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Add TLSv1.3 post-handshake authentication (PHA)
[thirdparty/openssl.git] / ssl / statem / extensions_clnt.c
1 /*
2 * Copyright 2016-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 *
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
8 */
9
10 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
11 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
12 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
13 #include "statem_locl.h"
14
15 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_renegotiate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
16 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
17 size_t chainidx)
18 {
19 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
20 if (!s->renegotiate)
21 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
22
23 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
24 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
25 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->s3->previous_client_finished,
26 s->s3->previous_client_finished_len)
27 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
28 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_RENEGOTIATE,
29 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
30 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
31 }
32
33 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
34 }
35
36 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_server_name(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
37 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
38 size_t chainidx)
39 {
40 if (s->ext.hostname == NULL)
41 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
42
43 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
44 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
45 /* Sub-packet for server_name extension */
46 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
47 /* Sub-packet for servername list (always 1 hostname)*/
48 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
49 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name)
50 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->ext.hostname,
51 strlen(s->ext.hostname))
52 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
53 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
54 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SERVER_NAME,
55 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
56 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
57 }
58
59 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
60 }
61
62 /* Push a Max Fragment Len extension into ClientHello */
63 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_maxfragmentlen(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
64 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
65 size_t chainidx)
66 {
67 if (s->ext.max_fragment_len_mode == TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_DISABLED)
68 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
69
70 /* Add Max Fragment Length extension if client enabled it. */
71 /*-
72 * 4 bytes for this extension type and extension length
73 * 1 byte for the Max Fragment Length code value.
74 */
75 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_max_fragment_length)
76 /* Sub-packet for Max Fragment Length extension (1 byte) */
77 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
78 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->ext.max_fragment_len_mode)
79 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
80 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
81 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_MAXFRAGMENTLEN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
82 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
83 }
84
85 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
86 }
87
88 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
89 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_srp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
90 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
91 {
92 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
93 if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL)
94 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
95
96 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
97 /* Sub-packet for SRP extension */
98 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
99 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
100 /* login must not be zero...internal error if so */
101 || !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt, WPACKET_FLAGS_NON_ZERO_LENGTH)
102 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->srp_ctx.login,
103 strlen(s->srp_ctx.login))
104 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
105 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
106 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SRP,
107 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
108 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
109 }
110
111 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
112 }
113 #endif
114
115 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
116 static int use_ecc(SSL *s)
117 {
118 int i, end;
119 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
120 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = NULL;
121
122 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
123 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
124 return 0;
125
126 cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
127 end = sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack);
128 for (i = 0; i < end; i++) {
129 const SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
130
131 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
132 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
133 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK))
134 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)
135 || c->min_tls >= TLS1_3_VERSION)
136 return 1;
137 }
138
139 return 0;
140 }
141
142 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
143 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
144 size_t chainidx)
145 {
146 const unsigned char *pformats;
147 size_t num_formats;
148
149 if (!use_ecc(s))
150 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
151
152 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
153 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &pformats, &num_formats);
154
155 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
156 /* Sub-packet for formats extension */
157 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
158 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, pformats, num_formats)
159 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
160 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
161 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EC_PT_FORMATS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
162 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
163 }
164
165 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
166 }
167
168 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_supported_groups(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
169 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
170 size_t chainidx)
171 {
172 const uint16_t *pgroups = NULL;
173 size_t num_groups = 0, i;
174
175 if (!use_ecc(s))
176 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
177
178 /*
179 * Add TLS extension supported_groups to the ClientHello message
180 */
181 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Add support for DHE groups */
182 tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &pgroups, &num_groups);
183
184 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_groups)
185 /* Sub-packet for supported_groups extension */
186 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
187 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
188 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
