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1 /* ssl/s3_srvr.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
3 * All rights reserved.
4 *
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8 *
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15 *
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22 *
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25 * are met:
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40 *
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
51 * SUCH DAMAGE.
52 *
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
57 */
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
60 *
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
63 * are met:
64 *
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
67 *
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
71 * distribution.
72 *
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
77 *
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
82 *
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
86 *
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
88 * acknowledgment:
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
91 *
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
105 *
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
109 *
110 */
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
113 *
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
116 *
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
119 *
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
122 *
123 */
124 /* ====================================================================
125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
126 *
127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
129 * license.
130 *
131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
134 *
135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
138 *
139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
142 * to make use of the Contribution.
143 *
144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
148 * OTHERWISE.
149 */
150
151 #define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
152 #define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
153
154 #include <stdio.h>
155 #include "ssl_locl.h"
156 #include "kssl_lcl.h"
157 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
158 #include <openssl/rand.h>
159 #include <openssl/objects.h>
160 #include <openssl/evp.h>
161 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
162 #include <openssl/x509.h>
163 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
164 #include <openssl/dh.h>
165 #endif
166 #include <openssl/bn.h>
167 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
168 #include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
169 #endif
170 #include <openssl/md5.h>
171
172 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver);
173
174 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)
175 {
176 if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
177 return(SSLv3_server_method());
178 else
179 return(NULL);
180 }
181
182 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
183 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al)
184 {
185 int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE;
186
187 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
188
189 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
190 (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL))
191 {
192 if(s->srp_ctx.login == NULL)
193 {
194 /* RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject,
195 we do so if There is no srp login name */
196 ret = SSL3_AL_FATAL;
197 *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
198 }
199 else
200 {
201 ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s,al);
202 }
203 }
204 return ret;
205 }
206 #endif
207
208 IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method,
209 ssl3_accept,
210 ssl_undefined_function,
211 ssl3_get_server_method)
212
213 int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
214 {
215 BUF_MEM *buf;
216 unsigned long alg_k,Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
217 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
218 int ret= -1;
219 int new_state,state,skip=0;
220
221 RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0);
222 ERR_clear_error();
223 clear_sys_error();
224
225 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
226 cb=s->info_callback;
227 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
228 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
229
230 /* init things to blank */
231 s->in_handshake++;
232 if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s);
233
234 if (s->cert == NULL)
235 {
236 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
237 return(-1);
238 }
239
240 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
241 /* If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we
242 * already got and don't await it anymore, because
243 * Heartbeats don't make sense during handshakes anyway.
244 */
245 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
246 {
247 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
248 s->tlsext_hb_seq++;
249 }
250 #endif
251
252 for (;;)
253 {
254 state=s->state;
255
256 switch (s->state)
257 {
258 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
259 s->renegotiate=1;
260 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
261
262 case SSL_ST_BEFORE:
263 case SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
264 case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
265 case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
266
267 s->server=1;
268 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1);
269
270 if ((s->version>>8) != 3)
271 {
272 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
273 return -1;
274 }
275
276 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_VERSION, 0,
277 s->version, NULL))
278 {
279 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW);
280 return -1;
281 }
282
283 s->type=SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
284
285 if (s->init_buf == NULL)
286 {
287 if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)
288 {
289 ret= -1;
290 goto end;
291 }
292 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH))
293 {
294 ret= -1;
295 goto end;
296 }
297 s->init_buf=buf;
298 }
299
300 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
301 {
302 ret= -1;
303 goto end;
304 }
305
306 s->init_num=0;
307 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE;
308 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY;
309
310 if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE)
311 {
312 /* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that
313 * the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
314 */
315 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) { ret= -1; goto end; }
316
317 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
318 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
319 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
320 }
321 else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
322 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
323 {
324 /* Server attempting to renegotiate with
325 * client that doesn't support secure
326 * renegotiation.
327 */
328 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
329 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
330 ret = -1;
331 goto end;
332 }
333 else
334 {
335 /* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE,
336 * we will just send a HelloRequest */
337 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
338 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
339 }
340 break;
341
342 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
343 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
344
345 s->shutdown=0;
346 ret=ssl3_send_hello_request(s);
347 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
348 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
349 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
350 s->init_num=0;
351
352 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
353 break;
354
355 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
356 s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
357 break;
358
359 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
360 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
361 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
362
363 ret=ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
364 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
365 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
366 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D;
367 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D:
368 {
369 int al;
370 if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s,&al)) < 0)
371 {
372 /* callback indicates firther work to be done */
373 s->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
374 goto end;
375 }
376 if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE)
377 {
378 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
379 /* This is not really an error but the only means to
380 for a client to detect whether srp is supported. */
381 if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY)
382 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
383 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
384 ret= -1;
385 goto end;
386 }
387 }
388 #endif
389
390 s->renegotiate = 2;
391 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
392 s->init_num=0;
393 break;
394
395 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
396 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
397 ret=ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
398 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
399 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
400 if (s->hit)
401 {
402 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
403 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
404 else
405 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
406 }
407 #else
408 if (s->hit)
409 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
410 #endif
411 else
412 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
413 s->init_num = 0;
414 break;
415
416 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
417 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
418 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
419 /* normal PSK or KRB5 or SRP */
420 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
421 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)
422 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5))
423 {
424 ret=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
425 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
426 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
427 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
428 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
429 else
430 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
431 }
432 else
433 {
434 skip = 1;
435 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
436 }
437 #else
438 }
439 else
440 skip=1;
441
442 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
443 #endif
444 s->init_num=0;
445 break;
446
447 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
448 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
449 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
450
451 /* clear this, it may get reset by
452 * send_server_key_exchange */
453 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA)
454 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
455 && !(alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
456 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
457 )
458 /* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key
459 * even when forbidden by protocol specs
460 * (handshake may fail as clients are not required to
461 * be able to handle this) */
462 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
463 else
464 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0;
465
466
467 /* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or
468 * RSA but we have a sign only certificate
469 *
470 * PSK: may send PSK identity hints
471 *
472 * For ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange
473 * message only if the cipher suite is either
474 * ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, the
475 * server certificate contains the server's
476 * public key for key exchange.
477 */
478 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp
479 /* PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity
480 * hint if provided */
481 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
482 || ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
483 #endif
484 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
485 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
486 || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
487 #endif
488 || (alg_k & SSL_kDHE)
489 || (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE)
490 || ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
491 && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
492 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
493 && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
494 )
495 )
496 )
497 )
498 {
499 ret=ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);
500 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
501 }
502 else
503 skip=1;
504
505 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
506 s->init_num=0;
507 break;
508
509 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
510 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
511 if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
512 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
513 /* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set,
514 * don't request cert during re-negotiation: */
515 ((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
516 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
517 /* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites
518 * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts
519 * and in RFC 2246): */
520 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) &&
521 /* ... except when the application insists on verification
522 * (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */
523 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
524 /* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */
525 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5)
526 /* With normal PSK Certificates and
527 * Certificate Requests are omitted */
528 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
529 {
530 /* no cert request */
531 skip=1;
532 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=0;
533 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
534 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
535 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
536 return -1;
537 }
538 else
539 {
540 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=1;
541 ret=ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
542 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
543 #ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
544 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
545 #else
546 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
547 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
548 #endif
549 s->init_num=0;
550 }
551 break;
552
553 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
554 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
555 ret=ssl3_send_server_done(s);
556 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
557 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
558 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
559 s->init_num=0;
560 break;
561
562 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
563
564 /* This code originally checked to see if
565 * any data was pending using BIO_CTRL_INFO
566 * and then flushed. This caused problems
567 * as documented in PR#1939. The proposed
568 * fix doesn't completely resolve this issue
569 * as buggy implementations of BIO_CTRL_PENDING
570 * still exist. So instead we just flush
571 * unconditionally.
572 */
573
574 s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
575 if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0)
576 {
577 ret= -1;
578 goto end;
579 }
580 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
581
582 s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state;
583 break;
584
585 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
586 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
587 /* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */
588 ret = ssl3_check_client_hello(s);
589 if (ret <= 0)
590 goto end;
591 if (ret == 2)
592 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C;
593 else {
594 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
595 {
596 ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
597 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
598 }
599 s->init_num=0;
600 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
601 }
602 break;
603
604 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
605 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
606 ret=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
607 if (ret <= 0)
608 goto end;
609 if (ret == 2)
610 {
611 /* For the ECDH ciphersuites when
612 * the client sends its ECDH pub key in
613 * a certificate, the CertificateVerify
614 * message is not sent.
615 * Also for GOST ciphersuites when
616 * the client uses its key from the certificate
617 * for key exchange.
618 */
619 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
620 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
621 #else
622 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
623 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
624 else
625 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
626 #endif
627 s->init_num = 0;
628 }
629 else if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
630 {
631 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
632 s->init_num=0;
633 if (!s->session->peer)
634 break;
635 /* For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer
636 * at this point and digest cached records.
