1 /* ssl/s3_srvr.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
124 /* ====================================================================
125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
142 * to make use of the Contribution.
144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
151 #define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
152 #define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
155 #include <openssl/crypto.h>
156 #include "ssl_locl.h"
157 #include "kssl_lcl.h"
158 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
159 #include <openssl/rand.h>
160 #include <openssl/objects.h>
161 #include <openssl/evp.h>
162 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
163 #include <openssl/x509.h>
164 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
165 #include <openssl/dh.h>
167 #include <openssl/bn.h>
168 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
169 #include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
171 #include <openssl/md5.h>
173 static const SSL_METHOD
*ssl3_get_server_method(int ver
);
175 static const SSL_METHOD
*ssl3_get_server_method(int ver
)
177 if (ver
== SSL3_VERSION
)
178 return(SSLv3_server_method());
183 IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method
,
185 ssl_undefined_function
,
186 ssl3_get_server_method
)
188 int ssl3_accept(SSL
*s
)
191 unsigned long alg_k
,Time
=(unsigned long)time(NULL
);
192 void (*cb
)(const SSL
*ssl
,int type
,int val
)=NULL
;
194 int new_state
,state
,skip
=0;
196 RAND_add(&Time
,sizeof(Time
),0);
200 if (s
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
202 else if (s
->ctx
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
203 cb
=s
->ctx
->info_callback
;
205 /* init things to blank */
207 if (!SSL_in_init(s
) || SSL_in_before(s
)) SSL_clear(s
);
211 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT
,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET
);
221 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE
:
223 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
227 case SSL_ST_BEFORE
|SSL_ST_ACCEPT
:
228 case SSL_ST_OK
|SSL_ST_ACCEPT
:
231 if (cb
!= NULL
) cb(s
,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START
,1);
233 if ((s
->version
>>8) != 3)
235 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
238 s
->type
=SSL_ST_ACCEPT
;
240 if (s
->init_buf
== NULL
)
242 if ((buf
=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL
)
247 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf
,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
))
255 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s
))
263 if (s
->state
!= SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE
)
265 /* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that
266 * the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
268 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s
,1)) { ret
= -1; goto end
; }
270 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s
);
271 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A
;
272 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_accept
++;
274 else if (!s
->s3
->send_connection_binding
&&
275 !(s
->options
& SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION
))
277 /* Server attempting to renegotiate with
278 * client that doesn't support secure
281 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT
, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED
);
282 ssl3_send_alert(s
,SSL3_AL_FATAL
,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
288 /* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE,
289 * we will just send a HelloRequest */
290 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_accept_renegotiate
++;
291 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A
;
295 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A
:
296 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B
:
299 ret
=ssl3_send_hello_request(s
);
300 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
301 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C
;
302 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH
;
305 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s
);
308 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C
:
312 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A
:
313 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B
:
314 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C
:
317 ret
=ssl3_get_client_hello(s
);
318 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
321 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A
;
325 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A
:
326 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B
:
327 ret
=ssl3_send_server_hello(s
);
328 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
329 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
332 if (s
->tlsext_ticket_expected
)
333 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A
;
335 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A
;
339 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A
;
342 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A
;
346 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A
:
347 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B
:
348 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
349 /* normal PSK or KRB5 */
350 if (!(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aNULL
)
351 && !(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kPSK
)
352 && !(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aKRB5
))
354 ret
=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s
);
355 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
356 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
357 if (s
->tlsext_status_expected
)
358 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A
;
360 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A
;
365 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A
;
372 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A
;
377 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A
:
378 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B
:
379 alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
381 /* clear this, it may get reset by
382 * send_server_key_exchange */
383 if ((s
->options
& SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA
)
384 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
385 && !(alg_k
& SSL_kKRB5
)
386 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
388 /* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key
389 * even when forbidden by protocol specs
390 * (handshake may fail as clients are not required to
391 * be able to handle this) */
392 s
->s3
->tmp
.use_rsa_tmp
=1;
394 s
->s3
->tmp
.use_rsa_tmp
=0;
397 /* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or
398 * RSA but we have a sign only certificate
400 * PSK: may send PSK identity hints
402 * For ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange
403 * message only if the cipher suite is either
404 * ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, the
405 * server certificate contains the server's
406 * public key for key exchange.
408 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.use_rsa_tmp
409 /* PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity
410 * hint if provided */
411 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
412 || ((alg_k
& SSL_kPSK
) && s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
)
414 || (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHr
|SSL_kDHd
|SSL_kEDH
))
415 || (alg_k
& SSL_kEECDH
)
416 || ((alg_k
& SSL_kRSA
)
417 && (s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
].privatekey
== NULL
418 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
)
419 && EVP_PKEY_size(s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
].privatekey
)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
)
425 ret
=ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s
);
426 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
431 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A
;
435 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A
:
436 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B
:
437 if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
438 !(s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
) ||
439 /* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set,
440 * don't request cert during re-negotiation: */
441 ((s
->session
->peer
!= NULL
) &&
442 (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE
)) ||
443 /* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites
444 * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts
445 * and in RFC 2246): */
446 ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aNULL
) &&
447 /* ... except when the application insists on verification
448 * (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */
449 !(s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT
)) ||
450 /* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */
451 (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aKRB5
)
452 /* With normal PSK Certificates and
453 * Certificate Requests are omitted */
454 || (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kPSK
))
456 /* no cert request */
458 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
=0;
459 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A
;
463 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
=1;
464 ret
=ssl3_send_certificate_request(s
);
465 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
466 #ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
467 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A
;
469 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH
;
470 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A
;
476 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A
:
477 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B
:
478 ret
=ssl3_send_server_done(s
);
479 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
480 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A
;
481 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH
;
485 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH
:
487 /* This code originally checked to see if
488 * any data was pending using BIO_CTRL_INFO
489 * and then flushed. This caused problems
490 * as documented in PR#1939. The proposed
491 * fix doesn't completely resolve this issue
492 * as buggy implementations of BIO_CTRL_PENDING
493 * still exist. So instead we just flush
497 s
->rwstate
=SSL_WRITING
;
498 if (BIO_flush(s
->wbio
) <= 0)
503 s
->rwstate
=SSL_NOTHING
;
505 s
->state
=s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
;
508 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A
:
509 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B
:
510 /* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */
511 ret
= ssl3_check_client_hello(s
);
515 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C
;
517 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
)
519 ret
=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s
);
520 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
523 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A
;
527 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A
:
528 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B
:
529 ret
=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s
);
534 /* For the ECDH ciphersuites when
535 * the client sends its ECDH pub key in
536 * a certificate, the CertificateVerify
537 * message is not sent.