189 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_GROUPS,
190 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
191 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
192 }
193 /* Copy curve ID if supported */
194 for (i = 0; i < num_groups; i++) {
195 uint16_t ctmp = pgroups[i];
196
197 if (tls_curve_allowed(s, ctmp, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) {
198 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, ctmp)) {
199 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
200 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_GROUPS,
201 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
202 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
203 }
204 }
205 }
206 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
207 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
208 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_GROUPS,
209 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
210 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
211 }
212
213 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
214 }
215 #endif
216
217 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_session_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
218 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
219 size_t chainidx)
220 {
221 size_t ticklen;
222
223 if (!tls_use_ticket(s))
224 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
225
226 if (!s->new_session && s->session != NULL
227 && s->session->ext.tick != NULL
228 && s->session->ssl_version != TLS1_3_VERSION) {
229 ticklen = s->session->ext.ticklen;
230 } else if (s->session && s->ext.session_ticket != NULL
231 && s->ext.session_ticket->data != NULL) {
232 ticklen = s->ext.session_ticket->length;
233 s->session->ext.tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
234 if (s->session->ext.tick == NULL) {
235 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
236 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SESSION_TICKET,
237 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
238 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
239 }
240 memcpy(s->session->ext.tick,
241 s->ext.session_ticket->data, ticklen);
242 s->session->ext.ticklen = ticklen;
243 } else {
244 ticklen = 0;
245 }
246
247 if (ticklen == 0 && s->ext.session_ticket != NULL &&
248 s->ext.session_ticket->data == NULL)
249 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
250
251 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
252 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->session->ext.tick, ticklen)) {
253 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
254 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
255 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
256 }
257
258 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
259 }
260
261 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_sig_algs(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
262 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
263 size_t chainidx)
264 {
265 size_t salglen;
266 const uint16_t *salg;
267
268 if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_SIGALGS(s))
269 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
270
271 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &salg);
272 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
273 /* Sub-packet for sig-algs extension */
274 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
275 /* Sub-packet for the actual list */
276 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
277 || !tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, pkt, salg, salglen)
278 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
279 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
280 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SIG_ALGS,
281 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
282 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
283 }
284
285 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
286 }
287
288 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
289 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_status_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
290 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
291 size_t chainidx)
292 {
293 int i;
294
295 /* This extension isn't defined for client Certificates */
296 if (x != NULL)
297 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
298
299 if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
300 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
301
302 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
303 /* Sub-packet for status request extension */
304 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
305 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
306 /* Sub-packet for the ids */
307 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
308 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
309 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
310 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
311 }
312 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->ext.ocsp.ids); i++) {
313 unsigned char *idbytes;
314 OCSP_RESPID *id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->ext.ocsp.ids, i);
315 int idlen = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
316
317 if (idlen <= 0
318 /* Sub-packet for an individual id */
319 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, idlen, &idbytes)
320 || i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &idbytes) != idlen) {
321 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
322 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST,
323 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
324 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
325 }
326 }
327 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)
328 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
329 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
330 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
331 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
332 }
333 if (s->ext.ocsp.exts) {
334 unsigned char *extbytes;
335 int extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->ext.ocsp.exts, NULL);
336
337 if (extlen < 0) {
338 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
339 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST,
340 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
341 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
342 }
343 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, extlen, &extbytes)
344 || i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->ext.ocsp.exts, &extbytes)
345 != extlen) {
346 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
347 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST,
348 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
349 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
350 }
351 }
352 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
353 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
354 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
355 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
356 }
357
358 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
359 }
360 #endif
361
362 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
363 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_npn(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
364 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
365 {
366 if (s->ctx->ext.npn_select_cb == NULL || !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s))
367 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
368
369 /*
370 * The client advertises an empty extension to indicate its support
371 * for Next Protocol Negotiation
372 */
373 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg)
374 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
375 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_NPN,
376 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
