1 /* ssl/s3_srvr.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
124 /* ====================================================================
125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
142 * to make use of the Contribution.
144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
151 #define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
152 #define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
155 #include <openssl/crypto.h>
156 #include "ssl_locl.h"
157 #include "kssl_lcl.h"
158 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
159 #include <openssl/rand.h>
160 #include <openssl/objects.h>
161 #include <openssl/evp.h>
162 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
163 #include <openssl/x509.h>
164 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
165 #include <openssl/dh.h>
167 #include <openssl/bn.h>
168 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
169 #include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
171 #include <openssl/md5.h>
173 static const SSL_METHOD
*ssl3_get_server_method(int ver
);
175 static const SSL_METHOD
*ssl3_get_server_method(int ver
)
177 if (ver
== SSL3_VERSION
)
178 return(SSLv3_server_method());
183 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
184 static int SSL_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL
*s
,int *ad
)
186 int ret
= SSL_ERROR_NONE
;
188 *ad
= SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME
;
190 if ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kSRP
) &&
191 (s
->srp_ctx
.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback
!= NULL
))
193 if(s
->srp_ctx
.login
== NULL
)
195 /* There isn't any srp login extension !!! */
196 ret
= SSL3_AL_WARNING
;
197 *ad
= SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME
;
201 ret
= SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s
,ad
);
208 IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method
,
210 ssl_undefined_function
,
211 ssl3_get_server_method
)
213 int ssl3_accept(SSL
*s
)
216 unsigned long alg_k
,Time
=(unsigned long)time(NULL
);
217 void (*cb
)(const SSL
*ssl
,int type
,int val
)=NULL
;
219 int new_state
,state
,skip
=0;
220 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
221 int srp_no_username
=0;
224 RAND_add(&Time
,sizeof(Time
),0);
228 if (s
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
230 else if (s
->ctx
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
231 cb
=s
->ctx
->info_callback
;
233 /* init things to blank */
235 if (!SSL_in_init(s
) || SSL_in_before(s
)) SSL_clear(s
);
239 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT
,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET
);
249 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE
:
251 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
255 case SSL_ST_BEFORE
|SSL_ST_ACCEPT
:
256 case SSL_ST_OK
|SSL_ST_ACCEPT
:
259 if (cb
!= NULL
) cb(s
,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START
,1);
261 if ((s
->version
>>8) != 3)
263 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
266 s
->type
=SSL_ST_ACCEPT
;
268 if (s
->init_buf
== NULL
)
270 if ((buf
=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL
)
275 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf
,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
))
283 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s
))
291 if (s
->state
!= SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE
)
293 /* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that
294 * the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
296 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s
,1)) { ret
= -1; goto end
; }
298 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s
);
299 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A
;
300 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_accept
++;
302 else if (!s
->s3
->send_connection_binding
&&
303 !(s
->options
& SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION
))
305 /* Server attempting to renegotiate with
306 * client that doesn't support secure
309 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT
, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED
);
310 ssl3_send_alert(s
,SSL3_AL_FATAL
,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
316 /* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE,
317 * we will just send a HelloRequest */
318 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_accept_renegotiate
++;
319 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A
;
323 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A
:
324 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B
:
327 ret
=ssl3_send_hello_request(s
);
328 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
329 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C
;
330 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH
;
333 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s
);
336 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C
:
340 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A
:
341 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B
:
342 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C
:
343 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
344 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_SRP_USERNAME
:
348 ret
=ssl3_get_client_hello(s
);
349 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
350 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
352 int extension_error
= 0,al
;
354 if ((al
= SSL_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s
,&extension_error
)) != SSL_ERROR_NONE
)
356 ssl3_send_alert(s
,al
,extension_error
);
357 if (extension_error
== SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME
)
359 if (srp_no_username
) goto end
;
362 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_SRP_USERNAME
;
363 if (cb
!= NULL
) cb(s
,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START
,1);
364 if ((ret
=BIO_flush(s
->wbio
)) <= 0) goto end
;
369 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT
,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
);
376 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A
;
380 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A
:
381 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B
:
382 ret
=ssl3_send_server_hello(s
);
383 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
384 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
387 if (s
->tlsext_ticket_expected
)
388 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A
;
390 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A
;
394 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A
;
397 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A
;
401 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A
:
402 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B
:
403 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
404 /* normal PSK or KRB5 or SRP */
405 if (!(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aNULL
)
406 && !(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kPSK
)
407 && !(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aKRB5
))
409 ret
=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s
);
410 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
411 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
412 if (s
->tlsext_status_expected
)
413 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A
;
415 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A
;
420 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A
;
427 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A
;
432 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A
:
433 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B
:
434 alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
436 /* clear this, it may get reset by
437 * send_server_key_exchange */
438 if ((s
->options
& SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA
)
439 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
440 && !(alg_k
& SSL_kKRB5
)
441 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
443 /* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key
444 * even when forbidden by protocol specs
445 * (handshake may fail as clients are not required to
446 * be able to handle this) */
447 s
->s3
->tmp
.use_rsa_tmp
=1;
449 s
->s3
->tmp
.use_rsa_tmp
=0;
452 /* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or
453 * RSA but we have a sign only certificate
455 * PSK: may send PSK identity hints
457 * For ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange
458 * message only if the cipher suite is either
459 * ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, the
460 * server certificate contains the server's
461 * public key for key exchange.
463 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.use_rsa_tmp
464 /* PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity
465 * hint if provided */
466 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
467 || ((alg_k
& SSL_kPSK
) && s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
)
469 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
470 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
471 || (alg_k
& SSL_kSRP
)
473 || (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHr
|SSL_kDHd
|SSL_kEDH
))
474 || (alg_k
& SSL_kEECDH
)
475 || ((alg_k
& SSL_kRSA
)
476 && (s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
].privatekey
== NULL
477 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
)
478 && EVP_PKEY_size(s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
].privatekey
)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
)
484 ret
=ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s
);
485 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
490 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A
;
494 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A
:
495 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B
:
496 if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
497 !(s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
) ||
498 /* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set,
499 * don't request cert during re-negotiation: */
500 ((s
->session
->peer
!= NULL
) &&
501 (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE
)) ||
502 /* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites
503 * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts
504 * and in RFC 2246): */
505 ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aNULL
) &&
506 /* ... except when the application insists on verification
507 * (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */
508 !(s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT
)) ||
509 /* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */
510 (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aKRB5
)
511 /* With normal PSK Certificates and
512 * Certificate Requests are omitted */
513 || (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kPSK
))
515 /* no cert request */
517 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
=0;
518 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A
;
519 if (s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
)
520 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
))
525 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
=1;
526 ret
=ssl3_send_certificate_request(s
);
527 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
528 #ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
529 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A
;
531 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH
;
532 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A
;
538 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A
:
539 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B
:
540 ret
=ssl3_send_server_done(s
);
541 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
542 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A
;
543 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH
;
547 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH
:
549 /* This code originally checked to see if
550 * any data was pending using BIO_CTRL_INFO
551 * and then flushed. This caused problems
552 * as documented in PR#1939. The proposed
553 * fix doesn't completely resolve this issue
554 * as buggy implementations of BIO_CTRL_PENDING
555 * still exist. So instead we just flush
559 s
->rwstate
=SSL_WRITING
;
560 if (BIO_flush(s
->wbio
) <= 0)
565 s
->rwstate
=SSL_NOTHING
;
567 s
->state
=s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
;
570 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A
:
571 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B
:
572 /* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */
573 ret
= ssl3_check_client_hello(s
);
577 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C
;
579 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
)
581 ret
=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s
);
582 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
585 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A
;
589 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A
:
590 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B
:
591 ret
=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s
);
596 /* For the ECDH ciphersuites when
597 * the client sends its ECDH pub key in
598 * a certificate, the CertificateVerify
599 * message is not sent.
