]> git.ipfire.org Git - thirdparty/openssl.git/blob - ssl/s3_srvr.c
projects / thirdparty / openssl.git / blob
? search:
summary | shortlog | log | commit | commitdiff | tree
blame | history | raw | HEAD
(EC)DH memory handling fixes.
[thirdparty/openssl.git] / ssl / s3_srvr.c
1 /* ssl/s3_srvr.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
3 * All rights reserved.
4 *
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8 *
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15 *
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22 *
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25 * are met:
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40 *
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
51 * SUCH DAMAGE.
52 *
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
57 */
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
60 *
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
63 * are met:
64 *
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
67 *
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
71 * distribution.
72 *
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
77 *
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
82 *
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
86 *
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
88 * acknowledgment:
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
91 *
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
105 *
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
109 *
110 */
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
113 *
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
116 *
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
119 *
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
122 *
123 */
124 /* ====================================================================
125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
126 *
127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
129 * license.
130 *
131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
134 *
135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
138 *
139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
142 * to make use of the Contribution.
143 *
144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
148 * OTHERWISE.
149 */
150
151 #define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
152 #define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
153
154 #include <stdio.h>
155 #include <openssl/crypto.h>
156 #include "ssl_locl.h"
157 #include "kssl_lcl.h"
158 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
159 #include <openssl/rand.h>
160 #include <openssl/objects.h>
161 #include <openssl/evp.h>
162 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
163 #include <openssl/x509.h>
164 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
165 #include <openssl/dh.h>
166 #endif
167 #include <openssl/bn.h>
168 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
169 #include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
170 #endif
171 #include <openssl/md5.h>
172
173 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver);
174
175 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)
176 {
177 if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
178 return(SSLv3_server_method());
179 else
180 return(NULL);
181 }
182
183 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
184 static int SSL_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s,int *ad)
185 {
186 int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE;
187
188 *ad = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
189
190 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
191 (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL))
192 {
193 if(s->srp_ctx.login == NULL)
194 {
195 /* There isn't any srp login extension !!! */
196 ret = SSL3_AL_WARNING;
197 *ad = SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME;
198 }
199 else
200 {
201 ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s,ad);
202 }
203 }
204 return ret;
205 }
206 #endif
207
208 IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method,
209 ssl3_accept,
210 ssl_undefined_function,
211 ssl3_get_server_method)
212
213 int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
214 {
215 BUF_MEM *buf;
216 unsigned long alg_k,Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
217 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
218 int ret= -1;
219 int new_state,state,skip=0;
220 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
221 int srp_no_username =0;
222 #endif
223
224 RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0);
225 ERR_clear_error();
226 clear_sys_error();
227
228 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
229 cb=s->info_callback;
230 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
231 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
232
233 /* init things to blank */
234 s->in_handshake++;
235 if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s);
236
237 if (s->cert == NULL)
238 {
239 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
240 return(-1);
241 }
242
243 for (;;)
244 {
245 state=s->state;
246
247 switch (s->state)
248 {
249 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
250 s->renegotiate=1;
251 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
252
253 case SSL_ST_BEFORE:
254 case SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
255 case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
256 case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
257
258 s->server=1;
259 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1);
260
261 if ((s->version>>8) != 3)
262 {
263 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
264 return -1;
265 }
266 s->type=SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
267
268 if (s->init_buf == NULL)
269 {
270 if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)
271 {
272 ret= -1;
273 goto end;
274 }
275 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH))
276 {
277 ret= -1;
278 goto end;
279 }
280 s->init_buf=buf;
281 }
282
283 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
284 {
285 ret= -1;
286 goto end;
287 }
288
289 s->init_num=0;
290
291 if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE)
292 {
293 /* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that
294 * the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
295 */
296 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) { ret= -1; goto end; }
297
298 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
299 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
300 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
301 }
302 else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
303 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
304 {
305 /* Server attempting to renegotiate with
306 * client that doesn't support secure
307 * renegotiation.
308 */
309 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
310 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
311 ret = -1;
312 goto end;
313 }
314 else
315 {
316 /* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE,
317 * we will just send a HelloRequest */
318 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
319 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
320 }
321 break;
322
323 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
324 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
325
326 s->shutdown=0;
327 ret=ssl3_send_hello_request(s);
328 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
329 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
330 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
331 s->init_num=0;
332
333 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
334 break;
335
336 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
337 s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
338 break;
339
340 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
341 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
342 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
343 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
344 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_SRP_USERNAME:
345 #endif
346
347 s->shutdown=0;
348 ret=ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
349 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
350 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
351 {
352 int extension_error = 0,al;
353
354 if ((al = SSL_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s,&extension_error)) != SSL_ERROR_NONE)
355 {
356 ssl3_send_alert(s,al,extension_error);
357 if (extension_error == SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME)
358 {
359 if (srp_no_username) goto end;
360 ERR_clear_error();
361 srp_no_username = 1;
362 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_SRP_USERNAME;
363 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1);
364 if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0) goto end;
365 s->init_num=0;
366 break;
367 }
368 ret = -1;
369 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
370 goto end;
371 }
372 }
373 #endif
374
375 s->renegotiate = 2;
376 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
377 s->init_num=0;
378 break;
379
380 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
381 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
382 ret=ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
383 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
384 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
385 if (s->hit)
386 {
387 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
388 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
389 else
390 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
391 }
392 #else
393 if (s->hit)
394 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
395 #endif
396 else
397 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
398 s->init_num=0;
399 break;
400
401 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
402 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
403 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
404 /* normal PSK or KRB5 or SRP */
405 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
406 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)
407 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5))
408 {
409 ret=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
410 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
411 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
412 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
413 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
414 else
415 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
416 }
417 else
418 {
419 skip = 1;
420 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
421 }
422 #else
423 }
424 else
425 skip=1;
426
427 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
428 #endif
429 s->init_num=0;
430 break;
431
432 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
433 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
434 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
435
436 /* clear this, it may get reset by
437 * send_server_key_exchange */
438 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA)
439 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
440 && !(alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
441 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
442 )
443 /* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key
444 * even when forbidden by protocol specs
445 * (handshake may fail as clients are not required to
446 * be able to handle this) */
447 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
448 else
449 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0;
450
451
452 /* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or
453 * RSA but we have a sign only certificate
454 *
455 * PSK: may send PSK identity hints
456 *
457 * For ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange
458 * message only if the cipher suite is either
459 * ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, the
460 * server certificate contains the server's
461 * public key for key exchange.
462 */
463 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp
464 /* PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity
465 * hint if provided */
466 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
467 || ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
468 #endif
469 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
470 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
471 || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
472 #endif
473 || (alg_k & (SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd|SSL_kEDH))
474 || (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
475 || ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
476 && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
477 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
478 && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
479 )
480 )
481 )
482 )
483 {
484 ret=ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);
485 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
486 }
487 else
488 skip=1;
489
490 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
491 s->init_num=0;
492 break;
493
494 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
495 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
496 if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
497 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
498 /* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set,
499 * don't request cert during re-negotiation: */
500 ((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
501 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
502 /* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites
503 * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts
504 * and in RFC 2246): */
505 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) &&
506 /* ... except when the application insists on verification
507 * (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */
508 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
509 /* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */
510 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5)
511 /* With normal PSK Certificates and
512 * Certificate Requests are omitted */
513 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
514 {
515 /* no cert request */
516 skip=1;
517 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=0;
518 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
519 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
520 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
521 return -1;
522 }
523 else
524 {
525 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=1;
526 ret=ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
527 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
528 #ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
529 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
530 #else
531 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
532 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
533 #endif
534 s->init_num=0;
535 }
536 break;
537
538 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
539 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
540 ret=ssl3_send_server_done(s);
541 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
542 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
543 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
544 s->init_num=0;
545 break;
546
547 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
548
549 /* This code originally checked to see if
550 * any data was pending using BIO_CTRL_INFO
551 * and then flushed. This caused problems
552 * as documented in PR#1939. The proposed
553 * fix doesn't completely resolve this issue
554 * as buggy implementations of BIO_CTRL_PENDING
555 * still exist. So instead we just flush
556 * unconditionally.
