1 /* ssl/s3_srvr.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
124 /* ====================================================================
125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
142 * to make use of the Contribution.
144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
151 #define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
152 #define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
155 #include "ssl_locl.h"
156 #include "kssl_lcl.h"
157 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
158 #include <openssl/rand.h>
159 #include <openssl/objects.h>
160 #include <openssl/evp.h>
161 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
162 #include <openssl/x509.h>
163 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
164 #include <openssl/dh.h>
166 #include <openssl/bn.h>
167 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
168 #include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
170 #include <openssl/md5.h>
172 static const SSL_METHOD
*ssl3_get_server_method(int ver
);
174 static const SSL_METHOD
*ssl3_get_server_method(int ver
)
176 if (ver
== SSL3_VERSION
)
177 return(SSLv3_server_method());
182 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
183 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL
*s
, int *al
)
185 int ret
= SSL_ERROR_NONE
;
187 *al
= SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME
;
189 if ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kSRP
) &&
190 (s
->srp_ctx
.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback
!= NULL
))
192 if(s
->srp_ctx
.login
== NULL
)
194 /* RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject,
195 we do so if There is no srp login name */
197 *al
= SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY
;
201 ret
= SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s
,al
);
208 IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method
,
210 ssl_undefined_function
,
211 ssl3_get_server_method
)
213 int ssl3_accept(SSL
*s
)
216 unsigned long alg_k
,Time
=(unsigned long)time(NULL
);
217 void (*cb
)(const SSL
*ssl
,int type
,int val
)=NULL
;
219 int new_state
,state
,skip
=0;
221 RAND_add(&Time
,sizeof(Time
),0);
225 if (s
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
227 else if (s
->ctx
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
228 cb
=s
->ctx
->info_callback
;
230 /* init things to blank */
232 if (!SSL_in_init(s
) || SSL_in_before(s
)) SSL_clear(s
);
236 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT
,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET
);
240 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
241 /* If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we
242 * already got and don't await it anymore, because
243 * Heartbeats don't make sense during handshakes anyway.
245 if (s
->tlsext_hb_pending
)
247 s
->tlsext_hb_pending
= 0;
258 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE
:
260 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
264 case SSL_ST_BEFORE
|SSL_ST_ACCEPT
:
265 case SSL_ST_OK
|SSL_ST_ACCEPT
:
268 if (cb
!= NULL
) cb(s
,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START
,1);
270 if ((s
->version
>>8) != 3)
272 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
276 if (!ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_VERSION
, 0,
279 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT
, SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW
);
283 s
->type
=SSL_ST_ACCEPT
;
285 if (s
->init_buf
== NULL
)
287 if ((buf
=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL
)
292 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf
,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
))
300 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s
))
307 s
->s3
->flags
&= ~SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE
;
308 s
->s3
->flags
&= ~TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY
;
310 if (s
->state
!= SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE
)
312 /* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that
313 * the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
315 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s
,1)) { ret
= -1; goto end
; }
317 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s
);
318 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A
;
319 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_accept
++;
321 else if (!s
->s3
->send_connection_binding
&&
322 !(s
->options
& SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION
))
324 /* Server attempting to renegotiate with
325 * client that doesn't support secure
328 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT
, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED
);
329 ssl3_send_alert(s
,SSL3_AL_FATAL
,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
335 /* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE,
336 * we will just send a HelloRequest */
337 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_accept_renegotiate
++;
338 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A
;
342 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A
:
343 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B
:
346 ret
=ssl3_send_hello_request(s
);
347 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
348 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C
;
349 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH
;
352 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s
);
355 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C
:
359 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A
:
360 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B
:
361 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C
:
363 ret
=ssl3_get_client_hello(s
);
364 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
365 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
366 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D
;
367 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D
:
370 if ((ret
= ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s
,&al
)) < 0)
372 /* callback indicates firther work to be done */
373 s
->rwstate
=SSL_X509_LOOKUP
;
376 if (ret
!= SSL_ERROR_NONE
)
378 ssl3_send_alert(s
,SSL3_AL_FATAL
,al
);
379 /* This is not really an error but the only means to
380 for a client to detect whether srp is supported. */
381 if (al
!= TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY
)
382 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT
,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
);
383 ret
= SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL
;
391 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A
;
395 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A
:
396 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B
:
397 ret
=ssl3_send_server_hello(s
);
398 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
399 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
402 if (s
->tlsext_ticket_expected
)
403 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A
;
405 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A
;
409 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A
;
412 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A
;
416 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A
:
417 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B
:
418 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
419 /* normal PSK or KRB5 or SRP */
420 if (!(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aNULL
)
421 && !(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kPSK
)
422 && !(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aKRB5
))
424 ret
=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s
);
425 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
426 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
427 if (s
->tlsext_status_expected
)
428 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A
;
430 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A
;
435 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A
;
442 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A
;
447 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A
:
448 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B
:
449 alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
451 /* clear this, it may get reset by
452 * send_server_key_exchange */
453 if ((s
->options
& SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA
)
454 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
455 && !(alg_k
& SSL_kKRB5
)
456 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
458 /* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key
459 * even when forbidden by protocol specs
460 * (handshake may fail as clients are not required to
461 * be able to handle this) */
462 s
->s3
->tmp
.use_rsa_tmp
=1;
464 s
->s3
->tmp
.use_rsa_tmp
=0;
467 /* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or
468 * RSA but we have a sign only certificate
470 * PSK: may send PSK identity hints
472 * For ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange
473 * message only if the cipher suite is either
474 * ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, the
475 * server certificate contains the server's
476 * public key for key exchange.
478 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.use_rsa_tmp
479 /* PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity
480 * hint if provided */
481 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
482 || ((alg_k
& SSL_kPSK
) && s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
)
484 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
485 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
486 || (alg_k
& SSL_kSRP
)
488 || (alg_k
& SSL_kDHE
)
489 || (alg_k
& SSL_kECDHE
)
490 || ((alg_k
& SSL_kRSA
)
491 && (s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
].privatekey
== NULL
492 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
)
493 && EVP_PKEY_size(s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
].privatekey
)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
)
499 ret
=ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s
);
500 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
505 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A
;
509 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A
:
510 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B
:
511 if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
512 !(s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
) ||
513 /* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set,
514 * don't request cert during re-negotiation: */
515 ((s
->session
->peer
!= NULL
) &&
516 (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE
)) ||
517 /* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites
518 * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts
519 * and in RFC 2246): */
520 ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aNULL
) &&
521 /* ... except when the application insists on verification
522 * (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */
523 !(s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT
)) ||
524 /* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */
525 (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aKRB5
)
526 /* With normal PSK Certificates and
527 * Certificate Requests are omitted */
528 || (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kPSK
))
530 /* no cert request */
532 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
=0;
533 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A
;
534 if (s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
)
535 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
))
540 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
=1;
541 ret
=ssl3_send_certificate_request(s
);
542 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
543 #ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
544 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A
;
546 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH
;
547 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A
;
553 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A
:
554 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B
:
555 ret
=ssl3_send_server_done(s
);
556 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
557 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A
;
558 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH
;
562 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH
:
564 /* This code originally checked to see if
565 * any data was pending using BIO_CTRL_INFO
566 * and then flushed. This caused problems
567 * as documented in PR#1939. The proposed
568 * fix doesn't completely resolve this issue
569 * as buggy implementations of BIO_CTRL_PENDING
570 * still exist. So instead we just flush
574 s
->rwstate
=SSL_WRITING
;
575 if (BIO_flush(s
->wbio
) <= 0)
580 s
->rwstate
=SSL_NOTHING
;
582 s
->state
=s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
;
585 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A
:
586 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B
:
587 /* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */
588 ret
= ssl3_check_client_hello(s
);
592 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C
;
594 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
)
596 ret
=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s
);
597 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
600 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A
;
604 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A
:
605 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B
:
606 ret
=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s
);
611 /* For the ECDH ciphersuites when
612 * the client sends its ECDH pub key in
613 * a certificate, the CertificateVerify
614 * message is not sent.
