1 /* ssl/s3_srvr.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
124 /* ====================================================================
125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
142 * to make use of the Contribution.
144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
151 #define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
152 #define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
155 #include <openssl/crypto.h>
156 #include "ssl_locl.h"
157 #include "kssl_lcl.h"
158 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
159 #include <openssl/rand.h>
160 #include <openssl/objects.h>
161 #include <openssl/evp.h>
162 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
163 #include <openssl/x509.h>
164 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
165 #include <openssl/dh.h>
167 #include <openssl/bn.h>
168 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
169 #include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
171 #include <openssl/md5.h>
173 static const SSL_METHOD
*ssl3_get_server_method(int ver
);
175 static const SSL_METHOD
*ssl3_get_server_method(int ver
)
177 if (ver
== SSL3_VERSION
)
178 return(SSLv3_server_method());
183 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
184 static int SSL_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL
*s
,int *ad
)
186 int ret
= SSL_ERROR_NONE
;
188 *ad
= SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME
;
190 if ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kSRP
) &&
191 (s
->srp_ctx
.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback
!= NULL
))
193 if(s
->srp_ctx
.login
== NULL
)
195 /* There isn't any srp login extension !!! */
196 ret
= SSL3_AL_WARNING
;
197 *ad
= SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME
;
201 ret
= SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s
,ad
);
208 IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method
,
210 ssl_undefined_function
,
211 ssl3_get_server_method
)
213 int ssl3_accept(SSL
*s
)
216 unsigned long alg_k
,Time
=(unsigned long)time(NULL
);
217 void (*cb
)(const SSL
*ssl
,int type
,int val
)=NULL
;
219 int new_state
,state
,skip
=0;
220 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
221 int srp_no_username
=0;
224 RAND_add(&Time
,sizeof(Time
),0);
228 if (s
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
230 else if (s
->ctx
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
231 cb
=s
->ctx
->info_callback
;
233 /* init things to blank */
235 if (!SSL_in_init(s
) || SSL_in_before(s
)) SSL_clear(s
);
239 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT
,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET
);
249 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE
:
251 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
255 case SSL_ST_BEFORE
|SSL_ST_ACCEPT
:
256 case SSL_ST_OK
|SSL_ST_ACCEPT
:
259 if (cb
!= NULL
) cb(s
,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START
,1);
261 if ((s
->version
>>8) != 3)
263 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
266 s
->type
=SSL_ST_ACCEPT
;
268 if (s
->init_buf
== NULL
)
270 if ((buf
=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL
)
275 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf
,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
))
283 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s
))
291 if (s
->state
!= SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE
)
293 /* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that
294 * the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
296 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s
,1)) { ret
= -1; goto end
; }
298 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s
);
299 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A
;
300 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_accept
++;
302 else if (!s
->s3
->send_connection_binding
&&
303 !(s
->options
& SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION
))
305 /* Server attempting to renegotiate with
306 * client that doesn't support secure
309 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT
, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED
);
310 ssl3_send_alert(s
,SSL3_AL_FATAL
,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
316 /* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE,
317 * we will just send a HelloRequest */
318 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_accept_renegotiate
++;
319 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A
;
323 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A
:
324 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B
:
327 ret
=ssl3_send_hello_request(s
);
328 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
329 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C
;
330 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH
;
333 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s
);
336 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C
:
340 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A
:
341 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B
:
342 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C
:
343 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
344 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_SRP_USERNAME
:
348 ret
=ssl3_get_client_hello(s
);
349 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
350 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
352 int extension_error
= 0,al
;
354 if ((al
= SSL_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s
,&extension_error
)) != SSL_ERROR_NONE
)
356 ssl3_send_alert(s
,al
,extension_error
);
357 if (extension_error
== SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME
)
359 if (srp_no_username
) goto end
;
362 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_SRP_USERNAME
;
363 if (cb
!= NULL
) cb(s
,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START
,1);
364 if ((ret
=BIO_flush(s
->wbio
)) <= 0) goto end
;
369 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
);
376 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A
;
380 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A
:
381 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B
:
382 ret
=ssl3_send_server_hello(s
);
383 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
384 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
387 if (s
->tlsext_ticket_expected
)
388 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A
;
390 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A
;
394 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A
;
397 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A
;
401 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A
:
402 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B
:
403 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
404 /* normal PSK or KRB5 or SRP */
405 if (!(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aNULL
)
406 && !(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kPSK
)
407 && !(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aKRB5
))
409 ret
=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s
);
410 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
411 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
412 if (s
->tlsext_status_expected
)
413 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A
;
415 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A
;
420 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A
;
427 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A
;
432 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A
:
433 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B
:
434 alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
436 /* clear this, it may get reset by
437 * send_server_key_exchange */
438 if ((s
->options
& SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA
)
439 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
440 && !(alg_k
& SSL_kKRB5
)
441 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
443 /* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key
444 * even when forbidden by protocol specs
445 * (handshake may fail as clients are not required to
446 * be able to handle this) */
447 s
->s3
->tmp
.use_rsa_tmp
=1;
449 s
->s3
->tmp
.use_rsa_tmp
=0;
452 /* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or
453 * RSA but we have a sign only certificate
455 * PSK: may send PSK identity hints
457 * For ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange
458 * message only if the cipher suite is either
459 * ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, the
460 * server certificate contains the server's
461 * public key for key exchange.
463 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.use_rsa_tmp
464 /* PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity
465 * hint if provided */
466 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
467 || ((alg_k
& SSL_kPSK
) && s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
)
469 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
470 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
471 || (alg_k
& SSL_kSRP
)
473 || (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHr
|SSL_kDHd
|SSL_kEDH
))
474 || (alg_k
& SSL_kEECDH
)
475 || ((alg_k
& SSL_kRSA
)
476 && (s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
].privatekey
== NULL
477 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
)
478 && EVP_PKEY_size(s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
].privatekey
)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
)
484 ret
=ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s
);
485 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
490 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A
;
494 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A
:
495 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B
:
496 if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
497 !(s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
) ||
498 /* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set,
499 * don't request cert during re-negotiation: */
500 ((s
->session
->peer
!= NULL
) &&
501 (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE
)) ||
502 /* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites
503 * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts
504 * and in RFC 2246): */
505 ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aNULL
) &&
506 /* ... except when the application insists on verification
507 * (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */
508 !(s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT
)) ||
509 /* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */
510 (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aKRB5
)
511 /* With normal PSK Certificates and
512 * Certificate Requests are omitted */
513 || (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kPSK
))
515 /* no cert request */
517 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
=0;
518 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A
;
522 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
=1;
523 ret
=ssl3_send_certificate_request(s
);
524 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
525 #ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
526 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A
;
528 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH
;
529 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A
;
535 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A
:
536 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B
:
537 ret
=ssl3_send_server_done(s
);
538 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
539 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A
;
540 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH
;
544 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH
:
546 /* This code originally checked to see if
547 * any data was pending using BIO_CTRL_INFO
548 * and then flushed. This caused problems
549 * as documented in PR#1939. The proposed
550 * fix doesn't completely resolve this issue
551 * as buggy implementations of BIO_CTRL_PENDING
552 * still exist. So instead we just flush
556 s
->rwstate
=SSL_WRITING
;
557 if (BIO_flush(s
->wbio
) <= 0)
562 s
->rwstate
=SSL_NOTHING
;
564 s
->state
=s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
;
567 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A
:
568 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B
:
569 /* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */
570 ret
= ssl3_check_client_hello(s
);
574 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C
;
576 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
)
578 ret
=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s
);
579 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
582 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A
;
586 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A
:
587 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B
:
588 ret
=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s
);
593 /* For the ECDH ciphersuites when
594 * the client sends its ECDH pub key in
595 * a certificate, the CertificateVerify
596 * message is not sent.
