1 /* ssl/s3_srvr.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
124 /* ====================================================================
125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
142 * to make use of the Contribution.
144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
151 #define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
152 #define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
155 #include "ssl_locl.h"
156 #include "kssl_lcl.h"
157 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
158 #include <openssl/rand.h>
159 #include <openssl/objects.h>
160 #include <openssl/evp.h>
161 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
162 #include <openssl/x509.h>
163 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
164 #include <openssl/dh.h>
166 #include <openssl/bn.h>
167 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
168 #include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
170 #include <openssl/md5.h>
172 static const SSL_METHOD
*ssl3_get_server_method(int ver
);
174 static const SSL_METHOD
*ssl3_get_server_method(int ver
)
176 if (ver
== SSL3_VERSION
)
177 return(SSLv3_server_method());
182 IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method
,
184 ssl_undefined_function
,
185 ssl3_get_server_method
)
187 int ssl3_accept(SSL
*s
)
190 unsigned long alg_k
,Time
=(unsigned long)time(NULL
);
191 void (*cb
)(const SSL
*ssl
,int type
,int val
)=NULL
;
193 int new_state
,state
,skip
=0;
195 RAND_add(&Time
,sizeof(Time
),0);
199 if (s
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
201 else if (s
->ctx
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
202 cb
=s
->ctx
->info_callback
;
204 /* init things to blank */
206 if (!SSL_in_init(s
) || SSL_in_before(s
)) SSL_clear(s
);
210 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT
,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET
);
220 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE
:
222 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
226 case SSL_ST_BEFORE
|SSL_ST_ACCEPT
:
227 case SSL_ST_OK
|SSL_ST_ACCEPT
:
230 if (cb
!= NULL
) cb(s
,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START
,1);
232 if ((s
->version
>>8) != 3)
234 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
237 s
->type
=SSL_ST_ACCEPT
;
239 if (s
->init_buf
== NULL
)
241 if ((buf
=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL
)
246 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf
,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
))
254 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s
))
262 if (s
->state
!= SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE
)
264 /* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that
265 * the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
267 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s
,1)) { ret
= -1; goto end
; }
269 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s
);
270 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A
;
271 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_accept
++;
273 else if (!s
->s3
->send_connection_binding
&&
274 !(s
->options
& SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION
))
276 /* Server attempting to renegotiate with
277 * client that doesn't support secure
280 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT
, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED
);
281 ssl3_send_alert(s
,SSL3_AL_FATAL
,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
287 /* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE,
288 * we will just send a HelloRequest */
289 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_accept_renegotiate
++;
290 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A
;
294 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A
:
295 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B
:
298 ret
=ssl3_send_hello_request(s
);
299 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
300 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C
;
301 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH
;
304 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s
);
307 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C
:
311 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A
:
312 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B
:
313 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C
:
316 ret
=ssl3_get_client_hello(s
);
317 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
320 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A
;
324 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A
:
325 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B
:
326 ret
=ssl3_send_server_hello(s
);
327 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
328 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
331 if (s
->tlsext_ticket_expected
)
332 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A
;
334 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A
;
338 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A
;
341 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A
;
345 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A
:
346 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B
:
347 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
348 /* normal PSK or KRB5 */
349 if (!(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aNULL
)
350 && !(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kPSK
)
351 && !(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aKRB5
))
353 ret
=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s
);
354 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
355 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
356 if (s
->tlsext_status_expected
)
357 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A
;
359 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A
;
364 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A
;
371 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A
;
376 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A
:
377 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B
:
378 alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
380 /* clear this, it may get reset by
381 * send_server_key_exchange */
382 if ((s
->options
& SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA
)
383 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
384 && !(alg_k
& SSL_kKRB5
)
385 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
387 /* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key
388 * even when forbidden by protocol specs
389 * (handshake may fail as clients are not required to
390 * be able to handle this) */
391 s
->s3
->tmp
.use_rsa_tmp
=1;
393 s
->s3
->tmp
.use_rsa_tmp
=0;
396 /* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or
397 * RSA but we have a sign only certificate
399 * PSK: may send PSK identity hints
401 * For ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange
402 * message only if the cipher suite is either
403 * ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, the
404 * server certificate contains the server's
405 * public key for key exchange.
407 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.use_rsa_tmp
408 /* PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity
409 * hint if provided */
410 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
411 || ((alg_k
& SSL_kPSK
) && s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
)
413 || (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHr
|SSL_kDHd
|SSL_kEDH
))
414 || (alg_k
& SSL_kEECDH
)
415 || ((alg_k
& SSL_kRSA
)
416 && (s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
].privatekey
== NULL
417 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
)
418 && EVP_PKEY_size(s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
].privatekey
)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
)
424 ret
=ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s
);
425 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
430 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A
;
434 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A
:
435 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B
:
436 if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
437 !(s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
) ||
438 /* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set,
439 * don't request cert during re-negotiation: */
440 ((s
->session
->peer
!= NULL
) &&
441 (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE
)) ||
442 /* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites
443 * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts
444 * and in RFC 2246): */
445 ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aNULL
) &&
446 /* ... except when the application insists on verification
447 * (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */
448 !(s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT
)) ||
449 /* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */
450 (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aKRB5
)
451 /* With normal PSK Certificates and
452 * Certificate Requests are omitted */
453 || (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kPSK
))
455 /* no cert request */
457 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
=0;
458 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A
;
462 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
=1;
463 ret
=ssl3_send_certificate_request(s
);
464 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
465 #ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
466 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A
;
468 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH
;
469 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A
;
475 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A
:
476 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B
:
477 ret
=ssl3_send_server_done(s
);
478 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
479 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A
;
480 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH
;
484 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH
:
486 /* This code originally checked to see if
487 * any data was pending using BIO_CTRL_INFO
488 * and then flushed. This caused problems
489 * as documented in PR#1939. The proposed
490 * fix doesn't completely resolve this issue
491 * as buggy implementations of BIO_CTRL_PENDING
492 * still exist. So instead we just flush
496 s
->rwstate
=SSL_WRITING
;
497 if (BIO_flush(s
->wbio
) <= 0)
502 s
->rwstate
=SSL_NOTHING
;
504 s
->state
=s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
;
507 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A
:
508 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B
:
509 /* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */
510 ret
= ssl3_check_client_hello(s
);
514 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C
;
516 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
)
518 ret
=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s
);
519 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
522 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A
;
526 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A
:
527 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B
:
528 ret
=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s
);
533 /* For the ECDH ciphersuites when
534 * the client sends its ECDH pub key in
535 * a certificate, the CertificateVerify
536 * message is not sent.