538 * Also for GOST ciphersuites when
539 * the client uses its key from the certificate
542 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
543 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
;
545 if (s
->s3
->next_proto_neg_seen
)
546 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A
;
548 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
;
557 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A
;
560 /* We need to get hashes here so if there is
561 * a client cert, it can be verified
562 * FIXME - digest processing for CertificateVerify
563 * should be generalized. But it is next step
565 if (s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
)
566 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
))
568 for (dgst_num
=0; dgst_num
<SSL_MAX_DIGEST
;dgst_num
++)
569 if (s
->s3
->handshake_dgst
[dgst_num
])
573 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->cert_verify_mac(s
,EVP_MD_CTX_type(s
->s3
->handshake_dgst
[dgst_num
]),&(s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_verify_md
[offset
]));
574 dgst_size
=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s
->s3
->handshake_dgst
[dgst_num
]);
585 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A
:
586 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B
:
588 /* we should decide if we expected this one */
589 ret
=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s
);
590 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
592 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
593 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
;
595 if (s
->s3
->next_proto_neg_seen
)
596 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A
;
598 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
;
603 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
604 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A
:
605 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B
:
606 ret
=ssl3_get_next_proto(s
);
607 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
609 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
;
613 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
:
614 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B
:
615 ret
=ssl3_get_finished(s
,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
,
616 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B
);
617 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
618 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
619 if (s
->tlsext_ticket_expected
)
620 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A
;
628 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A
;
632 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
633 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A
:
634 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B
:
635 ret
=ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s
);
636 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
637 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A
;
641 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A
:
642 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B
:
643 ret
=ssl3_send_cert_status(s
);
644 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
645 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A
;
651 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A
:
652 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B
:
654 s
->session
->cipher
=s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
;
655 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->setup_key_block(s
))
656 { ret
= -1; goto end
; }
658 ret
=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s
,
659 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A
,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B
);
661 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
662 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A
;
665 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
666 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE
))
674 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A
:
675 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B
:
676 ret
=ssl3_send_finished(s
,
677 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A
,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B
,
678 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->server_finished_label
,
679 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->server_finished_label_len
);
680 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
681 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH
;
684 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
685 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
;
687 if (s
->s3
->next_proto_neg_seen
)
688 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A
;
690 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
;
694 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
=SSL_ST_OK
;
699 /* clean a few things up */
700 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s
);
702 BUF_MEM_free(s
->init_buf
);
705 /* remove buffering on output */
706 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s
);
710 if (s
->renegotiate
== 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
712 /* actually not necessarily a 'new' session unless
713 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is set */
718 ssl_update_cache(s
,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER
);
720 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_accept_good
++;
722 s
->handshake_func
=ssl3_accept
;
724 if (cb
!= NULL
) cb(s
,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE
,1);
732 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT
,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE
);
738 if (!s
->s3
->tmp
.reuse_message
&& !skip
)
742 if ((ret
=BIO_flush(s
->wbio
)) <= 0)
747 if ((cb
!= NULL
) && (s
->state
!= state
))
751 cb(s
,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP
,1);
758 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
762 cb(s
,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT
,ret
);
766 int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL
*s
)
770 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A
)
772 p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
773 *(p
++)=SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST
;
778 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B
;
779 /* number of bytes to write */
784 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
785 return(ssl3_do_write(s
,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
));
788 int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL
*s
)
793 /* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message,
794 * so permit appropriate message length */
795 n
=s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
801 if (!ok
) return((int)n
);
802 s
->s3
->tmp
.reuse_message
= 1;
803 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
== SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO
)
805 /* Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake,
806 * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.)
807 * I hope that tmp.dh is the only thing that may need to be cleared
808 * when a handshake is not completed ... */
809 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
810 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
!= NULL
)
812 DH_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
);
813 s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
= NULL
;
821 int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL
*s
)
823 int i
,j
,ok
,al
,ret
= -1;
824 unsigned int cookie_len
;
827 unsigned char *p
,*d
,*q
;
829 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
832 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *ciphers
=NULL
;
834 /* We do this so that we will respond with our native type.
835 * If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1,
836 * This down switching should be handled by a different method.
837 * If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with
840 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A
)
842 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B
;
845 n
=s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
846 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B
,
847 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C
,
848 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
849 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
,
852 if (!ok
) return((int)n
);
854 d
=p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
856 /* use version from inside client hello, not from record header
857 * (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */
858 s
->client_version
=(((int)p
[0])<<8)|(int)p
[1];
861 if ((s
->version
== DTLS1_VERSION
&& s
->client_version
> s
->version
) ||
862 (s
->version
!= DTLS1_VERSION
&& s
->client_version
< s
->version
))
864 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER
);
865 if ((s
->client_version
>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR
)
867 /* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
868 s
->version
= s
->client_version
;
870 al
= SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
874 /* If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't
875 * contain one, just return since we do not want to
876 * allocate any memory yet. So check cookie length...
878 if (SSL_get_options(s
) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE
)
880 unsigned int session_length
, cookie_length
;
882 session_length
= *(p
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
883 cookie_length
= *(p
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
+ session_length
+ 1);
885 if (cookie_length
== 0)
889 /* load the client random */
890 memcpy(s
->s3
->client_random
,p
,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
893 /* get the session-id */
897 /* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow session reuse during renegotiation
898 * (i.e. when s->new_session is true), option
899 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is new with 0.9.7.
900 * Maybe this optional behaviour should always have been the default,
901 * but we cannot safely change the default behaviour (or new applications
902 * might be written that become totally unsecure when compiled with
903 * an earlier library version)
905 if ((s
->new_session
&& (s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
)))
907 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s
,1))
912 i
=ssl_get_prev_session(s
, p
, j
, d
+ n
);
914 { /* previous session */
921 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s
,1))
928 if (s
->version
== DTLS1_VERSION
|| s
->version
== DTLS1_BAD_VER
)
934 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
935 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
936 * does not cause an overflow.
938 if ( cookie_len
> sizeof(s
->d1
->rcvd_cookie
))
941 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
942 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH
);
946 /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
947 if ((SSL_get_options(s
) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE
) &&
950 memcpy(s
->d1
->rcvd_cookie
, p
, cookie_len
);
952 if ( s
->ctx
->app_verify_cookie_cb
!= NULL
)
954 if ( s
->ctx
->app_verify_cookie_cb(s
, s
->d1
->rcvd_cookie
,
957 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
958 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,
959 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH
);
962 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
964 else if ( memcmp(s
->d1
->rcvd_cookie
, s
->d1
->cookie
,
965 s
->d1
->cookie_len
) != 0) /* default verification */
967 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
968 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,
969 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH
);
980 if ((i
== 0) && (j
!= 0))
982 /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */
983 al
=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
984 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED
);
989 /* not enough data */
990 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
991 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
994 if ((i
> 0) && (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s
,p
,i
,&(ciphers
))
1001 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
1002 if ((s
->hit
) && (i
> 0))
1005 id
=s
->session
->cipher
->id
;
1008 printf("client sent %d ciphers\n",sk_num(ciphers
));
1010 for (i
=0; i
<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers
); i
++)
1012 c
=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers
,i
);
1014 printf("client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1015 i
,sk_num(ciphers
),SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c
));
1023 /* Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade
1024 * attack: CVE-2010-4180.
