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Fix SRP authentication ciphersuites.
[thirdparty/openssl.git] / ssl / s3_srvr.c
1 /* ssl/s3_srvr.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
3 * All rights reserved.
4 *
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8 *
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15 *
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22 *
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25 * are met:
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40 *
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
51 * SUCH DAMAGE.
52 *
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
57 */
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
60 *
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
63 * are met:
64 *
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
67 *
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
71 * distribution.
72 *
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
77 *
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
82 *
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
86 *
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
88 * acknowledgment:
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
91 *
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
105 *
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
109 *
110 */
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
113 *
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
116 *
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
119 *
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
122 *
123 */
124 /* ====================================================================
125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
126 *
127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
129 * license.
130 *
131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
134 *
135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
138 *
139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
142 * to make use of the Contribution.
143 *
144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
148 * OTHERWISE.
149 */
150
151 #define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
152 #define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
153
154 #include <stdio.h>
155 #include "ssl_locl.h"
156 #include "kssl_lcl.h"
157 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
158 #include <openssl/rand.h>
159 #include <openssl/objects.h>
160 #include <openssl/evp.h>
161 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
162 #include <openssl/x509.h>
163 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
164 #include <openssl/dh.h>
165 #endif
166 #include <openssl/bn.h>
167 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
168 #include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
169 #endif
170 #include <openssl/md5.h>
171
172 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver);
173
174 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)
175 {
176 if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
177 return(SSLv3_server_method());
178 else
179 return(NULL);
180 }
181
182 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
183 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al)
184 {
185 int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE;
186
187 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
188
189 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
190 (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL))
191 {
192 if(s->srp_ctx.login == NULL)
193 {
194 /* RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject,
195 we do so if There is no srp login name */
196 ret = SSL3_AL_FATAL;
197 *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
198 }
199 else
200 {
201 ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s,al);
202 }
203 }
204 return ret;
205 }
206 #endif
207
208 IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method,
209 ssl3_accept,
210 ssl_undefined_function,
211 ssl3_get_server_method)
212
213 int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
214 {
215 BUF_MEM *buf;
216 unsigned long alg_k,Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
217 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
218 int ret= -1;
219 int new_state,state,skip=0;
220
221 RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0);
222 ERR_clear_error();
223 clear_sys_error();
224
225 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
226 cb=s->info_callback;
227 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
228 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
229
230 /* init things to blank */
231 s->in_handshake++;
232 if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s);
233
234 if (s->cert == NULL)
235 {
236 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
237 return(-1);
238 }
239
240 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
241 /* If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we
242 * already got and don't await it anymore, because
243 * Heartbeats don't make sense during handshakes anyway.
244 */
245 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
246 {
247 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
248 s->tlsext_hb_seq++;
249 }
250 #endif
251
252 for (;;)
253 {
254 state=s->state;
255
256 switch (s->state)
257 {
258 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
259 s->renegotiate=1;
260 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
261
262 case SSL_ST_BEFORE:
263 case SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
264 case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
265 case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
266
267 s->server=1;
268 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1);
269
270 if ((s->version>>8) != 3)
271 {
272 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
273 return -1;
274 }
275
276 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_VERSION, 0,
277 s->version, NULL))
278 {
279 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW);
280 return -1;
281 }
282
283 s->type=SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
284
285 if (s->init_buf == NULL)
286 {
287 if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)
288 {
289 ret= -1;
290 goto end;
291 }
292 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH))
293 {
294 ret= -1;
295 goto end;
296 }
297 s->init_buf=buf;
298 }
299
300 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
301 {
302 ret= -1;
303 goto end;
304 }
305
306 s->init_num=0;
307 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE;
308 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY;
309
310 if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE)
311 {
312 /* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that
313 * the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
314 */
315 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) { ret= -1; goto end; }
316
317 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
318 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
319 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
320 }
321 else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
322 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
323 {
324 /* Server attempting to renegotiate with
325 * client that doesn't support secure
326 * renegotiation.
327 */
328 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
329 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
330 ret = -1;
331 goto end;
332 }
333 else
334 {
335 /* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE,
336 * we will just send a HelloRequest */
337 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
338 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
339 }
340 break;
341
342 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
343 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
344
345 s->shutdown=0;
346 ret=ssl3_send_hello_request(s);
347 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
348 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
349 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
350 s->init_num=0;
351
352 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
353 break;
354
355 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
356 s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
357 break;
358
359 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
360 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
361 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
362
363 ret=ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
364 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
365 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
366 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D;
367 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D:
368 {
369 int al;
370 if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s,&al)) < 0)
371 {
372 /* callback indicates firther work to be done */
373 s->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
374 goto end;
375 }
376 if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE)
377 {
378 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
379 /* This is not really an error but the only means to
380 for a client to detect whether srp is supported. */
381 if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY)
382 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
383 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
384 ret= -1;
385 goto end;
386 }
387 }
388 #endif
389
390 s->renegotiate = 2;
391 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
392 s->init_num=0;
393 break;
394
395 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
396 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
397 ret=ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
398 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
399 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
400 if (s->hit)
401 {
402 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
403 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
404 else
405 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
406 }
407 #else
408 if (s->hit)
409 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
410 #endif
411 else
412 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
413 s->init_num = 0;
414 break;
415
416 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
417 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
418 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
419 /* normal PSK or KRB5 or SRP */
420 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL|SSL_aKRB5|SSL_aSRP))
421 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
422 {
423 ret=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
424 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
425 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
426 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
427 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
428 else
429 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
430 }
431 else
432 {
433 skip = 1;
434 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
435 }
436 #else
437 }
438 else
439 skip=1;
440
441 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
442 #endif
443 s->init_num=0;
444 break;
445
446 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
447 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
448 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
449
450 /* clear this, it may get reset by
451 * send_server_key_exchange */
452 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA)
453 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
454 && !(alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
455 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
456 )
457 /* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key
458 * even when forbidden by protocol specs
459 * (handshake may fail as clients are not required to
460 * be able to handle this) */
461 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
462 else
463 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0;
464
465
466 /* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or
467 * RSA but we have a sign only certificate
468 *
469 * PSK: may send PSK identity hints
470 *
471 * For ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange
472 * message only if the cipher suite is either
473 * ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, the
474 * server certificate contains the server's
475 * public key for key exchange.
476 */
477 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp
478 /* PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity
479 * hint if provided */
480 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
481 || ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
482 #endif
483 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
484 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
485 || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
486 #endif
487 || (alg_k & SSL_kDHE)
488 || (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE)
489 || ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
490 && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
491 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
492 && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
493 )
494 )
495 )
496 )
497 {
498 ret=ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);
499 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
500 }
501 else
502 skip=1;
503
504 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
505 s->init_num=0;
506 break;
507
508 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
509 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
510 if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
511 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
512 /* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set,
513 * don't request cert during re-negotiation: */
514 ((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
515 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
516 /* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites
517 * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts
518 * and in RFC 2246): */
519 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) &&
520 /* ... except when the application insists on verification
521 * (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */
522 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
523 /* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */
524 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5) ||
525 /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
526 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)
527 /* With normal PSK Certificates and
528 * Certificate Requests are omitted */
529 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
530 {
531 /* no cert request */
532 skip=1;
533 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=0;
534 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
535 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
536 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
537 return -1;
538 }
539 else
540 {
541 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=1;
542 ret=ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
543 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
544 #ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
545 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
546 #else
547 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
548 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
549 #endif
550 s->init_num=0;
551 }
552 break;
553
554 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
555 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
556 ret=ssl3_send_server_done(s);
557 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
558 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
559 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
560 s->init_num=0;
561 break;
562
563 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
564
565 /* This code originally checked to see if
566 * any data was pending using BIO_CTRL_INFO
567 * and then flushed. This caused problems
568 * as documented in PR#1939. The proposed
569 * fix doesn't completely resolve this issue
570 * as buggy implementations of BIO_CTRL_PENDING
571 * still exist. So instead we just flush
572 * unconditionally.
573 */
574
575 s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
576 if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0)
577 {
578 ret= -1;
579 goto end;
580 }
581 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
582
583 s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state;
584 break;
585
586 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
587 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
588 /* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */
589 ret = ssl3_check_client_hello(s);
590 if (ret <= 0)
591 goto end;
592 if (ret == 2)
593 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C;
594 else {
595 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
596 {
597 ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
598 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
599 }
600 s->init_num=0;
601 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
602 }
603 break;
604
605 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
606 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
607 ret=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
608 if (ret <= 0)
609 goto end;
610 if (ret == 2)
611 {
612 /* For the ECDH ciphersuites when
613 * the client sends its ECDH pub key in
614 * a certificate, the CertificateVerify
615 * message is not sent.
616 * Also for GOST ciphersuites when
617 * the client uses its key from the certificate
618 * for key exchange.
619 */
620 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
621 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
622 #else
623 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
624 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
625 else
626 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
627 #endif
628 s->init_num = 0;
629 }
630 else if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
631 {
632 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
633 s->init_num=0;
634 if (!s->session->peer)
635 break;
636 /* For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer
637 * at this point and digest cached records.