537 * Also for GOST ciphersuites when
538 * the client uses its key from the certificate
541 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
542 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
;
544 if (s
->s3
->next_proto_neg_seen
)
545 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A
;
547 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
;
556 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A
;
559 /* We need to get hashes here so if there is
560 * a client cert, it can be verified
561 * FIXME - digest processing for CertificateVerify
562 * should be generalized. But it is next step
564 if (s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
)
565 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
))
567 for (dgst_num
=0; dgst_num
<SSL_MAX_DIGEST
;dgst_num
++)
568 if (s
->s3
->handshake_dgst
[dgst_num
])
572 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->cert_verify_mac(s
,EVP_MD_CTX_type(s
->s3
->handshake_dgst
[dgst_num
]),&(s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_verify_md
[offset
]));
573 dgst_size
=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s
->s3
->handshake_dgst
[dgst_num
]);
584 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A
:
585 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B
:
587 /* we should decide if we expected this one */
588 ret
=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s
);
589 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
591 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
592 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
;
594 if (s
->s3
->next_proto_neg_seen
)
595 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A
;
597 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
;
602 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
603 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A
:
604 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B
:
605 ret
=ssl3_get_next_proto(s
);
606 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
608 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
;
612 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
:
613 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B
:
614 ret
=ssl3_get_finished(s
,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
,
615 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B
);
616 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
617 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
618 if (s
->tlsext_ticket_expected
)
619 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A
;
627 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A
;
631 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
632 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A
:
633 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B
:
634 ret
=ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s
);
635 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
636 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A
;
640 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A
:
641 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B
:
642 ret
=ssl3_send_cert_status(s
);
643 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
644 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A
;
650 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A
:
651 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B
:
653 s
->session
->cipher
=s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
;
654 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->setup_key_block(s
))
655 { ret
= -1; goto end
; }
657 ret
=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s
,
658 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A
,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B
);
660 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
661 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A
;
664 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
665 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE
))
673 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A
:
674 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B
:
675 ret
=ssl3_send_finished(s
,
676 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A
,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B
,
677 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->server_finished_label
,
678 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->server_finished_label_len
);
679 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
680 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH
;
683 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
684 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
;
686 if (s
->s3
->next_proto_neg_seen
)
687 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A
;
689 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
;
693 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
=SSL_ST_OK
;
698 /* clean a few things up */
699 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s
);
701 BUF_MEM_free(s
->init_buf
);
704 /* remove buffering on output */
705 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s
);
709 if (s
->renegotiate
== 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
711 /* actually not necessarily a 'new' session unless
712 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is set */
717 ssl_update_cache(s
,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER
);
719 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_accept_good
++;
721 s
->handshake_func
=ssl3_accept
;
723 if (cb
!= NULL
) cb(s
,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE
,1);
731 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT
,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE
);
737 if (!s
->s3
->tmp
.reuse_message
&& !skip
)
741 if ((ret
=BIO_flush(s
->wbio
)) <= 0)
746 if ((cb
!= NULL
) && (s
->state
!= state
))
750 cb(s
,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP
,1);
757 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
761 cb(s
,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT
,ret
);
765 int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL
*s
)
769 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A
)
771 p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
772 *(p
++)=SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST
;
777 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B
;
778 /* number of bytes to write */
783 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
784 return(ssl3_do_write(s
,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
));
787 int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL
*s
)
792 /* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message,
793 * so permit appropriate message length */
794 n
=s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
800 if (!ok
) return((int)n
);
801 s
->s3
->tmp
.reuse_message
= 1;
802 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
== SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO
)
804 /* Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake,
805 * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.)
806 * I hope that tmp.dh is the only thing that may need to be cleared
807 * when a handshake is not completed ... */
808 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
809 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
!= NULL
)
811 DH_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
);
812 s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
= NULL
;
820 int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL
*s
)
822 int i
,j
,ok
,al
,ret
= -1;
823 unsigned int cookie_len
;
826 unsigned char *p
,*d
,*q
;
828 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
831 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *ciphers
=NULL
;
833 /* We do this so that we will respond with our native type.
834 * If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1,
835 * This down switching should be handled by a different method.
836 * If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with
839 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A
)
841 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B
;
844 n
=s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
845 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B
,
846 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C
,
847 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
848 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
,
851 if (!ok
) return((int)n
);
853 d
=p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
855 /* use version from inside client hello, not from record header
856 * (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */
857 s
->client_version
=(((int)p
[0])<<8)|(int)p
[1];
860 if ((s
->version
== DTLS1_VERSION
&& s
->client_version
> s
->version
) ||
861 (s
->version
!= DTLS1_VERSION
&& s
->client_version
< s
->version
))
863 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER
);
864 if ((s
->client_version
>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR
)
866 /* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
867 s
->version
= s
->client_version
;
869 al
= SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
873 /* If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't
874 * contain one, just return since we do not want to
875 * allocate any memory yet. So check cookie length...
877 if (SSL_get_options(s
) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE
)
879 unsigned int session_length
, cookie_length
;
881 session_length
= *(p
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
882 cookie_length
= *(p
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
+ session_length
+ 1);
884 if (cookie_length
== 0)
888 /* load the client random */
889 memcpy(s
->s3
->client_random
,p
,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
892 /* get the session-id */
896 /* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow session reuse during renegotiation
897 * (i.e. when s->new_session is true), option
898 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is new with 0.9.7.
899 * Maybe this optional behaviour should always have been the default,
900 * but we cannot safely change the default behaviour (or new applications
901 * might be written that become totally unsecure when compiled with
902 * an earlier library version)
904 if ((s
->new_session
&& (s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
)))
906 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s
,1))
911 i
=ssl_get_prev_session(s
, p
, j
, d
+ n
);
913 { /* previous session */
920 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s
,1))
927 if (s
->version
== DTLS1_VERSION
|| s
->version
== DTLS1_BAD_VER
)
933 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
934 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
935 * does not cause an overflow.