615 * Also for GOST ciphersuites when
616 * the client uses its key from the certificate
619 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
620 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
;
622 if (s
->s3
->next_proto_neg_seen
)
623 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A
;
625 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
;
629 else if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
))
631 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A
;
633 if (!s
->session
->peer
)
635 /* For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer
636 * at this point and digest cached records.
638 if (!s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
)
640 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT
,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
643 s
->s3
->flags
|= TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE
;
644 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
))
652 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A
;
655 /* We need to get hashes here so if there is
656 * a client cert, it can be verified
657 * FIXME - digest processing for CertificateVerify
658 * should be generalized. But it is next step
660 if (s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
)
661 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
))
663 for (dgst_num
=0; dgst_num
<SSL_MAX_DIGEST
;dgst_num
++)
664 if (s
->s3
->handshake_dgst
[dgst_num
])
668 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->cert_verify_mac(s
,EVP_MD_CTX_type(s
->s3
->handshake_dgst
[dgst_num
]),&(s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_verify_md
[offset
]));
669 dgst_size
=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s
->s3
->handshake_dgst
[dgst_num
]);
680 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A
:
681 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B
:
683 s
->s3
->flags
|= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK
;
684 /* we should decide if we expected this one */
685 ret
=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s
);
686 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
688 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
689 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
;
691 if (s
->s3
->next_proto_neg_seen
)
692 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A
;
694 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
;
699 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
700 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A
:
701 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B
:
702 ret
=ssl3_get_next_proto(s
);
703 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
705 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
;
709 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
:
710 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B
:
711 s
->s3
->flags
|= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK
;
712 ret
=ssl3_get_finished(s
,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
,
713 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B
);
714 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
717 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
718 else if (s
->tlsext_ticket_expected
)
719 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A
;
722 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A
;
726 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
727 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A
:
728 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B
:
729 ret
=ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s
);
730 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
731 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A
;
735 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A
:
736 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B
:
737 ret
=ssl3_send_cert_status(s
);
738 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
739 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A
;
745 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A
:
746 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B
:
748 s
->session
->cipher
=s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
;
749 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->setup_key_block(s
))
750 { ret
= -1; goto end
; }
752 ret
=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s
,
753 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A
,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B
);
755 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
756 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A
;
759 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
760 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE
))
768 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A
:
769 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B
:
770 ret
=ssl3_send_finished(s
,
771 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A
,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B
,
772 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->server_finished_label
,
773 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->server_finished_label_len
);
774 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
775 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH
;
778 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
779 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
;
781 if (s
->s3
->next_proto_neg_seen
)
783 s
->s3
->flags
|= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK
;
784 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A
;
787 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
;
791 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
=SSL_ST_OK
;
796 /* clean a few things up */
797 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s
);
799 BUF_MEM_free(s
->init_buf
);
802 /* remove buffering on output */
803 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s
);
807 if (s
->renegotiate
== 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
812 ssl_update_cache(s
,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER
);
814 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_accept_good
++;
816 s
->handshake_func
=ssl3_accept
;
818 if (cb
!= NULL
) cb(s
,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE
,1);
826 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT
,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE
);
832 if (!s
->s3
->tmp
.reuse_message
&& !skip
)
836 if ((ret
=BIO_flush(s
->wbio
)) <= 0)
841 if ((cb
!= NULL
) && (s
->state
!= state
))
845 cb(s
,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP
,1);
852 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
856 cb(s
,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT
,ret
);
860 int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL
*s
)
863 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A
)
865 ssl_set_handshake_header(s
, SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST
, 0);
866 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B
;
869 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
870 return ssl_do_write(s
);
873 int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL
*s
)
878 /* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message,
879 * so permit appropriate message length */
880 n
=s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
886 if (!ok
) return((int)n
);
887 s
->s3
->tmp
.reuse_message
= 1;
888 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
== SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO
)
890 /* We only allow the client to restart the handshake once per
892 if (s
->s3
->flags
& SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE
)
894 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_MULTIPLE_SGC_RESTARTS
);
897 /* Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake,
898 * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.) */
899 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
900 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
!= NULL
)
902 DH_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
);
903 s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
= NULL
;
906 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
907 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.ecdh
!= NULL
)
909 EC_KEY_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.ecdh
);
910 s
->s3
->tmp
.ecdh
= NULL
;
913 s
->s3
->flags
|= SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE
;
919 int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL
*s
)
921 int i
,j
,ok
,al
=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,ret
= -1;
922 unsigned int cookie_len
;
927 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
931 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *ciphers
=NULL
;
933 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C
&& !s
->first_packet
)
936 /* We do this so that we will respond with our native type.
937 * If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1,
938 * This down switching should be handled by a different method.
939 * If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with
942 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A
945 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B
;
948 n
=s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
949 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B
,
950 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C
,
951 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
952 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
,
955 if (!ok
) return((int)n
);
957 d
=p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
959 /* use version from inside client hello, not from record header
960 * (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */
961 s
->client_version
=(((int)p
[0])<<8)|(int)p
[1];
964 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) ? (s
->client_version
> s
->version
&&
965 s
->method
->version
!= DTLS_ANY_VERSION
)
966 : (s
->client_version
< s
->version
))
968 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER
);
969 if ((s
->client_version
>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR
&&
970 !s
->enc_write_ctx
&& !s
->write_hash
)
972 /* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
973 s
->version
= s
->client_version
;
975 al
= SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
979 /* If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't
980 * contain one, just return since we do not want to
981 * allocate any memory yet. So check cookie length...
983 if (SSL_get_options(s
) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE
)
985 unsigned int session_length
, cookie_length
;
987 session_length
= *(p
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
988 cookie_length
= *(p
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
+ session_length
+ 1);
990 if (cookie_length
== 0)
994 /* load the client random */
995 memcpy(s
->s3
->client_random
,p
,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
998 /* get the session-id */
1002 /* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in renegotiation.
1003 * 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally ignore resumption requests
1004 * with flag SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
1005 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on this for security
1006 * won't even compile against older library versions).
1008 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to request
1009 * renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains unset): for servers,
1010 * this essentially just means that the SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1011 * setting will be ignored.
1013 if ((s
->new_session
&& (s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
)))
1015 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s
,1))
1020 i
=ssl_get_prev_session(s
, p
, j
, d
+ n
);
1022 { /* previous session */
1029 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s
,1))
1039 cookie_len
= *(p
++);
1042 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
1043 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
1044 * does not cause an overflow.
1046 if ( cookie_len
> sizeof(s
->d1
->rcvd_cookie
))
1049 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1050 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH
);
1054 /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
1055 if ((SSL_get_options(s
) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE
) &&
1058 memcpy(s
->d1
->rcvd_cookie
, p
, cookie_len
);
1060 if ( s
->ctx
->app_verify_cookie_cb
!= NULL
)
1062 if ( s
->ctx
->app_verify_cookie_cb(s
, s
->d1
->rcvd_cookie
,
1065 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1066 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1067 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH
);
1070 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1072 else if ( memcmp(s
->d1
->rcvd_cookie
, s
->d1
->cookie
,
1073 s
->d1
->cookie_len
) != 0) /* default verification */
1075 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1076 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1077 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH
);
1080 /* Set to -2 so if successful we return 2 */
1085 if (s
->method
->version
== DTLS_ANY_VERSION
)
1087 /* Select version to use */
1088 if (s
->client_version
<= DTLS1_2_VERSION
&&
1089 !(s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2
))
1091 s
->version
= DTLS1_2_VERSION
;
1092 s
->method
= DTLSv1_2_server_method();
1094 else if (tls1_suiteb(s
))
1096 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE
);
1097 s
->version
= s
->client_version
;
1098 al
= SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
1101 else if (s
->client_version
<= DTLS1_VERSION
&&
1102 !(s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1
))
1104 s
->version
= DTLS1_VERSION
;
1105 s
->method
= DTLSv1_server_method();
1109 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER
);
1110 s
->version
= s
->client_version
;
1111 al
= SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
1114 s
->session
->ssl_version
= s
->version
;
1119 if ((i
== 0) && (j
!= 0))
1121 /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */
1122 al
=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1123 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED
);
1128 /* not enough data */
1129 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1130 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1133 if ((i
> 0) && (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s
,p
,i
,&(ciphers
))
1140 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
1141 if ((s
->hit
) && (i
> 0))
1144 id
=s
->session
->cipher
->id
;
1147 printf("client sent %d ciphers\n",sk_num(ciphers
));
1149 for (i
=0; i
<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers
); i
++)
1151 c
=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers
,i
);
1153 printf("client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1154 i
,sk_num(ciphers
),SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c
));
1162 /* Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade
1163 * attack: CVE-2010-4180.