377 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
378 }
379
380 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
381 }
382 #endif
383
384 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_alpn(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
385 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
386 {
387 s->s3->alpn_sent = 0;
388
389 if (s->ext.alpn == NULL || !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s))
390 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
391
392 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt,
393 TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)
394 /* Sub-packet ALPN extension */
395 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
396 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->ext.alpn, s->ext.alpn_len)
397 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
398 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_ALPN,
399 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
400 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
401 }
402 s->s3->alpn_sent = 1;
403
404 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
405 }
406
407
408 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
409 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_use_srtp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
410 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
411 size_t chainidx)
412 {
413 STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *clnt = SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s);
414 int i, end;
415
416 if (clnt == NULL)
417 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
418
419 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
420 /* Sub-packet for SRTP extension */
421 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
422 /* Sub-packet for the protection profile list */
423 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
424 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_USE_SRTP,
425 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
426 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
427 }
428
429 end = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(clnt);
430 for (i = 0; i < end; i++) {
431 const SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *prof =
432 sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(clnt, i);
433
434 if (prof == NULL || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, prof->id)) {
435 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
436 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_USE_SRTP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
437 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
438 }
439 }
440 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)
441 /* Add an empty use_mki value */
442 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)
443 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
444 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_USE_SRTP,
445 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
446 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
447 }
448
449 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
450 }
451 #endif
452
453 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_etm(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
454 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
455 {
456 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
457 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
458
459 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
460 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
461 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_ETM,
462 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
463 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
464 }
465
466 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
467 }
468
469 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
470 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_sct(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
471 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
472 {
473 if (s->ct_validation_callback == NULL)
474 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
475
476 /* Not defined for client Certificates */
477 if (x != NULL)
478 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
479
480 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp)
481 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
482 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SCT,
483 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
484 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
485 }
486
487 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
488 }
489 #endif
490
491 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_ems(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
492 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
493 {
494 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret)
495 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
496 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EMS,
497 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
498 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
499 }
500
501 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
502 }
503
504 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_supported_versions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
505 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
506 size_t chainidx)
507 {
508 int currv, min_version, max_version, reason;
509
510 reason = ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &min_version, &max_version);
511 if (reason != 0) {
512 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
513 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS, reason);
514 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
515 }
516
517 /*
518 * Don't include this if we can't negotiate TLSv1.3. We can do a straight
519 * comparison here because we will never be called in DTLS.
520 */
521 if (max_version < TLS1_3_VERSION)
522 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
523
524 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_versions)
525 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
526 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)) {
527 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
528 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS,
529 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
530 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
531 }
532
533 /*
534 * TODO(TLS1.3): There is some discussion on the TLS list as to whether
535 * we should include versions <TLS1.2. For the moment we do. To be
536 * reviewed later.
537 */
538 for (currv = max_version; currv >= min_version; currv--) {
539 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove this first if clause prior to release!! */
540 if (currv == TLS1_3_VERSION) {
541 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT)) {
542 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
543 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS,
544 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
545 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
546 }
547 } else if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, currv)) {
548 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
549 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS,
550 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
551 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
552 }
553 }
554 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
555 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
556 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS,
557 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
558 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
559 }
560
561 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
562 }
563
564 /*
565 * Construct a psk_kex_modes extension.