557 */
558
559 s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
560 if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0)
561 {
562 ret= -1;
563 goto end;
564 }
565 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
566
567 s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state;
568 break;
569
570 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
571 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
572 /* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */
573 ret = ssl3_check_client_hello(s);
574 if (ret <= 0)
575 goto end;
576 if (ret == 2)
577 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C;
578 else {
579 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
580 {
581 ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
582 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
583 }
584 s->init_num=0;
585 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
586 }
587 break;
588
589 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
590 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
591 ret=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
592 if (ret <= 0)
593 goto end;
594 if (ret == 2)
595 {
596 /* For the ECDH ciphersuites when
597 * the client sends its ECDH pub key in
598 * a certificate, the CertificateVerify
599 * message is not sent.
600 * Also for GOST ciphersuites when
601 * the client uses its key from the certificate
602 * for key exchange.
603 */
604 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
605 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
606 #else
607 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
608 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
609 else
610 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
611 #endif
612 s->init_num = 0;
613 }
614 else if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
615 {
616 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
617 s->init_num=0;
618 if (!s->session->peer)
619 break;
620 /* For TLS v1.2 freeze the handshake buffer
621 * at this point and digest cached records.
622 */
623 if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer)
624 {
625 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
626 return -1;
627 }
628 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
629 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
630 return -1;
631 }
632 else
633 {
634 int offset=0;
635 int dgst_num;
636
637 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
638 s->init_num=0;
639
640 /* We need to get hashes here so if there is
641 * a client cert, it can be verified
642 * FIXME - digest processing for CertificateVerify
643 * should be generalized. But it is next step
644 */
645 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
646 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
647 return -1;
648 for (dgst_num=0; dgst_num<SSL_MAX_DIGEST;dgst_num++)
649 if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num])
650 {
651 int dgst_size;
652
653 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,EVP_MD_CTX_type(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]),&(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[offset]));
654 dgst_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]);
655 if (dgst_size < 0)
656 {
657 ret = -1;
658 goto end;
659 }
660 offset+=dgst_size;
661 }
662 }
663 break;
664
665 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
666 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
667
668 /* we should decide if we expected this one */
669 ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
670 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
671
672 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
673 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
674 #else
675 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
676 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
677 else
678 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
679 #endif
680 s->init_num=0;
681 break;
682
683 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
684 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A:
685 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B:
686 ret=ssl3_get_next_proto(s);
687 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
688 s->init_num = 0;
689 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
690 break;
691 #endif
692
693 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
694 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
695 ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
696 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
697 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
698 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
699 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
700 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
701 else if (s->hit)
702 s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
703 #else
704 if (s->hit)
705 s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
706 #endif
707 else
708 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
709 s->init_num=0;
710 break;
711
712 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
713 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
714 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
715 ret=ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s);
716 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
717 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
718 s->init_num=0;
719 break;
720
721 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A:
722 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B:
723 ret=ssl3_send_cert_status(s);
724 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
725 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
726 s->init_num=0;
727 break;
728
729 #endif
730
731 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
732 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
733
734 s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
735 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
736 { ret= -1; goto end; }
737
738 ret=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
739 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
740
741 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
742 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
743 s->init_num=0;
744
745 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
746 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
747 {
748 ret= -1;
749 goto end;
750 }
751
752 break;
753
754 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
755 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
756 ret=ssl3_send_finished(s,
757 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
758 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
759 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
760 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
761 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
762 if (s->hit)
763 {
764 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
765 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
766 #else
767 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
768 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
769 else
770 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
771 #endif
772 }
773 else
774 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK;
775 s->init_num=0;
776 break;
777
778 case SSL_ST_OK:
779 /* clean a few things up */
780 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
781
782 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
783 s->init_buf=NULL;
784
785 /* remove buffering on output */
786 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
787
788 s->init_num=0;
789
790 if (s->renegotiate == 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
791 {
792 /* actually not necessarily a 'new' session unless
793 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is set */
794
795 s->renegotiate=0;
796 s->new_session=0;
797
798 ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
799
800 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
801 /* s->server=1; */
802 s->handshake_func=ssl3_accept;
803
804 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1);
805 }
806
807 ret = 1;
808 goto end;
809 /* break; */
810
811 default:
812 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
813 ret= -1;
814 goto end;
815 /* break; */
816 }
817
818 if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip)
819 {
820 if (s->debug)
821 {
822 if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
823 goto end;
824 }
825
826
827 if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state))
828 {
829 new_state=s->state;
830 s->state=state;
831 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP,1);
832 s->state=new_state;
833 }
834 }
835 skip=0;
836 }
837 end:
838 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
839
840 s->in_handshake--;
841 if (cb != NULL)
842 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT,ret);
843 return(ret);
844 }
845
846 int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
847 {
848 unsigned char *p;
849
850 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A)
851 {
852 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
853 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST;
854 *(p++)=0;
855 *(p++)=0;
856 *(p++)=0;
857
858 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
859 /* number of bytes to write */
860 s->init_num=4;
861 s->init_off=0;
862 }
863
864 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
865 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
866 }
867
868 int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s)
869 {
870 int ok;
871 long n;
872
873 /* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message,
874 * so permit appropriate message length */
875 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
876 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A,
877 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B,
878 -1,
879 s->max_cert_list,
880 &ok);
881 if (!ok) return((int)n);
882 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
883 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)
884 {
885 /* Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake,
886 * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.) */
887 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
888 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
889 {
890 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
891 s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
892 }
893 #endif
894 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
895 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
896 {
897 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
898 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
899 }
900 #endif
901 return 2;
902 }
903 return 1;
904 }
905
906 int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
907 {
908 int i,j,ok,al,ret= -1;
909 unsigned int cookie_len;
910 long n;
911 unsigned long id;
912 unsigned char *p,*d,*q;
913 SSL_CIPHER *c;
914 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
915 SSL_COMP *comp=NULL;
916 #endif
917 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers=NULL;
918
919 /* We do this so that we will respond with our native type.
920 * If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1,
921 * This down switching should be handled by a different method.
922 * If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with
923 * TLSv1.
924 */
925 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A
926 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
927 || (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_SRP_USERNAME)
928 #endif
929 )
930 {
931 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
932 }
933 s->first_packet=1;
934 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
935 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
936 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C,
937 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,
938 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
939 &ok);
940
941 if (!ok) return((int)n);
942 s->first_packet=0;
943 d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
944
945 /* use version from inside client hello, not from record header
946 * (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */
947 s->client_version=(((int)p[0])<<8)|(int)p[1];
948 p+=2;
949
950 if ((s->version == DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version > s->version) ||
951 (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version < s->version))
952 {
953 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
954 if ((s->client_version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
955 {
956 /* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
957 s->version = s->client_version;
958 }
959 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
960 goto f_err;
961 }
962
963 /* If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't
964 * contain one, just return since we do not want to
965 * allocate any memory yet. So check cookie length...
966 */
967 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE)
968 {
969 unsigned int session_length, cookie_length;
970
971 session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
972 cookie_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1);
973
974 if (cookie_length == 0)
975 return 1;
976 }
977
978 /* load the client random */
979 memcpy(s->s3->client_random,p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
980 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
981
982 /* get the session-id */
983 j= *(p++);
984
985 s->hit=0;
986 /* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow session reuse during renegotiation
987 * (i.e. when s->new_session is true), option
988 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is new with 0.9.7.
989 * Maybe this optional behaviour should always have been the default,
990 * but we cannot safely change the default behaviour (or new applications
991 * might be written that become totally unsecure when compiled with
992 * an earlier library version)
993 */
994 if ((s->new_session && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION)))
995 {
996 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
997 goto err;
998 }
999 else
1000 {
1001 i=ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n);
1002 if (i == 1)
1003 { /* previous session */
1004 s->hit=1;
1005 }
1006 else if (i == -1)
1007 goto err;
1008 else /* i == 0 */
1009 {
1010 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
1011 goto err;
1012 }
1013 }
1014
1015 p+=j;
1016
1017 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
1018 {
1019 /* cookie stuff */
1020 cookie_len = *(p++);
1021
1022 /*
1023 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
1024 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
1025 * does not cause an overflow.