1166 if (j
== 0 && (s
->options
& SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG
) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers
) == 1))
1168 /* Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used cipher may
1169 * not be in the current list, the client instead might be trying to
1170 * continue using a cipher that before wasn't chosen due to server
1171 * preferences. We'll have to reject the connection if the cipher is not
1172 * enabled, though. */
1173 c
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers
, 0);
1174 if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s
), c
) >= 0)
1176 s
->session
->cipher
= c
;
1183 /* we need to have the cipher in the cipher
1184 * list if we are asked to reuse it */
1185 al
=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1186 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING
);
1195 /* not enough data */
1196 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1197 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1200 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1205 if (p
[j
] == 0) break;
1212 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1213 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED
);
1217 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1219 if (s
->version
>= SSL3_VERSION
)
1221 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s
,&p
,d
,n
))
1223 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT
);
1228 /* Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this
1229 * handshake for not reused session only. We need to generate
1230 * server_random before calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow
1231 * SessionTicket processing to use it in key derivation. */
1234 pos
=s
->s3
->server_random
;
1235 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s
, 1, pos
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) <= 0)
1241 if (!s
->hit
&& s
->version
>= TLS1_VERSION
&& s
->tls_session_secret_cb
)
1243 SSL_CIPHER
*pref_cipher
=NULL
;
1245 s
->session
->master_key_length
=sizeof(s
->session
->master_key
);
1246 if(s
->tls_session_secret_cb(s
, s
->session
->master_key
, &s
->session
->master_key_length
,
1247 ciphers
, &pref_cipher
, s
->tls_session_secret_cb_arg
))
1250 s
->session
->ciphers
=ciphers
;
1251 s
->session
->verify_result
=X509_V_OK
;
1255 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1256 pref_cipher
=pref_cipher
? pref_cipher
: ssl3_choose_cipher(s
, s
->session
->ciphers
, SSL_get_ciphers(s
));
1257 if (pref_cipher
== NULL
)
1259 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1260 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER
);
1264 s
->session
->cipher
=pref_cipher
;
1267 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s
->cipher_list
);
1269 if (s
->cipher_list_by_id
)
1270 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s
->cipher_list_by_id
);
1272 s
->cipher_list
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s
->session
->ciphers
);
1273 s
->cipher_list_by_id
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s
->session
->ciphers
);
1278 /* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1279 * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
1280 * algorithms from the client, starting at q. */
1281 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
=NULL
;
1282 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1283 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1284 if (s
->session
->compress_meth
!= 0)
1286 int m
, comp_id
= s
->session
->compress_meth
;
1287 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1288 /* Can't disable compression */
1289 if (!ssl_allow_compression(s
))
1291 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION
);
1294 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1295 for (m
= 0; m
< sk_SSL_COMP_num(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
); m
++)
1297 comp
=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
,m
);
1298 if (comp_id
== comp
->id
)
1300 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
=comp
;
1304 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
== NULL
)
1306 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM
);
1309 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1310 for (m
= 0; m
< i
; m
++)
1312 if (q
[m
] == comp_id
)
1317 al
=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1318 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING
);
1324 else if (ssl_allow_compression(s
) && s
->ctx
->comp_methods
)
1325 { /* See if we have a match */
1326 int m
,nn
,o
,v
,done
=0;
1328 nn
=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
);
1329 for (m
=0; m
<nn
; m
++)
1331 comp
=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
,m
);
1344 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
=comp
;
1349 /* If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1350 * using compression.
1352 if (s
->session
->compress_meth
!= 0)
1354 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION
);
1359 /* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must
1364 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1365 s
->session
->compress_meth
=0;
1367 s
->session
->compress_meth
=(comp
== NULL
)?0:comp
->id
;
1369 if (s
->session
->ciphers
!= NULL
)
1370 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s
->session
->ciphers
);
1371 s
->session
->ciphers
=ciphers
;
1372 if (ciphers
== NULL
)
1374 al
=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1375 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED
);
1379 /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
1381 if (s
->cert
->cert_cb
)
1383 int rv
= s
->cert
->cert_cb(s
, s
->cert
->cert_cb_arg
);
1386 al
=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1387 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR
);
1392 s
->rwstate
=SSL_X509_LOOKUP
;
1395 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
1397 c
=ssl3_choose_cipher(s
,s
->session
->ciphers
,
1398 SSL_get_ciphers(s
));
1402 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1403 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER
);
1406 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
=c
;
1407 /* check whether we should disable session resumption */
1408 if (s
->not_resumable_session_cb
!= NULL
)
1409 s
->session
->not_resumable
=s
->not_resumable_session_cb(s
,
1410 ((c
->algorithm_mkey
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kECDHE
)) != 0));
1411 if (s
->session
->not_resumable
)
1412 /* do not send a session ticket */
1413 s
->tlsext_ticket_expected
= 0;
1417 /* Session-id reuse */
1418 #ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
1419 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *sk
;
1420 SSL_CIPHER
*nc
=NULL
;
1421 SSL_CIPHER
*ec
=NULL
;
1423 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG
)
1425 sk
=s
->session
->ciphers
;
1426 for (i
=0; i
<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk
); i
++)
1428 c
=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk
,i
);
1429 if (c
->algorithm_enc
& SSL_eNULL
)
1431 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c
))
1435 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
=nc
;
1436 else if (ec
!= NULL
)
1437 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
=ec
;
1439 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
=s
->session
->cipher
;
1443 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
=s
->session
->cipher
;
1446 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
) || !(s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
))
1448 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
))
1452 /* we now have the following setup.
1454 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
1455 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
1456 * compression - basically ignored right now
1457 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1458 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1459 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1460 * s->s3->tmp.new_cipher- the new cipher to use.
1463 /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */
1464 if (s
->version
>= SSL3_VERSION
)
1466 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s
) <= 0)
1468 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
);
1473 if (ret
< 0) ret
=-ret
;
1477 ssl3_send_alert(s
,SSL3_AL_FATAL
,al
);
1480 if (ciphers
!= NULL
) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers
);
1481 return ret
< 0 ? -1 : ret
;
1484 int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL
*s
)
1487 unsigned char *p
,*d
;
1492 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A
)
1494 buf
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
1495 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1496 p
=s
->s3
->server_random
;
1497 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s
, 1, p
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) <= 0)
1500 /* Do the message type and length last */
1501 d
=p
= ssl_handshake_start(s
);
1503 *(p
++)=s
->version
>>8;
1504 *(p
++)=s
->version
&0xff;
1507 memcpy(p
,s
->s3
->server_random
,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
1508 p
+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
;
1510 /* There are several cases for the session ID to send
1511 * back in the server hello:
1512 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
1513 * we send back the old session ID.