937 if ( cookie_len
> sizeof(s
->d1
->rcvd_cookie
))
940 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
941 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH
);
945 /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
946 if ((SSL_get_options(s
) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE
) &&
949 memcpy(s
->d1
->rcvd_cookie
, p
, cookie_len
);
951 if ( s
->ctx
->app_verify_cookie_cb
!= NULL
)
953 if ( s
->ctx
->app_verify_cookie_cb(s
, s
->d1
->rcvd_cookie
,
956 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
957 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,
958 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH
);
961 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
963 else if ( memcmp(s
->d1
->rcvd_cookie
, s
->d1
->cookie
,
964 s
->d1
->cookie_len
) != 0) /* default verification */
966 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
967 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,
968 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH
);
979 if ((i
== 0) && (j
!= 0))
981 /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */
982 al
=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
983 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED
);
988 /* not enough data */
989 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
990 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
993 if ((i
> 0) && (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s
,p
,i
,&(ciphers
))
1000 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
1001 if ((s
->hit
) && (i
> 0))
1004 id
=s
->session
->cipher
->id
;
1007 printf("client sent %d ciphers\n",sk_num(ciphers
));
1009 for (i
=0; i
<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers
); i
++)
1011 c
=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers
,i
);
1013 printf("client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1014 i
,sk_num(ciphers
),SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c
));
1022 if (j
== 0 && (s
->options
& SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG
) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers
) == 1))
1024 /* Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used cipher may
1025 * not be in the current list, the client instead might be trying to
1026 * continue using a cipher that before wasn't chosen due to server
1027 * preferences. We'll have to reject the connection if the cipher is not
1028 * enabled, though. */
1029 c
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers
, 0);
1030 if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s
), c
) >= 0)
1032 s
->session
->cipher
= c
;
1038 /* we need to have the cipher in the cipher
1039 * list if we are asked to reuse it */
1040 al
=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1041 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING
);
1050 /* not enough data */
1051 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1052 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1058 if (p
[j
] == 0) break;
1065 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1066 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED
);
1070 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1072 if (s
->version
>= SSL3_VERSION
)
1074 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s
,&p
,d
,n
, &al
))
1076 /* 'al' set by ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext */
1077 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT
);
1081 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(s
) <= 0) {
1082 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
);
1086 /* Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this
1087 * handshake for not reused session only. We need to generate
1088 * server_random before calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow
1089 * SessionTicket processing to use it in key derivation. */
1093 Time
=(unsigned long)time(NULL
); /* Time */
1094 pos
=s
->s3
->server_random
;
1096 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(pos
,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
-4) <= 0)
1098 al
=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1103 if (!s
->hit
&& s
->version
>= TLS1_VERSION
&& s
->tls_session_secret_cb
)
1105 SSL_CIPHER
*pref_cipher
=NULL
;
1107 s
->session
->master_key_length
=sizeof(s
->session
->master_key
);
1108 if(s
->tls_session_secret_cb(s
, s
->session
->master_key
, &s
->session
->master_key_length
,
1109 ciphers
, &pref_cipher
, s
->tls_session_secret_cb_arg
))
1112 s
->session
->ciphers
=ciphers
;
1113 s
->session
->verify_result
=X509_V_OK
;
1117 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1118 pref_cipher
=pref_cipher
? pref_cipher
: ssl3_choose_cipher(s
, s
->session
->ciphers
, SSL_get_ciphers(s
));
1119 if (pref_cipher
== NULL
)
1121 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1122 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER
);
1126 s
->session
->cipher
=pref_cipher
;
1129 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s
->cipher_list
);
1131 if (s
->cipher_list_by_id
)
1132 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s
->cipher_list_by_id
);
1134 s
->cipher_list
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s
->session
->ciphers
);
1135 s
->cipher_list_by_id
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s
->session
->ciphers
);
1140 /* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1141 * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
1142 * algorithms from the client, starting at q. */
1143 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
=NULL
;
1144 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1145 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1146 if (s
->session
->compress_meth
!= 0)
1148 int m
, comp_id
= s
->session
->compress_meth
;
1149 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1150 /* Can't disable compression */
1151 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION
)
1153 al
=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1154 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION
);
1157 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1158 for (m
= 0; m
< sk_SSL_COMP_num(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
); m
++)
1160 comp
=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
,m
);
1161 if (comp_id
== comp
->id
)
1163 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
=comp
;
1167 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
== NULL
)
1169 al
=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1170 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM
);
1173 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1174 for (m
= 0; m
< i
; m
++)
1176 if (q
[m
] == comp_id
)
1181 al
=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1182 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING
);
1188 else if (!(s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION
) && s
->ctx
->comp_methods
)
1189 { /* See if we have a match */
1190 int m
,nn
,o
,v
,done
=0;
1192 nn
=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
);
1193 for (m
=0; m
<nn
; m
++)
1195 comp
=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
,m
);
1208 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
=comp
;
1213 /* If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1214 * using compression.
1216 if (s
->session
->compress_meth
!= 0)
1218 al
=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1219 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION
);
1224 /* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must
1229 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1230 s
->session
->compress_meth
=0;
1232 s
->session
->compress_meth
=(comp
== NULL
)?0:comp
->id
;
1234 if (s
->session
->ciphers
!= NULL
)
1235 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s
->session
->ciphers
);
1236 s
->session
->ciphers
=ciphers
;
1237 if (ciphers
== NULL
)
1239 al
=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1240 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED
);
1244 c
=ssl3_choose_cipher(s
,s
->session
->ciphers
,
1245 SSL_get_ciphers(s
));
1249 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1250 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER
);
1253 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
=c
;
1254 /* check whether we should disable session resumption */
1255 if (s
->not_resumable_session_cb
!= NULL
)
1256 s
->session
->not_resumable
=s
->not_resumable_session_cb(s
,
1257 ((c
->algorithm_mkey
& (SSL_kEDH
| SSL_kEECDH
)) != 0));
1258 if (s
->session
->not_resumable
)
1259 /* do not send a session ticket */
1260 s
->tlsext_ticket_expected
= 0;
1264 /* Session-id reuse */
1265 #ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
1266 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *sk
;
1267 SSL_CIPHER
*nc
=NULL
;
1268 SSL_CIPHER
*ec
=NULL
;
1270 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG
)
1272 sk
=s
->session
->ciphers
;
1273 for (i
=0; i
<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk
); i
++)
1275 c
=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk
,i
);
1276 if (c
->algorithm_enc
& SSL_eNULL
)
1278 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c
))
1282 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
=nc
;
1283 else if (ec
!= NULL
)
1284 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
=ec
;
1286 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
=s
->session
->cipher
;
1290 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
=s
->session
->cipher
;
1293 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
))
1296 /* we now have the following setup.
1298 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
1299 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
1300 * compression - basically ignored right now
1301 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1302 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1303 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1304 * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
1311 ssl3_send_alert(s
,SSL3_AL_FATAL
,al
);
1314 if (ciphers
!= NULL
) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers
);
1318 int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL
*s
)
1321 unsigned char *p
,*d
;
1324 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1328 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A
)
1330 buf
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
1331 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1332 p
=s
->s3
->server_random
;
1333 /* Generate server_random if it was not needed previously */
1334 Time
=(unsigned long)time(NULL
); /* Time */
1336 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p
,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
-4) <= 0)
1339 /* Do the message type and length last */
1342 *(p
++)=s
->version
>>8;
1343 *(p
++)=s
->version
&0xff;
1346 memcpy(p
,s
->s3
->server_random
,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
1347 p
+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
;
1349 /* now in theory we have 3 options to sending back the
1350 * session id. If it is a re-use, we send back the
1351 * old session-id, if it is a new session, we send
1352 * back the new session-id or we send back a 0 length
1353 * session-id if we want it to be single use.