1027 if (j
== 0 && (s
->options
& SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG
) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers
) == 1))
1029 /* Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used cipher may
1030 * not be in the current list, the client instead might be trying to
1031 * continue using a cipher that before wasn't chosen due to server
1032 * preferences. We'll have to reject the connection if the cipher is not
1033 * enabled, though. */
1034 c
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers
, 0);
1035 if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s
), c
) >= 0)
1037 s
->session
->cipher
= c
;
1044 /* we need to have the cipher in the cipher
1045 * list if we are asked to reuse it */
1046 al
=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1047 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING
);
1056 /* not enough data */
1057 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1058 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1064 if (p
[j
] == 0) break;
1071 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1072 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED
);
1076 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1078 if (s
->version
>= SSL3_VERSION
)
1080 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s
,&p
,d
,n
, &al
))
1082 /* 'al' set by ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext */
1083 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT
);
1087 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(s
) <= 0) {
1088 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
);
1092 /* Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this
1093 * handshake for not reused session only. We need to generate
1094 * server_random before calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow
1095 * SessionTicket processing to use it in key derivation. */
1099 Time
=(unsigned long)time(NULL
); /* Time */
1100 pos
=s
->s3
->server_random
;
1102 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(pos
,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
-4) <= 0)
1104 al
=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1109 if (!s
->hit
&& s
->version
>= TLS1_VERSION
&& s
->tls_session_secret_cb
)
1111 SSL_CIPHER
*pref_cipher
=NULL
;
1113 s
->session
->master_key_length
=sizeof(s
->session
->master_key
);
1114 if(s
->tls_session_secret_cb(s
, s
->session
->master_key
, &s
->session
->master_key_length
,
1115 ciphers
, &pref_cipher
, s
->tls_session_secret_cb_arg
))
1118 s
->session
->ciphers
=ciphers
;
1119 s
->session
->verify_result
=X509_V_OK
;
1123 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1124 pref_cipher
=pref_cipher
? pref_cipher
: ssl3_choose_cipher(s
, s
->session
->ciphers
, SSL_get_ciphers(s
));
1125 if (pref_cipher
== NULL
)
1127 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1128 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER
);
1132 s
->session
->cipher
=pref_cipher
;
1135 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s
->cipher_list
);
1137 if (s
->cipher_list_by_id
)
1138 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s
->cipher_list_by_id
);
1140 s
->cipher_list
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s
->session
->ciphers
);
1141 s
->cipher_list_by_id
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s
->session
->ciphers
);
1146 /* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1147 * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
1148 * algorithms from the client, starting at q. */
1149 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
=NULL
;
1150 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1151 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1152 if (s
->session
->compress_meth
!= 0)
1154 int m
, comp_id
= s
->session
->compress_meth
;
1155 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1156 /* Can't disable compression */
1157 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION
)
1159 al
=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1160 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION
);
1163 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1164 for (m
= 0; m
< sk_SSL_COMP_num(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
); m
++)
1166 comp
=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
,m
);
1167 if (comp_id
== comp
->id
)
1169 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
=comp
;
1173 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
== NULL
)
1175 al
=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1176 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM
);
1179 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1180 for (m
= 0; m
< i
; m
++)
1182 if (q
[m
] == comp_id
)
1187 al
=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1188 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING
);
1194 else if (!(s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION
) && s
->ctx
->comp_methods
)
1195 { /* See if we have a match */
1196 int m
,nn
,o
,v
,done
=0;
1198 nn
=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
);
1199 for (m
=0; m
<nn
; m
++)
1201 comp
=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
,m
);
1214 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
=comp
;
1219 /* If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1220 * using compression.
1222 if (s
->session
->compress_meth
!= 0)
1224 al
=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1225 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION
);
1230 /* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must
1235 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1236 s
->session
->compress_meth
=0;
1238 s
->session
->compress_meth
=(comp
== NULL
)?0:comp
->id
;
1240 if (s
->session
->ciphers
!= NULL
)
1241 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s
->session
->ciphers
);
1242 s
->session
->ciphers
=ciphers
;
1243 if (ciphers
== NULL
)
1245 al
=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1246 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED
);
1250 c
=ssl3_choose_cipher(s
,s
->session
->ciphers
,
1251 SSL_get_ciphers(s
));
1255 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1256 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER
);
1259 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
=c
;
1260 /* check whether we should disable session resumption */
1261 if (s
->not_resumable_session_cb
!= NULL
)
1262 s
->session
->not_resumable
=s
->not_resumable_session_cb(s
,
1263 ((c
->algorithm_mkey
& (SSL_kEDH
| SSL_kEECDH
)) != 0));
1264 if (s
->session
->not_resumable
)
1265 /* do not send a session ticket */
1266 s
->tlsext_ticket_expected
= 0;
1270 /* Session-id reuse */
1271 #ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
1272 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *sk
;
1273 SSL_CIPHER
*nc
=NULL
;
1274 SSL_CIPHER
*ec
=NULL
;
1276 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG
)
1278 sk
=s
->session
->ciphers
;
1279 for (i
=0; i
<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk
); i
++)
1281 c
=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk
,i
);
1282 if (c
->algorithm_enc
& SSL_eNULL
)
1284 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c
))
1288 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
=nc
;
1289 else if (ec
!= NULL
)
1290 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
=ec
;
1292 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
=s
->session
->cipher
;
1296 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
=s
->session
->cipher
;
1299 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
))
1302 /* we now have the following setup.
1304 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
1305 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
1306 * compression - basically ignored right now
1307 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1308 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1309 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1310 * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
1317 ssl3_send_alert(s
,SSL3_AL_FATAL
,al
);
1320 if (ciphers
!= NULL
) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers
);
1324 int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL
*s
)
1327 unsigned char *p
,*d
;
1330 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1334 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A
)
1336 buf
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
1337 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1338 p
=s
->s3
->server_random
;
1339 /* Generate server_random if it was not needed previously */
1340 Time
=(unsigned long)time(NULL
); /* Time */
1342 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p
,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
-4) <= 0)
1345 /* Do the message type and length last */
1348 *(p
++)=s
->version
>>8;
1349 *(p
++)=s
->version
&0xff;
1352 memcpy(p
,s
->s3
->server_random
,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
1353 p
+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
;
1355 /* now in theory we have 3 options to sending back the
1356 * session id. If it is a re-use, we send back the
1357 * old session-id, if it is a new session, we send
1358 * back the new session-id or we send back a 0 length
1359 * session-id if we want it to be single use.
