc,llen,n;
3304 const unsigned char *p,*q;
3305 unsigned char *d;
3306 STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL;
3307
3308 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3309 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A,
3310 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B,
3311 -1,
3312 s->max_cert_list,
3313 &ok);
3314
3315 if (!ok) return((int)n);
3316
3317 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE)
3318 {
3319 if ( (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3320 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
3321 {
3322 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3323 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3324 goto f_err;
3325 }
3326 /* If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list */
3327 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
3328 {
3329 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST);
3330 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3331 goto f_err;
3332 }
3333 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
3334 return(1);
3335 }
3336
3337 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE)
3338 {
3339 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3340 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
3341 goto f_err;
3342 }
3343 p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3344
3345 if ((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)
3346 {
3347 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3348 goto err;
3349 }
3350
3351 n2l3(p,llen);
3352 if (llen+3 != n)
3353 {
3354 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3355 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3356 goto f_err;
3357 }
3358 for (nc=0; nc<llen; )
3359 {
3360 n2l3(p,l);
3361 if ((l+nc+3) > llen)
3362 {
3363 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3364 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3365 goto f_err;
3366 }
3367
3368 q=p;
3369 x=d2i_X509(NULL,&p,l);
3370 if (x == NULL)
3371 {
3372 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
3373 goto err;
3374 }
3375 if (p != (q+l))
3376 {
3377 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3378 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3379 goto f_err;
3380 }
3381 if (!sk_X509_push(sk,x))
3382 {
3383 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3384 goto err;
3385 }
3386 x=NULL;
3387 nc+=l+3;
3388 }
3389
3390 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0)
3391 {
3392 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3393 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
3394 {
3395 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3396 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
3397 goto f_err;
3398 }
3399 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3400 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3401 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
3402 {
3403 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3404 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3405 goto f_err;
3406 }
3407 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
3408 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
3409 {
3410 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3411 goto f_err;
3412 }
3413 }
3414 else
3415 {
3416 i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk);
3417 if (i <= 0)
3418 {
3419 al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
3420 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
3421 goto f_err;
3422 }
3423 }
3424
3425 if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */
3426 X509_free(s->session->peer);
3427 s->session->peer=sk_X509_shift(sk);
3428 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
3429
3430 /* With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL
3431 * when we arrive here. */
3432 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
3433 {
3434 s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
3435 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
3436 {
3437 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3438 goto err;
3439 }
3440 }
3441 if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL)
3442 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free);
3443 s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain=sk;
3444 /* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the
3445 * peer's own certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c */
3446
3447 sk=NULL;
3448
3449 ret=1;
3450 if (0)
3451 {
3452 f_err:
3453 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3454 }
3455 err:
3456 if (x != NULL) X509_free(x);
3457 if (sk != NULL) sk_X509_pop_free(sk,X509_free);
3458 return(ret);
3459 }
3460
3461 int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
3462 {
3463 CERT_PKEY *cpk;
3464
3465 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A)
3466 {
3467 cpk=ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
3468 if (cpk == NULL)
3469 {
3470 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
3471 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aKRB5) ||
3472 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5))
3473 {
3474 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3475 return(0);
3476 }
3477 }
3478
3479 ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,cpk);
3480 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
3481 }
3482
3483 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
3484 return ssl_do_write(s);
3485 }
3486
3487 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
3488 /* send a new session ticket (not necessarily for a new session) */
3489 int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
3490 {
3491 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A)
3492 {
3493 unsigned char *p, *senc, *macstart;
3494 const unsigned char *const_p;
3495 int len, slen_full, slen;
3496 SSL_SESSION *sess;
3497 unsigned int hlen;
3498 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
3499 HMAC_CTX hctx;
3500 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3501 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
3502 unsigned char key_name[16];
3503
3504 /* get session encoding length */
3505 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
3506 /* Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is
3507 * too long
3508 */
3509 if (slen_full > 0xFF00)
3510 return -1;
3511 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
3512 if (!senc)
3513 return -1;
3514 p = senc;
3515 i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p);
3516
3517 /* create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up */
3518 const_p = senc;
3519 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
3520 if (sess == NULL)
3521 {
3522 OPENSSL_free(senc);
3523 return -1;
3524 }
3525 sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
3526
3527 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
3528 if (slen > slen_full) /* shouldn't ever happen */
3529 {
3530 OPENSSL_free(senc);
3531 return -1;
3532 }
3533 p = senc;
3534 i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p);
3535 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3536
3537 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3538 * follows handshake_header_length +
3539 * 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
3540 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
3541 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
3542 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
3543 */
3544 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
3545 SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + 22 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH +
3546 EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
3547 return -1;
3548 p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
3549 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3550 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3551 /* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present
3552 * it does all the work otherwise use generated values
3553 * from parent ctx.