566 */
567 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_psk_kex_modes(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
568 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
569 size_t chainidx)
570 {
571 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
572 int nodhe = s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_NO_DHE_KEX;
573
574 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_psk_kex_modes)
575 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
576 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
577 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_KE_DHE)
578 || (nodhe && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_KE))
579 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
580 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
581 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
582 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK_KEX_MODES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
583 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
584 }
585
586 s->ext.psk_kex_mode = TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE_DHE;
587 if (nodhe)
588 s->ext.psk_kex_mode |= TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE;
589 #endif
590
591 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
592 }
593
594 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
595 static int add_key_share(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int curve_id)
596 {
597 unsigned char *encoded_point = NULL;
598 EVP_PKEY *key_share_key = NULL;
599 size_t encodedlen;
600
601 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) {
602 if (!ossl_assert(s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING)) {
603 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_ADD_KEY_SHARE,
604 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
605 return 0;
606 }
607 /*
608 * Could happen if we got an HRR that wasn't requesting a new key_share
609 */
610 key_share_key = s->s3->tmp.pkey;
611 } else {
612 key_share_key = ssl_generate_pkey_group(s, curve_id);
613 if (key_share_key == NULL) {
614 /* SSLfatal() already called */
615 return 0;
616 }
617 }
618
619 /* Encode the public key. */
620 encodedlen = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(key_share_key,
621 &encoded_point);
622 if (encodedlen == 0) {
623 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_ADD_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
624 goto err;
625 }
626
627 /* Create KeyShareEntry */
628 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, curve_id)
629 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, encoded_point, encodedlen)) {
630 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_ADD_KEY_SHARE,
631 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
632 goto err;
633 }
634
635 /*
636 * TODO(TLS1.3): When changing to send more than one key_share we're
637 * going to need to be able to save more than one EVP_PKEY. For now
638 * we reuse the existing tmp.pkey
639 */
640 s->s3->tmp.pkey = key_share_key;
641 s->s3->group_id = curve_id;
642 OPENSSL_free(encoded_point);
643
644 return 1;
645 err:
646 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL)
647 EVP_PKEY_free(key_share_key);
648 OPENSSL_free(encoded_point);
649 return 0;
650 }
651 #endif
652
653 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_key_share(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
654 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
655 size_t chainidx)
656 {
657 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
658 size_t i, num_groups = 0;
659 const uint16_t *pgroups = NULL;
660 uint16_t curve_id = 0;
661
662 /* key_share extension */
663 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share)
664 /* Extension data sub-packet */
665 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
666 /* KeyShare list sub-packet */
667 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
668 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_KEY_SHARE,
669 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
670 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
671 }
672
673 tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &pgroups, &num_groups);
674
675 /*
676 * TODO(TLS1.3): Make the number of key_shares sent configurable. For
677 * now, just send one
678 */
679 if (s->s3->group_id != 0) {
680 curve_id = s->s3->group_id;
681 } else {
682 for (i = 0; i < num_groups; i++) {
683
684 if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pgroups[i], SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED))
685 continue;
686
687 curve_id = pgroups[i];
688 break;
689 }
690 }
691
692 if (curve_id == 0) {
693 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_KEY_SHARE,
694 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_KEY_SHARE);
695 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
696 }
697
698 if (!add_key_share(s, pkt, curve_id)) {
699 /* SSLfatal() already called */
700 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
701 }
702
703 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
704 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_KEY_SHARE,
705 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
706 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
707 }
708 #endif
709
710 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
711 }
712
713 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_cookie(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
714 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
715 {
716 EXT_RETURN ret = EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
717
718 /* Should only be set if we've had an HRR */
719 if (s->ext.tls13_cookie_len == 0)
720 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
721
722 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_cookie)
723 /* Extension data sub-packet */
724 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
725 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->ext.tls13_cookie,
