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Only allow ephemeral RSA keys in export ciphersuites.
[thirdparty/openssl.git] / ssl / s3_srvr.c
1 /* ssl/s3_srvr.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
3 * All rights reserved.
4 *
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8 *
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15 *
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22 *
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25 * are met:
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40 *
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
51 * SUCH DAMAGE.
52 *
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
57 */
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
60 *
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
63 * are met:
64 *
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
67 *
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
71 * distribution.
72 *
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
77 *
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
82 *
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
86 *
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
88 * acknowledgment:
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
91 *
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
105 *
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
109 *
110 */
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
113 *
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
116 *
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
119 *
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
122 *
123 */
124 /* ====================================================================
125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
126 *
127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
129 * license.
130 *
131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
134 *
135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
138 *
139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
142 * to make use of the Contribution.
143 *
144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
148 * OTHERWISE.
149 */
150
151 #define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
152 #define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
153
154 #include <stdio.h>
155 #include "ssl_locl.h"
156 #include "kssl_lcl.h"
157 #include "../crypto/constant_time_locl.h"
158 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
159 #include <openssl/rand.h>
160 #include <openssl/objects.h>
161 #include <openssl/evp.h>
162 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
163 #include <openssl/x509.h>
164 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
165 #include <openssl/dh.h>
166 #endif
167 #include <openssl/bn.h>
168 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
169 #include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
170 #endif
171 #include <openssl/md5.h>
172
173 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD
174 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver);
175
176 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)
177 {
178 if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
179 return(SSLv3_server_method());
180 else
181 return(NULL);
182 }
183
184 IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method,
185 ssl3_accept,
186 ssl_undefined_function,
187 ssl3_get_server_method)
188 #endif
189
190 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
191 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al)
192 {
193 int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE;
194
195 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
196
197 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
198 (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL))
199 {
200 if(s->srp_ctx.login == NULL)
201 {
202 /* RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject,
203 we do so if There is no srp login name */
204 ret = SSL3_AL_FATAL;
205 *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
206 }
207 else
208 {
209 ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s,al);
210 }
211 }
212 return ret;
213 }
214 #endif
215
216 int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
217 {
218 BUF_MEM *buf;
219 unsigned long alg_k,Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
220 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
221 int ret= -1;
222 int new_state,state,skip=0;
223
224 RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0);
225 ERR_clear_error();
226 clear_sys_error();
227
228 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
229 cb=s->info_callback;
230 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
231 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
232
233 /* init things to blank */
234 s->in_handshake++;
235 if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s);
236
237 if (s->cert == NULL)
238 {
239 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
240 return(-1);
241 }
242
243 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
244 /* If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we
245 * already got and don't await it anymore, because
246 * Heartbeats don't make sense during handshakes anyway.
247 */
248 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
249 {
250 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
251 s->tlsext_hb_seq++;
252 }
253 #endif
254
255 for (;;)
256 {
257 state=s->state;
258
259 switch (s->state)
260 {
261 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
262 s->renegotiate=1;
263 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
264
265 case SSL_ST_BEFORE:
266 case SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
267 case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
268 case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
269
270 s->server=1;
271 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1);
272
273 if ((s->version>>8) != 3)
274 {
275 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
276 return -1;
277 }
278
279 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_VERSION, 0,
280 s->version, NULL))
281 {
282 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW);
283 return -1;
284 }
285
286 s->type=SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
287
288 if (s->init_buf == NULL)
289 {
290 if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)
291 {
292 ret= -1;
293 goto end;
294 }
295 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH))
296 {
297 BUF_MEM_free(buf);
298 ret= -1;
299 goto end;
300 }
301 s->init_buf=buf;
302 }
303
304 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
305 {
306 ret= -1;
307 goto end;
308 }
309
310 s->init_num=0;
311 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY;
312 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
313 /* Should have been reset by ssl3_get_finished, too. */
314 s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0;
315
316 if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE)
317 {
318 /* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that
319 * the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
320 */
321 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) { ret= -1; goto end; }
322
323 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
324 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
325 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
326 }
327 else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
328 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
329 {
330 /* Server attempting to renegotiate with
331 * client that doesn't support secure
332 * renegotiation.
333 */
334 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
335 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
336 ret = -1;
337 goto end;
338 }
339 else
340 {
341 /* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE,
342 * we will just send a HelloRequest */
343 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
344 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
345 }
346 break;
347
348 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
349 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
350
351 s->shutdown=0;
352 ret=ssl3_send_hello_request(s);
353 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
354 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
355 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
356 s->init_num=0;
357
358 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
359 break;
360
361 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
362 s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
363 break;
364
365 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
366 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
367 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
368
369 ret=ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
370 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
371 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
372 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D;
373 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D:
374 {
375 int al;
376 if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s,&al)) < 0)
377 {
378 /* callback indicates firther work to be done */
379 s->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
380 goto end;
381 }
382 if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE)
383 {
384 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
385 /* This is not really an error but the only means to
386 for a client to detect whether srp is supported. */
387 if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY)
388 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
389 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
390 ret= -1;
391 goto end;
392 }
393 }
394 #endif
395
396 s->renegotiate = 2;
397 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
398 s->init_num=0;
399 break;
400
401 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
402 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
403 ret=ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
404 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
405 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
406 if (s->hit)
407 {
408 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
409 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
410 else
411 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
412 }
413 #else
414 if (s->hit)
415 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
416 #endif
417 else
418 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
419 s->init_num = 0;
420 break;
421
422 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
423 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
424 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
425 /* normal PSK or KRB5 or SRP */
426 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL|SSL_aKRB5|SSL_aSRP))
427 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
428 {
429 ret=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
430 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
431 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
432 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
433 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
434 else
435 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
436 }
437 else
438 {
439 skip = 1;
440 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
441 }
442 #else
443 }
444 else
445 skip=1;
446
447 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
448 #endif
449 s->init_num=0;
450 break;
451
452 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
453 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
454 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
455
456 /*
457 * clear this, it may get reset by
458 * send_server_key_exchange
459 */
460 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0;
461
462
463 /* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or
464 * RSA but we have a sign only certificate
465 *
466 * PSK: may send PSK identity hints
467 *
468 * For ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange
469 * message only if the cipher suite is either
470 * ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, the
471 * server certificate contains the server's
472 * public key for key exchange.
473 */
474 if (
475 /* PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity
476 * hint if provided */
477 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
478 || ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
479 #endif
480 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
481 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
482 || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
483 #endif
484 || (alg_k & SSL_kDHE)
485 || (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE)
486 || ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
487 && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
488 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
489 && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
490 )
491 )
492 )
493 )
494 {
495 ret=ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);
496 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
497 }
498 else
499 skip=1;
500
501 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
502 s->init_num=0;
503 break;
504
505 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
506 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
507 if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
508 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
509 /* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set,
510 * don't request cert during re-negotiation: */
511 ((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
512 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
513 /* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites
514 * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts
515 * and in RFC 2246): */
516 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) &&
517 /* ... except when the application insists on verification
518 * (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */
519 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
520 /* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */
521 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5) ||
522 /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
523 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)
524 /* With normal PSK Certificates and
525 * Certificate Requests are omitted */
526 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
527 {
528 /* no cert request */
529 skip=1;
530 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=0;
531 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
532 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
533 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
534 return -1;
535 }
536 else
537 {
538 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=1;
539 ret=ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
540 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
541 #ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
542 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
543 #else
544 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
545 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
546 #endif
547 s->init_num=0;
548 }
549 break;
550
551 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
552 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
553 ret=ssl3_send_server_done(s);
554 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
555 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
556 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
557 s->init_num=0;
558 break;
559
560 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
561
562 /* This code originally checked to see if
563 * any data was pending using BIO_CTRL_INFO
564 * and then flushed. This caused problems
565 * as documented in PR#1939. The proposed
566 * fix doesn't completely resolve this issue
567 * as buggy implementations of BIO_CTRL_PENDING
568 * still exist. So instead we just flush
569 * unconditionally.
570 */
571
572 s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
573 if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0)
574 {
575 ret= -1;
576 goto end;
577 }
578 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
579
580 s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state;
581 break;
582
583 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
584 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
585 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
586 {
587 ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
588 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
589 }
590 s->init_num=0;
591 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
592 break;
593
594 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
595 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
596 ret=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
597 if (ret <= 0)
598 goto end;
599 if (ret == 2)
600 {
601 /* For the ECDH ciphersuites when
602 * the client sends its ECDH pub key in
603 * a certificate, the CertificateVerify
604 * message is not sent.
605 * Also for GOST ciphersuites when
606 * the client uses its key from the certificate
607 * for key exchange.
608 */
609 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
610 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
611 #else
612 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
613 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
614 else
615 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
616 #endif
617 s->init_num = 0;
618 }
619 else if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
620 {
621 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
622 s->init_num=0;
623 if (!s->session->peer)
624 break;
625 /* For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer
626 * at this point and digest cached records.