3554 */
3555 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
3556 {
3557 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx,
3558 &hctx, 1) < 0)
3559 {
3560 OPENSSL_free(senc);
3561 return -1;
3562 }
3563 }
3564 else
3565 {
3566 RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, 16);
3567 EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3568 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv);
3569 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3570 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
3571 memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
3572 }
3573
3574 /* Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only):
3575 * We leave this unspecified for resumed session (for simplicity),
3576 * and guess that tickets for new sessions will live as long
3577 * as their sessions. */
3578 l2n(s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout, p);
3579
3580 /* Skip ticket length for now */
3581 p += 2;
3582 /* Output key name */
3583 macstart = p;
3584 memcpy(p, key_name, 16);
3585 p += 16;
3586 /* output IV */
3587 memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx));
3588 p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3589 /* Encrypt session data */
3590 EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen);
3591 p += len;
3592 EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len);
3593 p += len;
3594 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3595
3596 HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart);
3597 HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen);
3598 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3599
3600 p += hlen;
3601 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
3602 /* Total length */
3603 len = p - ssl_handshake_start(s);
3604 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, len);
3605 /* Skip ticket lifetime hint */
3606 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + 4;
3607 s2n(len - 6, p);
3608 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
3609 OPENSSL_free(senc);
3610 }
3611
3612 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
3613 return ssl_do_write(s);
3614 }
3615
3616 int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s)
3617 {
3618 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A)
3619 {
3620 unsigned char *p;
3621 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3622 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
3623 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
3624 * + (ocsp response)
3625 */
3626 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen))
3627 return -1;
3628
3629 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3630
3631 /* do the header */
3632 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
3633 /* message length */
3634 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p);
3635 /* status type */
3636 *(p++)= s->tlsext_status_type;
3637 /* length of OCSP response */
3638 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p);
3639 /* actual response */
3640 memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen);
3641 /* number of bytes to write */
3642 s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen;
3643 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B;
3644 s->init_off = 0;
3645 }
3646
3647 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
3648 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3649 }
3650
3651 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3652 /* ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message. It
3653 * sets the next_proto member in s if found */
3654 int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s)
3655 {
3656 int ok;
3657 int proto_len, padding_len;
3658 long n;
3659 const unsigned char *p;
3660
3661 /* Clients cannot send a NextProtocol message if we didn't see the
3662 * extension in their ClientHello */
3663 if (!s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
3664 {
3665 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION);
3666 return -1;
3667 }
3668
3669 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3670 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A,
3671 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B,
3672 SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO,
3673 514, /* See the payload format below */
3674 &ok);
3675
3676 if (!ok)
3677 return((int)n);
3678
3679 /* s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received
3680 * in this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset
3681 * by ssl3_get_finished). */
3682 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
3683 {
3684 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS);
3685 return -1;
3686 }
3687
3688 if (n < 2)
3689 return 0; /* The body must be > 1 bytes long */
3690
3691 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3692
3693 /* The payload looks like:
3694 * uint8 proto_len;
3695 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
3696 * uint8 padding_len;
3697 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
3698 */
3699 proto_len = p[0];
3700 if (proto_len + 2 > s->init_num)
3701 return 0;
3702 padding_len = p[proto_len + 1];
3703 if (proto_len + padding_len + 2 != s->init_num)
3704 return 0;
3705
3706 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(proto_len);
3707 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
3708 {
3709 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3710 return 0;
3711 }
3712 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, p + 1, proto_len);
3713 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = proto_len;
3714
3715 return 1;
3716 }
3717 # endif
3718
3719 int tls1_send_server_supplemental_data(SSL *s, int *skip)
3720 {
3721 int al = 0;
3722 if (s->ctx->srv_supp_data_records_count)
3723 {
3724 unsigned char *p = NULL;
3725 unsigned char *size_loc = NULL;
3726 srv_supp_data_record *record = NULL;
3727 size_t length = 0;
3728 size_t i = 0;
3729
3730 for (i = 0; i < s->ctx->srv_supp_data_records_count; i++)
3731 {
3732 const unsigned char *out = NULL;
3733 unsigned short outlen = 0;
3734 int cb_retval = 0;
3735 record = &s->ctx->srv_supp_data_records[i];
3736
3737 /* NULL callback or -1 omits supp data entry */
3738 if (!record->fn1)
3739 continue;
3740 cb_retval = record->fn1(s, record->supp_data_type,
3741 &out, &outlen, &al, record->arg);
3742 if (cb_retval == -1)
3743 continue; /* skip this supp data entry */
3744 if (cb_retval == 0)
3745 {
3746 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SEND_SERVER_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
3747 goto f_err;
3748 }
3749 if (outlen == 0 || TLSEXT_MAXLEN_supplemental_data < outlen + 4 + length)
3750 {
3751 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SEND_SERVER_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
3752 return 0;
3753 }
3754 /* write supp data entry...