638 */
639 if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer)
640 {
641 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
642 return -1;
643 }
644 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
645 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
646 return -1;
647 }
648 else
649 {
650 int offset=0;
651 int dgst_num;
652
653 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
654 s->init_num=0;
655
656 /* We need to get hashes here so if there is
657 * a client cert, it can be verified
658 * FIXME - digest processing for CertificateVerify
659 * should be generalized. But it is next step
660 */
661 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
662 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
663 return -1;
664 for (dgst_num=0; dgst_num<SSL_MAX_DIGEST;dgst_num++)
665 if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num])
666 {
667 int dgst_size;
668
669 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,EVP_MD_CTX_type(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]),&(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[offset]));
670 dgst_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]);
671 if (dgst_size < 0)
672 {
673 ret = -1;
674 goto end;
675 }
676 offset+=dgst_size;
677 }
678 }
679 break;
680
681 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
682 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
683
684 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
685 /* we should decide if we expected this one */
686 ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
687 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
688
689 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
690 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
691 #else
692 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
693 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
694 else
695 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
696 #endif
697 s->init_num=0;
698 break;
699
700 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
701 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A:
702 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B:
703 ret=ssl3_get_next_proto(s);
704 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
705 s->init_num = 0;
706 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
707 break;
708 #endif
709
710 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
711 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
712 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
713 ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
714 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
715 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
716 if (s->hit)
717 s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
718 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
719 else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
720 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
721 #endif
722 else
723 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
724 s->init_num=0;
725 break;
726
727 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
728 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
729 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
730 ret=ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s);
731 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
732 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
733 s->init_num=0;
734 break;
735
736 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A:
737 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B:
738 ret=ssl3_send_cert_status(s);
739 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
740 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
741 s->init_num=0;
742 break;
743
744 #endif
745
746 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
747 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
748
749 s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
750 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
751 { ret= -1; goto end; }
752
753 ret=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
754 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
755
756 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
757 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
758 s->init_num=0;
759
760 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
761 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
762 {
763 ret= -1;
764 goto end;
765 }
766
767 break;
768
769 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
770 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
771 ret=ssl3_send_finished(s,
772 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
773 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
774 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
775 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
776 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
777 if (s->hit)
778 {
779 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
780 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
781 #else
782 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
783 {
784 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
785 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
786 }
787 else
788 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
789 #endif
790 }
791 else
792 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK;
793 s->init_num=0;
794 break;
795
796 case SSL_ST_OK:
797 /* clean a few things up */
798 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
799
800 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
801 s->init_buf=NULL;
802
803 /* remove buffering on output */
804 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
805
806 s->init_num=0;
807
808 if (s->renegotiate == 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
809 {
810 s->renegotiate=0;
811 s->new_session=0;
812
813 ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
814
815 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
816 /* s->server=1; */
817 s->handshake_func=ssl3_accept;
818
819 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1);
820 }
821
822 ret = 1;
823 goto end;
824 /* break; */
825
826 default:
827 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
828 ret= -1;
829 goto end;
830 /* break; */
831 }
832
833 if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip)
834 {
835 if (s->debug)
836 {
837 if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
838 goto end;
839 }
840
841
842 if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state))
843 {
844 new_state=s->state;
845 s->state=state;
846 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP,1);
847 s->state=new_state;
848 }
849 }
850 skip=0;
851 }
852 end:
853 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
854
855 s->in_handshake--;
856 if (cb != NULL)
857 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT,ret);
858 return(ret);
859 }
860
861 int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
862 {
863
864 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A)
865 {
866 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST, 0);
867 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
868 }
869
870 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
871 return ssl_do_write(s);
872 }
873
874 int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s)
875 {
876 int ok;
877 long n;
878
879 /* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message,
880 * so permit appropriate message length */
881 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
882 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A,
883 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B,
884 -1,
885 s->max_cert_list,
886 &ok);
887 if (!ok) return((int)n);
888 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
889 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)
890 {
891 /* We only allow the client to restart the handshake once per
892 * negotiation. */
893 if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE)
894 {
895 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_MULTIPLE_SGC_RESTARTS);
896 return -1;
897 }
898 /* Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake,
899 * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.) */
900 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
901 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
902 {
903 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
904 s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
905 }
906 #endif
907 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
908 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
909 {
910 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
911 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
912 }
913 #endif
914 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE;
915 return 2;
916 }
917 return 1;
918 }
919
920 int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
921 {
922 int i,j,ok,al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,ret= -1;
923 unsigned int cookie_len;
924 long n;
925 unsigned long id;
926 unsigned char *p,*d;
927 SSL_CIPHER *c;
928 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
929 unsigned char *q;
930 SSL_COMP *comp=NULL;
931 #endif
932 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers=NULL;
933
934 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C && !s->first_packet)
935 goto retry_cert;
936
937 /* We do this so that we will respond with our native type.
938 * If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1,
939 * This down switching should be handled by a different method.
940 * If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with
941 * TLSv1.
942 */
943 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A
944 )
945 {
946 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
947 }
948 s->first_packet=1;
949 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
950 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
951 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C,
952 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,
953 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
954 &ok);
955
956 if (!ok) return((int)n);
957 s->first_packet=0;
958 d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
959
960 /* use version from inside client hello, not from record header
961 * (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */
962 s->client_version=(((int)p[0])<<8)|(int)p[1];
963 p+=2;
964
965 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) ? (s->client_version > s->version &&
966 s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION)
967 : (s->client_version < s->version))
968 {
969 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
970 if ((s->client_version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR &&
971 !s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash)
972 {
973 /* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
974 s->version = s->client_version;
975 }
976 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
977 goto f_err;
978 }
979
980 /* If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't
981 * contain one, just return since we do not want to
982 * allocate any memory yet. So check cookie length...
983 */
984 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE)
985 {
986 unsigned int session_length, cookie_length;
987
988 session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
989 cookie_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1);
990
991 if (cookie_length == 0)
992 return 1;
993 }
994
995 /* load the client random */
996 memcpy(s->s3->client_random,p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
997 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
998
999 /* get the session-id */
1000 j= *(p++);
1001
1002 s->hit=0;
1003 /* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in renegotiation.
1004 * 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally ignore resumption requests
1005 * with flag SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
1006 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on this for security
1007 * won't even compile against older library versions).
1008 *
1009 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to request
1010 * renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains unset): for servers,
1011 * this essentially just means that the SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1012 * setting will be ignored.
1013 */
1014 if ((s->new_session && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION)))
1015 {
1016 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
1017 goto err;
1018 }
1019 else
1020 {
1021 i=ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n);
1022 if (i == 1)
1023 { /* previous session */
1024 s->hit=1;
1025 }
1026 else if (i == -1)
1027 goto err;
1028 else /* i == 0 */
1029 {
1030 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
1031 goto err;
1032 }
1033 }
1034
1035 p+=j;
1036
1037 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
1038 {
1039 /* cookie stuff */
1040 cookie_len = *(p++);
1041
1042 /*
1043 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
1044 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
1045 * does not cause an overflow.
1046 */
1047 if ( cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie))
1048 {
1049 /* too much data */
1050 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1051 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1052 goto f_err;
1053 }
1054
1055 /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
1056 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) &&
1057 cookie_len > 0)
1058 {
1059 memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len);
1060
1061 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL)
1062 {
1063 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie,
1064 cookie_len) == 0)
1065 {
1066 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1067 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1068 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1069 goto f_err;
1070 }
1071 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1072 }
1073 else if ( memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
1074 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) /* default verification */
1075 {
1076 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1077 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1078 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1079 goto f_err;
1080 }
1081 /* Set to -2 so if successful we return 2 */
1082 ret = -2;
1083 }
1084
1085 p += cookie_len;
1086 if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION)
1087 {
1088 /* Select version to use */
1089 if (s->client_version <= DTLS1_2_VERSION &&
1090 !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2))
1091 {
1092 s->version = DTLS1_2_VERSION;
1093 s->method = DTLSv1_2_server_method();
1094 }
1095 else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
1096 {
1097 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE);
1098 s->version = s->client_version;
1099 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1100 goto f_err;
1101 }
1102 else if (s->client_version <= DTLS1_VERSION &&
1103 !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1))
1104 {
1105 s->version = DTLS1_VERSION;
1106 s->method = DTLSv1_server_method();
1107 }
1108 else
1109 {
1110 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
1111 s->version = s->client_version;
1112 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1113 goto f_err;
1114 }
1115 s->session->ssl_version = s->version;
1116 }
1117 }
1118
1119 n2s(p,i);
1120 if ((i == 0) && (j != 0))
1121 {
1122 /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */
1123 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1124 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
1125 goto f_err;
1126 }
1127 if ((p+i) >= (d+n))
1128 {
1129 /* not enough data */
1130 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1131 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1132 goto f_err;
1133 }
1134 if ((i > 0) && (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s,p,i,&(ciphers))
1135 == NULL))
1136 {
1137 goto err;
1138 }
1139 p+=i;
1140
1141 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
1142 if ((s->hit) && (i > 0))
1143 {
1144 j=0;
1145 id=s->session->cipher->id;
1146
1147 #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
1148 printf("client sent %d ciphers\n",sk_num(ciphers));
1149 #endif
1150 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++)
1151 {
1152 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers,i);
1153 #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
1154 printf("client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1155 i,sk_num(ciphers),SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
1156 #endif
1157 if (c->id == id)
1158 {
1159 j=1;
1160 break;
1161 }
1162 }
1163 /* Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade
1164 * attack: CVE-2010-4180.