1360 * Currently I will not implement the '0' length session-id
1361 * 12-Jan-98 - I'll now support the '0' length stuff.
1363 * We also have an additional case where stateless session
1364 * resumption is successful: we always send back the old
1365 * session id. In this case s->hit is non zero: this can
1366 * only happen if stateless session resumption is succesful
1367 * if session caching is disabled so existing functionality
1370 if (s
->session
->not_resumable
||
1371 (!(s
->ctx
->session_cache_mode
& SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER
)
1373 s
->session
->session_id_length
=0;
1375 sl
=s
->session
->session_id_length
;
1376 if (sl
> (int)sizeof(s
->session
->session_id
))
1378 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1382 memcpy(p
,s
->session
->session_id
,sl
);
1385 /* put the cipher */
1386 i
=ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
,p
);
1389 /* put the compression method */
1390 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1393 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
== NULL
)
1396 *(p
++)=s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
->id
;
1398 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1399 if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s
) <= 0)
1401 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO
,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT
);
1404 if ((p
= ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s
, p
, buf
+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
)) == NULL
)
1406 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO
,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1413 *(d
++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO
;
1416 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B
;
1417 /* number of bytes to write */
1422 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
1423 return(ssl3_do_write(s
,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
));
1426 int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL
*s
)
1430 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A
)
1432 p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
1435 *(p
++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE
;
1440 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B
;
1441 /* number of bytes to write */
1446 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
1447 return(ssl3_do_write(s
,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
));
1450 int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL
*s
)
1452 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1456 unsigned char md_buf
[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
];
1459 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1462 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1463 EC_KEY
*ecdh
=NULL
, *ecdhp
;
1464 unsigned char *encodedPoint
= NULL
;
1467 BN_CTX
*bn_ctx
= NULL
;
1470 unsigned char *p
,*d
;
1480 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx
);
1481 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A
)
1483 type
=s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
1488 r
[0]=r
[1]=r
[2]=r
[3]=NULL
;
1490 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1491 if (type
& SSL_kRSA
)
1494 if ((rsa
== NULL
) && (s
->cert
->rsa_tmp_cb
!= NULL
))
1496 rsa
=s
->cert
->rsa_tmp_cb(s
,
1497 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
),
1498 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
));
1501 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1502 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY
);
1510 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1511 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY
);
1516 s
->s3
->tmp
.use_rsa_tmp
=1;
1520 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1521 if (type
& SSL_kEDH
)
1524 if ((dhp
== NULL
) && (s
->cert
->dh_tmp_cb
!= NULL
))
1525 dhp
=s
->cert
->dh_tmp_cb(s
,
1526 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
),
1527 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
));
1530 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1531 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY
);
1535 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
!= NULL
)
1538 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1542 if ((dh
=DHparams_dup(dhp
)) == NULL
)
1544 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_DH_LIB
);
1549 if ((dhp
->pub_key
== NULL
||
1550 dhp
->priv_key
== NULL
||
1551 (s
->options
& SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE
)))
1553 if(!DH_generate_key(dh
))
1555 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1562 dh
->pub_key
=BN_dup(dhp
->pub_key
);
1563 dh
->priv_key
=BN_dup(dhp
->priv_key
);
1564 if ((dh
->pub_key
== NULL
) ||
1565 (dh
->priv_key
== NULL
))
1567 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_DH_LIB
);
1577 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1578 if (type
& SSL_kEECDH
)
1580 const EC_GROUP
*group
;
1582 ecdhp
=cert
->ecdh_tmp
;
1583 if ((ecdhp
== NULL
) && (s
->cert
->ecdh_tmp_cb
!= NULL
))
1585 ecdhp
=s
->cert
->ecdh_tmp_cb(s
,
1586 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
),
1587 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
));
1591 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1592 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY
);
1596 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.ecdh
!= NULL
)
1598 EC_KEY_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.ecdh
);
1599 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1603 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
1606 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB
);
1609 if (!EC_KEY_up_ref(ecdhp
))
1611 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB
);
1616 s
->s3
->tmp
.ecdh
=ecdh
;
1617 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh
) == NULL
) ||
1618 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh
) == NULL
) ||
1619 (s
->options
& SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE
))
1621 if(!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh
))
1623 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB
);
1628 if (((group
= EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh
)) == NULL
) ||
1629 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh
) == NULL
) ||
1630 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh
) == NULL
))
1632 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB
);
1636 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
) &&
1637 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group
) > 163))
1639 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER
);
1643 /* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH
1644 * keys over named (not generic) curves. For
1645 * supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero.
1648 tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group
)))
1651 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE
);
1655 /* Encode the public key.
1656 * First check the size of encoding and
1657 * allocate memory accordingly.
1659 encodedlen
= EC_POINT_point2oct(group
,
1660 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh
),
1661 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED
,
1664 encodedPoint
= (unsigned char *)
1665 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen
*sizeof(unsigned char));
1666 bn_ctx
= BN_CTX_new();
1667 if ((encodedPoint
== NULL
) || (bn_ctx
== NULL
))
1669 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1674 encodedlen
= EC_POINT_point2oct(group
,
1675 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh
),
1676 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED
,
1677 encodedPoint
, encodedlen
, bn_ctx
);
1679 if (encodedlen
== 0)
1681 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB
);
1685 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx
); bn_ctx
=NULL
;
1687 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not
1688 * generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges.
1689 * In this situation, we need four additional bytes
1690 * to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
1695 /* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message
1696 * explicitly so we can set these to NULLs
1704 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
1705 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1706 if (type
& SSL_kPSK
)
1708 /* reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint*/
1709 n
+=2+strlen(s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
);
1712 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1714 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1715 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE
);
1718 for (i
=0; r
[i
] != NULL
; i
++)
1720 nr
[i
]=BN_num_bytes(r
[i
]);
1724 if (!(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aNULL
)
1725 && !(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kPSK
))
1727 if ((pkey
=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s
,s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
))
1730 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1733 kn
=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey
);
1741 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf
,n
+4+kn
))
1743 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_LIB_BUF
);
1746 d
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
1749 for (i
=0; r
[i
] != NULL
; i
++)
1756 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1757 if (type
& SSL_kEECDH
)
1759 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves.