600 * Also for GOST ciphersuites when
601 * the client uses its key from the certificate
604 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
605 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
;
607 if (s
->s3
->next_proto_neg_seen
)
608 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A
;
610 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
;
614 else if (TLS1_get_version(s
) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
)
616 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A
;
618 if (!s
->session
->peer
)
620 /* For TLS v1.2 freeze the handshake buffer
621 * at this point and digest cached records.
623 if (!s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
)
625 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT
,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
628 s
->s3
->flags
|= TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE
;
629 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
))
637 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A
;
640 /* We need to get hashes here so if there is
641 * a client cert, it can be verified
642 * FIXME - digest processing for CertificateVerify
643 * should be generalized. But it is next step
645 if (s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
)
646 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
))
648 for (dgst_num
=0; dgst_num
<SSL_MAX_DIGEST
;dgst_num
++)
649 if (s
->s3
->handshake_dgst
[dgst_num
])
653 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->cert_verify_mac(s
,EVP_MD_CTX_type(s
->s3
->handshake_dgst
[dgst_num
]),&(s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_verify_md
[offset
]));
654 dgst_size
=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s
->s3
->handshake_dgst
[dgst_num
]);
665 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A
:
666 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B
:
668 /* we should decide if we expected this one */
669 ret
=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s
);
670 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
672 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
673 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
;
675 if (s
->s3
->next_proto_neg_seen
)
676 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A
;
678 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
;
683 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
684 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A
:
685 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B
:
686 ret
=ssl3_get_next_proto(s
);
687 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
689 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
;
693 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
:
694 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B
:
695 ret
=ssl3_get_finished(s
,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
,
696 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B
);
697 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
698 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
699 if (s
->tlsext_ticket_expected
)
700 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A
;
708 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A
;
712 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
713 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A
:
714 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B
:
715 ret
=ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s
);
716 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
717 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A
;
721 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A
:
722 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B
:
723 ret
=ssl3_send_cert_status(s
);
724 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
725 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A
;
731 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A
:
732 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B
:
734 s
->session
->cipher
=s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
;
735 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->setup_key_block(s
))
736 { ret
= -1; goto end
; }
738 ret
=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s
,
739 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A
,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B
);
741 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
742 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A
;
745 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
746 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE
))
754 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A
:
755 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B
:
756 ret
=ssl3_send_finished(s
,
757 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A
,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B
,
758 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->server_finished_label
,
759 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->server_finished_label_len
);
760 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
761 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH
;
764 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
765 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
;
767 if (s
->s3
->next_proto_neg_seen
)
768 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A
;
770 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
;
774 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
=SSL_ST_OK
;
779 /* clean a few things up */
780 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s
);
782 BUF_MEM_free(s
->init_buf
);
785 /* remove buffering on output */
786 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s
);
790 if (s
->renegotiate
== 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
792 /* actually not necessarily a 'new' session unless
793 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is set */
798 ssl_update_cache(s
,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER
);
800 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_accept_good
++;
802 s
->handshake_func
=ssl3_accept
;
804 if (cb
!= NULL
) cb(s
,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE
,1);
812 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT
,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE
);
818 if (!s
->s3
->tmp
.reuse_message
&& !skip
)
822 if ((ret
=BIO_flush(s
->wbio
)) <= 0)
827 if ((cb
!= NULL
) && (s
->state
!= state
))
831 cb(s
,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP
,1);
838 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
842 cb(s
,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT
,ret
);
846 int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL
*s
)
850 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A
)
852 p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
853 *(p
++)=SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST
;
858 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B
;
859 /* number of bytes to write */
864 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
865 return(ssl3_do_write(s
,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
));
868 int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL
*s
)
873 /* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message,
874 * so permit appropriate message length */
875 n
=s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
881 if (!ok
) return((int)n
);
882 s
->s3
->tmp
.reuse_message
= 1;
883 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
== SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO
)
885 /* Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake,
886 * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.)
887 * I hope that tmp.dh is the only thing that may need to be cleared
888 * when a handshake is not completed ... */
889 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
890 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
!= NULL
)
892 DH_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
);
893 s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
= NULL
;
901 int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL
*s
)
903 int i
,j
,ok
,al
,ret
= -1;
904 unsigned int cookie_len
;
907 unsigned char *p
,*d
,*q
;
909 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
912 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *ciphers
=NULL
;
914 /* We do this so that we will respond with our native type.
915 * If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1,
916 * This down switching should be handled by a different method.
917 * If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with
920 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A
921 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
922 || (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_SRP_USERNAME
)
926 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B
;
929 n
=s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
930 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B
,
931 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C
,
932 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
933 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
,
936 if (!ok
) return((int)n
);
938 d
=p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
940 /* use version from inside client hello, not from record header
941 * (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */
942 s
->client_version
=(((int)p
[0])<<8)|(int)p
[1];
945 if ((s
->version
== DTLS1_VERSION
&& s
->client_version
> s
->version
) ||
946 (s
->version
!= DTLS1_VERSION
&& s
->client_version
< s
->version
))
948 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER
);
949 if ((s
->client_version
>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR
)
951 /* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
952 s
->version
= s
->client_version
;
954 al
= SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
958 /* If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't
959 * contain one, just return since we do not want to
960 * allocate any memory yet. So check cookie length...
962 if (SSL_get_options(s
) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE
)
964 unsigned int session_length
, cookie_length
;
966 session_length
= *(p
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
967 cookie_length
= *(p
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
+ session_length
+ 1);
969 if (cookie_length
== 0)
973 /* load the client random */
974 memcpy(s
->s3
->client_random
,p
,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
977 /* get the session-id */
981 /* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow session reuse during renegotiation
982 * (i.e. when s->new_session is true), option
983 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is new with 0.9.7.
984 * Maybe this optional behaviour should always have been the default,
985 * but we cannot safely change the default behaviour (or new applications
986 * might be written that become totally unsecure when compiled with
987 * an earlier library version)
989 if ((s
->new_session
&& (s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
)))
991 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s
,1))
996 i
=ssl_get_prev_session(s
, p
, j
, d
+ n
);
998 { /* previous session */
1005 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s
,1))
1012 if (s
->version
== DTLS1_VERSION
|| s
->version
== DTLS1_BAD_VER
)
1015 cookie_len
= *(p
++);
1018 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
1019 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
1020 * does not cause an overflow.