1354 * Currently I will not implement the '0' length session-id
1355 * 12-Jan-98 - I'll now support the '0' length stuff.
1357 * We also have an additional case where stateless session
1358 * resumption is successful: we always send back the old
1359 * session id. In this case s->hit is non zero: this can
1360 * only happen if stateless session resumption is succesful
1361 * if session caching is disabled so existing functionality
1364 if (s
->session
->not_resumable
||
1365 (!(s
->ctx
->session_cache_mode
& SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER
)
1367 s
->session
->session_id_length
=0;
1369 sl
=s
->session
->session_id_length
;
1370 if (sl
> (int)sizeof(s
->session
->session_id
))
1372 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1376 memcpy(p
,s
->session
->session_id
,sl
);
1379 /* put the cipher */
1380 i
=ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
,p
);
1383 /* put the compression method */
1384 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1387 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
== NULL
)
1390 *(p
++)=s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
->id
;
1392 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1393 if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s
) <= 0)
1395 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO
,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT
);
1398 if ((p
= ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s
, p
, buf
+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
)) == NULL
)
1400 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO
,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1407 *(d
++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO
;
1410 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B
;
1411 /* number of bytes to write */
1416 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
1417 return(ssl3_do_write(s
,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
));
1420 int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL
*s
)
1424 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A
)
1426 p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
1429 *(p
++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE
;
1434 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B
;
1435 /* number of bytes to write */
1440 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
1441 return(ssl3_do_write(s
,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
));
1444 int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL
*s
)
1446 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1450 unsigned char md_buf
[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
];
1453 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1456 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1457 EC_KEY
*ecdh
=NULL
, *ecdhp
;
1458 unsigned char *encodedPoint
= NULL
;
1461 BN_CTX
*bn_ctx
= NULL
;
1464 unsigned char *p
,*d
;
1474 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx
);
1475 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A
)
1477 type
=s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
1482 r
[0]=r
[1]=r
[2]=r
[3]=NULL
;
1484 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1485 if (type
& SSL_kRSA
)
1488 if ((rsa
== NULL
) && (s
->cert
->rsa_tmp_cb
!= NULL
))
1490 rsa
=s
->cert
->rsa_tmp_cb(s
,
1491 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
),
1492 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
));
1495 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1496 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY
);
1504 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1505 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY
);
1510 s
->s3
->tmp
.use_rsa_tmp
=1;
1514 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1515 if (type
& SSL_kEDH
)
1518 if ((dhp
== NULL
) && (s
->cert
->dh_tmp_cb
!= NULL
))
1519 dhp
=s
->cert
->dh_tmp_cb(s
,
1520 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
),
1521 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
));
1524 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1525 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY
);
1529 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
!= NULL
)
1532 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1536 if ((dh
=DHparams_dup(dhp
)) == NULL
)
1538 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_DH_LIB
);
1543 if ((dhp
->pub_key
== NULL
||
1544 dhp
->priv_key
== NULL
||
1545 (s
->options
& SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE
)))
1547 if(!DH_generate_key(dh
))
1549 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1556 dh
->pub_key
=BN_dup(dhp
->pub_key
);
1557 dh
->priv_key
=BN_dup(dhp
->priv_key
);
1558 if ((dh
->pub_key
== NULL
) ||
1559 (dh
->priv_key
== NULL
))
1561 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_DH_LIB
);
1571 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1572 if (type
& SSL_kEECDH
)
1574 const EC_GROUP
*group
;
1576 ecdhp
=cert
->ecdh_tmp
;
1577 if ((ecdhp
== NULL
) && (s
->cert
->ecdh_tmp_cb
!= NULL
))
1579 ecdhp
=s
->cert
->ecdh_tmp_cb(s
,
1580 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
),
1581 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
));
1585 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1586 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY
);
1590 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.ecdh
!= NULL
)
1592 EC_KEY_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.ecdh
);
1593 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1597 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
1600 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB
);
1603 if (!EC_KEY_up_ref(ecdhp
))
1605 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB
);
1610 s
->s3
->tmp
.ecdh
=ecdh
;
1611 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh
) == NULL
) ||
1612 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh
) == NULL
) ||
1613 (s
->options
& SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE
))
1615 if(!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh
))
1617 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB
);
1622 if (((group
= EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh
)) == NULL
) ||
1623 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh
) == NULL
) ||
1624 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh
) == NULL
))
1626 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB
);
1630 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
) &&
1631 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group
) > 163))
1633 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER
);
1637 /* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH
1638 * keys over named (not generic) curves. For
1639 * supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero.
1642 tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group
)))
1645 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE
);
1649 /* Encode the public key.
1650 * First check the size of encoding and
1651 * allocate memory accordingly.
1653 encodedlen
= EC_POINT_point2oct(group
,
1654 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh
),
1655 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED
,
1658 encodedPoint
= (unsigned char *)
1659 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen
*sizeof(unsigned char));
1660 bn_ctx
= BN_CTX_new();
1661 if ((encodedPoint
== NULL
) || (bn_ctx
== NULL
))
1663 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1668 encodedlen
= EC_POINT_point2oct(group
,
1669 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh
),
1670 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED
,
1671 encodedPoint
, encodedlen
, bn_ctx
);
1673 if (encodedlen
== 0)
1675 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB
);
1679 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx
); bn_ctx
=NULL
;
1681 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not
1682 * generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges.
1683 * In this situation, we need four additional bytes
1684 * to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
1689 /* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message
1690 * explicitly so we can set these to NULLs
1698 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
1699 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1700 if (type
& SSL_kPSK
)
1702 /* reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint*/
1703 n
+=2+strlen(s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
);
1706 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1708 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1709 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE
);
1712 for (i
=0; r
[i
] != NULL
; i
++)
1714 nr
[i
]=BN_num_bytes(r
[i
]);
1718 if (!(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aNULL
)
1719 && !(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kPSK
))
1721 if ((pkey
=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s
,s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
))
1724 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1727 kn
=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey
);
1735 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf
,n
+4+kn
))
1737 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_LIB_BUF
);
1740 d
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
1743 for (i
=0; r
[i
] != NULL
; i
++)
1750 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1751 if (type
& SSL_kEECDH
)
1753 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves.
