2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2003 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
125 #define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
126 #define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
129 #include "ssl_locl.h"
130 #include "kssl_lcl.h"
131 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
132 #include <openssl/rand.h>
133 #include <openssl/objects.h>
134 #include <openssl/evp.h>
135 #include <openssl/x509.h>
136 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
137 #include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
139 #include <openssl/md5.h>
141 static SSL_METHOD
*ssl3_get_server_method(int ver
);
142 static int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL
*s
);
143 static int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL
*s
);
144 static int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL
*s
);
145 static int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL
*s
);
146 static int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL
*s
);
147 static int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL
*s
);
148 static int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL
*s
);
149 static int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL
*s
);
150 static int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL
*s
);
151 static int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL
*s
);
153 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
154 static int nid2curve_id(int nid
);
157 static SSL_METHOD
*ssl3_get_server_method(int ver
)
159 if (ver
== SSL3_VERSION
)
160 return(SSLv3_server_method());
165 SSL_METHOD
*SSLv3_server_method(void)
168 static SSL_METHOD SSLv3_server_data
;
172 CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_METHOD
);
176 memcpy((char *)&SSLv3_server_data
,(char *)sslv3_base_method(),
178 SSLv3_server_data
.ssl_accept
=ssl3_accept
;
179 SSLv3_server_data
.get_ssl_method
=ssl3_get_server_method
;
183 CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_METHOD
);
185 return(&SSLv3_server_data
);
188 int ssl3_accept(SSL
*s
)
191 unsigned long l
,Time
=time(NULL
);
192 void (*cb
)(const SSL
*ssl
,int type
,int val
)=NULL
;
195 int new_state
,state
,skip
=0;
197 RAND_add(&Time
,sizeof(Time
),0);
201 if (s
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
203 else if (s
->ctx
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
204 cb
=s
->ctx
->info_callback
;
206 /* init things to blank */
208 if (!SSL_in_init(s
) || SSL_in_before(s
)) SSL_clear(s
);
212 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT
,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET
);
222 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE
:
224 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
228 case SSL_ST_BEFORE
|SSL_ST_ACCEPT
:
229 case SSL_ST_OK
|SSL_ST_ACCEPT
:
232 if (cb
!= NULL
) cb(s
,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START
,1);
234 if ((s
->version
>>8) != 3)
236 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
239 s
->type
=SSL_ST_ACCEPT
;
241 if (s
->init_buf
== NULL
)
243 if ((buf
=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL
)
248 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf
,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
))
256 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s
))
264 if (s
->state
!= SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE
)
266 /* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that
267 * the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
269 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s
,1)) { ret
= -1; goto end
; }
271 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s
);
272 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A
;
273 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_accept
++;
277 /* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE,
278 * we will just send a HelloRequest */
279 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_accept_renegotiate
++;
280 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A
;
284 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A
:
285 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B
:
288 ret
=ssl3_send_hello_request(s
);
289 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
290 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C
;
291 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH
;
294 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s
);
297 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C
:
301 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A
:
302 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B
:
303 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C
:
306 ret
=ssl3_get_client_hello(s
);
307 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
309 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A
;
313 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A
:
314 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B
:
315 ret
=ssl3_send_server_hello(s
);
316 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
319 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A
;
321 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A
;
325 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A
:
326 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B
:
327 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH */
328 if (!(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithms
& SSL_aNULL
))
330 ret
=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s
);
331 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
335 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A
;
339 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A
:
340 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B
:
341 l
=s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithms
;
343 /* clear this, it may get reset by
344 * send_server_key_exchange */
345 if ((s
->options
& SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA
)
346 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
348 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
350 /* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key
351 * even when forbidden by protocol specs
352 * (handshake may fail as clients are not required to
353 * be able to handle this) */
354 s
->s3
->tmp
.use_rsa_tmp
=1;
356 s
->s3
->tmp
.use_rsa_tmp
=0;
359 /* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or
360 * RSA but we have a sign only certificate
362 * For ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange
363 * message only if the cipher suite is either
364 * ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, the
365 * server certificate contains the server's
366 * public key for key exchange.