726 s->ext.tls13_cookie_len)
727 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
728 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_COOKIE,
729 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
730 goto end;
731 }
732
733 ret = EXT_RETURN_SENT;
734 end:
735 OPENSSL_free(s->ext.tls13_cookie);
736 s->ext.tls13_cookie = NULL;
737 s->ext.tls13_cookie_len = 0;
738
739 return ret;
740 }
741
742 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_early_data(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
743 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
744 size_t chainidx)
745 {
746 const unsigned char *id = NULL;
747 size_t idlen = 0;
748 SSL_SESSION *psksess = NULL;
749 SSL_SESSION *edsess = NULL;
750 const EVP_MD *handmd = NULL;
751
752 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING)
753 handmd = ssl_handshake_md(s);
754
755 if (s->psk_use_session_cb != NULL
756 && (!s->psk_use_session_cb(s, handmd, &id, &idlen, &psksess)
757 || (psksess != NULL
758 && psksess->ssl_version != TLS1_3_VERSION))) {
759 SSL_SESSION_free(psksess);
760 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA,
761 SSL_R_BAD_PSK);
762 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
763 }
764
765 SSL_SESSION_free(s->psksession);
766 s->psksession = psksess;
767 if (psksess != NULL) {
768 OPENSSL_free(s->psksession_id);
769 s->psksession_id = OPENSSL_memdup(id, idlen);
770 if (s->psksession_id == NULL) {
771 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
772 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
773 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
774 }
775 s->psksession_id_len = idlen;
776 }
777
778 if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
779 || (s->session->ext.max_early_data == 0
780 && (psksess == NULL || psksess->ext.max_early_data == 0))) {
781 s->max_early_data = 0;
782 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
783 }
784 edsess = s->session->ext.max_early_data != 0 ? s->session : psksess;
785 s->max_early_data = edsess->ext.max_early_data;
786
787 if (edsess->ext.hostname != NULL) {
788 if (s->ext.hostname == NULL
789 || (s->ext.hostname != NULL
790 && strcmp(s->ext.hostname, edsess->ext.hostname) != 0)) {
791 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
792 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA,
793 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EARLY_DATA_SNI);
794 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
795 }
796 }
797
798 if ((s->ext.alpn == NULL && edsess->ext.alpn_selected != NULL)) {
799 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA,
800 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EARLY_DATA_ALPN);
801 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
802 }
803
804 /*
805 * Verify that we are offering an ALPN protocol consistent with the early
806 * data.
807 */
808 if (edsess->ext.alpn_selected != NULL) {
809 PACKET prots, alpnpkt;
810 int found = 0;
811
812 if (!PACKET_buf_init(&prots, s->ext.alpn, s->ext.alpn_len)) {
813 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
814 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
815 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
816 }
817 while (PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&prots, &alpnpkt)) {
818 if (PACKET_equal(&alpnpkt, edsess->ext.alpn_selected,
819 edsess->ext.alpn_selected_len)) {
820 found = 1;
821 break;
822 }
823 }
824 if (!found) {
825 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
826 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA,
827 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EARLY_DATA_ALPN);
828 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
829 }
830 }
831
832 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_early_data)
833 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
834 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
835 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA,
836 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
837 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
838 }
839
840 /*
841 * We set this to rejected here. Later, if the server acknowledges the
842 * extension, we set it to accepted.
843 */
844 s->ext.early_data = SSL_EARLY_DATA_REJECTED;
845 s->ext.early_data_ok = 1;
846
847 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
848 }
849
850 #define F5_WORKAROUND_MIN_MSG_LEN 0xff
851 #define F5_WORKAROUND_MAX_MSG_LEN 0x200
852
853 /*
854 * PSK pre binder overhead =
855 * 2 bytes for TLSEXT_TYPE_psk
856 * 2 bytes for extension length
857 * 2 bytes for identities list length
858 * 2 bytes for identity length
859 * 4 bytes for obfuscated_ticket_age
860 * 2 bytes for binder list length
861 * 1 byte for binder length
862 * The above excludes the number of bytes for the identity itself and the
863 * subsequent binder bytes
864 */
865 #define PSK_PRE_BINDER_OVERHEAD (2 + 2 + 2 + 2 + 4 + 2 + 1)
866
867 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_padding(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
868 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
869 size_t chainidx)
870 {
871 unsigned char *padbytes;
872 size_t hlen;
873
874 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING) == 0)
875 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
876
877 /*
878 * Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See RFC7685.
879 * This code calculates the length of all extensions added so far but
880 * excludes the PSK extension (because that MUST be written last). Therefore
881 * this extension MUST always appear second to last.
882 */
883 if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &hlen)) {
884 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PADDING,
885 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
886 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
887 }
888
889 /*
890 * If we're going to send a PSK then that will be written out after this
891 * extension, so we need to calculate how long it is going to be.