627 */
628 if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer)
629 {
630 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
631 return -1;
632 }
633 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
634 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
635 return -1;
636 }
637 else
638 {
639 int offset=0;
640 int dgst_num;
641
642 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
643 s->init_num=0;
644
645 /* We need to get hashes here so if there is
646 * a client cert, it can be verified
647 * FIXME - digest processing for CertificateVerify
648 * should be generalized. But it is next step
649 */
650 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
651 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
652 return -1;
653 for (dgst_num=0; dgst_num<SSL_MAX_DIGEST;dgst_num++)
654 if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num])
655 {
656 int dgst_size;
657
658 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,EVP_MD_CTX_type(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]),&(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[offset]));
659 dgst_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]);
660 if (dgst_size < 0)
661 {
662 ret = -1;
663 goto end;
664 }
665 offset+=dgst_size;
666 }
667 }
668 break;
669
670 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
671 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
672 /*
673 * This *should* be the first time we enable CCS, but be
674 * extra careful about surrounding code changes. We need
675 * to set this here because we don't know if we're
676 * expecting a CertificateVerify or not.
677 */
678 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
679 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
680 /* we should decide if we expected this one */
681 ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
682 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
683
684 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
685 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
686 #else
687 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
688 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
689 else
690 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
691 #endif
692 s->init_num=0;
693 break;
694
695 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
696 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A:
697 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B:
698 /*
699 * Enable CCS for resumed handshakes with NPN.
700 * In a full handshake with NPN, we end up here through
701 * SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B, where SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK was
702 * already set. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make
703 * sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates.
704 * s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is
705 * processed in s3_pkt.c, and remains set until
706 * the client's Finished message is read.
707 */
708 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
709 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
710
711 ret=ssl3_get_next_proto(s);
712 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
713 s->init_num = 0;
714 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
715 break;
716 #endif
717
718 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
719 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
720 /*
721 * Enable CCS for resumed handshakes without NPN.
722 * In a full handshake, we end up here through
723 * SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B, where SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK was
724 * already set. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make
725 * sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates.
726 * s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is
727 * processed in s3_pkt.c, and remains set until
728 * the client's Finished message is read.
729 */
730 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
731 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
732 ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
733 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
734 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
735 if (s->hit)
736 s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
737 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
738 else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
739 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
740 #endif
741 else
742 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
743 s->init_num=0;
744 break;
745
746 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
747 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
748 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
749 ret=ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s);
750 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
751 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
752 s->init_num=0;
753 break;
754
755 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A:
756 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B:
757 ret=ssl3_send_cert_status(s);
758 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
759 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
760 s->init_num=0;
761 break;
762
763 #endif
764
765 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
766 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
767
768 s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
769 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
770 { ret= -1; goto end; }
771
772 ret=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
773 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
774
775 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
776 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
777 s->init_num=0;
778
779 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
780 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
781 {
782 ret= -1;
783 goto end;
784 }
785
786 break;
787
788 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
789 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
790 ret=ssl3_send_finished(s,
791 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
792 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
793 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
794 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
795 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
796 if (s->hit)
797 {
798 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
799 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
800 #else
801 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
802 {
803 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
804 }
805 else
806 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
807 #endif
808 }
809 else
810 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK;
811 s->init_num=0;
812 break;
813
814 case SSL_ST_OK:
815 /* clean a few things up */
816 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
817
818 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
819 s->init_buf=NULL;
820
821 /* remove buffering on output */
822 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
823
824 s->init_num=0;
825
826 if (s->renegotiate == 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
827 {
828 s->renegotiate=0;
829 s->new_session=0;
830
831 ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
832
833 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
834 /* s->server=1; */
835 s->handshake_func=ssl3_accept;
836
837 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1);
838 }
839
840 ret = 1;
841 goto end;
842 /* break; */
843
844 default:
845 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
846 ret= -1;
847 goto end;
848 /* break; */
849 }
850
851 if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip)
852 {
853 if (s->debug)
854 {
855 if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
856 goto end;
857 }
858
859
860 if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state))
861 {
862 new_state=s->state;
863 s->state=state;
864 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP,1);
865 s->state=new_state;
866 }
867 }
868 skip=0;
869 }
870 end:
871 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
872
873 s->in_handshake--;
874 if (cb != NULL)
875 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT,ret);
876 return(ret);
877 }
878
879 int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
880 {
881
882 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A)
883 {
884 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST, 0);
885 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
886 }
887
888 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
889 return ssl_do_write(s);
890 }
891
892 int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
893 {
894 int i,j,ok,al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,ret= -1;
895 unsigned int cookie_len;
896 long n;
897 unsigned long id;
898 unsigned char *p,*d;
899 SSL_CIPHER *c;
900 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
901 unsigned char *q;
902 SSL_COMP *comp=NULL;
903 #endif
904 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers=NULL;
905
906 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C && !s->first_packet)
907 goto retry_cert;
908
909 /* We do this so that we will respond with our native type.
910 * If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1,
911 * This down switching should be handled by a different method.
912 * If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with
913 * TLSv1.
914 */
915 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A
916 )
917 {
918 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
919 }
920 s->first_packet=1;
921 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
922 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
923 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C,
924 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,
925 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
926 &ok);
927
928 if (!ok) return((int)n);
929 s->first_packet=0;
930 d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
931
932 /* use version from inside client hello, not from record header
933 * (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */
934 s->client_version=(((int)p[0])<<8)|(int)p[1];
935 p+=2;
936
937 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) ? (s->client_version > s->version &&
938 s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION)
939 : (s->client_version < s->version))
940 {
941 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
942 if ((s->client_version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR &&
943 !s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash)
944 {
945 /* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
946 s->version = s->client_version;
947 }
948 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
949 goto f_err;
950 }
951
952 /* If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't
953 * contain one, just return since we do not want to
954 * allocate any memory yet. So check cookie length...
955 */
956 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE)
957 {
958 unsigned int session_length, cookie_length;
959
960 session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
961 cookie_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1);
962
963 if (cookie_length == 0)
964 return 1;
965 }
966
967 /* load the client random */
968 memcpy(s->s3->client_random,p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
969 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
970
971 /* get the session-id */
972 j= *(p++);
973
974 s->hit=0;
975 /* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in renegotiation.
976 * 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally ignore resumption requests
977 * with flag SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
978 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on this for security
979 * won't even compile against older library versions).
980 *
981 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to request
982 * renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains unset): for servers,
983 * this essentially just means that the SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
984 * setting will be ignored.
985 */
986 if ((s->new_session && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION)))
987 {
988 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
989 goto err;
990 }
991 else
992 {
993 i=ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n);
994 /*
995 * Only resume if the session's version matches the negotiated
996 * version.
997 * RFC 5246 does not provide much useful advice on resumption
998 * with a different protocol version. It doesn't forbid it but
999 * the sanity of such behaviour would be questionable.
1000 * In practice, clients do not accept a version mismatch and
1001 * will abort the handshake with an error.
1002 */
1003 if (i == 1 && s->version == s->session->ssl_version)
1004 { /* previous session */
1005 s->hit=1;
1006 }
1007 else if (i == -1)
1008 goto err;
1009 else /* i == 0 */
1010 {
1011 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
1012 goto err;
1013 }
1014 }
1015
1016 p+=j;
1017
1018 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
1019 {
1020 /* cookie stuff */
1021 cookie_len = *(p++);
1022
1023 /*
1024 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
1025 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
1026 * does not cause an overflow.
1027 */
1028 if ( cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie))
1029 {
1030 /* too much data */
1031 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1032 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1033 goto f_err;
1034 }
1035
1036 /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
1037 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) &&
1038 cookie_len > 0)
1039 {
1040 memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len);
1041
1042 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL)
1043 {
1044 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie,
1045 cookie_len) == 0)
1046 {
1047 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1048 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1049 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1050 goto f_err;
1051 }
1052 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1053 }
1054 else if ( memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
1055 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) /* default verification */
1056 {
1057 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1058 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1059 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1060 goto f_err;
1061 }
1062 /* Set to -2 so if successful we return 2 */
1063 ret = -2;
1064 }
1065
1066 p += cookie_len;
1067 if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION)
1068 {
1069 /* Select version to use */
1070 if (s->client_version <= DTLS1_2_VERSION &&
1071 !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2))
1072 {
1073 s->version = DTLS1_2_VERSION;
1074 s->method = DTLSv1_2_server_method();
1075 }
1076 else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
1077 {
1078 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE);
1079 s->version = s->client_version;
1080 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1081 goto f_err;
1082 }
1083 else if (s->client_version <= DTLS1_VERSION &&
1084 !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1))
1085 {
1086 s->version = DTLS1_VERSION;
1087 s->method = DTLSv1_server_method();
1088 }
1089 else
1090 {
1091 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
1092 s->version = s->client_version;
1093 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1094 goto f_err;
1095 }
1096 s->session->ssl_version = s->version;
1097 }
1098 }
1099
1100 n2s(p,i);
1101 if ((i == 0) && (j != 0))
1102 {
1103 /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */
1104 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1105 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
1106 goto f_err;
1107 }
1108 if ((p+i) >= (d+n))
1109 {
1110 /* not enough data */
1111 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1112 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1113 goto f_err;
1114 }
1115 if ((i > 0) && (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s,p,i,&(ciphers))
1116 == NULL))
1117 {
1118 goto err;
1119 }
1120 p+=i;
1121
1122 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
1123 if ((s->hit) && (i > 0))
1124 {
1125 j=0;
1126 id=s->session->cipher->id;
1127
1128 #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
1129 fprintf(stderr,"client sent %d ciphers\n",sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers));
1130 #endif
1131 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++)
1132 {
1133 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers,i);
1134 #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
1135 fprintf(stderr,"client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1136 i,sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers),
1137 SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
1138 #endif
1139 if (c->id == id)
1140 {
1141 j=1;
1142 break;
1143 }
1144 }
1145 /* Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade
1146 * attack: CVE-2010-4180.