637 */
638 if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer)
639 {
640 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
641 return -1;
642 }
643 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
644 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
645 return -1;
646 }
647 else
648 {
649 int offset=0;
650 int dgst_num;
651
652 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
653 s->init_num=0;
654
655 /* We need to get hashes here so if there is
656 * a client cert, it can be verified
657 * FIXME - digest processing for CertificateVerify
658 * should be generalized. But it is next step
659 */
660 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
661 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
662 return -1;
663 for (dgst_num=0; dgst_num<SSL_MAX_DIGEST;dgst_num++)
664 if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num])
665 {
666 int dgst_size;
667
668 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,EVP_MD_CTX_type(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]),&(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[offset]));
669 dgst_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]);
670 if (dgst_size < 0)
671 {
672 ret = -1;
673 goto end;
674 }
675 offset+=dgst_size;
676 }
677 }
678 break;
679
680 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
681 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
682
683 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
684 /* we should decide if we expected this one */
685 ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
686 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
687
688 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
689 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
690 #else
691 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
692 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
693 else
694 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
695 #endif
696 s->init_num=0;
697 break;
698
699 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
700 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A:
701 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B:
702 ret=ssl3_get_next_proto(s);
703 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
704 s->init_num = 0;
705 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
706 break;
707 #endif
708
709 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
710 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
711 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
712 ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
713 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
714 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
715 if (s->hit)
716 s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
717 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
718 else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
719 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
720 #endif
721 else
722 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
723 s->init_num=0;
724 break;
725
726 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
727 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
728 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
729 ret=ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s);
730 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
731 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
732 s->init_num=0;
733 break;
734
735 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A:
736 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B:
737 ret=ssl3_send_cert_status(s);
738 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
739 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
740 s->init_num=0;
741 break;
742
743 #endif
744
745 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
746 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
747
748 s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
749 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
750 { ret= -1; goto end; }
751
752 ret=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
753 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
754
755 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
756 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
757 s->init_num=0;
758
759 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
760 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
761 {
762 ret= -1;
763 goto end;
764 }
765
766 break;
767
768 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
769 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
770 ret=ssl3_send_finished(s,
771 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
772 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
773 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
774 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
775 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
776 if (s->hit)
777 {
778 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
779 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
780 #else
781 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
782 {
783 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
784 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
785 }
786 else
787 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
788 #endif
789 }
790 else
791 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK;
792 s->init_num=0;
793 break;
794
795 case SSL_ST_OK:
796 /* clean a few things up */
797 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
798
799 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
800 s->init_buf=NULL;
801
802 /* remove buffering on output */
803 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
804
805 s->init_num=0;
806
807 if (s->renegotiate == 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
808 {
809 s->renegotiate=0;
810 s->new_session=0;
811
812 ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
813
814 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
815 /* s->server=1; */
816 s->handshake_func=ssl3_accept;
817
818 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1);
819 }
820
821 ret = 1;
822 goto end;
823 /* break; */
824
825 default:
826 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
827 ret= -1;
828 goto end;
829 /* break; */
830 }
831
832 if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip)
833 {
834 if (s->debug)
835 {
836 if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
837 goto end;
838 }
839
840
841 if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state))
842 {
843 new_state=s->state;
844 s->state=state;
845 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP,1);
846 s->state=new_state;
847 }
848 }
849 skip=0;
850 }
851 end:
852 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
853
854 s->in_handshake--;
855 if (cb != NULL)
856 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT,ret);
857 return(ret);
858 }
859
860 int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
861 {
862
863 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A)
864 {
865 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST, 0);
866 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
867 }
868
869 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
870 return ssl_do_write(s);
871 }
872
873 int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s)
874 {
875 int ok;
876 long n;
877
878 /* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message,
879 * so permit appropriate message length */
880 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
881 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A,
882 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B,
883 -1,
884 s->max_cert_list,
885 &ok);
886 if (!ok) return((int)n);
887 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
888 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)
889 {
890 /* We only allow the client to restart the handshake once per
891 * negotiation. */
892 if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE)
893 {
894 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_MULTIPLE_SGC_RESTARTS);
895 return -1;
896 }
897 /* Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake,
898 * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.) */
899 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
900 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
901 {
902 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
903 s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
904 }
905 #endif
906 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
907 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
908 {
909 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
910 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
911 }
912 #endif
913 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE;
914 return 2;
915 }
916 return 1;
917 }
918
919 int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
920 {
921 int i,j,ok,al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,ret= -1;
922 unsigned int cookie_len;
923 long n;
924 unsigned long id;
925 unsigned char *p,*d;
926 SSL_CIPHER *c;
927 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
928 unsigned char *q;
929 SSL_COMP *comp=NULL;
930 #endif
931 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers=NULL;
932
933 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C && !s->first_packet)
934 goto retry_cert;
935
936 /* We do this so that we will respond with our native type.
937 * If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1,
938 * This down switching should be handled by a different method.
939 * If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with
940 * TLSv1.
941 */
942 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A
943 )
944 {
945 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
946 }
947 s->first_packet=1;
948 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
949 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
950 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C,
951 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,
952 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
953 &ok);
954
955 if (!ok) return((int)n);
956 s->first_packet=0;
957 d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
958
959 /* use version from inside client hello, not from record header
960 * (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */
961 s->client_version=(((int)p[0])<<8)|(int)p[1];
962 p+=2;
963
964 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) ? (s->client_version > s->version &&
965 s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION)
966 : (s->client_version < s->version))
967 {
968 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
969 if ((s->client_version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR &&
970 !s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash)
971 {
972 /* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
973 s->version = s->client_version;
974 }
975 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
976 goto f_err;
977 }
978
979 /* If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't
980 * contain one, just return since we do not want to
981 * allocate any memory yet. So check cookie length...
982 */
983 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE)
984 {
985 unsigned int session_length, cookie_length;
986
987 session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
988 cookie_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1);
989
990 if (cookie_length == 0)
991 return 1;
992 }
993
994 /* load the client random */
995 memcpy(s->s3->client_random,p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
996 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
997
998 /* get the session-id */
999 j= *(p++);
1000
1001 s->hit=0;
1002 /* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in renegotiation.
1003 * 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally ignore resumption requests
1004 * with flag SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
1005 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on this for security
1006 * won't even compile against older library versions).
1007 *
1008 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to request
1009 * renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains unset): for servers,
1010 * this essentially just means that the SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1011 * setting will be ignored.
1012 */
1013 if ((s->new_session && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION)))
1014 {
1015 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
1016 goto err;
1017 }
1018 else
1019 {
1020 i=ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n);
1021 if (i == 1)
1022 { /* previous session */
1023 s->hit=1;
1024 }
1025 else if (i == -1)
1026 goto err;
1027 else /* i == 0 */
1028 {
1029 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
1030 goto err;
1031 }
1032 }
1033
1034 p+=j;
1035
1036 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
1037 {
1038 /* cookie stuff */
1039 cookie_len = *(p++);
1040
1041 /*
1042 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
1043 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
1044 * does not cause an overflow.
1045 */
1046 if ( cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie))
1047 {
1048 /* too much data */
1049 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1050 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1051 goto f_err;
1052 }
1053
1054 /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
1055 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) &&
1056 cookie_len > 0)
1057 {
1058 memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len);
1059
1060 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL)
1061 {
1062 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie,
1063 cookie_len) == 0)
1064 {
1065 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1066 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1067 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1068 goto f_err;
1069 }
1070 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1071 }
1072 else if ( memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
1073 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) /* default verification */
1074 {
1075 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1076 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1077 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1078 goto f_err;
1079 }
1080 /* Set to -2 so if successful we return 2 */
1081 ret = -2;
1082 }
1083
1084 p += cookie_len;
1085 if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION)
1086 {
1087 /* Select version to use */
1088 if (s->client_version <= DTLS1_2_VERSION &&
1089 !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2))
1090 {
1091 s->version = DTLS1_2_VERSION;
1092 s->method = DTLSv1_2_server_method();
1093 }
1094 else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
1095 {
1096 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE);
1097 s->version = s->client_version;
1098 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1099 goto f_err;
1100 }
1101 else if (s->client_version <= DTLS1_VERSION &&
1102 !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1))
1103 {
1104 s->version = DTLS1_VERSION;
1105 s->method = DTLSv1_server_method();
1106 }
1107 else
1108 {
1109 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
1110 s->version = s->client_version;
1111 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1112 goto f_err;
1113 }
1114 s->session->ssl_version = s->version;
1115 }
1116 }
1117
1118 n2s(p,i);
1119 if ((i == 0) && (j != 0))
1120 {
1121 /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */
1122 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1123 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
1124 goto f_err;
1125 }
1126 if ((p+i) >= (d+n))
1127 {
1128 /* not enough data */
1129 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1130 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1131 goto f_err;
1132 }
1133 if ((i > 0) && (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s,p,i,&(ciphers))
1134 == NULL))
1135 {
1136 goto err;
1137 }
1138 p+=i;
1139
1140 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
1141 if ((s->hit) && (i > 0))
1142 {
1143 j=0;
1144 id=s->session->cipher->id;
1145
1146 #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
1147 printf("client sent %d ciphers\n",sk_num(ciphers));
1148 #endif
1149 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++)
1150 {
1151 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers,i);
1152 #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
1153 printf("client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1154 i,sk_num(ciphers),SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
1155 #endif
1156 if (c->id == id)
1157 {
1158 j=1;
1159 break;
1160 }
1161 }
1162 /* Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade
1163 * attack: CVE-2010-4180.