1760 * In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has:
1761 * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
1762 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by
1763 * the actual encoded point itself
1765 *p
= NAMED_CURVE_TYPE
;
1773 memcpy((unsigned char*)p
,
1774 (unsigned char *)encodedPoint
,
1776 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint
);
1781 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1782 if (type
& SSL_kPSK
)
1784 /* copy PSK identity hint */
1785 s2n(strlen(s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
), p
);
1786 strncpy((char *)p
, s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
, strlen(s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
));
1787 p
+=strlen(s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
);
1794 /* n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4])
1795 * and p points to the space at the end. */
1796 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1797 if (pkey
->type
== EVP_PKEY_RSA
)
1801 for (num
=2; num
> 0; num
--)
1803 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx
,(num
== 2)
1804 ?s
->ctx
->md5
:s
->ctx
->sha1
, NULL
);
1805 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx
,&(s
->s3
->client_random
[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
1806 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx
,&(s
->s3
->server_random
[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
1807 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx
,&(d
[4]),n
);
1808 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx
,q
,
1809 (unsigned int *)&i
);
1813 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1
, md_buf
, j
,
1814 &(p
[2]), &u
, pkey
->pkey
.rsa
) <= 0)
1816 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_LIB_RSA
);
1824 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA)
1825 if (pkey
->type
== EVP_PKEY_DSA
)
1828 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx
,EVP_dss1(), NULL
);
1829 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx
,&(s
->s3
->client_random
[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
1830 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx
,&(s
->s3
->server_random
[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
1831 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx
,&(d
[4]),n
);
1832 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx
,&(p
[2]),
1833 (unsigned int *)&i
,pkey
))
1835 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_LIB_DSA
);
1843 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA)
1844 if (pkey
->type
== EVP_PKEY_EC
)
1846 /* let's do ECDSA */
1847 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx
,EVP_ecdsa(), NULL
);
1848 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx
,&(s
->s3
->client_random
[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
1849 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx
,&(s
->s3
->server_random
[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
1850 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx
,&(d
[4]),n
);
1851 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx
,&(p
[2]),
1852 (unsigned int *)&i
,pkey
))
1854 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_LIB_ECDSA
);
1863 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
1864 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1865 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE
);
1870 *(d
++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
;
1873 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
1879 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B
;
1880 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx
);
1881 return(ssl3_do_write(s
,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
));
1883 ssl3_send_alert(s
,SSL3_AL_FATAL
,al
);
1885 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1886 if (encodedPoint
!= NULL
) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint
);
1887 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx
);
1889 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx
);
1893 int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL
*s
)
1895 unsigned char *p
,*d
;
1897 STACK_OF(X509_NAME
) *sk
=NULL
;
1901 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A
)
1905 d
=p
=(unsigned char *)&(buf
->data
[4]);
1907 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
1909 n
=ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s
,p
);
1918 sk
=SSL_get_client_CA_list(s
);
1922 for (i
=0; i
<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk
); i
++)
1924 name
=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk
,i
);
1925 j
=i2d_X509_NAME(name
,NULL
);
1926 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf
,4+n
+j
+2))
1928 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,ERR_R_BUF_LIB
);
1931 p
=(unsigned char *)&(buf
->data
[4+n
]);
1932 if (!(s
->options
& SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG
))
1935 i2d_X509_NAME(name
,&p
);
1942 i2d_X509_NAME(name
,&p
);
1943 j
-=2; s2n(j
,d
); j
+=2;
1949 /* else no CA names */
1950 p
=(unsigned char *)&(buf
->data
[4+off
]);
1953 d
=(unsigned char *)buf
->data
;
1954 *(d
++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
;
1957 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
1962 #ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
1963 p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
+ s
->init_num
;
1966 *(p
++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE
;
1973 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B
;
1976 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
1977 return(ssl3_do_write(s
,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
));
1982 int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL
*s
)
1986 unsigned long alg_k
;
1988 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1990 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
=NULL
;
1992 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1996 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1998 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2000 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2001 EC_KEY
*srvr_ecdh
= NULL
;
2002 EVP_PKEY
*clnt_pub_pkey
= NULL
;
2003 EC_POINT
*clnt_ecpoint
= NULL
;
2004 BN_CTX
*bn_ctx
= NULL
;
2007 n
=s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
2008 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A
,
2009 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B
,
2010 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2014 if (!ok
) return((int)n
);
2015 p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
2017 alg_k
=s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
2019 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2020 if (alg_k
& SSL_kRSA
)
2022 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
2023 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.use_rsa_tmp
)
2025 if ((s
->cert
!= NULL
) && (s
->cert
->rsa_tmp
!= NULL
))
2026 rsa
=s
->cert
->rsa_tmp
;
2027 /* Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should
2028 * be sent already */
2031 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2032 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY
);
2039 pkey
=s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
].privatekey
;
2040 if ( (pkey
== NULL
) ||
2041 (pkey
->type
!= EVP_PKEY_RSA
) ||
2042 (pkey
->pkey
.rsa
== NULL
))
2044 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2045 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE
);
2051 /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */
2052 if (s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
&& s
->version
!= DTLS1_BAD_VER
)
2057 if (!(s
->options
& SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG
))
2059 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG
);
2069 i
=RSA_private_decrypt((int)n
,p
,p
,rsa
,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING
);
2073 if (i
!= SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
)
2075 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2076 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); */
2079 if ((al
== -1) && !((p
[0] == (s
->client_version
>>8)) && (p
[1] == (s
->client_version
& 0xff))))
2081 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2082 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2083 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2084 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
2085 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
2087 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. */
2088 if (!((s
->options
& SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG
) &&
2089 (p
[0] == (s
->version
>>8)) && (p
[1] == (s
->version
& 0xff))))
2091 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2092 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER); */
2094 /* The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2095 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version
2096 * number check as a "bad version oracle" -- an alert would
2097 * reveal that the plaintext corresponding to some ciphertext
2098 * made up by the adversary is properly formatted except
2099 * that the version number is wrong. To avoid such attacks,
2100 * we should treat this just like any other decryption error. */
2106 /* Some decryption failure -- use random value instead as countermeasure
2107 * against Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding
2108 * (see RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). */
2110 i
= SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
;
2111 p
[0] = s
->client_version
>> 8;
2112 p
[1] = s
->client_version
& 0xff;
2113 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p
+2, i
-2) <= 0) /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure */
2117 s
->session
->master_key_length
=
2118 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
2119 s
->session
->master_key
,
2121 OPENSSL_cleanse(p
,i
);
2125 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2126 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kEDH
|SSL_kDHr
|SSL_kDHd
))
2131 if (!(s
->options
& SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG
))
2133 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG
);
2143 if (n
== 0L) /* the parameters are in the cert */
2145 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2146 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_DH_CERTS
);
2151 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
== NULL
)
2153 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2154 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY
);
2158 dh_srvr
=s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
;
2161 pub
=BN_bin2bn(p
,i
,NULL
);
2164 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_BN_LIB
);
2168 i
=DH_compute_key(p
,pub
,dh_srvr
);
2172 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_DH_LIB
);
2176 DH_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
);
2181 s
->session
->master_key_length
=
2182 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
2183 s
->session
->master_key
,p
,i
);
2184 OPENSSL_cleanse(p
,i
);
2188 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2189 if (alg_k
& SSL_kKRB5
)
2191 krb5_error_code krb5rc
;
2192 krb5_data enc_ticket
;
2193 krb5_data authenticator
;
2195 KSSL_CTX
*kssl_ctx
= s
->kssl_ctx
;
2196 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx
;
2197 const EVP_CIPHER
*enc
= NULL
;
2198 unsigned char iv
[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH
];
2199 unsigned char pms
[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
2200 + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH
];
2202 krb5_timestamp authtime
= 0;
2203 krb5_ticket_times ttimes
;
2205 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx
);
2207 if (!kssl_ctx
) kssl_ctx
= kssl_ctx_new();
2210 enc_ticket
.length
= i
;
2212 if (n
< (long)(enc_ticket
.length
+ 6))
2214 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2215 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2219 enc_ticket
.data
= (char *)p
;
2220 p
+=enc_ticket
.length
;
2223 authenticator
.length
= i
;
2225 if (n
< (long)(enc_ticket
.length
+ authenticator
.length
+ 6))
2227 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2228 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2232 authenticator
.data
= (char *)p
;
2233 p
+=authenticator
.length
;
2237 enc_pms
.data
= (char *)p
;
2240 /* Note that the length is checked again below,
2243 if(enc_pms
.length
> sizeof pms
)
2245 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2246 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2250 if (n
!= (long)(enc_ticket
.length
+ authenticator
.length
+
2251 enc_pms
.length
+ 6))
2253 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2254 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2258 if ((krb5rc
= kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx
, &enc_ticket
, &ttimes
,
2262 printf("kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
2263 krb5rc
, kssl_err
.reason
);
2265 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err
.text
);
2266 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2267 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2272 /* Note: no authenticator is not considered an error,
2273 ** but will return authtime == 0.