368 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.use_rsa_tmp
370 || (l
& (SSL_DH
|SSL_kFZA
))
372 && (s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
].privatekey
== NULL
373 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
)
374 && EVP_PKEY_size(s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
].privatekey
)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
)
380 ret
=ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s
);
381 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
386 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A
;
390 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A
:
391 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B
:
392 if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
393 !(s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
) ||
394 /* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set,
395 * don't request cert during re-negotiation: */
396 ((s
->session
->peer
!= NULL
) &&
397 (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE
)) ||
398 /* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites
399 * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts
400 * and in RFC 2246): */
401 ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithms
& SSL_aNULL
) &&
402 /* ... except when the application insists on verification
403 * (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */
404 !(s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT
)) ||
405 /* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */
406 (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithms
& SSL_aKRB5
))
408 /* no cert request */
410 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
=0;
411 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A
;
415 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
=1;
416 ret
=ssl3_send_certificate_request(s
);
417 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
418 #ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
419 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A
;
421 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH
;
422 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A
;
428 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A
:
429 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B
:
430 ret
=ssl3_send_server_done(s
);
431 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
432 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A
;
433 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH
;
437 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH
:
438 /* number of bytes to be flushed */
439 num1
=BIO_ctrl(s
->wbio
,BIO_CTRL_INFO
,0,NULL
);
442 s
->rwstate
=SSL_WRITING
;
443 num1
=BIO_flush(s
->wbio
);
444 if (num1
<= 0) { ret
= -1; goto end
; }
445 s
->rwstate
=SSL_NOTHING
;
448 s
->state
=s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
;
451 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A
:
452 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B
:
453 /* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */
454 ret
= ssl3_check_client_hello(s
);
458 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C
;
460 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
)
462 ret
=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s
);
463 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
466 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A
;
470 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A
:
471 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B
:
472 ret
=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s
);
477 /* For the ECDH ciphersuites when
478 * the client sends its ECDH pub key in
479 * a certificate, the CertificateVerify
480 * message is not sent.
482 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
;
487 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A
;
490 /* We need to get hashes here so if there is
491 * a client cert, it can be verified
493 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->cert_verify_mac(s
,
494 &(s
->s3
->finish_dgst1
),
495 &(s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_verify_md
[0]));
496 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->cert_verify_mac(s
,
497 &(s
->s3
->finish_dgst2
),
498 &(s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_verify_md
[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
]));
502 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A
:
503 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B
:
505 /* we should decide if we expected this one */
506 ret
=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s
);
507 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
509 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
;
513 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
:
514 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B
:
515 ret
=ssl3_get_finished(s
,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
,
516 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B
);
517 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
521 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A
;
525 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A
:
526 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B
:
528 s
->session
->cipher
=s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
;
529 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->setup_key_block(s
))
530 { ret
= -1; goto end
; }
532 ret
=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s
,
533 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A
,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B
);
535 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
536 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A
;
539 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
540 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE
))
548 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A
:
549 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B
:
550 ret
=ssl3_send_finished(s
,
551 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A
,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B
,
552 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->server_finished_label
,
553 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->server_finished_label_len
);
554 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
555 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH
;
557 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
;
559 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
=SSL_ST_OK
;
564 /* clean a few things up */
565 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s
);
567 BUF_MEM_free(s
->init_buf
);
570 /* remove buffering on output */
571 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s
);
575 if (s
->new_session
== 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
577 /* actually not necessarily a 'new' session unless
578 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is set */
582 ssl_update_cache(s
,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER
);
584 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_accept_good
++;
586 s
->handshake_func
=ssl3_accept
;
588 if (cb
!= NULL
) cb(s
,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE
,1);
596 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT
,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE
);
602 if (!s
->s3
->tmp
.reuse_message
&& !skip
)
606 if ((ret
=BIO_flush(s
->wbio
)) <= 0)
611 if ((cb
!= NULL
) && (s
->state
!= state
))
615 cb(s
,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP
,1);
622 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
626 cb(s
,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT
,ret
);
630 static int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL
*s
)
634 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A
)
636 p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
637 *(p
++)=SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST
;
642 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B
;
643 /* number of bytes to write */
648 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
649 return(ssl3_do_write(s
,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
));
652 static int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL
*s
)
657 /* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message,
658 * so permit appropriate message length */
659 n
=ssl3_get_message(s
,
665 if (!ok
) return((int)n
);
666 s
->s3
->tmp
.reuse_message
= 1;
667 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
== SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO
)
669 /* Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake,
670 * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.)
671 * I hope that tmp.dh is the only thing that may need to be cleared
672 * when a handshake is not completed ... */
673 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
674 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
!= NULL
)
676 DH_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
);
677 s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
= NULL
;
685 static int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL
*s
)
687 int i
,j
,ok
,al
,ret
= -1;
690 unsigned char *p
,*d
,*q
;
693 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *ciphers
=NULL
;
695 /* We do this so that we will respond with our native type.
696 * If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1,
697 * This down switching should be handled by a different method.
698 * If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with
701 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A
)
704 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B
;
706 n
=ssl3_get_message(s
,
707 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B
,
708 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C
,
709 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
710 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
,
713 if (!ok
) return((int)n
);
714 d
=p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
716 /* use version from inside client hello, not from record header
717 * (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */
718 s
->client_version
=(((int)p
[0])<<8)|(int)p
[1];
721 if (s
->client_version
< s
->version
)
723 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER
);
724 if ((s
->client_version
>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR
)
726 /* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
727 s
->version
= s
->client_version
;
729 al
= SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
733 /* load the client random */
734 memcpy(s
->s3
->client_random
,p
,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
737 /* get the session-id */
741 /* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow session reuse during renegotiation
742 * (i.e. when s->new_session is true), option
743 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is new with 0.9.7.