1164 */
1165 #if 0
1166 if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1))
1167 {
1168 /* Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used cipher may
1169 * not be in the current list, the client instead might be trying to
1170 * continue using a cipher that before wasn't chosen due to server
1171 * preferences. We'll have to reject the connection if the cipher is not
1172 * enabled, though. */
1173 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0);
1174 if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0)
1175 {
1176 s->session->cipher = c;
1177 j = 1;
1178 }
1179 }
1180 #endif
1181 if (j == 0)
1182 {
1183 /* we need to have the cipher in the cipher
1184 * list if we are asked to reuse it */
1185 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1186 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
1187 goto f_err;
1188 }
1189 }
1190
1191 /* compression */
1192 i= *(p++);
1193 if ((p+i) > (d+n))
1194 {
1195 /* not enough data */
1196 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1197 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1198 goto f_err;
1199 }
1200 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1201 q=p;
1202 #endif
1203 for (j=0; j<i; j++)
1204 {
1205 if (p[j] == 0) break;
1206 }
1207
1208 p+=i;
1209 if (j >= i)
1210 {
1211 /* no compress */
1212 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1213 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
1214 goto f_err;
1215 }
1216
1217 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1218 /* TLS extensions*/
1219 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION)
1220 {
1221 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s,&p,d,n))
1222 {
1223 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
1224 goto err;
1225 }
1226 }
1227
1228 /* Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this
1229 * handshake for not reused session only. We need to generate
1230 * server_random before calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow
1231 * SessionTicket processing to use it in key derivation. */
1232 {
1233 unsigned char *pos;
1234 pos=s->s3->server_random;
1235 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0)
1236 {
1237 goto f_err;
1238 }
1239 }
1240
1241 if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb)
1242 {
1243 SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher=NULL;
1244
1245 s->session->master_key_length=sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1246 if(s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key, &s->session->master_key_length,
1247 ciphers, &pref_cipher, s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg))
1248 {
1249 s->hit=1;
1250 s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
1251 s->session->verify_result=X509_V_OK;
1252
1253 ciphers=NULL;
1254
1255 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1256 pref_cipher=pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1257 if (pref_cipher == NULL)
1258 {
1259 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1260 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1261 goto f_err;
1262 }
1263
1264 s->session->cipher=pref_cipher;
1265
1266 if (s->cipher_list)
1267 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
1268
1269 if (s->cipher_list_by_id)
1270 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
1271
1272 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1273 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1274 }
1275 }
1276 #endif
1277
1278 /* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1279 * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
1280 * algorithms from the client, starting at q. */
1281 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=NULL;
1282 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1283 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1284 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0)
1285 {
1286 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
1287 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1288 /* Can't disable compression */
1289 if (!ssl_allow_compression(s))
1290 {
1291 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1292 goto f_err;
1293 }
1294 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1295 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++)
1296 {
1297 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
1298 if (comp_id == comp->id)
1299 {
1300 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
1301 break;
1302 }
1303 }
1304 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1305 {
1306 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1307 goto f_err;
1308 }
1309 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1310 for (m = 0; m < i; m++)
1311 {
1312 if (q[m] == comp_id)
1313 break;
1314 }
1315 if (m >= i)
1316 {
1317 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1318 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
1319 goto f_err;
1320 }
1321 }
1322 else if (s->hit)
1323 comp = NULL;
1324 else if (ssl_allow_compression(s) && s->ctx->comp_methods)
1325 { /* See if we have a match */
1326 int m,nn,o,v,done=0;
1327
1328 nn=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1329 for (m=0; m<nn; m++)
1330 {
1331 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
1332 v=comp->id;
1333 for (o=0; o<i; o++)
1334 {
1335 if (v == q[o])
1336 {
1337 done=1;
1338 break;
1339 }
1340 }
1341 if (done) break;
1342 }
1343 if (done)
1344 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
1345 else
1346 comp=NULL;
1347 }
1348 #else
1349 /* If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1350 * using compression.
1351 */
1352 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0)
1353 {
1354 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1355 goto f_err;
1356 }
1357 #endif
1358
1359 /* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must
1360 * pick a cipher */
1361
1362 if (!s->hit)
1363 {
1364 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1365 s->session->compress_meth=0;
1366 #else
1367 s->session->compress_meth=(comp == NULL)?0:comp->id;
1368 #endif
1369 if (s->session->ciphers != NULL)
1370 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
1371 s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
1372 if (ciphers == NULL)
1373 {
1374 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1375 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED);
1376 goto f_err;
1377 }
1378 ciphers=NULL;
1379 /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
1380 retry_cert:
1381 if (s->cert->cert_cb)
1382 {
1383 int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
1384 if (rv == 0)
1385 {
1386 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1387 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
1388 goto f_err;
1389 }
1390 if (rv < 0)
1391 {
1392 s->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
1393 return -1;
1394 }
1395 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1396 }
1397 c=ssl3_choose_cipher(s,s->session->ciphers,
1398 SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1399
1400 if (c == NULL)
1401 {
1402 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1403 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1404 goto f_err;
1405 }
1406 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=c;
1407 /* check whether we should disable session resumption */
1408 if (s->not_resumable_session_cb != NULL)
1409 s->session->not_resumable=s->not_resumable_session_cb(s,
1410 ((c->algorithm_mkey & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)) != 0));
1411 if (s->session->not_resumable)
1412 /* do not send a session ticket */
1413 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
1414 }
1415 else
1416 {
1417 /* Session-id reuse */
1418 #ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
1419 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1420 SSL_CIPHER *nc=NULL;
1421 SSL_CIPHER *ec=NULL;
1422
1423 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG)
1424 {
1425 sk=s->session->ciphers;
1426 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++)
1427 {
1428 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,i);
1429 if (c->algorithm_enc & SSL_eNULL)
1430 nc=c;
1431 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c))
1432 ec=c;
1433 }
1434 if (nc != NULL)
1435 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=nc;
1436 else if (ec != NULL)
1437 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=ec;
1438 else
1439 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1440 }
1441 else
1442 #endif
1443 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1444 }
1445
1446 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER))
1447 {
1448 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
1449 goto f_err;
1450 }
1451
1452 /* we now have the following setup.
1453 * client_random
1454 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
1455 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
1456 * compression - basically ignored right now
1457 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1458 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1459 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1460 * s->s3->tmp.new_cipher- the new cipher to use.
1461 */
1462
1463 /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */
1464 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION)
1465 {
1466 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s) <= 0)
1467 {
1468 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1469 goto err;
1470 }
1471 }
1472
1473 if (ret < 0) ret=-ret;
1474 if (0)
1475 {
1476 f_err:
1477 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1478 }
1479 err:
1480 if (ciphers != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1481 return ret < 0 ? -1 : ret;
1482 }
1483
1484 int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
1485 {
1486 unsigned char *buf;
1487 unsigned char *p,*d;
1488 int i,sl;
1489 int al = 0;
1490 unsigned long l;
1491
1492 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1493 {
1494 buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1495 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1496 p=s->s3->server_random;
1497 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0)
1498 return -1;
1499 #endif
1500 /* Do the message type and length last */
1501 d=p= ssl_handshake_start(s);
1502
1503 *(p++)=s->version>>8;
1504 *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
1505
1506 /* Random stuff */
1507 memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1508 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1509
1510 /* There are several cases for the session ID to send
1511 * back in the server hello:
1512 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
1513 * we send back the old session ID.
1514 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
1515 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
1516 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
1517 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
1518 * session ID.
1519 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
1520 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
1521 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
1522 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
1523 * to send back.