1026 */
1027 if ( cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie))
1028 {
1029 /* too much data */
1030 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1031 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1032 goto f_err;
1033 }
1034
1035 /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
1036 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) &&
1037 cookie_len > 0)
1038 {
1039 memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len);
1040
1041 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL)
1042 {
1043 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie,
1044 cookie_len) == 0)
1045 {
1046 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1047 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1048 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1049 goto f_err;
1050 }
1051 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1052 }
1053 else if ( memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
1054 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) /* default verification */
1055 {
1056 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1057 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1058 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1059 goto f_err;
1060 }
1061
1062 ret = 2;
1063 }
1064
1065 p += cookie_len;
1066 }
1067
1068 n2s(p,i);
1069 if ((i == 0) && (j != 0))
1070 {
1071 /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */
1072 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1073 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
1074 goto f_err;
1075 }
1076 if ((p+i) >= (d+n))
1077 {
1078 /* not enough data */
1079 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1080 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1081 goto f_err;
1082 }
1083 if ((i > 0) && (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s,p,i,&(ciphers))
1084 == NULL))
1085 {
1086 goto err;
1087 }
1088 p+=i;
1089
1090 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
1091 if ((s->hit) && (i > 0))
1092 {
1093 j=0;
1094 id=s->session->cipher->id;
1095
1096 #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
1097 printf("client sent %d ciphers\n",sk_num(ciphers));
1098 #endif
1099 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++)
1100 {
1101 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers,i);
1102 #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
1103 printf("client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1104 i,sk_num(ciphers),SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
1105 #endif
1106 if (c->id == id)
1107 {
1108 j=1;
1109 break;
1110 }
1111 }
1112 /* Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade
1113 * attack: CVE-2010-4180.
1114 */
1115 #if 0
1116 if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1))
1117 {
1118 /* Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used cipher may
1119 * not be in the current list, the client instead might be trying to
1120 * continue using a cipher that before wasn't chosen due to server
1121 * preferences. We'll have to reject the connection if the cipher is not
1122 * enabled, though. */
1123 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0);
1124 if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0)
1125 {
1126 s->session->cipher = c;
1127 j = 1;
1128 }
1129 }
1130 #endif
1131 if (j == 0)
1132 {
1133 /* we need to have the cipher in the cipher
1134 * list if we are asked to reuse it */
1135 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1136 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
1137 goto f_err;
1138 }
1139 }
1140
1141 /* compression */
1142 i= *(p++);
1143 if ((p+i) > (d+n))
1144 {
1145 /* not enough data */
1146 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1147 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1148 goto f_err;
1149 }
1150 q=p;
1151 for (j=0; j<i; j++)
1152 {
1153 if (p[j] == 0) break;
1154 }
1155
1156 p+=i;
1157 if (j >= i)
1158 {
1159 /* no compress */
1160 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1161 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
1162 goto f_err;
1163 }
1164
1165 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1166 /* TLS extensions*/
1167 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION)
1168 {
1169 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s,&p,d,n, &al))
1170 {
1171 /* 'al' set by ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext */
1172 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
1173 goto f_err;
1174 }
1175 }
1176 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
1177 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1178 goto err;
1179 }
1180
1181 /* Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this
1182 * handshake for not reused session only. We need to generate
1183 * server_random before calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow
1184 * SessionTicket processing to use it in key derivation. */
1185 {
1186 unsigned long Time;
1187 unsigned char *pos;
1188 Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); /* Time */
1189 pos=s->s3->server_random;
1190 l2n(Time,pos);
1191 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(pos,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0)
1192 {
1193 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1194 goto f_err;
1195 }
1196 }
1197
1198 if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb)
1199 {
1200 SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher=NULL;
1201
1202 s->session->master_key_length=sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1203 if(s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key, &s->session->master_key_length,
1204 ciphers, &pref_cipher, s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg))
1205 {
1206 s->hit=1;
1207 s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
1208 s->session->verify_result=X509_V_OK;
1209
1210 ciphers=NULL;
1211
1212 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1213 pref_cipher=pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1214 if (pref_cipher == NULL)
1215 {
1216 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1217 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1218 goto f_err;
1219 }
1220
1221 s->session->cipher=pref_cipher;
1222
1223 if (s->cipher_list)
1224 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
1225
1226 if (s->cipher_list_by_id)
1227 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
1228
1229 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1230 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1231 }
1232 }
1233 #endif
1234
1235 /* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1236 * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
1237 * algorithms from the client, starting at q. */
1238 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=NULL;
1239 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1240 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1241 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0)
1242 {
1243 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
1244 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1245 /* Can't disable compression */
1246 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION)
1247 {
1248 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1249 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1250 goto f_err;
1251 }
1252 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1253 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++)
1254 {
1255 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
1256 if (comp_id == comp->id)
1257 {
1258 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
1259 break;
1260 }
1261 }
1262 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1263 {
1264 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1265 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1266 goto f_err;
1267 }
1268 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1269 for (m = 0; m < i; m++)
1270 {
1271 if (q[m] == comp_id)
1272 break;
1273 }
1274 if (m >= i)
1275 {
1276 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1277 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
1278 goto f_err;
1279 }
1280 }
1281 else if (s->hit)
1282 comp = NULL;
1283 else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) && s->ctx->comp_methods)
1284 { /* See if we have a match */
1285 int m,nn,o,v,done=0;
1286
1287 nn=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1288 for (m=0; m<nn; m++)
1289 {
1290 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
1291 v=comp->id;
1292 for (o=0; o<i; o++)
1293 {
1294 if (v == q[o])
1295 {
1296 done=1;
1297 break;
1298 }
1299 }
1300 if (done) break;
1301 }
1302 if (done)
1303 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
1304 else
1305 comp=NULL;
1306 }
1307 #else
1308 /* If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1309 * using compression.
1310 */
1311 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0)
1312 {
1313 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1314 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1315 goto f_err;
1316 }
1317 #endif
1318
1319 /* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must
1320 * pick a cipher */
1321
1322 if (!s->hit)
1323 {
1324 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1325 s->session->compress_meth=0;
1326 #else
1327 s->session->compress_meth=(comp == NULL)?0:comp->id;
1328 #endif
1329 if (s->session->ciphers != NULL)
1330 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
1331 s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
1332 if (ciphers == NULL)
1333 {
1334 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1335 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED);
1336 goto f_err;
1337 }
1338 ciphers=NULL;
1339 c=ssl3_choose_cipher(s,s->session->ciphers,
1340 SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1341
1342 if (c == NULL)
1343 {
1344 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1345 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1346 goto f_err;
1347 }
1348 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=c;
1349 /* check whether we should disable session resumption */
1350 if (s->not_resumable_session_cb != NULL)
1351 s->session->not_resumable=s->not_resumable_session_cb(s,
1352 ((c->algorithm_mkey & (SSL_kEDH | SSL_kEECDH)) != 0));
1353 if (s->session->not_resumable)
1354 /* do not send a session ticket */
1355 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
1356 }
1357 else
1358 {
1359 /* Session-id reuse */
1360 #ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
1361 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1362 SSL_CIPHER *nc=NULL;
1363 SSL_CIPHER *ec=NULL;
1364
1365 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG)
1366 {
1367 sk=s->session->ciphers;
1368 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++)
1369 {
1370 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,i);
1371 if (c->algorithm_enc & SSL_eNULL)
1372 nc=c;
1373 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c))
1374 ec=c;
1375 }
1376 if (nc != NULL)
1377 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=nc;
1378 else if (ec != NULL)
1379 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=ec;
1380 else
1381 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1382 }
1383 else
1384 #endif
1385 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1386 }
1387
1388 if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER))
1389 {
1390 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
1391 goto f_err;
1392 }
1393
1394 /* we now have the following setup.
1395 * client_random
1396 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
1397 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
1398 * compression - basically ignored right now
1399 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1400 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1401 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1402 * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
1403 */
1404
1405 if (ret < 0) ret=1;
1406 if (0)
1407 {
1408 f_err:
1409 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1410 }
1411 err:
1412 if (ciphers != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1413 return(ret);
1414 }
1415
1416 int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
1417 {
1418 unsigned char *buf;
1419 unsigned char *p,*d;
1420 int i,sl;
1421 unsigned long l;
1422 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1423 unsigned long Time;
1424 #endif
1425
1426 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1427 {
1428 buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1429 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1430 p=s->s3->server_random;
1431 /* Generate server_random if it was not needed previously */
1432 Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); /* Time */
1433 l2n(Time,p);
1434 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0)
1435 return -1;
1436 #endif
1437 /* Do the message type and length last */
1438 d=p= &(buf[4]);
1439
1440 *(p++)=s->version>>8;
1441 *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
1442
1443 /* Random stuff */
1444 memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1445 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1446
1447 /* now in theory we have 3 options to sending back the
1448 * session id. If it is a re-use, we send back the
1449 * old session-id, if it is a new session, we send
1450 * back the new session-id or we send back a 0 length
1451 * session-id if we want it to be single use.