1147 */
1148 #if 0
1149 if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1))
1150 {
1151 /* Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used cipher may
1152 * not be in the current list, the client instead might be trying to
1153 * continue using a cipher that before wasn't chosen due to server
1154 * preferences. We'll have to reject the connection if the cipher is not
1155 * enabled, though. */
1156 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0);
1157 if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0)
1158 {
1159 s->session->cipher = c;
1160 j = 1;
1161 }
1162 }
1163 #endif
1164 if (j == 0)
1165 {
1166 /* we need to have the cipher in the cipher
1167 * list if we are asked to reuse it */
1168 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1169 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
1170 goto f_err;
1171 }
1172 }
1173
1174 /* compression */
1175 i= *(p++);
1176 if ((p+i) > (d+n))
1177 {
1178 /* not enough data */
1179 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1180 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1181 goto f_err;
1182 }
1183 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1184 q=p;
1185 #endif
1186 for (j=0; j<i; j++)
1187 {
1188 if (p[j] == 0) break;
1189 }
1190
1191 p+=i;
1192 if (j >= i)
1193 {
1194 /* no compress */
1195 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1196 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
1197 goto f_err;
1198 }
1199
1200 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1201 /* TLS extensions*/
1202 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION)
1203 {
1204 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s,&p,d,n))
1205 {
1206 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
1207 goto err;
1208 }
1209 }
1210
1211 /* Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this
1212 * handshake for not reused session only. We need to generate
1213 * server_random before calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow
1214 * SessionTicket processing to use it in key derivation. */
1215 {
1216 unsigned char *pos;
1217 pos=s->s3->server_random;
1218 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0)
1219 {
1220 goto f_err;
1221 }
1222 }
1223
1224 if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb)
1225 {
1226 SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher=NULL;
1227
1228 s->session->master_key_length=sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1229 if(s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key, &s->session->master_key_length,
1230 ciphers, &pref_cipher, s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg))
1231 {
1232 s->hit=1;
1233 s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
1234 s->session->verify_result=X509_V_OK;
1235
1236 ciphers=NULL;
1237
1238 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1239 pref_cipher=pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1240 if (pref_cipher == NULL)
1241 {
1242 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1243 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1244 goto f_err;
1245 }
1246
1247 s->session->cipher=pref_cipher;
1248
1249 if (s->cipher_list)
1250 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
1251
1252 if (s->cipher_list_by_id)
1253 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
1254
1255 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1256 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1257 }
1258 }
1259 #endif
1260
1261 /* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1262 * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
1263 * algorithms from the client, starting at q. */
1264 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=NULL;
1265 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1266 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1267 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0)
1268 {
1269 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
1270 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1271 /* Can't disable compression */
1272 if (!ssl_allow_compression(s))
1273 {
1274 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1275 goto f_err;
1276 }
1277 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1278 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++)
1279 {
1280 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
1281 if (comp_id == comp->id)
1282 {
1283 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
1284 break;
1285 }
1286 }
1287 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1288 {
1289 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1290 goto f_err;
1291 }
1292 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1293 for (m = 0; m < i; m++)
1294 {
1295 if (q[m] == comp_id)
1296 break;
1297 }
1298 if (m >= i)
1299 {
1300 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1301 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
1302 goto f_err;
1303 }
1304 }
1305 else if (s->hit)
1306 comp = NULL;
1307 else if (ssl_allow_compression(s) && s->ctx->comp_methods)
1308 { /* See if we have a match */
1309 int m,nn,o,v,done=0;
1310
1311 nn=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1312 for (m=0; m<nn; m++)
1313 {
1314 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
1315 v=comp->id;
1316 for (o=0; o<i; o++)
1317 {
1318 if (v == q[o])
1319 {
1320 done=1;
1321 break;
1322 }
1323 }
1324 if (done) break;
1325 }
1326 if (done)
1327 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
1328 else
1329 comp=NULL;
1330 }
1331 #else
1332 /* If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1333 * using compression.
1334 */
1335 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0)
1336 {
1337 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1338 goto f_err;
1339 }
1340 #endif
1341
1342 /* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must
1343 * pick a cipher */
1344
1345 if (!s->hit)
1346 {
1347 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1348 s->session->compress_meth=0;
1349 #else
1350 s->session->compress_meth=(comp == NULL)?0:comp->id;
1351 #endif
1352 if (s->session->ciphers != NULL)
1353 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
1354 s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
1355 if (ciphers == NULL)
1356 {
1357 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1358 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED);
1359 goto f_err;
1360 }
1361 ciphers=NULL;
1362 if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s))
1363 {
1364 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1365 goto err;
1366 }
1367 /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
1368 retry_cert:
1369 if (s->cert->cert_cb)
1370 {
1371 int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
1372 if (rv == 0)
1373 {
1374 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1375 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
1376 goto f_err;
1377 }
1378 if (rv < 0)
1379 {
1380 s->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
1381 return -1;
1382 }
1383 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1384 }
1385 c=ssl3_choose_cipher(s,s->session->ciphers,
1386 SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1387
1388 if (c == NULL)
1389 {
1390 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1391 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1392 goto f_err;
1393 }
1394 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=c;
1395 /* check whether we should disable session resumption */
1396 if (s->not_resumable_session_cb != NULL)
1397 s->session->not_resumable=s->not_resumable_session_cb(s,
1398 ((c->algorithm_mkey & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)) != 0));
1399 if (s->session->not_resumable)
1400 /* do not send a session ticket */
1401 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
1402 }
1403 else
1404 {
1405 /* Session-id reuse */
1406 #ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
1407 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1408 SSL_CIPHER *nc=NULL;
1409 SSL_CIPHER *ec=NULL;
1410
1411 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG)
1412 {
1413 sk=s->session->ciphers;
1414 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++)
1415 {
1416 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,i);
1417 if (c->algorithm_enc & SSL_eNULL)
1418 nc=c;
1419 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c))
1420 ec=c;
1421 }
1422 if (nc != NULL)
1423 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=nc;
1424 else if (ec != NULL)
1425 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=ec;
1426 else
1427 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1428 }
1429 else
1430 #endif
1431 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1432 }
1433
1434 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER))
1435 {
1436 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
1437 goto f_err;
1438 }
1439
1440 /*-
1441 * we now have the following setup.
1442 * client_random
1443 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
1444 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
1445 * compression - basically ignored right now
1446 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1447 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1448 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1449 * s->s3->tmp.new_cipher- the new cipher to use.
1450 */
1451
1452 /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */
1453 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION)
1454 {
1455 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s) <= 0)
1456 {
1457 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1458 goto err;
1459 }
1460 }
1461
1462 if (ret < 0) ret=-ret;
1463 if (0)
1464 {
1465 f_err:
1466 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1467 }
1468 err:
1469 if (ciphers != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1470 return ret < 0 ? -1 : ret;
1471 }
1472
1473 int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
1474 {
1475 unsigned char *buf;
1476 unsigned char *p,*d;
1477 int i,sl;
1478 int al = 0;
1479 unsigned long l;
1480
1481 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1482 {
1483 buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1484 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1485 p=s->s3->server_random;
1486 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0)
1487 return -1;
1488 #endif
1489 /* Do the message type and length last */
1490 d=p= ssl_handshake_start(s);
1491
1492 *(p++)=s->version>>8;
1493 *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
1494
1495 /* Random stuff */
1496 memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1497 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1498
1499 /*-
1500 * There are several cases for the session ID to send
1501 * back in the server hello:
1502 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
1503 * we send back the old session ID.
1504 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
1505 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
1506 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
1507 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
1508 * session ID.
1509 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
1510 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
1511 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
1512 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
1513 * to send back.
