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Always return errors in ssl3_get_client_hello
[thirdparty/openssl.git] / ssl / s3_srvr.c
1 /* ssl/s3_srvr.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
3 * All rights reserved.
4 *
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8 *
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15 *
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22 *
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25 * are met:
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40 *
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
51 * SUCH DAMAGE.
52 *
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
57 */
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
60 *
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
63 * are met:
64 *
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
67 *
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
71 * distribution.
72 *
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
77 *
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
82 *
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
86 *
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
88 * acknowledgment:
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
91 *
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
105 *
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
109 *
110 */
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
113 *
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
116 *
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
119 *
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
122 *
123 */
124 /* ====================================================================
125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
126 *
127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
129 * license.
130 *
131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
134 *
135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
138 *
139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
142 * to make use of the Contribution.
143 *
144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
148 * OTHERWISE.
149 */
150
151 #define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
152 #define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
153
154 #include <stdio.h>
155 #include "ssl_locl.h"
156 #include "kssl_lcl.h"
157 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
158 #include <openssl/rand.h>
159 #include <openssl/objects.h>
160 #include <openssl/evp.h>
161 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
162 #include <openssl/x509.h>
163 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
164 #include <openssl/dh.h>
165 #endif
166 #include <openssl/bn.h>
167 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
168 #include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
169 #endif
170 #include <openssl/md5.h>
171
172 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver);
173
174 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)
175 {
176 if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
177 return(SSLv3_server_method());
178 else
179 return(NULL);
180 }
181
182 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
183 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al)
184 {
185 int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE;
186
187 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
188
189 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
190 (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL))
191 {
192 if(s->srp_ctx.login == NULL)
193 {
194 /* RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject,
195 we do so if There is no srp login name */
196 ret = SSL3_AL_FATAL;
197 *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
198 }
199 else
200 {
201 ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s,al);
202 }
203 }
204 return ret;
205 }
206 #endif
207
208 IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method,
209 ssl3_accept,
210 ssl_undefined_function,
211 ssl3_get_server_method)
212
213 int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
214 {
215 BUF_MEM *buf;
216 unsigned long alg_k,Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
217 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
218 int ret= -1;
219 int new_state,state,skip=0;
220
221 RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0);
222 ERR_clear_error();
223 clear_sys_error();
224
225 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
226 cb=s->info_callback;
227 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
228 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
229
230 /* init things to blank */
231 s->in_handshake++;
232 if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s);
233
234 if (s->cert == NULL)
235 {
236 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
237 return(-1);
238 }
239
240 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
241 /* If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we
242 * already got and don't await it anymore, because
243 * Heartbeats don't make sense during handshakes anyway.
244 */
245 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
246 {
247 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
248 s->tlsext_hb_seq++;
249 }
250 #endif
251
252 for (;;)
253 {
254 state=s->state;
255
256 switch (s->state)
257 {
258 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
259 s->renegotiate=1;
260 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
261
262 case SSL_ST_BEFORE:
263 case SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
264 case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
265 case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
266
267 s->server=1;
268 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1);
269
270 if ((s->version>>8) != 3)
271 {
272 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
273 return -1;
274 }
275 s->type=SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
276
277 if (s->init_buf == NULL)
278 {
279 if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)
280 {
281 ret= -1;
282 goto end;
283 }
284 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH))
285 {
286 ret= -1;
287 goto end;
288 }
289 s->init_buf=buf;
290 }
291
292 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
293 {
294 ret= -1;
295 goto end;
296 }
297
298 s->init_num=0;
299 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE;
300 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY;
301
302 if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE)
303 {
304 /* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that
305 * the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
306 */
307 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) { ret= -1; goto end; }
308
309 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
310 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
311 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
312 }
313 else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
314 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
315 {
316 /* Server attempting to renegotiate with
317 * client that doesn't support secure
318 * renegotiation.
319 */
320 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
321 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
322 ret = -1;
323 goto end;
324 }
325 else
326 {
327 /* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE,
328 * we will just send a HelloRequest */
329 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
330 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
331 }
332 break;
333
334 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
335 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
336
337 s->shutdown=0;
338 ret=ssl3_send_hello_request(s);
339 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
340 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
341 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
342 s->init_num=0;
343
344 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
345 break;
346
347 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
348 s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
349 break;
350
351 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
352 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
353 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
354
355 if (s->rwstate != SSL_X509_LOOKUP)
356 {
357 ret=ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
358 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
359 }
360 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
361 {
362 int al;
363 if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s,&al)) < 0)
364 {
365 /* callback indicates firther work to be done */
366 s->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
367 goto end;
368 }
369 if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE)
370 {
371 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
372 /* This is not really an error but the only means to
373 for a client to detect whether srp is supported. */
374 if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY)
375 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
376 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
377 ret= -1;
378 goto end;
379 }
380 }
381 #endif
382
383 s->renegotiate = 2;
384 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
385 s->init_num=0;
386 break;
387
388 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
389 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
390 ret=ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
391 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
392 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
393 if (s->hit)
394 {
395 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
396 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
397 else
398 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
399 }
400 #else
401 if (s->hit)
402 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
403 #endif
404 else
405 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
406 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA_A;
407 #else
408 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
409 #endif
410 s->init_num = 0;
411 break;
412
413 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
414 case SSL3_ST_SW_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA_A:
415 case SSL3_ST_SW_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA_B:
416 /* We promised to send an audit proof in the hello. */
417 if (s->s3->tlsext_authz_promised_to_client)
418 {
419 ret = tls1_send_server_supplemental_data(s);
420 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
421 }
422 else
423 skip = 1;
424
425 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
426 s->init_num = 0;
427 break;
428 #endif
429
430 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
431 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
432 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
433 /* normal PSK or KRB5 or SRP */
434 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
435 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)
436 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5))
437 {
438 ret=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
439 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
440 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
441 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
442 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
443 else
444 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
445 }
446 else
447 {
448 skip = 1;
449 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
450 }
451 #else
452 }
453 else
454 skip=1;
455
456 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
457 #endif
458 s->init_num=0;
459 break;
460
461 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
462 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
463 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
464
465 /* clear this, it may get reset by
466 * send_server_key_exchange */
467 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA)
468 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
469 && !(alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
470 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
471 )
472 /* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key
473 * even when forbidden by protocol specs
474 * (handshake may fail as clients are not required to
475 * be able to handle this) */
476 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
477 else
478 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0;
479
480
481 /* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or
482 * RSA but we have a sign only certificate
483 *
484 * PSK: may send PSK identity hints
485 *
486 * For ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange
487 * message only if the cipher suite is either
488 * ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, the
489 * server certificate contains the server's
490 * public key for key exchange.
491 */
492 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp
493 /* PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity
494 * hint if provided */
495 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
496 || ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
497 #endif
498 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
499 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
500 || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
501 #endif
502 || (alg_k & SSL_kEDH)
503 || (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
504 || ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
505 && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
506 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
507 && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
508 )
509 )
510 )
511 )
512 {
513 ret=ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);
514 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
515 }
516 else
517 skip=1;
518
519 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
520 s->init_num=0;
521 break;
522
523 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
524 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
525 if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
526 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
527 /* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set,
528 * don't request cert during re-negotiation: */
529 ((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
530 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
531 /* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites
532 * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts
533 * and in RFC 2246): */
534 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) &&
535 /* ... except when the application insists on verification
536 * (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */
537 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
538 /* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */
539 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5)
540 /* With normal PSK Certificates and
541 * Certificate Requests are omitted */
542 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
543 {
544 /* no cert request */
545 skip=1;
546 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=0;
547 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
548 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
549 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
550 return -1;
551 }
552 else
553 {
554 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=1;
555 ret=ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
556 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
557 #ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
558 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
559 #else
560 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
561 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
562 #endif
563 s->init_num=0;
564 }
565 break;
566
567 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
568 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
569 ret=ssl3_send_server_done(s);
570 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
571 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
572 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
573 s->init_num=0;
574 break;
575
576 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
577
578 /* This code originally checked to see if
579 * any data was pending using BIO_CTRL_INFO
580 * and then flushed. This caused problems
581 * as documented in PR#1939. The proposed
582 * fix doesn't completely resolve this issue
583 * as buggy implementations of BIO_CTRL_PENDING
584 * still exist. So instead we just flush
585 * unconditionally.
586 */
587
588 s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
589 if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0)
590 {
591 ret= -1;
592 goto end;
593 }
594 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
595
596 s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state;
597 break;
598
599 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
600 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
601 /* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */
602 ret = ssl3_check_client_hello(s);
603 if (ret <= 0)
604 goto end;
605 if (ret == 2)
606 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C;
607 else {
608 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
609 {
610 ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
611 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
612 }
613 s->init_num=0;
614 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
615 }
616 break;
617
618 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
619 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
620 ret=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
621 if (ret <= 0)
622 goto end;
623 if (ret == 2)
624 {
625 /* For the ECDH ciphersuites when
626 * the client sends its ECDH pub key in
627 * a certificate, the CertificateVerify
628 * message is not sent.