597 * Also for GOST ciphersuites when
598 * the client uses its key from the certificate
601 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
602 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
;
604 if (s
->s3
->next_proto_neg_seen
)
605 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A
;
607 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
;
616 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A
;
619 /* We need to get hashes here so if there is
620 * a client cert, it can be verified
621 * FIXME - digest processing for CertificateVerify
622 * should be generalized. But it is next step
624 if (s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
)
625 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
))
627 for (dgst_num
=0; dgst_num
<SSL_MAX_DIGEST
;dgst_num
++)
628 if (s
->s3
->handshake_dgst
[dgst_num
])
632 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->cert_verify_mac(s
,EVP_MD_CTX_type(s
->s3
->handshake_dgst
[dgst_num
]),&(s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_verify_md
[offset
]));
633 dgst_size
=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s
->s3
->handshake_dgst
[dgst_num
]);
644 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A
:
645 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B
:
647 /* we should decide if we expected this one */
648 ret
=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s
);
649 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
651 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
652 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
;
654 if (s
->s3
->next_proto_neg_seen
)
655 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A
;
657 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
;
662 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
663 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A
:
664 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B
:
665 ret
=ssl3_get_next_proto(s
);
666 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
668 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
;
672 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
:
673 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B
:
674 ret
=ssl3_get_finished(s
,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
,
675 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B
);
676 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
677 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
678 if (s
->tlsext_ticket_expected
)
679 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A
;
687 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A
;
691 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
692 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A
:
693 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B
:
694 ret
=ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s
);
695 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
696 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A
;
700 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A
:
701 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B
:
702 ret
=ssl3_send_cert_status(s
);
703 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
704 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A
;
710 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A
:
711 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B
:
713 s
->session
->cipher
=s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
;
714 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->setup_key_block(s
))
715 { ret
= -1; goto end
; }
717 ret
=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s
,
718 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A
,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B
);
720 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
721 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A
;
724 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
725 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE
))
733 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A
:
734 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B
:
735 ret
=ssl3_send_finished(s
,
736 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A
,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B
,
737 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->server_finished_label
,
738 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->server_finished_label_len
);
739 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
740 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH
;
743 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
744 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
;
746 if (s
->s3
->next_proto_neg_seen
)
747 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A
;
749 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
;
753 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
=SSL_ST_OK
;
758 /* clean a few things up */
759 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s
);
761 BUF_MEM_free(s
->init_buf
);
764 /* remove buffering on output */
765 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s
);
769 if (s
->renegotiate
== 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
771 /* actually not necessarily a 'new' session unless
772 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is set */
777 ssl_update_cache(s
,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER
);
779 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_accept_good
++;
781 s
->handshake_func
=ssl3_accept
;
783 if (cb
!= NULL
) cb(s
,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE
,1);
791 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT
,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE
);
797 if (!s
->s3
->tmp
.reuse_message
&& !skip
)
801 if ((ret
=BIO_flush(s
->wbio
)) <= 0)
806 if ((cb
!= NULL
) && (s
->state
!= state
))
810 cb(s
,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP
,1);
817 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
821 cb(s
,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT
,ret
);
825 int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL
*s
)
829 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A
)
831 p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
832 *(p
++)=SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST
;
837 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B
;
838 /* number of bytes to write */
843 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
844 return(ssl3_do_write(s
,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
));
847 int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL
*s
)
852 /* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message,
853 * so permit appropriate message length */
854 n
=s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
860 if (!ok
) return((int)n
);
861 s
->s3
->tmp
.reuse_message
= 1;
862 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
== SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO
)
864 /* Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake,
865 * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.)
866 * I hope that tmp.dh is the only thing that may need to be cleared
867 * when a handshake is not completed ... */
868 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
869 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
!= NULL
)
871 DH_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
);
872 s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
= NULL
;
880 int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL
*s
)
882 int i
,j
,ok
,al
,ret
= -1;
883 unsigned int cookie_len
;
886 unsigned char *p
,*d
,*q
;
888 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
891 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *ciphers
=NULL
;
893 /* We do this so that we will respond with our native type.
894 * If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1,
895 * This down switching should be handled by a different method.
896 * If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with
899 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A
900 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
901 || (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_SRP_USERNAME
)
905 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B
;
908 n
=s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
909 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B
,
910 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C
,
911 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
912 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
,
915 if (!ok
) return((int)n
);
917 d
=p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
919 /* use version from inside client hello, not from record header
920 * (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */
921 s
->client_version
=(((int)p
[0])<<8)|(int)p
[1];
924 if ((s
->version
== DTLS1_VERSION
&& s
->client_version
> s
->version
) ||
925 (s
->version
!= DTLS1_VERSION
&& s
->client_version
< s
->version
))
927 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER
);
928 if ((s
->client_version
>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR
)
930 /* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
931 s
->version
= s
->client_version
;
933 al
= SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
937 /* If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't
938 * contain one, just return since we do not want to
939 * allocate any memory yet. So check cookie length...
941 if (SSL_get_options(s
) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE
)
943 unsigned int session_length
, cookie_length
;
945 session_length
= *(p
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
946 cookie_length
= *(p
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
+ session_length
+ 1);
948 if (cookie_length
== 0)
952 /* load the client random */
953 memcpy(s
->s3
->client_random
,p
,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
956 /* get the session-id */
960 /* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow session reuse during renegotiation
961 * (i.e. when s->new_session is true), option
962 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is new with 0.9.7.
963 * Maybe this optional behaviour should always have been the default,
964 * but we cannot safely change the default behaviour (or new applications
965 * might be written that become totally unsecure when compiled with
966 * an earlier library version)
968 if ((s
->new_session
&& (s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
)))
970 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s
,1))
975 i
=ssl_get_prev_session(s
, p
, j
, d
+ n
);
977 { /* previous session */
984 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s
,1))
991 if (s
->version
== DTLS1_VERSION
|| s
->version
== DTLS1_BAD_VER
)
997 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
998 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
999 * does not cause an overflow.