744 * Maybe this optional behaviour should always have been the default,
745 * but we cannot safely change the default behaviour (or new applications
746 * might be written that become totally unsecure when compiled with
747 * an earlier library version)
749 if (j
== 0 || (s
->new_session
&& (s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
)))
751 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s
,1))
756 i
=ssl_get_prev_session(s
,p
,j
);
758 { /* previous session */
765 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s
,1))
772 if ((i
== 0) && (j
!= 0))
774 /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */
775 al
=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
776 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED
);
781 /* not enough data */
782 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
783 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
786 if ((i
> 0) && (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s
,p
,i
,&(ciphers
))
793 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
794 if ((s
->hit
) && (i
> 0))
797 id
=s
->session
->cipher
->id
;
800 printf("client sent %d ciphers\n",sk_num(ciphers
));
802 for (i
=0; i
<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers
); i
++)
804 c
=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers
,i
);
806 printf("client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
807 i
,sk_num(ciphers
),SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c
));
817 if ((s
->options
& SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG
) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers
) == 1))
819 /* Very bad for multi-threading.... */
820 s
->session
->cipher
=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers
,
825 /* we need to have the cipher in the cipher
826 * list if we are asked to reuse it */
827 al
=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
828 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING
);
838 /* not enough data */
839 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
840 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
846 if (p
[j
] == 0) break;
853 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
854 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED
);
858 /* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
859 * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
860 * algorithms from the client, starting at q. */
861 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
=NULL
;
862 if (s
->ctx
->comp_methods
!= NULL
)
863 { /* See if we have a match */
866 nn
=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
);
869 comp
=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
,m
);
882 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
=comp
;
887 /* TLS does not mind if there is extra stuff */
888 #if 0 /* SSL 3.0 does not mind either, so we should disable this test
889 * (was enabled in 0.9.6d through 0.9.6j and 0.9.7 through 0.9.7b,
890 * in earlier SSLeay/OpenSSL releases this test existed but was buggy) */
891 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
)
895 /* wrong number of bytes,
896 * there could be more to follow */
897 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
898 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
904 /* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must
909 s
->session
->compress_meth
=(comp
== NULL
)?0:comp
->id
;
910 if (s
->session
->ciphers
!= NULL
)
911 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s
->session
->ciphers
);
912 s
->session
->ciphers
=ciphers
;
915 al
=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
916 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED
);
920 c
=ssl3_choose_cipher(s
,s
->session
->ciphers
,
925 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
926 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER
);
929 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
=c
;
933 /* Session-id reuse */
934 #ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
935 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *sk
;
939 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG
)
941 sk
=s
->session
->ciphers
;
942 for (i
=0; i
<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk
); i
++)
944 c
=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk
,i
);
945 if (c
->algorithms
& SSL_eNULL
)
947 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c
))
951 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
=nc
;
953 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
=ec
;
955 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
=s
->session
->cipher
;
959 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
=s
->session
->cipher
;
962 /* we now have the following setup.
964 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
965 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
966 * compression - basically ignored right now
967 * ssl version is set - sslv3
968 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
969 * s->hit - session reuse flag
970 * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
977 ssl3_send_alert(s
,SSL3_AL_FATAL
,al
);
980 if (ciphers
!= NULL
) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers
);
984 static int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL
*s
)
989 unsigned long l
,Time
;
991 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A
)
993 buf
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
994 p
=s
->s3
->server_random
;
995 Time
=time(NULL
); /* Time */
997 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p
,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
-sizeof(Time
));
998 /* Do the message type and length last */
1001 *(p
++)=s
->version
>>8;
1002 *(p
++)=s
->version
&0xff;
1005 memcpy(p
,s
->s3
->server_random
,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
1006 p
+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
;
1008 /* now in theory we have 3 options to sending back the
1009 * session id. If it is a re-use, we send back the
1010 * old session-id, if it is a new session, we send
1011 * back the new session-id or we send back a 0 length
1012 * session-id if we want it to be single use.
1013 * Currently I will not implement the '0' length session-id
1014 * 12-Jan-98 - I'll now support the '0' length stuff.