629 * Also for GOST ciphersuites when
630 * the client uses its key from the certificate
631 * for key exchange.
632 */
633 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
634 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
635 #else
636 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
637 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
638 else
639 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
640 #endif
641 s->init_num = 0;
642 }
643 else if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
644 {
645 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
646 s->init_num=0;
647 if (!s->session->peer)
648 break;
649 /* For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer
650 * at this point and digest cached records.
651 */
652 if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer)
653 {
654 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
655 return -1;
656 }
657 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
658 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
659 return -1;
660 }
661 else
662 {
663 int offset=0;
664 int dgst_num;
665
666 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
667 s->init_num=0;
668
669 /* We need to get hashes here so if there is
670 * a client cert, it can be verified
671 * FIXME - digest processing for CertificateVerify
672 * should be generalized. But it is next step
673 */
674 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
675 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
676 return -1;
677 for (dgst_num=0; dgst_num<SSL_MAX_DIGEST;dgst_num++)
678 if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num])
679 {
680 int dgst_size;
681
682 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,EVP_MD_CTX_type(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]),&(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[offset]));
683 dgst_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]);
684 if (dgst_size < 0)
685 {
686 ret = -1;
687 goto end;
688 }
689 offset+=dgst_size;
690 }
691 }
692 break;
693
694 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
695 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
696
697 /* we should decide if we expected this one */
698 ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
699 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
700
701 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
702 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
703 #else
704 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
705 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
706 else
707 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
708 #endif
709 s->init_num=0;
710 break;
711
712 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
713 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A:
714 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B:
715 ret=ssl3_get_next_proto(s);
716 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
717 s->init_num = 0;
718 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
719 break;
720 #endif
721
722 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
723 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
724 ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
725 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
726 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
727 if (s->hit)
728 s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
729 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
730 else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
731 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
732 #endif
733 else
734 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
735 s->init_num=0;
736 break;
737
738 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
739 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
740 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
741 ret=ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s);
742 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
743 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
744 s->init_num=0;
745 break;
746
747 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A:
748 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B:
749 ret=ssl3_send_cert_status(s);
750 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
751 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
752 s->init_num=0;
753 break;
754
755 #endif
756
757 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
758 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
759
760 s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
761 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
762 { ret= -1; goto end; }
763
764 ret=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
765 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
766
767 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
768 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
769 s->init_num=0;
770
771 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
772 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
773 {
774 ret= -1;
775 goto end;
776 }
777
778 break;
779
780 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
781 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
782 ret=ssl3_send_finished(s,
783 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
784 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
785 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
786 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
787 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
788 if (s->hit)
789 {
790 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
791 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
792 #else
793 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
794 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
795 else
796 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
797 #endif
798 }
799 else
800 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK;
801 s->init_num=0;
802 break;
803
804 case SSL_ST_OK:
805 /* clean a few things up */
806 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
807
808 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
809 s->init_buf=NULL;
810
811 /* remove buffering on output */
812 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
813
814 s->init_num=0;
815
816 if (s->renegotiate == 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
817 {
818 s->renegotiate=0;
819 s->new_session=0;
820
821 ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
822
823 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
824 /* s->server=1; */
825 s->handshake_func=ssl3_accept;
826
827 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1);
828 }
829
830 ret = 1;
831 goto end;
832 /* break; */
833
834 default:
835 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
836 ret= -1;
837 goto end;
838 /* break; */
839 }
840
841 if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip)
842 {
843 if (s->debug)
844 {
845 if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
846 goto end;
847 }
848
849
850 if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state))
851 {
852 new_state=s->state;
853 s->state=state;
854 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP,1);
855 s->state=new_state;
856 }
857 }
858 skip=0;
859 }
860 end:
861 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
862
863 s->in_handshake--;
864 if (cb != NULL)
865 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT,ret);
866 return(ret);
867 }
868
869 int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
870 {
871
872 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A)
873 {
874 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST, 0);
875 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
876 }
877
878 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
879 return ssl_do_write(s);
880 }
881
882 int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s)
883 {
884 int ok;
885 long n;
886
887 /* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message,
888 * so permit appropriate message length */
889 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
890 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A,
891 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B,
892 -1,
893 s->max_cert_list,
894 &ok);
895 if (!ok) return((int)n);
896 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
897 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)
898 {
899 /* We only allow the client to restart the handshake once per
900 * negotiation. */
901 if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE)
902 {
903 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_MULTIPLE_SGC_RESTARTS);
904 return -1;
905 }
906 /* Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake,
907 * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.) */
908 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
909 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
910 {
911 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
912 s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
913 }
914 #endif
915 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
916 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
917 {
918 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
919 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
920 }
921 #endif
922 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE;
923 return 2;
924 }
925 return 1;
926 }
927
928 int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
929 {
930 int i,j,ok,al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,ret= -1;
931 unsigned int cookie_len;
932 long n;
933 unsigned long id;
934 unsigned char *p,*d;
935 SSL_CIPHER *c;
936 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
937 unsigned char *q;
938 SSL_COMP *comp=NULL;
939 #endif
940 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers=NULL;
941
942 /* We do this so that we will respond with our native type.
943 * If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1,
944 * This down switching should be handled by a different method.
945 * If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with
946 * TLSv1.
947 */
948 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A
949 )
950 {
951 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
952 }
953 s->first_packet=1;
954 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
955 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
956 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C,
957 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,
958 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
959 &ok);
960
961 if (!ok) return((int)n);
962 s->first_packet=0;
963 d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
964
965 /* use version from inside client hello, not from record header
966 * (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */
967 s->client_version=(((int)p[0])<<8)|(int)p[1];
968 p+=2;
969
970 if ((SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->client_version > s->version
971 && s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION) ||
972 (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->client_version < s->version))
973 {
974 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
975 if ((s->client_version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
976 {
977 /* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
978 s->version = s->client_version;
979 }
980 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
981 goto f_err;
982 }
983
984 /* If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't
985 * contain one, just return since we do not want to
986 * allocate any memory yet. So check cookie length...
987 */
988 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE)
989 {
990 unsigned int session_length, cookie_length;
991
992 session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
993 cookie_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1);
994
995 if (cookie_length == 0)
996 return 1;
997 }
998
999 /* load the client random */
1000 memcpy(s->s3->client_random,p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1001 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1002
1003 /* get the session-id */
1004 j= *(p++);
1005
1006 s->hit=0;
1007 /* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in renegotiation.
1008 * 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally ignore resumption requests
1009 * with flag SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
1010 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on this for security
1011 * won't even compile against older library versions).
1012 *
1013 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to request
1014 * renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains unset): for servers,
1015 * this essentially just means that the SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1016 * setting will be ignored.
1017 */
1018 if ((s->new_session && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION)))
1019 {
1020 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
1021 goto err;
1022 }
1023 else
1024 {
1025 i=ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n);
1026 if (i == 1)
1027 { /* previous session */
1028 s->hit=1;
1029 }
1030 else if (i == -1)
1031 goto err;
1032 else /* i == 0 */
1033 {
1034 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
1035 goto err;
1036 }
1037 }
1038
1039 p+=j;
1040
1041 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
1042 {
1043 /* cookie stuff */
1044 cookie_len = *(p++);
1045
1046 /*
1047 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
1048 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
1049 * does not cause an overflow.
1050 */
1051 if ( cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie))
1052 {
1053 /* too much data */
1054 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1055 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1056 goto f_err;
1057 }
1058
1059 /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
1060 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) &&
1061 cookie_len > 0)
1062 {
1063 memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len);
1064
1065 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL)
1066 {
1067 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie,
1068 cookie_len) == 0)
1069 {
1070 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1071 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1072 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1073 goto f_err;
1074 }
1075 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1076 }
1077 else if ( memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
1078 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) /* default verification */
1079 {
1080 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1081 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1082 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1083 goto f_err;
1084 }
1085 /* Set to -2 so if successful we return 2 */
1086 ret = -2;
1087 }
1088
1089 p += cookie_len;
1090 if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION)
1091 {
1092 /* Select version to use */
1093 if (s->client_version <= DTLS1_2_VERSION &&
1094 !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2))
1095 {
1096 s->version = DTLS1_2_VERSION;
1097 s->method = DTLSv1_2_server_method();
1098 }
1099 else if (s->client_version <= DTLS1_VERSION &&
1100 !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1))
1101 {
1102 s->version = DTLS1_VERSION;
1103 s->method = DTLSv1_server_method();
1104 }
1105 else
1106 {
1107 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
1108 s->version = s->client_version;
1109 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1110 goto f_err;
1111 }
1112 s->session->ssl_version = s->version;
1113 }
1114 }
1115
1116 n2s(p,i);
1117 if ((i == 0) && (j != 0))
1118 {
1119 /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */
1120 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1121 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
1122 goto f_err;
1123 }
1124 if ((p+i) >= (d+n))
1125 {
1126 /* not enough data */
1127 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1128 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1129 goto f_err;
1130 }
1131 if ((i > 0) && (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s,p,i,&(ciphers))
1132 == NULL))
1133 {
1134 goto err;
1135 }
1136 p+=i;
1137
1138 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
1139 if ((s->hit) && (i > 0))
1140 {
1141 j=0;
1142 id=s->session->cipher->id;
1143
1144 #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
1145 printf("client sent %d ciphers\n",sk_num(ciphers));
1146 #endif
1147 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++)
1148 {
1149 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers,i);
1150 #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
1151 printf("client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1152 i,sk_num(ciphers),SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
1153 #endif
1154 if (c->id == id)
1155 {
1156 j=1;
1157 break;
1158 }
1159 }
1160 /* Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade
1161 * attack: CVE-2010-4180.