1165 */
1166 #if 0
1167 if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1))
1168 {
1169 /* Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used cipher may
1170 * not be in the current list, the client instead might be trying to
1171 * continue using a cipher that before wasn't chosen due to server
1172 * preferences. We'll have to reject the connection if the cipher is not
1173 * enabled, though. */
1174 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0);
1175 if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0)
1176 {
1177 s->session->cipher = c;
1178 j = 1;
1179 }
1180 }
1181 #endif
1182 if (j == 0)
1183 {
1184 /* we need to have the cipher in the cipher
1185 * list if we are asked to reuse it */
1186 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1187 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
1188 goto f_err;
1189 }
1190 }
1191
1192 /* compression */
1193 i= *(p++);
1194 if ((p+i) > (d+n))
1195 {
1196 /* not enough data */
1197 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1198 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1199 goto f_err;
1200 }
1201 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1202 q=p;
1203 #endif
1204 for (j=0; j<i; j++)
1205 {
1206 if (p[j] == 0) break;
1207 }
1208
1209 p+=i;
1210 if (j >= i)
1211 {
1212 /* no compress */
1213 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1214 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
1215 goto f_err;
1216 }
1217
1218 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1219 /* TLS extensions*/
1220 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION)
1221 {
1222 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s,&p,d,n))
1223 {
1224 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
1225 goto err;
1226 }
1227 }
1228
1229 /* Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this
1230 * handshake for not reused session only. We need to generate
1231 * server_random before calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow
1232 * SessionTicket processing to use it in key derivation. */
1233 {
1234 unsigned char *pos;
1235 pos=s->s3->server_random;
1236 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0)
1237 {
1238 goto f_err;
1239 }
1240 }
1241
1242 if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb)
1243 {
1244 SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher=NULL;
1245
1246 s->session->master_key_length=sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1247 if(s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key, &s->session->master_key_length,
1248 ciphers, &pref_cipher, s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg))
1249 {
1250 s->hit=1;
1251 s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
1252 s->session->verify_result=X509_V_OK;
1253
1254 ciphers=NULL;
1255
1256 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1257 pref_cipher=pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1258 if (pref_cipher == NULL)
1259 {
1260 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1261 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1262 goto f_err;
1263 }
1264
1265 s->session->cipher=pref_cipher;
1266
1267 if (s->cipher_list)
1268 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
1269
1270 if (s->cipher_list_by_id)
1271 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
1272
1273 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1274 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1275 }
1276 }
1277 #endif
1278
1279 /* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1280 * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
1281 * algorithms from the client, starting at q. */
1282 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=NULL;
1283 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1284 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1285 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0)
1286 {
1287 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
1288 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1289 /* Can't disable compression */
1290 if (!ssl_allow_compression(s))
1291 {
1292 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1293 goto f_err;
1294 }
1295 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1296 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++)
1297 {
1298 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
1299 if (comp_id == comp->id)
1300 {
1301 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
1302 break;
1303 }
1304 }
1305 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1306 {
1307 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1308 goto f_err;
1309 }
1310 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1311 for (m = 0; m < i; m++)
1312 {
1313 if (q[m] == comp_id)
1314 break;
1315 }
1316 if (m >= i)
1317 {
1318 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1319 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
1320 goto f_err;
1321 }
1322 }
1323 else if (s->hit)
1324 comp = NULL;
1325 else if (ssl_allow_compression(s) && s->ctx->comp_methods)
1326 { /* See if we have a match */
1327 int m,nn,o,v,done=0;
1328
1329 nn=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1330 for (m=0; m<nn; m++)
1331 {
1332 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
1333 v=comp->id;
1334 for (o=0; o<i; o++)
1335 {
1336 if (v == q[o])
1337 {
1338 done=1;
1339 break;
1340 }
1341 }
1342 if (done) break;
1343 }
1344 if (done)
1345 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
1346 else
1347 comp=NULL;
1348 }
1349 #else
1350 /* If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1351 * using compression.
1352 */
1353 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0)
1354 {
1355 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1356 goto f_err;
1357 }
1358 #endif
1359
1360 /* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must
1361 * pick a cipher */
1362
1363 if (!s->hit)
1364 {
1365 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1366 s->session->compress_meth=0;
1367 #else
1368 s->session->compress_meth=(comp == NULL)?0:comp->id;
1369 #endif
1370 if (s->session->ciphers != NULL)
1371 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
1372 s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
1373 if (ciphers == NULL)
1374 {
1375 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1376 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED);
1377 goto f_err;
1378 }
1379 ciphers=NULL;
1380 /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
1381 retry_cert:
1382 if (s->cert->cert_cb)
1383 {
1384 int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
1385 if (rv == 0)
1386 {
1387 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1388 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
1389 goto f_err;
1390 }
1391 if (rv < 0)
1392 {
1393 s->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
1394 return -1;
1395 }
1396 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1397 }
1398 c=ssl3_choose_cipher(s,s->session->ciphers,
1399 SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1400
1401 if (c == NULL)
1402 {
1403 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1404 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1405 goto f_err;
1406 }
1407 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=c;
1408 /* check whether we should disable session resumption */
1409 if (s->not_resumable_session_cb != NULL)
1410 s->session->not_resumable=s->not_resumable_session_cb(s,
1411 ((c->algorithm_mkey & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)) != 0));
1412 if (s->session->not_resumable)
1413 /* do not send a session ticket */
1414 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
1415 }
1416 else
1417 {
1418 /* Session-id reuse */
1419 #ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
1420 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1421 SSL_CIPHER *nc=NULL;
1422 SSL_CIPHER *ec=NULL;
1423
1424 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG)
1425 {
1426 sk=s->session->ciphers;
1427 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++)
1428 {
1429 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,i);
1430 if (c->algorithm_enc & SSL_eNULL)
1431 nc=c;
1432 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c))
1433 ec=c;
1434 }
1435 if (nc != NULL)
1436 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=nc;
1437 else if (ec != NULL)
1438 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=ec;
1439 else
1440 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1441 }
1442 else
1443 #endif
1444 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1445 }
1446
1447 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER))
1448 {
1449 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
1450 goto f_err;
1451 }
1452
1453 /* we now have the following setup.
1454 * client_random
1455 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
1456 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
1457 * compression - basically ignored right now
1458 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1459 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1460 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1461 * s->s3->tmp.new_cipher- the new cipher to use.
1462 */
1463
1464 /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */
1465 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION)
1466 {
1467 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s) <= 0)
1468 {
1469 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1470 goto err;
1471 }
1472 }
1473
1474 if (ret < 0) ret=-ret;
1475 if (0)
1476 {
1477 f_err:
1478 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1479 }
1480 err:
1481 if (ciphers != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1482 return ret < 0 ? -1 : ret;
1483 }
1484
1485 int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
1486 {
1487 unsigned char *buf;
1488 unsigned char *p,*d;
1489 int i,sl;
1490 int al = 0;
1491 unsigned long l;
1492
1493 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1494 {
1495 buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1496 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1497 p=s->s3->server_random;
1498 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0)
1499 return -1;
1500 #endif
1501 /* Do the message type and length last */
1502 d=p= ssl_handshake_start(s);
1503
1504 *(p++)=s->version>>8;
1505 *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
1506
1507 /* Random stuff */
1508 memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1509 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1510
1511 /* There are several cases for the session ID to send
1512 * back in the server hello:
1513 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
1514 * we send back the old session ID.
1515 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
1516 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
1517 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
1518 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
1519 * session ID.
1520 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
1521 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
1522 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
1523 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
1524 * to send back.