1001 if ( cookie_len
> sizeof(s
->d1
->rcvd_cookie
))
1004 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1005 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH
);
1009 /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
1010 if ((SSL_get_options(s
) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE
) &&
1013 memcpy(s
->d1
->rcvd_cookie
, p
, cookie_len
);
1015 if ( s
->ctx
->app_verify_cookie_cb
!= NULL
)
1017 if ( s
->ctx
->app_verify_cookie_cb(s
, s
->d1
->rcvd_cookie
,
1020 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1021 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1022 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH
);
1025 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1027 else if ( memcmp(s
->d1
->rcvd_cookie
, s
->d1
->cookie
,
1028 s
->d1
->cookie_len
) != 0) /* default verification */
1030 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1031 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1032 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH
);
1043 if ((i
== 0) && (j
!= 0))
1045 /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */
1046 al
=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1047 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED
);
1052 /* not enough data */
1053 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1054 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1057 if ((i
> 0) && (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s
,p
,i
,&(ciphers
))
1064 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
1065 if ((s
->hit
) && (i
> 0))
1068 id
=s
->session
->cipher
->id
;
1071 printf("client sent %d ciphers\n",sk_num(ciphers
));
1073 for (i
=0; i
<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers
); i
++)
1075 c
=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers
,i
);
1077 printf("client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1078 i
,sk_num(ciphers
),SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c
));
1086 /* Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade
1087 * attack: CVE-2010-4180.
1090 if (j
== 0 && (s
->options
& SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG
) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers
) == 1))
1092 /* Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used cipher may
1093 * not be in the current list, the client instead might be trying to
1094 * continue using a cipher that before wasn't chosen due to server
1095 * preferences. We'll have to reject the connection if the cipher is not
1096 * enabled, though. */
1097 c
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers
, 0);
1098 if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s
), c
) >= 0)
1100 s
->session
->cipher
= c
;
1107 /* we need to have the cipher in the cipher
1108 * list if we are asked to reuse it */
1109 al
=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1110 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING
);
1119 /* not enough data */
1120 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1121 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1127 if (p
[j
] == 0) break;
1134 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1135 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED
);
1139 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1141 if (s
->version
>= SSL3_VERSION
)
1143 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s
,&p
,d
,n
, &al
))
1145 /* 'al' set by ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext */
1146 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT
);
1150 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(s
) <= 0) {
1151 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
);
1155 /* Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this
1156 * handshake for not reused session only. We need to generate
1157 * server_random before calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow
1158 * SessionTicket processing to use it in key derivation. */
1162 Time
=(unsigned long)time(NULL
); /* Time */
1163 pos
=s
->s3
->server_random
;
1165 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(pos
,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
-4) <= 0)
1167 al
=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1172 if (!s
->hit
&& s
->version
>= TLS1_VERSION
&& s
->tls_session_secret_cb
)
1174 SSL_CIPHER
*pref_cipher
=NULL
;
1176 s
->session
->master_key_length
=sizeof(s
->session
->master_key
);
1177 if(s
->tls_session_secret_cb(s
, s
->session
->master_key
, &s
->session
->master_key_length
,
1178 ciphers
, &pref_cipher
, s
->tls_session_secret_cb_arg
))
1181 s
->session
->ciphers
=ciphers
;
1182 s
->session
->verify_result
=X509_V_OK
;
1186 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1187 pref_cipher
=pref_cipher
? pref_cipher
: ssl3_choose_cipher(s
, s
->session
->ciphers
, SSL_get_ciphers(s
));
1188 if (pref_cipher
== NULL
)
1190 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1191 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER
);
1195 s
->session
->cipher
=pref_cipher
;
1198 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s
->cipher_list
);
1200 if (s
->cipher_list_by_id
)
1201 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s
->cipher_list_by_id
);
1203 s
->cipher_list
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s
->session
->ciphers
);
1204 s
->cipher_list_by_id
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s
->session
->ciphers
);
1209 /* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1210 * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
1211 * algorithms from the client, starting at q. */
1212 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
=NULL
;
1213 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1214 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1215 if (s
->session
->compress_meth
!= 0)
1217 int m
, comp_id
= s
->session
->compress_meth
;
1218 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1219 /* Can't disable compression */
1220 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION
)
1222 al
=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1223 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION
);
1226 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1227 for (m
= 0; m
< sk_SSL_COMP_num(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
); m
++)
1229 comp
=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
,m
);
1230 if (comp_id
== comp
->id
)
1232 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
=comp
;
1236 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
== NULL
)
1238 al
=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1239 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM
);
1242 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1243 for (m
= 0; m
< i
; m
++)
1245 if (q
[m
] == comp_id
)
1250 al
=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1251 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING
);
1257 else if (!(s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION
) && s
->ctx
->comp_methods
)
1258 { /* See if we have a match */
1259 int m
,nn
,o
,v
,done
=0;
1261 nn
=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
);
1262 for (m
=0; m
<nn
; m
++)
1264 comp
=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
,m
);
1277 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
=comp
;
1282 /* If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1283 * using compression.
1285 if (s
->session
->compress_meth
!= 0)
1287 al
=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1288 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION
);
1293 /* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must
1298 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1299 s
->session
->compress_meth
=0;
1301 s
->session
->compress_meth
=(comp
== NULL
)?0:comp
->id
;
1303 if (s
->session
->ciphers
!= NULL
)
1304 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s
->session
->ciphers
);
1305 s
->session
->ciphers
=ciphers
;
1306 if (ciphers
== NULL
)
1308 al
=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1309 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED
);
1313 c
=ssl3_choose_cipher(s
,s
->session
->ciphers
,
1314 SSL_get_ciphers(s
));
1318 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1319 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER
);
1322 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
=c
;
1323 /* check whether we should disable session resumption */
1324 if (s
->not_resumable_session_cb
!= NULL
)
1325 s
->session
->not_resumable
=s
->not_resumable_session_cb(s
,
1326 ((c
->algorithm_mkey
& (SSL_kEDH
| SSL_kEECDH
)) != 0));
1327 if (s
->session
->not_resumable
)
1328 /* do not send a session ticket */
1329 s
->tlsext_ticket_expected
= 0;
1333 /* Session-id reuse */
1334 #ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
1335 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *sk
;
1336 SSL_CIPHER
*nc
=NULL
;
1337 SSL_CIPHER
*ec
=NULL
;
1339 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG
)
1341 sk
=s
->session
->ciphers
;
1342 for (i
=0; i
<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk
); i
++)
1344 c
=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk
,i
);
1345 if (c
->algorithm_enc
& SSL_eNULL
)
1347 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c
))
1351 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
=nc
;
1352 else if (ec
!= NULL
)
1353 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
=ec
;
1355 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
=s
->session
->cipher
;
1359 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
=s
->session
->cipher
;
1362 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
))
1365 /* we now have the following setup.
1367 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
1368 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
1369 * compression - basically ignored right now
1370 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1371 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1372 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1373 * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
1380 ssl3_send_alert(s
,SSL3_AL_FATAL
,al
);
1383 if (ciphers
!= NULL
) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers
);
1387 int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL
*s
)
1390 unsigned char *p
,*d
;
1393 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1397 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A
)
1399 buf
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
1400 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1401 p
=s
->s3
->server_random
;
1402 /* Generate server_random if it was not needed previously */
1403 Time
=(unsigned long)time(NULL
); /* Time */
1405 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p
,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
-4) <= 0)
1408 /* Do the message type and length last */
1411 *(p
++)=s
->version
>>8;
1412 *(p
++)=s
->version
&0xff;
1415 memcpy(p
,s
->s3
->server_random
,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
1416 p
+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
;
1418 /* now in theory we have 3 options to sending back the
1419 * session id. If it is a re-use, we send back the
1420 * old session-id, if it is a new session, we send
1421 * back the new session-id or we send back a 0 length
1422 * session-id if we want it to be single use.