1162 */
1163 #if 0
1164 if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1))
1165 {
1166 /* Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used cipher may
1167 * not be in the current list, the client instead might be trying to
1168 * continue using a cipher that before wasn't chosen due to server
1169 * preferences. We'll have to reject the connection if the cipher is not
1170 * enabled, though. */
1171 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0);
1172 if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0)
1173 {
1174 s->session->cipher = c;
1175 j = 1;
1176 }
1177 }
1178 #endif
1179 if (j == 0)
1180 {
1181 /* we need to have the cipher in the cipher
1182 * list if we are asked to reuse it */
1183 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1184 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
1185 goto f_err;
1186 }
1187 }
1188
1189 /* compression */
1190 i= *(p++);
1191 if ((p+i) > (d+n))
1192 {
1193 /* not enough data */
1194 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1195 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1196 goto f_err;
1197 }
1198 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1199 q=p;
1200 #endif
1201 for (j=0; j<i; j++)
1202 {
1203 if (p[j] == 0) break;
1204 }
1205
1206 p+=i;
1207 if (j >= i)
1208 {
1209 /* no compress */
1210 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1211 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
1212 goto f_err;
1213 }
1214
1215 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1216 /* TLS extensions*/
1217 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION)
1218 {
1219 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s,&p,d,n))
1220 {
1221 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
1222 goto err;
1223 }
1224 }
1225
1226 /* Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this
1227 * handshake for not reused session only. We need to generate
1228 * server_random before calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow
1229 * SessionTicket processing to use it in key derivation. */
1230 {
1231 unsigned long Time;
1232 unsigned char *pos;
1233 Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); /* Time */
1234 pos=s->s3->server_random;
1235 l2n(Time,pos);
1236 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(pos,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0)
1237 {
1238 goto f_err;
1239 }
1240 }
1241
1242 if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb)
1243 {
1244 SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher=NULL;
1245
1246 s->session->master_key_length=sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1247 if(s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key, &s->session->master_key_length,
1248 ciphers, &pref_cipher, s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg))
1249 {
1250 s->hit=1;
1251 s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
1252 s->session->verify_result=X509_V_OK;
1253
1254 ciphers=NULL;
1255
1256 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1257 pref_cipher=pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1258 if (pref_cipher == NULL)
1259 {
1260 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1261 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1262 goto f_err;
1263 }
1264
1265 s->session->cipher=pref_cipher;
1266
1267 if (s->cipher_list)
1268 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
1269
1270 if (s->cipher_list_by_id)
1271 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
1272
1273 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1274 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1275 }
1276 }
1277 #endif
1278
1279 /* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1280 * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
1281 * algorithms from the client, starting at q. */
1282 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=NULL;
1283 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1284 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1285 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0)
1286 {
1287 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
1288 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1289 /* Can't disable compression */
1290 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION)
1291 {
1292 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1293 goto f_err;
1294 }
1295 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1296 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++)
1297 {
1298 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
1299 if (comp_id == comp->id)
1300 {
1301 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
1302 break;
1303 }
1304 }
1305 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1306 {
1307 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1308 goto f_err;
1309 }
1310 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1311 for (m = 0; m < i; m++)
1312 {
1313 if (q[m] == comp_id)
1314 break;
1315 }
1316 if (m >= i)
1317 {
1318 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1319 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
1320 goto f_err;
1321 }
1322 }
1323 else if (s->hit)
1324 comp = NULL;
1325 else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) && s->ctx->comp_methods)
1326 { /* See if we have a match */
1327 int m,nn,o,v,done=0;
1328
1329 nn=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1330 for (m=0; m<nn; m++)
1331 {
1332 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
1333 v=comp->id;
1334 for (o=0; o<i; o++)
1335 {
1336 if (v == q[o])
1337 {
1338 done=1;
1339 break;
1340 }
1341 }
1342 if (done) break;
1343 }
1344 if (done)
1345 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
1346 else
1347 comp=NULL;
1348 }
1349 #else
1350 /* If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1351 * using compression.
1352 */
1353 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0)
1354 {
1355 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1356 goto f_err;
1357 }
1358 #endif
1359
1360 /* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must
1361 * pick a cipher */
1362
1363 if (!s->hit)
1364 {
1365 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1366 s->session->compress_meth=0;
1367 #else
1368 s->session->compress_meth=(comp == NULL)?0:comp->id;
1369 #endif
1370 if (s->session->ciphers != NULL)
1371 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
1372 s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
1373 if (ciphers == NULL)
1374 {
1375 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1376 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED);
1377 goto f_err;
1378 }
1379 ciphers=NULL;
1380 /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
1381 if (s->cert->cert_cb
1382 && s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg) <= 0)
1383 {
1384 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1385 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
1386 goto f_err;
1387 }
1388 c=ssl3_choose_cipher(s,s->session->ciphers,
1389 SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1390
1391 if (c == NULL)
1392 {
1393 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1394 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1395 goto f_err;
1396 }
1397 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=c;
1398 /* check whether we should disable session resumption */
1399 if (s->not_resumable_session_cb != NULL)
1400 s->session->not_resumable=s->not_resumable_session_cb(s,
1401 ((c->algorithm_mkey & (SSL_kEDH | SSL_kEECDH)) != 0));
1402 if (s->session->not_resumable)
1403 /* do not send a session ticket */
1404 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
1405 }
1406 else
1407 {
1408 /* Session-id reuse */
1409 #ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
1410 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1411 SSL_CIPHER *nc=NULL;
1412 SSL_CIPHER *ec=NULL;
1413
1414 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG)
1415 {
1416 sk=s->session->ciphers;
1417 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++)
1418 {
1419 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,i);
1420 if (c->algorithm_enc & SSL_eNULL)
1421 nc=c;
1422 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c))
1423 ec=c;
1424 }
1425 if (nc != NULL)
1426 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=nc;
1427 else if (ec != NULL)
1428 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=ec;
1429 else
1430 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1431 }
1432 else
1433 #endif
1434 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1435 }
1436
1437 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER))
1438 {
1439 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
1440 goto f_err;
1441 }
1442
1443 /* we now have the following setup.
1444 * client_random
1445 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
1446 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
1447 * compression - basically ignored right now
1448 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1449 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1450 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1451 * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
1452 */
1453
1454 /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */
1455 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION)
1456 {
1457 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s) <= 0)
1458 {
1459 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1460 goto err;
1461 }
1462 }
1463
1464 if (ret < 0) ret=-ret;
1465 if (0)
1466 {
1467 f_err:
1468 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1469 }
1470 err:
1471 if (ciphers != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1472 return ret < 0 ? -1 : ret;
1473 }
1474
1475 int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
1476 {
1477 unsigned char *buf;
1478 unsigned char *p,*d;
1479 int i,sl;
1480 unsigned long l;
1481 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1482 unsigned long Time;
1483 #endif
1484
1485 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1486 {
1487 buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1488 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1489 p=s->s3->server_random;
1490 /* Generate server_random if it was not needed previously */
1491 Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); /* Time */
1492 l2n(Time,p);
1493 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0)
1494 return -1;
1495 #endif
1496 /* Do the message type and length last */
1497 d=p= ssl_handshake_start(s);
1498
1499 *(p++)=s->version>>8;
1500 *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
1501
1502 /* Random stuff */
1503 memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1504 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1505
1506 /* There are several cases for the session ID to send
1507 * back in the server hello:
1508 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
1509 * we send back the old session ID.
1510 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
1511 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
1512 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
1513 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
1514 * session ID.
1515 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
1516 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
1517 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
1518 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
1519 * to send back.