1525 */
1526 if (s->session->not_resumable ||
1527 (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
1528 && !s->hit))
1529 s->session->session_id_length=0;
1530
1531 sl=s->session->session_id_length;
1532 if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id))
1533 {
1534 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1535 return -1;
1536 }
1537 *(p++)=sl;
1538 memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,sl);
1539 p+=sl;
1540
1541 /* put the cipher */
1542 i=ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,p);
1543 p+=i;
1544
1545 /* put the compression method */
1546 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1547 *(p++)=0;
1548 #else
1549 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1550 *(p++)=0;
1551 else
1552 *(p++)=s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
1553 #endif
1554 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1555 if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
1556 {
1557 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
1558 return -1;
1559 }
1560 if ((p = ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &al)) == NULL)
1561 {
1562 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1563 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1564 return -1;
1565 }
1566 #endif
1567 /* do the header */
1568 l=(p-d);
1569 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO, l);
1570 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B;
1571 }
1572
1573 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
1574 return ssl_do_write(s);
1575 }
1576
1577 int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)
1578 {
1579
1580 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A)
1581 {
1582 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE, 0);
1583 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
1584 }
1585
1586 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
1587 return ssl_do_write(s);
1588 }
1589
1590 int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1591 {
1592 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1593 unsigned char *q;
1594 int j,num;
1595 RSA *rsa;
1596 unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
1597 unsigned int u;
1598 #endif
1599 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1600 DH *dh=NULL,*dhp;
1601 #endif
1602 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1603 EC_KEY *ecdh=NULL, *ecdhp;
1604 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1605 int encodedlen = 0;
1606 int curve_id = 0;
1607 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1608 #endif
1609 EVP_PKEY *pkey;
1610 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1611 unsigned char *p,*d;
1612 int al,i;
1613 unsigned long type;
1614 int n;
1615 CERT *cert;
1616 BIGNUM *r[4];
1617 int nr[4],kn;
1618 BUF_MEM *buf;
1619 EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
1620
1621 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
1622 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A)
1623 {
1624 type=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1625 cert=s->cert;
1626
1627 buf=s->init_buf;
1628
1629 r[0]=r[1]=r[2]=r[3]=NULL;
1630 n=0;
1631 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1632 if (type & SSL_kRSA)
1633 {
1634 rsa=cert->rsa_tmp;
1635 if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL))
1636 {
1637 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s,
1638 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1639 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1640 if(rsa == NULL)
1641 {
1642 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1643 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1644 goto f_err;
1645 }
1646 RSA_up_ref(rsa);
1647 cert->rsa_tmp=rsa;
1648 }
1649 if (rsa == NULL)
1650 {
1651 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1652 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1653 goto f_err;
1654 }
1655 r[0]=rsa->n;
1656 r[1]=rsa->e;
1657 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
1658 }
1659 else
1660 #endif
1661 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1662 if (type & SSL_kDHE)
1663 {
1664 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto)
1665 {
1666 dhp = ssl_get_auto_dh(s);
1667 if (dhp == NULL)
1668 {
1669 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1670 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1671 goto f_err;
1672 }
1673 }
1674 else
1675 dhp=cert->dh_tmp;
1676 if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1677 dhp=s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s,
1678 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1679 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1680 if (dhp == NULL)
1681 {
1682 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1683 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1684 goto f_err;
1685 }
1686 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH,
1687 DH_security_bits(dhp), 0, dhp))
1688 {
1689 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1690 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
1691 goto f_err;
1692 }
1693 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
1694 {
1695 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1696 goto err;
1697 }
1698
1699 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto)
1700 dh = dhp;
1701 else if ((dh=DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL)
1702 {
1703 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1704 goto err;
1705 }
1706
1707 s->s3->tmp.dh=dh;
1708 if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL ||
1709 dhp->priv_key == NULL ||
1710 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE)))
1711 {
1712 if(!DH_generate_key(dh))
1713 {
1714 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1715 ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1716 goto err;
1717 }
1718 }
1719 else
1720 {
1721 dh->pub_key=BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
1722 dh->priv_key=BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
1723 if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) ||
1724 (dh->priv_key == NULL))
1725 {
1726 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1727 goto err;
1728 }
1729 }
1730 r[0]=dh->p;
1731 r[1]=dh->g;
1732 r[2]=dh->pub_key;
1733 }
1734 else
1735 #endif
1736 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1737 if (type & SSL_kECDHE)
1738 {
1739 const EC_GROUP *group;
1740
1741 ecdhp=cert->ecdh_tmp;
1742 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
1743 {
1744 /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
1745 int nid = tls1_shared_curve(s, -2);
1746 if (nid != NID_undef)
1747 ecdhp = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid);
1748 }
1749 else if ((ecdhp == NULL) && s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
1750 {
1751 ecdhp=s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s,
1752 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1753 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1754 }
1755 if (ecdhp == NULL)
1756 {
1757 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1758 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
1759 goto f_err;
1760 }
1761
1762 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
1763 {
1764 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1765 goto err;
1766 }
1767
1768 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
1769 if (ecdhp == NULL)
1770 {
1771 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1772 goto err;
1773 }
1774 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
1775 ecdh = ecdhp;
1776 else if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp)) == NULL)
1777 {
1778 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1779 goto err;
1780 }
1781
1782 s->s3->tmp.ecdh=ecdh;
1783 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1784 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1785 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE))
1786 {
1787 if(!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh))
1788 {
1789 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1790 goto err;
1791 }
1792 }
1793
1794 if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||
1795 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1796 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL))
1797 {
1798 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1799 goto err;
1800 }
1801
1802 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
1803 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163))
1804 {
1805 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
1806 goto err;
1807 }
1808
1809 /* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH
1810 * keys over named (not generic) curves. For
1811 * supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero.
1812 */
1813 if ((curve_id =
1814 tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)))
1815 == 0)
1816 {
1817 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
1818 goto err;
1819 }
1820
1821 /* Encode the public key.
1822 * First check the size of encoding and
1823 * allocate memory accordingly.
1824 */
1825 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1826 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1827 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1828 NULL, 0, NULL);
1829
1830 encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
1831 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen*sizeof(unsigned char));
1832 bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
1833 if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL))
1834 {
1835 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1836 goto err;
1837 }
1838
1839
1840 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1841 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1842 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1843 encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
1844
1845 if (encodedlen == 0)
1846 {
1847 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1848 goto err;
1849 }
1850
1851 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); bn_ctx=NULL;
1852
1853 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not
1854 * generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges.
1855 * In this situation, we need four additional bytes
1856 * to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
1857 * structure.
1858 */
1859 n = 4 + encodedlen;
1860
1861 /* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message
1862 * explicitly so we can set these to NULLs
1863 */
1864 r[0]=NULL;
1865 r[1]=NULL;
1866 r[2]=NULL;
1867 r[3]=NULL;
1868 }
1869 else
1870 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
1871 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1872 if (type & SSL_kPSK)
1873 {
1874 /* reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint*/
1875 n+=2+strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1876 }
1877 else
1878 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1879 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1880 if (type & SSL_kSRP)
1881 {
1882 if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
1883 (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
1884 (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) ||
1885 (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL))
1886 {
1887 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
1888 goto err;
1889 }
1890 r[0]=s->srp_ctx.N;
1891 r[1]=s->srp_ctx.g;
1892 r[2]=s->srp_ctx.s;
1893 r[3]=s->srp_ctx.B;
1894 }
1895 else
1896 #endif
1897 {
1898 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1899 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
1900 goto f_err;
1901 }
1902 for (i=0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++)
1903 {
1904 nr[i]=BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
1905 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1906 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
1907 n+=1+nr[i];
1908 else
1909 #endif
1910 n+=2+nr[i];
1911 }
1912
1913 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL|SSL_aSRP))
1914 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
1915 {
1916 if ((pkey=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s,s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,&md))
1917 == NULL)
1918 {
1919 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1920 goto f_err;
1921 }
1922 kn=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1923 }
1924 else
1925 {
1926 pkey=NULL;
1927 kn=0;
1928 }
1929
1930 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,n+SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s)+kn))
1931 {
1932 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_BUF);
1933 goto err;
1934 }
1935 d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
1936
1937 for (i=0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++)
1938 {
1939 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1940 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
1941 {
1942 *p = nr[i];
1943 p++;
1944 }
1945 else
1946 #endif
1947 s2n(nr[i],p);
1948 BN_bn2bin(r[i],p);
1949 p+=nr[i];
1950 }
1951
1952 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1953 if (type & SSL_kECDHE)
1954 {
1955 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves.