1754 * In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has:
1755 * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
1756 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by
1757 * the actual encoded point itself
1759 *p
= NAMED_CURVE_TYPE
;
1767 memcpy((unsigned char*)p
,
1768 (unsigned char *)encodedPoint
,
1770 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint
);
1775 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1776 if (type
& SSL_kPSK
)
1778 /* copy PSK identity hint */
1779 s2n(strlen(s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
), p
);
1780 strncpy((char *)p
, s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
, strlen(s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
));
1781 p
+=strlen(s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
);
1788 /* n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4])
1789 * and p points to the space at the end. */
1790 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1791 if (pkey
->type
== EVP_PKEY_RSA
)
1795 for (num
=2; num
> 0; num
--)
1797 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx
,(num
== 2)
1798 ?s
->ctx
->md5
:s
->ctx
->sha1
, NULL
);
1799 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx
,&(s
->s3
->client_random
[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
1800 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx
,&(s
->s3
->server_random
[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
1801 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx
,&(d
[4]),n
);
1802 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx
,q
,
1803 (unsigned int *)&i
);
1807 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1
, md_buf
, j
,
1808 &(p
[2]), &u
, pkey
->pkey
.rsa
) <= 0)
1810 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_LIB_RSA
);
1818 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA)
1819 if (pkey
->type
== EVP_PKEY_DSA
)
1822 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx
,EVP_dss1(), NULL
);
1823 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx
,&(s
->s3
->client_random
[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
1824 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx
,&(s
->s3
->server_random
[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
1825 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx
,&(d
[4]),n
);
1826 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx
,&(p
[2]),
1827 (unsigned int *)&i
,pkey
))
1829 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_LIB_DSA
);
1837 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA)
1838 if (pkey
->type
== EVP_PKEY_EC
)
1840 /* let's do ECDSA */
1841 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx
,EVP_ecdsa(), NULL
);
1842 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx
,&(s
->s3
->client_random
[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
1843 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx
,&(s
->s3
->server_random
[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
1844 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx
,&(d
[4]),n
);
1845 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx
,&(p
[2]),
1846 (unsigned int *)&i
,pkey
))
1848 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_LIB_ECDSA
);
1857 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
1858 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1859 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE
);
1864 *(d
++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
;
1867 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
1873 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B
;
1874 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx
);
1875 return(ssl3_do_write(s
,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
));
1877 ssl3_send_alert(s
,SSL3_AL_FATAL
,al
);
1879 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1880 if (encodedPoint
!= NULL
) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint
);
1881 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx
);
1883 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx
);
1887 int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL
*s
)
1889 unsigned char *p
,*d
;
1891 STACK_OF(X509_NAME
) *sk
=NULL
;
1895 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A
)
1899 d
=p
=(unsigned char *)&(buf
->data
[4]);
1901 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
1903 n
=ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s
,p
);
1912 sk
=SSL_get_client_CA_list(s
);
1916 for (i
=0; i
<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk
); i
++)
1918 name
=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk
,i
);
1919 j
=i2d_X509_NAME(name
,NULL
);
1920 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf
,4+n
+j
+2))
1922 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,ERR_R_BUF_LIB
);
1925 p
=(unsigned char *)&(buf
->data
[4+n
]);
1926 if (!(s
->options
& SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG
))
1929 i2d_X509_NAME(name
,&p
);
1936 i2d_X509_NAME(name
,&p
);
1937 j
-=2; s2n(j
,d
); j
+=2;
1943 /* else no CA names */
1944 p
=(unsigned char *)&(buf
->data
[4+off
]);
1947 d
=(unsigned char *)buf
->data
;
1948 *(d
++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
;
1951 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
1956 #ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
1957 p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
+ s
->init_num
;
1960 *(p
++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE
;
1967 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B
;
1970 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
1971 return(ssl3_do_write(s
,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
));
1976 int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL
*s
)
1980 unsigned long alg_k
;
1982 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1984 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
=NULL
;
1986 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1990 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1992 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
1994 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1995 EC_KEY
*srvr_ecdh
= NULL
;
1996 EVP_PKEY
*clnt_pub_pkey
= NULL
;
1997 EC_POINT
*clnt_ecpoint
= NULL
;
1998 BN_CTX
*bn_ctx
= NULL
;
2001 n
=s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
2002 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A
,
2003 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B
,
2004 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2008 if (!ok
) return((int)n
);
2009 p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
2011 alg_k
=s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
2013 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2014 if (alg_k
& SSL_kRSA
)
2016 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
2017 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.use_rsa_tmp
)
2019 if ((s
->cert
!= NULL
) && (s
->cert
->rsa_tmp
!= NULL
))
2020 rsa
=s
->cert
->rsa_tmp
;
2021 /* Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should
2022 * be sent already */
2025 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2026 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY
);
2033 pkey
=s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
].privatekey
;
2034 if ( (pkey
== NULL
) ||
2035 (pkey
->type
!= EVP_PKEY_RSA
) ||
2036 (pkey
->pkey
.rsa
== NULL
))
2038 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2039 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE
);
2045 /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */
2046 if (s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
&& s
->version
!= DTLS1_BAD_VER
)
2051 if (!(s
->options
& SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG
))
2053 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG
);
2063 i
=RSA_private_decrypt((int)n
,p
,p
,rsa
,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING
);
2067 if (i
!= SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
)
2069 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2070 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); */
2073 if ((al
== -1) && !((p
[0] == (s
->client_version
>>8)) && (p
[1] == (s
->client_version
& 0xff))))
2075 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2076 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2077 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2078 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
2079 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
2081 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. */
2082 if (!((s
->options
& SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG
) &&
2083 (p
[0] == (s
->version
>>8)) && (p
[1] == (s
->version
& 0xff))))
2085 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2086 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER); */
2088 /* The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2089 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version
2090 * number check as a "bad version oracle" -- an alert would
2091 * reveal that the plaintext corresponding to some ciphertext
2092 * made up by the adversary is properly formatted except
2093 * that the version number is wrong. To avoid such attacks,
2094 * we should treat this just like any other decryption error. */
2100 /* Some decryption failure -- use random value instead as countermeasure
2101 * against Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding
2102 * (see RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). */
2104 i
= SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
;
2105 p
[0] = s
->client_version
>> 8;
2106 p
[1] = s
->client_version
& 0xff;
2107 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p
+2, i
-2) <= 0) /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure */
2111 s
->session
->master_key_length
=
2112 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
2113 s
->session
->master_key
,
2115 OPENSSL_cleanse(p
,i
);
2119 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2120 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kEDH
|SSL_kDHr
|SSL_kDHd
))
2125 if (!(s
->options
& SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG
))
2127 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG
);
2137 if (n
== 0L) /* the parameters are in the cert */
2139 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2140 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_DH_CERTS
);
2145 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
== NULL
)
2147 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2148 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY
);
2152 dh_srvr
=s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
;
2155 pub
=BN_bin2bn(p
,i
,NULL
);
2158 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_BN_LIB
);
2162 i
=DH_compute_key(p
,pub
,dh_srvr
);
2166 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_DH_LIB
);
2170 DH_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
);
2175 s
->session
->master_key_length
=
2176 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
2177 s
->session
->master_key
,p
,i
);
2178 OPENSSL_cleanse(p
,i
);
2182 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2183 if (alg_k
& SSL_kKRB5
)
2185 krb5_error_code krb5rc
;
2186 krb5_data enc_ticket
;
2187 krb5_data authenticator
;
2189 KSSL_CTX
*kssl_ctx
= s
->kssl_ctx
;
2190 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx
;
2191 const EVP_CIPHER
*enc
= NULL
;
2192 unsigned char iv
[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH
];
2193 unsigned char pms
[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
2194 + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH
];
2196 krb5_timestamp authtime
= 0;
2197 krb5_ticket_times ttimes
;
2199 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx
);
2201 if (!kssl_ctx
) kssl_ctx
= kssl_ctx_new();
2204 enc_ticket
.length
= i
;
2206 if (n
< (long)(enc_ticket
.length
+ 6))
2208 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2209 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2213 enc_ticket
.data
= (char *)p
;
2214 p
+=enc_ticket
.length
;
2217 authenticator
.length
= i
;
2219 if (n
< (long)(enc_ticket
.length
+ authenticator
.length
+ 6))
2221 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2222 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2226 authenticator
.data
= (char *)p
;
2227 p
+=authenticator
.length
;
2231 enc_pms
.data
= (char *)p
;
2234 /* Note that the length is checked again below,
2237 if(enc_pms
.length
> sizeof pms
)
2239 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2240 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2244 if (n
!= (long)(enc_ticket
.length
+ authenticator
.length
+
2245 enc_pms
.length
+ 6))
2247 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2248 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2252 if ((krb5rc
= kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx
, &enc_ticket
, &ttimes
,
2256 printf("kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
2257 krb5rc
, kssl_err
.reason
);
2259 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err
.text
);
2260 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2261 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2266 /* Note: no authenticator is not considered an error,
2267 ** but will return authtime == 0.