1520 */
1521 if (s->session->not_resumable ||
1522 (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
1523 && !s->hit))
1524 s->session->session_id_length=0;
1525
1526 sl=s->session->session_id_length;
1527 if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id))
1528 {
1529 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1530 return -1;
1531 }
1532 *(p++)=sl;
1533 memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,sl);
1534 p+=sl;
1535
1536 /* put the cipher */
1537 i=ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,p);
1538 p+=i;
1539
1540 /* put the compression method */
1541 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1542 *(p++)=0;
1543 #else
1544 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1545 *(p++)=0;
1546 else
1547 *(p++)=s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
1548 #endif
1549 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1550 if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
1551 {
1552 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
1553 return -1;
1554 }
1555 if ((p = ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) == NULL)
1556 {
1557 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1558 return -1;
1559 }
1560 #endif
1561 /* do the header */
1562 l=(p-d);
1563 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO, l);
1564 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B;
1565 }
1566
1567 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
1568 return ssl_do_write(s);
1569 }
1570
1571 int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)
1572 {
1573
1574 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A)
1575 {
1576 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE, 0);
1577 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
1578 }
1579
1580 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
1581 return ssl_do_write(s);
1582 }
1583
1584 int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1585 {
1586 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1587 unsigned char *q;
1588 int j,num;
1589 RSA *rsa;
1590 unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
1591 unsigned int u;
1592 #endif
1593 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1594 DH *dh=NULL,*dhp;
1595 #endif
1596 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1597 EC_KEY *ecdh=NULL, *ecdhp;
1598 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1599 int encodedlen = 0;
1600 int curve_id = 0;
1601 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1602 #endif
1603 EVP_PKEY *pkey;
1604 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1605 unsigned char *p,*d;
1606 int al,i;
1607 unsigned long type;
1608 int n;
1609 CERT *cert;
1610 BIGNUM *r[4];
1611 int nr[4],kn;
1612 BUF_MEM *buf;
1613 EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
1614
1615 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
1616 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A)
1617 {
1618 type=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1619 cert=s->cert;
1620
1621 buf=s->init_buf;
1622
1623 r[0]=r[1]=r[2]=r[3]=NULL;
1624 n=0;
1625 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1626 if (type & SSL_kRSA)
1627 {
1628 rsa=cert->rsa_tmp;
1629 if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL))
1630 {
1631 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s,
1632 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1633 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1634 if(rsa == NULL)
1635 {
1636 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1637 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1638 goto f_err;
1639 }
1640 RSA_up_ref(rsa);
1641 cert->rsa_tmp=rsa;
1642 }
1643 if (rsa == NULL)
1644 {
1645 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1646 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1647 goto f_err;
1648 }
1649 r[0]=rsa->n;
1650 r[1]=rsa->e;
1651 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
1652 }
1653 else
1654 #endif
1655 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1656 if (type & SSL_kEDH)
1657 {
1658 dhp=cert->dh_tmp;
1659 if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1660 dhp=s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s,
1661 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1662 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1663 if (dhp == NULL)
1664 {
1665 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1666 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1667 goto f_err;
1668 }
1669
1670 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
1671 {
1672 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1673 goto err;
1674 }
1675
1676 if ((dh=DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL)
1677 {
1678 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1679 goto err;
1680 }
1681
1682 s->s3->tmp.dh=dh;
1683 if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL ||
1684 dhp->priv_key == NULL ||
1685 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE)))
1686 {
1687 if(!DH_generate_key(dh))
1688 {
1689 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1690 ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1691 goto err;
1692 }
1693 }
1694 else
1695 {
1696 dh->pub_key=BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
1697 dh->priv_key=BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
1698 if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) ||
1699 (dh->priv_key == NULL))
1700 {
1701 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1702 goto err;
1703 }
1704 }
1705 r[0]=dh->p;
1706 r[1]=dh->g;
1707 r[2]=dh->pub_key;
1708 }
1709 else
1710 #endif
1711 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1712 if (type & SSL_kEECDH)
1713 {
1714 const EC_GROUP *group;
1715
1716 ecdhp=cert->ecdh_tmp;
1717 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
1718 {
1719 /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
1720 int nid = tls1_shared_curve(s, -2);
1721 if (nid != NID_undef)
1722 ecdhp = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid);
1723 }
1724 else if ((ecdhp == NULL) && s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
1725 {
1726 ecdhp=s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s,
1727 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1728 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1729 }
1730 if (ecdhp == NULL)
1731 {
1732 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1733 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
1734 goto f_err;
1735 }
1736
1737 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
1738 {
1739 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1740 goto err;
1741 }
1742
1743 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
1744 if (ecdhp == NULL)
1745 {
1746 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1747 goto err;
1748 }
1749 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
1750 ecdh = ecdhp;
1751 else if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp)) == NULL)
1752 {
1753 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1754 goto err;
1755 }
1756
1757 s->s3->tmp.ecdh=ecdh;
1758 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1759 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1760 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE))
1761 {
1762 if(!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh))
1763 {
1764 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1765 goto err;
1766 }
1767 }
1768
1769 if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||
1770 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1771 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL))
1772 {
1773 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1774 goto err;
1775 }
1776
1777 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
1778 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163))
1779 {
1780 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
1781 goto err;
1782 }
1783
1784 /* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH
1785 * keys over named (not generic) curves. For
1786 * supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero.
1787 */
1788 if ((curve_id =
1789 tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)))
1790 == 0)
1791 {
1792 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
1793 goto err;
1794 }
1795
1796 /* Encode the public key.
1797 * First check the size of encoding and
1798 * allocate memory accordingly.
1799 */
1800 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1801 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1802 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1803 NULL, 0, NULL);
1804
1805 encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
1806 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen*sizeof(unsigned char));
1807 bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
1808 if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL))
1809 {
1810 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1811 goto err;
1812 }
1813
1814
1815 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1816 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1817 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1818 encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
1819
1820 if (encodedlen == 0)
1821 {
1822 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1823 goto err;
1824 }
1825
1826 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); bn_ctx=NULL;
1827
1828 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not
1829 * generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges.
1830 * In this situation, we need four additional bytes
1831 * to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
1832 * structure.
1833 */
1834 n = 4 + encodedlen;
1835
1836 /* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message
1837 * explicitly so we can set these to NULLs
1838 */
1839 r[0]=NULL;
1840 r[1]=NULL;
1841 r[2]=NULL;
1842 r[3]=NULL;
1843 }
1844 else
1845 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
1846 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1847 if (type & SSL_kPSK)
1848 {
1849 /* reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint*/
1850 n+=2+strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1851 }
1852 else
1853 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1854 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1855 if (type & SSL_kSRP)
1856 {
1857 if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
1858 (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
1859 (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) ||
1860 (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL))
1861 {
1862 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
1863 goto err;
1864 }
1865 r[0]=s->srp_ctx.N;
1866 r[1]=s->srp_ctx.g;
1867 r[2]=s->srp_ctx.s;
1868 r[3]=s->srp_ctx.B;
1869 }
1870 else
1871 #endif
1872 {
1873 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1874 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
1875 goto f_err;
1876 }
1877 for (i=0; r[i] != NULL && i<4; i++)
1878 {
1879 nr[i]=BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
1880 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1881 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
1882 n+=1+nr[i];
1883 else
1884 #endif
1885 n+=2+nr[i];
1886 }
1887
1888 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
1889 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
1890 {
1891 if ((pkey=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s,s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,&md))
1892 == NULL)
1893 {
1894 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1895 goto f_err;
1896 }
1897 kn=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1898 }
1899 else
1900 {
1901 pkey=NULL;
1902 kn=0;
1903 }
1904
1905 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,n+SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s)+kn))
1906 {
1907 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_BUF);
1908 goto err;
1909 }
1910 d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
1911
1912 for (i=0; r[i] != NULL && i<4; i++)
1913 {
1914 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1915 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
1916 {
1917 *p = nr[i];
1918 p++;
1919 }
1920 else
1921 #endif
1922 s2n(nr[i],p);
1923 BN_bn2bin(r[i],p);
1924 p+=nr[i];
1925 }
1926
1927 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1928 if (type & SSL_kEECDH)
1929 {
1930 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves.