1514 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
1515 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
1516 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
1517 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
1519 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
1520 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
1521 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
1522 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
1525 if (s
->session
->not_resumable
||
1526 (!(s
->ctx
->session_cache_mode
& SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER
)
1528 s
->session
->session_id_length
=0;
1530 sl
=s
->session
->session_id_length
;
1531 if (sl
> (int)sizeof(s
->session
->session_id
))
1533 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1537 memcpy(p
,s
->session
->session_id
,sl
);
1540 /* put the cipher */
1541 i
=ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
,p
);
1544 /* put the compression method */
1545 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1548 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
== NULL
)
1551 *(p
++)=s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
->id
;
1553 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1554 if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s
) <= 0)
1556 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO
,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT
);
1559 if ((p
= ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s
, p
, buf
+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
, &al
)) == NULL
)
1561 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1562 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO
,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1568 ssl_set_handshake_header(s
, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO
, l
);
1569 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B
;
1572 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
1573 return ssl_do_write(s
);
1576 int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL
*s
)
1579 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A
)
1581 ssl_set_handshake_header(s
, SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE
, 0);
1582 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B
;
1585 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
1586 return ssl_do_write(s
);
1589 int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL
*s
)
1591 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1595 unsigned char md_buf
[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
];
1598 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1601 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1602 EC_KEY
*ecdh
=NULL
, *ecdhp
;
1603 unsigned char *encodedPoint
= NULL
;
1606 BN_CTX
*bn_ctx
= NULL
;
1609 const EVP_MD
*md
= NULL
;
1610 unsigned char *p
,*d
;
1620 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx
);
1621 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A
)
1623 type
=s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
1628 r
[0]=r
[1]=r
[2]=r
[3]=NULL
;
1630 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1631 if (type
& SSL_kRSA
)
1634 if ((rsa
== NULL
) && (s
->cert
->rsa_tmp_cb
!= NULL
))
1636 rsa
=s
->cert
->rsa_tmp_cb(s
,
1637 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
),
1638 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
));
1641 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1642 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY
);
1650 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1651 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY
);
1656 s
->s3
->tmp
.use_rsa_tmp
=1;
1660 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1661 if (type
& SSL_kDHE
)
1663 if (s
->cert
->dh_tmp_auto
)
1665 dhp
= ssl_get_auto_dh(s
);
1668 al
=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1669 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1675 if ((dhp
== NULL
) && (s
->cert
->dh_tmp_cb
!= NULL
))
1676 dhp
=s
->cert
->dh_tmp_cb(s
,
1677 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
),
1678 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
));
1681 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1682 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY
);
1685 if (!ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH
,
1686 DH_security_bits(dhp
), 0, dhp
))
1688 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1689 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL
);
1692 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
!= NULL
)
1694 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1698 if (s
->cert
->dh_tmp_auto
)
1700 else if ((dh
=DHparams_dup(dhp
)) == NULL
)
1702 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_DH_LIB
);
1707 if ((dhp
->pub_key
== NULL
||
1708 dhp
->priv_key
== NULL
||
1709 (s
->options
& SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE
)))
1711 if(!DH_generate_key(dh
))
1713 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1720 dh
->pub_key
=BN_dup(dhp
->pub_key
);
1721 dh
->priv_key
=BN_dup(dhp
->priv_key
);
1722 if ((dh
->pub_key
== NULL
) ||
1723 (dh
->priv_key
== NULL
))
1725 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_DH_LIB
);
1735 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1736 if (type
& SSL_kECDHE
)
1738 const EC_GROUP
*group
;
1740 ecdhp
=cert
->ecdh_tmp
;
1741 if (s
->cert
->ecdh_tmp_auto
)
1743 /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
1744 int nid
= tls1_shared_curve(s
, -2);
1745 if (nid
!= NID_undef
)
1746 ecdhp
= EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid
);
1748 else if ((ecdhp
== NULL
) && s
->cert
->ecdh_tmp_cb
)
1750 ecdhp
=s
->cert
->ecdh_tmp_cb(s
,
1751 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
),
1752 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
));
1756 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1757 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY
);
1761 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.ecdh
!= NULL
)
1763 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1767 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
1770 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB
);
1773 if (s
->cert
->ecdh_tmp_auto
)
1775 else if ((ecdh
= EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp
)) == NULL
)
1777 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB
);
1781 s
->s3
->tmp
.ecdh
=ecdh
;
1782 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh
) == NULL
) ||
1783 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh
) == NULL
) ||
1784 (s
->options
& SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE
))
1786 if(!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh
))
1788 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB
);
1793 if (((group
= EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh
)) == NULL
) ||
1794 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh
) == NULL
) ||
1795 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh
) == NULL
))
1797 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB
);
1801 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
) &&
1802 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group
) > 163))
1804 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER
);
1808 /* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH
1809 * keys over named (not generic) curves. For
1810 * supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero.
1813 tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group
)))
1816 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE
);
1820 /* Encode the public key.
1821 * First check the size of encoding and
1822 * allocate memory accordingly.
1824 encodedlen
= EC_POINT_point2oct(group
,
1825 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh
),
1826 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED
,
1829 encodedPoint
= (unsigned char *)
1830 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen
*sizeof(unsigned char));
1831 bn_ctx
= BN_CTX_new();
1832 if ((encodedPoint
== NULL
) || (bn_ctx
== NULL
))
1834 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1839 encodedlen
= EC_POINT_point2oct(group
,
1840 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh
),
1841 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED
,
1842 encodedPoint
, encodedlen
, bn_ctx
);
1844 if (encodedlen
== 0)
1846 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB
);
1850 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx
); bn_ctx
=NULL
;
1852 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not
1853 * generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges.
1854 * In this situation, we need four additional bytes
1855 * to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
1860 /* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message
1861 * explicitly so we can set these to NULLs
1869 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
1870 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1871 if (type
& SSL_kPSK
)
1873 /* reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint*/
1874 n
+=2+strlen(s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
);
1877 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1878 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1879 if (type
& SSL_kSRP
)
1881 if ((s
->srp_ctx
.N
== NULL
) ||
1882 (s
->srp_ctx
.g
== NULL
) ||
1883 (s
->srp_ctx
.s
== NULL
) ||
1884 (s
->srp_ctx
.B
== NULL
))
1886 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM
);
1897 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1898 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE
);
1901 for (i
=0; i
< 4 && r
[i
] != NULL
; i
++)
1903 nr
[i
]=BN_num_bytes(r
[i
]);
1904 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1905 if ((i
== 2) && (type
& SSL_kSRP
))
1912 if (!(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aNULL
)
1913 && !(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kPSK
))
1915 if ((pkey
=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s
,s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
,&md
))
1918 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1921 kn
=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey
);
1929 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf
,n
+SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s
)+kn
))
1931 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_LIB_BUF
);
1934 d
= p
= ssl_handshake_start(s
);
1936 for (i
=0; i
< 4 && r
[i
] != NULL
; i
++)
1938 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1939 if ((i
== 2) && (type
& SSL_kSRP
))
1951 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1952 if (type
& SSL_kECDHE
)
1954 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves.