2275 if ((krb5rc
= kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx
, &authenticator
,
2276 &authtime
, &kssl_err
)) != 0)
2279 printf("kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
2280 krb5rc
, kssl_err
.reason
);
2282 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err
.text
);
2283 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2284 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2289 if ((krb5rc
= kssl_validate_times(authtime
, &ttimes
)) != 0)
2291 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, krb5rc
);
2296 kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx
);
2297 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2299 enc
= kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx
->enctype
);
2303 memset(iv
, 0, sizeof iv
); /* per RFC 1510 */
2305 if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx
,enc
,NULL
,kssl_ctx
->key
,iv
))
2307 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2308 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
2311 if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx
, pms
,&outl
,
2312 (unsigned char *)enc_pms
.data
, enc_pms
.length
))
2314 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2315 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
2318 if (outl
> SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
)
2320 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2321 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2324 if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx
,&(pms
[outl
]),&padl
))
2326 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2327 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
2331 if (outl
> SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
)
2333 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2334 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2337 if (!((pms
[0] == (s
->client_version
>>8)) && (pms
[1] == (s
->client_version
& 0xff))))
2339 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2340 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2341 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2342 * However, buggy clients exist that send random bytes instead of
2343 * the protocol version.
2344 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients.
2345 * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos cipher)
2347 if (!(s
->options
& SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG
))
2349 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2350 SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
2355 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx
);
2357 s
->session
->master_key_length
=
2358 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
2359 s
->session
->master_key
, pms
, outl
);
2361 if (kssl_ctx
->client_princ
)
2363 size_t len
= strlen(kssl_ctx
->client_princ
);
2364 if ( len
< SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH
)
2366 s
->session
->krb5_client_princ_len
= len
;
2367 memcpy(s
->session
->krb5_client_princ
,kssl_ctx
->client_princ
,len
);
2372 /* Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
2373 ** but it caused problems for apache.
2374 ** kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
2375 ** if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
2379 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2381 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2382 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kEECDH
|SSL_kECDHr
|SSL_kECDHe
))
2387 const EC_GROUP
*group
;
2388 const BIGNUM
*priv_key
;
2390 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
2391 if ((srvr_ecdh
= EC_KEY_new()) == NULL
)
2393 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2394 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2398 /* Let's get server private key and group information */
2399 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kECDHr
|SSL_kECDHe
))
2401 /* use the certificate */
2402 tkey
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_ECC
].privatekey
->pkey
.ec
;
2406 /* use the ephermeral values we saved when
2407 * generating the ServerKeyExchange msg.
2409 tkey
= s
->s3
->tmp
.ecdh
;
2412 group
= EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey
);
2413 priv_key
= EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey
);
2415 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh
, group
) ||
2416 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh
, priv_key
))
2418 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2423 /* Let's get client's public key */
2424 if ((clnt_ecpoint
= EC_POINT_new(group
)) == NULL
)
2426 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2427 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2433 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
2435 if (alg_k
& SSL_kEECDH
)
2437 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2438 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY
);
2441 if (((clnt_pub_pkey
=X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
))
2443 (clnt_pub_pkey
->type
!= EVP_PKEY_EC
))
2445 /* XXX: For now, we do not support client
2446 * authentication using ECDH certificates
2447 * so this branch (n == 0L) of the code is
2448 * never executed. When that support is
2449 * added, we ought to ensure the key
2450 * received in the certificate is
2451 * authorized for key agreement.
2452 * ECDH_compute_key implicitly checks that
2453 * the two ECDH shares are for the same
2456 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2457 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2458 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS
);
2462 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint
,
2463 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey
->pkey
.ec
)) == 0)
2465 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2469 ret
= 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
2473 /* Get client's public key from encoded point
2474 * in the ClientKeyExchange message.