1423 * Currently I will not implement the '0' length session-id
1424 * 12-Jan-98 - I'll now support the '0' length stuff.
1426 * We also have an additional case where stateless session
1427 * resumption is successful: we always send back the old
1428 * session id. In this case s->hit is non zero: this can
1429 * only happen if stateless session resumption is succesful
1430 * if session caching is disabled so existing functionality
1433 if (s
->session
->not_resumable
||
1434 (!(s
->ctx
->session_cache_mode
& SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER
)
1436 s
->session
->session_id_length
=0;
1438 sl
=s
->session
->session_id_length
;
1439 if (sl
> (int)sizeof(s
->session
->session_id
))
1441 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1445 memcpy(p
,s
->session
->session_id
,sl
);
1448 /* put the cipher */
1449 i
=ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
,p
);
1452 /* put the compression method */
1453 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1456 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
== NULL
)
1459 *(p
++)=s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
->id
;
1461 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1462 if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s
) <= 0)
1464 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO
,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT
);
1467 if ((p
= ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s
, p
, buf
+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
)) == NULL
)
1469 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO
,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1476 *(d
++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO
;
1479 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B
;
1480 /* number of bytes to write */
1485 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
1486 return(ssl3_do_write(s
,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
));
1489 int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL
*s
)
1493 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A
)
1495 p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
1498 *(p
++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE
;
1503 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B
;
1504 /* number of bytes to write */
1509 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
1510 return(ssl3_do_write(s
,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
));
1513 int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL
*s
)
1515 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1519 unsigned char md_buf
[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
];
1522 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1525 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1526 EC_KEY
*ecdh
=NULL
, *ecdhp
;
1527 unsigned char *encodedPoint
= NULL
;
1530 BN_CTX
*bn_ctx
= NULL
;
1533 unsigned char *p
,*d
;
1543 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx
);
1544 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A
)
1546 type
=s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
1551 r
[0]=r
[1]=r
[2]=r
[3]=NULL
;
1553 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1554 if (type
& SSL_kRSA
)
1557 if ((rsa
== NULL
) && (s
->cert
->rsa_tmp_cb
!= NULL
))
1559 rsa
=s
->cert
->rsa_tmp_cb(s
,
1560 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
),
1561 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
));
1564 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1565 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY
);
1573 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1574 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY
);
1579 s
->s3
->tmp
.use_rsa_tmp
=1;
1583 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1584 if (type
& SSL_kEDH
)
1587 if ((dhp
== NULL
) && (s
->cert
->dh_tmp_cb
!= NULL
))
1588 dhp
=s
->cert
->dh_tmp_cb(s
,
1589 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
),
1590 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
));
1593 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1594 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY
);
1598 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
!= NULL
)
1601 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1605 if ((dh
=DHparams_dup(dhp
)) == NULL
)
1607 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_DH_LIB
);
1612 if ((dhp
->pub_key
== NULL
||
1613 dhp
->priv_key
== NULL
||
1614 (s
->options
& SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE
)))
1616 if(!DH_generate_key(dh
))
1618 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1625 dh
->pub_key
=BN_dup(dhp
->pub_key
);
1626 dh
->priv_key
=BN_dup(dhp
->priv_key
);
1627 if ((dh
->pub_key
== NULL
) ||
1628 (dh
->priv_key
== NULL
))
1630 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_DH_LIB
);
1640 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1641 if (type
& SSL_kEECDH
)
1643 const EC_GROUP
*group
;
1645 ecdhp
=cert
->ecdh_tmp
;
1646 if ((ecdhp
== NULL
) && (s
->cert
->ecdh_tmp_cb
!= NULL
))
1648 ecdhp
=s
->cert
->ecdh_tmp_cb(s
,
1649 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
),
1650 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
));
1654 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1655 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY
);
1659 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.ecdh
!= NULL
)
1661 EC_KEY_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.ecdh
);
1662 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1666 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
1669 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB
);
1672 if (!EC_KEY_up_ref(ecdhp
))
1674 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB
);
1679 s
->s3
->tmp
.ecdh
=ecdh
;
1680 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh
) == NULL
) ||
1681 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh
) == NULL
) ||
1682 (s
->options
& SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE
))
1684 if(!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh
))
1686 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB
);
1691 if (((group
= EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh
)) == NULL
) ||
1692 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh
) == NULL
) ||
1693 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh
) == NULL
))
1695 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB
);
1699 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
) &&
1700 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group
) > 163))
1702 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER
);
1706 /* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH
1707 * keys over named (not generic) curves. For
1708 * supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero.
1711 tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group
)))
1714 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE
);
1718 /* Encode the public key.
1719 * First check the size of encoding and
1720 * allocate memory accordingly.
1722 encodedlen
= EC_POINT_point2oct(group
,
1723 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh
),
1724 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED
,
1727 encodedPoint
= (unsigned char *)
1728 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen
*sizeof(unsigned char));
1729 bn_ctx
= BN_CTX_new();
1730 if ((encodedPoint
== NULL
) || (bn_ctx
== NULL
))
1732 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1737 encodedlen
= EC_POINT_point2oct(group
,
1738 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh
),
1739 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED
,
1740 encodedPoint
, encodedlen
, bn_ctx
);
1742 if (encodedlen
== 0)
1744 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB
);
1748 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx
); bn_ctx
=NULL
;
1750 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not
1751 * generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges.
1752 * In this situation, we need four additional bytes
1753 * to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
1758 /* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message
1759 * explicitly so we can set these to NULLs
1767 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
1768 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1769 if (type
& SSL_kPSK
)
1771 /* reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint*/
1772 n
+=2+strlen(s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
);
1775 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1776 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1777 if (type
& SSL_kSRP
)
1779 if ((s
->srp_ctx
.N
== NULL
) ||
1780 (s
->srp_ctx
.g
== NULL
) ||
1781 (s
->srp_ctx
.s
== NULL
) ||
1782 (s
->srp_ctx
.B
== NULL
))
1784 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM
);
1795 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1796 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE
);
1799 for (i
=0; r
[i
] != NULL
&& i
<4; i
++)
1801 nr
[i
]=BN_num_bytes(r
[i
]);
1802 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1803 if ((i
== 2) && (type
& SSL_kSRP
))
1810 if (!(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aNULL
)
1811 && !(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kPSK
))
1813 if ((pkey
=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s
,s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
))
1816 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1819 kn
=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey
);
1827 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf
,n
+4+kn
))
1829 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_LIB_BUF
);
1832 d
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
1835 for (i
=0; r
[i
] != NULL
&& i
<4; i
++)
1837 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1838 if ((i
== 2) && (type
& SSL_kSRP
))
1850 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1851 if (type
& SSL_kEECDH
)
1853 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves.