1524 */
1525 if (s->session->not_resumable ||
1526 (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
1527 && !s->hit))
1528 s->session->session_id_length=0;
1529
1530 sl=s->session->session_id_length;
1531 if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id))
1532 {
1533 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1534 return -1;
1535 }
1536 *(p++)=sl;
1537 memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,sl);
1538 p+=sl;
1539
1540 /* put the cipher */
1541 i=ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,p);
1542 p+=i;
1543
1544 /* put the compression method */
1545 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1546 *(p++)=0;
1547 #else
1548 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1549 *(p++)=0;
1550 else
1551 *(p++)=s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
1552 #endif
1553 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1554 if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
1555 {
1556 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
1557 return -1;
1558 }
1559 if ((p = ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &al)) == NULL)
1560 {
1561 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1562 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1563 return -1;
1564 }
1565 #endif
1566 /* do the header */
1567 l=(p-d);
1568 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO, l);
1569 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B;
1570 }
1571
1572 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
1573 return ssl_do_write(s);
1574 }
1575
1576 int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)
1577 {
1578
1579 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A)
1580 {
1581 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE, 0);
1582 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
1583 }
1584
1585 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
1586 return ssl_do_write(s);
1587 }
1588
1589 int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1590 {
1591 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1592 unsigned char *q;
1593 int j,num;
1594 RSA *rsa;
1595 unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
1596 unsigned int u;
1597 #endif
1598 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1599 DH *dh=NULL,*dhp;
1600 #endif
1601 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1602 EC_KEY *ecdh=NULL, *ecdhp;
1603 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1604 int encodedlen = 0;
1605 int curve_id = 0;
1606 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1607 #endif
1608 EVP_PKEY *pkey;
1609 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1610 unsigned char *p,*d;
1611 int al,i;
1612 unsigned long type;
1613 int n;
1614 CERT *cert;
1615 BIGNUM *r[4];
1616 int nr[4],kn;
1617 BUF_MEM *buf;
1618 EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
1619
1620 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
1621 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A)
1622 {
1623 type=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1624 cert=s->cert;
1625
1626 buf=s->init_buf;
1627
1628 r[0]=r[1]=r[2]=r[3]=NULL;
1629 n=0;
1630 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1631 if (type & SSL_kRSA)
1632 {
1633 rsa=cert->rsa_tmp;
1634 if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL))
1635 {
1636 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s,
1637 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1638 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1639 if(rsa == NULL)
1640 {
1641 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1642 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1643 goto f_err;
1644 }
1645 RSA_up_ref(rsa);
1646 cert->rsa_tmp=rsa;
1647 }
1648 if (rsa == NULL)
1649 {
1650 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1651 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1652 goto f_err;
1653 }
1654 r[0]=rsa->n;
1655 r[1]=rsa->e;
1656 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
1657 }
1658 else
1659 #endif
1660 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1661 if (type & SSL_kDHE)
1662 {
1663 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto)
1664 {
1665 dhp = ssl_get_auto_dh(s);
1666 if (dhp == NULL)
1667 {
1668 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1669 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1670 goto f_err;
1671 }
1672 }
1673 else
1674 dhp=cert->dh_tmp;
1675 if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1676 dhp=s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s,
1677 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1678 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1679 if (dhp == NULL)
1680 {
1681 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1682 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1683 goto f_err;
1684 }
1685 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH,
1686 DH_security_bits(dhp), 0, dhp))
1687 {
1688 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1689 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
1690 goto f_err;
1691 }
1692 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
1693 {
1694 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1695 goto err;
1696 }
1697
1698 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto)
1699 dh = dhp;
1700 else if ((dh=DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL)
1701 {
1702 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1703 goto err;
1704 }
1705
1706 s->s3->tmp.dh=dh;
1707 if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL ||
1708 dhp->priv_key == NULL ||
1709 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE)))
1710 {
1711 if(!DH_generate_key(dh))
1712 {
1713 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1714 ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1715 goto err;
1716 }
1717 }
1718 else
1719 {
1720 dh->pub_key=BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
1721 dh->priv_key=BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
1722 if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) ||
1723 (dh->priv_key == NULL))
1724 {
1725 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1726 goto err;
1727 }
1728 }
1729 r[0]=dh->p;
1730 r[1]=dh->g;
1731 r[2]=dh->pub_key;
1732 }
1733 else
1734 #endif
1735 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1736 if (type & SSL_kECDHE)
1737 {
1738 const EC_GROUP *group;
1739
1740 ecdhp=cert->ecdh_tmp;
1741 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
1742 {
1743 /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
1744 int nid = tls1_shared_curve(s, -2);
1745 if (nid != NID_undef)
1746 ecdhp = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid);
1747 }
1748 else if ((ecdhp == NULL) && s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
1749 {
1750 ecdhp=s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s,
1751 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1752 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1753 }
1754 if (ecdhp == NULL)
1755 {
1756 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1757 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
1758 goto f_err;
1759 }
1760
1761 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
1762 {
1763 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1764 goto err;
1765 }
1766
1767 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
1768 if (ecdhp == NULL)
1769 {
1770 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1771 goto err;
1772 }
1773 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
1774 ecdh = ecdhp;
1775 else if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp)) == NULL)
1776 {
1777 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1778 goto err;
1779 }
1780
1781 s->s3->tmp.ecdh=ecdh;
1782 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1783 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1784 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE))
1785 {
1786 if(!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh))
1787 {
1788 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1789 goto err;
1790 }
1791 }
1792
1793 if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||
1794 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1795 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL))
1796 {
1797 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1798 goto err;
1799 }
1800
1801 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
1802 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163))
1803 {
1804 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
1805 goto err;
1806 }
1807
1808 /* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH
1809 * keys over named (not generic) curves. For
1810 * supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero.
1811 */
1812 if ((curve_id =
1813 tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)))
1814 == 0)
1815 {
1816 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
1817 goto err;
1818 }
1819
1820 /* Encode the public key.
1821 * First check the size of encoding and
1822 * allocate memory accordingly.
1823 */
1824 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1825 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1826 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1827 NULL, 0, NULL);
1828
1829 encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
1830 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen*sizeof(unsigned char));
1831 bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
1832 if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL))
1833 {
1834 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1835 goto err;
1836 }
1837
1838
1839 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1840 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1841 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1842 encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
1843
1844 if (encodedlen == 0)
1845 {
1846 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1847 goto err;
1848 }
1849
1850 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); bn_ctx=NULL;
1851
1852 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not
1853 * generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges.
1854 * In this situation, we need four additional bytes
1855 * to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
1856 * structure.
1857 */
1858 n = 4 + encodedlen;
1859
1860 /* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message
1861 * explicitly so we can set these to NULLs
1862 */
1863 r[0]=NULL;
1864 r[1]=NULL;
1865 r[2]=NULL;
1866 r[3]=NULL;
1867 }
1868 else
1869 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
1870 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1871 if (type & SSL_kPSK)
1872 {
1873 /* reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint*/
1874 n+=2+strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1875 }
1876 else
1877 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1878 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1879 if (type & SSL_kSRP)
1880 {
1881 if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
1882 (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
1883 (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) ||
1884 (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL))
1885 {
1886 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
1887 goto err;
1888 }
1889 r[0]=s->srp_ctx.N;
1890 r[1]=s->srp_ctx.g;
1891 r[2]=s->srp_ctx.s;
1892 r[3]=s->srp_ctx.B;
1893 }
1894 else
1895 #endif
1896 {
1897 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1898 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
1899 goto f_err;
1900 }
1901 for (i=0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++)
1902 {
1903 nr[i]=BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
1904 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1905 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
1906 n+=1+nr[i];
1907 else
1908 #endif
1909 n+=2+nr[i];
1910 }
1911
1912 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
1913 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
1914 {
1915 if ((pkey=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s,s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,&md))
1916 == NULL)
1917 {
1918 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1919 goto f_err;
1920 }
1921 kn=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1922 }
1923 else
1924 {
1925 pkey=NULL;
1926 kn=0;
1927 }
1928
1929 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,n+SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s)+kn))
1930 {
1931 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_BUF);
1932 goto err;
1933 }
1934 d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
1935
1936 for (i=0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++)
1937 {
1938 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1939 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
1940 {
1941 *p = nr[i];
1942 p++;
1943 }
1944 else
1945 #endif
1946 s2n(nr[i],p);
1947 BN_bn2bin(r[i],p);
1948 p+=nr[i];
1949 }
1950
1951 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1952 if (type & SSL_kECDHE)
1953 {
1954 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves.