1931 * In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has:
1932 * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
1933 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by
1934 * the actual encoded point itself
1935 */
1936 *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
1937 p += 1;
1938 *p = 0;
1939 p += 1;
1940 *p = curve_id;
1941 p += 1;
1942 *p = encodedlen;
1943 p += 1;
1944 memcpy((unsigned char*)p,
1945 (unsigned char *)encodedPoint,
1946 encodedlen);
1947 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1948 encodedPoint = NULL;
1949 p += encodedlen;
1950 }
1951 #endif
1952
1953 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1954 if (type & SSL_kPSK)
1955 {
1956 /* copy PSK identity hint */
1957 s2n(strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint), p);
1958 strncpy((char *)p, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint, strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint));
1959 p+=strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1960 }
1961 #endif
1962
1963 /* not anonymous */
1964 if (pkey != NULL)
1965 {
1966 /* n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4])
1967 * and p points to the space at the end. */
1968 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1969 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
1970 {
1971 q=md_buf;
1972 j=0;
1973 for (num=2; num > 0; num--)
1974 {
1975 EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx,
1976 EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
1977 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2)
1978 ?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
1979 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1980 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1981 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,d,n);
1982 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q,
1983 (unsigned int *)&i);
1984 q+=i;
1985 j+=i;
1986 }
1987 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,
1988 &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0)
1989 {
1990 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_RSA);
1991 goto err;
1992 }
1993 s2n(u,p);
1994 n+=u+2;
1995 }
1996 else
1997 #endif
1998 if (md)
1999 {
2000 /* send signature algorithm */
2001 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2002 {
2003 if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md))
2004 {
2005 /* Should never happen */
2006 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2007 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2008 goto f_err;
2009 }
2010 p+=2;
2011 }
2012 #ifdef SSL_DEBUG
2013 fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n",
2014 EVP_MD_name(md));
2015 #endif
2016 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL);
2017 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
2018 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
2019 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,d,n);
2020 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
2021 (unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
2022 {
2023 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_EVP);
2024 goto err;
2025 }
2026 s2n(i,p);
2027 n+=i+2;
2028 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2029 n+= 2;
2030 }
2031 else
2032 {
2033 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
2034 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2035 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
2036 goto f_err;
2037 }
2038 }
2039
2040 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, n);
2041 }
2042
2043 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
2044 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
2045 return ssl_do_write(s);
2046 f_err:
2047 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2048 err:
2049 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2050 if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2051 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2052 #endif
2053 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
2054 return(-1);
2055 }
2056
2057 int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
2058 {
2059 unsigned char *p,*d;
2060 int i,j,nl,off,n;
2061 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk=NULL;
2062 X509_NAME *name;
2063 BUF_MEM *buf;
2064
2065 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A)
2066 {
2067 buf=s->init_buf;
2068
2069 d=p=ssl_handshake_start(s);
2070
2071 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
2072 p++;
2073 n=ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s,p);
2074 d[0]=n;
2075 p+=n;
2076 n++;
2077
2078 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2079 {
2080 const unsigned char *psigs;
2081 nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &psigs);
2082 s2n(nl, p);
2083 memcpy(p, psigs, nl);
2084 p += nl;
2085 n += nl + 2;
2086 }
2087
2088 off=n;
2089 p+=2;
2090 n+=2;
2091
2092 sk=SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
2093 nl=0;
2094 if (sk != NULL)
2095 {
2096 for (i=0; i<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++)
2097 {
2098 name=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i);
2099 j=i2d_X509_NAME(name,NULL);
2100 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,4+n+j+2))
2101 {
2102 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
2103 goto err;
2104 }
2105 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+n]);
2106 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG))
2107 {
2108 s2n(j,p);
2109 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
2110 n+=2+j;
2111 nl+=2+j;
2112 }
2113 else
2114 {
2115 d=p;
2116 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
2117 j-=2; s2n(j,d); j+=2;
2118 n+=j;
2119 nl+=j;
2120 }
2121 }
2122 }
2123 /* else no CA names */
2124 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + off;
2125 s2n(nl,p);
2126
2127 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, n);
2128
2129 #ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
2130 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
2131 {
2132 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num;
2133 /* do the header */
2134 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
2135 *(p++)=0;
2136 *(p++)=0;
2137 *(p++)=0;
2138 s->init_num += 4;
2139 }
2140 #endif
2141
2142 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
2143 }
2144
2145 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
2146 return ssl_do_write(s);
2147 err:
2148 return(-1);
2149 }
2150
2151 int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
2152 {
2153 int i,al,ok;
2154 long n;
2155 unsigned long alg_k;
2156 unsigned char *p;
2157 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2158 RSA *rsa=NULL;
2159 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
2160 #endif
2161 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2162 BIGNUM *pub=NULL;
2163 DH *dh_srvr, *dh_clnt = NULL;
2164 #endif
2165 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2166 KSSL_ERR kssl_err;
2167 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2168
2169 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2170 EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;
2171 EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
2172 EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
2173 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
2174 #endif
2175
2176 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2177 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
2178 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B,
2179 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2180 2048, /* ??? */
2181 &ok);
2182
2183 if (!ok) return((int)n);
2184 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2185
2186 alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2187
2188 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2189 if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
2190 {
2191 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
2192 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp)
2193 {
2194 if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL))
2195 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp;
2196 /* Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should
2197 * be sent already */
2198 if (rsa == NULL)
2199 {
2200 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2201 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY);
2202 goto f_err;
2203
2204 }
2205 }
2206 else
2207 {
2208 pkey=s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey;
2209 if ( (pkey == NULL) ||
2210 (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) ||
2211 (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL))
2212 {
2213 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2214 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2215 goto f_err;
2216 }
2217 rsa=pkey->pkey.rsa;
2218 }
2219
2220 /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */
2221 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
2222 {
2223 n2s(p,i);
2224 if (n != i+2)
2225 {
2226 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG))
2227 {
2228 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2229 goto err;
2230 }
2231 else
2232 p-=2;
2233 }
2234 else
2235 n=i;
2236 }
2237
2238 i=RSA_private_decrypt((int)n,p,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
2239
2240 al = -1;
2241
2242 if (i != SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2243 {
2244 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2245 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); */
2246 }
2247
2248 if ((al == -1) && !((p[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
2249 {
2250 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2251 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2252 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2253 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
2254 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
2255 * protocol version.
2256 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. */
2257 if (!((s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) &&
2258 (p[0] == (s->version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->version & 0xff))))
2259 {
2260 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2261 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER); */
2262
2263 /* The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2264 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version
2265 * number check as a "bad version oracle" -- an alert would
2266 * reveal that the plaintext corresponding to some ciphertext
2267 * made up by the adversary is properly formatted except
2268 * that the version number is wrong. To avoid such attacks,
2269 * we should treat this just like any other decryption error. */
2270 }
2271 }
2272
2273 if (al != -1)
2274 {
2275 /* Some decryption failure -- use random value instead as countermeasure
2276 * against Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding
2277 * (see RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). */
2278 ERR_clear_error();
2279 i = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2280 p[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
2281 p[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
2282 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p+2, i-2) <= 0) /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure */
2283 goto err;
2284 }
2285
2286 s->session->master_key_length=
2287 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2288 s->session->master_key,
2289 p,i);
2290 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
2291 }
2292 else
2293 #endif
2294 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2295 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
2296 {
2297 int idx = -1;
2298 EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL;
2299 if (n)
2300 n2s(p,i);
2301 else
2302 i = 0;
2303 if (n && n != i+2)
2304 {
2305 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG))
2306 {
2307 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2308 goto err;
2309 }
2310 else
2311 {
2312 p-=2;
2313 i=(int)n;
2314 }
2315 }
2316 if (alg_k & SSL_kDHr)
2317 idx = SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA;
2318 else if (alg_k & SSL_kDHd)
2319 idx = SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA;
2320 if (idx >= 0)
2321 {
2322 skey = s->cert->pkeys[idx].privatekey;
2323 if ((skey == NULL) ||
2324 (skey->type != EVP_PKEY_DH) ||
2325 (skey->pkey.dh == NULL))
2326 {
2327 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2328 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2329 goto f_err;
2330 }
2331 dh_srvr = skey->pkey.dh;
2332 }
2333 else if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL)
2334 {
2335 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2336 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2337 goto f_err;
2338 }
2339 else
2340 dh_srvr=s->s3->tmp.dh;
2341
2342 if (n == 0L)
2343 {
2344 /* Get pubkey from cert */
2345 EVP_PKEY *clkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2346 if (clkey)
2347 {
2348 if (EVP_PKEY_cmp_parameters(clkey, skey) == 1)
2349 dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(clkey);
2350 }
2351 if (dh_clnt == NULL)
2352 {
2353 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2354 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2355 goto f_err;
2356 }
2357 EVP_PKEY_free(clkey);
2358 pub = dh_clnt->pub_key;
2359 }
2360 else
2361 pub=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL);
2362 if (pub == NULL)
2363 {
2364 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BN_LIB);
2365 goto err;
2366 }
2367
2368 i=DH_compute_key(p,pub,dh_srvr);
2369
2370 if (i <= 0)
2371 {
2372 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
2373 BN_clear_free(pub);
2374 goto err;
2375 }
2376
2377 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
2378 s->s3->tmp.dh=NULL;
2379 if (dh_clnt)
2380 DH_free(dh_clnt);
2381 else
2382 BN_clear_free(pub);
2383 pub=NULL;
2384 s->session->master_key_length=
2385 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2386 s->session->master_key,p,i);
2387 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
2388 if (dh_clnt)
2389 return 2;
2390 }
2391 else
2392 #endif
2393 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2394 if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
2395 {
2396 krb5_error_code krb5rc;
2397 krb5_data enc_ticket;
2398 krb5_data authenticator;
2399 krb5_data enc_pms;
2400 KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
2401 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
2402 const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
2403 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
2404 unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
2405 + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
2406 int padl, outl;
2407 krb5_timestamp authtime = 0;
2408 krb5_ticket_times ttimes;
2409
2410 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
2411
2412 if (!kssl_ctx) kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
2413
2414 n2s(p,i);
2415 enc_ticket.length = i;
2416
2417 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + 6))
2418 {
2419 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2420 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2421 goto err;
2422 }
2423
2424 enc_ticket.data = (char *)p;
2425 p+=enc_ticket.length;
2426
2427 n2s(p,i);
2428 authenticator.length = i;
2429
2430 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 6))
2431 {
2432 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2433 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2434 goto err;
2435 }
2436
2437 authenticator.data = (char *)p;
2438 p+=authenticator.length;
2439
2440 n2s(p,i);
2441 enc_pms.length = i;
2442 enc_pms.data = (char *)p;
2443 p+=enc_pms.length;
2444
2445 /* Note that the length is checked again below,
2446 ** after decryption
2447 */
2448 if(enc_pms.length > sizeof pms)
2449 {
2450 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2451 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2452 goto err;
2453 }
2454
2455 if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length +
2456 enc_pms.length + 6))
2457 {
2458 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2459 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2460 goto err;
2461 }
2462
2463 if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes,
2464 &kssl_err)) != 0)
2465 {
2466 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
2467 printf("kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
2468 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2469 if (kssl_err.text)
2470 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2471 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2472 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2473 kssl_err.reason);
2474 goto err;
2475 }
2476
2477 /* Note: no authenticator is not considered an error,
2478 ** but will return authtime == 0.