1854 * In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has:
1855 * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
1856 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by
1857 * the actual encoded point itself
1859 *p
= NAMED_CURVE_TYPE
;
1867 memcpy((unsigned char*)p
,
1868 (unsigned char *)encodedPoint
,
1870 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint
);
1875 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1876 if (type
& SSL_kPSK
)
1878 /* copy PSK identity hint */
1879 s2n(strlen(s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
), p
);
1880 strncpy((char *)p
, s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
, strlen(s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
));
1881 p
+=strlen(s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
);
1888 /* n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4])
1889 * and p points to the space at the end. */
1890 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1891 if (pkey
->type
== EVP_PKEY_RSA
)
1895 for (num
=2; num
> 0; num
--)
1897 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx
,(num
== 2)
1898 ?s
->ctx
->md5
:s
->ctx
->sha1
, NULL
);
1899 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx
,&(s
->s3
->client_random
[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
1900 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx
,&(s
->s3
->server_random
[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
1901 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx
,&(d
[4]),n
);
1902 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx
,q
,
1903 (unsigned int *)&i
);
1907 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1
, md_buf
, j
,
1908 &(p
[2]), &u
, pkey
->pkey
.rsa
) <= 0)
1910 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_LIB_RSA
);
1918 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA)
1919 if (pkey
->type
== EVP_PKEY_DSA
)
1922 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx
,EVP_dss1(), NULL
);
1923 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx
,&(s
->s3
->client_random
[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
1924 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx
,&(s
->s3
->server_random
[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
1925 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx
,&(d
[4]),n
);
1926 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx
,&(p
[2]),
1927 (unsigned int *)&i
,pkey
))
1929 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_LIB_DSA
);
1937 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA)
1938 if (pkey
->type
== EVP_PKEY_EC
)
1940 /* let's do ECDSA */
1941 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx
,EVP_ecdsa(), NULL
);
1942 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx
,&(s
->s3
->client_random
[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
1943 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx
,&(s
->s3
->server_random
[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
1944 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx
,&(d
[4]),n
);
1945 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx
,&(p
[2]),
1946 (unsigned int *)&i
,pkey
))
1948 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_LIB_ECDSA
);
1957 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
1958 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1959 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE
);
1964 *(d
++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
;
1967 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
1973 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B
;
1974 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx
);
1975 return(ssl3_do_write(s
,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
));
1977 ssl3_send_alert(s
,SSL3_AL_FATAL
,al
);
1979 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1980 if (encodedPoint
!= NULL
) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint
);
1981 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx
);
1983 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx
);
1987 int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL
*s
)
1989 unsigned char *p
,*d
;
1991 STACK_OF(X509_NAME
) *sk
=NULL
;
1995 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A
)
1999 d
=p
=(unsigned char *)&(buf
->data
[4]);
2001 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
2003 n
=ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s
,p
);
2012 sk
=SSL_get_client_CA_list(s
);
2016 for (i
=0; i
<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk
); i
++)
2018 name
=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk
,i
);
2019 j
=i2d_X509_NAME(name
,NULL
);
2020 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf
,4+n
+j
+2))
2022 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,ERR_R_BUF_LIB
);
2025 p
=(unsigned char *)&(buf
->data
[4+n
]);
2026 if (!(s
->options
& SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG
))
2029 i2d_X509_NAME(name
,&p
);
2036 i2d_X509_NAME(name
,&p
);
2037 j
-=2; s2n(j
,d
); j
+=2;
2043 /* else no CA names */
2044 p
=(unsigned char *)&(buf
->data
[4+off
]);
2047 d
=(unsigned char *)buf
->data
;
2048 *(d
++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
;
2051 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
2056 #ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
2057 p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
+ s
->init_num
;
2060 *(p
++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE
;
2067 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B
;
2070 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
2071 return(ssl3_do_write(s
,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
));
2076 int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL
*s
)
2080 unsigned long alg_k
;
2082 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2084 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
=NULL
;
2086 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2090 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2092 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2094 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2095 EC_KEY
*srvr_ecdh
= NULL
;
2096 EVP_PKEY
*clnt_pub_pkey
= NULL
;
2097 EC_POINT
*clnt_ecpoint
= NULL
;
2098 BN_CTX
*bn_ctx
= NULL
;
2101 n
=s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
2102 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A
,
2103 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B
,
2104 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2108 if (!ok
) return((int)n
);
2109 p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
2111 alg_k
=s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
2113 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2114 if (alg_k
& SSL_kRSA
)
2116 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
2117 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.use_rsa_tmp
)
2119 if ((s
->cert
!= NULL
) && (s
->cert
->rsa_tmp
!= NULL
))
2120 rsa
=s
->cert
->rsa_tmp
;
2121 /* Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should
2122 * be sent already */
2125 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2126 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY
);
2133 pkey
=s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
].privatekey
;
2134 if ( (pkey
== NULL
) ||
2135 (pkey
->type
!= EVP_PKEY_RSA
) ||
2136 (pkey
->pkey
.rsa
== NULL
))
2138 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2139 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE
);
2145 /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */
2146 if (s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
&& s
->version
!= DTLS1_BAD_VER
)
2151 if (!(s
->options
& SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG
))
2153 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG
);
2163 i
=RSA_private_decrypt((int)n
,p
,p
,rsa
,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING
);
2167 if (i
!= SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
)
2169 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2170 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); */
2173 if ((al
== -1) && !((p
[0] == (s
->client_version
>>8)) && (p
[1] == (s
->client_version
& 0xff))))
2175 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2176 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2177 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2178 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
2179 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
2181 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. */
2182 if (!((s
->options
& SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG
) &&
2183 (p
[0] == (s
->version
>>8)) && (p
[1] == (s
->version
& 0xff))))
2185 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2186 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER); */
2188 /* The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2189 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version
2190 * number check as a "bad version oracle" -- an alert would
2191 * reveal that the plaintext corresponding to some ciphertext
2192 * made up by the adversary is properly formatted except
2193 * that the version number is wrong. To avoid such attacks,
2194 * we should treat this just like any other decryption error. */
2200 /* Some decryption failure -- use random value instead as countermeasure
2201 * against Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding
2202 * (see RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). */
2204 i
= SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
;
2205 p
[0] = s
->client_version
>> 8;
2206 p
[1] = s