1022 if ( cookie_len
> sizeof(s
->d1
->rcvd_cookie
))
1025 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1026 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH
);
1030 /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
1031 if ((SSL_get_options(s
) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE
) &&
1034 memcpy(s
->d1
->rcvd_cookie
, p
, cookie_len
);
1036 if ( s
->ctx
->app_verify_cookie_cb
!= NULL
)
1038 if ( s
->ctx
->app_verify_cookie_cb(s
, s
->d1
->rcvd_cookie
,
1041 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1042 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1043 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH
);
1046 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1048 else if ( memcmp(s
->d1
->rcvd_cookie
, s
->d1
->cookie
,
1049 s
->d1
->cookie_len
) != 0) /* default verification */
1051 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1052 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1053 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH
);
1064 if ((i
== 0) && (j
!= 0))
1066 /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */
1067 al
=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1068 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED
);
1073 /* not enough data */
1074 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1075 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1078 if ((i
> 0) && (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s
,p
,i
,&(ciphers
))
1085 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
1086 if ((s
->hit
) && (i
> 0))
1089 id
=s
->session
->cipher
->id
;
1092 printf("client sent %d ciphers\n",sk_num(ciphers
));
1094 for (i
=0; i
<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers
); i
++)
1096 c
=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers
,i
);
1098 printf("client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1099 i
,sk_num(ciphers
),SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c
));
1107 /* Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade
1108 * attack: CVE-2010-4180.
1111 if (j
== 0 && (s
->options
& SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG
) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers
) == 1))
1113 /* Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used cipher may
1114 * not be in the current list, the client instead might be trying to
1115 * continue using a cipher that before wasn't chosen due to server
1116 * preferences. We'll have to reject the connection if the cipher is not
1117 * enabled, though. */
1118 c
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers
, 0);
1119 if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s
), c
) >= 0)
1121 s
->session
->cipher
= c
;
1128 /* we need to have the cipher in the cipher
1129 * list if we are asked to reuse it */
1130 al
=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1131 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING
);
1140 /* not enough data */
1141 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1142 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1148 if (p
[j
] == 0) break;
1155 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1156 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED
);
1160 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1162 if (s
->version
>= SSL3_VERSION
)
1164 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s
,&p
,d
,n
, &al
))
1166 /* 'al' set by ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext */
1167 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT
);
1171 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(s
) <= 0) {
1172 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
);
1176 /* Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this
1177 * handshake for not reused session only. We need to generate
1178 * server_random before calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow
1179 * SessionTicket processing to use it in key derivation. */
1183 Time
=(unsigned long)time(NULL
); /* Time */
1184 pos
=s
->s3
->server_random
;
1186 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(pos
,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
-4) <= 0)
1188 al
=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1193 if (!s
->hit
&& s
->version
>= TLS1_VERSION
&& s
->tls_session_secret_cb
)
1195 SSL_CIPHER
*pref_cipher
=NULL
;
1197 s
->session
->master_key_length
=sizeof(s
->session
->master_key
);
1198 if(s
->tls_session_secret_cb(s
, s
->session
->master_key
, &s
->session
->master_key_length
,
1199 ciphers
, &pref_cipher
, s
->tls_session_secret_cb_arg
))
1202 s
->session
->ciphers
=ciphers
;
1203 s
->session
->verify_result
=X509_V_OK
;
1207 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1208 pref_cipher
=pref_cipher
? pref_cipher
: ssl3_choose_cipher(s
, s
->session
->ciphers
, SSL_get_ciphers(s
));
1209 if (pref_cipher
== NULL
)
1211 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1212 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER
);
1216 s
->session
->cipher
=pref_cipher
;
1219 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s
->cipher_list
);
1221 if (s
->cipher_list_by_id
)
1222 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s
->cipher_list_by_id
);
1224 s
->cipher_list
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s
->session
->ciphers
);
1225 s
->cipher_list_by_id
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s
->session
->ciphers
);
1230 /* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1231 * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
1232 * algorithms from the client, starting at q. */
1233 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
=NULL
;
1234 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1235 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1236 if (s
->session
->compress_meth
!= 0)
1238 int m
, comp_id
= s
->session
->compress_meth
;
1239 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1240 /* Can't disable compression */
1241 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION
)
1243 al
=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1244 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION
);
1247 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1248 for (m
= 0; m
< sk_SSL_COMP_num(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
); m
++)
1250 comp
=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
,m
);
1251 if (comp_id
== comp
->id
)
1253 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
=comp
;
1257 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
== NULL
)
1259 al
=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1260 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM
);
1263 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1264 for (m
= 0; m
< i
; m
++)
1266 if (q
[m
] == comp_id
)
1271 al
=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1272 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING
);
1278 else if (!(s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION
) && s
->ctx
->comp_methods
)
1279 { /* See if we have a match */
1280 int m
,nn
,o
,v
,done
=0;
1282 nn
=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
);
1283 for (m
=0; m
<nn
; m
++)
1285 comp
=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
,m
);
1298 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
=comp
;
1303 /* If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1304 * using compression.
1306 if (s
->session
->compress_meth
!= 0)
1308 al
=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1309 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION
);
1314 /* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must
1319 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1320 s
->session
->compress_meth
=0;
1322 s
->session
->compress_meth
=(comp
== NULL
)?0:comp
->id
;
1324 if (s
->session
->ciphers
!= NULL
)
1325 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s
->session
->ciphers
);
1326 s
->session
->ciphers
=ciphers
;
1327 if (ciphers
== NULL
)
1329 al
=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1330 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED
);
1334 c
=ssl3_choose_cipher(s
,s
->session
->ciphers
,
1335 SSL_get_ciphers(s
));
1339 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1340 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER
);
1343 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
=c
;
1344 /* check whether we should disable session resumption */
1345 if (s
->not_resumable_session_cb
!= NULL
)
1346 s
->session
->not_resumable
=s
->not_resumable_session_cb(s
,
1347 ((c
->algorithm_mkey
& (SSL_kEDH
| SSL_kEECDH
)) != 0));
1348 if (s
->session
->not_resumable
)
1349 /* do not send a session ticket */
1350 s
->tlsext_ticket_expected
= 0;
1354 /* Session-id reuse */
1355 #ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
1356 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *sk
;
1357 SSL_CIPHER
*nc
=NULL
;
1358 SSL_CIPHER
*ec
=NULL
;
1360 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG
)
1362 sk
=s
->session
->ciphers
;
1363 for (i
=0; i
<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk
); i
++)
1365 c
=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk
,i
);
1366 if (c
->algorithm_enc
& SSL_eNULL
)
1368 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c
))
1372 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
=nc
;
1373 else if (ec
!= NULL
)
1374 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
=ec
;
1376 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
=s
->session
->cipher
;
1380 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
=s
->session
->cipher
;
1383 if (TLS1_get_version(s
) < TLS1_2_VERSION
|| !(s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
))
1385 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
))
1389 /* we now have the following setup.
1391 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
1392 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
1393 * compression - basically ignored right now
1394 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1395 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1396 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1397 * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
1404 ssl3_send_alert(s
,SSL3_AL_FATAL
,al
);
1407 if (ciphers
!= NULL
) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers
);
1411 int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL
*s
)
1414 unsigned char *p
,*d
;
1417 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1421 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A
)
1423 buf
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
1424 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1425 p
=s
->s3
->server_random
;
1426 /* Generate server_random if it was not needed previously */
1427 Time
=(unsigned long)time(NULL
); /* Time */
1429 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p
,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
-4) <= 0)
1432 /* Do the message type and length last */
1435 *(p
++)=s
->version
>>8;
1436 *(p
++)=s
->version
&0xff;
1439 memcpy(p
,s
->s3
->server_random
,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
1440 p
+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
;
1442 /* now in theory we have 3 options to sending back the
1443 * session id. If it is a re-use, we send back the
1444 * old session-id, if it is a new session, we send
1445 * back the new session-id or we send back a 0 length
1446 * session-id if we want it to be single use.