1452 * Currently I will not implement the '0' length session-id
1453 * 12-Jan-98 - I'll now support the '0' length stuff.
1454 *
1455 * We also have an additional case where stateless session
1456 * resumption is successful: we always send back the old
1457 * session id. In this case s->hit is non zero: this can
1458 * only happen if stateless session resumption is succesful
1459 * if session caching is disabled so existing functionality
1460 * is unaffected.
1461 */
1462 if (s->session->not_resumable ||
1463 (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
1464 && !s->hit))
1465 s->session->session_id_length=0;
1466
1467 sl=s->session->session_id_length;
1468 if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id))
1469 {
1470 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1471 return -1;
1472 }
1473 *(p++)=sl;
1474 memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,sl);
1475 p+=sl;
1476
1477 /* put the cipher */
1478 i=ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,p);
1479 p+=i;
1480
1481 /* put the compression method */
1482 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1483 *(p++)=0;
1484 #else
1485 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1486 *(p++)=0;
1487 else
1488 *(p++)=s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
1489 #endif
1490 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1491 if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
1492 {
1493 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
1494 return -1;
1495 }
1496 if ((p = ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) == NULL)
1497 {
1498 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1499 return -1;
1500 }
1501 #endif
1502 /* do the header */
1503 l=(p-d);
1504 d=buf;
1505 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO;
1506 l2n3(l,d);
1507
1508 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B;
1509 /* number of bytes to write */
1510 s->init_num=p-buf;
1511 s->init_off=0;
1512 }
1513
1514 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
1515 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1516 }
1517
1518 int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)
1519 {
1520 unsigned char *p;
1521
1522 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A)
1523 {
1524 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1525
1526 /* do the header */
1527 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
1528 *(p++)=0;
1529 *(p++)=0;
1530 *(p++)=0;
1531
1532 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
1533 /* number of bytes to write */
1534 s->init_num=4;
1535 s->init_off=0;
1536 }
1537
1538 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
1539 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1540 }
1541
1542 int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1543 {
1544 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1545 unsigned char *q;
1546 int j,num;
1547 RSA *rsa;
1548 unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
1549 unsigned int u;
1550 #endif
1551 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1552 DH *dh=NULL,*dhp;
1553 #endif
1554 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1555 EC_KEY *ecdh=NULL, *ecdhp;
1556 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1557 int encodedlen = 0;
1558 int curve_id = 0;
1559 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1560 #endif
1561 EVP_PKEY *pkey;
1562 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1563 unsigned char *p,*d;
1564 int al,i;
1565 unsigned long type;
1566 int n;
1567 CERT *cert;
1568 BIGNUM *r[4];
1569 int nr[4],kn;
1570 BUF_MEM *buf;
1571 EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
1572
1573 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
1574 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A)
1575 {
1576 type=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1577 cert=s->cert;
1578
1579 buf=s->init_buf;
1580
1581 r[0]=r[1]=r[2]=r[3]=NULL;
1582 n=0;
1583 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1584 if (type & SSL_kRSA)
1585 {
1586 rsa=cert->rsa_tmp;
1587 if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL))
1588 {
1589 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s,
1590 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1591 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1592 if(rsa == NULL)
1593 {
1594 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1595 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1596 goto f_err;
1597 }
1598 RSA_up_ref(rsa);
1599 cert->rsa_tmp=rsa;
1600 }
1601 if (rsa == NULL)
1602 {
1603 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1604 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1605 goto f_err;
1606 }
1607 r[0]=rsa->n;
1608 r[1]=rsa->e;
1609 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
1610 }
1611 else
1612 #endif
1613 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1614 if (type & SSL_kEDH)
1615 {
1616 dhp=cert->dh_tmp;
1617 if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1618 dhp=s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s,
1619 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1620 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1621 if (dhp == NULL)
1622 {
1623 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1624 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1625 goto f_err;
1626 }
1627
1628 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
1629 {
1630 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1631 goto err;
1632 }
1633
1634 if ((dh=DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL)
1635 {
1636 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1637 goto err;
1638 }
1639
1640 s->s3->tmp.dh=dh;
1641 if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL ||
1642 dhp->priv_key == NULL ||
1643 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE)))
1644 {
1645 if(!DH_generate_key(dh))
1646 {
1647 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1648 ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1649 goto err;
1650 }
1651 }
1652 else
1653 {
1654 dh->pub_key=BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
1655 dh->priv_key=BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
1656 if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) ||
1657 (dh->priv_key == NULL))
1658 {
1659 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1660 goto err;
1661 }
1662 }
1663 r[0]=dh->p;
1664 r[1]=dh->g;
1665 r[2]=dh->pub_key;
1666 }
1667 else
1668 #endif
1669 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1670 if (type & SSL_kEECDH)
1671 {
1672 const EC_GROUP *group;
1673
1674 ecdhp=cert->ecdh_tmp;
1675 if ((ecdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1676 {
1677 ecdhp=s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s,
1678 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1679 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1680 }
1681 if (ecdhp == NULL)
1682 {
1683 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1684 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
1685 goto f_err;
1686 }
1687
1688 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
1689 {
1690 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1691 goto err;
1692 }
1693
1694 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
1695 if (ecdhp == NULL)
1696 {
1697 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1698 goto err;
1699 }
1700 if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp)) == NULL)
1701 {
1702 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1703 goto err;
1704 }
1705
1706 s->s3->tmp.ecdh=ecdh;
1707 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1708 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1709 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE))
1710 {
1711 if(!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh))
1712 {
1713 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1714 goto err;
1715 }
1716 }
1717
1718 if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||
1719 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1720 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL))
1721 {
1722 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1723 goto err;
1724 }
1725
1726 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
1727 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163))
1728 {
1729 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
1730 goto err;
1731 }
1732
1733 /* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH
1734 * keys over named (not generic) curves. For
1735 * supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero.
1736 */
1737 if ((curve_id =
1738 tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)))
1739 == 0)
1740 {
1741 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
1742 goto err;
1743 }
1744
1745 /* Encode the public key.
1746 * First check the size of encoding and
1747 * allocate memory accordingly.
1748 */
1749 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1750 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1751 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1752 NULL, 0, NULL);
1753
1754 encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
1755 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen*sizeof(unsigned char));
1756 bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
1757 if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL))
1758 {
1759 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1760 goto err;
1761 }
1762
1763
1764 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1765 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1766 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1767 encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
1768
1769 if (encodedlen == 0)
1770 {
1771 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1772 goto err;
1773 }
1774
1775 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); bn_ctx=NULL;
1776
1777 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not
1778 * generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges.
1779 * In this situation, we need four additional bytes
1780 * to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
1781 * structure.
1782 */
1783 n = 4 + encodedlen;
1784
1785 /* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message
1786 * explicitly so we can set these to NULLs
1787 */
1788 r[0]=NULL;
1789 r[1]=NULL;
1790 r[2]=NULL;
1791 r[3]=NULL;
1792 }
1793 else
1794 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
1795 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1796 if (type & SSL_kPSK)
1797 {
1798 /* reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint*/
1799 n+=2+strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1800 }
1801 else
1802 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1803 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1804 if (type & SSL_kSRP)
1805 {
1806 if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
1807 (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
1808 (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) ||
1809 (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL))
1810 {
1811 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
1812 goto err;
1813 }
1814 r[0]=s->srp_ctx.N;
1815 r[1]=s->srp_ctx.g;
1816 r[2]=s->srp_ctx.s;
1817 r[3]=s->srp_ctx.B;
1818 }
1819 else
1820 #endif
1821 {
1822 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1823 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
1824 goto f_err;
1825 }
1826 for (i=0; r[i] != NULL && i<4; i++)
1827 {
1828 nr[i]=BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
1829 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1830 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
1831 n+=1+nr[i];
1832 else
1833 #endif
1834 n+=2+nr[i];
1835 }
1836
1837 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
1838 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
1839 {
1840 if ((pkey=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s,s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,&md))
1841 == NULL)
1842 {
1843 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1844 goto f_err;
1845 }
1846 kn=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1847 }
1848 else
1849 {
1850 pkey=NULL;
1851 kn=0;
1852 }
1853
1854 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,n+4+kn))
1855 {
1856 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_BUF);
1857 goto err;
1858 }
1859 d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1860 p= &(d[4]);
1861
1862 for (i=0; r[i] != NULL && i<4; i++)
1863 {
1864 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1865 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
1866 {
1867 *p = nr[i];
1868 p++;
1869 }
1870 else
1871 #endif
1872 s2n(nr[i],p);
1873 BN_bn2bin(r[i],p);
1874 p+=nr[i];
1875 }
1876
1877 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1878 if (type & SSL_kEECDH)
1879 {
1880 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves.