->client_version
& 0xff;
2207 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p
+2, i
-2) <= 0) /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure */
2211 s
->session
->master_key_length
=
2212 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
2213 s
->session
->master_key
,
2215 OPENSSL_cleanse(p
,i
);
2219 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2220 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kEDH
|SSL_kDHr
|SSL_kDHd
))
2225 if (!(s
->options
& SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG
))
2227 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG
);
2237 if (n
== 0L) /* the parameters are in the cert */
2239 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2240 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_DH_CERTS
);
2245 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
== NULL
)
2247 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2248 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY
);
2252 dh_srvr
=s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
;
2255 pub
=BN_bin2bn(p
,i
,NULL
);
2258 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_BN_LIB
);
2262 i
=DH_compute_key(p
,pub
,dh_srvr
);
2266 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_DH_LIB
);
2270 DH_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
);
2275 s
->session
->master_key_length
=
2276 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
2277 s
->session
->master_key
,p
,i
);
2278 OPENSSL_cleanse(p
,i
);
2282 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2283 if (alg_k
& SSL_kKRB5
)
2285 krb5_error_code krb5rc
;
2286 krb5_data enc_ticket
;
2287 krb5_data authenticator
;
2289 KSSL_CTX
*kssl_ctx
= s
->kssl_ctx
;
2290 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx
;
2291 const EVP_CIPHER
*enc
= NULL
;
2292 unsigned char iv
[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH
];
2293 unsigned char pms
[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
2294 + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH
];
2296 krb5_timestamp authtime
= 0;
2297 krb5_ticket_times ttimes
;
2299 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx
);
2301 if (!kssl_ctx
) kssl_ctx
= kssl_ctx_new();
2304 enc_ticket
.length
= i
;
2306 if (n
< (long)(enc_ticket
.length
+ 6))
2308 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2309 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2313 enc_ticket
.data
= (char *)p
;
2314 p
+=enc_ticket
.length
;
2317 authenticator
.length
= i
;
2319 if (n
< (long)(enc_ticket
.length
+ authenticator
.length
+ 6))
2321 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2322 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2326 authenticator
.data
= (char *)p
;
2327 p
+=authenticator
.length
;
2331 enc_pms
.data
= (char *)p
;
2334 /* Note that the length is checked again below,
2337 if(enc_pms
.length
> sizeof pms
)
2339 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2340 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2344 if (n
!= (long)(enc_ticket
.length
+ authenticator
.length
+
2345 enc_pms
.length
+ 6))
2347 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2348 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2352 if ((krb5rc
= kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx
, &enc_ticket
, &ttimes
,
2356 printf("kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
2357 krb5rc
, kssl_err
.reason
);
2359 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err
.text
);
2360 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2361 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2366 /* Note: no authenticator is not considered an error,
2367 ** but will return authtime == 0.
2369 if ((krb5rc
= kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx
, &authenticator
,
2370 &authtime
, &kssl_err
)) != 0)
2373 printf("kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
2374 krb5rc
, kssl_err
.reason
);
2376 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err
.text
);
2377 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2378 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2383 if ((krb5rc
= kssl_validate_times(authtime
, &ttimes
)) != 0)
2385 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, krb5rc
);
2390 kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx
);
2391 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2393 enc
= kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx
->enctype
);
2397 memset(iv
, 0, sizeof iv
); /* per RFC 1510 */
2399 if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx
,enc
,NULL
,kssl_ctx
->key
,iv
))
2401 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2402 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
2405 if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx
, pms
,&outl
,
2406 (unsigned char *)enc_pms
.data
, enc_pms
.length
))
2408 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2409 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
2412 if (outl
> SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
)
2414 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2415 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2418 if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx
,&(pms
[outl
]),&padl
))
2420 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2421 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
2425 if (outl
> SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
)
2427 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2428 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2431 if (!((pms
[0] == (s
->client_version
>>8)) && (pms
[1] == (s
->client_version
& 0xff))))
2433 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2434 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2435 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2436 * However, buggy clients exist that send random bytes instead of
2437 * the protocol version.
2438 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients.
2439 * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos cipher)
2441 if (!(s
->options
& SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG
))
2443 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2444 SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
2449 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx
);
2451 s
->session
->master_key_length
=
2452 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
2453 s
->session
->master_key
, pms
, outl
);
2455 if (kssl_ctx
->client_princ
)
2457 size_t len
= strlen(kssl_ctx
->client_princ
);
2458 if ( len
< SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH
)
2460 s
->session
->krb5_client_princ_len
= len
;
2461 memcpy(s
->session
->krb5_client_princ
,kssl_ctx
->client_princ
,len
);
2466 /* Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
2467 ** but it caused problems for apache.
2468 ** kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
2469 ** if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
2473 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2475 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2476 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kEECDH
|SSL_kECDHr
|SSL_kECDHe
))
2481 const EC_GROUP
*group
;
2482 const BIGNUM
*priv_key
;
2484 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
2485 if ((srvr_ecdh
= EC_KEY_new()) == NULL
)
2487 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2488 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2492 /* Let's get server private key and group information */
2493 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kECDHr
|SSL_kECDHe
))
2495 /* use the certificate */
2496 tkey
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_ECC
].privatekey
->pkey
.ec
;
2500 /* use the ephermeral values we saved when
2501 * generating the ServerKeyExchange msg.
2503 tkey
= s
->s3
->tmp
.ecdh
;
2506 group
= EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey
);
2507 priv_key
= EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey
);
2509 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh
, group
) ||
2510 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh
, priv_key
))
2512 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2517 /* Let's get client's public key */
2518 if ((clnt_ecpoint
= EC_POINT_new(group
)) == NULL
)
2520 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2521 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2527 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
2529 if (alg_k
& SSL_kEECDH
)
2531 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2532 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY
);
2535 if (((clnt_pub_pkey
=X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
))
2537 (clnt_pub_pkey
->type
!= EVP_PKEY_EC
))
2539 /* XXX: For now, we do not support client
2540 * authentication using ECDH certificates
2541 * so this branch (n == 0L) of the code is
2542 * never executed. When that support is
2543 * added, we ought to ensure the key
2544 * received in the certificate is
2545 * authorized for key agreement.
2546 * ECDH_compute_key implicitly checks that
2547 * the two ECDH shares are for the same
2550 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2551 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2552 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS
);
2556 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint
,
2557 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey
->pkey
.ec
)) == 0)
2559 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2563 ret
= 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
2567 /* Get client's public key from encoded point
2568 * in the ClientKeyExchange message.