1955 * In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has:
1956 * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
1957 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by
1958 * the actual encoded point itself
1960 *p
= NAMED_CURVE_TYPE
;
1968 memcpy((unsigned char*)p
,
1969 (unsigned char *)encodedPoint
,
1971 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint
);
1972 encodedPoint
= NULL
;
1977 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1978 if (type
& SSL_kPSK
)
1980 /* copy PSK identity hint */
1981 s2n(strlen(s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
), p
);
1982 strncpy((char *)p
, s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
, strlen(s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
));
1983 p
+=strlen(s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
);
1990 /* n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4])
1991 * and p points to the space at the end. */
1992 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1993 if (pkey
->type
== EVP_PKEY_RSA
&& !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
))
1997 for (num
=2; num
> 0; num
--)
1999 EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx
,
2000 EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW
);
2001 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx
,(num
== 2)
2002 ?s
->ctx
->md5
:s
->ctx
->sha1
, NULL
);
2003 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx
,&(s
->s3
->client_random
[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
2004 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx
,&(s
->s3
->server_random
[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
2005 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx
,d
,n
);
2006 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx
,q
,
2007 (unsigned int *)&i
);
2011 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1
, md_buf
, j
,
2012 &(p
[2]), &u
, pkey
->pkey
.rsa
) <= 0)
2014 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_LIB_RSA
);
2024 /* send signature algorithm */
2025 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
))
2027 if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p
, pkey
, md
))
2029 /* Should never happen */
2030 al
=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2031 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2037 fprintf(stderr
, "Using hash %s\n",
2040 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx
, md
, NULL
);
2041 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx
,&(s
->s3
->client_random
[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
2042 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx
,&(s
->s3
->server_random
[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
2043 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx
,d
,n
);
2044 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx
,&(p
[2]),
2045 (unsigned int *)&i
,pkey
))
2047 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_LIB_EVP
);
2052 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
))
2057 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
2058 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2059 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE
);
2064 ssl_set_handshake_header(s
, SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, n
);
2067 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B
;
2068 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx
);
2069 return ssl_do_write(s
);
2071 ssl3_send_alert(s
,SSL3_AL_FATAL
,al
);
2073 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2074 if (encodedPoint
!= NULL
) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint
);
2075 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx
);
2077 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx
);
2081 int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL
*s
)
2083 unsigned char *p
,*d
;
2085 STACK_OF(X509_NAME
) *sk
=NULL
;
2089 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A
)
2093 d
=p
=ssl_handshake_start(s
);
2095 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
2097 n
=ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s
,p
);
2102 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
))
2104 const unsigned char *psigs
;
2105 unsigned char *etmp
= p
;
2106 nl
= tls12_get_psigalgs(s
, &psigs
);
2107 /* Skip over length for now */
2109 nl
= tls12_copy_sigalgs(s
, p
, psigs
, nl
);
2110 /* Now fill in length */
2120 sk
=SSL_get_client_CA_list(s
);
2124 for (i
=0; i
<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk
); i
++)
2126 name
=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk
,i
);
2127 j
=i2d_X509_NAME(name
,NULL
);
2128 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf
,SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s
)+n
+j
+2))
2130 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,ERR_R_BUF_LIB
);
2133 p
= ssl_handshake_start(s
) + n
;
2134 if (!(s
->options
& SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG
))
2137 i2d_X509_NAME(name
,&p
);
2144 i2d_X509_NAME(name
,&p
);
2145 j
-=2; s2n(j
,d
); j
+=2;
2151 /* else no CA names */
2152 p
= ssl_handshake_start(s
) + off
;
2155 ssl_set_handshake_header(s
, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, n
);
2157 #ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
2158 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s
))
2160 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf
, s
->init_num
+ 4))
2162 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,ERR_R_BUF_LIB
);
2165 p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
+ s
->init_num
;
2167 *(p
++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE
;
2175 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B
;
2178 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
2179 return ssl_do_write(s
);
2184 int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL
*s
)
2188 unsigned long alg_k
;
2190 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2192 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
=NULL
;
2194 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2196 DH
*dh_srvr
, *dh_clnt
= NULL
;
2198 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2200 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2202 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2203 EC_KEY
*srvr_ecdh
= NULL
;
2204 EVP_PKEY
*clnt_pub_pkey
= NULL
;
2205 EC_POINT
*clnt_ecpoint
= NULL
;
2206 BN_CTX
*bn_ctx
= NULL
;
2209 n
=s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
2210 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A
,
2211 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B
,
2212 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2216 if (!ok
) return((int)n
);
2217 p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
2219 alg_k
=s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
2221 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2222 if (alg_k
& SSL_kRSA
)
2224 unsigned char rand_premaster_secret
[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
];
2225 int decrypt_len
, decrypt_good_mask
;
2226 unsigned char version_good
;
2228 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
2229 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.use_rsa_tmp
)
2231 if ((s
->cert
!= NULL
) && (s
->cert
->rsa_tmp
!= NULL
))
2232 rsa
=s
->cert
->rsa_tmp
;
2233 /* Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should
2234 * be sent already */
2237 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2238 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY
);
2245 pkey
=s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
].privatekey
;
2246 if ( (pkey
== NULL
) ||
2247 (pkey
->type
!= EVP_PKEY_RSA
) ||
2248 (pkey
->pkey
.rsa
== NULL
))
2250 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2251 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE
);
2257 /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */
2258 if (s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
&& s
->version
!= DTLS1_BAD_VER
)
2263 if (!(s
->options
& SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG
))
2265 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG
);
2275 /* We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because
2276 * of Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see
2277 * RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of
2278 * the TLS RFC and generates a random premaster secret for the
2279 * case that the decrypt fails. See
2280 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1 */
2282 /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure. */
2283 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(rand_premaster_secret
,
2284 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret
)) <= 0)
2286 decrypt_len
= RSA_private_decrypt((int)n
,p
,p
,rsa
,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING
);
2289 /* decrypt_len should be SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH.
2290 * decrypt_good_mask will be zero if so and non-zero otherwise. */
2291 decrypt_good_mask
= decrypt_len
^ SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
;
2293 /* If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct
2294 * then version_good will be zero. The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa
2295 * extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2296 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version
2297 * number check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks
2298 * are done in constant time and are treated like any other
2299 * decryption error. */
2300 version_good
= p
[0] ^ (s
->client_version
>>8);
2301 version_good
|= p
[1] ^ (s
->client_version
&0xff);
2303 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as
2304 * the ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks
2305 * (strangely, the protocol does not offer such protection for
2306 * DH ciphersuites). However, buggy clients exist that send the
2307 * negotiated protocol version instead if the server does not
2308 * support the requested protocol version. If
2309 * SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. */
2310 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG
)
2312 unsigned char workaround_mask
= version_good
;
2313 unsigned char workaround
;
2315 /* workaround_mask will be 0xff if version_good is
2316 * non-zero (i.e. the version match failed). Otherwise
2318 workaround_mask
|= workaround_mask
>> 4;
2319 workaround_mask
|= workaround_mask
>> 2;
2320 workaround_mask
|= workaround_mask
>> 1;
2321 workaround_mask
= ~((workaround_mask
& 1) - 1);
2323 workaround
= p
[0] ^ (s
->version
>>8);
2324 workaround
|= p
[1] ^ (s
->version
&0xff);
2326 /* If workaround_mask is 0xff (i.e. there was a version
2327 * mismatch) then we copy the value of workaround over
2329 version_good
= (workaround
& workaround_mask
) |
2330 (version_good
& ~workaround_mask
);
2333 /* If any bits in version_good are set then they'll poision
2334 * decrypt_good_mask and cause rand_premaster_secret to be
2336 decrypt_good_mask
|= version_good
;
2338 /* decrypt_good_mask will be zero iff decrypt_len ==
2339 * SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH and the version check passed. We
2340 * fold the bottom 32 bits of it with an OR so that the LSB