1514 */
1515 if (s->session->not_resumable ||
1516 (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
1517 && !s->hit))
1518 s->session->session_id_length=0;
1519
1520 sl=s->session->session_id_length;
1521 if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id))
1522 {
1523 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1524 return -1;
1525 }
1526 *(p++)=sl;
1527 memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,sl);
1528 p+=sl;
1529
1530 /* put the cipher */
1531 i=ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,p);
1532 p+=i;
1533
1534 /* put the compression method */
1535 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1536 *(p++)=0;
1537 #else
1538 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1539 *(p++)=0;
1540 else
1541 *(p++)=s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
1542 #endif
1543 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1544 if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
1545 {
1546 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
1547 return -1;
1548 }
1549 if ((p = ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &al)) == NULL)
1550 {
1551 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1552 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1553 return -1;
1554 }
1555 #endif
1556 /* do the header */
1557 l=(p-d);
1558 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO, l);
1559 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B;
1560 }
1561
1562 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
1563 return ssl_do_write(s);
1564 }
1565
1566 int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)
1567 {
1568
1569 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A)
1570 {
1571 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE, 0);
1572 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
1573 }
1574
1575 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
1576 return ssl_do_write(s);
1577 }
1578
1579 int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1580 {
1581 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1582 unsigned char *q;
1583 int j,num;
1584 RSA *rsa;
1585 unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
1586 unsigned int u;
1587 #endif
1588 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1589 DH *dh=NULL,*dhp;
1590 #endif
1591 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1592 EC_KEY *ecdh=NULL, *ecdhp;
1593 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1594 int encodedlen = 0;
1595 int curve_id = 0;
1596 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1597 #endif
1598 EVP_PKEY *pkey;
1599 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1600 unsigned char *p,*d;
1601 int al,i;
1602 unsigned long type;
1603 int n;
1604 CERT *cert;
1605 BIGNUM *r[4];
1606 int nr[4],kn;
1607 BUF_MEM *buf;
1608 EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
1609
1610 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
1611 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A)
1612 {
1613 type=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1614 cert=s->cert;
1615
1616 buf=s->init_buf;
1617
1618 r[0]=r[1]=r[2]=r[3]=NULL;
1619 n=0;
1620 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1621 if (type & SSL_kRSA)
1622 {
1623 rsa=cert->rsa_tmp;
1624 if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL))
1625 {
1626 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s,
1627 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1628 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1629 if(rsa == NULL)
1630 {
1631 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1632 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1633 goto f_err;
1634 }
1635 RSA_up_ref(rsa);
1636 cert->rsa_tmp=rsa;
1637 }
1638 if (rsa == NULL)
1639 {
1640 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1641 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1642 goto f_err;
1643 }
1644 r[0]=rsa->n;
1645 r[1]=rsa->e;
1646 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
1647 }
1648 else
1649 #endif
1650 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1651 if (type & SSL_kDHE)
1652 {
1653 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto)
1654 {
1655 dhp = ssl_get_auto_dh(s);
1656 if (dhp == NULL)
1657 {
1658 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1659 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1660 goto f_err;
1661 }
1662 }
1663 else
1664 dhp=cert->dh_tmp;
1665 if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1666 dhp=s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s,
1667 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1668 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1669 if (dhp == NULL)
1670 {
1671 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1672 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1673 goto f_err;
1674 }
1675 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH,
1676 DH_security_bits(dhp), 0, dhp))
1677 {
1678 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1679 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
1680 goto f_err;
1681 }
1682 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
1683 {
1684 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1685 goto err;
1686 }
1687
1688 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto)
1689 dh = dhp;
1690 else if ((dh=DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL)
1691 {
1692 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1693 goto err;
1694 }
1695
1696 s->s3->tmp.dh=dh;
1697 if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL ||
1698 dhp->priv_key == NULL ||
1699 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE)))
1700 {
1701 if(!DH_generate_key(dh))
1702 {
1703 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1704 ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1705 goto err;
1706 }
1707 }
1708 else
1709 {
1710 dh->pub_key=BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
1711 dh->priv_key=BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
1712 if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) ||
1713 (dh->priv_key == NULL))
1714 {
1715 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1716 goto err;
1717 }
1718 }
1719 r[0]=dh->p;
1720 r[1]=dh->g;
1721 r[2]=dh->pub_key;
1722 }
1723 else
1724 #endif
1725 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1726 if (type & SSL_kECDHE)
1727 {
1728 const EC_GROUP *group;
1729
1730 ecdhp=cert->ecdh_tmp;
1731 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
1732 {
1733 /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
1734 int nid = tls1_shared_curve(s, -2);
1735 if (nid != NID_undef)
1736 ecdhp = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid);
1737 }
1738 else if ((ecdhp == NULL) && s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
1739 {
1740 ecdhp=s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s,
1741 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1742 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1743 }
1744 if (ecdhp == NULL)
1745 {
1746 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1747 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
1748 goto f_err;
1749 }
1750
1751 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
1752 {
1753 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1754 goto err;
1755 }
1756
1757 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
1758 if (ecdhp == NULL)
1759 {
1760 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1761 goto err;
1762 }
1763 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
1764 ecdh = ecdhp;
1765 else if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp)) == NULL)
1766 {
1767 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1768 goto err;
1769 }
1770
1771 s->s3->tmp.ecdh=ecdh;
1772 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1773 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1774 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE))
1775 {
1776 if(!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh))
1777 {
1778 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1779 goto err;
1780 }
1781 }
1782
1783 if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||
1784 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1785 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL))
1786 {
1787 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1788 goto err;
1789 }
1790
1791 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
1792 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163))
1793 {
1794 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
1795 goto err;
1796 }
1797
1798 /* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH
1799 * keys over named (not generic) curves. For
1800 * supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero.
1801 */
1802 if ((curve_id =
1803 tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)))
1804 == 0)
1805 {
1806 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
1807 goto err;
1808 }
1809
1810 /* Encode the public key.
1811 * First check the size of encoding and
1812 * allocate memory accordingly.
1813 */
1814 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1815 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1816 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1817 NULL, 0, NULL);
1818
1819 encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
1820 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen*sizeof(unsigned char));
1821 bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
1822 if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL))
1823 {
1824 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1825 goto err;
1826 }
1827
1828
1829 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1830 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1831 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1832 encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
1833
1834 if (encodedlen == 0)
1835 {
1836 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1837 goto err;
1838 }
1839
1840 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); bn_ctx=NULL;
1841
1842 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not
1843 * generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges.
1844 * In this situation, we need four additional bytes
1845 * to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
1846 * structure.
1847 */
1848 n = 4 + encodedlen;
1849
1850 /* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message
1851 * explicitly so we can set these to NULLs
1852 */
1853 r[0]=NULL;
1854 r[1]=NULL;
1855 r[2]=NULL;
1856 r[3]=NULL;
1857 }
1858 else
1859 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
1860 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1861 if (type & SSL_kPSK)
1862 {
1863 /* reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint*/
1864 n+=2+strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1865 }
1866 else
1867 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1868 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1869 if (type & SSL_kSRP)
1870 {
1871 if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
1872 (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
1873 (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) ||
1874 (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL))
1875 {
1876 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
1877 goto err;
1878 }
1879 r[0]=s->srp_ctx.N;
1880 r[1]=s->srp_ctx.g;
1881 r[2]=s->srp_ctx.s;
1882 r[3]=s->srp_ctx.B;
1883 }
1884 else
1885 #endif
1886 {
1887 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1888 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
1889 goto f_err;
1890 }
1891 for (i=0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++)
1892 {
1893 nr[i]=BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
1894 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1895 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
1896 n+=1+nr[i];
1897 else
1898 #endif
1899 n+=2+nr[i];
1900 }
1901
1902 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL|SSL_aSRP))
1903 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
1904 {
1905 if ((pkey=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s,s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,&md))
1906 == NULL)
1907 {
1908 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1909 goto f_err;
1910 }
1911 kn=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1912 }
1913 else
1914 {
1915 pkey=NULL;
1916 kn=0;
1917 }
1918
1919 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,n+SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s)+kn))
1920 {
1921 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_BUF);
1922 goto err;
1923 }
1924 d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
1925
1926 for (i=0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++)
1927 {
1928 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1929 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
1930 {
1931 *p = nr[i];
1932 p++;
1933 }
1934 else
1935 #endif
1936 s2n(nr[i],p);
1937 BN_bn2bin(r[i],p);
1938 p+=nr[i];
1939 }
1940
1941 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1942 if (type & SSL_kECDHE)
1943 {
1944 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves.