2476 if ((bn_ctx
= BN_CTX_new()) == NULL
)
2478 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2479 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2483 /* Get encoded point length */
2486 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group
,
2487 clnt_ecpoint
, p
, i
, bn_ctx
) == 0)
2489 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2493 /* p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer
2494 * currently, so set it to the start
2496 p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
2499 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
2500 field_size
= EC_GROUP_get_degree(group
);
2501 if (field_size
<= 0)
2503 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2507 i
= ECDH_compute_key(p
, (field_size
+7)/8, clnt_ecpoint
, srvr_ecdh
, NULL
);
2510 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2515 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey
);
2516 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint
);
2517 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh
);
2518 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx
);
2519 EC_KEY_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.ecdh
);
2520 s
->s3
->tmp
.ecdh
= NULL
;
2522 /* Compute the master secret */
2523 s
->session
->master_key_length
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
-> \
2524 generate_master_secret(s
, s
->session
->master_key
, p
, i
);
2526 OPENSSL_cleanse(p
, i
);
2531 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2532 if (alg_k
& SSL_kPSK
)
2534 unsigned char *t
= NULL
;
2535 unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms
[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
*2+4];
2536 unsigned int pre_ms_len
= 0, psk_len
= 0;
2538 char tmp_id
[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
+1];
2540 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2545 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2546 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2549 if (i
> PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
)
2551 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2552 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2555 if (s
->psk_server_callback
== NULL
)
2557 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2558 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB
);
2562 /* Create guaranteed NULL-terminated identity
2563 * string for the callback */
2564 memcpy(tmp_id
, p
, i
);
2565 memset(tmp_id
+i
, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
+1-i
);
2566 psk_len
= s
->psk_server_callback(s
, tmp_id
,
2567 psk_or_pre_ms
, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms
));
2568 OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_id
, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
+1);
2570 if (psk_len
> PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
)
2572 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2573 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2576 else if (psk_len
== 0)
2578 /* PSK related to the given identity not found */
2579 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2580 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND
);
2581 al
=SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY
;
2585 /* create PSK pre_master_secret */
2586 pre_ms_len
=2+psk_len
+2+psk_len
;
2588 memmove(psk_or_pre_ms
+psk_len
+4, psk_or_pre_ms
, psk_len
);
2590 memset(t
, 0, psk_len
);
2594 if (s
->session
->psk_identity
!= NULL
)
2595 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->psk_identity
);
2596 s
->session
->psk_identity
= BUF_strdup((char *)p
);
2597 if (s
->session
->psk_identity
== NULL
)
2599 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2600 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2604 if (s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
!= NULL
)
2605 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
);
2606 s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
= BUF_strdup(s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
);
2607 if (s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
!= NULL
&&
2608 s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
== NULL
)
2610 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2611 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2615 s
->session
->master_key_length
=
2616 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
2617 s
->session
->master_key
, psk_or_pre_ms
, pre_ms_len
);
2620 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms
, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms
));
2626 if (alg_k
& SSL_kGOST
)
2629 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pkey_ctx
;
2630 EVP_PKEY
*client_pub_pkey
= NULL
, *pk
= NULL
;
2631 unsigned char premaster_secret
[32], *start
;
2632 size_t outlen
=32, inlen
;
2633 unsigned long alg_a
;
2635 /* Get our certificate private key*/
2636 alg_a
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
;
2637 if (alg_a
& SSL_aGOST94
)
2638 pk
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_GOST94
].privatekey
;
2639 else if (alg_a
& SSL_aGOST01
)
2640 pk
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_GOST01
].privatekey
;
2642 pkey_ctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk
,NULL
);
2643 EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx
);
2644 /* If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
2645 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
2646 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use
2647 * a client certificate for authorization only. */
2648 client_pub_pkey
= X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
2649 if (client_pub_pkey
)
2651 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx
, client_pub_pkey
) <= 0)
2654 /* Decrypt session key */
2655 if ((*p
!=( V_ASN1_SEQUENCE
| V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED
)))
2657 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
2665 else if (p
[1] < 0x80)
2672 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
2675 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx
,premaster_secret
,&outlen
,start
,inlen
) <=0)
2678 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
2681 /* Generate master secret */
2682 s
->session
->master_key_length
=
2683 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
2684 s
->session
->master_key
,premaster_secret
,32);
2685 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2686 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx
, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY
, 2, NULL
) > 0)
2691 EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey
);
2692 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx
);
2700 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2701 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2702 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE
);
2708 ssl3_send_alert(s
,SSL3_AL_FATAL
,al
);
2709 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH)
2712 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2713 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey
);
2714 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint
);
2715 if (srvr_ecdh
!= NULL
)
2716 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh
);
2717 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx
);
2722 int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL
*s
)
2724 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
=NULL
;
2731 n
=s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
2732 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A
,
2733 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B
,
2738 if (!ok
) return((int)n
);
2740 if (s
->session
->peer
!= NULL
)
2742 peer
=s
->session
->peer
;
2743 pkey
=X509_get_pubkey(peer
);
2744 type
=X509_certificate_type(peer
,pkey
);
2752 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
!= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY
)
2754 s
->s3
->tmp
.reuse_message
=1;
2755 if ((peer
!= NULL
) && (type
| EVP_PKT_SIGN
))
2757 al
=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
2758 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE
);
2767 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED
);
2768 al
=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
2772 if (!(type
& EVP_PKT_SIGN
))
2774 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE
);
2775 al
=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
2779 if (s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
)
2781 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY
);
2782 al
=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
2786 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
2787 p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
2788 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
2789 /* If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare
2790 * signature without length field */
2791 if (n
==64 && (pkey
->type
==NID_id_GostR3410_94
||
2792 pkey
->type
== NID_id_GostR3410_2001
) )
2802 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2803 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2807 j
=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey
);
2808 if ((i
> j
) || (n
> j
) || (n
<= 0))
2810 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE
);
2811 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2815 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2816 if (pkey
->type
== EVP_PKEY_RSA
)
2818 i
=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1
, s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_verify_md
,
2819 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
, p
, i
,
2823 al
=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
2824 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT
);
2829 al
=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
2830 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE
);
2836 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2837 if (pkey
->type
== EVP_PKEY_DSA
)
2839 j
=DSA_verify(pkey
->save_type
,
2840 &(s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_verify_md
[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
]),
2841 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
,p
,i
,pkey
->pkey
.dsa
);
2845 al
=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
2846 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE
);
2852 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
2853 if (pkey
->type
== EVP_PKEY_EC
)
2855 j
=ECDSA_verify(pkey
->save_type
,
2856 &(s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_verify_md
[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
]),
2857 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
,p
,i
,pkey
->pkey
.ec
);
2861 al
=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
2862 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,
2863 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE
);
2869 if (pkey
->type
== NID_id_GostR3410_94
|| pkey
->type
== NID_id_GostR3410_2001
)
2870 { unsigned char signature
[64];
2872 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey
,NULL
);
2873 EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx
);
2875 fprintf(stderr
,"GOST signature length is %d",i
);
2877 for (idx
=0;idx
<64;idx
++) {
2878 signature
[63-idx
]=p
[idx
];
2880 j
=EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx
,signature
,64,s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_verify_md
,32);
2881 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