1447 * Currently I will not implement the '0' length session-id
1448 * 12-Jan-98 - I'll now support the '0' length stuff.
1450 * We also have an additional case where stateless session
1451 * resumption is successful: we always send back the old
1452 * session id. In this case s->hit is non zero: this can
1453 * only happen if stateless session resumption is succesful
1454 * if session caching is disabled so existing functionality
1457 if (s
->session
->not_resumable
||
1458 (!(s
->ctx
->session_cache_mode
& SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER
)
1460 s
->session
->session_id_length
=0;
1462 sl
=s
->session
->session_id_length
;
1463 if (sl
> (int)sizeof(s
->session
->session_id
))
1465 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1469 memcpy(p
,s
->session
->session_id
,sl
);
1472 /* put the cipher */
1473 i
=ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
,p
);
1476 /* put the compression method */
1477 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1480 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
== NULL
)
1483 *(p
++)=s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
->id
;
1485 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1486 if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s
) <= 0)
1488 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO
,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT
);
1491 if ((p
= ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s
, p
, buf
+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
)) == NULL
)
1493 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO
,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1500 *(d
++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO
;
1503 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B
;
1504 /* number of bytes to write */
1509 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
1510 return(ssl3_do_write(s
,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
));
1513 int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL
*s
)
1517 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A
)
1519 p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
1522 *(p
++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE
;
1527 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B
;
1528 /* number of bytes to write */
1533 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
1534 return(ssl3_do_write(s
,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
));
1537 int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL
*s
)
1539 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1543 unsigned char md_buf
[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
];
1546 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1549 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1550 EC_KEY
*ecdh
=NULL
, *ecdhp
;
1551 unsigned char *encodedPoint
= NULL
;
1554 BN_CTX
*bn_ctx
= NULL
;
1557 const EVP_MD
*md
= NULL
;
1558 unsigned char *p
,*d
;
1568 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx
);
1569 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A
)
1571 type
=s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
1576 r
[0]=r
[1]=r
[2]=r
[3]=NULL
;
1578 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1579 if (type
& SSL_kRSA
)
1582 if ((rsa
== NULL
) && (s
->cert
->rsa_tmp_cb
!= NULL
))
1584 rsa
=s
->cert
->rsa_tmp_cb(s
,
1585 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
),
1586 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
));
1589 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1590 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY
);
1598 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1599 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY
);
1604 s
->s3
->tmp
.use_rsa_tmp
=1;
1608 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1609 if (type
& SSL_kEDH
)
1612 if ((dhp
== NULL
) && (s
->cert
->dh_tmp_cb
!= NULL
))
1613 dhp
=s
->cert
->dh_tmp_cb(s
,
1614 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
),
1615 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
));
1618 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1619 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY
);
1623 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
!= NULL
)
1626 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1630 if ((dh
=DHparams_dup(dhp
)) == NULL
)
1632 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_DH_LIB
);
1637 if ((dhp
->pub_key
== NULL
||
1638 dhp
->priv_key
== NULL
||
1639 (s
->options
& SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE
)))
1641 if(!DH_generate_key(dh
))
1643 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1650 dh
->pub_key
=BN_dup(dhp
->pub_key
);
1651 dh
->priv_key
=BN_dup(dhp
->priv_key
);
1652 if ((dh
->pub_key
== NULL
) ||
1653 (dh
->priv_key
== NULL
))
1655 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_DH_LIB
);
1665 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1666 if (type
& SSL_kEECDH
)
1668 const EC_GROUP
*group
;
1670 ecdhp
=cert
->ecdh_tmp
;
1671 if ((ecdhp
== NULL
) && (s
->cert
->ecdh_tmp_cb
!= NULL
))
1673 ecdhp
=s
->cert
->ecdh_tmp_cb(s
,
1674 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
),
1675 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
));
1679 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1680 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY
);
1684 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.ecdh
!= NULL
)
1686 EC_KEY_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.ecdh
);
1687 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1691 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
1694 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB
);
1697 if (!EC_KEY_up_ref(ecdhp
))
1699 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB
);
1704 s
->s3
->tmp
.ecdh
=ecdh
;
1705 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh
) == NULL
) ||
1706 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh
) == NULL
) ||
1707 (s
->options
& SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE
))
1709 if(!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh
))
1711 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB
);
1716 if (((group
= EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh
)) == NULL
) ||
1717 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh
) == NULL
) ||
1718 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh
) == NULL
))
1720 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB
);
1724 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
) &&
1725 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group
) > 163))
1727 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER
);
1731 /* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH
1732 * keys over named (not generic) curves. For
1733 * supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero.
1736 tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group
)))
1739 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE
);
1743 /* Encode the public key.
1744 * First check the size of encoding and
1745 * allocate memory accordingly.
1747 encodedlen
= EC_POINT_point2oct(group
,
1748 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh
),
1749 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED
,
1752 encodedPoint
= (unsigned char *)
1753 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen
*sizeof(unsigned char));
1754 bn_ctx
= BN_CTX_new();
1755 if ((encodedPoint
== NULL
) || (bn_ctx
== NULL
))
1757 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1762 encodedlen
= EC_POINT_point2oct(group
,
1763 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh
),
1764 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED
,
1765 encodedPoint
, encodedlen
, bn_ctx
);
1767 if (encodedlen
== 0)
1769 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB
);
1773 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx
); bn_ctx
=NULL
;
1775 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not
1776 * generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges.
1777 * In this situation, we need four additional bytes
1778 * to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
1783 /* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message
1784 * explicitly so we can set these to NULLs
1792 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
1793 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1794 if (type
& SSL_kPSK
)
1796 /* reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint*/
1797 n
+=2+strlen(s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
);
1800 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1801 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1802 if (type
& SSL_kSRP
)
1804 if ((s
->srp_ctx
.N
== NULL
) ||
1805 (s
->srp_ctx
.g
== NULL
) ||
1806 (s
->srp_ctx
.s
== NULL
) ||
1807 (s
->srp_ctx
.B
== NULL
))
1809 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM
);
1820 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1821 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE
);
1824 for (i
=0; r
[i
] != NULL
&& i
<4; i
++)
1826 nr
[i
]=BN_num_bytes(r
[i
]);
1827 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1828 if ((i
== 2) && (type
& SSL_kSRP
))
1835 if (!(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aNULL
)
1836 && !(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kPSK
))
1838 if ((pkey
=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s
,s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
,&md
))
1841 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1844 kn
=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey
);
1852 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf
,n
+4+kn
))
1854 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_LIB_BUF
);
1857 d
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
1860 for (i
=0; r
[i
] != NULL
&& i
<4; i
++)
1862 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1863 if ((i
== 2) && (type
& SSL_kSRP
))
1875 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1876 if (type
& SSL_kEECDH
)
1878 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves.