1016 if (!(s
->ctx
->session_cache_mode
& SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER
))
1017 s
->session
->session_id_length
=0;
1019 sl
=s
->session
->session_id_length
;
1020 if (sl
> (int)sizeof(s
->session
->session_id
))
1022 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1026 memcpy(p
,s
->session
->session_id
,sl
);
1029 /* put the cipher */
1030 i
=ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
,p
);
1033 /* put the compression method */
1034 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
== NULL
)
1037 *(p
++)=s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
->id
;
1042 *(d
++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO
;
1045 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B
;
1046 /* number of bytes to write */
1051 /* SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B */
1052 return(ssl3_do_write(s
,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
));
1055 static int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL
*s
)
1059 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A
)
1061 p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
1064 *(p
++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE
;
1069 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B
;
1070 /* number of bytes to write */
1075 /* SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B */
1076 return(ssl3_do_write(s
,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
));
1079 static int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL
*s
)
1081 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1085 unsigned char md_buf
[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
];
1088 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1091 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1092 EC_KEY
*ecdh
=NULL
, *ecdhp
;
1093 unsigned char *encodedPoint
= NULL
;
1096 BN_CTX
*bn_ctx
= NULL
;
1099 unsigned char *p
,*d
;
1109 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx
);
1110 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A
)
1112 type
=s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithms
& SSL_MKEY_MASK
;
1117 r
[0]=r
[1]=r
[2]=r
[3]=NULL
;
1119 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1120 if (type
& SSL_kRSA
)
1123 if ((rsa
== NULL
) && (s
->cert
->rsa_tmp_cb
!= NULL
))
1125 rsa
=s
->cert
->rsa_tmp_cb(s
,
1126 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
),
1127 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
));
1130 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1131 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY
);
1139 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1140 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY
);
1145 s
->s3
->tmp
.use_rsa_tmp
=1;
1149 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1150 if (type
& SSL_kEDH
)
1153 if ((dhp
== NULL
) && (s
->cert
->dh_tmp_cb
!= NULL
))
1154 dhp
=s
->cert
->dh_tmp_cb(s
,
1155 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
),
1156 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
));
1159 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1160 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY
);
1164 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
!= NULL
)
1167 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1171 if ((dh
=DHparams_dup(dhp
)) == NULL
)
1173 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_DH_LIB
);
1178 if ((dhp
->pub_key
== NULL
||
1179 dhp
->priv_key
== NULL
||
1180 (s
->options
& SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE
)))
1182 if(!DH_generate_key(dh
))
1184 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1191 dh
->pub_key
=BN_dup(dhp
->pub_key
);
1192 dh
->priv_key
=BN_dup(dhp
->priv_key
);
1193 if ((dh
->pub_key
== NULL
) ||
1194 (dh
->priv_key
== NULL
))
1196 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_DH_LIB
);
1206 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1207 if (type
& SSL_kECDHE
)
1209 ecdhp
=cert
->ecdh_tmp
;
1210 if ((ecdhp
== NULL
) && (s
->cert
->ecdh_tmp_cb
!= NULL
))
1212 ecdhp
=s
->cert
->ecdh_tmp_cb(s
,
1213 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
),
1214 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
));
1218 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1219 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY
);
1223 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.ecdh
!= NULL
)
1225 EC_KEY_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.ecdh
);
1226 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1230 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
1233 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB
);
1236 if (!EC_KEY_up_ref(ecdhp
))
1238 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL
,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB
);
1243 s
->s3
->tmp
.ecdh
=ecdh
;
1244 if ((ecdh
->pub_key
== NULL
) ||
1245 (ecdh
->priv_key
== NULL
) ||
1246 (s
->options
& SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE
))
1248 if(!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh
))
1250 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB
);
1255 if ((ecdh
->group
== NULL
) ||
1256 (ecdh
->pub_key
== NULL
) ||
1257 (ecdh
->priv_key
== NULL
))
1259 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB
);
1263 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
) &&
1264 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(ecdh
->group
) > 163))
1266 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER
);
1270 /* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH
1271 * keys over named (not generic) curves. For
1272 * supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero.
1275 nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_nid(ecdh
->group
)))
1278 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE
);
1282 /* Encode the public key.
1283 * First check the size of encoding and
1284 * allocate memory accordingly.
1286 encodedlen
= EC_POINT_point2oct(ecdh
->group
,
1288 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED
,
1291 encodedPoint
= (unsigned char *)
1292 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen
*sizeof(unsigned char));
1293 bn_ctx
= BN_CTX_new();
1294 if ((encodedPoint
== NULL
) || (bn_ctx
== NULL
))
1296 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1301 encodedlen
= EC_POINT_point2oct(ecdh
->group
,
1303 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED
,
1304 encodedPoint
, encodedlen
, bn_ctx
);
1306 if (encodedlen
== 0)
1308 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB
);
1312 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx
); bn_ctx
=NULL
;
1314 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not
1315 * generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges.
1316 * In this situation, we need three additional bytes
1317 * to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
1322 /* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message
1323 * explicitly so we can set these to NULLs
1330 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
1332 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1333 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE
);
1336 for (i
=0; r
[i
] != NULL
; i
++)
1338 nr
[i
]=BN_num_bytes(r
[i
]);
1342 if (!(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithms
& SSL_aNULL
))
1344 if ((pkey
=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s
,s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
))
1347 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1350 kn
=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey
);
1358 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf
,n
+4+kn
))
1360 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_LIB_BUF
);
1363 d
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
1366 for (i
=0; r
[i
] != NULL
; i
++)
1373 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1374 if (type
& SSL_kECDHE
)
1376 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves.