1955 * In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has:
1956 * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
1957 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by
1958 * the actual encoded point itself
1959 */
1960 *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
1961 p += 1;
1962 *p = 0;
1963 p += 1;
1964 *p = curve_id;
1965 p += 1;
1966 *p = encodedlen;
1967 p += 1;
1968 memcpy((unsigned char*)p,
1969 (unsigned char *)encodedPoint,
1970 encodedlen);
1971 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1972 encodedPoint = NULL;
1973 p += encodedlen;
1974 }
1975 #endif
1976
1977 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1978 if (type & SSL_kPSK)
1979 {
1980 /* copy PSK identity hint */
1981 s2n(strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint), p);
1982 strncpy((char *)p, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint, strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint));
1983 p+=strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1984 }
1985 #endif
1986
1987 /* not anonymous */
1988 if (pkey != NULL)
1989 {
1990 /* n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4])
1991 * and p points to the space at the end. */
1992 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1993 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
1994 {
1995 q=md_buf;
1996 j=0;
1997 for (num=2; num > 0; num--)
1998 {
1999 EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx,
2000 EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
2001 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2)
2002 ?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
2003 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
2004 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
2005 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,d,n);
2006 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q,
2007 (unsigned int *)&i);
2008 q+=i;
2009 j+=i;
2010 }
2011 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,
2012 &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0)
2013 {
2014 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_RSA);
2015 goto err;
2016 }
2017 s2n(u,p);
2018 n+=u+2;
2019 }
2020 else
2021 #endif
2022 if (md)
2023 {
2024 /* send signature algorithm */
2025 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2026 {
2027 if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md))
2028 {
2029 /* Should never happen */
2030 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2031 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2032 goto f_err;
2033 }
2034 p+=2;
2035 }
2036 #ifdef SSL_DEBUG
2037 fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n",
2038 EVP_MD_name(md));
2039 #endif
2040 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL);
2041 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
2042 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
2043 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,d,n);
2044 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
2045 (unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
2046 {
2047 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_EVP);
2048 goto err;
2049 }
2050 s2n(i,p);
2051 n+=i+2;
2052 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2053 n+= 2;
2054 }
2055 else
2056 {
2057 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
2058 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2059 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
2060 goto f_err;
2061 }
2062 }
2063
2064 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, n);
2065 }
2066
2067 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
2068 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
2069 return ssl_do_write(s);
2070 f_err:
2071 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2072 err:
2073 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2074 if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2075 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2076 #endif
2077 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
2078 return(-1);
2079 }
2080
2081 int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
2082 {
2083 unsigned char *p,*d;
2084 int i,j,nl,off,n;
2085 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk=NULL;
2086 X509_NAME *name;
2087 BUF_MEM *buf;
2088
2089 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A)
2090 {
2091 buf=s->init_buf;
2092
2093 d=p=ssl_handshake_start(s);
2094
2095 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
2096 p++;
2097 n=ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s,p);
2098 d[0]=n;
2099 p+=n;
2100 n++;
2101
2102 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2103 {
2104 const unsigned char *psigs;
2105 unsigned char *etmp = p;
2106 nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &psigs);
2107 /* Skip over length for now */
2108 p += 2;
2109 nl = tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, p, psigs, nl);
2110 /* Now fill in length */
2111 s2n(nl, etmp);
2112 p += nl;
2113 n += nl + 2;
2114 }
2115
2116 off=n;
2117 p+=2;
2118 n+=2;
2119
2120 sk=SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
2121 nl=0;
2122 if (sk != NULL)
2123 {
2124 for (i=0; i<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++)
2125 {
2126 name=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i);
2127 j=i2d_X509_NAME(name,NULL);
2128 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s)+n+j+2))
2129 {
2130 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
2131 goto err;
2132 }
2133 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + n;
2134 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG))
2135 {
2136 s2n(j,p);
2137 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
2138 n+=2+j;
2139 nl+=2+j;
2140 }
2141 else
2142 {
2143 d=p;
2144 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
2145 j-=2; s2n(j,d); j+=2;
2146 n+=j;
2147 nl+=j;
2148 }
2149 }
2150 }
2151 /* else no CA names */
2152 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + off;
2153 s2n(nl,p);
2154
2155 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, n);
2156
2157 #ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
2158 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
2159 {
2160 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, s->init_num + 4))
2161 {
2162 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
2163 goto err;
2164 }
2165 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num;
2166 /* do the header */
2167 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
2168 *(p++)=0;
2169 *(p++)=0;
2170 *(p++)=0;
2171 s->init_num += 4;
2172 }
2173 #endif
2174
2175 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
2176 }
2177
2178 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
2179 return ssl_do_write(s);
2180 err:
2181 return(-1);
2182 }
2183
2184 int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
2185 {
2186 int i,al,ok;
2187 long n;
2188 unsigned long alg_k;
2189 unsigned char *p;
2190 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2191 RSA *rsa=NULL;
2192 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
2193 #endif
2194 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2195 BIGNUM *pub=NULL;
2196 DH *dh_srvr, *dh_clnt = NULL;
2197 #endif
2198 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2199 KSSL_ERR kssl_err;
2200 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2201
2202 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2203 EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;
2204 EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
2205 EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
2206 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
2207 #endif
2208
2209 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2210 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
2211 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B,
2212 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2213 2048, /* ??? */
2214 &ok);
2215
2216 if (!ok) return((int)n);
2217 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2218
2219 alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2220
2221 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2222 if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
2223 {
2224 unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
2225 int decrypt_len, decrypt_good_mask;
2226 unsigned char version_good;
2227
2228 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
2229 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp)
2230 {
2231 if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL))
2232 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp;
2233 /* Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should
2234 * be sent already */
2235 if (rsa == NULL)
2236 {
2237 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2238 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY);
2239 goto f_err;
2240
2241 }
2242 }
2243 else
2244 {
2245 pkey=s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey;
2246 if ( (pkey == NULL) ||
2247 (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) ||
2248 (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL))
2249 {
2250 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2251 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2252 goto f_err;
2253 }
2254 rsa=pkey->pkey.rsa;
2255 }
2256
2257 /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */
2258 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
2259 {
2260 n2s(p,i);
2261 if (n != i+2)
2262 {
2263 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG))
2264 {
2265 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2266 goto err;
2267 }
2268 else
2269 p-=2;
2270 }
2271 else
2272 n=i;
2273 }
2274
2275 /* We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because
2276 * of Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see
2277 * RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of
2278 * the TLS RFC and generates a random premaster secret for the
2279 * case that the decrypt fails. See
2280 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1 */
2281
2282 /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure. */
2283 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(rand_premaster_secret,
2284 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0)
2285 goto err;
2286 decrypt_len = RSA_private_decrypt((int)n,p,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
2287 ERR_clear_error();
2288
2289 /* decrypt_len should be SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH.
2290 * decrypt_good_mask will be zero if so and non-zero otherwise. */
2291 decrypt_good_mask = decrypt_len ^ SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2292
2293 /* If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct
2294 * then version_good will be zero. The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa
2295 * extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2296 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version
2297 * number check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks
2298 * are done in constant time and are treated like any other
2299 * decryption error. */
2300 version_good = p[0] ^ (s->client_version>>8);
2301 version_good |= p[1] ^ (s->client_version&0xff);
2302
2303 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as
2304 * the ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks
2305 * (strangely, the protocol does not offer such protection for
2306 * DH ciphersuites). However, buggy clients exist that send the
2307 * negotiated protocol version instead if the server does not
2308 * support the requested protocol version. If
2309 * SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. */
2310 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG)
2311 {
2312 unsigned char workaround_mask = version_good;
2313 unsigned char workaround;
2314
2315 /* workaround_mask will be 0xff if version_good is
2316 * non-zero (i.e. the version match failed). Otherwise
2317 * it'll be 0x00. */
2318 workaround_mask |= workaround_mask >> 4;
2319 workaround_mask |= workaround_mask >> 2;
2320 workaround_mask |= workaround_mask >> 1;
2321 workaround_mask = ~((workaround_mask & 1) - 1);
2322
2323 workaround = p[0] ^ (s->version>>8);
2324 workaround |= p[1] ^ (s->version&0xff);
2325
2326 /* If workaround_mask is 0xff (i.e. there was a version
2327 * mismatch) then we copy the value of workaround over
2328 * version_good. */
2329 version_good = (workaround & workaround_mask) |
2330 (version_good & ~workaround_mask);
2331 }
2332
2333 /* If any bits in version_good are set then they'll poision
2334 * decrypt_good_mask and cause rand_premaster_secret to be
2335 * used. */
2336 decrypt_good_mask |= version_good;
2337
2338 /* decrypt_good_mask will be zero iff decrypt_len ==
2339 * SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH and the version check passed. We
2340 * fold the bottom 32 bits of it with an OR so that the LSB
2341 * will be zero iff everything is good. This assumes that we'll
2342 * never decrypt a value > 2**31 bytes, which seems safe. */
2343 decrypt_good_mask |= decrypt_good_mask >> 16;
2344 decrypt_good_mask |= decrypt_good_mask >> 8;
2345 decrypt_good_mask |= decrypt_good_mask >> 4;