1956 * In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has:
1957 * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
1958 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by
1959 * the actual encoded point itself
1960 */
1961 *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
1962 p += 1;
1963 *p = 0;
1964 p += 1;
1965 *p = curve_id;
1966 p += 1;
1967 *p = encodedlen;
1968 p += 1;
1969 memcpy((unsigned char*)p,
1970 (unsigned char *)encodedPoint,
1971 encodedlen);
1972 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1973 encodedPoint = NULL;
1974 p += encodedlen;
1975 }
1976 #endif
1977
1978 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1979 if (type & SSL_kPSK)
1980 {
1981 /* copy PSK identity hint */
1982 s2n(strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint), p);
1983 strncpy((char *)p, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint, strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint));
1984 p+=strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1985 }
1986 #endif
1987
1988 /* not anonymous */
1989 if (pkey != NULL)
1990 {
1991 /* n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4])
1992 * and p points to the space at the end. */
1993 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1994 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
1995 {
1996 q=md_buf;
1997 j=0;
1998 for (num=2; num > 0; num--)
1999 {
2000 EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx,
2001 EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
2002 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2)
2003 ?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
2004 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
2005 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
2006 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,d,n);
2007 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q,
2008 (unsigned int *)&i);
2009 q+=i;
2010 j+=i;
2011 }
2012 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,
2013 &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0)
2014 {
2015 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_RSA);
2016 goto err;
2017 }
2018 s2n(u,p);
2019 n+=u+2;
2020 }
2021 else
2022 #endif
2023 if (md)
2024 {
2025 /* send signature algorithm */
2026 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2027 {
2028 if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md))
2029 {
2030 /* Should never happen */
2031 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2032 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2033 goto f_err;
2034 }
2035 p+=2;
2036 }
2037 #ifdef SSL_DEBUG
2038 fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n",
2039 EVP_MD_name(md));
2040 #endif
2041 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL);
2042 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
2043 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
2044 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,d,n);
2045 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
2046 (unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
2047 {
2048 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_EVP);
2049 goto err;
2050 }
2051 s2n(i,p);
2052 n+=i+2;
2053 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2054 n+= 2;
2055 }
2056 else
2057 {
2058 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
2059 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2060 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
2061 goto f_err;
2062 }
2063 }
2064
2065 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, n);
2066 }
2067
2068 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
2069 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
2070 return ssl_do_write(s);
2071 f_err:
2072 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2073 err:
2074 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2075 if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2076 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2077 #endif
2078 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
2079 return(-1);
2080 }
2081
2082 int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
2083 {
2084 unsigned char *p,*d;
2085 int i,j,nl,off,n;
2086 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk=NULL;
2087 X509_NAME *name;
2088 BUF_MEM *buf;
2089
2090 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A)
2091 {
2092 buf=s->init_buf;
2093
2094 d=p=ssl_handshake_start(s);
2095
2096 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
2097 p++;
2098 n=ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s,p);
2099 d[0]=n;
2100 p+=n;
2101 n++;
2102
2103 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2104 {
2105 const unsigned char *psigs;
2106 unsigned char *etmp = p;
2107 nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &psigs);
2108 /* Skip over length for now */
2109 p += 2;
2110 nl = tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, p, psigs, nl);
2111 /* Now fill in length */
2112 s2n(nl, etmp);
2113 p += nl;
2114 n += nl + 2;
2115 }
2116
2117 off=n;
2118 p+=2;
2119 n+=2;
2120
2121 sk=SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
2122 nl=0;
2123 if (sk != NULL)
2124 {
2125 for (i=0; i<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++)
2126 {
2127 name=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i);
2128 j=i2d_X509_NAME(name,NULL);
2129 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s)+n+j+2))
2130 {
2131 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
2132 goto err;
2133 }
2134 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + n;
2135 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG))
2136 {
2137 s2n(j,p);
2138 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
2139 n+=2+j;
2140 nl+=2+j;
2141 }
2142 else
2143 {
2144 d=p;
2145 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
2146 j-=2; s2n(j,d); j+=2;
2147 n+=j;
2148 nl+=j;
2149 }
2150 }
2151 }
2152 /* else no CA names */
2153 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + off;
2154 s2n(nl,p);
2155
2156 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, n);
2157
2158 #ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
2159 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
2160 {
2161 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, s->init_num + 4))
2162 {
2163 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
2164 goto err;
2165 }
2166 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num;
2167 /* do the header */
2168 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
2169 *(p++)=0;
2170 *(p++)=0;
2171 *(p++)=0;
2172 s->init_num += 4;
2173 }
2174 #endif
2175
2176 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
2177 }
2178
2179 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
2180 return ssl_do_write(s);
2181 err:
2182 return(-1);
2183 }
2184
2185 int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
2186 {
2187 int i,al,ok;
2188 long n;
2189 unsigned long alg_k;
2190 unsigned char *p;
2191 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2192 RSA *rsa=NULL;
2193 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
2194 #endif
2195 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2196 BIGNUM *pub=NULL;
2197 DH *dh_srvr, *dh_clnt = NULL;
2198 #endif
2199 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2200 KSSL_ERR kssl_err;
2201 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2202
2203 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2204 EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;
2205 EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
2206 EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
2207 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
2208 #endif
2209
2210 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2211 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
2212 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B,
2213 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2214 2048, /* ??? */
2215 &ok);
2216
2217 if (!ok) return((int)n);
2218 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2219
2220 alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2221
2222 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2223 if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
2224 {
2225 unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
2226 int decrypt_len, decrypt_good_mask;
2227 unsigned char version_good;
2228
2229 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
2230 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp)
2231 {
2232 if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL))
2233 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp;
2234 /* Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should
2235 * be sent already */
2236 if (rsa == NULL)
2237 {
2238 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2239 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY);
2240 goto f_err;
2241
2242 }
2243 }
2244 else
2245 {
2246 pkey=s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey;
2247 if ( (pkey == NULL) ||
2248 (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) ||
2249 (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL))
2250 {
2251 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2252 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2253 goto f_err;
2254 }
2255 rsa=pkey->pkey.rsa;
2256 }
2257
2258 /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */
2259 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
2260 {
2261 n2s(p,i);
2262 if (n != i+2)
2263 {
2264 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG))
2265 {
2266 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2267 goto err;
2268 }
2269 else
2270 p-=2;
2271 }
2272 else
2273 n=i;
2274 }
2275
2276 /* We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because
2277 * of Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see
2278 * RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of
2279 * the TLS RFC and generates a random premaster secret for the
2280 * case that the decrypt fails. See
2281 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1 */
2282
2283 /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure. */
2284 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(rand_premaster_secret,
2285 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0)
2286 goto err;
2287 decrypt_len = RSA_private_decrypt((int)n,p,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
2288 ERR_clear_error();
2289
2290 /* decrypt_len should be SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH.
2291 * decrypt_good_mask will be zero if so and non-zero otherwise. */
2292 decrypt_good_mask = decrypt_len ^ SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2293
2294 /* If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct
2295 * then version_good will be zero. The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa
2296 * extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2297 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version
2298 * number check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks
2299 * are done in constant time and are treated like any other
2300 * decryption error. */
2301 version_good = p[0] ^ (s->client_version>>8);
2302 version_good |= p[1] ^ (s->client_version&0xff);
2303
2304 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as
2305 * the ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks
2306 * (strangely, the protocol does not offer such protection for
2307 * DH ciphersuites). However, buggy clients exist that send the
2308 * negotiated protocol version instead if the server does not
2309 * support the requested protocol version. If
2310 * SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. */
2311 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG)
2312 {
2313 unsigned char workaround_mask = version_good;
2314 unsigned char workaround;
2315
2316 /* workaround_mask will be 0xff if version_good is
2317 * non-zero (i.e. the version match failed). Otherwise
2318 * it'll be 0x00. */
2319 workaround_mask |= workaround_mask >> 4;
2320 workaround_mask |= workaround_mask >> 2;
2321 workaround_mask |= workaround_mask >> 1;
2322 workaround_mask = ~((workaround_mask & 1) - 1);
2323
2324 workaround = p[0] ^ (s->version>>8);
2325 workaround |= p[1] ^ (s->version&0xff);
2326
2327 /* If workaround_mask is 0xff (i.e. there was a version
2328 * mismatch) then we copy the value of workaround over
2329 * version_good. */
2330 version_good = (workaround & workaround_mask) |
2331 (version_good & ~workaround_mask);
2332 }
2333
2334 /* If any bits in version_good are set then they'll poision
2335 * decrypt_good_mask and cause rand_premaster_secret to be
2336 * used. */
2337 decrypt_good_mask |= version_good;
2338
2339 /* decrypt_good_mask will be zero iff decrypt_len ==
2340 * SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH and the version check passed. We
2341 * fold the bottom 32 bits of it with an OR so that the LSB
2342 * will be zero iff everything is good. This assumes that we'll
2343 * never decrypt a value > 2**31 bytes, which seems safe. */
2344 decrypt_good_mask |= decrypt_good_mask >> 16;
2345 decrypt_good_mask |= decrypt_good_mask >> 8;
2346 decrypt_good_mask |= decrypt_good_mask >> 4;