1879 * In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has:
1880 * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
1881 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by
1882 * the actual encoded point itself
1884 *p
= NAMED_CURVE_TYPE
;
1892 memcpy((unsigned char*)p
,
1893 (unsigned char *)encodedPoint
,
1895 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint
);
1896 encodedPoint
= NULL
;
1901 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1902 if (type
& SSL_kPSK
)
1904 /* copy PSK identity hint */
1905 s2n(strlen(s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
), p
);
1906 strncpy((char *)p
, s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
, strlen(s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
));
1907 p
+=strlen(s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
);
1914 /* n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4])
1915 * and p points to the space at the end. */
1916 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1917 if (pkey
->type
== EVP_PKEY_RSA
1918 && TLS1_get_version(s
) < TLS1_2_VERSION
)
1922 for (num
=2; num
> 0; num
--)
1924 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx
,(num
== 2)
1925 ?s
->ctx
->md5
:s
->ctx
->sha1
, NULL
);
1926 EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx
,
1927 EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW
);
1928 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx
,&(s
->s3
->client_random
[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
1929 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx
,&(s
->s3
->server_random
[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
1930 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx
,&(d
[4]),n
);
1931 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx
,q
,
1932 (unsigned int *)&i
);
1936 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1
, md_buf
, j
,
1937 &(p
[2]), &u
, pkey
->pkey
.rsa
) <= 0)
1939 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_LIB_RSA
);
1949 /* For TLS1.2 and later send signature
1951 if (TLS1_get_version(s
) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
)
1953 if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p
, pkey
, md
))
1955 /* Should never happen */
1956 al
=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1957 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1963 fprintf(stderr
, "Using hash %s\n",
1966 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx
, md
, NULL
);
1967 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx
,&(s
->s3
->client_random
[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
1968 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx
,&(s
->s3
->server_random
[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
1969 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx
,&(d
[4]),n
);
1970 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx
,&(p
[2]),
1971 (unsigned int *)&i
,pkey
))
1973 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_LIB_EVP
);
1978 if (TLS1_get_version(s
) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
)
1983 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
1984 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1985 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE
);
1990 *(d
++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
;
1993 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
1999 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B
;
2000 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx
);
2001 return(ssl3_do_write(s
,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
));
2003 ssl3_send_alert(s
,SSL3_AL_FATAL
,al
);
2005 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2006 if (encodedPoint
!= NULL
) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint
);
2007 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx
);
2009 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx
);
2013 int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL
*s
)
2015 unsigned char *p
,*d
;
2017 STACK_OF(X509_NAME
) *sk
=NULL
;
2021 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A
)
2025 d
=p
=(unsigned char *)&(buf
->data
[4]);
2027 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
2029 n
=ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s
,p
);
2034 if (TLS1_get_version(s
) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
)
2036 nl
= tls12_get_req_sig_algs(s
, p
+ 2);
2046 sk
=SSL_get_client_CA_list(s
);
2050 for (i
=0; i
<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk
); i
++)
2052 name
=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk
,i
);
2053 j
=i2d_X509_NAME(name
,NULL
);
2054 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf
,4+n
+j
+2))
2056 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,ERR_R_BUF_LIB
);
2059 p
=(unsigned char *)&(buf
->data
[4+n
]);
2060 if (!(s
->options
& SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG
))
2063 i2d_X509_NAME(name
,&p
);
2070 i2d_X509_NAME(name
,&p
);
2071 j
-=2; s2n(j
,d
); j
+=2;
2077 /* else no CA names */
2078 p
=(unsigned char *)&(buf
->data
[4+off
]);
2081 d
=(unsigned char *)buf
->data
;
2082 *(d
++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
;
2085 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
2090 #ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
2091 p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
+ s
->init_num
;
2094 *(p
++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE
;
2101 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B
;
2104 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
2105 return(ssl3_do_write(s
,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
));
2110 int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL
*s
)
2114 unsigned long alg_k
;
2116 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2118 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
=NULL
;
2120 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2124 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2126 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2128 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2129 EC_KEY
*srvr_ecdh
= NULL
;
2130 EVP_PKEY
*clnt_pub_pkey
= NULL
;
2131 EC_POINT
*clnt_ecpoint
= NULL
;
2132 BN_CTX
*bn_ctx
= NULL
;
2135 n
=s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
2136 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A
,
2137 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B
,
2138 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2142 if (!ok
) return((int)n
);
2143 p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
2145 alg_k
=s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
2147 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2148 if (alg_k
& SSL_kRSA
)
2150 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
2151 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.use_rsa_tmp
)
2153 if ((s
->cert
!= NULL
) && (s
->cert
->rsa_tmp
!= NULL
))
2154 rsa
=s
->cert
->rsa_tmp
;
2155 /* Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should
2156 * be sent already */
2159 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2160 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY
);
2167 pkey
=s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
].privatekey
;
2168 if ( (pkey
== NULL
) ||
2169 (pkey
->type
!= EVP_PKEY_RSA
) ||
2170 (pkey
->pkey
.rsa
== NULL
))
2172 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2173 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE
);
2179 /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */
2180 if (s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
&& s
->version
!= DTLS1_BAD_VER
)
2185 if (!(s
->options
& SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG
))
2187 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG
);
2197 i
=RSA_private_decrypt((int)n
,p
,p
,rsa
,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING
);
2201 if (i
!= SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
)
2203 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2204 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); */
2207 if ((al
== -1) && !((p
[0] == (s
->client_version
>>8)) && (p
[1] == (s
->client_version
& 0xff))))
2209 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2210 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2211 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2212 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
2213 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
2215 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. */
2216 if (!((s
->options
& SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG
) &&
2217 (p
[0] == (s
->version
>>8)) && (p
[1] == (s
->version
& 0xff))))
2219 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2220 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER); */
2222 /* The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2223 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version
2224 * number check as a "bad version oracle" -- an alert would
2225 * reveal that the plaintext corresponding to some ciphertext
2226 * made up by the adversary is properly formatted except
2227 * that the version number is wrong. To avoid such attacks,
2228 * we should treat this just like any other decryption error. */
2234 /* Some decryption failure -- use random value instead as countermeasure
2235 * against Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding
2236 * (see RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). */
2238 i
= SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
;
2239 p
[0] = s
->client_version
>> 8;
2240 p
[1] = s
->client_version
& 0xff;
2241 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p
+2, i
-2) <= 0) /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure */
2245 s
->session
->master_key_length
=
2246 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
2247 s
->session
->master_key
,
2249 OPENSSL_cleanse(p
,i
);
2253 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2254 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kEDH
|SSL_kDHr
|SSL_kDHd
))
2259 if (!(s
->options
& SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG
))
2261 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG
);
2271 if (n
== 0L) /* the parameters are in the cert */
2273 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2274 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_DH_CERTS
);
2279 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
== NULL
)
2281 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2282 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY
);
2286 dh_srvr
=s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
;
2289 pub
=BN_bin2bn(p
,i
,NULL
);
2292 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_BN_LIB
);
2296 i
=DH_compute_key(p
,pub
,dh_srvr
);
2300 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_DH_LIB
);
2304 DH_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
);
2309 s
->session
->master_key_length
=
2310 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
2311 s
->session
->master_key
,p
,i
);
2312 OPENSSL_cleanse(p
,i
);
2316 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2317 if (alg_k
& SSL_kKRB5
)
2319 krb5_error_code krb5rc
;
2320 krb5_data enc_ticket
;
2321 krb5_data authenticator
;
2323 KSSL_CTX
*kssl_ctx
= s
->kssl_ctx
;
2324 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx
;
2325 const EVP_CIPHER
*enc
= NULL
;
2326 unsigned char iv
[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH
];
2327 unsigned char pms
[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
2328 + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH
];
2330 krb5_timestamp authtime
= 0;
2331 krb5_ticket_times ttimes
;
2333 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx
);
2335 if (!kssl_ctx
) kssl_ctx
= kssl_ctx_new();
2338 enc_ticket
.length
= i
;
2340 if (n
< (long)(enc_ticket
.length
+ 6))
2342 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2343 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2347 enc_ticket
.data
= (char *)p
;
2348 p
+=enc_ticket
.length
;
2351 authenticator
.length
= i
;
2353 if (n
< (long)(enc_ticket
.length
+ authenticator
.length
+ 6))
2355 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2356 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2360 authenticator
.data
= (char *)p
;
2361 p
+=authenticator
.length
;
2365 enc_pms
.data
= (char *)p
;
2368 /* Note that the length is checked again below,
2371 if(enc_pms
.length
> sizeof pms
)
2373 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2374 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2378 if (n
!= (long)(enc_ticket
.length
+ authenticator
.length
+
2379 enc_pms
.length
+ 6))
2381 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2382 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2386 if ((krb5rc
= kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx
, &enc_ticket
, &ttimes
,
2390 printf("kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
2391 krb5rc
, kssl_err
.reason
);
2393 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err
.text
);
2394 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2395 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2400 /* Note: no authenticator is not considered an error,
2401 ** but will return authtime == 0.