1377 * In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has:
1378 * [1 byte CurveType], [1 byte CurveName]
1379 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by
1380 * the actual encoded point itself
1382 *p
= NAMED_CURVE_TYPE
;
1388 memcpy((unsigned char*)p
,
1389 (unsigned char *)encodedPoint
,
1391 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint
);
1399 /* n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4])
1400 * and p points to the space at the end. */
1401 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1402 if (pkey
->type
== EVP_PKEY_RSA
)
1406 for (num
=2; num
> 0; num
--)
1408 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx
,(num
== 2)
1409 ?s
->ctx
->md5
:s
->ctx
->sha1
, NULL
);
1410 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx
,&(s
->s3
->client_random
[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
1411 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx
,&(s
->s3
->server_random
[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
1412 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx
,&(d
[4]),n
);
1413 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx
,q
,
1414 (unsigned int *)&i
);
1418 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1
, md_buf
, j
,
1419 &(p
[2]), &u
, pkey
->pkey
.rsa
) <= 0)
1421 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_LIB_RSA
);
1429 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA)
1430 if (pkey
->type
== EVP_PKEY_DSA
)
1433 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx
,EVP_dss1(), NULL
);
1434 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx
,&(s
->s3
->client_random
[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
1435 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx
,&(s
->s3
->server_random
[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
1436 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx
,&(d
[4]),n
);
1437 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx
,&(p
[2]),
1438 (unsigned int *)&i
,pkey
))
1440 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_LIB_DSA
);
1448 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA)
1449 if (pkey
->type
== EVP_PKEY_EC
)
1451 /* let's do ECDSA */
1452 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx
,EVP_ecdsa(), NULL
);
1453 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx
,&(s
->s3
->client_random
[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
1454 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx
,&(s
->s3
->server_random
[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
1455 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx
,&(d
[4]),n
);
1456 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx
,&(p
[2]),
1457 (unsigned int *)&i
,pkey
))
1459 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_LIB_ECDSA
);
1468 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
1469 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1470 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE
);
1475 *(d
++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
;
1478 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
1484 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B
;
1485 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx
);
1486 return(ssl3_do_write(s
,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
));
1488 ssl3_send_alert(s
,SSL3_AL_FATAL
,al
);
1490 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1491 if (encodedPoint
!= NULL
) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint
);
1492 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx
);
1494 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx
);
1498 static int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL
*s
)
1500 unsigned char *p
,*d
;
1502 STACK_OF(X509_NAME
) *sk
=NULL
;
1506 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A
)
1510 d
=p
=(unsigned char *)&(buf
->data
[4]);
1512 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
1514 n
=ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s
,p
);
1523 sk
=SSL_get_client_CA_list(s
);
1527 for (i
=0; i
<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk
); i
++)
1529 name
=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk
,i
);
1530 j
=i2d_X509_NAME(name
,NULL
);
1531 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf
,4+n
+j
+2))
1533 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,ERR_R_BUF_LIB
);
1536 p
=(unsigned char *)&(buf
->data
[4+n
]);
1537 if (!(s
->options
& SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG
))
1540 i2d_X509_NAME(name
,&p
);
1547 i2d_X509_NAME(name
,&p
);
1548 j
-=2; s2n(j
,d
); j
+=2;
1554 /* else no CA names */
1555 p
=(unsigned char *)&(buf
->data
[4+off
]);
1558 d
=(unsigned char *)buf
->data
;
1559 *(d
++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
;
1562 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
1567 #ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
1568 p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
+ s
->init_num
;
1571 *(p
++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE
;
1578 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B
;
1581 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
1582 return(ssl3_do_write(s
,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
));
1588 static const int KDF1_SHA1_len
= 20;
1589 static void *KDF1_SHA1(void *in
, size_t inlen
, void *out
, size_t outlen
)
1591 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
1592 if (outlen
!= SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
)
1594 return SHA1(in
, inlen
, out
);
1600 static int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL
*s
)
1606 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1608 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
=NULL
;
1610 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1614 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1616 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
1618 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1619 EC_KEY
*srvr_ecdh
= NULL
;
1620 EVP_PKEY
*clnt_pub_pkey
= NULL
;
1621 EC_POINT
*clnt_ecpoint
= NULL
;
1622 BN_CTX
*bn_ctx
= NULL
;
1625 n
=ssl3_get_message(s
,
1626 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A
,
1627 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B
,
1628 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1632 if (!ok
) return((int)n
);
1633 p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
1635 l
=s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithms
;
1637 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1640 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
1641 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.use_rsa_tmp
)
1643 if ((s
->cert
!= NULL
) && (s
->cert
->rsa_tmp
!= NULL
))
1644 rsa
=s
->cert
->rsa_tmp
;
1645 /* Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should
1646 * be sent already */
1649 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1650 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY
);
1657 pkey
=s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
].privatekey
;
1658 if ( (pkey
== NULL
) ||
1659 (pkey
->type
!= EVP_PKEY_RSA
) ||
1660 (pkey
->pkey
.rsa
== NULL
))
1662 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1663 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE
);
1670 if (s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
)
1675 if (!(s
->options
& SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG
))
1677 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG
);
1687 i
=RSA_private_decrypt((int)n
,p
,p
,rsa
,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING
);
1691 if (i
!= SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
)
1693 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1694 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); */
1697 if ((al
== -1) && !((p
[0] == (s
->client_version
>>8)) && (p
[1] == (s
->client_version
& 0xff))))