2347 decrypt_good_mask |= decrypt_good_mask >> 2;
2348 decrypt_good_mask |= decrypt_good_mask >> 1;
2349 /* Now select only the LSB and subtract one. If decrypt_len ==
2350 * SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH and the version check passed then
2351 * decrypt_good_mask will be all ones. Otherwise it'll be all
2352 * zeros. */
2353 decrypt_good_mask &= 1;
2354 decrypt_good_mask--;
2355
2356 /* Now copy rand_premaster_secret over p using
2357 * decrypt_good_mask. */
2358 for (i = 0; i < (int) sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); i++)
2359 {
2360 p[i] = (p[i] & decrypt_good_mask) |
2361 (rand_premaster_secret[i] & ~decrypt_good_mask);
2362 }
2363
2364 s->session->master_key_length=
2365 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2366 s->session->master_key,
2367 p,i);
2368 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
2369 }
2370 else
2371 #endif
2372 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2373 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
2374 {
2375 int idx = -1;
2376 EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL;
2377 if (n)
2378 n2s(p,i);
2379 else
2380 i = 0;
2381 if (n && n != i+2)
2382 {
2383 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG))
2384 {
2385 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2386 goto err;
2387 }
2388 else
2389 {
2390 p-=2;
2391 i=(int)n;
2392 }
2393 }
2394 if (alg_k & SSL_kDHr)
2395 idx = SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA;
2396 else if (alg_k & SSL_kDHd)
2397 idx = SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA;
2398 if (idx >= 0)
2399 {
2400 skey = s->cert->pkeys[idx].privatekey;
2401 if ((skey == NULL) ||
2402 (skey->type != EVP_PKEY_DH) ||
2403 (skey->pkey.dh == NULL))
2404 {
2405 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2406 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2407 goto f_err;
2408 }
2409 dh_srvr = skey->pkey.dh;
2410 }
2411 else if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL)
2412 {
2413 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2414 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2415 goto f_err;
2416 }
2417 else
2418 dh_srvr=s->s3->tmp.dh;
2419
2420 if (n == 0L)
2421 {
2422 /* Get pubkey from cert */
2423 EVP_PKEY *clkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2424 if (clkey)
2425 {
2426 if (EVP_PKEY_cmp_parameters(clkey, skey) == 1)
2427 dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(clkey);
2428 }
2429 if (dh_clnt == NULL)
2430 {
2431 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2432 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2433 goto f_err;
2434 }
2435 EVP_PKEY_free(clkey);
2436 pub = dh_clnt->pub_key;
2437 }
2438 else
2439 pub=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL);
2440 if (pub == NULL)
2441 {
2442 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BN_LIB);
2443 goto err;
2444 }
2445
2446 i=DH_compute_key(p,pub,dh_srvr);
2447
2448 if (i <= 0)
2449 {
2450 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
2451 BN_clear_free(pub);
2452 goto err;
2453 }
2454
2455 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
2456 s->s3->tmp.dh=NULL;
2457 if (dh_clnt)
2458 DH_free(dh_clnt);
2459 else
2460 BN_clear_free(pub);
2461 pub=NULL;
2462 s->session->master_key_length=
2463 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2464 s->session->master_key,p,i);
2465 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
2466 if (dh_clnt)
2467 return 2;
2468 }
2469 else
2470 #endif
2471 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2472 if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
2473 {
2474 krb5_error_code krb5rc;
2475 krb5_data enc_ticket;
2476 krb5_data authenticator;
2477 krb5_data enc_pms;
2478 KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
2479 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
2480 const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
2481 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
2482 unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
2483 + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
2484 int padl, outl;
2485 krb5_timestamp authtime = 0;
2486 krb5_ticket_times ttimes;
2487
2488 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
2489
2490 if (!kssl_ctx) kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
2491
2492 n2s(p,i);
2493 enc_ticket.length = i;
2494
2495 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + 6))
2496 {
2497 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2498 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2499 goto err;
2500 }
2501
2502 enc_ticket.data = (char *)p;
2503 p+=enc_ticket.length;
2504
2505 n2s(p,i);
2506 authenticator.length = i;
2507
2508 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 6))
2509 {
2510 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2511 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2512 goto err;
2513 }
2514
2515 authenticator.data = (char *)p;
2516 p+=authenticator.length;
2517
2518 n2s(p,i);
2519 enc_pms.length = i;
2520 enc_pms.data = (char *)p;
2521 p+=enc_pms.length;
2522
2523 /* Note that the length is checked again below,
2524 ** after decryption
2525 */
2526 if(enc_pms.length > sizeof pms)
2527 {
2528 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2529 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2530 goto err;
2531 }
2532
2533 if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length +
2534 enc_pms.length + 6))
2535 {
2536 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2537 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2538 goto err;
2539 }
2540
2541 if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes,
2542 &kssl_err)) != 0)
2543 {
2544 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
2545 printf("kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
2546 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2547 if (kssl_err.text)
2548 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2549 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2550 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2551 kssl_err.reason);
2552 goto err;
2553 }
2554
2555 /* Note: no authenticator is not considered an error,
2556 ** but will return authtime == 0.
2557 */
2558 if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator,
2559 &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0)
2560 {
2561 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
2562 printf("kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
2563 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2564 if (kssl_err.text)
2565 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2566 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2567 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2568 kssl_err.reason);
2569 goto err;
2570 }
2571
2572 if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0)
2573 {
2574 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc);
2575 goto err;
2576 }
2577
2578 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
2579 kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
2580 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2581
2582 enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
2583 if (enc == NULL)
2584 goto err;
2585
2586 memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
2587
2588 if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc,NULL,kssl_ctx->key,iv))
2589 {
2590 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2591 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2592 goto err;
2593 }
2594 if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms,&outl,
2595 (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length))
2596 {
2597 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2598 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2599 goto err;
2600 }
2601 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2602 {
2603 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2604 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2605 goto err;
2606 }
2607 if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx,&(pms[outl]),&padl))
2608 {
2609 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2610 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2611 goto err;
2612 }
2613 outl += padl;
2614 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2615 {
2616 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2617 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2618 goto err;
2619 }
2620 if (!((pms[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (pms[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
2621 {
2622 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2623 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2624 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2625 * However, buggy clients exist that send random bytes instead of
2626 * the protocol version.
2627 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients.
2628 * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos cipher)
2629 */
2630 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG))
2631 {
2632 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2633 SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2634 goto err;
2635 }
2636 }
2637
2638 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
2639
2640 s->session->master_key_length=
2641 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2642 s->session->master_key, pms, outl);
2643
2644 if (kssl_ctx->client_princ)
2645 {
2646 size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
2647 if ( len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH )
2648 {
2649 s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len;
2650 memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ,kssl_ctx->client_princ,len);
2651 }
2652 }
2653
2654
2655 /* Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
2656 ** but it caused problems for apache.
2657 ** kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
2658 ** if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
2659 */
2660 }
2661 else
2662 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2663
2664 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2665 if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
2666 {
2667 int ret = 1;
2668 int field_size = 0;
2669 const EC_KEY *tkey;
2670 const EC_GROUP *group;
2671 const BIGNUM *priv_key;
2672
2673 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
2674 if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL)
2675 {
2676 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2677 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2678 goto err;
2679 }
2680
2681 /* Let's get server private key and group information */
2682 if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
2683 {
2684 /* use the certificate */
2685 tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec;
2686 }
2687 else
2688 {
2689 /* use the ephermeral values we saved when
2690 * generating the ServerKeyExchange msg.
2691 */
2692 tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh;
2693 }
2694
2695 group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
2696 priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
2697
2698 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) ||
2699 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key))
2700 {
2701 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2702 ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2703 goto err;
2704 }
2705
2706 /* Let's get client's public key */
2707 if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL)
2708 {
2709 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2710 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2711 goto err;
2712 }
2713
2714 if (n == 0L)
2715 {
2716 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
2717
2718 if (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE)
2719 {
2720 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2721 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
2722 goto f_err;
2723 }
2724 if (((clnt_pub_pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer))
2725 == NULL) ||
2726 (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC))
2727 {
2728 /* XXX: For now, we do not support client
2729 * authentication using ECDH certificates
2730 * so this branch (n == 0L) of the code is
2731 * never executed. When that support is
2732 * added, we ought to ensure the key
2733 * received in the certificate is
2734 * authorized for key agreement.
2735 * ECDH_compute_key implicitly checks that
2736 * the two ECDH shares are for the same
2737 * group.
2738 */
2739 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2740 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2741 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS);
2742 goto f_err;
2743 }
2744
2745 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,
2746 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->pkey.ec)) == 0)
2747 {
2748 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2749 ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2750 goto err;
2751 }
2752 ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
2753 }
2754 else
2755 {
2756 /* Get client's public key from encoded point
2757 * in the ClientKeyExchange message.