2269 if ((krb5rc
= kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx
, &authenticator
,
2270 &authtime
, &kssl_err
)) != 0)
2273 printf("kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
2274 krb5rc
, kssl_err
.reason
);
2276 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err
.text
);
2277 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2278 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2283 if ((krb5rc
= kssl_validate_times(authtime
, &ttimes
)) != 0)
2285 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, krb5rc
);
2290 kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx
);
2291 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2293 enc
= kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx
->enctype
);
2297 memset(iv
, 0, sizeof iv
); /* per RFC 1510 */
2299 if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx
,enc
,NULL
,kssl_ctx
->key
,iv
))
2301 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2302 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
2305 if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx
, pms
,&outl
,
2306 (unsigned char *)enc_pms
.data
, enc_pms
.length
))
2308 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2309 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
2312 if (outl
> SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
)
2314 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2315 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2318 if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx
,&(pms
[outl
]),&padl
))
2320 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2321 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
2325 if (outl
> SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
)
2327 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2328 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2331 if (!((pms
[0] == (s
->client_version
>>8)) && (pms
[1] == (s
->client_version
& 0xff))))
2333 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2334 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2335 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2336 * However, buggy clients exist that send random bytes instead of
2337 * the protocol version.
2338 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients.
2339 * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos cipher)
2341 if (!(s
->options
& SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG
))
2343 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2344 SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
2349 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx
);
2351 s
->session
->master_key_length
=
2352 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
2353 s
->session
->master_key
, pms
, outl
);
2355 if (kssl_ctx
->client_princ
)
2357 size_t len
= strlen(kssl_ctx
->client_princ
);
2358 if ( len
< SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH
)
2360 s
->session
->krb5_client_princ_len
= len
;
2361 memcpy(s
->session
->krb5_client_princ
,kssl_ctx
->client_princ
,len
);
2366 /* Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
2367 ** but it caused problems for apache.
2368 ** kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
2369 ** if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
2373 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2375 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2376 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kEECDH
|SSL_kECDHr
|SSL_kECDHe
))
2381 const EC_GROUP
*group
;
2382 const BIGNUM
*priv_key
;
2384 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
2385 if ((srvr_ecdh
= EC_KEY_new()) == NULL
)
2387 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2388 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2392 /* Let's get server private key and group information */
2393 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kECDHr
|SSL_kECDHe
))
2395 /* use the certificate */
2396 tkey
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_ECC
].privatekey
->pkey
.ec
;
2400 /* use the ephermeral values we saved when
2401 * generating the ServerKeyExchange msg.
2403 tkey
= s
->s3
->tmp
.ecdh
;
2406 group
= EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey
);
2407 priv_key
= EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey
);
2409 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh
, group
) ||
2410 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh
, priv_key
))
2412 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2417 /* Let's get client's public key */
2418 if ((clnt_ecpoint
= EC_POINT_new(group
)) == NULL
)
2420 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2421 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2427 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
2429 if (alg_k
& SSL_kEECDH
)
2431 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2432 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY
);
2435 if (((clnt_pub_pkey
=X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
))
2437 (clnt_pub_pkey
->type
!= EVP_PKEY_EC
))
2439 /* XXX: For now, we do not support client
2440 * authentication using ECDH certificates
2441 * so this branch (n == 0L) of the code is
2442 * never executed. When that support is
2443 * added, we ought to ensure the key
2444 * received in the certificate is
2445 * authorized for key agreement.
2446 * ECDH_compute_key implicitly checks that
2447 * the two ECDH shares are for the same
2450 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2451 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2452 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS
);
2456 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint
,
2457 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey
->pkey
.ec
)) == 0)
2459 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2463 ret
= 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
2467 /* Get client's public key from encoded point
2468 * in the ClientKeyExchange message.