1699 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
1700 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
1701 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
1702 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
1703 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
1705 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. */
1706 if (!((s
->options
& SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG
) &&
1707 (p
[0] == (s
->version
>>8)) && (p
[1] == (s
->version
& 0xff))))
1709 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1710 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER); */
1712 /* The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
1713 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version
1714 * number check as a "bad version oracle" -- an alert would
1715 * reveal that the plaintext corresponding to some ciphertext
1716 * made up by the adversary is properly formatted except
1717 * that the version number is wrong. To avoid such attacks,
1718 * we should treat this just like any other decryption error. */
1724 /* Some decryption failure -- use random value instead as countermeasure
1725 * against Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding
1726 * (see RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). */
1728 i
= SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
;
1729 p
[0] = s
->client_version
>> 8;
1730 p
[1] = s
->client_version
& 0xff;
1731 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p
+2, i
-2); /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure */
1734 s
->session
->master_key_length
=
1735 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
1736 s
->session
->master_key
,
1738 OPENSSL_cleanse(p
,i
);
1742 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1743 if (l
& (SSL_kEDH
|SSL_kDHr
|SSL_kDHd
))
1748 if (!(s
->options
& SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG
))
1750 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG
);
1760 if (n
== 0L) /* the parameters are in the cert */
1762 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1763 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_DH_CERTS
);
1768 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
== NULL
)
1770 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1771 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY
);
1775 dh_srvr
=s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
;
1778 pub
=BN_bin2bn(p
,i
,NULL
);
1781 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_BN_LIB
);
1785 i
=DH_compute_key(p
,pub
,dh_srvr
);
1789 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_DH_LIB
);
1793 DH_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
);
1798 s
->session
->master_key_length
=
1799 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
1800 s
->session
->master_key
,p
,i
);
1801 OPENSSL_cleanse(p
,i
);
1805 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1808 krb5_error_code krb5rc
;
1809 krb5_data enc_ticket
;
1810 krb5_data authenticator
;
1812 KSSL_CTX
*kssl_ctx
= s
->kssl_ctx
;
1813 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx
;
1814 EVP_CIPHER
*enc
= NULL
;
1815 unsigned char iv
[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH
];
1816 unsigned char pms
[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
1817 + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH
];
1819 krb5_timestamp authtime
= 0;
1820 krb5_ticket_times ttimes
;
1822 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx
);
1824 if (!kssl_ctx
) kssl_ctx
= kssl_ctx_new();
1827 enc_ticket
.length
= i
;
1828 enc_ticket
.data
= (char *)p
;
1829 p
+=enc_ticket
.length
;
1832 authenticator
.length
= i
;
1833 authenticator
.data
= (char *)p
;
1834 p
+=authenticator
.length
;
1838 enc_pms
.data
= (char *)p
;
1841 /* Note that the length is checked again below,
1844 if(enc_pms
.length
> sizeof pms
)
1846 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1847 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
1851 if (n
!= enc_ticket
.length
+ authenticator
.length
+
1854 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1855 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
1859 if ((krb5rc
= kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx
, &enc_ticket
, &ttimes
,
1863 printf("kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
1864 krb5rc
, kssl_err
.reason
);
1866 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err
.text
);
1867 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
1868 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1873 /* Note: no authenticator is not considered an error,
1874 ** but will return authtime == 0.
1876 if ((krb5rc
= kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx
, &authenticator
,
1877 &authtime
, &kssl_err
)) != 0)
1880 printf("kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
1881 krb5rc
, kssl_err
.reason
);
1883 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err
.text
);
1884 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
1885 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1890 if ((krb5rc
= kssl_validate_times(authtime
, &ttimes
)) != 0)
1892 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, krb5rc
);
1897 kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx
);
1898 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
1900 enc
= kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx
->enctype
);
1904 memset(iv
, 0, sizeof iv
); /* per RFC 1510 */
1906 if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx
,enc
,NULL
,kssl_ctx
->key
,iv
))
1908 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1909 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
1912 if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx
, pms
,&outl
,
1913 (unsigned char *)enc_pms
.data
, enc_pms
.length
))
1915 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1916 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
1919 if (outl
> SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
)
1921 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1922 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
1925 if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx
,&(pms
[outl
]),&padl
))
1927 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1928 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
1932 if (outl
> SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
)
1934 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1935 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
1938 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx
);
1940 s
->session
->master_key_length
=
1941 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
1942 s
->session
->master_key
, pms
, outl
);
1944 if (kssl_ctx
->client_princ
)
1946 int len
= strlen(kssl_ctx
->client_princ
);
1947 if ( len
< SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH
)
1949 s
->session
->krb5_client_princ_len
= len
;
1950 memcpy(s
->session
->krb5_client_princ
,kssl_ctx
->client_princ
,len
);
1955 /* Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
1956 ** but it caused problems for apache.
1957 ** kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
1958 ** if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
1962 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
1964 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1965 if ((l
& SSL_kECDH
) || (l
& SSL_kECDHE
))
1970 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
1971 if ((srvr_ecdh
= EC_KEY_new()) == NULL
)
1973 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1974 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1978 /* Let's get server private key and group information */
1981 /* use the certificate */
1982 srvr_ecdh
->group
= s
->cert
->key
->privatekey
-> \
1984 srvr_ecdh
->priv_key
= s
->cert
->key
->privatekey
-> \
1985 pkey
.eckey
->priv_key
;
1989 /* use the ephermeral values we saved when
1990 * generating the ServerKeyExchange msg.