2341 * will be zero iff everything is good. This assumes that we'll
2342 * never decrypt a value > 2**31 bytes, which seems safe. */
2343 decrypt_good_mask
|= decrypt_good_mask
>> 16;
2344 decrypt_good_mask
|= decrypt_good_mask
>> 8;
2345 decrypt_good_mask
|= decrypt_good_mask
>> 4;
2346 decrypt_good_mask
|= decrypt_good_mask
>> 2;
2347 decrypt_good_mask
|= decrypt_good_mask
>> 1;
2348 /* Now select only the LSB and subtract one. If decrypt_len ==
2349 * SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH and the version check passed then
2350 * decrypt_good_mask will be all ones. Otherwise it'll be all
2352 decrypt_good_mask
&= 1;
2353 decrypt_good_mask
--;
2355 /* Now copy rand_premaster_secret over p using
2356 * decrypt_good_mask. */
2357 for (i
= 0; i
< (int) sizeof(rand_premaster_secret
); i
++)
2359 p
[i
] = (p
[i
] & decrypt_good_mask
) |
2360 (rand_premaster_secret
[i
] & ~decrypt_good_mask
);
2363 s
->session
->master_key_length
=
2364 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
2365 s
->session
->master_key
,
2367 OPENSSL_cleanse(p
,i
);
2371 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2372 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHE
|SSL_kDHr
|SSL_kDHd
))
2375 EVP_PKEY
*skey
= NULL
;
2382 if (!(s
->options
& SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG
))
2384 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG
);
2393 if (alg_k
& SSL_kDHr
)
2394 idx
= SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA
;
2395 else if (alg_k
& SSL_kDHd
)
2396 idx
= SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA
;
2399 skey
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[idx
].privatekey
;
2400 if ((skey
== NULL
) ||
2401 (skey
->type
!= EVP_PKEY_DH
) ||
2402 (skey
->pkey
.dh
== NULL
))
2404 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2405 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE
);
2408 dh_srvr
= skey
->pkey
.dh
;
2410 else if (s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
== NULL
)
2412 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2413 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY
);
2417 dh_srvr
=s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
;
2421 /* Get pubkey from cert */
2422 EVP_PKEY
*clkey
=X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
2425 if (EVP_PKEY_cmp_parameters(clkey
, skey
) == 1)
2426 dh_clnt
= EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(clkey
);
2428 if (dh_clnt
== NULL
)
2430 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2431 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY
);
2434 EVP_PKEY_free(clkey
);
2435 pub
= dh_clnt
->pub_key
;
2438 pub
=BN_bin2bn(p
,i
,NULL
);
2441 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_BN_LIB
);
2445 i
=DH_compute_key(p
,pub
,dh_srvr
);
2449 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_DH_LIB
);
2454 DH_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
);
2461 s
->session
->master_key_length
=
2462 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
2463 s
->session
->master_key
,p
,i
);
2464 OPENSSL_cleanse(p
,i
);
2470 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2471 if (alg_k
& SSL_kKRB5
)
2473 krb5_error_code krb5rc
;
2474 krb5_data enc_ticket
;
2475 krb5_data authenticator
;
2477 KSSL_CTX
*kssl_ctx
= s
->kssl_ctx
;
2478 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx
;
2479 const EVP_CIPHER
*enc
= NULL
;
2480 unsigned char iv
[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH
];
2481 unsigned char pms
[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
2482 + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH
];
2484 krb5_timestamp authtime
= 0;
2485 krb5_ticket_times ttimes
;
2487 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx
);
2489 if (!kssl_ctx
) kssl_ctx
= kssl_ctx_new();
2492 enc_ticket
.length
= i
;
2494 if (n
< (long)(enc_ticket
.length
+ 6))
2496 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2497 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2501 enc_ticket
.data
= (char *)p
;
2502 p
+=enc_ticket
.length
;
2505 authenticator
.length
= i
;
2507 if (n
< (long)(enc_ticket
.length
+ authenticator
.length
+ 6))
2509 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2510 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2514 authenticator
.data
= (char *)p
;
2515 p
+=authenticator
.length
;
2519 enc_pms
.data
= (char *)p
;
2522 /* Note that the length is checked again below,
2525 if(enc_pms
.length
> sizeof pms
)
2527 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2528 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2532 if (n
!= (long)(enc_ticket
.length
+ authenticator
.length
+
2533 enc_pms
.length
+ 6))
2535 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2536 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2540 if ((krb5rc
= kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx
, &enc_ticket
, &ttimes
,
2544 printf("kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
2545 krb5rc
, kssl_err
.reason
);
2547 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err
.text
);
2548 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2549 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2554 /* Note: no authenticator is not considered an error,
2555 ** but will return authtime == 0.
2557 if ((krb5rc
= kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx
, &authenticator
,
2558 &authtime
, &kssl_err
)) != 0)
2561 printf("kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
2562 krb5rc
, kssl_err
.reason
);
2564 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err
.text
);
2565 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2566 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2571 if ((krb5rc
= kssl_validate_times(authtime
, &ttimes
)) != 0)
2573 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, krb5rc
);
2578 kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx
);
2579 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2581 enc
= kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx
->enctype
);
2585 memset(iv
, 0, sizeof iv
); /* per RFC 1510 */
2587 if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx
,enc
,NULL
,kssl_ctx
->key
,iv
))
2589 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2590 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
2593 if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx
, pms
,&outl
,
2594 (unsigned char *)enc_pms
.data
, enc_pms
.length
))
2596 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2597 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
2600 if (outl
> SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
)
2602 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2603 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2606 if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx
,&(pms
[outl
]),&padl
))
2608 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2609 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
2613 if (outl
> SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
)
2615 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2616 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2619 if (!((pms
[0] == (s
->client_version
>>8)) && (pms
[1] == (s
->client_version
& 0xff))))
2621 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2622 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2623 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2624 * However, buggy clients exist that send random bytes instead of
2625 * the protocol version.
2626 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients.
2627 * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos cipher)
2629 if (!(s
->options
& SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG
))
2631 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2632 SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
2637 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx
);
2639 s
->session
->master_key_length
=
2640 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
2641 s
->session
->master_key
, pms
, outl
);
2643 if (kssl_ctx
->client_princ
)
2645 size_t len
= strlen(kssl_ctx
->client_princ
);
2646 if ( len
< SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH
)
2648 s
->session
->krb5_client_princ_len
= len
;
2649 memcpy(s
->session
->krb5_client_princ
,kssl_ctx
->client_princ
,len
);
2654 /* Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
2655 ** but it caused problems for apache.
2656 ** kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
2657 ** if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
2661 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2663 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2664 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kECDHE
|SSL_kECDHr
|SSL_kECDHe
))
2669 const EC_GROUP
*group
;
2670 const BIGNUM
*priv_key
;
2672 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
2673 if ((srvr_ecdh
= EC_KEY_new()) == NULL
)
2675 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2676 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2680 /* Let's get server private key and group information */
2681 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kECDHr
|SSL_kECDHe
))
2683 /* use the certificate */
2684 tkey
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_ECC
].privatekey
->pkey
.ec
;
2688 /* use the ephermeral values we saved when
2689 * generating the ServerKeyExchange msg.
2691 tkey
= s
->s3
->tmp
.ecdh
;
2694 group
= EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey
);
2695 priv_key
= EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey
);
2697 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh
, group
) ||
2698 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh
, priv_key
))
2700 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2705 /* Let's get client's public key */
2706 if ((clnt_ecpoint
= EC_POINT_new(group
)) == NULL
)
2708 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2709 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2715 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
2717 if (alg_k
& SSL_kECDHE
)
2719 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2720 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY
);
2723 if (((clnt_pub_pkey
=X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
))
2725 (clnt_pub_pkey
->type
!= EVP_PKEY_EC
))
2727 /* XXX: For now, we do not support client
2728 * authentication using ECDH certificates
2729 * so this branch (n == 0L) of the code is
2730 * never executed. When that support is
2731 * added, we ought to ensure the key
2732 * received in the certificate is
2733 * authorized for key agreement.
2734 * ECDH_compute_key implicitly checks that
2735 * the two ECDH shares are for the same
2738 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2739 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2740 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS
);
2744 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint
,
2745 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey
->pkey
.ec
)) == 0)
2747 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2751 ret
= 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
2755 /* Get client's public key from encoded point
2756 * in the ClientKeyExchange message.