2884 al
=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
2885 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,
2886 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE
);
2892 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2893 al
=SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE
;
2902 ssl3_send_alert(s
,SSL3_AL_FATAL
,al
);
2905 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey
);
2909 int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL
*s
)
2911 int i
,ok
,al
,ret
= -1;
2913 unsigned long l
,nc
,llen
,n
;
2914 const unsigned char *p
,*q
;
2916 STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
=NULL
;
2918 n
=s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
2925 if (!ok
) return((int)n
);
2927 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
== SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
)
2929 if ( (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
) &&
2930 (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT
))
2932 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE
);
2933 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2936 /* If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list */
2937 if ((s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
) && s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
)
2939 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST
);
2940 al
=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
2943 s
->s3
->tmp
.reuse_message
=1;
2947 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
!= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
)
2949 al
=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
2950 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE
);
2953 p
=d
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
2955 if ((sk
=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL
)
2957 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2964 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2965 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2968 for (nc
=0; nc
<llen
; )
2971 if ((l
+nc
+3) > llen
)
2973 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2974 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2979 x
=d2i_X509(NULL
,&p
,l
);
2982 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB
);
2987 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2988 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2991 if (!sk_X509_push(sk
,x
))
2993 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3000 if (sk_X509_num(sk
) <= 0)
3002 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3003 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
)
3005 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
3006 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED
);
3009 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3010 else if ((s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
) &&
3011 (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT
))
3013 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE
);
3014 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
3020 i
=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s
,sk
);
3023 al
=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s
->verify_result
);
3024 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_RETURNED
);
3029 if (s
->session
->peer
!= NULL
) /* This should not be needed */
3030 X509_free(s
->session
->peer
);
3031 s
->session
->peer
=sk_X509_shift(sk
);
3032 s
->session
->verify_result
= s
->verify_result
;
3034 /* With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL
3035 * when we arrive here. */
3036 if (s
->session
->sess_cert
== NULL
)
3038 s
->session
->sess_cert
= ssl_sess_cert_new();
3039 if (s
->session
->sess_cert
== NULL
)
3041 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3045 if (s
->session
->sess_cert
->cert_chain
!= NULL
)
3046 sk_X509_pop_free(s
->session
->sess_cert
->cert_chain
, X509_free
);
3047 s
->session
->sess_cert
->cert_chain
=sk
;
3048 /* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the
3049 * peer's own certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c */
3057 ssl3_send_alert(s
,SSL3_AL_FATAL
,al
);
3060 if (x
!= NULL
) X509_free(x
);
3061 if (sk
!= NULL
) sk_X509_pop_free(sk
,X509_free
);
3065 int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL
*s
)
3070 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A
)
3072 x
=ssl_get_server_send_cert(s
);
3075 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
3076 if ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
!= SSL_aKRB5
) ||
3077 (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kKRB5
))
3079 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3084 l
=ssl3_output_cert_chain(s
,x
);
3085 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B
;
3090 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
3091 return(ssl3_do_write(s
,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
));
3093 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
3094 int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL
*s
)
3096 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A
)
3098 unsigned char *p
, *senc
, *macstart
;
3103 SSL_CTX
*tctx
= s
->initial_ctx
;
3104 unsigned char iv
[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH
];
3105 unsigned char key_name
[16];
3107 /* get session encoding length */
3108 slen
= i2d_SSL_SESSION(s
->session
, NULL
);
3109 /* Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is
3114 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3115 * follows 1 (size of message name) + 3 (message length
3116 * bytes) + 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
3117 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
3118 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
3119 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
3121 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s
->init_buf
,
3122 26 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH
+ EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH
+
3123 EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
+ slen
))
3125 senc
= OPENSSL_malloc(slen
);
3129 i2d_SSL_SESSION(s
->session
, &p
);
3131 p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
3133 *(p
++)=SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET
;
3134 /* Skip message length for now */
3136 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx
);
3137 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx
);
3138 /* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present
3139 * it does all the work otherwise use generated values
3142 if (tctx
->tlsext_ticket_key_cb
)
3144 if (tctx
->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s
, key_name
, iv
, &ctx
,
3153 RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv
, 16);
3154 EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx
, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL
,
3155 tctx
->tlsext_tick_aes_key
, iv
);
3156 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx
, tctx
->tlsext_tick_hmac_key
, 16,
3157 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL
);
3158 memcpy(key_name
, tctx
->tlsext_tick_key_name
, 16);
3160 l2n(s
->session
->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint
, p
);
3161 /* Skip ticket length for now */
3163 /* Output key name */
3165 memcpy(p
, key_name
, 16);
3168 memcpy(p
, iv
, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx
));
3169 p
+= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx
);
3170 /* Encrypt session data */
3171 EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx
, p
, &len
, senc
, slen
);
3173 EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx
, p
, &len
);
3175 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx
);
3177 HMAC_Update(&hctx
, macstart
, p
- macstart
);
3178 HMAC_Final(&hctx
, p
, &hlen
);
3179 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx
);
3182 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
3184 len
= p
- (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
3185 p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
+ 1;
3186 l2n3(len
- 4, p
); /* Message length */
3188 s2n(len
- 10, p
); /* Ticket length */
3190 /* number of bytes to write */
3192 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B
;
3197 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
3198 return(ssl3_do_write(s
,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
));
3201 int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL
*s
)
3203 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A
)
3206 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3207 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
3208 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
3211 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s
->init_buf
, 8 + s
->tlsext_ocsp_resplen
))
3214 p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
3217 *(p
++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS
;
3218 /* message length */
3219 l2n3(s
->tlsext_ocsp_resplen
+ 4, p
);
3221 *(p
++)= s
->tlsext_status_type
;
3222 /* length of OCSP response */
3223 l2n3(s
->tlsext_ocsp_resplen
, p
);
3224 /* actual response */
3225 memcpy(p
, s
->tlsext_ocsp_resp
, s
->tlsext_ocsp_resplen
);
3226 /* number of bytes to write */
3227 s
->init_num
= 8 + s
->tlsext_ocsp_resplen
;
3228 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B
;
3232 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
3233 return(ssl3_do_write(s
,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
));
3236 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NPN
3237 /* ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message. It
3238 * sets the next_proto member in s if found */
3239 int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL
*s
)
3242 int proto_len
, padding_len
;
3244 const unsigned char *p
;
3246 /* Clients cannot send a NextProtocol message if we didn't see the
3247 * extension in their ClientHello */
3248 if (!s
->s3
->next_proto_neg_seen
)
3250 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO
,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION
);
3254 n
=s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
3255 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A
,
3256 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B
,
3258 514, /* See the payload format below */
3264 /* s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received
3265 * in this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset
3266 * by ssl3_get_finished). */
3267 if (!s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
)
3269 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO
,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS
);
3274 return 0; /* The body must be > 1 bytes long */
3276 p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
3278 /* The payload looks like:
3280 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
3281 * uint8 padding_len;
3282 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
3285 if (proto_len
+ 2 > s
->init_num
)
3287 padding_len
= p
[proto_len
+ 1];
3288 if (proto_len
+ padding_len
+ 2 != s
->init_num
)
3291 s
->next_proto_negotiated
= OPENSSL_malloc(proto_len
);
3292 if (!s
->next_proto_negotiated
)
3294 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO
,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3297 memcpy(s
->next_proto_negotiated
, p
+ 1, proto_len
);
3298 s
->next_proto_negotiated_len
= proto_len
;