1945 * In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has:
1946 * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
1947 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by
1948 * the actual encoded point itself
1949 */
1950 *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
1951 p += 1;
1952 *p = 0;
1953 p += 1;
1954 *p = curve_id;
1955 p += 1;
1956 *p = encodedlen;
1957 p += 1;
1958 memcpy((unsigned char*)p,
1959 (unsigned char *)encodedPoint,
1960 encodedlen);
1961 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1962 encodedPoint = NULL;
1963 p += encodedlen;
1964 }
1965 #endif
1966
1967 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1968 if (type & SSL_kPSK)
1969 {
1970 /* copy PSK identity hint */
1971 s2n(strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint), p);
1972 strncpy((char *)p, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint, strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint));
1973 p+=strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1974 }
1975 #endif
1976
1977 /* not anonymous */
1978 if (pkey != NULL)
1979 {
1980 /* n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4])
1981 * and p points to the space at the end. */
1982 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1983 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
1984 {
1985 q=md_buf;
1986 j=0;
1987 for (num=2; num > 0; num--)
1988 {
1989 EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx,
1990 EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
1991 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2)
1992 ?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
1993 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1994 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1995 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,d,n);
1996 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q,
1997 (unsigned int *)&i);
1998 q+=i;
1999 j+=i;
2000 }
2001 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,
2002 &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0)
2003 {
2004 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_RSA);
2005 goto err;
2006 }
2007 s2n(u,p);
2008 n+=u+2;
2009 }
2010 else
2011 #endif
2012 if (md)
2013 {
2014 /* send signature algorithm */
2015 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2016 {
2017 if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md))
2018 {
2019 /* Should never happen */
2020 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2021 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2022 goto f_err;
2023 }
2024 p+=2;
2025 }
2026 #ifdef SSL_DEBUG
2027 fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n",
2028 EVP_MD_name(md));
2029 #endif
2030 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL);
2031 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
2032 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
2033 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,d,n);
2034 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
2035 (unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
2036 {
2037 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_EVP);
2038 goto err;
2039 }
2040 s2n(i,p);
2041 n+=i+2;
2042 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2043 n+= 2;
2044 }
2045 else
2046 {
2047 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
2048 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2049 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
2050 goto f_err;
2051 }
2052 }
2053
2054 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, n);
2055 }
2056
2057 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
2058 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
2059 return ssl_do_write(s);
2060 f_err:
2061 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2062 err:
2063 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2064 if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2065 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2066 #endif
2067 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
2068 return(-1);
2069 }
2070
2071 int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
2072 {
2073 unsigned char *p,*d;
2074 int i,j,nl,off,n;
2075 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk=NULL;
2076 X509_NAME *name;
2077 BUF_MEM *buf;
2078
2079 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A)
2080 {
2081 buf=s->init_buf;
2082
2083 d=p=ssl_handshake_start(s);
2084
2085 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
2086 p++;
2087 n=ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s,p);
2088 d[0]=n;
2089 p+=n;
2090 n++;
2091
2092 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2093 {
2094 const unsigned char *psigs;
2095 unsigned char *etmp = p;
2096 nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &psigs);
2097 /* Skip over length for now */
2098 p += 2;
2099 nl = tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, p, psigs, nl);
2100 /* Now fill in length */
2101 s2n(nl, etmp);
2102 p += nl;
2103 n += nl + 2;
2104 }
2105
2106 off=n;
2107 p+=2;
2108 n+=2;
2109
2110 sk=SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
2111 nl=0;
2112 if (sk != NULL)
2113 {
2114 for (i=0; i<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++)
2115 {
2116 name=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i);
2117 j=i2d_X509_NAME(name,NULL);
2118 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s)+n+j+2))
2119 {
2120 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
2121 goto err;
2122 }
2123 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + n;
2124 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG))
2125 {
2126 s2n(j,p);
2127 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
2128 n+=2+j;
2129 nl+=2+j;
2130 }
2131 else
2132 {
2133 d=p;
2134 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
2135 j-=2; s2n(j,d); j+=2;
2136 n+=j;
2137 nl+=j;
2138 }
2139 }
2140 }
2141 /* else no CA names */
2142 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + off;
2143 s2n(nl,p);
2144
2145 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, n);
2146
2147 #ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
2148 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
2149 {
2150 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, s->init_num + 4))
2151 {
2152 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
2153 goto err;
2154 }
2155 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num;
2156 /* do the header */
2157 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
2158 *(p++)=0;
2159 *(p++)=0;
2160 *(p++)=0;
2161 s->init_num += 4;
2162 }
2163 #endif
2164
2165 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
2166 }
2167
2168 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
2169 return ssl_do_write(s);
2170 err:
2171 return(-1);
2172 }
2173
2174 int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
2175 {
2176 int i,al,ok;
2177 long n;
2178 unsigned long alg_k;
2179 unsigned char *p;
2180 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2181 RSA *rsa=NULL;
2182 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
2183 #endif
2184 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2185 BIGNUM *pub=NULL;
2186 DH *dh_srvr, *dh_clnt = NULL;
2187 #endif
2188 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2189 KSSL_ERR kssl_err;
2190 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2191
2192 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2193 EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;
2194 EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
2195 EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
2196 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
2197 #endif
2198
2199 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2200 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
2201 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B,
2202 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2203 2048, /* ??? */
2204 &ok);
2205
2206 if (!ok) return((int)n);
2207 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2208
2209 alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2210
2211 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2212 if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
2213 {
2214 unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
2215 int decrypt_len;
2216 unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good;
2217 size_t j;
2218
2219 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
2220 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp)
2221 {
2222 if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL))
2223 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp;
2224 /* Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should
2225 * be sent already */
2226 if (rsa == NULL)
2227 {
2228 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2229 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY);
2230 goto f_err;
2231
2232 }
2233 }
2234 else
2235 {
2236 pkey=s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey;
2237 if ( (pkey == NULL) ||
2238 (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) ||
2239 (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL))
2240 {
2241 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2242 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2243 goto f_err;
2244 }
2245 rsa=pkey->pkey.rsa;
2246 }
2247
2248 /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */
2249 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
2250 {
2251 n2s(p,i);
2252 if (n != i+2)
2253 {
2254 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG))
2255 {
2256 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2257 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2258 goto f_err;
2259 }
2260 else
2261 p-=2;
2262 }
2263 else
2264 n=i;
2265 }
2266
2267 /*
2268 * Reject overly short RSA ciphertext because we want to be sure
2269 * that the buffer size makes it safe to iterate over the entire
2270 * size of a premaster secret (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). The
2271 * actual expected size is larger due to RSA padding, but the
2272 * bound is sufficient to be safe.
2273 */
2274 if (n < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2275 {
2276 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2277 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2278 goto f_err;
2279 }
2280
2281 /* We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because
2282 * of Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see
2283 * RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of
2284 * the TLS RFC and generates a random premaster secret for the
2285 * case that the decrypt fails. See
2286 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1 */
2287
2288 /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure. */
2289 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(rand_premaster_secret,
2290 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0)
2291 goto err;
2292 decrypt_len = RSA_private_decrypt((int)n,p,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
2293 ERR_clear_error();
2294
2295 /* decrypt_len should be SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH.
2296 * decrypt_good will be 0xff if so and zero otherwise. */
2297 decrypt_good = constant_time_eq_int_8(decrypt_len, SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH);
2298
2299 /* If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct
2300 * then version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero.
2301 * The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2302 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version
2303 * number check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks
2304 * are done in constant time and are treated like any other
2305 * decryption error. */
2306 version_good = constant_time_eq_8(p[0], (unsigned)(s->client_version>>8));
2307 version_good &= constant_time_eq_8(p[1], (unsigned)(s->client_version&0xff));
2308
2309 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as
2310 * the ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks
2311 * (strangely, the protocol does not offer such protection for
2312 * DH ciphersuites). However, buggy clients exist that send the
2313 * negotiated protocol version instead if the server does not
2314 * support the requested protocol version. If
2315 * SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. */
2316 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG)
2317 {
2318 unsigned char workaround_good;
2319 workaround_good = constant_time_eq_8(p[0], (unsigned)(s->version>>8));
2320 workaround_good &= constant_time_eq_8(p[1], (unsigned)(s->version&0xff));
2321 version_good |= workaround_good;
2322 }
2323
2324 /* Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good
2325 * to remain non-zero (0xff). */
2326 decrypt_good &= version_good;
2327
2328 /*
2329 * Now copy rand_premaster_secret over from p using
2330 * decrypt_good_mask. If decryption failed, then p does not
2331 * contain valid plaintext, however, a check above guarantees
2332 * it is still sufficiently large to read from.