2758 if ((bn_ctx
= BN_CTX_new()) == NULL
)
2760 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2761 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2765 /* Get encoded point length */
2770 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2774 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group
,
2775 clnt_ecpoint
, p
, i
, bn_ctx
) == 0)
2777 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2781 /* p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer
2782 * currently, so set it to the start
2784 p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
2787 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
2788 field_size
= EC_GROUP_get_degree(group
);
2789 if (field_size
<= 0)
2791 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2795 i
= ECDH_compute_key(p
, (field_size
+7)/8, clnt_ecpoint
, srvr_ecdh
, NULL
);
2798 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2803 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey
);
2804 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint
);
2805 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh
);
2806 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx
);
2807 EC_KEY_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.ecdh
);
2808 s
->s3
->tmp
.ecdh
= NULL
;
2810 /* Compute the master secret */
2811 s
->session
->master_key_length
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
-> \
2812 generate_master_secret(s
, s
->session
->master_key
, p
, i
);
2814 OPENSSL_cleanse(p
, i
);
2819 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2820 if (alg_k
& SSL_kPSK
)
2822 unsigned char *t
= NULL
;
2823 unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms
[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
*2+4];
2824 unsigned int pre_ms_len
= 0, psk_len
= 0;
2826 char tmp_id
[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
+1];
2828 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2833 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2834 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2837 if (i
> PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
)
2839 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2840 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2843 if (s
->psk_server_callback
== NULL
)
2845 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2846 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB
);
2850 /* Create guaranteed NULL-terminated identity
2851 * string for the callback */
2852 memcpy(tmp_id
, p
, i
);
2853 memset(tmp_id
+i
, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
+1-i
);
2854 psk_len
= s
->psk_server_callback(s
, tmp_id
,
2855 psk_or_pre_ms
, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms
));
2856 OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_id
, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
+1);
2858 if (psk_len
> PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
)
2860 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2861 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2864 else if (psk_len
== 0)
2866 /* PSK related to the given identity not found */
2867 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2868 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND
);
2869 al
=SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY
;
2873 /* create PSK pre_master_secret */
2874 pre_ms_len
=2+psk_len
+2+psk_len
;
2876 memmove(psk_or_pre_ms
+psk_len
+4, psk_or_pre_ms
, psk_len
);
2878 memset(t
, 0, psk_len
);
2882 if (s
->session
->psk_identity
!= NULL
)
2883 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->psk_identity
);
2884 s
->session
->psk_identity
= BUF_strdup((char *)p
);
2885 if (s
->session
->psk_identity
== NULL
)
2887 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2888 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2892 if (s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
!= NULL
)
2893 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
);
2894 s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
= BUF_strdup(s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
);
2895 if (s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
!= NULL
&&
2896 s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
== NULL
)
2898 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2899 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2903 s
->session
->master_key_length
=
2904 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
2905 s
->session
->master_key
, psk_or_pre_ms
, pre_ms_len
);
2908 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms
, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms
));
2914 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2915 if (alg_k
& SSL_kSRP
)
2923 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2924 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH
);
2927 if (!(s
->srp_ctx
.A
=BN_bin2bn(p
,i
,NULL
)))
2929 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
2932 if (s
->session
->srp_username
!= NULL
)
2933 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->srp_username
);
2934 s
->session
->srp_username
= BUF_strdup(s
->srp_ctx
.login
);
2935 if (s
->session
->srp_username
== NULL
)
2937 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2938 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2942 if ((s
->session
->master_key_length
= SRP_generate_server_master_secret(s
,s
->session
->master_key
))<0)
2944 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2951 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
2952 if (alg_k
& SSL_kGOST
)
2955 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pkey_ctx
;
2956 EVP_PKEY
*client_pub_pkey
= NULL
, *pk
= NULL
;
2957 unsigned char premaster_secret
[32], *start
;
2958 size_t outlen
=32, inlen
;
2959 unsigned long alg_a
;
2963 /* Get our certificate private key*/
2964 alg_a
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
;
2965 if (alg_a
& SSL_aGOST94
)
2966 pk
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_GOST94
].privatekey
;
2967 else if (alg_a
& SSL_aGOST01
)
2968 pk
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_GOST01
].privatekey
;
2970 pkey_ctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk
,NULL
);
2971 EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx
);
2972 /* If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
2973 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
2974 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use
2975 * a client certificate for authorization only. */
2976 client_pub_pkey
= X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
2977 if (client_pub_pkey
)
2979 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx
, client_pub_pkey
) <= 0)
2982 /* Decrypt session key */
2983 if (ASN1_get_object((const unsigned char **)&p
, &Tlen
, &Ttag
, &Tclass
, n
) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED
||
2984 Ttag
!= V_ASN1_SEQUENCE
||
2985 Tclass
!= V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL
)
2987 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
2992 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx
,premaster_secret
,&outlen
,start
,inlen
) <=0)
2995 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
2998 /* Generate master secret */
2999 s
->session
->master_key_length
=
3000 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
3001 s
->session
->master_key
,premaster_secret
,32);
3002 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
3003 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx
, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY
, 2, NULL
) > 0)
3008 EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey
);
3009 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx
);
3017 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
3018 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
3019 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE
);
3025 ssl3_send_alert(s
,SSL3_AL_FATAL
,al
);
3026 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_SRP)
3029 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
3030 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey
);
3031 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint
);
3032 if (srvr_ecdh
!= NULL
)
3033 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh
);
3034 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx
);
3039 int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL
*s
)
3041 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
=NULL
;
3047 const EVP_MD
*md
= NULL
;
3049 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx
);
3051 n
=s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
3052 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A
,
3053 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B
,
3055 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
,
3058 if (!ok
) return((int)n
);
3060 if (s
->session
->peer
!= NULL
)
3062 peer
=s
->session
->peer
;
3063 pkey
=X509_get_pubkey(peer
);
3064 type
=X509_certificate_type(peer
,pkey
);
3072 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
!= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY
)
3074 s
->s3
->tmp
.reuse_message
=1;
3075 if ((peer
!= NULL
) && (type
& EVP_PKT_SIGN
))
3077 al
=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
3078 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE
);
3087 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED
);
3088 al
=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
3092 if (!(type
& EVP_PKT_SIGN
))
3094 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE
);
3095 al
=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
3099 if (s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
)
3101 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY
);
3102 al
=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
3106 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
3107 p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
3108 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
3109 /* If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare
3110 * signature without length field */
3111 if (n
==64 && (pkey
->type
==NID_id_GostR3410_94
||
3112 pkey
->type
== NID_id_GostR3410_2001
) )
3118 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
))
3120 int rv
= tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md
, s
, p
, pkey
);
3123 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3128 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
3132 fprintf(stderr
, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md
));
3141 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3142 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
3146 j
=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey
);
3147 if ((i
> j
) || (n
> j
) || (n
<= 0))
3149 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE
);
3150 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
3154 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
))
3158 hdatalen
= BIO_get_mem_data(s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
, &hdata
);
3161 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3162 al
=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3166 fprintf(stderr
, "Using TLS 1.2 with client verify alg %s\n",
3169 if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&mctx
, md
, NULL
)
3170 || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(&mctx
, hdata
, hdatalen
))
3172 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
3173 al
=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3177 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&mctx
, p
, i
, pkey
) <= 0)
3179 al
=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
3180 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE
);
3185 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3186 if (pkey
->type
== EVP_PKEY_RSA
)
3188 i
=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1
, s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_verify_md
,
3189 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
, p
, i
,
3193 al
=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
3194 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT
);
3199 al
=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
3200 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE
);
3206 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3207 if (pkey
->type
== EVP_PKEY_DSA
)
3209 j
=DSA_verify(pkey
->save_type
,
3210 &(s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_verify_md
[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
]),
3211 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
,p
,i
,pkey
->pkey
.dsa
);
3215 al
=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
3216 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE
);
3222 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3223 if (pkey
->type
== EVP_PKEY_EC
)
3225 j
=ECDSA_verify(pkey
->save_type
,
3226 &(s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_verify_md
[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
]),
3227 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
,p
,i
,pkey
->pkey
.ec
);
3231 al
=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
3232 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,
3233 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE
);
3239 if (pkey
->type
== NID_id_GostR3410_94
|| pkey
->type
== NID_id_GostR3410_2001
)
3240 { unsigned char signature
[64];
3242 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey
,NULL
);
3243 EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx
);
3245 fprintf(stderr