2403 if ((krb5rc
= kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx
, &authenticator
,
2404 &authtime
, &kssl_err
)) != 0)
2407 printf("kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
2408 krb5rc
, kssl_err
.reason
);
2410 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err
.text
);
2411 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2412 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2417 if ((krb5rc
= kssl_validate_times(authtime
, &ttimes
)) != 0)
2419 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, krb5rc
);
2424 kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx
);
2425 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2427 enc
= kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx
->enctype
);
2431 memset(iv
, 0, sizeof iv
); /* per RFC 1510 */
2433 if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx
,enc
,NULL
,kssl_ctx
->key
,iv
))
2435 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2436 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
2439 if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx
, pms
,&outl
,
2440 (unsigned char *)enc_pms
.data
, enc_pms
.length
))
2442 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2443 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
2446 if (outl
> SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
)
2448 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2449 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2452 if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx
,&(pms
[outl
]),&padl
))
2454 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2455 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
2459 if (outl
> SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
)
2461 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2462 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2465 if (!((pms
[0] == (s
->client_version
>>8)) && (pms
[1] == (s
->client_version
& 0xff))))
2467 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2468 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2469 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2470 * However, buggy clients exist that send random bytes instead of
2471 * the protocol version.
2472 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients.
2473 * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos cipher)
2475 if (!(s
->options
& SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG
))
2477 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2478 SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
2483 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx
);
2485 s
->session
->master_key_length
=
2486 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
2487 s
->session
->master_key
, pms
, outl
);
2489 if (kssl_ctx
->client_princ
)
2491 size_t len
= strlen(kssl_ctx
->client_princ
);
2492 if ( len
< SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH
)
2494 s
->session
->krb5_client_princ_len
= len
;
2495 memcpy(s
->session
->krb5_client_princ
,kssl_ctx
->client_princ
,len
);
2500 /* Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
2501 ** but it caused problems for apache.
2502 ** kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
2503 ** if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
2507 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2509 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2510 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kEECDH
|SSL_kECDHr
|SSL_kECDHe
))
2515 const EC_GROUP
*group
;
2516 const BIGNUM
*priv_key
;
2518 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
2519 if ((srvr_ecdh
= EC_KEY_new()) == NULL
)
2521 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2522 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2526 /* Let's get server private key and group information */
2527 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kECDHr
|SSL_kECDHe
))
2529 /* use the certificate */
2530 tkey
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_ECC
].privatekey
->pkey
.ec
;
2534 /* use the ephermeral values we saved when
2535 * generating the ServerKeyExchange msg.
2537 tkey
= s
->s3
->tmp
.ecdh
;
2540 group
= EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey
);
2541 priv_key
= EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey
);
2543 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh
, group
) ||
2544 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh
, priv_key
))
2546 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2551 /* Let's get client's public key */
2552 if ((clnt_ecpoint
= EC_POINT_new(group
)) == NULL
)
2554 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2555 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2561 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
2563 if (alg_k
& SSL_kEECDH
)
2565 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2566 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY
);
2569 if (((clnt_pub_pkey
=X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
))
2571 (clnt_pub_pkey
->type
!= EVP_PKEY_EC
))
2573 /* XXX: For now, we do not support client
2574 * authentication using ECDH certificates
2575 * so this branch (n == 0L) of the code is
2576 * never executed. When that support is
2577 * added, we ought to ensure the key
2578 * received in the certificate is
2579 * authorized for key agreement.
2580 * ECDH_compute_key implicitly checks that
2581 * the two ECDH shares are for the same
2584 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2585 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2586 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS
);
2590 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint
,
2591 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey
->pkey
.ec
)) == 0)
2593 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2597 ret
= 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
2601 /* Get client's public key from encoded point
2602 * in the ClientKeyExchange message.