2479 */
2480 if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator,
2481 &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0)
2482 {
2483 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
2484 printf("kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
2485 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2486 if (kssl_err.text)
2487 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2488 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2489 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2490 kssl_err.reason);
2491 goto err;
2492 }
2493
2494 if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0)
2495 {
2496 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc);
2497 goto err;
2498 }
2499
2500 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
2501 kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
2502 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2503
2504 enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
2505 if (enc == NULL)
2506 goto err;
2507
2508 memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
2509
2510 if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc,NULL,kssl_ctx->key,iv))
2511 {
2512 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2513 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2514 goto err;
2515 }
2516 if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms,&outl,
2517 (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length))
2518 {
2519 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2520 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2521 goto err;
2522 }
2523 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2524 {
2525 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2526 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2527 goto err;
2528 }
2529 if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx,&(pms[outl]),&padl))
2530 {
2531 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2532 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2533 goto err;
2534 }
2535 outl += padl;
2536 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2537 {
2538 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2539 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2540 goto err;
2541 }
2542 if (!((pms[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (pms[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
2543 {
2544 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2545 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2546 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2547 * However, buggy clients exist that send random bytes instead of
2548 * the protocol version.
2549 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients.
2550 * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos cipher)
2551 */
2552 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG))
2553 {
2554 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2555 SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2556 goto err;
2557 }
2558 }
2559
2560 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
2561
2562 s->session->master_key_length=
2563 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2564 s->session->master_key, pms, outl);
2565
2566 if (kssl_ctx->client_princ)
2567 {
2568 size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
2569 if ( len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH )
2570 {
2571 s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len;
2572 memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ,kssl_ctx->client_princ,len);
2573 }
2574 }
2575
2576
2577 /* Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
2578 ** but it caused problems for apache.
2579 ** kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
2580 ** if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
2581 */
2582 }
2583 else
2584 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2585
2586 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2587 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
2588 {
2589 int ret = 1;
2590 int field_size = 0;
2591 const EC_KEY *tkey;
2592 const EC_GROUP *group;
2593 const BIGNUM *priv_key;
2594
2595 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
2596 if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL)
2597 {
2598 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2599 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2600 goto err;
2601 }
2602
2603 /* Let's get server private key and group information */
2604 if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
2605 {
2606 /* use the certificate */
2607 tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec;
2608 }
2609 else
2610 {
2611 /* use the ephermeral values we saved when
2612 * generating the ServerKeyExchange msg.
2613 */
2614 tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh;
2615 }
2616
2617 group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
2618 priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
2619
2620 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) ||
2621 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key))
2622 {
2623 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2624 ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2625 goto err;
2626 }
2627
2628 /* Let's get client's public key */
2629 if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL)
2630 {
2631 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2632 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2633 goto err;
2634 }
2635
2636 if (n == 0L)
2637 {
2638 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
2639
2640 if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
2641 {
2642 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2643 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
2644 goto f_err;
2645 }
2646 if (((clnt_pub_pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer))
2647 == NULL) ||
2648 (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC))
2649 {
2650 /* XXX: For now, we do not support client
2651 * authentication using ECDH certificates
2652 * so this branch (n == 0L) of the code is
2653 * never executed. When that support is
2654 * added, we ought to ensure the key
2655 * received in the certificate is
2656 * authorized for key agreement.
2657 * ECDH_compute_key implicitly checks that
2658 * the two ECDH shares are for the same
2659 * group.
2660 */
2661 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2662 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2663 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS);
2664 goto f_err;
2665 }
2666
2667 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,
2668 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->pkey.ec)) == 0)
2669 {
2670 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2671 ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2672 goto err;
2673 }
2674 ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
2675 }
2676 else
2677 {
2678 /* Get client's public key from encoded point
2679 * in the ClientKeyExchange message.
2680 */
2681 if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
2682 {
2683 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2684 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2685 goto err;
2686 }
2687
2688 /* Get encoded point length */
2689 i = *p;
2690 p += 1;
2691 if (n != 1 + i)
2692 {
2693 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2694 ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2695 goto err;
2696 }
2697 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group,
2698 clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0)
2699 {
2700 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2701 ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2702 goto err;
2703 }
2704 /* p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer
2705 * currently, so set it to the start
2706 */
2707 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2708 }
2709
2710 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
2711 field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
2712 if (field_size <= 0)
2713 {
2714 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2715 ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
2716 goto err;
2717 }
2718 i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size+7)/8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh, NULL);
2719 if (i <= 0)
2720 {
2721 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2722 ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
2723 goto err;
2724 }
2725
2726 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2727 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2728 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2729 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2730 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
2731 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
2732
2733 /* Compute the master secret */
2734 s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc-> \
2735 generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, p, i);
2736
2737 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
2738 return (ret);
2739 }
2740 else
2741 #endif
2742 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2743 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK)
2744 {
2745 unsigned char *t = NULL;
2746 unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN*2+4];
2747 unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0;
2748 int psk_err = 1;
2749 char tmp_id[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1];
2750
2751 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2752
2753 n2s(p,i);
2754 if (n != i+2)
2755 {
2756 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2757 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2758 goto psk_err;
2759 }
2760 if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN)
2761 {
2762 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2763 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2764 goto psk_err;
2765 }
2766 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL)
2767 {
2768 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2769 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
2770 goto psk_err;
2771 }
2772
2773 /* Create guaranteed NULL-terminated identity
2774 * string for the callback */
2775 memcpy(tmp_id, p, i);
2776 memset(tmp_id+i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1-i);
2777 psk_len = s->psk_server_callback(s, tmp_id,
2778 psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2779 OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_id, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1);
2780
2781 if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN)
2782 {
2783 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2784 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2785 goto psk_err;
2786 }
2787 else if (psk_len == 0)
2788 {
2789 /* PSK related to the given identity not found */
2790 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2791 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2792 al=SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
2793 goto psk_err;
2794 }
2795
2796 /* create PSK pre_master_secret */
2797 pre_ms_len=2+psk_len+2+psk_len;
2798 t = psk_or_pre_ms;
2799 memmove(psk_or_pre_ms+psk_len+4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len);
2800 s2n(psk_len, t);
2801 memset(t, 0, psk_len);
2802 t+=psk_len;
2803 s2n(psk_len, t);
2804
2805 if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL)
2806 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2807 s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup((char *)p);
2808 if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL)
2809 {
2810 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2811 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2812 goto psk_err;
2813 }
2814
2815 if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
2816 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
2817 s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
2818 if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL &&
2819 s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
2820 {
2821 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2822 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2823 goto psk_err;
2824 }
2825
2826 s->session->master_key_length=
2827 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2828 s->session->master_key, psk_or_pre_ms, pre_ms_len);
2829 psk_err = 0;
2830 psk_err:
2831 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2832 if (psk_err != 0)
2833 goto f_err;
2834 }
2835 else
2836 #endif
2837 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2838 if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
2839 {
2840 int param_len;
2841
2842 n2s(p,i);
2843 param_len=i+2;
2844 if (param_len > n)
2845 {
2846 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2847 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
2848 goto f_err;
2849 }
2850 if (!(s->srp_ctx.A=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
2851 {
2852 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2853 goto err;
2854 }
2855 if (s->session->srp_username != NULL)
2856 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
2857 s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
2858 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL)
2859 {
2860 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2861 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2862 goto err;
2863 }
2864
2865 if ((s->session->master_key_length = SRP_generate_server_master_secret(s,s->session->master_key))<0)
2866 {
2867 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2868 goto err;
2869 }