1881 * In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has:
1882 * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
1883 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by
1884 * the actual encoded point itself
1885 */
1886 *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
1887 p += 1;
1888 *p = 0;
1889 p += 1;
1890 *p = curve_id;
1891 p += 1;
1892 *p = encodedlen;
1893 p += 1;
1894 memcpy((unsigned char*)p,
1895 (unsigned char *)encodedPoint,
1896 encodedlen);
1897 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1898 encodedPoint = NULL;
1899 p += encodedlen;
1900 }
1901 #endif
1902
1903 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1904 if (type & SSL_kPSK)
1905 {
1906 /* copy PSK identity hint */
1907 s2n(strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint), p);
1908 strncpy((char *)p, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint, strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint));
1909 p+=strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1910 }
1911 #endif
1912
1913 /* not anonymous */
1914 if (pkey != NULL)
1915 {
1916 /* n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4])
1917 * and p points to the space at the end. */
1918 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1919 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA
1920 && TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)
1921 {
1922 q=md_buf;
1923 j=0;
1924 for (num=2; num > 0; num--)
1925 {
1926 EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx,
1927 EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
1928 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2)
1929 ?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
1930 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1931 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1932 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1933 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q,
1934 (unsigned int *)&i);
1935 q+=i;
1936 j+=i;
1937 }
1938 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,
1939 &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0)
1940 {
1941 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_RSA);
1942 goto err;
1943 }
1944 s2n(u,p);
1945 n+=u+2;
1946 }
1947 else
1948 #endif
1949 if (md)
1950 {
1951 /* For TLS1.2 and later send signature
1952 * algorithm */
1953 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
1954 {
1955 if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md))
1956 {
1957 /* Should never happen */
1958 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1959 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1960 goto f_err;
1961 }
1962 p+=2;
1963 }
1964 #ifdef SSL_DEBUG
1965 fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n",
1966 EVP_MD_name(md));
1967 #endif
1968 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL);
1969 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1970 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1971 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1972 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
1973 (unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
1974 {
1975 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_EVP);
1976 goto err;
1977 }
1978 s2n(i,p);
1979 n+=i+2;
1980 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
1981 n+= 2;
1982 }
1983 else
1984 {
1985 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
1986 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1987 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
1988 goto f_err;
1989 }
1990 }
1991
1992 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE;
1993 l2n3(n,d);
1994
1995 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
1996 * it off */
1997 s->init_num=n+4;
1998 s->init_off=0;
1999 }
2000
2001 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
2002 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
2003 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
2004 f_err:
2005 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2006 err:
2007 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2008 if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2009 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2010 #endif
2011 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
2012 return(-1);
2013 }
2014
2015 int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
2016 {
2017 unsigned char *p,*d;
2018 int i,j,nl,off,n;
2019 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk=NULL;
2020 X509_NAME *name;
2021 BUF_MEM *buf;
2022
2023 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A)
2024 {
2025 buf=s->init_buf;
2026
2027 d=p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4]);
2028
2029 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
2030 p++;
2031 n=ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s,p);
2032 d[0]=n;
2033 p+=n;
2034 n++;
2035
2036 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
2037 {
2038 nl = tls12_get_req_sig_algs(s, p + 2);
2039 s2n(nl, p);
2040 p += nl + 2;
2041 n += nl + 2;
2042 }
2043
2044 off=n;
2045 p+=2;
2046 n+=2;
2047
2048 sk=SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
2049 nl=0;
2050 if (sk != NULL)
2051 {
2052 for (i=0; i<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++)
2053 {
2054 name=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i);
2055 j=i2d_X509_NAME(name,NULL);
2056 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,4+n+j+2))
2057 {
2058 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
2059 goto err;
2060 }
2061 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+n]);
2062 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG))
2063 {
2064 s2n(j,p);
2065 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
2066 n+=2+j;
2067 nl+=2+j;
2068 }
2069 else
2070 {
2071 d=p;
2072 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
2073 j-=2; s2n(j,d); j+=2;
2074 n+=j;
2075 nl+=j;
2076 }
2077 }
2078 }
2079 /* else no CA names */
2080 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+off]);
2081 s2n(nl,p);
2082
2083 d=(unsigned char *)buf->data;
2084 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
2085 l2n3(n,d);
2086
2087 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
2088 * it off */
2089
2090 s->init_num=n+4;
2091 s->init_off=0;
2092 #ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
2093 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num;
2094
2095 /* do the header */
2096 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
2097 *(p++)=0;
2098 *(p++)=0;
2099 *(p++)=0;
2100 s->init_num += 4;
2101 #endif
2102
2103 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
2104 }
2105
2106 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
2107 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
2108 err:
2109 return(-1);
2110 }
2111
2112 int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
2113 {
2114 int i,al,ok;
2115 long n;
2116 unsigned long alg_k;
2117 unsigned char *p;
2118 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2119 RSA *rsa=NULL;
2120 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
2121 #endif
2122 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2123 BIGNUM *pub=NULL;
2124 DH *dh_srvr;
2125 #endif
2126 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2127 KSSL_ERR kssl_err;
2128 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2129
2130 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2131 EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;
2132 EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
2133 EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
2134 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
2135 #endif
2136
2137 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2138 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
2139 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B,
2140 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2141 2048, /* ??? */
2142 &ok);
2143
2144 if (!ok) return((int)n);
2145 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2146
2147 alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2148
2149 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2150 if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
2151 {
2152 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
2153 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp)
2154 {
2155 if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL))
2156 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp;
2157 /* Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should
2158 * be sent already */
2159 if (rsa == NULL)
2160 {
2161 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2162 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY);
2163 goto f_err;
2164
2165 }
2166 }
2167 else
2168 {
2169 pkey=s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey;
2170 if ( (pkey == NULL) ||
2171 (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) ||
2172 (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL))
2173 {
2174 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2175 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2176 goto f_err;
2177 }
2178 rsa=pkey->pkey.rsa;
2179 }
2180
2181 /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */
2182 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
2183 {
2184 n2s(p,i);
2185 if (n != i+2)
2186 {
2187 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG))
2188 {
2189 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2190 goto err;
2191 }
2192 else
2193 p-=2;
2194 }
2195 else
2196 n=i;
2197 }
2198
2199 i=RSA_private_decrypt((int)n,p,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
2200
2201 al = -1;
2202
2203 if (i != SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2204 {
2205 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2206 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); */
2207 }
2208
2209 if ((al == -1) && !((p[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
2210 {
2211 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2212 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2213 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2214 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
2215 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
2216 * protocol version.