3755 * if first entry, write handshake message type
3756 * jump back to write length at end */
3757 if (length == 0)
3758 {
3759 /* 1 byte message type + 3 bytes for
3760 * message length */
3761 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(s->init_buf, 4))
3762 {
3763 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SEND_SERVER_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
3764 return 0;
3765 }
3766 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3767 *(p++) = SSL3_MT_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA;
3768 /* hold on to length field to update later */
3769 size_loc = p;
3770 /* skip over handshake length field (3
3771 * bytes) and supp_data length field
3772 * (3 bytes) */
3773 p += 3 + 3;
3774 length += 1 +3 +3;
3775 }
3776 /* 2 byte supp data type + 2 byte length + outlen */
3777 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, outlen + 4))
3778 {
3779 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SEND_SERVER_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
3780 return 0;
3781 }
3782 s2n(record->supp_data_type, p);
3783 s2n(outlen, p);
3784 memcpy(p, out, outlen);
3785 /* update length to supp data type (2 bytes) +
3786 * supp data length (2 bytes) + supp data */
3787 length += (outlen + 4);
3788 p += outlen;
3789 }
3790 if (length > 0)
3791 {
3792 /* write handshake length */
3793 l2n3(length - 4, size_loc);
3794 /* supp_data length */
3795 l2n3(length - 7, size_loc);
3796 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA_B;
3797 s->init_num = length;
3798 s->init_off = 0;
3799
3800 return ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE);
3801 }
3802 }
3803
3804 /* no supp data message sent */
3805 *skip = 1;
3806 s->init_num = 0;
3807 s->init_off = 0;
3808 return 1;
3809 f_err:
3810 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3811 return 0;
3812 }
3813
3814 int tls1_get_client_supplemental_data(SSL *s)
3815 {
3816 int al = 0;
3817 int cb_retval = 0;
3818 int ok;
3819 long n;
3820 const unsigned char *p, *d;
3821 unsigned short supp_data_entry_type = 0;
3822 unsigned short supp_data_entry_len = 0;
3823 unsigned long supp_data_len = 0;
3824 size_t i = 0;
3825
3826 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3827 SSL3_ST_SR_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA_A,
3828 SSL3_ST_SR_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA_B,
3829 SSL3_MT_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA,
3830 /* use default limit */
3831 TLSEXT_MAXLEN_supplemental_data,
3832 &ok);
3833
3834 if (!ok) return((int)n);
3835
3836 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3837 d = p;
3838
3839 /* The message cannot be empty */
3840 if (n < 3)
3841 {
3842 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3843 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CLIENT_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3844 goto f_err;
3845 }
3846 n2l3(p, supp_data_len);
3847 while (p<d+supp_data_len)
3848 {
3849 n2s(p, supp_data_entry_type);
3850 n2s(p, supp_data_entry_len);
3851 /* if there is a callback for this supp data type, send it */
3852 for (i=0; i < s->ctx->srv_supp_data_records_count; i++)
3853 {
3854 if (s->ctx->srv_supp_data_records[i].supp_data_type == supp_data_entry_type && s->ctx->srv_supp_data_records[i].fn2)
3855 {
3856 cb_retval = s->ctx->srv_supp_data_records[i].fn2(s, supp_data_entry_type, p, supp_data_entry_len, &al, s->ctx->srv_supp_data_records[i].arg);
3857 if (cb_retval == 0)
3858 {
3859 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CLIENT_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA, ERR_R_SSL_LIB);
3860 goto f_err;
3861 }
3862 }
3863 }
3864 p+=supp_data_entry_len;
3865 }
3866 return 1;
3867 f_err:
3868 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3869 return -1;
3870 }
3871 #endif
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