2870
2871 p+=i;
2872 }
2873 else
2874 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
2875 if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST)
2876 {
2877 int ret = 0;
2878 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
2879 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
2880 unsigned char premaster_secret[32], *start;
2881 size_t outlen=32, inlen;
2882 unsigned long alg_a;
2883
2884 /* Get our certificate private key*/
2885 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2886 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST94)
2887 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST94].privatekey;
2888 else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01)
2889 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
2890
2891 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk,NULL);
2892 EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx);
2893 /* If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
2894 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
2895 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use
2896 * a client certificate for authorization only. */
2897 client_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2898 if (client_pub_pkey)
2899 {
2900 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
2901 ERR_clear_error();
2902 }
2903 /* Decrypt session key */
2904 if ((*p!=( V_ASN1_SEQUENCE| V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)))
2905 {
2906 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2907 goto gerr;
2908 }
2909 if (p[1] == 0x81)
2910 {
2911 start = p+3;
2912 inlen = p[2];
2913 }
2914 else if (p[1] < 0x80)
2915 {
2916 start = p+2;
2917 inlen = p[1];
2918 }
2919 else
2920 {
2921 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2922 goto gerr;
2923 }
2924 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx,premaster_secret,&outlen,start,inlen) <=0)
2925
2926 {
2927 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2928 goto gerr;
2929 }
2930 /* Generate master secret */
2931 s->session->master_key_length=
2932 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2933 s->session->master_key,premaster_secret,32);
2934 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2935 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
2936 ret = 2;
2937 else
2938 ret = 1;
2939 gerr:
2940 EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey);
2941 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2942 if (ret)
2943 return ret;
2944 else
2945 goto err;
2946 }
2947 else
2948 {
2949 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2950 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2951 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
2952 goto f_err;
2953 }
2954
2955 return(1);
2956 f_err:
2957 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2958 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_SRP)
2959 err:
2960 #endif
2961 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2962 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2963 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2964 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
2965 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2966 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2967 #endif
2968 return(-1);
2969 }
2970
2971 int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
2972 {
2973 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
2974 unsigned char *p;
2975 int al,ok,ret=0;
2976 long n;
2977 int type=0,i,j;
2978 X509 *peer;
2979 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
2980 EVP_MD_CTX mctx;
2981 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx);
2982
2983 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2984 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
2985 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,
2986 -1,
2987 516, /* Enough for 4096 bit RSA key with TLS v1.2 */
2988 &ok);
2989
2990 if (!ok) return((int)n);
2991
2992 if (s->session->peer != NULL)
2993 {
2994 peer=s->session->peer;
2995 pkey=X509_get_pubkey(peer);
2996 type=X509_certificate_type(peer,pkey);
2997 }
2998 else
2999 {
3000 peer=NULL;
3001 pkey=NULL;
3002 }
3003
3004 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY)
3005 {
3006 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
3007 if ((peer != NULL) && (type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
3008 {
3009 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3010 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE);
3011 goto f_err;
3012 }
3013 ret=1;
3014 goto end;
3015 }
3016
3017 if (peer == NULL)
3018 {
3019 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED);
3020 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3021 goto f_err;
3022 }
3023
3024 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
3025 {
3026 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
3027 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3028 goto f_err;
3029 }
3030
3031 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
3032 {
3033 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
3034 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3035 goto f_err;
3036 }
3037
3038 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
3039 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3040 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
3041 /* If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare
3042 * signature without length field */
3043 if (n==64 && (pkey->type==NID_id_GostR3410_94 ||
3044 pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) )
3045 {
3046 i=64;
3047 }
3048 else
3049 {
3050 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3051 {
3052 int rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, p, pkey);
3053 if (rv == -1)
3054 {
3055 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3056 goto f_err;
3057 }
3058 else if (rv == 0)
3059 {
3060 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3061 goto f_err;
3062 }
3063 #ifdef SSL_DEBUG
3064 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
3065 #endif
3066 p += 2;
3067 n -= 2;
3068 }
3069 n2s(p,i);
3070 n-=2;
3071 if (i > n)
3072 {
3073 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3074 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3075 goto f_err;
3076 }
3077 }
3078 j=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
3079 if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0))
3080 {
3081 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
3082 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3083 goto f_err;
3084 }
3085
3086 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3087 {
3088 long hdatalen = 0;
3089 void *hdata;
3090 hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
3091 if (hdatalen <= 0)
3092 {
3093 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3094 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3095 goto f_err;
3096 }
3097 #ifdef SSL_DEBUG
3098 fprintf(stderr, "Using TLS 1.2 with client verify alg %s\n",
3099 EVP_MD_name(md));
3100 #endif
3101 if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL)
3102 || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen))
3103 {
3104 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
3105 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3106 goto f_err;
3107 }
3108
3109 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&mctx, p , i, pkey) <= 0)
3110 {
3111 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3112 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
3113 goto f_err;
3114 }
3115 }
3116 else
3117 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3118 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
3119 {
3120 i=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
3121 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i,
3122 pkey->pkey.rsa);
3123 if (i < 0)
3124 {
3125 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3126 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
3127 goto f_err;
3128 }
3129 if (i == 0)
3130 {
3131 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3132 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE);
3133 goto f_err;
3134 }
3135 }
3136 else
3137 #endif
3138 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3139 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
3140 {
3141 j=DSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
3142 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3143 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.dsa);
3144 if (j <= 0)
3145 {
3146 /* bad signature */
3147 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3148 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE);
3149 goto f_err;
3150 }
3151 }
3152 else
3153 #endif
3154 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3155 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
3156 {
3157 j=ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
3158 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3159 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.ec);
3160 if (j <= 0)
3161 {
3162 /* bad signature */
3163 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3164 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
3165 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
3166 goto f_err;
3167 }
3168 }
3169 else
3170 #endif
3171 if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001)
3172 { unsigned char signature[64];
3173 int idx;
3174 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey,NULL);
3175 EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx);
3176 if (i!=64) {
3177 fprintf(stderr,"GOST signature length is %d",i);
3178 }
3179 for (idx=0;idx<64;idx++) {
3180 signature[63-idx]=p[idx];
3181 }
3182 j=EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx,signature,64,s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,32);
3183 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
3184 if (j<=0)
3185 {
3186 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3187 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
3188 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
3189 goto f_err;
3190 }
3191 }
3192 else
3193 {
3194 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3195 al=SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
3196 goto f_err;
3197 }
3198
3199
3200 ret=1;
3201 if (0)
3202 {
3203 f_err:
3204 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3205 }
3206 end:
3207 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
3208 {
3209 BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
3210 s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
3211 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
3212 }
3213 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
3214 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3215 return(ret);
3216 }
3217
3218 int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
3219 {
3220 int i,ok,al,ret= -1;
3221 X509 *x=NULL;
3222 unsigned long l,nc,llen,n;
3223 const unsigned char *p,*q;
3224 unsigned char *d;
3225 STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL;
3226
3227 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3228 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A,
3229 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B,
3230 -1,
3231 s->max_cert_list,
3232 &ok);
3233
3234 if (!ok) return((int)n);
3235
3236 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE)
3237 {
3238 if ( (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3239 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
3240 {
3241 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3242 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3243 goto f_err;
3244 }
3245 /* If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list */
3246 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
3247 {
3248 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST);
3249 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3250 goto f_err;
3251 }
3252 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
3253 return(1);
3254 }
3255
3256 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE)
3257 {
3258 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3259 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
3260 goto f_err;
3261 }
3262 p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3263
3264 if ((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)
3265 {
3266 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3267 goto err;
3268 }
3269
3270 n2l3(p,llen);
3271 if (llen+3 != n)
3272 {
3273 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3274 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3275 goto f_err;
3276 }
3277 for (nc=0; nc<llen; )
3278 {
3279 n2l3(p,l);
3280 if ((l+nc+3) > llen)
3281 {
3282 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3283 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3284 goto f_err;
3285 }
3286
3287 q=p;
3288 x=d2i_X509(NULL,&p,l);
3289 if (x == NULL)
3290 {
3291 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
3292 goto err;
3293 }
3294 if (p != (q+l))
3295 {
3296 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3297 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3298 goto f_err;
3299 }
3300 if (!sk_X509_push(sk,x))
3301 {
3302 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3303 goto err;
3304 }
3305 x=NULL;
3306 nc+=l+3;
3307 }
3308
3309 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0)
3310 {
3311 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3312 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
3313 {
3314 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3315 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
3316 goto f_err;
3317 }