2758 */
2759 if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
2760 {
2761 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2762 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2763 goto err;
2764 }
2765
2766 /* Get encoded point length */
2767 i = *p;
2768 p += 1;
2769 if (n != 1 + i)
2770 {
2771 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2772 ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2773 goto err;
2774 }
2775 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group,
2776 clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0)
2777 {
2778 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2779 ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2780 goto err;
2781 }
2782 /* p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer
2783 * currently, so set it to the start
2784 */
2785 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2786 }
2787
2788 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
2789 field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
2790 if (field_size <= 0)
2791 {
2792 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2793 ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
2794 goto err;
2795 }
2796 i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size+7)/8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh, NULL);
2797 if (i <= 0)
2798 {
2799 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2800 ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
2801 goto err;
2802 }
2803
2804 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2805 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2806 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2807 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2808 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
2809 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
2810
2811 /* Compute the master secret */
2812 s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc-> \
2813 generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, p, i);
2814
2815 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
2816 return (ret);
2817 }
2818 else
2819 #endif
2820 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2821 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK)
2822 {
2823 unsigned char *t = NULL;
2824 unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN*2+4];
2825 unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0;
2826 int psk_err = 1;
2827 char tmp_id[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1];
2828
2829 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2830
2831 n2s(p,i);
2832 if (n != i+2)
2833 {
2834 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2835 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2836 goto psk_err;
2837 }
2838 if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN)
2839 {
2840 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2841 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2842 goto psk_err;
2843 }
2844 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL)
2845 {
2846 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2847 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
2848 goto psk_err;
2849 }
2850
2851 /* Create guaranteed NULL-terminated identity
2852 * string for the callback */
2853 memcpy(tmp_id, p, i);
2854 memset(tmp_id+i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1-i);
2855 psk_len = s->psk_server_callback(s, tmp_id,
2856 psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2857 OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_id, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1);
2858
2859 if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN)
2860 {
2861 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2862 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2863 goto psk_err;
2864 }
2865 else if (psk_len == 0)
2866 {
2867 /* PSK related to the given identity not found */
2868 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2869 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2870 al=SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
2871 goto psk_err;
2872 }
2873
2874 /* create PSK pre_master_secret */
2875 pre_ms_len=2+psk_len+2+psk_len;
2876 t = psk_or_pre_ms;
2877 memmove(psk_or_pre_ms+psk_len+4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len);
2878 s2n(psk_len, t);
2879 memset(t, 0, psk_len);
2880 t+=psk_len;
2881 s2n(psk_len, t);
2882
2883 if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL)
2884 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2885 s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup((char *)p);
2886 if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL)
2887 {
2888 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2889 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2890 goto psk_err;
2891 }
2892
2893 if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
2894 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
2895 s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
2896 if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL &&
2897 s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
2898 {
2899 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2900 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2901 goto psk_err;
2902 }
2903
2904 s->session->master_key_length=
2905 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2906 s->session->master_key, psk_or_pre_ms, pre_ms_len);
2907 psk_err = 0;
2908 psk_err:
2909 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2910 if (psk_err != 0)
2911 goto f_err;
2912 }
2913 else
2914 #endif
2915 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2916 if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
2917 {
2918 int param_len;
2919
2920 n2s(p,i);
2921 param_len=i+2;
2922 if (param_len > n)
2923 {
2924 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2925 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
2926 goto f_err;
2927 }
2928 if (!(s->srp_ctx.A=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
2929 {
2930 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2931 goto err;
2932 }
2933 if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0
2934 || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A))
2935 {
2936 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2937 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
2938 goto f_err;
2939 }
2940 if (s->session->srp_username != NULL)
2941 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
2942 s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
2943 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL)
2944 {
2945 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2946 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2947 goto err;
2948 }
2949
2950 if ((s->session->master_key_length = SRP_generate_server_master_secret(s,s->session->master_key))<0)
2951 {
2952 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2953 goto err;
2954 }
2955
2956 p+=i;
2957 }
2958 else
2959 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
2960 if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST)
2961 {
2962 int ret = 0;
2963 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
2964 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
2965 unsigned char premaster_secret[32], *start;
2966 size_t outlen=32, inlen;
2967 unsigned long alg_a;
2968 int Ttag, Tclass;
2969 long Tlen;
2970
2971 /* Get our certificate private key*/
2972 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2973 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST94)
2974 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST94].privatekey;
2975 else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01)
2976 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
2977
2978 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk,NULL);
2979 EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx);
2980 /* If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
2981 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
2982 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use
2983 * a client certificate for authorization only. */
2984 client_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2985 if (client_pub_pkey)
2986 {
2987 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
2988 ERR_clear_error();
2989 }
2990 /* Decrypt session key */
2991 if (ASN1_get_object((const unsigned char **)&p, &Tlen, &Ttag, &Tclass, n) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED ||
2992 Ttag != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE ||
2993 Tclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL)
2994 {
2995 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2996 goto gerr;
2997 }
2998 start = p;
2999 inlen = Tlen;
3000 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx,premaster_secret,&outlen,start,inlen) <=0)
3001
3002 {
3003 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3004 goto gerr;
3005 }
3006 /* Generate master secret */
3007 s->session->master_key_length=
3008 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
3009 s->session->master_key,premaster_secret,32);
3010 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
3011 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
3012 ret = 2;
3013 else
3014 ret = 1;
3015 gerr:
3016 EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey);
3017 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3018 if (ret)
3019 return ret;
3020 else
3021 goto err;
3022 }
3023 else
3024 {
3025 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3026 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
3027 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
3028 goto f_err;
3029 }
3030
3031 return(1);
3032 f_err:
3033 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3034 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_SRP)
3035 err:
3036 #endif
3037 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
3038 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
3039 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
3040 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
3041 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
3042 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
3043 #endif
3044 return(-1);
3045 }
3046
3047 int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
3048 {
3049 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
3050 unsigned char *p;
3051 int al,ok,ret=0;
3052 long n;
3053 int type=0,i,j;
3054 X509 *peer;
3055 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
3056 EVP_MD_CTX mctx;
3057 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx);
3058
3059 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3060 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
3061 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,
3062 -1,
3063 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
3064 &ok);
3065
3066 if (!ok) return((int)n);
3067
3068 if (s->session->peer != NULL)
3069 {
3070 peer=s->session->peer;
3071 pkey=X509_get_pubkey(peer);
3072 type=X509_certificate_type(peer,pkey);
3073 }
3074 else
3075 {
3076 peer=NULL;
3077 pkey=NULL;
3078 }
3079
3080 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY)
3081 {
3082 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
3083 if ((peer != NULL) && (type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
3084 {
3085 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3086 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE);
3087 goto f_err;
3088 }
3089 ret=1;
3090 goto end;
3091 }
3092
3093 if (peer == NULL)
3094 {
3095 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED);
3096 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3097 goto f_err;
3098 }
3099
3100 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
3101 {
3102 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
3103 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3104 goto f_err;
3105 }
3106
3107 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
3108 {
3109 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
3110 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3111 goto f_err;
3112 }
3113
3114 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
3115 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3116 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
3117 /* If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare
3118 * signature without length field */
3119 if (n==64 && (pkey->type==NID_id_GostR3410_94 ||
3120 pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) )
3121 {
3122 i=64;
3123 }
3124 else
3125 {
3126 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3127 {
3128 int rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, p, pkey);
3129 if (rv == -1)
3130 {
3131 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3132 goto f_err;
3133 }
3134 else if (rv == 0)
3135 {
3136 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3137 goto f_err;
3138 }
3139 #ifdef SSL_DEBUG
3140 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
3141 #endif
3142 p += 2;
3143 n -= 2;
3144 }
3145 n2s(p,i);
3146 n-=2;
3147 if (i > n)
3148 {
3149 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3150 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3151 goto f_err;
3152 }
3153 }
3154 j=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
3155 if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0))
3156 {
3157 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
3158 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3159 goto f_err;
3160 }
3161
3162 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3163 {
3164 long hdatalen = 0;
3165 void *hdata;
3166 hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
3167 if (hdatalen <= 0)
3168 {
3169 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3170 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3171 goto f_err;
3172 }
3173 #ifdef SSL_DEBUG
3174 fprintf(stderr, "Using TLS 1.2 with client verify alg %s\n",
3175 EVP_MD_name(md));
3176 #endif
3177 if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL)
3178 || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen))
3179 {
3180 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
3181 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3182 goto f_err;
3183 }
3184
3185 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&mctx, p , i, pkey) <= 0)
3186 {
3187 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3188 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
3189 goto f_err;
3190 }
3191 }
3192 else
3193 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3194 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
3195 {
3196 i=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
3197 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i,
3198 pkey->pkey.rsa);
3199 if (i < 0)
3200 {
3201 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3202 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
3203 goto f_err;
3204 }
3205 if (i == 0)
3206 {
3207 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3208 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE);
3209 goto f_err;
3210 }
3211 }
3212 else
3213 #endif
3214 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3215 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
3216 {
3217 j=DSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
3218 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3219 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.dsa);
3220 if (j <= 0)
3221 {
3222 /* bad signature */
3223 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3224 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE);
3225 goto f_err;
3226 }
3227 }
3228 else
3229 #endif
3230 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3231 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
3232 {
3233 j=ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
3234 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3235 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.ec);
3236 if (j <= 0)
3237 {
3238 /* bad signature */
3239 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3240 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