2333 */
2334 for (j = 0; j < sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); j++)
2335 {
2336 p[j] = constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good, p[j],
2337 rand_premaster_secret[j]);
2338 }
2339
2340 s->session->master_key_length=
2341 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2342 s->session->master_key,
2343 p,sizeof(rand_premaster_secret));
2344 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,sizeof(rand_premaster_secret));
2345 }
2346 else
2347 #endif
2348 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2349 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
2350 {
2351 int idx = -1;
2352 EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL;
2353 if (n)
2354 n2s(p,i);
2355 else
2356 i = 0;
2357 if (n && n != i+2)
2358 {
2359 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG))
2360 {
2361 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2362 goto err;
2363 }
2364 else
2365 {
2366 p-=2;
2367 i=(int)n;
2368 }
2369 }
2370 if (alg_k & SSL_kDHr)
2371 idx = SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA;
2372 else if (alg_k & SSL_kDHd)
2373 idx = SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA;
2374 if (idx >= 0)
2375 {
2376 skey = s->cert->pkeys[idx].privatekey;
2377 if ((skey == NULL) ||
2378 (skey->type != EVP_PKEY_DH) ||
2379 (skey->pkey.dh == NULL))
2380 {
2381 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2382 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2383 goto f_err;
2384 }
2385 dh_srvr = skey->pkey.dh;
2386 }
2387 else if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL)
2388 {
2389 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2390 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2391 goto f_err;
2392 }
2393 else
2394 dh_srvr=s->s3->tmp.dh;
2395
2396 if (n == 0L)
2397 {
2398 /* Get pubkey from cert */
2399 EVP_PKEY *clkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2400 if (clkey)
2401 {
2402 if (EVP_PKEY_cmp_parameters(clkey, skey) == 1)
2403 dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(clkey);
2404 }
2405 if (dh_clnt == NULL)
2406 {
2407 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2408 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2409 goto f_err;
2410 }
2411 EVP_PKEY_free(clkey);
2412 pub = dh_clnt->pub_key;
2413 }
2414 else
2415 pub=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL);
2416 if (pub == NULL)
2417 {
2418 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BN_LIB);
2419 goto err;
2420 }
2421
2422 i=DH_compute_key(p,pub,dh_srvr);
2423
2424 if (i <= 0)
2425 {
2426 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
2427 BN_clear_free(pub);
2428 goto err;
2429 }
2430
2431 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
2432 s->s3->tmp.dh=NULL;
2433 if (dh_clnt)
2434 DH_free(dh_clnt);
2435 else
2436 BN_clear_free(pub);
2437 pub=NULL;
2438 s->session->master_key_length=
2439 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2440 s->session->master_key,p,i);
2441 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
2442 if (dh_clnt)
2443 return 2;
2444 }
2445 else
2446 #endif
2447 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2448 if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
2449 {
2450 krb5_error_code krb5rc;
2451 krb5_data enc_ticket;
2452 krb5_data authenticator;
2453 krb5_data enc_pms;
2454 KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
2455 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
2456 const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
2457 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
2458 unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
2459 + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
2460 int padl, outl;
2461 krb5_timestamp authtime = 0;
2462 krb5_ticket_times ttimes;
2463
2464 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
2465
2466 if (!kssl_ctx) kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
2467
2468 n2s(p,i);
2469 enc_ticket.length = i;
2470
2471 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + 6))
2472 {
2473 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2474 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2475 goto err;
2476 }
2477
2478 enc_ticket.data = (char *)p;
2479 p+=enc_ticket.length;
2480
2481 n2s(p,i);
2482 authenticator.length = i;
2483
2484 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 6))
2485 {
2486 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2487 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2488 goto err;
2489 }
2490
2491 authenticator.data = (char *)p;
2492 p+=authenticator.length;
2493
2494 n2s(p,i);
2495 enc_pms.length = i;
2496 enc_pms.data = (char *)p;
2497 p+=enc_pms.length;
2498
2499 /* Note that the length is checked again below,
2500 ** after decryption
2501 */
2502 if(enc_pms.length > sizeof pms)
2503 {
2504 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2505 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2506 goto err;
2507 }
2508
2509 if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length +
2510 enc_pms.length + 6))
2511 {
2512 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2513 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2514 goto err;
2515 }
2516
2517 if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes,
2518 &kssl_err)) != 0)
2519 {
2520 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
2521 fprintf(stderr,"kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
2522 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2523 if (kssl_err.text)
2524 fprintf(stderr,"kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2525 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2526 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2527 kssl_err.reason);
2528 goto err;
2529 }
2530
2531 /* Note: no authenticator is not considered an error,
2532 ** but will return authtime == 0.
2533 */
2534 if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator,
2535 &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0)
2536 {
2537 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
2538 fprintf(stderr,"kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
2539 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2540 if (kssl_err.text)
2541 fprintf(stderr,"kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2542 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2543 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2544 kssl_err.reason);
2545 goto err;
2546 }
2547
2548 if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0)
2549 {
2550 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc);
2551 goto err;
2552 }
2553
2554 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
2555 kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
2556 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2557
2558 enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
2559 if (enc == NULL)
2560 goto err;
2561
2562 memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
2563
2564 if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc,NULL,kssl_ctx->key,iv))
2565 {
2566 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2567 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2568 goto err;
2569 }
2570 if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms,&outl,
2571 (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length))
2572 {
2573 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2574 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2575 goto err;
2576 }
2577 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2578 {
2579 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2580 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2581 goto err;
2582 }
2583 if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx,&(pms[outl]),&padl))
2584 {
2585 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2586 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2587 goto err;
2588 }
2589 outl += padl;
2590 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2591 {
2592 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2593 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2594 goto err;
2595 }
2596 if (!((pms[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (pms[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
2597 {
2598 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2599 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2600 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2601 * However, buggy clients exist that send random bytes instead of
2602 * the protocol version.
2603 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients.
2604 * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos cipher)
2605 */
2606 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG))
2607 {
2608 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2609 SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2610 goto err;
2611 }
2612 }
2613
2614 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
2615
2616 s->session->master_key_length=
2617 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2618 s->session->master_key, pms, outl);
2619
2620 if (kssl_ctx->client_princ)
2621 {
2622 size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
2623 if ( len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH )
2624 {
2625 s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len;
2626 memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ,kssl_ctx->client_princ,len);
2627 }
2628 }
2629
2630
2631 /*- Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
2632 * but it caused problems for apache.
2633 * kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
2634 * if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
2635 */
2636 }
2637 else
2638 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2639
2640 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2641 if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
2642 {
2643 int ret = 1;
2644 int field_size = 0;
2645 const EC_KEY *tkey;
2646 const EC_GROUP *group;
2647 const BIGNUM *priv_key;
2648
2649 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
2650 if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL)
2651 {
2652 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2653 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2654 goto err;
2655 }
2656
2657 /* Let's get server private key and group information */
2658 if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
2659 {
2660 /* use the certificate */
2661 tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec;
2662 }
2663 else
2664 {
2665 /* use the ephermeral values we saved when
2666 * generating the ServerKeyExchange msg.
2667 */
2668 tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh;
2669 }
2670
2671 group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
2672 priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
2673
2674 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) ||
2675 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key))
2676 {
2677 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2678 ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2679 goto err;
2680 }
2681
2682 /* Let's get client's public key */
2683 if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL)
2684 {
2685 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2686 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2687 goto err;
2688 }
2689
2690 if (n == 0L)
2691 {
2692 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
2693
2694 if (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE)
2695 {
2696 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2697 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
2698 goto f_err;
2699 }
2700 if (((clnt_pub_pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer))
2701 == NULL) ||
2702 (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC))
2703 {
2704 /* XXX: For now, we do not support client
2705 * authentication using ECDH certificates
2706 * so this branch (n == 0L) of the code is
2707 * never executed. When that support is
2708 * added, we ought to ensure the key
2709 * received in the certificate is
2710 * authorized for key agreement.
2711 * ECDH_compute_key implicitly checks that
2712 * the two ECDH shares are for the same
2713 * group.
2714 */
2715 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2716 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2717 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS);
2718 goto f_err;
2719 }
2720
2721 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,
2722 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->pkey.ec)) == 0)
2723 {
2724 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2725 ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2726 goto err;
2727 }
2728 ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
2729 }
2730 else
2731 {
2732 /* Get client's public key from encoded point
2733 * in the ClientKeyExchange message.