2570 if ((bn_ctx
= BN_CTX_new()) == NULL
)
2572 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2573 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2577 /* Get encoded point length */
2580 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group
,
2581 clnt_ecpoint
, p
, i
, bn_ctx
) == 0)
2583 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2587 /* p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer
2588 * currently, so set it to the start
2590 p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
2593 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
2594 field_size
= EC_GROUP_get_degree(group
);
2595 if (field_size
<= 0)
2597 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2601 i
= ECDH_compute_key(p
, (field_size
+7)/8, clnt_ecpoint
, srvr_ecdh
, NULL
);
2604 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2609 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey
);
2610 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint
);
2611 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh
);
2612 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx
);
2613 EC_KEY_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.ecdh
);
2614 s
->s3
->tmp
.ecdh
= NULL
;
2616 /* Compute the master secret */
2617 s
->session
->master_key_length
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
-> \
2618 generate_master_secret(s
, s
->session
->master_key
, p
, i
);
2620 OPENSSL_cleanse(p
, i
);
2625 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2626 if (alg_k
& SSL_kPSK
)
2628 unsigned char *t
= NULL
;
2629 unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms
[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
*2+4];
2630 unsigned int pre_ms_len
= 0, psk_len
= 0;
2632 char tmp_id
[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
+1];
2634 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2639 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2640 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2643 if (i
> PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
)
2645 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2646 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2649 if (s
->psk_server_callback
== NULL
)
2651 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2652 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB
);
2656 /* Create guaranteed NULL-terminated identity
2657 * string for the callback */
2658 memcpy(tmp_id
, p
, i
);
2659 memset(tmp_id
+i
, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
+1-i
);
2660 psk_len
= s
->psk_server_callback(s
, tmp_id
,
2661 psk_or_pre_ms
, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms
));
2662 OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_id
, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
+1);
2664 if (psk_len
> PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
)
2666 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2667 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2670 else if (psk_len
== 0)
2672 /* PSK related to the given identity not found */
2673 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2674 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND
);
2675 al
=SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY
;
2679 /* create PSK pre_master_secret */
2680 pre_ms_len
=2+psk_len
+2+psk_len
;
2682 memmove(psk_or_pre_ms
+psk_len
+4, psk_or_pre_ms
, psk_len
);
2684 memset(t
, 0, psk_len
);
2688 if (s
->session
->psk_identity
!= NULL
)
2689 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->psk_identity
);
2690 s
->session
->psk_identity
= BUF_strdup((char *)p
);
2691 if (s
->session
->psk_identity
== NULL
)
2693 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2694 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2698 if (s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
!= NULL
)
2699 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
);
2700 s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
= BUF_strdup(s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
);
2701 if (s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
!= NULL
&&
2702 s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
== NULL
)
2704 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2705 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2709 s
->session
->master_key_length
=
2710 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
2711 s
->session
->master_key
, psk_or_pre_ms
, pre_ms_len
);
2714 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms
, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms
));
2720 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2721 if (alg_k
& SSL_kSRP
)
2729 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2730 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH
);
2733 if (!(s
->srp_ctx
.A
=BN_bin2bn(p
,i
,NULL
)))
2735 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
2738 if (s
->session
->srp_username
!= NULL
)
2739 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->srp_username
);
2740 s
->session
->srp_username
= BUF_strdup(s
->srp_ctx
.login
);
2741 if (s
->session
->srp_username
== NULL
)
2743 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2744 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2748 if ((s
->session
->master_key_length
= SRP_generate_server_master_secret(s
,s
->session
->master_key
))<0)
2750 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2757 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
2758 if (alg_k
& SSL_kGOST
)
2761 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pkey_ctx
;
2762 EVP_PKEY
*client_pub_pkey
= NULL
, *pk
= NULL
;
2763 unsigned char premaster_secret
[32], *start
;
2764 size_t outlen
=32, inlen
;
2765 unsigned long alg_a
;
2767 /* Get our certificate private key*/
2768 alg_a
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
;
2769 if (alg_a
& SSL_aGOST94
)
2770 pk
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_GOST94
].privatekey
;
2771 else if (alg_a
& SSL_aGOST01
)
2772 pk
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_GOST01
].privatekey
;
2774 pkey_ctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk
,NULL
);
2775 EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx
);
2776 /* If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
2777 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
2778 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use
2779 * a client certificate for authorization only. */
2780 client_pub_pkey
= X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
2781 if (client_pub_pkey
)
2783 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx
, client_pub_pkey
) <= 0)
2786 /* Decrypt session key */
2787 if ((*p
!=( V_ASN1_SEQUENCE
| V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED
)))
2789 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
2797 else if (p
[1] < 0x80)
2804 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
2807 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx
,premaster_secret
,&outlen
,start
,inlen
) <=0)
2810 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
2813 /* Generate master secret */
2814 s
->session
->master_key_length
=
2815 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
2816 s
->session
->master_key
,premaster_secret
,32);
2817 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2818 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx
, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY
, 2, NULL
) > 0)
2823 EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey
);
2824 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx
);
2832 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2833 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2834 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE
);
2840 ssl3_send_alert(s
,SSL3_AL_FATAL
,al
);
2841 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_SRP)
2844 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2845 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey
);
2846 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint
);
2847 if (srvr_ecdh
!= NULL
)
2848 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh
);
2849 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx
);
2854 int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL
*s
)
2856 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
=NULL
;
2863 n
=s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
2864 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A
,
2865 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B
,
2870 if (!ok
) return((int)n
);
2872 if (s
->session
->peer
!= NULL
)
2874 peer
=s
->session
->peer
;
2875 pkey
=X509_get_pubkey(peer
);
2876 type
=X509_certificate_type(peer
,pkey
);
2884 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
!= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY
)
2886 s
->s3
->tmp
.reuse_message
=1;
2887 if ((peer
!= NULL
) && (type
| EVP_PKT_SIGN
))
2889 al
=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
2890 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE
);
2899 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED
);
2900 al
=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
2904 if (!(type
& EVP_PKT_SIGN
))
2906 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE
);
2907 al
=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
2911 if (s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
)
2913 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY
);
2914 al
=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
2918 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
2919 p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
2920 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
2921 /* If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare
2922 * signature without length field */
2923 if (n
==64 && (pkey
->type
==NID_id_GostR3410_94
||
2924 pkey
->type
== NID_id_GostR3410_2001
) )
2934 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2935 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2939 j
=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey
);
2940 if ((i
> j
) || (n
> j
) || (n
<= 0))
2942 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE
);
2943 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2947 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2948 if (pkey
->type
== EVP_PKEY_RSA
)
2950 i
=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1
, s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_verify_md
,
2951 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
, p
, i
,
2955 al
=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
2956 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT
);
2961 al
=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
2962 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE
);
2968 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2969 if (pkey
->type
== EVP_PKEY_DSA
)
2971 j
=DSA_verify(pkey
->save_type
,
2972 &(s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_verify_md
[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
]),
2973 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
,p
,i
,pkey
->pkey
.dsa
);
2977 al
=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
2978 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE
);
2984 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
2985 if (pkey
->type
== EVP_PKEY_EC
)
2987 j
=ECDSA_verify(pkey
->save_type
,
2988 &(s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_verify_md
[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
]),
2989 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
,p
,i
,pkey
->pkey
.ec
);
2993 al
=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
2994 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,
2995 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE
);
3001 if (pkey
->type
== NID_id_GostR3410_94
|| pkey
->type
== NID_id_GostR3410_2001
)
3002 { unsigned char signature
[64];