2346 decrypt_good_mask |= decrypt_good_mask >> 2;
2347 decrypt_good_mask |= decrypt_good_mask >> 1;
2348 /* Now select only the LSB and subtract one. If decrypt_len ==
2349 * SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH and the version check passed then
2350 * decrypt_good_mask will be all ones. Otherwise it'll be all
2351 * zeros. */
2352 decrypt_good_mask &= 1;
2353 decrypt_good_mask--;
2354
2355 /* Now copy rand_premaster_secret over p using
2356 * decrypt_good_mask. */
2357 for (i = 0; i < (int) sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); i++)
2358 {
2359 p[i] = (p[i] & decrypt_good_mask) |
2360 (rand_premaster_secret[i] & ~decrypt_good_mask);
2361 }
2362
2363 s->session->master_key_length=
2364 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2365 s->session->master_key,
2366 p,i);
2367 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
2368 }
2369 else
2370 #endif
2371 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2372 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
2373 {
2374 int idx = -1;
2375 EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL;
2376 if (n)
2377 n2s(p,i);
2378 else
2379 i = 0;
2380 if (n && n != i+2)
2381 {
2382 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG))
2383 {
2384 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2385 goto err;
2386 }
2387 else
2388 {
2389 p-=2;
2390 i=(int)n;
2391 }
2392 }
2393 if (alg_k & SSL_kDHr)
2394 idx = SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA;
2395 else if (alg_k & SSL_kDHd)
2396 idx = SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA;
2397 if (idx >= 0)
2398 {
2399 skey = s->cert->pkeys[idx].privatekey;
2400 if ((skey == NULL) ||
2401 (skey->type != EVP_PKEY_DH) ||
2402 (skey->pkey.dh == NULL))
2403 {
2404 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2405 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2406 goto f_err;
2407 }
2408 dh_srvr = skey->pkey.dh;
2409 }
2410 else if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL)
2411 {
2412 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2413 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2414 goto f_err;
2415 }
2416 else
2417 dh_srvr=s->s3->tmp.dh;
2418
2419 if (n == 0L)
2420 {
2421 /* Get pubkey from cert */
2422 EVP_PKEY *clkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2423 if (clkey)
2424 {
2425 if (EVP_PKEY_cmp_parameters(clkey, skey) == 1)
2426 dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(clkey);
2427 }
2428 if (dh_clnt == NULL)
2429 {
2430 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2431 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2432 goto f_err;
2433 }
2434 EVP_PKEY_free(clkey);
2435 pub = dh_clnt->pub_key;
2436 }
2437 else
2438 pub=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL);
2439 if (pub == NULL)
2440 {
2441 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BN_LIB);
2442 goto err;
2443 }
2444
2445 i=DH_compute_key(p,pub,dh_srvr);
2446
2447 if (i <= 0)
2448 {
2449 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
2450 BN_clear_free(pub);
2451 goto err;
2452 }
2453
2454 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
2455 s->s3->tmp.dh=NULL;
2456 if (dh_clnt)
2457 DH_free(dh_clnt);
2458 else
2459 BN_clear_free(pub);
2460 pub=NULL;
2461 s->session->master_key_length=
2462 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2463 s->session->master_key,p,i);
2464 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
2465 if (dh_clnt)
2466 return 2;
2467 }
2468 else
2469 #endif
2470 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2471 if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
2472 {
2473 krb5_error_code krb5rc;
2474 krb5_data enc_ticket;
2475 krb5_data authenticator;
2476 krb5_data enc_pms;
2477 KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
2478 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
2479 const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
2480 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
2481 unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
2482 + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
2483 int padl, outl;
2484 krb5_timestamp authtime = 0;
2485 krb5_ticket_times ttimes;
2486
2487 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
2488
2489 if (!kssl_ctx) kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
2490
2491 n2s(p,i);
2492 enc_ticket.length = i;
2493
2494 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + 6))
2495 {
2496 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2497 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2498 goto err;
2499 }
2500
2501 enc_ticket.data = (char *)p;
2502 p+=enc_ticket.length;
2503
2504 n2s(p,i);
2505 authenticator.length = i;
2506
2507 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 6))
2508 {
2509 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2510 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2511 goto err;
2512 }
2513
2514 authenticator.data = (char *)p;
2515 p+=authenticator.length;
2516
2517 n2s(p,i);
2518 enc_pms.length = i;
2519 enc_pms.data = (char *)p;
2520 p+=enc_pms.length;
2521
2522 /* Note that the length is checked again below,
2523 ** after decryption
2524 */
2525 if(enc_pms.length > sizeof pms)
2526 {
2527 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2528 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2529 goto err;
2530 }
2531
2532 if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length +
2533 enc_pms.length + 6))
2534 {
2535 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2536 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2537 goto err;
2538 }
2539
2540 if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes,
2541 &kssl_err)) != 0)
2542 {
2543 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
2544 printf("kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
2545 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2546 if (kssl_err.text)
2547 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2548 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2549 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2550 kssl_err.reason);
2551 goto err;
2552 }
2553
2554 /* Note: no authenticator is not considered an error,
2555 ** but will return authtime == 0.
2556 */
2557 if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator,
2558 &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0)
2559 {
2560 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
2561 printf("kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
2562 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2563 if (kssl_err.text)
2564 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2565 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2566 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2567 kssl_err.reason);
2568 goto err;
2569 }
2570
2571 if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0)
2572 {
2573 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc);
2574 goto err;
2575 }
2576
2577 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
2578 kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
2579 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2580
2581 enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
2582 if (enc == NULL)
2583 goto err;
2584
2585 memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
2586
2587 if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc,NULL,kssl_ctx->key,iv))
2588 {
2589 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2590 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2591 goto err;
2592 }
2593 if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms,&outl,
2594 (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length))
2595 {
2596 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2597 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2598 goto err;
2599 }
2600 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2601 {
2602 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2603 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2604 goto err;
2605 }
2606 if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx,&(pms[outl]),&padl))
2607 {
2608 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2609 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2610 goto err;
2611 }
2612 outl += padl;
2613 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2614 {
2615 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2616 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2617 goto err;
2618 }
2619 if (!((pms[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (pms[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
2620 {
2621 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2622 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2623 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2624 * However, buggy clients exist that send random bytes instead of
2625 * the protocol version.
2626 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients.
2627 * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos cipher)
2628 */
2629 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG))
2630 {
2631 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2632 SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2633 goto err;
2634 }
2635 }
2636
2637 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
2638
2639 s->session->master_key_length=
2640 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2641 s->session->master_key, pms, outl);
2642
2643 if (kssl_ctx->client_princ)
2644 {
2645 size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
2646 if ( len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH )
2647 {
2648 s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len;
2649 memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ,kssl_ctx->client_princ,len);
2650 }
2651 }
2652
2653
2654 /* Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
2655 ** but it caused problems for apache.
2656 ** kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
2657 ** if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
2658 */
2659 }
2660 else
2661 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2662
2663 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2664 if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
2665 {
2666 int ret = 1;
2667 int field_size = 0;
2668 const EC_KEY *tkey;
2669 const EC_GROUP *group;
2670 const BIGNUM *priv_key;
2671
2672 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
2673 if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL)
2674 {
2675 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2676 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2677 goto err;
2678 }
2679
2680 /* Let's get server private key and group information */
2681 if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
2682 {
2683 /* use the certificate */
2684 tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec;
2685 }
2686 else
2687 {
2688 /* use the ephermeral values we saved when
2689 * generating the ServerKeyExchange msg.
2690 */
2691 tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh;
2692 }
2693
2694 group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
2695 priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
2696
2697 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) ||
2698 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key))
2699 {
2700 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2701 ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2702 goto err;
2703 }
2704
2705 /* Let's get client's public key */
2706 if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL)
2707 {
2708 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2709 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2710 goto err;
2711 }
2712
2713 if (n == 0L)
2714 {
2715 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
2716
2717 if (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE)
2718 {
2719 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2720 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
2721 goto f_err;
2722 }
2723 if (((clnt_pub_pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer))
2724 == NULL) ||
2725 (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC))
2726 {
2727 /* XXX: For now, we do not support client
2728 * authentication using ECDH certificates
2729 * so this branch (n == 0L) of the code is
2730 * never executed. When that support is
2731 * added, we ought to ensure the key
2732 * received in the certificate is
2733 * authorized for key agreement.
2734 * ECDH_compute_key implicitly checks that
2735 * the two ECDH shares are for the same
2736 * group.
2737 */
2738 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2739 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2740 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS);
2741 goto f_err;
2742 }
2743
2744 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,
2745 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->pkey.ec)) == 0)
2746 {
2747 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2748 ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2749 goto err;
2750 }
2751 ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
2752 }
2753 else
2754 {
2755 /* Get client's public key from encoded point
2756 * in the ClientKeyExchange message.