2217 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. */
2218 if (!((s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) &&
2219 (p[0] == (s->version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->version & 0xff))))
2220 {
2221 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2222 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER); */
2223
2224 /* The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2225 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version
2226 * number check as a "bad version oracle" -- an alert would
2227 * reveal that the plaintext corresponding to some ciphertext
2228 * made up by the adversary is properly formatted except
2229 * that the version number is wrong. To avoid such attacks,
2230 * we should treat this just like any other decryption error. */
2231 }
2232 }
2233
2234 if (al != -1)
2235 {
2236 /* Some decryption failure -- use random value instead as countermeasure
2237 * against Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding
2238 * (see RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). */
2239 ERR_clear_error();
2240 i = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2241 p[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
2242 p[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
2243 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p+2, i-2) <= 0) /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure */
2244 goto err;
2245 }
2246
2247 s->session->master_key_length=
2248 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2249 s->session->master_key,
2250 p,i);
2251 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
2252 }
2253 else
2254 #endif
2255 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2256 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
2257 {
2258 n2s(p,i);
2259 if (n != i+2)
2260 {
2261 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG))
2262 {
2263 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2264 goto err;
2265 }
2266 else
2267 {
2268 p-=2;
2269 i=(int)n;
2270 }
2271 }
2272
2273 if (n == 0L) /* the parameters are in the cert */
2274 {
2275 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2276 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_DH_CERTS);
2277 goto f_err;
2278 }
2279 else
2280 {
2281 if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL)
2282 {
2283 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2284 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2285 goto f_err;
2286 }
2287 else
2288 dh_srvr=s->s3->tmp.dh;
2289 }
2290
2291 pub=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL);
2292 if (pub == NULL)
2293 {
2294 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BN_LIB);
2295 goto err;
2296 }
2297
2298 i=DH_compute_key(p,pub,dh_srvr);
2299
2300 if (i <= 0)
2301 {
2302 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
2303 goto err;
2304 }
2305
2306 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
2307 s->s3->tmp.dh=NULL;
2308
2309 BN_clear_free(pub);
2310 pub=NULL;
2311 s->session->master_key_length=
2312 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2313 s->session->master_key,p,i);
2314 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
2315 }
2316 else
2317 #endif
2318 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2319 if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
2320 {
2321 krb5_error_code krb5rc;
2322 krb5_data enc_ticket;
2323 krb5_data authenticator;
2324 krb5_data enc_pms;
2325 KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
2326 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
2327 const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
2328 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
2329 unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
2330 + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
2331 int padl, outl;
2332 krb5_timestamp authtime = 0;
2333 krb5_ticket_times ttimes;
2334
2335 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
2336
2337 if (!kssl_ctx) kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
2338
2339 n2s(p,i);
2340 enc_ticket.length = i;
2341
2342 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + 6))
2343 {
2344 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2345 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2346 goto err;
2347 }
2348
2349 enc_ticket.data = (char *)p;
2350 p+=enc_ticket.length;
2351
2352 n2s(p,i);
2353 authenticator.length = i;
2354
2355 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 6))
2356 {
2357 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2358 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2359 goto err;
2360 }
2361
2362 authenticator.data = (char *)p;
2363 p+=authenticator.length;
2364
2365 n2s(p,i);
2366 enc_pms.length = i;
2367 enc_pms.data = (char *)p;
2368 p+=enc_pms.length;
2369
2370 /* Note that the length is checked again below,
2371 ** after decryption
2372 */
2373 if(enc_pms.length > sizeof pms)
2374 {
2375 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2376 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2377 goto err;
2378 }
2379
2380 if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length +
2381 enc_pms.length + 6))
2382 {
2383 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2384 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2385 goto err;
2386 }
2387
2388 if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes,
2389 &kssl_err)) != 0)
2390 {
2391 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
2392 printf("kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
2393 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2394 if (kssl_err.text)
2395 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2396 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2397 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2398 kssl_err.reason);
2399 goto err;
2400 }
2401
2402 /* Note: no authenticator is not considered an error,
2403 ** but will return authtime == 0.
2404 */
2405 if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator,
2406 &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0)
2407 {
2408 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
2409 printf("kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
2410 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2411 if (kssl_err.text)
2412 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2413 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2414 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2415 kssl_err.reason);
2416 goto err;
2417 }
2418
2419 if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0)
2420 {
2421 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc);
2422 goto err;
2423 }
2424
2425 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
2426 kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
2427 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2428
2429 enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
2430 if (enc == NULL)
2431 goto err;
2432
2433 memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
2434
2435 if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc,NULL,kssl_ctx->key,iv))
2436 {
2437 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2438 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2439 goto err;
2440 }
2441 if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms,&outl,
2442 (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length))
2443 {
2444 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2445 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2446 goto err;
2447 }
2448 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2449 {
2450 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2451 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2452 goto err;
2453 }
2454 if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx,&(pms[outl]),&padl))
2455 {
2456 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2457 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2458 goto err;
2459 }
2460 outl += padl;
2461 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2462 {
2463 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2464 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2465 goto err;
2466 }
2467 if (!((pms[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (pms[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
2468 {
2469 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2470 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2471 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2472 * However, buggy clients exist that send random bytes instead of
2473 * the protocol version.
2474 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients.
2475 * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos cipher)
2476 */
2477 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG))
2478 {
2479 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2480 SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2481 goto err;
2482 }
2483 }
2484
2485 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
2486
2487 s->session->master_key_length=
2488 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2489 s->session->master_key, pms, outl);
2490
2491 if (kssl_ctx->client_princ)
2492 {
2493 size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
2494 if ( len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH )
2495 {
2496 s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len;
2497 memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ,kssl_ctx->client_princ,len);
2498 }
2499 }
2500
2501
2502 /* Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
2503 ** but it caused problems for apache.
2504 ** kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
2505 ** if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
2506 */
2507 }
2508 else
2509 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2510
2511 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2512 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
2513 {
2514 int ret = 1;
2515 int field_size = 0;
2516 const EC_KEY *tkey;
2517 const EC_GROUP *group;
2518 const BIGNUM *priv_key;
2519
2520 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
2521 if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL)
2522 {
2523 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2524 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2525 goto err;
2526 }
2527
2528 /* Let's get server private key and group information */
2529 if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
2530 {
2531 /* use the certificate */
2532 tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec;
2533 }
2534 else
2535 {
2536 /* use the ephermeral values we saved when
2537 * generating the ServerKeyExchange msg.
2538 */
2539 tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh;
2540 }
2541
2542 group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
2543 priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
2544
2545 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) ||
2546 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key))
2547 {
2548 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2549 ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2550 goto err;
2551 }
2552
2553 /* Let's get client's public key */
2554 if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL)
2555 {
2556 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2557 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2558 goto err;
2559 }
2560
2561 if (n == 0L)
2562 {
2563 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
2564
2565 if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
2566 {
2567 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2568 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
2569 goto f_err;
2570 }
2571 if (((clnt_pub_pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer))
2572 == NULL) ||
2573 (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC))
2574 {
2575 /* XXX: For now, we do not support client
2576 * authentication using ECDH certificates
2577 * so this branch (n == 0L) of the code is
2578 * never executed. When that support is
2579 * added, we ought to ensure the key
2580 * received in the certificate is
2581 * authorized for key agreement.
2582 * ECDH_compute_key implicitly checks that
2583 * the two ECDH shares are for the same
2584 * group.
2585 */
2586 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2587 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2588 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS);
2589 goto f_err;
2590 }
2591
2592 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,
2593 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->pkey.ec)) == 0)
2594 {
2595 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2596 ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2597 goto err;
2598 }
2599 ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
2600 }
2601 else
2602 {
2603 /* Get client's public key from encoded point
2604 * in the ClientKeyExchange message.