3318 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3319 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3320 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
3321 {
3322 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3323 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3324 goto f_err;
3325 }
3326 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
3327 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
3328 {
3329 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3330 goto f_err;
3331 }
3332 }
3333 else
3334 {
3335 i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk);
3336 if (i <= 0)
3337 {
3338 al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
3339 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
3340 goto f_err;
3341 }
3342 }
3343
3344 if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */
3345 X509_free(s->session->peer);
3346 s->session->peer=sk_X509_shift(sk);
3347 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
3348
3349 /* With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL
3350 * when we arrive here. */
3351 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
3352 {
3353 s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
3354 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
3355 {
3356 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3357 goto err;
3358 }
3359 }
3360 if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL)
3361 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free);
3362 s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain=sk;
3363 /* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the
3364 * peer's own certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c */
3365
3366 sk=NULL;
3367
3368 ret=1;
3369 if (0)
3370 {
3371 f_err:
3372 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3373 }
3374 err:
3375 if (x != NULL) X509_free(x);
3376 if (sk != NULL) sk_X509_pop_free(sk,X509_free);
3377 return(ret);
3378 }
3379
3380 int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
3381 {
3382 CERT_PKEY *cpk;
3383
3384 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A)
3385 {
3386 cpk=ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
3387 if (cpk == NULL)
3388 {
3389 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
3390 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aKRB5) ||
3391 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5))
3392 {
3393 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3394 return(0);
3395 }
3396 }
3397
3398 ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,cpk);
3399 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
3400 }
3401
3402 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
3403 return ssl_do_write(s);
3404 }
3405
3406 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
3407 /* send a new session ticket (not necessarily for a new session) */
3408 int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
3409 {
3410 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A)
3411 {
3412 unsigned char *p, *senc, *macstart;
3413 const unsigned char *const_p;
3414 int len, slen_full, slen;
3415 SSL_SESSION *sess;
3416 unsigned int hlen;
3417 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
3418 HMAC_CTX hctx;
3419 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3420 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
3421 unsigned char key_name[16];
3422
3423 /* get session encoding length */
3424 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
3425 /* Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is
3426 * too long
3427 */
3428 if (slen_full > 0xFF00)
3429 return -1;
3430 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
3431 if (!senc)
3432 return -1;
3433 p = senc;
3434 i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p);
3435
3436 /* create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up */
3437 const_p = senc;
3438 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
3439 if (sess == NULL)
3440 {
3441 OPENSSL_free(senc);
3442 return -1;
3443 }
3444 sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
3445
3446 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
3447 if (slen > slen_full) /* shouldn't ever happen */
3448 {
3449 OPENSSL_free(senc);
3450 return -1;
3451 }
3452 p = senc;
3453 i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p);
3454 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3455
3456 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3457 * follows handshake_header_length +
3458 * 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
3459 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
3460 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
3461 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
3462 */
3463 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
3464 SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + 22 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH +
3465 EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
3466 return -1;
3467 p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
3468 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3469 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3470 /* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present
3471 * it does all the work otherwise use generated values
3472 * from parent ctx.
3473 */
3474 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
3475 {
3476 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx,
3477 &hctx, 1) < 0)
3478 {
3479 OPENSSL_free(senc);
3480 return -1;
3481 }
3482 }
3483 else
3484 {
3485 RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, 16);
3486 EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3487 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv);
3488 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3489 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
3490 memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
3491 }
3492
3493 /* Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only):
3494 * We leave this unspecified for resumed session (for simplicity),
3495 * and guess that tickets for new sessions will live as long
3496 * as their sessions. */
3497 l2n(s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout, p);
3498
3499 /* Skip ticket length for now */
3500 p += 2;
3501 /* Output key name */
3502 macstart = p;
3503 memcpy(p, key_name, 16);
3504 p += 16;
3505 /* output IV */
3506 memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx));
3507 p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3508 /* Encrypt session data */
3509 EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen);
3510 p += len;
3511 EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len);
3512 p += len;
3513 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3514
3515 HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart);
3516 HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen);
3517 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3518
3519 p += hlen;
3520 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
3521 /* Total length */
3522 len = p - ssl_handshake_start(s);
3523 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, len);
3524 /* Skip ticket lifetime hint */
3525 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + 4;
3526 s2n(len - 6, p);
3527 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
3528 OPENSSL_free(senc);
3529 }
3530
3531 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
3532 return ssl_do_write(s);
3533 }
3534
3535 int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s)
3536 {
3537 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A)
3538 {
3539 unsigned char *p;
3540 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3541 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
3542 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
3543 * + (ocsp response)
3544 */
3545 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen))
3546 return -1;
3547
3548 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3549
3550 /* do the header */
3551 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
3552 /* message length */
3553 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p);
3554 /* status type */
3555 *(p++)= s->tlsext_status_type;
3556 /* length of OCSP response */
3557 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p);
3558 /* actual response */
3559 memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen);
3560 /* number of bytes to write */
3561 s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen;
3562 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B;
3563 s->init_off = 0;
3564 }
3565
3566 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
3567 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3568 }
3569
3570 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3571 /* ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message. It
3572 * sets the next_proto member in s if found */
3573 int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s)
3574 {
3575 int ok;
3576 int proto_len, padding_len;
3577 long n;
3578 const unsigned char *p;
3579
3580 /* Clients cannot send a NextProtocol message if we didn't see the
3581 * extension in their ClientHello */
3582 if (!s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
3583 {
3584 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION);
3585 return -1;
3586 }
3587
3588 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3589 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A,
3590 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B,
3591 SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO,
3592 514, /* See the payload format below */
3593 &ok);
3594
3595 if (!ok)
3596 return((int)n);
3597
3598 /* s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received
3599 * in this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset
3600 * by ssl3_get_finished). */
3601 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
3602 {
3603 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS);
3604 return -1;
3605 }
3606
3607 if (n < 2)
3608 return 0; /* The body must be > 1 bytes long */
3609
3610 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3611
3612 /* The payload looks like:
3613 * uint8 proto_len;
3614 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
3615 * uint8 padding_len;
3616 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
3617 */
3618 proto_len = p[0];
3619 if (proto_len + 2 > s->init_num)
3620 return 0;
3621 padding_len = p[proto_len + 1];
3622 if (proto_len + padding_len + 2 != s->init_num)
3623 return 0;
3624
3625 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(proto_len);
3626 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
3627 {
3628 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3629 return 0;
3630 }
3631 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, p + 1, proto_len);
3632 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = proto_len;
3633
3634 return 1;
3635 }
3636 # endif
3637
3638 int tls1_send_server_supplemental_data(SSL *s)
3639 {
3640 size_t length = 0;
3641 const unsigned char *authz, *orig_authz;
3642 unsigned char *p;
3643 size_t authz_length, i;
3644
3645 if (s->state != SSL3_ST_SW_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA_A)
3646 return ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE);
3647
3648 orig_authz = authz = ssl_get_authz_data(s, &authz_length);
3649 if (authz == NULL)
3650 {
3651 /* This should never occur. */
3652 return 0;
3653 }
3654
3655 /* First we walk over the authz data to see how long the handshake
3656 * message will be. */
3657 for (i = 0; i < authz_length; i++)
3658 {
3659 unsigned short len;
3660 unsigned char type;
3661
3662 type = *(authz++);
3663 n2s(authz, len);
3664 /* n2s increments authz by 2*/
3665 i += 2;
3666
3667 if (memchr(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
3668 type,
3669 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len) != NULL)
3670 length += 1 /* authz type */ + 2 /* length */ + len;
3671
3672 authz += len;
3673 i += len;
3674 }
3675
3676 length += 1 /* handshake type */ +
3677 3 /* handshake length */ +
3678 3 /* supplemental data length */ +
3679 2 /* supplemental entry type */ +
3680 2 /* supplemental entry length */;
3681
3682 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(s->init_buf, length))
3683 {
3684 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SEND_SERVER_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
3685 return 0;
3686 }
3687
3688 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3689 *(p++) = SSL3_MT_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA;
3690 /* Handshake length */
3691 l2n3(length - 4, p);
3692 /* Length of supplemental data */
3693 l2n3(length - 7, p);
3694 /* Supplemental data type */
3695 s2n(TLSEXT_SUPPLEMENTALDATATYPE_authz_data, p);
3696 /* Its length */
3697 s2n(length - 11, p);
3698
3699 authz = orig_authz;
3700
3701 /* Walk over the authz again and append the selected elements. */
3702 for (i = 0; i < authz_length; i++)
3703 {
3704 unsigned short len;
3705 unsigned char type;
3706
3707 type = *(authz++);
3708 n2s(authz, len);
3709 /* n2s increments authz by 2 */
3710 i += 2;
3711
3712 if (memchr(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
3713 type,
3714 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len) != NULL)
3715 {
3716 *(p++) = type;
3717 s2n(len, p);
3718 memcpy(p, authz, len);
3719 p += len;
3720 }
3721
3722 authz += len;
3723 i += len;
3724 }
3725
3726 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA_B;
3727 s->init_num = length;
3728 s->init_off = 0;
3729
3730 return ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE);
3731 }
3732 #endif
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