2470 if ((bn_ctx
= BN_CTX_new()) == NULL
)
2472 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2473 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2477 /* Get encoded point length */
2480 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group
,
2481 clnt_ecpoint
, p
, i
, bn_ctx
) == 0)
2483 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2487 /* p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer
2488 * currently, so set it to the start
2490 p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
2493 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
2494 field_size
= EC_GROUP_get_degree(group
);
2495 if (field_size
<= 0)
2497 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2501 i
= ECDH_compute_key(p
, (field_size
+7)/8, clnt_ecpoint
, srvr_ecdh
, NULL
);
2504 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2509 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey
);
2510 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint
);
2511 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh
);
2512 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx
);
2513 EC_KEY_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.ecdh
);
2514 s
->s3
->tmp
.ecdh
= NULL
;
2516 /* Compute the master secret */
2517 s
->session
->master_key_length
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
-> \
2518 generate_master_secret(s
, s
->session
->master_key
, p
, i
);
2520 OPENSSL_cleanse(p
, i
);
2525 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2526 if (alg_k
& SSL_kPSK
)
2528 unsigned char *t
= NULL
;
2529 unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms
[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
*2+4];
2530 unsigned int pre_ms_len
= 0, psk_len
= 0;
2532 char tmp_id
[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
+1];
2534 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2539 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2540 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2543 if (i
> PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
)
2545 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2546 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2549 if (s
->psk_server_callback
== NULL
)
2551 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2552 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB
);
2556 /* Create guaranteed NULL-terminated identity
2557 * string for the callback */
2558 memcpy(tmp_id
, p
, i
);
2559 memset(tmp_id
+i
, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
+1-i
);
2560 psk_len
= s
->psk_server_callback(s
, tmp_id
,
2561 psk_or_pre_ms
, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms
));
2562 OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_id
, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
+1);
2564 if (psk_len
> PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
)
2566 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2567 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2570 else if (psk_len
== 0)
2572 /* PSK related to the given identity not found */
2573 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2574 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND
);
2575 al
=SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY
;
2579 /* create PSK pre_master_secret */
2580 pre_ms_len
=2+psk_len
+2+psk_len
;
2582 memmove(psk_or_pre_ms
+psk_len
+4, psk_or_pre_ms
, psk_len
);
2584 memset(t
, 0, psk_len
);
2588 if (s
->session
->psk_identity
!= NULL
)
2589 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->psk_identity
);
2590 s
->session
->psk_identity
= BUF_strdup((char *)p
);
2591 if (s
->session
->psk_identity
== NULL
)
2593 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2594 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2598 if (s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
!= NULL
)
2599 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
);
2600 s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
= BUF_strdup(s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
);
2601 if (s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
!= NULL
&&
2602 s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
== NULL
)
2604 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2605 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2609 s
->session
->master_key_length
=
2610 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
2611 s
->session
->master_key
, psk_or_pre_ms
, pre_ms_len
);
2614 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms
, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms
));
2620 if (alg_k
& SSL_kGOST
)
2623 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pkey_ctx
;
2624 EVP_PKEY
*client_pub_pkey
= NULL
, *pk
= NULL
;
2625 unsigned char premaster_secret
[32], *start
;
2626 size_t outlen
=32, inlen
;
2627 unsigned long alg_a
;
2629 /* Get our certificate private key*/
2630 alg_a
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
;
2631 if (alg_a
& SSL_aGOST94
)
2632 pk
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_GOST94
].privatekey
;
2633 else if (alg_a
& SSL_aGOST01
)
2634 pk
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_GOST01
].privatekey
;
2636 pkey_ctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk
,NULL
);
2637 EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx
);
2638 /* If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
2639 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
2640 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use
2641 * a client certificate for authorization only. */
2642 client_pub_pkey
= X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
2643 if (client_pub_pkey
)
2645 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx
, client_pub_pkey
) <= 0)
2648 /* Decrypt session key */
2649 if ((*p
!=( V_ASN1_SEQUENCE
| V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED
)))
2651 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
2659 else if (p
[1] < 0x80)
2666 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
2669 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx
,premaster_secret
,&outlen
,start
,inlen
) <=0)
2672 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
2675 /* Generate master secret */
2676 s
->session
->master_key_length
=
2677 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
2678 s
->session
->master_key
,premaster_secret
,32);
2679 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2680 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx
, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY
, 2, NULL
) > 0)
2685 EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey
);
2686 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx
);
2694 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2695 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2696 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE
);
2702 ssl3_send_alert(s
,SSL3_AL_FATAL
,al
);
2703 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH)
2706 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2707 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey
);
2708 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint
);
2709 if (srvr_ecdh
!= NULL
)
2710 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh
);
2711 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx
);
2716 int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL
*s
)
2718 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
=NULL
;
2725 n
=s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
2726 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A
,
2727 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B
,
2732 if (!ok
) return((int)n
);
2734 if (s
->session
->peer
!= NULL
)
2736 peer
=s
->session
->peer
;
2737 pkey
=X509_get_pubkey(peer
);
2738 type
=X509_certificate_type(peer
,pkey
);
2746 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
!= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY
)
2748 s
->s3
->tmp
.reuse_message
=1;
2749 if ((peer
!= NULL
) && (type
| EVP_PKT_SIGN
))
2751 al
=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
2752 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE
);
2761 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED
);
2762 al
=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
2766 if (!(type
& EVP_PKT_SIGN
))
2768 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE
);
2769 al
=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
2773 if (s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
)
2775 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY
);
2776 al
=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
2780 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
2781 p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
2782 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
2783 /* If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare
2784 * signature without length field */
2785 if (n
==64 && (pkey
->type
==NID_id_GostR3410_94
||
2786 pkey
->type
== NID_id_GostR3410_2001
) )
2796 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2797 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2801 j
=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey
);
2802 if ((i
> j
) || (n
> j
) || (n
<= 0))
2804 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE
);
2805 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2809 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2810 if (pkey
->type
== EVP_PKEY_RSA
)
2812 i
=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1
, s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_verify_md
,
2813 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
, p
, i
,
2817 al
=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
2818 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT
);
2823 al
=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
2824 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE
);
2830 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2831 if (pkey
->type
== EVP_PKEY_DSA
)
2833 j
=DSA_verify(pkey
->save_type
,
2834 &(s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_verify_md
[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
]),
2835 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
,p
,i
,pkey
->pkey
.dsa
);
2839 al
=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
2840 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE
);
2846 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
2847 if (pkey
->type
== EVP_PKEY_EC
)
2849 j
=ECDSA_verify(pkey
->save_type
,
2850 &(s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_verify_md
[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
]),
2851 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
,p
,i
,pkey
->pkey
.ec
);
2855 al
=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
2856 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,
2857 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE
);
2863 if (pkey
->type
== NID_id_GostR3410_94
|| pkey
->type
== NID_id_GostR3410_2001
)
2864 { unsigned char signature
[64];
2866 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey
,NULL
);
2867 EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx
);
2869 fprintf(stderr
,"GOST signature length is %d",i
);
2871 for (idx
=0;idx
<64;idx
++) {
2872 signature
[63-idx
]=p
[idx
];
2874 j
=EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx
,signature
,64,s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_verify_md
,32);
2875 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