,"GOST signature length is %d",i
);
3247 for (idx
=0;idx
<64;idx
++) {
3248 signature
[63-idx
]=p
[idx
];
3250 j
=EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx
,signature
,64,s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_verify_md
,32);
3251 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
3254 al
=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
3255 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,
3256 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE
);
3262 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3263 al
=SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE
;
3272 ssl3_send_alert(s
,SSL3_AL_FATAL
,al
);
3275 if (s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
)
3277 BIO_free(s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
);
3278 s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
= NULL
;
3279 s
->s3
->flags
&= ~TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE
;
3281 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx
);
3282 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey
);
3286 int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL
*s
)
3288 int i
,ok
,al
,ret
= -1;
3290 unsigned long l
,nc
,llen
,n
;
3291 const unsigned char *p
,*q
;
3293 STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
=NULL
;
3295 n
=s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
3302 if (!ok
) return((int)n
);
3304 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
== SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
)
3306 if ( (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
) &&
3307 (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT
))
3309 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE
);
3310 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
3313 /* If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list */
3314 if ((s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
) && s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
)
3316 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST
);
3317 al
=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
3320 s
->s3
->tmp
.reuse_message
=1;
3324 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
!= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
)
3326 al
=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
3327 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE
);
3330 p
=d
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
3332 if ((sk
=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL
)
3334 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3341 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
3342 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3345 for (nc
=0; nc
<llen
; )
3348 if ((l
+nc
+3) > llen
)
3350 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
3351 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3356 x
=d2i_X509(NULL
,&p
,l
);
3359 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB
);
3364 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
3365 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3368 if (!sk_X509_push(sk
,x
))
3370 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3377 if (sk_X509_num(sk
) <= 0)
3379 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3380 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
)
3382 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
3383 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED
);
3386 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3387 else if ((s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
) &&
3388 (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT
))
3390 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE
);
3391 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
3394 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
3395 if (s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
&& !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
))
3397 al
=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3404 i
=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s
,sk
);
3407 al
=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s
->verify_result
);
3408 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED
);
3413 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, i
);
3414 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
3417 pkey
= X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(sk
, 0));
3420 al
=SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
3421 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3422 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE
);
3425 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey
);
3428 if (s
->session
->peer
!= NULL
) /* This should not be needed */
3429 X509_free(s
->session
->peer
);
3430 s
->session
->peer
=sk_X509_shift(sk
);
3431 s
->session
->verify_result
= s
->verify_result
;
3433 /* With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL
3434 * when we arrive here. */
3435 if (s
->session
->sess_cert
== NULL
)
3437 s
->session
->sess_cert
= ssl_sess_cert_new();
3438 if (s
->session
->sess_cert
== NULL
)
3440 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3444 if (s
->session
->sess_cert
->cert_chain
!= NULL
)
3445 sk_X509_pop_free(s
->session
->sess_cert
->cert_chain
, X509_free
);
3446 s
->session
->sess_cert
->cert_chain
=sk
;
3447 /* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the
3448 * peer's own certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c */
3456 ssl3_send_alert(s
,SSL3_AL_FATAL
,al
);
3459 if (x
!= NULL
) X509_free(x
);
3460 if (sk
!= NULL
) sk_X509_pop_free(sk
,X509_free
);
3464 int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL
*s
)
3468 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A
)
3470 cpk
=ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s
);
3473 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
3474 if ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
!= SSL_aKRB5
) ||
3475 (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kKRB5
))
3477 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3482 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s
,cpk
))
3484 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3487 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B
;
3490 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
3491 return ssl_do_write(s
);
3494 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
3495 /* send a new session ticket (not necessarily for a new session) */
3496 int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL
*s
)
3498 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A
)
3500 unsigned char *p
, *senc
, *macstart
;
3501 const unsigned char *const_p
;
3502 int len
, slen_full
, slen
;
3507 SSL_CTX
*tctx
= s
->initial_ctx
;
3508 unsigned char iv
[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH
];
3509 unsigned char key_name
[16];
3511 /* get session encoding length */
3512 slen_full
= i2d_SSL_SESSION(s
->session
, NULL
);
3513 /* Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is
3516 if (slen_full
> 0xFF00)
3518 senc
= OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full
);
3522 i2d_SSL_SESSION(s
->session
, &p
);
3524 /* create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up */
3526 sess
= d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL
, &const_p
, slen_full
);
3532 sess
->session_id_length
= 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
3534 slen
= i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess
, NULL
);
3535 if (slen
> slen_full
) /* shouldn't ever happen */
3541 i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess
, &p
);
3542 SSL_SESSION_free(sess
);
3544 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3545 * follows handshake_header_length +
3546 * 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
3547 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
3548 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
3549 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
3551 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s
->init_buf
,
3552 SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s
) + 22 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH
+
3553 EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH
+ EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
+ slen
))
3555 p
= ssl_handshake_start(s
);
3556 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx
);
3557 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx
);
3558 /* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present
3559 * it does all the work otherwise use generated values
3562 if (tctx
->tlsext_ticket_key_cb
)
3564 if (tctx
->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s
, key_name
, iv
, &ctx
,
3573 RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv
, 16);
3574 EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx
, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL
,
3575 tctx
->tlsext_tick_aes_key
, iv
);
3576 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx
, tctx
->tlsext_tick_hmac_key
, 16,
3577 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL
);
3578 memcpy(key_name
, tctx
->tlsext_tick_key_name
, 16);
3581 /* Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only):
3582 * We leave this unspecified for resumed session (for simplicity),
3583 * and guess that tickets for new sessions will live as long
3584 * as their sessions. */
3585 l2n(s
->hit
? 0 : s
->session
->timeout
, p
);
3587 /* Skip ticket length for now */
3589 /* Output key name */
3591 memcpy(p
, key_name
, 16);
3594 memcpy(p
, iv
, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx
));
3595 p
+= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx
);
3596 /* Encrypt session data */
3597 EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx
, p
, &len
, senc
, slen
);
3599 EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx
, p
, &len
);
3601 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx
);
3603 HMAC_Update(&hctx
, macstart
, p
- macstart
);
3604 HMAC_Final(&hctx
, p
, &hlen
);
3605 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx
);
3608 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
3610 len
= p
- ssl_handshake_start(s
);
3611 ssl_set_handshake_header(s
, SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET
, len
);
3612 /* Skip ticket lifetime hint */
3613 p
= ssl_handshake_start(s
) + 4;
3615 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B
;
3619 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
3620 return ssl_do_write(s
);
3623 int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL
*s
)
3625 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A
)
3628 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3629 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
3630 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
3633 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s
->init_buf
, 8 + s
->tlsext_ocsp_resplen
))
3636 p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
3639 *(p
++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS
;
3640 /* message length */
3641 l2n3(s
->tlsext_ocsp_resplen
+ 4, p
);
3643 *(p
++)= s
->tlsext_status_type
;
3644 /* length of OCSP response */
3645 l2n3(s
->tlsext_ocsp_resplen
, p
);
3646 /* actual response */
3647 memcpy(p
, s
->tlsext_ocsp_resp
, s
->tlsext_ocsp_resplen
);
3648 /* number of bytes to write */
3649 s
->init_num
= 8 + s
->tlsext_ocsp_resplen
;
3650 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B
;
3654 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
3655 return(ssl3_do_write(s
,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
));
3658 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3659 /* ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message. It
3660 * sets the next_proto member in s if found */
3661 int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL
*s
)
3664 int proto_len
, padding_len
;
3666 const unsigned char *p
;
3668 /* Clients cannot send a NextProtocol message if we didn't see the
3669 * extension in their ClientHello */
3670 if (!s
->s3
->next_proto_neg_seen
)
3672 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO
,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION
);
3676 n
=s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
3677 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A
,
3678 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B
,
3680 514, /* See the payload format below */
3686 /* s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received
3687 * in this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset
3688 * by ssl3_get_finished). */
3689 if (!s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
)
3691 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO
,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS
);
3696 return 0; /* The body must be > 1 bytes long */
3698 p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
3700 /* The payload looks like:
3702 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
3703 * uint8 padding_len;
3704 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
3707 if (proto_len
+ 2 > s
->init_num
)
3709 padding_len
= p
[proto_len
+ 1];
3710 if (proto_len
+ padding_len
+ 2 != s
->init_num
)
3713 s
->next_proto_negotiated
= OPENSSL_malloc(proto_len
);
3714 if (!s
->next_proto_negotiated
)
3716 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO
,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3719 memcpy(s
->next_proto_negotiated
, p
+ 1, proto_len
);
3720 s
->next_proto_negotiated_len
= proto_len
;