2757 */
2758 if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
2759 {
2760 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2761 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2762 goto err;
2763 }
2764
2765 /* Get encoded point length */
2766 i = *p;
2767 p += 1;
2768 if (n != 1 + i)
2769 {
2770 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2771 ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2772 goto err;
2773 }
2774 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group,
2775 clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0)
2776 {
2777 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2778 ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2779 goto err;
2780 }
2781 /* p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer
2782 * currently, so set it to the start
2783 */
2784 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2785 }
2786
2787 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
2788 field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
2789 if (field_size <= 0)
2790 {
2791 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2792 ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
2793 goto err;
2794 }
2795 i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size+7)/8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh, NULL);
2796 if (i <= 0)
2797 {
2798 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2799 ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
2800 goto err;
2801 }
2802
2803 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2804 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2805 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2806 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2807 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
2808 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
2809
2810 /* Compute the master secret */
2811 s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc-> \
2812 generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, p, i);
2813
2814 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
2815 return (ret);
2816 }
2817 else
2818 #endif
2819 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2820 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK)
2821 {
2822 unsigned char *t = NULL;
2823 unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN*2+4];
2824 unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0;
2825 int psk_err = 1;
2826 char tmp_id[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1];
2827
2828 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2829
2830 n2s(p,i);
2831 if (n != i+2)
2832 {
2833 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2834 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2835 goto psk_err;
2836 }
2837 if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN)
2838 {
2839 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2840 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2841 goto psk_err;
2842 }
2843 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL)
2844 {
2845 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2846 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
2847 goto psk_err;
2848 }
2849
2850 /* Create guaranteed NULL-terminated identity
2851 * string for the callback */
2852 memcpy(tmp_id, p, i);
2853 memset(tmp_id+i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1-i);
2854 psk_len = s->psk_server_callback(s, tmp_id,
2855 psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2856 OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_id, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1);
2857
2858 if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN)
2859 {
2860 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2861 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2862 goto psk_err;
2863 }
2864 else if (psk_len == 0)
2865 {
2866 /* PSK related to the given identity not found */
2867 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2868 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2869 al=SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
2870 goto psk_err;
2871 }
2872
2873 /* create PSK pre_master_secret */
2874 pre_ms_len=2+psk_len+2+psk_len;
2875 t = psk_or_pre_ms;
2876 memmove(psk_or_pre_ms+psk_len+4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len);
2877 s2n(psk_len, t);
2878 memset(t, 0, psk_len);
2879 t+=psk_len;
2880 s2n(psk_len, t);
2881
2882 if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL)
2883 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2884 s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup((char *)p);
2885 if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL)
2886 {
2887 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2888 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2889 goto psk_err;
2890 }
2891
2892 if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
2893 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
2894 s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
2895 if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL &&
2896 s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
2897 {
2898 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2899 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2900 goto psk_err;
2901 }
2902
2903 s->session->master_key_length=
2904 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2905 s->session->master_key, psk_or_pre_ms, pre_ms_len);
2906 psk_err = 0;
2907 psk_err:
2908 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2909 if (psk_err != 0)
2910 goto f_err;
2911 }
2912 else
2913 #endif
2914 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2915 if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
2916 {
2917 int param_len;
2918
2919 n2s(p,i);
2920 param_len=i+2;
2921 if (param_len > n)
2922 {
2923 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2924 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
2925 goto f_err;
2926 }
2927 if (!(s->srp_ctx.A=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
2928 {
2929 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2930 goto err;
2931 }
2932 if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0
2933 || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A))
2934 {
2935 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2936 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
2937 goto f_err;
2938 }
2939 if (s->session->srp_username != NULL)
2940 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
2941 s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
2942 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL)
2943 {
2944 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2945 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2946 goto err;
2947 }
2948
2949 if ((s->session->master_key_length = SRP_generate_server_master_secret(s,s->session->master_key))<0)
2950 {
2951 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2952 goto err;
2953 }
2954
2955 p+=i;
2956 }
2957 else
2958 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
2959 if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST)
2960 {
2961 int ret = 0;
2962 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
2963 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
2964 unsigned char premaster_secret[32], *start;
2965 size_t outlen=32, inlen;
2966 unsigned long alg_a;
2967 int Ttag, Tclass;
2968 long Tlen;
2969
2970 /* Get our certificate private key*/
2971 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2972 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST94)
2973 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST94].privatekey;
2974 else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01)
2975 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
2976
2977 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk,NULL);
2978 EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx);
2979 /* If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
2980 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
2981 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use
2982 * a client certificate for authorization only. */
2983 client_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2984 if (client_pub_pkey)
2985 {
2986 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
2987 ERR_clear_error();
2988 }
2989 /* Decrypt session key */
2990 if (ASN1_get_object((const unsigned char **)&p, &Tlen, &Ttag, &Tclass, n) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED ||
2991 Ttag != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE ||
2992 Tclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL)
2993 {
2994 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2995 goto gerr;
2996 }
2997 start = p;
2998 inlen = Tlen;
2999 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx,premaster_secret,&outlen,start,inlen) <=0)
3000
3001 {
3002 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3003 goto gerr;
3004 }
3005 /* Generate master secret */
3006 s->session->master_key_length=
3007 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
3008 s->session->master_key,premaster_secret,32);
3009 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
3010 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
3011 ret = 2;
3012 else
3013 ret = 1;
3014 gerr:
3015 EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey);
3016 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3017 if (ret)
3018 return ret;
3019 else
3020 goto err;
3021 }
3022 else
3023 {
3024 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3025 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
3026 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
3027 goto f_err;
3028 }
3029
3030 return(1);
3031 f_err:
3032 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3033 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_SRP)
3034 err:
3035 #endif
3036 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
3037 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
3038 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
3039 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
3040 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
3041 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
3042 #endif
3043 return(-1);
3044 }
3045
3046 int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
3047 {
3048 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
3049 unsigned char *p;
3050 int al,ok,ret=0;
3051 long n;
3052 int type=0,i,j;
3053 X509 *peer;
3054 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
3055 EVP_MD_CTX mctx;
3056 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx);
3057
3058 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3059 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
3060 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,
3061 -1,
3062 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
3063 &ok);
3064
3065 if (!ok) return((int)n);
3066
3067 if (s->session->peer != NULL)
3068 {
3069 peer=s->session->peer;
3070 pkey=X509_get_pubkey(peer);
3071 type=X509_certificate_type(peer,pkey);
3072 }
3073 else
3074 {
3075 peer=NULL;
3076 pkey=NULL;
3077 }
3078
3079 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY)
3080 {
3081 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
3082 if ((peer != NULL) && (type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
3083 {
3084 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3085 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE);
3086 goto f_err;
3087 }
3088 ret=1;
3089 goto end;
3090 }
3091
3092 if (peer == NULL)
3093 {
3094 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED);
3095 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3096 goto f_err;
3097 }
3098
3099 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
3100 {
3101 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
3102 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3103 goto f_err;
3104 }
3105
3106 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
3107 {
3108 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
3109 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3110 goto f_err;
3111 }
3112
3113 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
3114 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3115 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
3116 /* If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare
3117 * signature without length field */
3118 if (n==64 && (pkey->type==NID_id_GostR3410_94 ||
3119 pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) )
3120 {
3121 i=64;
3122 }
3123 else
3124 {
3125 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3126 {
3127 int rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, p, pkey);
3128 if (rv == -1)
3129 {
3130 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3131 goto f_err;
3132 }
3133 else if (rv == 0)
3134 {
3135 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3136 goto f_err;
3137 }
3138 #ifdef SSL_DEBUG
3139 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
3140 #endif
3141 p += 2;
3142 n -= 2;
3143 }
3144 n2s(p,i);
3145 n-=2;
3146 if (i > n)
3147 {
3148 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3149 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3150 goto f_err;
3151 }
3152 }
3153 j=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
3154 if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0))
3155 {
3156 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
3157 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3158 goto f_err;
3159 }
3160
3161 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3162 {
3163 long hdatalen = 0;
3164 void *hdata;
3165 hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
3166 if (hdatalen <= 0)
3167 {
3168 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3169 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3170 goto f_err;
3171 }
3172 #ifdef SSL_DEBUG
3173 fprintf(stderr, "Using TLS 1.2 with client verify alg %s\n",
3174 EVP_MD_name(md));
3175 #endif
3176 if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL)
3177 || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen))
3178 {
3179 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
3180 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3181 goto f_err;
3182 }
3183
3184 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&mctx, p , i, pkey) <= 0)
3185 {
3186 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3187 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
3188 goto f_err;
3189 }
3190 }
3191 else
3192 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3193 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
3194 {
3195 i=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
3196 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i,
3197 pkey->pkey.rsa);
3198 if (i < 0)
3199 {
3200 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3201 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
3202 goto f_err;
3203 }
3204 if (i == 0)
3205 {
3206 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3207 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE);
3208 goto f_err;
3209 }
3210 }
3211 else
3212 #endif
3213 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3214 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
3215 {
3216 j=DSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
3217 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3218 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.dsa);
3219 if (j <= 0)
3220 {
3221 /* bad signature */
3222 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3223 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE);
3224 goto f_err;
3225 }
3226 }
3227 else
3228 #endif
3229 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3230 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
3231 {
3232 j=ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
3233 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3234 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.ec);
3235 if (j <= 0)
3236 {
3237 /* bad signature */
3238 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3239 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