2605 */
2606 if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
2607 {
2608 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2609 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2610 goto err;
2611 }
2612
2613 /* Get encoded point length */
2614 i = *p;
2615 p += 1;
2616 if (n != 1 + i)
2617 {
2618 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2619 ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2620 goto err;
2621 }
2622 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group,
2623 clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0)
2624 {
2625 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2626 ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2627 goto err;
2628 }
2629 /* p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer
2630 * currently, so set it to the start
2631 */
2632 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2633 }
2634
2635 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
2636 field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
2637 if (field_size <= 0)
2638 {
2639 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2640 ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
2641 goto err;
2642 }
2643 i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size+7)/8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh, NULL);
2644 if (i <= 0)
2645 {
2646 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2647 ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
2648 goto err;
2649 }
2650
2651 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2652 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2653 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2654 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2655 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
2656 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
2657
2658 /* Compute the master secret */
2659 s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc-> \
2660 generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, p, i);
2661
2662 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
2663 return (ret);
2664 }
2665 else
2666 #endif
2667 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2668 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK)
2669 {
2670 unsigned char *t = NULL;
2671 unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN*2+4];
2672 unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0;
2673 int psk_err = 1;
2674 char tmp_id[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1];
2675
2676 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2677
2678 n2s(p,i);
2679 if (n != i+2)
2680 {
2681 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2682 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2683 goto psk_err;
2684 }
2685 if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN)
2686 {
2687 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2688 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2689 goto psk_err;
2690 }
2691 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL)
2692 {
2693 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2694 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
2695 goto psk_err;
2696 }
2697
2698 /* Create guaranteed NULL-terminated identity
2699 * string for the callback */
2700 memcpy(tmp_id, p, i);
2701 memset(tmp_id+i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1-i);
2702 psk_len = s->psk_server_callback(s, tmp_id,
2703 psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2704 OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_id, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1);
2705
2706 if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN)
2707 {
2708 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2709 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2710 goto psk_err;
2711 }
2712 else if (psk_len == 0)
2713 {
2714 /* PSK related to the given identity not found */
2715 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2716 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2717 al=SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
2718 goto psk_err;
2719 }
2720
2721 /* create PSK pre_master_secret */
2722 pre_ms_len=2+psk_len+2+psk_len;
2723 t = psk_or_pre_ms;
2724 memmove(psk_or_pre_ms+psk_len+4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len);
2725 s2n(psk_len, t);
2726 memset(t, 0, psk_len);
2727 t+=psk_len;
2728 s2n(psk_len, t);
2729
2730 if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL)
2731 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2732 s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup((char *)p);
2733 if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL)
2734 {
2735 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2736 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2737 goto psk_err;
2738 }
2739
2740 if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
2741 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
2742 s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
2743 if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL &&
2744 s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
2745 {
2746 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2747 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2748 goto psk_err;
2749 }
2750
2751 s->session->master_key_length=
2752 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2753 s->session->master_key, psk_or_pre_ms, pre_ms_len);
2754 psk_err = 0;
2755 psk_err:
2756 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2757 if (psk_err != 0)
2758 goto f_err;
2759 }
2760 else
2761 #endif
2762 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2763 if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
2764 {
2765 int param_len;
2766
2767 n2s(p,i);
2768 param_len=i+2;
2769 if (param_len > n)
2770 {
2771 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2772 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
2773 goto f_err;
2774 }
2775 if (!(s->srp_ctx.A=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
2776 {
2777 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2778 goto err;
2779 }
2780 if (s->session->srp_username != NULL)
2781 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
2782 s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
2783 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL)
2784 {
2785 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2786 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2787 goto err;
2788 }
2789
2790 if ((s->session->master_key_length = SRP_generate_server_master_secret(s,s->session->master_key))<0)
2791 {
2792 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2793 goto err;
2794 }
2795
2796 p+=i;
2797 }
2798 else
2799 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
2800 if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST)
2801 {
2802 int ret = 0;
2803 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
2804 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
2805 unsigned char premaster_secret[32], *start;
2806 size_t outlen=32, inlen;
2807 unsigned long alg_a;
2808
2809 /* Get our certificate private key*/
2810 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2811 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST94)
2812 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST94].privatekey;
2813 else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01)
2814 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
2815
2816 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk,NULL);
2817 EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx);
2818 /* If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
2819 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
2820 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use
2821 * a client certificate for authorization only. */
2822 client_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2823 if (client_pub_pkey)
2824 {
2825 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
2826 ERR_clear_error();
2827 }
2828 /* Decrypt session key */
2829 if ((*p!=( V_ASN1_SEQUENCE| V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)))
2830 {
2831 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2832 goto gerr;
2833 }
2834 if (p[1] == 0x81)
2835 {
2836 start = p+3;
2837 inlen = p[2];
2838 }
2839 else if (p[1] < 0x80)
2840 {
2841 start = p+2;
2842 inlen = p[1];
2843 }
2844 else
2845 {
2846 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2847 goto gerr;
2848 }
2849 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx,premaster_secret,&outlen,start,inlen) <=0)
2850
2851 {
2852 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2853 goto gerr;
2854 }
2855 /* Generate master secret */
2856 s->session->master_key_length=
2857 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2858 s->session->master_key,premaster_secret,32);
2859 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2860 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
2861 ret = 2;
2862 else
2863 ret = 1;
2864 gerr:
2865 EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey);
2866 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2867 if (ret)
2868 return ret;
2869 else
2870 goto err;
2871 }
2872 else
2873 {
2874 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2875 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2876 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
2877 goto f_err;
2878 }
2879
2880 return(1);
2881 f_err:
2882 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2883 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_SRP)
2884 err:
2885 #endif
2886 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2887 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2888 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2889 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
2890 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2891 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2892 #endif
2893 return(-1);
2894 }
2895
2896 int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
2897 {
2898 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
2899 unsigned char *p;
2900 int al,ok,ret=0;
2901 long n;
2902 int type=0,i,j;
2903 X509 *peer;
2904 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
2905 EVP_MD_CTX mctx;
2906 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx);
2907
2908 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2909 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
2910 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,
2911 -1,
2912 514, /* 514? */
2913 &ok);
2914
2915 if (!ok) return((int)n);
2916
2917 if (s->session->peer != NULL)
2918 {
2919 peer=s->session->peer;
2920 pkey=X509_get_pubkey(peer);
2921 type=X509_certificate_type(peer,pkey);
2922 }
2923 else
2924 {
2925 peer=NULL;
2926 pkey=NULL;
2927 }
2928
2929 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY)
2930 {
2931 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
2932 if ((peer != NULL) && (type | EVP_PKT_SIGN))
2933 {
2934 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2935 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE);
2936 goto f_err;
2937 }
2938 ret=1;
2939 goto end;
2940 }
2941
2942 if (peer == NULL)
2943 {
2944 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED);
2945 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2946 goto f_err;
2947 }
2948
2949 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
2950 {
2951 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
2952 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2953 goto f_err;
2954 }
2955
2956 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
2957 {
2958 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
2959 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2960 goto f_err;
2961 }
2962
2963 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
2964 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2965 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
2966 /* If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare
2967 * signature without length field */
2968 if (n==64 && (pkey->type==NID_id_GostR3410_94 ||
2969 pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) )
2970 {
2971 i=64;
2972 }
2973 else
2974 {
2975 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
2976 {
2977 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
2978 /* Should never happen */
2979 if (sigalg == -1)
2980 {
2981 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2982 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2983 goto f_err;
2984 }
2985 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
2986 if (sigalg != (int)p[1])
2987 {
2988 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
2989 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2990 goto f_err;
2991 }
2992 md = tls12_get_hash(p[0]);
2993 if (md == NULL)
2994 {
2995 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
2996 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2997 goto f_err;
2998 }
2999 #ifdef SSL_DEBUG
3000 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
3001 #endif
3002 p += 2;
3003 n -= 2;
3004 }
3005 n2s(p,i);
3006 n-=2;
3007 if (i > n)
3008 {
3009 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3010 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3011 goto f_err;
3012 }
3013 }
3014 j=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
3015 if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0))
3016 {
3017 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
3018 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3019 goto f_err;
3020 }
3021
3022 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
3023 {
3024 long hdatalen = 0;
3025 void *hdata;
3026 hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
3027 if (hdatalen <= 0)
3028 {
3029 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3030 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3031 goto f_err;
3032 }
3033 #ifdef SSL_DEBUG
3034 fprintf(stderr, "Using TLS 1.2 with client verify alg %s\n",
3035 EVP_MD_name(md));
3036 #endif
3037 if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL)
3038 || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen))
3039 {
3040 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
3041 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3042 goto f_err;
3043 }
3044
3045 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&mctx, p , i, pkey) <= 0)
3046 {
3047 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3048 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
3049 goto f_err;
3050 }
3051 }
3052 else
3053 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3054 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
3055 {
3056 i=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
3057 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i,
3058 pkey->pkey.rsa);
3059 if (i < 0)
3060 {
3061 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3062 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
3063 goto f_err;
3064 }
3065 if (i == 0)
3066 {
3067 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3068 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE);
3069 goto f_err;
3070 }
3071 }
3072 else
3073 #endif
3074 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3075 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
3076 {
3077 j=DSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
3078 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3079 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.dsa);
3080 if (j <= 0)