2604 if ((bn_ctx
= BN_CTX_new()) == NULL
)
2606 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2607 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2611 /* Get encoded point length */
2614 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group
,
2615 clnt_ecpoint
, p
, i
, bn_ctx
) == 0)
2617 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2621 /* p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer
2622 * currently, so set it to the start
2624 p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
2627 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
2628 field_size
= EC_GROUP_get_degree(group
);
2629 if (field_size
<= 0)
2631 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2635 i
= ECDH_compute_key(p
, (field_size
+7)/8, clnt_ecpoint
, srvr_ecdh
, NULL
);
2638 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2643 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey
);
2644 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint
);
2645 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh
);
2646 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx
);
2647 EC_KEY_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.ecdh
);
2648 s
->s3
->tmp
.ecdh
= NULL
;
2650 /* Compute the master secret */
2651 s
->session
->master_key_length
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
-> \
2652 generate_master_secret(s
, s
->session
->master_key
, p
, i
);
2654 OPENSSL_cleanse(p
, i
);
2659 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2660 if (alg_k
& SSL_kPSK
)
2662 unsigned char *t
= NULL
;
2663 unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms
[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
*2+4];
2664 unsigned int pre_ms_len
= 0, psk_len
= 0;
2666 char tmp_id
[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
+1];
2668 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2673 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2674 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2677 if (i
> PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
)
2679 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2680 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2683 if (s
->psk_server_callback
== NULL
)
2685 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2686 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB
);
2690 /* Create guaranteed NULL-terminated identity
2691 * string for the callback */
2692 memcpy(tmp_id
, p
, i
);
2693 memset(tmp_id
+i
, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
+1-i
);
2694 psk_len
= s
->psk_server_callback(s
, tmp_id
,
2695 psk_or_pre_ms
, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms
));
2696 OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_id
, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
+1);
2698 if (psk_len
> PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
)
2700 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2701 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2704 else if (psk_len
== 0)
2706 /* PSK related to the given identity not found */
2707 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2708 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND
);
2709 al
=SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY
;
2713 /* create PSK pre_master_secret */
2714 pre_ms_len
=2+psk_len
+2+psk_len
;
2716 memmove(psk_or_pre_ms
+psk_len
+4, psk_or_pre_ms
, psk_len
);
2718 memset(t
, 0, psk_len
);
2722 if (s
->session
->psk_identity
!= NULL
)
2723 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->psk_identity
);
2724 s
->session
->psk_identity
= BUF_strdup((char *)p
);
2725 if (s
->session
->psk_identity
== NULL
)
2727 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2728 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2732 if (s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
!= NULL
)
2733 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
);
2734 s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
= BUF_strdup(s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
);
2735 if (s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
!= NULL
&&
2736 s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
== NULL
)
2738 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2739 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2743 s
->session
->master_key_length
=
2744 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
2745 s
->session
->master_key
, psk_or_pre_ms
, pre_ms_len
);
2748 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms
, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms
));
2754 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2755 if (alg_k
& SSL_kSRP
)
2763 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2764 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH
);
2767 if (!(s
->srp_ctx
.A
=BN_bin2bn(p
,i
,NULL
)))
2769 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
2772 if (s
->session
->srp_username
!= NULL
)
2773 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->srp_username
);
2774 s
->session
->srp_username
= BUF_strdup(s
->srp_ctx
.login
);
2775 if (s
->session
->srp_username
== NULL
)
2777 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2778 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2782 if ((s
->session
->master_key_length
= SRP_generate_server_master_secret(s
,s
->session
->master_key
))<0)
2784 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2791 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
2792 if (alg_k
& SSL_kGOST
)
2795 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pkey_ctx
;
2796 EVP_PKEY
*client_pub_pkey
= NULL
, *pk
= NULL
;
2797 unsigned char premaster_secret
[32], *start
;
2798 size_t outlen
=32, inlen
;
2799 unsigned long alg_a
;
2801 /* Get our certificate private key*/
2802 alg_a
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
;
2803 if (alg_a
& SSL_aGOST94
)
2804 pk
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_GOST94
].privatekey
;
2805 else if (alg_a
& SSL_aGOST01
)
2806 pk
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_GOST01
].privatekey
;
2808 pkey_ctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk
,NULL
);
2809 EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx
);
2810 /* If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
2811 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
2812 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use
2813 * a client certificate for authorization only. */
2814 client_pub_pkey
= X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
2815 if (client_pub_pkey
)
2817 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx
, client_pub_pkey
) <= 0)
2820 /* Decrypt session key */
2821 if ((*p
!=( V_ASN1_SEQUENCE
| V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED
)))
2823 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
2831 else if (p
[1] < 0x80)
2838 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
2841 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx
,premaster_secret
,&outlen
,start
,inlen
) <=0)
2844 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
2847 /* Generate master secret */
2848 s
->session
->master_key_length
=
2849 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
2850 s
->session
->master_key
,premaster_secret
,32);
2851 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2852 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx
, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY
, 2, NULL
) > 0)
2857 EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey
);
2858 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx
);
2866 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2867 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2868 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE
);
2874 ssl3_send_alert(s
,SSL3_AL_FATAL
,al
);
2875 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_SRP)
2878 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2879 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey
);
2880 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint
);
2881 if (srvr_ecdh
!= NULL
)
2882 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh
);
2883 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx
);
2888 int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL
*s
)
2890 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
=NULL
;
2896 const EVP_MD
*md
= NULL
;
2898 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx
);
2900 n
=s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
2901 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A
,
2902 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B
,
2907 if (!ok
) return((int)n
);
2909 if (s
->session
->peer
!= NULL
)
2911 peer
=s
->session
->peer
;
2912 pkey
=X509_get_pubkey(peer
);
2913 type
=X509_certificate_type(peer
,pkey
);
2921 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
!= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY
)
2923 s
->s3
->tmp
.reuse_message
=1;
2924 if ((peer
!= NULL
) && (type
| EVP_PKT_SIGN
))
2926 al
=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
2927 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE
);
2936 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED
);
2937 al
=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
2941 if (!(type
& EVP_PKT_SIGN
))
2943 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE
);
2944 al
=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
2948 if (s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
)
2950 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY
);
2951 al
=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
2955 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
2956 p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
2957 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
2958 /* If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare
2959 * signature without length field */
2960 if (n
==64 && (pkey
->type
==NID_id_GostR3410_94
||
2961 pkey
->type
== NID_id_GostR3410_2001
) )
2967 if (TLS1_get_version(s
) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
)
2969 int sigalg
= tls12_get_sigid(pkey
);
2970 /* Should never happen */
2973 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2974 al
=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2977 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
2978 if (sigalg
!= (int)p
[1])
2980 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
2981 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2984 md
= tls12_get_hash(p
[0]);
2987 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST
);
2988 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2992 fprintf(stderr
, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md
));
3001 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3002 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
3006 j
=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey
);
3007 if ((i
> j
) || (n
> j
) || (n
<= 0))
3009 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE
);
3010 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
3014 if (TLS1_get_version(s
) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
)
3018 hdatalen
= BIO_get_mem_data(s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
, &hdata
);
3021 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3022 al
=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3026 fprintf(stderr
, "Using TLS 1.2 with client verify alg %s\n",
3029 if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&mctx
, md
, NULL
)
3030 || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(&mctx
, hdata
, hdatalen
))
3032 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
3033 al
=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3037 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&mctx
, p
, i
, pkey
) <= 0)
3039 al
=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
3040 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE
);
3045 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3046 if (pkey
->type
== EVP_PKEY_RSA
)
3048 i
=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1
, s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_verify_md
,
3049 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
, p
, i
,
3053 al
=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
3054 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT
);
3059 al
=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
3060 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE
);
3066 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3067 if (pkey
->type
== EVP_PKEY_DSA
)
3069 j
=DSA_verify(pkey
->save_type
,
3070 &(s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_verify_md
[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
]),
3071 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
,p
,i
,pkey
->pkey
.dsa
);
3075 al
=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
3076 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE
);
3082 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3083 if (pkey
->type
== EVP_PKEY_EC
)
3085 j
=ECDSA_verify(pkey