3240 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
3241 goto f_err;
3242 }
3243 }
3244 else
3245 #endif
3246 if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001)
3247 { unsigned char signature[64];
3248 int idx;
3249 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey,NULL);
3250 EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx);
3251 if (i!=64) {
3252 fprintf(stderr,"GOST signature length is %d",i);
3253 }
3254 for (idx=0;idx<64;idx++) {
3255 signature[63-idx]=p[idx];
3256 }
3257 j=EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx,signature,64,s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,32);
3258 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
3259 if (j<=0)
3260 {
3261 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3262 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
3263 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
3264 goto f_err;
3265 }
3266 }
3267 else
3268 {
3269 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3270 al=SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
3271 goto f_err;
3272 }
3273
3274
3275 ret=1;
3276 if (0)
3277 {
3278 f_err:
3279 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3280 }
3281 end:
3282 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
3283 {
3284 BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
3285 s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
3286 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
3287 }
3288 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
3289 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3290 return(ret);
3291 }
3292
3293 int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
3294 {
3295 int i,ok,al,ret= -1;
3296 X509 *x=NULL;
3297 unsigned long l,nc,llen,n;
3298 const unsigned char *p,*q;
3299 unsigned char *d;
3300 STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL;
3301
3302 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3303 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A,
3304 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B,
3305 -1,
3306 s->max_cert_list,
3307 &ok);
3308
3309 if (!ok) return((int)n);
3310
3311 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE)
3312 {
3313 if ( (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3314 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
3315 {
3316 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3317 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3318 goto f_err;
3319 }
3320 /* If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list */
3321 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
3322 {
3323 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST);
3324 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3325 goto f_err;
3326 }
3327 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
3328 return(1);
3329 }
3330
3331 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE)
3332 {
3333 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3334 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
3335 goto f_err;
3336 }
3337 p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3338
3339 if ((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)
3340 {
3341 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3342 goto err;
3343 }
3344
3345 n2l3(p,llen);
3346 if (llen+3 != n)
3347 {
3348 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3349 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3350 goto f_err;
3351 }
3352 for (nc=0; nc<llen; )
3353 {
3354 n2l3(p,l);
3355 if ((l+nc+3) > llen)
3356 {
3357 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3358 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3359 goto f_err;
3360 }
3361
3362 q=p;
3363 x=d2i_X509(NULL,&p,l);
3364 if (x == NULL)
3365 {
3366 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
3367 goto err;
3368 }
3369 if (p != (q+l))
3370 {
3371 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3372 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3373 goto f_err;
3374 }
3375 if (!sk_X509_push(sk,x))
3376 {
3377 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3378 goto err;
3379 }
3380 x=NULL;
3381 nc+=l+3;
3382 }
3383
3384 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0)
3385 {
3386 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3387 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
3388 {
3389 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3390 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
3391 goto f_err;
3392 }
3393 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3394 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3395 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
3396 {
3397 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3398 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3399 goto f_err;
3400 }
3401 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
3402 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
3403 {
3404 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3405 goto f_err;
3406 }
3407 }
3408 else
3409 {
3410 EVP_PKEY *pkey;
3411 i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk);
3412 if (i <= 0)
3413 {
3414 al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
3415 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
3416 goto f_err;
3417 }
3418 if (i > 1)
3419 {
3420 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, i);
3421 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3422 goto f_err;
3423 }
3424 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(sk, 0));
3425 if (pkey == NULL)
3426 {
3427 al=SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3428 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3429 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
3430 goto f_err;
3431 }
3432 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3433 }
3434
3435 if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */
3436 X509_free(s->session->peer);
3437 s->session->peer=sk_X509_shift(sk);
3438 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
3439
3440 /* With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL
3441 * when we arrive here. */
3442 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
3443 {
3444 s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
3445 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
3446 {
3447 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3448 goto err;
3449 }
3450 }
3451 if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL)
3452 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free);
3453 s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain=sk;
3454 /* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the
3455 * peer's own certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c */
3456
3457 sk=NULL;
3458
3459 ret=1;
3460 if (0)
3461 {
3462 f_err:
3463 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3464 }
3465 err:
3466 if (x != NULL) X509_free(x);
3467 if (sk != NULL) sk_X509_pop_free(sk,X509_free);
3468 return(ret);
3469 }
3470
3471 int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
3472 {
3473 CERT_PKEY *cpk;
3474
3475 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A)
3476 {
3477 cpk=ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
3478 if (cpk == NULL)
3479 {
3480 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
3481 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aKRB5) ||
3482 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5))
3483 {
3484 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3485 return(0);
3486 }
3487 }
3488
3489 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,cpk))
3490 {
3491 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3492 return(0);
3493 }
3494 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
3495 }
3496
3497 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
3498 return ssl_do_write(s);
3499 }
3500
3501 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
3502 /* send a new session ticket (not necessarily for a new session) */
3503 int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
3504 {
3505 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A)
3506 {
3507 unsigned char *p, *senc, *macstart;
3508 const unsigned char *const_p;
3509 int len, slen_full, slen;
3510 SSL_SESSION *sess;
3511 unsigned int hlen;
3512 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
3513 HMAC_CTX hctx;
3514 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3515 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
3516 unsigned char key_name[16];
3517
3518 /* get session encoding length */
3519 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
3520 /* Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is
3521 * too long
3522 */
3523 if (slen_full > 0xFF00)
3524 return -1;
3525 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
3526 if (!senc)
3527 return -1;
3528 p = senc;
3529 i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p);
3530
3531 /* create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up */
3532 const_p = senc;
3533 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
3534 if (sess == NULL)
3535 {
3536 OPENSSL_free(senc);
3537 return -1;
3538 }
3539 sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
3540
3541 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
3542 if (slen > slen_full) /* shouldn't ever happen */
3543 {
3544 OPENSSL_free(senc);
3545 return -1;
3546 }
3547 p = senc;
3548 i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p);
3549 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3550
3551 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3552 * follows handshake_header_length +
3553 * 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
3554 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
3555 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
3556 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
3557 */
3558 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
3559 SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + 22 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH +
3560 EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
3561 return -1;
3562 p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
3563 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3564 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3565 /* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present
3566 * it does all the work otherwise use generated values
3567 * from parent ctx.
3568 */
3569 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
3570 {
3571 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx,
3572 &hctx, 1) < 0)
3573 {
3574 OPENSSL_free(senc);
3575 return -1;
3576 }
3577 }
3578 else
3579 {
3580 RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, 16);
3581 EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3582 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv);
3583 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3584 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
3585 memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
3586 }
3587
3588 /* Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only):
3589 * We leave this unspecified for resumed session (for simplicity),
3590 * and guess that tickets for new sessions will live as long
3591 * as their sessions. */
3592 l2n(s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout, p);
3593
3594 /* Skip ticket length for now */
3595 p += 2;
3596 /* Output key name */
3597 macstart = p;
3598 memcpy(p, key_name, 16);
3599 p += 16;
3600 /* output IV */
3601 memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx));
3602 p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3603 /* Encrypt session data */
3604 EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen);
3605 p += len;
3606 EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len);
3607 p += len;
3608 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3609
3610 HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart);
3611 HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen);
3612 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3613
3614 p += hlen;
3615 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
3616 /* Total length */
3617 len = p - ssl_handshake_start(s);
3618 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, len);
3619 /* Skip ticket lifetime hint */
3620 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + 4;
3621 s2n(len - 6, p);
3622 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
3623 OPENSSL_free(senc);
3624 }
3625
3626 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
3627 return ssl_do_write(s);
3628 }
3629
3630 int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s)
3631 {
3632 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A)
3633 {
3634 unsigned char *p;
3635 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3636 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
3637 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
3638 * + (ocsp response)
3639 */
3640 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen))
3641 return -1;
3642
3643 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3644
3645 /* do the header */
3646 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
3647 /* message length */
3648 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p);
3649 /* status type */
3650 *(p++)= s->tlsext_status_type;
3651 /* length of OCSP response */
3652 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p);
3653 /* actual response */
3654 memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen);
3655 /* number of bytes to write */
3656 s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen;
3657 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B;
3658 s->init_off = 0;
3659 }
3660
3661 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
3662 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3663 }
3664
3665 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3666 /* ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message. It
3667 * sets the next_proto member in s if found */
3668 int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s)
3669 {
3670 int ok;
3671 int proto_len, padding_len;
3672 long n;
3673 const unsigned char *p;
3674
3675 /* Clients cannot send a NextProtocol message if we didn't see the
3676 * extension in their ClientHello */
3677 if (!s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
3678 {
3679 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION);
3680 return -1;
3681 }
3682
3683 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3684 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A,
3685 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B,
3686 SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO,
3687 514, /* See the payload format below */
3688 &ok);
3689
3690 if (!ok)
3691 return((int)n);
3692
3693 /* s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received
3694 * in this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset
3695 * by ssl3_get_finished). */
3696 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
3697 {
3698 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS);
3699 return -1;
3700 }
3701
3702 if (n < 2)
3703 return 0; /* The body must be > 1 bytes long */
3704
3705 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3706
3707 /* The payload looks like:
3708 * uint8 proto_len;
3709 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
3710 * uint8 padding_len;
3711 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
3712 */
3713 proto_len = p[0];
3714 if (proto_len + 2 > s->init_num)
3715 return 0;
3716 padding_len = p[proto_len + 1];
3717 if (proto_len + padding_len + 2 != s->init_num)
3718 return 0;
3719
3720 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(proto_len);
3721 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
3722 {
3723 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3724 return 0;
3725 }
3726 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, p + 1, proto_len);
3727 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = proto_len;
3728
3729 return 1;
3730 }
3731 # endif
3732
3733 #endif
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