2734 */
2735 if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
2736 {
2737 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2738 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2739 goto err;
2740 }
2741
2742 /* Get encoded point length */
2743 i = *p;
2744 p += 1;
2745 if (n != 1 + i)
2746 {
2747 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2748 ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2749 goto err;
2750 }
2751 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group,
2752 clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0)
2753 {
2754 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2755 ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2756 goto err;
2757 }
2758 /* p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer
2759 * currently, so set it to the start
2760 */
2761 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2762 }
2763
2764 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
2765 field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
2766 if (field_size <= 0)
2767 {
2768 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2769 ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
2770 goto err;
2771 }
2772 i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size+7)/8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh, NULL);
2773 if (i <= 0)
2774 {
2775 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2776 ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
2777 goto err;
2778 }
2779
2780 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2781 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2782 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2783 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2784 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
2785 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
2786
2787 /* Compute the master secret */
2788 s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc-> \
2789 generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, p, i);
2790
2791 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
2792 return (ret);
2793 }
2794 else
2795 #endif
2796 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2797 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK)
2798 {
2799 unsigned char *t = NULL;
2800 unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN*2+4];
2801 unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0;
2802 int psk_err = 1;
2803 char tmp_id[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1];
2804
2805 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2806
2807 n2s(p,i);
2808 if (n != i+2)
2809 {
2810 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2811 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2812 goto psk_err;
2813 }
2814 if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN)
2815 {
2816 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2817 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2818 goto psk_err;
2819 }
2820 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL)
2821 {
2822 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2823 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
2824 goto psk_err;
2825 }
2826
2827 /* Create guaranteed NULL-terminated identity
2828 * string for the callback */
2829 memcpy(tmp_id, p, i);
2830 memset(tmp_id+i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1-i);
2831 psk_len = s->psk_server_callback(s, tmp_id,
2832 psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2833 OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_id, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1);
2834
2835 if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN)
2836 {
2837 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2838 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2839 goto psk_err;
2840 }
2841 else if (psk_len == 0)
2842 {
2843 /* PSK related to the given identity not found */
2844 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2845 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2846 al=SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
2847 goto psk_err;
2848 }
2849
2850 /* create PSK pre_master_secret */
2851 pre_ms_len=2+psk_len+2+psk_len;
2852 t = psk_or_pre_ms;
2853 memmove(psk_or_pre_ms+psk_len+4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len);
2854 s2n(psk_len, t);
2855 memset(t, 0, psk_len);
2856 t+=psk_len;
2857 s2n(psk_len, t);
2858
2859 if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL)
2860 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2861 s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup((char *)p);
2862 if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL)
2863 {
2864 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2865 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2866 goto psk_err;
2867 }
2868
2869 if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
2870 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
2871 s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
2872 if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL &&
2873 s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
2874 {
2875 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2876 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2877 goto psk_err;
2878 }
2879
2880 s->session->master_key_length=
2881 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2882 s->session->master_key, psk_or_pre_ms, pre_ms_len);
2883 psk_err = 0;
2884 psk_err:
2885 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2886 if (psk_err != 0)
2887 goto f_err;
2888 }
2889 else
2890 #endif
2891 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2892 if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
2893 {
2894 int param_len;
2895
2896 n2s(p,i);
2897 param_len=i+2;
2898 if (param_len > n)
2899 {
2900 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2901 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
2902 goto f_err;
2903 }
2904 if (!(s->srp_ctx.A=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
2905 {
2906 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2907 goto err;
2908 }
2909 if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0
2910 || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A))
2911 {
2912 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2913 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
2914 goto f_err;
2915 }
2916 if (s->session->srp_username != NULL)
2917 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
2918 s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
2919 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL)
2920 {
2921 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2922 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2923 goto err;
2924 }
2925
2926 if ((s->session->master_key_length = SRP_generate_server_master_secret(s,s->session->master_key))<0)
2927 {
2928 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2929 goto err;
2930 }
2931
2932 p+=i;
2933 }
2934 else
2935 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
2936 if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST)
2937 {
2938 int ret = 0;
2939 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
2940 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
2941 unsigned char premaster_secret[32], *start;
2942 size_t outlen=32, inlen;
2943 unsigned long alg_a;
2944 int Ttag, Tclass;
2945 long Tlen;
2946
2947 /* Get our certificate private key*/
2948 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2949 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST94)
2950 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST94].privatekey;
2951 else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01)
2952 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
2953
2954 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk,NULL);
2955 EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx);
2956 /* If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
2957 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
2958 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use
2959 * a client certificate for authorization only. */
2960 client_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2961 if (client_pub_pkey)
2962 {
2963 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
2964 ERR_clear_error();
2965 }
2966 /* Decrypt session key */
2967 if (ASN1_get_object((const unsigned char **)&p, &Tlen, &Ttag, &Tclass, n) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED ||
2968 Ttag != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE ||
2969 Tclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL)
2970 {
2971 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2972 goto gerr;
2973 }
2974 start = p;
2975 inlen = Tlen;
2976 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx,premaster_secret,&outlen,start,inlen) <=0)
2977
2978 {
2979 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2980 goto gerr;
2981 }
2982 /* Generate master secret */
2983 s->session->master_key_length=
2984 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2985 s->session->master_key,premaster_secret,32);
2986 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2987 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
2988 ret = 2;
2989 else
2990 ret = 1;
2991 gerr:
2992 EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey);
2993 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2994 if (ret)
2995 return ret;
2996 else
2997 goto err;
2998 }
2999 else
3000 {
3001 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3002 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
3003 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
3004 goto f_err;
3005 }
3006
3007 return(1);
3008 f_err:
3009 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3010 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_SRP)
3011 err:
3012 #endif
3013 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
3014 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
3015 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
3016 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
3017 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
3018 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
3019 #endif
3020 return(-1);
3021 }
3022
3023 int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
3024 {
3025 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
3026 unsigned char *p;
3027 int al,ok,ret=0;
3028 long n;
3029 int type=0,i,j;
3030 X509 *peer;
3031 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
3032 EVP_MD_CTX mctx;
3033 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx);
3034
3035 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3036 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
3037 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,
3038 -1,
3039 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
3040 &ok);
3041
3042 if (!ok) return((int)n);
3043
3044 if (s->session->peer != NULL)
3045 {
3046 peer=s->session->peer;
3047 pkey=X509_get_pubkey(peer);
3048 type=X509_certificate_type(peer,pkey);
3049 }
3050 else
3051 {
3052 peer=NULL;
3053 pkey=NULL;
3054 }
3055
3056 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY)
3057 {
3058 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
3059 if ((peer != NULL) && (type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
3060 {
3061 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3062 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE);
3063 goto f_err;
3064 }
3065 ret=1;
3066 goto end;
3067 }
3068
3069 if (peer == NULL)
3070 {
3071 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED);
3072 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3073 goto f_err;
3074 }
3075
3076 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
3077 {
3078 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
3079 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3080 goto f_err;
3081 }
3082
3083 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
3084 {
3085 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
3086 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3087 goto f_err;
3088 }
3089
3090 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
3091 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3092 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
3093 /* If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare
3094 * signature without length field */
3095 if (n==64 && (pkey->type==NID_id_GostR3410_94 ||
3096 pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) )
3097 {
3098 i=64;
3099 }
3100 else
3101 {
3102 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3103 {
3104 int rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, p, pkey);
3105 if (rv == -1)
3106 {
3107 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3108 goto f_err;
3109 }
3110 else if (rv == 0)
3111 {
3112 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3113 goto f_err;
3114 }
3115 #ifdef SSL_DEBUG
3116 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
3117 #endif
3118 p += 2;
3119 n -= 2;
3120 }
3121 n2s(p,i);
3122 n-=2;
3123 if (i > n)
3124 {
3125 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3126 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3127 goto f_err;
3128 }
3129 }
3130 j=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
3131 if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0))
3132 {
3133 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
3134 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3135 goto f_err;
3136 }
3137
3138 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3139 {
3140 long hdatalen = 0;
3141 void *hdata;
3142 hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
3143 if (hdatalen <= 0)
3144 {
3145 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3146 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3147 goto f_err;
3148 }
3149 #ifdef SSL_DEBUG
3150 fprintf(stderr, "Using TLS 1.2 with client verify alg %s\n",
3151 EVP_MD_name(md));
3152 #endif
3153 if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL)
3154 || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen))
3155 {
3156 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
3157 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3158 goto f_err;
3159 }
3160
3161 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&mctx, p , i, pkey) <= 0)
3162 {
3163 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3164 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
3165 goto f_err;
3166 }
3167 }
3168 else
3169 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3170 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
3171 {
3172 i=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
3173 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i,
3174 pkey->pkey.rsa);
3175 if (i < 0)
3176 {
3177 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3178 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
3179 goto f_err;
3180 }
3181 if (i == 0)
3182 {
3183 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3184 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE);
3185 goto f_err;
3186 }
3187 }
3188 else
3189 #endif
3190 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3191 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
3192 {
3193 j=DSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
3194 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3195 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.dsa);
3196 if (j <= 0)
3197 {
3198 /* bad signature */
3199 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3200 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE);
3201 goto f_err;
3202 }
3203 }
3204 else
3205 #endif
3206 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3207 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
3208 {
3209 j=ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
3210 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3211 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.ec);
3212 if (j <= 0)
3213 {
3214 /* bad signature */
3215 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3216 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
3217 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