1992 srvr_ecdh
->group
= s
->s3
->tmp
.ecdh
->group
;
1993 srvr_ecdh
->priv_key
= s
->s3
->tmp
.ecdh
->priv_key
;
1996 /* Let's get client's public key */
1997 if ((clnt_ecpoint
= EC_POINT_new(srvr_ecdh
->group
))
2000 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2001 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2007 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
2011 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2012 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY
);
2015 if (((clnt_pub_pkey
=X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
))
2017 (clnt_pub_pkey
->type
!= EVP_PKEY_EC
))
2019 /* XXX: For now, we do not support client
2020 * authentication using ECDH certificates
2021 * so this branch (n == 0L) of the code is
2022 * never executed. When that support is
2023 * added, we ought to ensure the key
2024 * received in the certificate is
2025 * authorized for key agreement.
2026 * ECDH_compute_key implicitly checks that
2027 * the two ECDH shares are for the same
2030 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2031 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2032 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS
);
2036 EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint
,
2037 clnt_pub_pkey
->pkey
.eckey
->pub_key
);
2038 ret
= 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
2042 /* Get client's public key from encoded point
2043 * in the ClientKeyExchange message.
2045 if ((bn_ctx
= BN_CTX_new()) == NULL
)
2047 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2048 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2052 /* Get encoded point length */
2055 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(srvr_ecdh
->group
,
2056 clnt_ecpoint
, p
, i
, bn_ctx
) == 0)
2058 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2062 /* p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer
2063 * currently, so set it to the start
2065 p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
2068 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
2069 field_size
= EC_GROUP_get_degree(srvr_ecdh
->group
);
2070 if (field_size
<= 0)
2072 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2076 /* If field size is not more than 24 octets, then use SHA-1 hash of result;
2077 * otherwise, use result (see section 4.8 of draft-ietf-tls-ecc-03.txt;
2078 * this is new with this version of the Internet Draft).
2080 if (field_size
<= 24 * 8)
2081 i
= ECDH_compute_key(p
, KDF1_SHA1_len
, clnt_ecpoint
, srvr_ecdh
, KDF1_SHA1
);
2083 i
= ECDH_compute_key(p
, (field_size
+7)/8, clnt_ecpoint
, srvr_ecdh
, NULL
);
2086 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2091 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey
);
2092 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint
);
2093 if (srvr_ecdh
!= NULL
)
2095 srvr_ecdh
->priv_key
= NULL
;
2096 srvr_ecdh
->group
= NULL
;
2097 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh
);
2099 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx
);
2101 /* Compute the master secret */
2102 s
->session
->master_key_length
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
-> \
2103 generate_master_secret(s
, s
->session
->master_key
, p
, i
);
2105 OPENSSL_cleanse(p
, i
);
2111 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2112 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2113 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE
);
2119 ssl3_send_alert(s
,SSL3_AL_FATAL
,al
);
2120 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH)
2123 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2124 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey
);
2125 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint
);
2126 if (srvr_ecdh
!= NULL
)
2128 srvr_ecdh
->priv_key
= NULL
;
2129 srvr_ecdh
->group
= NULL
;
2130 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh
);
2132 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx
);
2137 static int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL
*s
)
2139 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
=NULL
;
2146 n
=ssl3_get_message(s
,
2147 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A
,
2148 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B
,
2153 if (!ok
) return((int)n
);
2155 if (s
->session
->peer
!= NULL
)
2157 peer
=s
->session
->peer
;
2158 pkey
=X509_get_pubkey(peer
);
2159 type
=X509_certificate_type(peer
,pkey
);
2167 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
!= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY
)
2169 s
->s3
->tmp
.reuse_message
=1;
2170 if ((peer
!= NULL
) && (type
| EVP_PKT_SIGN
))
2172 al
=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
2173 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE
);
2182 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED
);
2183 al
=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
2187 if (!(type
& EVP_PKT_SIGN
))
2189 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE
);
2190 al
=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
2194 if (s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
)
2196 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY
);
2197 al
=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
2201 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
2202 p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
2207 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2208 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2212 j
=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey
);
2213 if ((i
> j
) || (n
> j
) || (n
<= 0))
2215 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE
);
2216 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2220 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2221 if (pkey
->type
== EVP_PKEY_RSA
)
2223 i
=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1
, s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_verify_md
,
2224 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
, p
, i
,
2228 al
=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
2229 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT
);
2234 al
=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
2235 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE
);
2241 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2242 if (pkey
->type
== EVP_PKEY_DSA
)
2244 j
=DSA_verify(pkey
->save_type
,
2245 &(s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_verify_md
[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
]),
2246 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
,p
,i
,pkey
->pkey
.dsa
);
2250 al
=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
2251 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE
);
2257 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