3004 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey
,NULL
);
3005 EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx
);
3007 fprintf(stderr
,"GOST signature length is %d",i
);
3009 for (idx
=0;idx
<64;idx
++) {
3010 signature
[63-idx
]=p
[idx
];
3012 j
=EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx
,signature
,64,s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_verify_md
,32);
3013 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
3016 al
=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
3017 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,
3018 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE
);
3024 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3025 al
=SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE
;
3034 ssl3_send_alert(s
,SSL3_AL_FATAL
,al
);
3037 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey
);
3041 int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL
*s
)
3043 int i
,ok
,al
,ret
= -1;
3045 unsigned long l
,nc
,llen
,n
;
3046 const unsigned char *p
,*q
;
3048 STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
=NULL
;
3050 n
=s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
3057 if (!ok
) return((int)n
);
3059 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
== SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
)
3061 if ( (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
) &&
3062 (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT
))
3064 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE
);
3065 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
3068 /* If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list */
3069 if ((s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
) && s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
)
3071 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST
);
3072 al
=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
3075 s
->s3
->tmp
.reuse_message
=1;
3079 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
!= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
)
3081 al
=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
3082 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE
);
3085 p
=d
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
3087 if ((sk
=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL
)
3089 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3096 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
3097 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3100 for (nc
=0; nc
<llen
; )
3103 if ((l
+nc
+3) > llen
)
3105 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
3106 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3111 x
=d2i_X509(NULL
,&p
,l
);
3114 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB
);
3119 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
3120 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3123 if (!sk_X509_push(sk
,x
))
3125 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3132 if (sk_X509_num(sk
) <= 0)
3134 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3135 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
)
3137 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
3138 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED
);
3141 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3142 else if ((s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
) &&
3143 (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT
))
3145 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE
);
3146 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
3152 i
=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s
,sk
);
3155 al
=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s
->verify_result
);
3156 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_RETURNED
);
3161 if (s
->session
->peer
!= NULL
) /* This should not be needed */
3162 X509_free(s
->session
->peer
);
3163 s
->session
->peer
=sk_X509_shift(sk
);
3164 s
->session
->verify_result
= s
->verify_result
;
3166 /* With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL
3167 * when we arrive here. */
3168 if (s
->session
->sess_cert
== NULL
)
3170 s
->session
->sess_cert
= ssl_sess_cert_new();
3171 if (s
->session
->sess_cert
== NULL
)
3173 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3177 if (s
->session
->sess_cert
->cert_chain
!= NULL
)
3178 sk_X509_pop_free(s
->session
->sess_cert
->cert_chain
, X509_free
);
3179 s
->session
->sess_cert
->cert_chain
=sk
;
3180 /* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the
3181 * peer's own certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c */
3189 ssl3_send_alert(s
,SSL3_AL_FATAL
,al
);
3192 if (x
!= NULL
) X509_free(x
);
3193 if (sk
!= NULL
) sk_X509_pop_free(sk
,X509_free
);
3197 int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL
*s
)
3202 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A
)
3204 x
=ssl_get_server_send_cert(s
);
3207 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
3208 if ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
!= SSL_aKRB5
) ||
3209 (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kKRB5
))
3211 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3216 l
=ssl3_output_cert_chain(s
,x
);
3217 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B
;
3222 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
3223 return(ssl3_do_write(s
,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
));
3225 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
3226 int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL
*s
)
3228 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A
)
3230 unsigned char *p
, *senc
, *macstart
;
3235 SSL_CTX
*tctx
= s
->initial_ctx
;
3236 unsigned char iv
[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH
];
3237 unsigned char key_name
[16];
3239 /* get session encoding length */
3240 slen
= i2d_SSL_SESSION(s
->session
, NULL
);
3241 /* Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is
3246 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3247 * follows 1 (size of message name) + 3 (message length
3248 * bytes) + 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
3249 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
3250 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
3251 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
3253 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s
->init_buf
,
3254 26 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH
+ EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH
+
3255 EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
+ slen
))
3257 senc
= OPENSSL_malloc(slen
);
3261 i2d_SSL_SESSION(s
->session
, &p
);
3263 p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
3265 *(p
++)=SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET
;
3266 /* Skip message length for now */
3268 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx
);
3269 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx
);
3270 /* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present
3271 * it does all the work otherwise use generated values
3274 if (tctx
->tlsext_ticket_key_cb
)
3276 if (tctx
->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s
, key_name
, iv
, &ctx
,
3285 RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv
, 16);
3286 EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx
, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL
,
3287 tctx
->tlsext_tick_aes_key
, iv
);
3288 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx
, tctx
->tlsext_tick_hmac_key
, 16,
3289 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL
);
3290 memcpy(key_name
, tctx
->tlsext_tick_key_name
, 16);
3292 l2n(s
->session
->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint
, p
);
3293 /* Skip ticket length for now */
3295 /* Output key name */
3297 memcpy(p
, key_name
, 16);
3300 memcpy(p
, iv
, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx
));
3301 p
+= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx
);
3302 /* Encrypt session data */
3303 EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx
, p
, &len
, senc
, slen
);
3305 EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx
, p
, &len
);
3307 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx
);
3309 HMAC_Update(&hctx
, macstart
, p
- macstart
);
3310 HMAC_Final(&hctx
, p
, &hlen
);
3311 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx
);
3314 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
3316 len
= p
- (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
3317 p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
+ 1;
3318 l2n3(len
- 4, p
); /* Message length */
3320 s2n(len
- 10, p
); /* Ticket length */
3322 /* number of bytes to write */
3324 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B
;
3329 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
3330 return(ssl3_do_write(s
,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
));
3333 int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL
*s
)
3335 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A
)
3338 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3339 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
3340 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
3343 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s
->init_buf
, 8 + s
->tlsext_ocsp_resplen
))
3346 p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
3349 *(p
++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS
;
3350 /* message length */
3351 l2n3(s
->tlsext_ocsp_resplen
+ 4, p
);
3353 *(p
++)= s
->tlsext_status_type
;
3354 /* length of OCSP response */
3355 l2n3(s
->tlsext_ocsp_resplen
, p
);
3356 /* actual response */
3357 memcpy(p
, s
->tlsext_ocsp_resp
, s
->tlsext_ocsp_resplen
);
3358 /* number of bytes to write */
3359 s
->init_num
= 8 + s
->tlsext_ocsp_resplen
;
3360 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B
;
3364 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
3365 return(ssl3_do_write(s
,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
));
3368 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NPN
3369 /* ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message. It
3370 * sets the next_proto member in s if found */
3371 int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL
*s
)
3374 int proto_len
, padding_len
;
3376 const unsigned char *p
;
3378 /* Clients cannot send a NextProtocol message if we didn't see the
3379 * extension in their ClientHello */
3380 if (!s
->s3
->next_proto_neg_seen
)
3382 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO
,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION
);
3386 n
=s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
3387 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A
,
3388 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B
,
3390 514, /* See the payload format below */
3396 /* s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received
3397 * in this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset
3398 * by ssl3_get_finished). */
3399 if (!s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
)
3401 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO
,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS
);
3406 return 0; /* The body must be > 1 bytes long */
3408 p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
3410 /* The payload looks like:
3412 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
3413 * uint8 padding_len;
3414 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
3417 if (proto_len
+ 2 > s
->init_num
)
3419 padding_len
= p
[proto_len
+ 1];
3420 if (proto_len
+ padding_len
+ 2 != s
->init_num
)
3423 s
->next_proto_negotiated
= OPENSSL_malloc(proto_len
);
3424 if (!s
->next_proto_negotiated
)
3426 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO
,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3429 memcpy(s
->next_proto_negotiated
, p
+ 1, proto_len
);
3430 s
->next_proto_negotiated_len
= proto_len
;