->save_type
,
3086 &(s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_verify_md
[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
]),
3087 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
,p
,i
,pkey
->pkey
.ec
);
3091 al
=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
3092 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,
3093 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE
);
3099 if (pkey
->type
== NID_id_GostR3410_94
|| pkey
->type
== NID_id_GostR3410_2001
)
3100 { unsigned char signature
[64];
3102 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey
,NULL
);
3103 EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx
);
3105 fprintf(stderr
,"GOST signature length is %d",i
);
3107 for (idx
=0;idx
<64;idx
++) {
3108 signature
[63-idx
]=p
[idx
];
3110 j
=EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx
,signature
,64,s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_verify_md
,32);
3111 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
3114 al
=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
3115 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,
3116 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE
);
3122 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3123 al
=SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE
;
3132 ssl3_send_alert(s
,SSL3_AL_FATAL
,al
);
3135 if (s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
)
3137 BIO_free(s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
);
3138 s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
= NULL
;
3139 s
->s3
->flags
&= ~TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE
;
3141 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx
);
3142 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey
);
3146 int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL
*s
)
3148 int i
,ok
,al
,ret
= -1;
3150 unsigned long l
,nc
,llen
,n
;
3151 const unsigned char *p
,*q
;
3153 STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
=NULL
;
3155 n
=s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
3162 if (!ok
) return((int)n
);
3164 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
== SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
)
3166 if ( (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
) &&
3167 (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT
))
3169 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE
);
3170 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
3173 /* If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list */
3174 if ((s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
) && s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
)
3176 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST
);
3177 al
=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
3180 s
->s3
->tmp
.reuse_message
=1;
3184 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
!= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
)
3186 al
=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
3187 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE
);
3190 p
=d
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
3192 if ((sk
=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL
)
3194 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3201 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
3202 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3205 for (nc
=0; nc
<llen
; )
3208 if ((l
+nc
+3) > llen
)
3210 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
3211 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3216 x
=d2i_X509(NULL
,&p
,l
);
3219 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB
);
3224 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
3225 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3228 if (!sk_X509_push(sk
,x
))
3230 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3237 if (sk_X509_num(sk
) <= 0)
3239 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3240 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
)
3242 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
3243 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED
);
3246 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3247 else if ((s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
) &&
3248 (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT
))
3250 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE
);
3251 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
3254 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
3255 if (s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
&& !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
))
3257 al
=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3263 i
=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s
,sk
);
3266 al
=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s
->verify_result
);
3267 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_RETURNED
);
3272 if (s
->session
->peer
!= NULL
) /* This should not be needed */
3273 X509_free(s
->session
->peer
);
3274 s
->session
->peer
=sk_X509_shift(sk
);
3275 s
->session
->verify_result
= s
->verify_result
;
3277 /* With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL
3278 * when we arrive here. */
3279 if (s
->session
->sess_cert
== NULL
)
3281 s
->session
->sess_cert
= ssl_sess_cert_new();
3282 if (s
->session
->sess_cert
== NULL
)
3284 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3288 if (s
->session
->sess_cert
->cert_chain
!= NULL
)
3289 sk_X509_pop_free(s
->session
->sess_cert
->cert_chain
, X509_free
);
3290 s
->session
->sess_cert
->cert_chain
=sk
;
3291 /* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the
3292 * peer's own certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c */
3300 ssl3_send_alert(s
,SSL3_AL_FATAL
,al
);
3303 if (x
!= NULL
) X509_free(x
);
3304 if (sk
!= NULL
) sk_X509_pop_free(sk
,X509_free
);
3308 int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL
*s
)
3313 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A
)
3315 x
=ssl_get_server_send_cert(s
);
3318 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
3319 if ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
!= SSL_aKRB5
) ||
3320 (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kKRB5
))
3322 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3327 l
=ssl3_output_cert_chain(s
,x
);
3328 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B
;
3333 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
3334 return(ssl3_do_write(s
,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
));
3336 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
3337 int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL
*s
)
3339 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A
)
3341 unsigned char *p
, *senc
, *macstart
;
3346 SSL_CTX
*tctx
= s
->initial_ctx
;
3347 unsigned char iv
[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH
];
3348 unsigned char key_name
[16];
3350 /* get session encoding length */
3351 slen
= i2d_SSL_SESSION(s
->session
, NULL
);
3352 /* Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is
3357 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3358 * follows 1 (size of message name) + 3 (message length
3359 * bytes) + 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
3360 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
3361 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
3362 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
3364 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s
->init_buf
,
3365 26 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH
+ EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH
+
3366 EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
+ slen
))
3368 senc
= OPENSSL_malloc(slen
);
3372 i2d_SSL_SESSION(s
->session
, &p
);
3374 p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
3376 *(p
++)=SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET
;
3377 /* Skip message length for now */
3379 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx
);
3380 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx
);
3381 /* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present
3382 * it does all the work otherwise use generated values
3385 if (tctx
->tlsext_ticket_key_cb
)
3387 if (tctx
->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s
, key_name
, iv
, &ctx
,
3396 RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv
, 16);
3397 EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx
, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL
,
3398 tctx
->tlsext_tick_aes_key
, iv
);
3399 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx
, tctx
->tlsext_tick_hmac_key
, 16,
3400 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL
);
3401 memcpy(key_name
, tctx
->tlsext_tick_key_name
, 16);
3403 l2n(s
->session
->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint
, p
);
3404 /* Skip ticket length for now */
3406 /* Output key name */
3408 memcpy(p
, key_name
, 16);
3411 memcpy(p
, iv
, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx
));
3412 p
+= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx
);
3413 /* Encrypt session data */
3414 EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx
, p
, &len
, senc
, slen
);
3416 EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx
, p
, &len
);
3418 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx
);
3420 HMAC_Update(&hctx
, macstart
, p
- macstart
);
3421 HMAC_Final(&hctx
, p
, &hlen
);
3422 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx
);
3425 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
3427 len
= p
- (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
3428 p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
+ 1;
3429 l2n3(len
- 4, p
); /* Message length */
3431 s2n(len
- 10, p
); /* Ticket length */
3433 /* number of bytes to write */
3435 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B
;
3440 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
3441 return(ssl3_do_write(s
,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
));
3444 int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL
*s
)
3446 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A
)
3449 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3450 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
3451 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
3454 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s
->init_buf
, 8 + s
->tlsext_ocsp_resplen
))
3457 p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
3460 *(p
++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS
;
3461 /* message length */
3462 l2n3(s
->tlsext_ocsp_resplen
+ 4, p
);
3464 *(p
++)= s
->tlsext_status_type
;
3465 /* length of OCSP response */
3466 l2n3(s
->tlsext_ocsp_resplen
, p
);
3467 /* actual response */
3468 memcpy(p
, s
->tlsext_ocsp_resp
, s
->tlsext_ocsp_resplen
);
3469 /* number of bytes to write */
3470 s
->init_num
= 8 + s
->tlsext_ocsp_resplen
;
3471 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B
;
3475 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
3476 return(ssl3_do_write(s
,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
));
3479 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NPN
3480 /* ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message. It
3481 * sets the next_proto member in s if found */
3482 int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL
*s
)
3485 int proto_len
, padding_len
;
3487 const unsigned char *p
;
3489 /* Clients cannot send a NextProtocol message if we didn't see the
3490 * extension in their ClientHello */
3491 if (!s
->s3
->next_proto_neg_seen
)
3493 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO
,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION
);
3497 n
=s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
3498 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A
,
3499 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B
,
3501 514, /* See the payload format below */
3507 /* s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received
3508 * in this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset
3509 * by ssl3_get_finished). */
3510 if (!s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
)
3512 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO
,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS
);
3517 return 0; /* The body must be > 1 bytes long */
3519 p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
3521 /* The payload looks like:
3523 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
3524 * uint8 padding_len;
3525 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
3528 if (proto_len
+ 2 > s
->init_num
)
3530 padding_len
= p
[proto_len
+ 1];
3531 if (proto_len
+ padding_len
+ 2 != s
->init_num
)
3534 s
->next_proto_negotiated
= OPENSSL_malloc(proto_len
);
3535 if (!s
->next_proto_negotiated
)
3537 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO
,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3540 memcpy(s
->next_proto_negotiated
, p
+ 1, proto_len
);
3541 s
->next_proto_negotiated_len
= proto_len
;