2878 al
=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
2879 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,
2880 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE
);
2886 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2887 al
=SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE
;
2896 ssl3_send_alert(s
,SSL3_AL_FATAL
,al
);
2899 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey
);
2903 int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL
*s
)
2905 int i
,ok
,al
,ret
= -1;
2907 unsigned long l
,nc
,llen
,n
;
2908 const unsigned char *p
,*q
;
2910 STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
=NULL
;
2912 n
=s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
2919 if (!ok
) return((int)n
);
2921 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
== SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
)
2923 if ( (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
) &&
2924 (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT
))
2926 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE
);
2927 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2930 /* If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list */
2931 if ((s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
) && s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
)
2933 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST
);
2934 al
=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
2937 s
->s3
->tmp
.reuse_message
=1;
2941 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
!= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
)
2943 al
=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
2944 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE
);
2947 p
=d
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
2949 if ((sk
=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL
)
2951 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2958 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2959 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2962 for (nc
=0; nc
<llen
; )
2965 if ((l
+nc
+3) > llen
)
2967 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2968 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2973 x
=d2i_X509(NULL
,&p
,l
);
2976 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB
);
2981 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2982 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2985 if (!sk_X509_push(sk
,x
))
2987 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2994 if (sk_X509_num(sk
) <= 0)
2996 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
2997 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
)
2999 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
3000 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED
);
3003 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3004 else if ((s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
) &&
3005 (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT
))
3007 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE
);
3008 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
3014 i
=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s
,sk
);
3017 al
=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s
->verify_result
);
3018 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_RETURNED
);
3023 if (s
->session
->peer
!= NULL
) /* This should not be needed */
3024 X509_free(s
->session
->peer
);
3025 s
->session
->peer
=sk_X509_shift(sk
);
3026 s
->session
->verify_result
= s
->verify_result
;
3028 /* With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL
3029 * when we arrive here. */
3030 if (s
->session
->sess_cert
== NULL
)
3032 s
->session
->sess_cert
= ssl_sess_cert_new();
3033 if (s
->session
->sess_cert
== NULL
)
3035 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3039 if (s
->session
->sess_cert
->cert_chain
!= NULL
)
3040 sk_X509_pop_free(s
->session
->sess_cert
->cert_chain
, X509_free
);
3041 s
->session
->sess_cert
->cert_chain
=sk
;
3042 /* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the
3043 * peer's own certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c */
3051 ssl3_send_alert(s
,SSL3_AL_FATAL
,al
);
3054 if (x
!= NULL
) X509_free(x
);
3055 if (sk
!= NULL
) sk_X509_pop_free(sk
,X509_free
);
3059 int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL
*s
)
3064 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A
)
3066 x
=ssl_get_server_send_cert(s
);
3069 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
3070 if ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
!= SSL_aKRB5
) ||
3071 (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kKRB5
))
3073 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3078 l
=ssl3_output_cert_chain(s
,x
);
3079 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B
;
3084 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
3085 return(ssl3_do_write(s
,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
));
3087 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
3088 int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL
*s
)
3090 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A
)
3092 unsigned char *p
, *senc
, *macstart
;
3097 SSL_CTX
*tctx
= s
->initial_ctx
;
3098 unsigned char iv
[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH
];
3099 unsigned char key_name
[16];
3101 /* get session encoding length */
3102 slen
= i2d_SSL_SESSION(s
->session
, NULL
);
3103 /* Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is
3108 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3109 * follows 1 (size of message name) + 3 (message length
3110 * bytes) + 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
3111 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
3112 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
3113 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
3115 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s
->init_buf
,
3116 26 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH
+ EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH
+
3117 EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
+ slen
))
3119 senc
= OPENSSL_malloc(slen
);
3123 i2d_SSL_SESSION(s
->session
, &p
);
3125 p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
3127 *(p
++)=SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET
;
3128 /* Skip message length for now */
3130 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx
);
3131 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx
);
3132 /* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present
3133 * it does all the work otherwise use generated values
3136 if (tctx
->tlsext_ticket_key_cb
)
3138 if (tctx
->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s
, key_name
, iv
, &ctx
,
3147 RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv
, 16);
3148 EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx
, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL
,
3149 tctx
->tlsext_tick_aes_key
, iv
);
3150 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx
, tctx
->tlsext_tick_hmac_key
, 16,
3151 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL
);
3152 memcpy(key_name
, tctx
->tlsext_tick_key_name
, 16);
3154 l2n(s
->session
->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint
, p
);
3155 /* Skip ticket length for now */
3157 /* Output key name */
3159 memcpy(p
, key_name
, 16);
3162 memcpy(p
, iv
, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx
));
3163 p
+= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx
);
3164 /* Encrypt session data */
3165 EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx
, p
, &len
, senc
, slen
);
3167 EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx
, p
, &len
);
3169 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx
);
3171 HMAC_Update(&hctx
, macstart
, p
- macstart
);
3172 HMAC_Final(&hctx
, p
, &hlen
);
3173 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx
);
3176 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
3178 len
= p
- (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
3179 p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
+ 1;
3180 l2n3(len
- 4, p
); /* Message length */
3182 s2n(len
- 10, p
); /* Ticket length */
3184 /* number of bytes to write */
3186 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B
;
3191 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
3192 return(ssl3_do_write(s
,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
));
3195 int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL
*s
)
3197 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A
)
3200 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3201 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
3202 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
3205 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s
->init_buf
, 8 + s
->tlsext_ocsp_resplen
))
3208 p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
3211 *(p
++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS
;
3212 /* message length */
3213 l2n3(s
->tlsext_ocsp_resplen
+ 4, p
);
3215 *(p
++)= s
->tlsext_status_type
;
3216 /* length of OCSP response */
3217 l2n3(s
->tlsext_ocsp_resplen
, p
);
3218 /* actual response */
3219 memcpy(p
, s
->tlsext_ocsp_resp
, s
->tlsext_ocsp_resplen
);
3220 /* number of bytes to write */
3221 s
->init_num
= 8 + s
->tlsext_ocsp_resplen
;
3222 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B
;
3226 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
3227 return(ssl3_do_write(s
,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
));
3230 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NPN
3231 /* ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message. It
3232 * sets the next_proto member in s if found */
3233 int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL
*s
)
3236 int proto_len
, padding_len
;
3238 const unsigned char *p
;
3240 /* Clients cannot send a NextProtocol message if we didn't see the
3241 * extension in their ClientHello */
3242 if (!s
->s3
->next_proto_neg_seen
)
3244 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO
,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION
);
3248 n
=s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
3249 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A
,
3250 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B
,
3252 514, /* See the payload format below */
3258 /* s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received
3259 * in this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset
3260 * by ssl3_get_finished). */
3261 if (!s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
)
3263 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO
,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS
);
3268 return 0; /* The body must be > 1 bytes long */
3270 p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
3272 /* The payload looks like:
3274 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
3275 * uint8 padding_len;
3276 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
3279 if (proto_len
+ 2 > s
->init_num
)
3281 padding_len
= p
[proto_len
+ 1];
3282 if (proto_len
+ padding_len
+ 2 != s
->init_num
)
3285 s
->next_proto_negotiated
= OPENSSL_malloc(proto_len
);
3286 if (!s
->next_proto_negotiated
)
3288 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO
,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3291 memcpy(s
->next_proto_negotiated
, p
+ 1, proto_len
);
3292 s
->next_proto_negotiated_len
= proto_len
;