2258 if (pkey
->type
== EVP_PKEY_EC
)
2260 j
=ECDSA_verify(pkey
->save_type
,
2261 &(s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_verify_md
[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
]),
2262 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
,p
,i
,pkey
->pkey
.eckey
);
2266 al
=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
2267 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,
2268 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE
);
2275 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2276 al
=SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE
;
2285 ssl3_send_alert(s
,SSL3_AL_FATAL
,al
);
2288 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey
);
2292 static int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL
*s
)
2294 int i
,ok
,al
,ret
= -1;
2296 unsigned long l
,nc
,llen
,n
;
2297 const unsigned char *p
,*q
;
2299 STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
=NULL
;
2301 n
=ssl3_get_message(s
,
2308 if (!ok
) return((int)n
);
2310 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
== SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
)
2312 if ( (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
) &&
2313 (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT
))
2315 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE
);
2316 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2319 /* If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list */
2320 if ((s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
) && s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
)
2322 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST
);
2323 al
=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
2326 s
->s3
->tmp
.reuse_message
=1;
2330 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
!= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
)
2332 al
=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
2333 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE
);
2336 p
=d
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
2338 if ((sk
=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL
)
2340 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2347 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2348 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2351 for (nc
=0; nc
<llen
; )
2354 if ((l
+nc
+3) > llen
)
2356 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2357 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2362 x
=d2i_X509(NULL
,&p
,l
);
2365 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB
);
2370 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2371 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2374 if (!sk_X509_push(sk
,x
))
2376 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2383 if (sk_X509_num(sk
) <= 0)
2385 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
2386 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
)
2388 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2389 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED
);
2392 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
2393 else if ((s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
) &&
2394 (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT
))
2396 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE
);
2397 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2403 i
=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s
,sk
);
2406 al
=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s
->verify_result
);
2407 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_RETURNED
);
2412 if (s
->session
->peer
!= NULL
) /* This should not be needed */
2413 X509_free(s
->session
->peer
);
2414 s
->session
->peer
=sk_X509_shift(sk
);
2415 s
->session
->verify_result
= s
->verify_result
;
2417 /* With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL
2418 * when we arrive here. */
2419 if (s
->session
->sess_cert
== NULL
)
2421 s
->session
->sess_cert
= ssl_sess_cert_new();
2422 if (s
->session
->sess_cert
== NULL
)
2424 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2428 if (s
->session
->sess_cert
->cert_chain
!= NULL
)
2429 sk_X509_pop_free(s
->session
->sess_cert
->cert_chain
, X509_free
);
2430 s
->session
->sess_cert
->cert_chain
=sk
;
2431 /* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the
2432 * peer's own certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c */
2440 ssl3_send_alert(s
,SSL3_AL_FATAL
,al
);
2443 if (x
!= NULL
) X509_free(x
);
2444 if (sk
!= NULL
) sk_X509_pop_free(sk
,X509_free
);
2448 int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL
*s
)
2453 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A
)
2455 x
=ssl_get_server_send_cert(s
);
2457 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
2458 (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithms
2459 & (SSL_MKEY_MASK
|SSL_AUTH_MASK
))
2460 != (SSL_aKRB5
|SSL_kKRB5
))
2462 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2466 l
=ssl3_output_cert_chain(s
,x
);
2467 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B
;
2472 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
2473 return(ssl3_do_write(s
,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
));
2477 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2478 /* This is the complement of curve_id2nid in s3_clnt.c. */
2479 static int nid2curve_id(int nid
)
2481 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-01.txt (Mar 15, 2001)
2482 * (no changes in draft-ietf-tls-ecc-03.txt [June 2003]) */
2484 case NID_sect163k1
: /* sect163k1 (1) */
2486 case NID_sect163r1
: /* sect163r1 (2) */
2488 case NID_sect163r2
: /* sect163r2 (3) */
2490 case NID_sect193r1
: /* sect193r1 (4) */
2492 case NID_sect193r2
: /* sect193r2 (5) */
2494 case NID_sect233k1
: /* sect233k1 (6) */
2496 case NID_sect233r1
: /* sect233r1 (7) */
2498 case NID_sect239k1
: /* sect239k1 (8) */
2500 case NID_sect283k1
: /* sect283k1 (9) */
2502 case NID_sect283r1
: /* sect283r1 (10) */
2504 case NID_sect409k1
: /* sect409k1 (11) */
2506 case NID_sect409r1
: /* sect409r1 (12) */
2508 case NID_sect571k1
: /* sect571k1 (13) */
2510 case NID_sect571r1
: /* sect571r1 (14) */
2512 case NID_secp160k1
: /* secp160k1 (15) */
2514 case NID_secp160r1
: /* secp160r1 (16) */
2516 case NID_secp160r2
: /* secp160r2 (17) */
2518 case NID_secp192k1
: /* secp192k1 (18) */
2520 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1
: /* secp192r1 (19) */
2522 case NID_secp224k1
: /* secp224k1 (20) */
2524 case NID_secp224r1
: /* secp224r1 (21) */
2526 case NID_secp256k1
: /* secp256k1 (22) */
2528 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1
: /* secp256r1 (23) */
2530 case NID_secp384r1
: /* secp384r1 (24) */
2532 case NID_secp521r1
: /* secp521r1 (25) */