3081 {
3082 /* bad signature */
3083 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3084 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE);
3085 goto f_err;
3086 }
3087 }
3088 else
3089 #endif
3090 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3091 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
3092 {
3093 j=ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
3094 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3095 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.ec);
3096 if (j <= 0)
3097 {
3098 /* bad signature */
3099 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3100 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
3101 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
3102 goto f_err;
3103 }
3104 }
3105 else
3106 #endif
3107 if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001)
3108 { unsigned char signature[64];
3109 int idx;
3110 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey,NULL);
3111 EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx);
3112 if (i!=64) {
3113 fprintf(stderr,"GOST signature length is %d",i);
3114 }
3115 for (idx=0;idx<64;idx++) {
3116 signature[63-idx]=p[idx];
3117 }
3118 j=EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx,signature,64,s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,32);
3119 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
3120 if (j<=0)
3121 {
3122 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3123 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
3124 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
3125 goto f_err;
3126 }
3127 }
3128 else
3129 {
3130 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3131 al=SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
3132 goto f_err;
3133 }
3134
3135
3136 ret=1;
3137 if (0)
3138 {
3139 f_err:
3140 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3141 }
3142 end:
3143 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
3144 {
3145 BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
3146 s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
3147 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
3148 }
3149 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
3150 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3151 return(ret);
3152 }
3153
3154 int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
3155 {
3156 int i,ok,al,ret= -1;
3157 X509 *x=NULL;
3158 unsigned long l,nc,llen,n;
3159 const unsigned char *p,*q;
3160 unsigned char *d;
3161 STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL;
3162
3163 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3164 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A,
3165 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B,
3166 -1,
3167 s->max_cert_list,
3168 &ok);
3169
3170 if (!ok) return((int)n);
3171
3172 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE)
3173 {
3174 if ( (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3175 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
3176 {
3177 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3178 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3179 goto f_err;
3180 }
3181 /* If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list */
3182 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
3183 {
3184 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST);
3185 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3186 goto f_err;
3187 }
3188 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
3189 return(1);
3190 }
3191
3192 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE)
3193 {
3194 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3195 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
3196 goto f_err;
3197 }
3198 p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3199
3200 if ((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)
3201 {
3202 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3203 goto err;
3204 }
3205
3206 n2l3(p,llen);
3207 if (llen+3 != n)
3208 {
3209 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3210 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3211 goto f_err;
3212 }
3213 for (nc=0; nc<llen; )
3214 {
3215 n2l3(p,l);
3216 if ((l+nc+3) > llen)
3217 {
3218 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3219 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3220 goto f_err;
3221 }
3222
3223 q=p;
3224 x=d2i_X509(NULL,&p,l);
3225 if (x == NULL)
3226 {
3227 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
3228 goto err;
3229 }
3230 if (p != (q+l))
3231 {
3232 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3233 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3234 goto f_err;
3235 }
3236 if (!sk_X509_push(sk,x))
3237 {
3238 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3239 goto err;
3240 }
3241 x=NULL;
3242 nc+=l+3;
3243 }
3244
3245 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0)
3246 {
3247 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3248 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
3249 {
3250 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3251 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
3252 goto f_err;
3253 }
3254 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3255 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3256 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
3257 {
3258 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3259 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3260 goto f_err;
3261 }
3262 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
3263 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
3264 {
3265 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3266 goto f_err;
3267 }
3268 }
3269 else
3270 {
3271 i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk);
3272 if (i <= 0)
3273 {
3274 al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
3275 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_RETURNED);
3276 goto f_err;
3277 }
3278 }
3279
3280 if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */
3281 X509_free(s->session->peer);
3282 s->session->peer=sk_X509_shift(sk);
3283 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
3284
3285 /* With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL
3286 * when we arrive here. */
3287 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
3288 {
3289 s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
3290 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
3291 {
3292 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3293 goto err;
3294 }
3295 }
3296 if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL)
3297 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free);
3298 s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain=sk;
3299 /* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the
3300 * peer's own certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c */
3301
3302 sk=NULL;
3303
3304 ret=1;
3305 if (0)
3306 {
3307 f_err:
3308 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3309 }
3310 err:
3311 if (x != NULL) X509_free(x);
3312 if (sk != NULL) sk_X509_pop_free(sk,X509_free);
3313 return(ret);
3314 }
3315
3316 int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
3317 {
3318 unsigned long l;
3319 X509 *x;
3320
3321 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A)
3322 {
3323 x=ssl_get_server_send_cert(s);
3324 if (x == NULL)
3325 {
3326 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
3327 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aKRB5) ||
3328 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5))
3329 {
3330 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3331 return(0);
3332 }
3333 }
3334
3335 l=ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,x);
3336 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
3337 s->init_num=(int)l;
3338 s->init_off=0;
3339 }
3340
3341 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
3342 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3343 }
3344 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
3345 int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
3346 {
3347 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A)
3348 {
3349 unsigned char *p, *senc, *macstart;
3350 int len, slen;
3351 unsigned int hlen;
3352 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
3353 HMAC_CTX hctx;
3354 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3355 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
3356 unsigned char key_name[16];
3357
3358 /* get session encoding length */
3359 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
3360 /* Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is
3361 * too long
3362 */
3363 if (slen > 0xFF00)
3364 return -1;
3365 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3366 * follows 1 (size of message name) + 3 (message length
3367 * bytes) + 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
3368 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
3369 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
3370 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
3371 */
3372 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
3373 26 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH +
3374 EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
3375 return -1;
3376 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen);
3377 if (!senc)
3378 return -1;
3379 p = senc;
3380 i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p);
3381
3382 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3383 /* do the header */
3384 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET;
3385 /* Skip message length for now */
3386 p += 3;
3387 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3388 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3389 /* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present
3390 * it does all the work otherwise use generated values
3391 * from parent ctx.
3392 */
3393 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
3394 {
3395 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx,
3396 &hctx, 1) < 0)
3397 {
3398 OPENSSL_free(senc);
3399 return -1;
3400 }
3401 }
3402 else
3403 {
3404 RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, 16);
3405 EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3406 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv);
3407 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3408 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
3409 memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
3410 }
3411 l2n(s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint, p);
3412 /* Skip ticket length for now */
3413 p += 2;
3414 /* Output key name */
3415 macstart = p;
3416 memcpy(p, key_name, 16);
3417 p += 16;
3418 /* output IV */
3419 memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx));
3420 p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3421 /* Encrypt session data */
3422 EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen);
3423 p += len;
3424 EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len);
3425 p += len;
3426 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3427
3428 HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart);
3429 HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen);
3430 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3431
3432 p += hlen;
3433 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
3434 /* Total length */
3435 len = p - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3436 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + 1;
3437 l2n3(len - 4, p); /* Message length */
3438 p += 4;
3439 s2n(len - 10, p); /* Ticket length */
3440
3441 /* number of bytes to write */
3442 s->init_num= len;
3443 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
3444 s->init_off=0;
3445 OPENSSL_free(senc);
3446 }
3447
3448 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
3449 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3450 }
3451
3452 int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s)
3453 {
3454 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A)
3455 {
3456 unsigned char *p;
3457 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3458 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
3459 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
3460 * + (ocsp response)
3461 */
3462 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen))
3463 return -1;
3464
3465 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3466
3467 /* do the header */
3468 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
3469 /* message length */
3470 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p);
3471 /* status type */
3472 *(p++)= s->tlsext_status_type;
3473 /* length of OCSP response */
3474 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p);
3475 /* actual response */
3476 memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen);
3477 /* number of bytes to write */
3478 s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen;
3479 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B;
3480 s->init_off = 0;
3481 }
3482
3483 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
3484 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3485 }
3486
3487 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NPN
3488 /* ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message. It
3489 * sets the next_proto member in s if found */
3490 int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s)
3491 {
3492 int ok;
3493 int proto_len, padding_len;
3494 long n;
3495 const unsigned char *p;
3496
3497 /* Clients cannot send a NextProtocol message if we didn't see the
3498 * extension in their ClientHello */
3499 if (!s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
3500 {
3501 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION);
3502 return -1;
3503 }
3504
3505 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3506 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A,
3507 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B,
3508 SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO,
3509 514, /* See the payload format below */
3510 &ok);
3511
3512 if (!ok)
3513 return((int)n);
3514
3515 /* s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received
3516 * in this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset
3517 * by ssl3_get_finished). */
3518 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
3519 {
3520 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS);
3521 return -1;
3522 }
3523
3524 if (n < 2)
3525 return 0; /* The body must be > 1 bytes long */
3526
3527 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3528
3529 /* The payload looks like:
3530 * uint8 proto_len;
3531 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
3532 * uint8 padding_len;
3533 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
3534 */
3535 proto_len = p[0];
3536 if (proto_len + 2 > s->init_num)
3537 return 0;
3538 padding_len = p[proto_len + 1];
3539 if (proto_len + padding_len + 2 != s->init_num)
3540 return 0;
3541
3542 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(proto_len);
3543 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
3544 {
3545 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3546 return 0;
3547 }
3548 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, p + 1, proto_len);
3549 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = proto_len;
3550
3551 return 1;
3552 }
3553 # endif
3554 #endif
A mirror of the official openssl repository