3218 goto f_err;
3219 }
3220 }
3221 else
3222 #endif
3223 if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001)
3224 { unsigned char signature[64];
3225 int idx;
3226 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey,NULL);
3227 EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx);
3228 if (i!=64) {
3229 fprintf(stderr,"GOST signature length is %d",i);
3230 }
3231 for (idx=0;idx<64;idx++) {
3232 signature[63-idx]=p[idx];
3233 }
3234 j=EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx,signature,64,s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,32);
3235 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
3236 if (j<=0)
3237 {
3238 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3239 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
3240 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
3241 goto f_err;
3242 }
3243 }
3244 else
3245 {
3246 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3247 al=SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
3248 goto f_err;
3249 }
3250
3251
3252 ret=1;
3253 if (0)
3254 {
3255 f_err:
3256 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3257 }
3258 end:
3259 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
3260 {
3261 BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
3262 s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
3263 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
3264 }
3265 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
3266 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3267 return(ret);
3268 }
3269
3270 int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
3271 {
3272 int i,ok,al,ret= -1;
3273 X509 *x=NULL;
3274 unsigned long l,nc,llen,n;
3275 const unsigned char *p,*q;
3276 unsigned char *d;
3277 STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL;
3278
3279 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3280 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A,
3281 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B,
3282 -1,
3283 s->max_cert_list,
3284 &ok);
3285
3286 if (!ok) return((int)n);
3287
3288 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE)
3289 {
3290 if ( (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3291 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
3292 {
3293 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3294 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3295 goto f_err;
3296 }
3297 /* If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list */
3298 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
3299 {
3300 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST);
3301 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3302 goto f_err;
3303 }
3304 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
3305 return(1);
3306 }
3307
3308 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE)
3309 {
3310 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3311 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
3312 goto f_err;
3313 }
3314 p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3315
3316 if ((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)
3317 {
3318 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3319 goto err;
3320 }
3321
3322 n2l3(p,llen);
3323 if (llen+3 != n)
3324 {
3325 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3326 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3327 goto f_err;
3328 }
3329 for (nc=0; nc<llen; )
3330 {
3331 n2l3(p,l);
3332 if ((l+nc+3) > llen)
3333 {
3334 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3335 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3336 goto f_err;
3337 }
3338
3339 q=p;
3340 x=d2i_X509(NULL,&p,l);
3341 if (x == NULL)
3342 {
3343 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
3344 goto err;
3345 }
3346 if (p != (q+l))
3347 {
3348 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3349 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3350 goto f_err;
3351 }
3352 if (!sk_X509_push(sk,x))
3353 {
3354 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3355 goto err;
3356 }
3357 x=NULL;
3358 nc+=l+3;
3359 }
3360
3361 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0)
3362 {
3363 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3364 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
3365 {
3366 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3367 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
3368 goto f_err;
3369 }
3370 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3371 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3372 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
3373 {
3374 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3375 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3376 goto f_err;
3377 }
3378 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
3379 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
3380 {
3381 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3382 goto f_err;
3383 }
3384 }
3385 else
3386 {
3387 EVP_PKEY *pkey;
3388 i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk);
3389 if (i <= 0)
3390 {
3391 al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
3392 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
3393 goto f_err;
3394 }
3395 if (i > 1)
3396 {
3397 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, i);
3398 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3399 goto f_err;
3400 }
3401 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(sk, 0));
3402 if (pkey == NULL)
3403 {
3404 al=SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3405 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3406 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
3407 goto f_err;
3408 }
3409 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3410 }
3411
3412 if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */
3413 X509_free(s->session->peer);
3414 s->session->peer=sk_X509_shift(sk);
3415 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
3416
3417 /* With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL
3418 * when we arrive here. */
3419 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
3420 {
3421 s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
3422 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
3423 {
3424 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3425 goto err;
3426 }
3427 }
3428 if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL)
3429 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free);
3430 s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain=sk;
3431 /* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the
3432 * peer's own certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c */
3433
3434 sk=NULL;
3435
3436 ret=1;
3437 if (0)
3438 {
3439 f_err:
3440 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3441 }
3442 err:
3443 if (x != NULL) X509_free(x);
3444 if (sk != NULL) sk_X509_pop_free(sk,X509_free);
3445 return(ret);
3446 }
3447
3448 int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
3449 {
3450 CERT_PKEY *cpk;
3451
3452 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A)
3453 {
3454 cpk=ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
3455 if (cpk == NULL)
3456 {
3457 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
3458 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aKRB5) ||
3459 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5))
3460 {
3461 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3462 return(0);
3463 }
3464 }
3465
3466 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,cpk))
3467 {
3468 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3469 return(0);
3470 }
3471 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
3472 }
3473
3474 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
3475 return ssl_do_write(s);
3476 }
3477
3478 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
3479 /* send a new session ticket (not necessarily for a new session) */
3480 int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
3481 {
3482 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A)
3483 {
3484 unsigned char *p, *senc, *macstart;
3485 const unsigned char *const_p;
3486 int len, slen_full, slen;
3487 SSL_SESSION *sess;
3488 unsigned int hlen;
3489 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
3490 HMAC_CTX hctx;
3491 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3492 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
3493 unsigned char key_name[16];
3494
3495 /* get session encoding length */
3496 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
3497 /* Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is
3498 * too long
3499 */
3500 if (slen_full > 0xFF00)
3501 return -1;
3502 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
3503 if (!senc)
3504 return -1;
3505 p = senc;
3506 i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p);
3507
3508 /* create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up */
3509 const_p = senc;
3510 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
3511 if (sess == NULL)
3512 {
3513 OPENSSL_free(senc);
3514 return -1;
3515 }
3516 sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
3517
3518 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
3519 if (slen > slen_full) /* shouldn't ever happen */
3520 {
3521 OPENSSL_free(senc);
3522 return -1;
3523 }
3524 p = senc;
3525 i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p);
3526 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3527
3528 /*-
3529 * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3530 * follows handshake_header_length +
3531 * 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
3532 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
3533 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
3534 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
3535 */
3536 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
3537 SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + 22 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH +
3538 EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
3539 return -1;
3540 p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
3541 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3542 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3543 /* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present
3544 * it does all the work otherwise use generated values
3545 * from parent ctx.
3546 */
3547 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
3548 {
3549 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx,
3550 &hctx, 1) < 0)
3551 {
3552 OPENSSL_free(senc);
3553 return -1;
3554 }
3555 }
3556 else
3557 {
3558 RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, 16);
3559 EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3560 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv);
3561 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3562 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
3563 memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
3564 }
3565
3566 /* Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only):
3567 * We leave this unspecified for resumed session (for simplicity),
3568 * and guess that tickets for new sessions will live as long
3569 * as their sessions. */
3570 l2n(s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout, p);
3571
3572 /* Skip ticket length for now */
3573 p += 2;
3574 /* Output key name */
3575 macstart = p;
3576 memcpy(p, key_name, 16);
3577 p += 16;
3578 /* output IV */
3579 memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx));
3580 p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3581 /* Encrypt session data */
3582 EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen);
3583 p += len;
3584 EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len);
3585 p += len;
3586 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3587
3588 HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart);
3589 HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen);
3590 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3591
3592 p += hlen;
3593 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
3594 /* Total length */
3595 len = p - ssl_handshake_start(s);
3596 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, len);
3597 /* Skip ticket lifetime hint */
3598 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + 4;
3599 s2n(len - 6, p);
3600 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
3601 OPENSSL_free(senc);
3602 }
3603
3604 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
3605 return ssl_do_write(s);
3606 }
3607
3608 int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s)
3609 {
3610 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A)
3611 {
3612 unsigned char *p;
3613 /*-
3614 * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3615 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
3616 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
3617 * + (ocsp response)
3618 */
3619 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen))
3620 return -1;
3621
3622 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3623
3624 /* do the header */
3625 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
3626 /* message length */
3627 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p);
3628 /* status type */
3629 *(p++)= s->tlsext_status_type;
3630 /* length of OCSP response */
3631 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p);
3632 /* actual response */
3633 memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen);
3634 /* number of bytes to write */
3635 s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen;
3636 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B;
3637 s->init_off = 0;
3638 }
3639
3640 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
3641 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3642 }
3643
3644 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3645 /* ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message. It
3646 * sets the next_proto member in s if found */
3647 int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s)
3648 {
3649 int ok;
3650 int proto_len, padding_len;
3651 long n;
3652 const unsigned char *p;
3653
3654 /* Clients cannot send a NextProtocol message if we didn't see the
3655 * extension in their ClientHello */
3656 if (!s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
3657 {
3658 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION);
3659 return -1;
3660 }
3661
3662 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3663 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A,
3664 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B,
3665 SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO,
3666 514, /* See the payload format below */
3667 &ok);
3668
3669 if (!ok)
3670 return((int)n);
3671
3672 /* s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received
3673 * in this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset
3674 * by ssl3_get_finished). */
3675 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
3676 {
3677 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS);
3678 return -1;
3679 }
3680
3681 if (n < 2)
3682 return 0; /* The body must be > 1 bytes long */
3683
3684 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3685
3686 /*-
3687 * The payload looks like:
3688 * uint8 proto_len;
3689 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
3690 * uint8 padding_len;
3691 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
3692 */
3693 proto_len = p[0];
3694 if (proto_len + 2 > s->init_num)
3695 return 0;
3696 padding_len = p[proto_len + 1];
3697 if (proto_len + padding_len + 2 != s->init_num)
3698 return 0;
3699
3700 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(proto_len);
3701 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
3702 {
3703 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3704 return 0;
3705 }
3706 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, p + 1, proto_len);
3707 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = proto_len;
3708
3709 return 1;
3710 }
3711 # endif
3712
3713 #endif
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