3241 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
3242 goto f_err;
3243 }
3244 }
3245 else
3246 #endif
3247 if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001)
3248 { unsigned char signature[64];
3249 int idx;
3250 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey,NULL);
3251 EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx);
3252 if (i!=64) {
3253 fprintf(stderr,"GOST signature length is %d",i);
3254 }
3255 for (idx=0;idx<64;idx++) {
3256 signature[63-idx]=p[idx];
3257 }
3258 j=EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx,signature,64,s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,32);
3259 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
3260 if (j<=0)
3261 {
3262 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3263 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
3264 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
3265 goto f_err;
3266 }
3267 }
3268 else
3269 {
3270 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3271 al=SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
3272 goto f_err;
3273 }
3274
3275
3276 ret=1;
3277 if (0)
3278 {
3279 f_err:
3280 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3281 }
3282 end:
3283 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
3284 {
3285 BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
3286 s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
3287 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
3288 }
3289 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
3290 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3291 return(ret);
3292 }
3293
3294 int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
3295 {
3296 int i,ok,al,ret= -1;
3297 X509 *x=NULL;
3298 unsigned long l,nc,llen,n;
3299 const unsigned char *p,*q;
3300 unsigned char *d;
3301 STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL;
3302
3303 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3304 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A,
3305 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B,
3306 -1,
3307 s->max_cert_list,
3308 &ok);
3309
3310 if (!ok) return((int)n);
3311
3312 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE)
3313 {
3314 if ( (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3315 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
3316 {
3317 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3318 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3319 goto f_err;
3320 }
3321 /* If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list */
3322 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
3323 {
3324 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST);
3325 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3326 goto f_err;
3327 }
3328 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
3329 return(1);
3330 }
3331
3332 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE)
3333 {
3334 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3335 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
3336 goto f_err;
3337 }
3338 p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3339
3340 if ((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)
3341 {
3342 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3343 goto err;
3344 }
3345
3346 n2l3(p,llen);
3347 if (llen+3 != n)
3348 {
3349 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3350 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3351 goto f_err;
3352 }
3353 for (nc=0; nc<llen; )
3354 {
3355 n2l3(p,l);
3356 if ((l+nc+3) > llen)
3357 {
3358 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3359 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3360 goto f_err;
3361 }
3362
3363 q=p;
3364 x=d2i_X509(NULL,&p,l);
3365 if (x == NULL)
3366 {
3367 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
3368 goto err;
3369 }
3370 if (p != (q+l))
3371 {
3372 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3373 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3374 goto f_err;
3375 }
3376 if (!sk_X509_push(sk,x))
3377 {
3378 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3379 goto err;
3380 }
3381 x=NULL;
3382 nc+=l+3;
3383 }
3384
3385 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0)
3386 {
3387 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3388 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
3389 {
3390 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3391 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
3392 goto f_err;
3393 }
3394 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3395 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3396 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
3397 {
3398 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3399 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3400 goto f_err;
3401 }
3402 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
3403 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
3404 {
3405 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3406 goto f_err;
3407 }
3408 }
3409 else
3410 {
3411 EVP_PKEY *pkey;
3412 i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk);
3413 if (i <= 0)
3414 {
3415 al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
3416 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
3417 goto f_err;
3418 }
3419 if (i > 1)
3420 {
3421 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, i);
3422 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3423 goto f_err;
3424 }
3425 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(sk, 0));
3426 if (pkey == NULL)
3427 {
3428 al=SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3429 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3430 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
3431 goto f_err;
3432 }
3433 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3434 }
3435
3436 if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */
3437 X509_free(s->session->peer);
3438 s->session->peer=sk_X509_shift(sk);
3439 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
3440
3441 /* With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL
3442 * when we arrive here. */
3443 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
3444 {
3445 s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
3446 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
3447 {
3448 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3449 goto err;
3450 }
3451 }
3452 if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL)
3453 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free);
3454 s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain=sk;
3455 /* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the
3456 * peer's own certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c */
3457
3458 sk=NULL;
3459
3460 ret=1;
3461 if (0)
3462 {
3463 f_err:
3464 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3465 }
3466 err:
3467 if (x != NULL) X509_free(x);
3468 if (sk != NULL) sk_X509_pop_free(sk,X509_free);
3469 return(ret);
3470 }
3471
3472 int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
3473 {
3474 CERT_PKEY *cpk;
3475
3476 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A)
3477 {
3478 cpk=ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
3479 if (cpk == NULL)
3480 {
3481 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
3482 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aKRB5) ||
3483 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5))
3484 {
3485 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3486 return(0);
3487 }
3488 }
3489
3490 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,cpk))
3491 {
3492 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3493 return(0);
3494 }
3495 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
3496 }
3497
3498 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
3499 return ssl_do_write(s);
3500 }
3501
3502 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
3503 /* send a new session ticket (not necessarily for a new session) */
3504 int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
3505 {
3506 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A)
3507 {
3508 unsigned char *p, *senc, *macstart;
3509 const unsigned char *const_p;
3510 int len, slen_full, slen;
3511 SSL_SESSION *sess;
3512 unsigned int hlen;
3513 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
3514 HMAC_CTX hctx;
3515 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3516 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
3517 unsigned char key_name[16];
3518
3519 /* get session encoding length */
3520 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
3521 /* Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is
3522 * too long
3523 */
3524 if (slen_full > 0xFF00)
3525 return -1;
3526 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
3527 if (!senc)
3528 return -1;
3529 p = senc;
3530 i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p);
3531
3532 /* create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up */
3533 const_p = senc;
3534 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
3535 if (sess == NULL)
3536 {
3537 OPENSSL_free(senc);
3538 return -1;
3539 }
3540 sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
3541
3542 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
3543 if (slen > slen_full) /* shouldn't ever happen */
3544 {
3545 OPENSSL_free(senc);
3546 return -1;
3547 }
3548 p = senc;
3549 i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p);
3550 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3551
3552 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3553 * follows handshake_header_length +
3554 * 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
3555 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
3556 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
3557 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
3558 */
3559 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
3560 SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + 22 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH +
3561 EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
3562 return -1;
3563 p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
3564 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3565 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3566 /* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present
3567 * it does all the work otherwise use generated values
3568 * from parent ctx.
3569 */
3570 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
3571 {
3572 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx,
3573 &hctx, 1) < 0)
3574 {
3575 OPENSSL_free(senc);
3576 return -1;
3577 }
3578 }
3579 else
3580 {
3581 RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, 16);
3582 EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3583 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv);
3584 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3585 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
3586 memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
3587 }
3588
3589 /* Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only):
3590 * We leave this unspecified for resumed session (for simplicity),
3591 * and guess that tickets for new sessions will live as long
3592 * as their sessions. */
3593 l2n(s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout, p);
3594
3595 /* Skip ticket length for now */
3596 p += 2;
3597 /* Output key name */
3598 macstart = p;
3599 memcpy(p, key_name, 16);
3600 p += 16;
3601 /* output IV */
3602 memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx));
3603 p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3604 /* Encrypt session data */
3605 EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen);
3606 p += len;
3607 EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len);
3608 p += len;
3609 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3610
3611 HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart);
3612 HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen);
3613 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3614
3615 p += hlen;
3616 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
3617 /* Total length */
3618 len = p - ssl_handshake_start(s);
3619 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, len);
3620 /* Skip ticket lifetime hint */
3621 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + 4;
3622 s2n(len - 6, p);
3623 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
3624 OPENSSL_free(senc);
3625 }
3626
3627 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
3628 return ssl_do_write(s);
3629 }
3630
3631 int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s)
3632 {
3633 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A)
3634 {
3635 unsigned char *p;
3636 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3637 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
3638 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
3639 * + (ocsp response)
3640 */
3641 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen))
3642 return -1;
3643
3644 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3645
3646 /* do the header */
3647 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
3648 /* message length */
3649 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p);
3650 /* status type */
3651 *(p++)= s->tlsext_status_type;
3652 /* length of OCSP response */
3653 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p);
3654 /* actual response */
3655 memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen);
3656 /* number of bytes to write */
3657 s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen;
3658 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B;
3659 s->init_off = 0;
3660 }
3661
3662 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
3663 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3664 }
3665
3666 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3667 /* ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message. It
3668 * sets the next_proto member in s if found */
3669 int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s)
3670 {
3671 int ok;
3672 int proto_len, padding_len;
3673 long n;
3674 const unsigned char *p;
3675
3676 /* Clients cannot send a NextProtocol message if we didn't see the
3677 * extension in their ClientHello */
3678 if (!s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
3679 {
3680 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION);
3681 return -1;
3682 }
3683
3684 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3685 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A,
3686 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B,
3687 SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO,
3688 514, /* See the payload format below */
3689 &ok);
3690
3691 if (!ok)
3692 return((int)n);
3693
3694 /* s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received
3695 * in this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset
3696 * by ssl3_get_finished). */
3697 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
3698 {
3699 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS);
3700 return -1;
3701 }
3702
3703 if (n < 2)
3704 return 0; /* The body must be > 1 bytes long */
3705
3706 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3707
3708 /* The payload looks like:
3709 * uint8 proto_len;
3710 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
3711 * uint8 padding_len;
3712 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
3713 */
3714 proto_len = p[0];
3715 if (proto_len + 2 > s->init_num)
3716 return 0;
3717 padding_len = p[proto_len + 1];
3718 if (proto_len + padding_len + 2 != s->init_num)
3719 return 0;
3720
3721 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(proto_len);
3722 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
3723 {
3724 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3725 return 0;
3726 }
3727 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, p + 1, proto_len);
3728 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = proto_len;
3729
3730 return 1;
3731 }
3732 # endif
3733
3734 #endif
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