892 */
893 if (s->session->ssl_version == TLS1_3_VERSION
894 && s->session->ext.ticklen != 0
895 && s->session->cipher != NULL) {
896 const EVP_MD *md = ssl_md(s->session->cipher->algorithm2);
897
898 if (md != NULL) {
899 /*
900 * Add the fixed PSK overhead, the identity length and the binder
901 * length.
902 */
903 hlen += PSK_PRE_BINDER_OVERHEAD + s->session->ext.ticklen
904 + EVP_MD_size(md);
905 }
906 }
907
908 if (hlen > F5_WORKAROUND_MIN_MSG_LEN && hlen < F5_WORKAROUND_MAX_MSG_LEN) {
909 /* Calculate the amount of padding we need to add */
910 hlen = F5_WORKAROUND_MAX_MSG_LEN - hlen;
911
912 /*
913 * Take off the size of extension header itself (2 bytes for type and
914 * 2 bytes for length bytes), but ensure that the extension is at least
915 * 1 byte long so as not to have an empty extension last (WebSphere 7.x,
916 * 8.x are intolerant of that condition)
917 */
918 if (hlen > 4)
919 hlen -= 4;
920 else
921 hlen = 1;
922
923 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_padding)
924 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, hlen, &padbytes)) {
925 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PADDING,
926 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
927 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
928 }
929 memset(padbytes, 0, hlen);
930 }
931
932 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
933 }
934
935 /*
936 * Construct the pre_shared_key extension
937 */
938 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_psk(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
939 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
940 {
941 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
942 uint32_t now, agesec, agems = 0;
943 size_t reshashsize = 0, pskhashsize = 0, binderoffset, msglen;
944 unsigned char *resbinder = NULL, *pskbinder = NULL, *msgstart = NULL;
945 const EVP_MD *handmd = NULL, *mdres = NULL, *mdpsk = NULL;
946 int dores = 0;
947
948 s->session->ext.tick_identity = TLSEXT_PSK_BAD_IDENTITY;
949
950 /*
951 * Note: At this stage of the code we only support adding a single
952 * resumption PSK. If we add support for multiple PSKs then the length
953 * calculations in the padding extension will need to be adjusted.
954 */
955
956 /*
957 * If this is an incompatible or new session then we have nothing to resume
958 * so don't add this extension.
959 */
960 if (s->session->ssl_version != TLS1_3_VERSION
961 || (s->session->ext.ticklen == 0 && s->psksession == NULL))
962 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
963
964 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING)
965 handmd = ssl_handshake_md(s);
966
967 if (s->session->ext.ticklen != 0) {
968 /* Get the digest associated with the ciphersuite in the session */
969 if (s->session->cipher == NULL) {
970 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK,
971 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
972 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
973 }
974 mdres = ssl_md(s->session->cipher->algorithm2);
975 if (mdres == NULL) {
976 /*
977 * Don't recognize this cipher so we can't use the session.
978 * Ignore it
979 */
980 goto dopsksess;
981 }
982
983 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING && mdres != handmd) {
984 /*
985 * Selected ciphersuite hash does not match the hash for the session
986 * so we can't use it.
987 */
988 goto dopsksess;
989 }
990
991 /*
992 * Technically the C standard just says time() returns a time_t and says
993 * nothing about the encoding of that type. In practice most
994 * implementations follow POSIX which holds it as an integral type in
995 * seconds since epoch. We've already made the assumption that we can do
996 * this in multiple places in the code, so portability shouldn't be an
997 * issue.
998 */
999 now = (uint32_t)time(NULL);
1000 agesec = now - (uint32_t)s->session->time;
1001
1002 if (s->session->ext.tick_lifetime_hint < agesec) {
1003 /* Ticket is too old. Ignore it. */
1004 goto dopsksess;
1005 }
1006
1007 /*
1008 * Calculate age in ms. We're just doing it to nearest second. Should be
1009 * good enough.
1010 */
1011 agems = agesec * (uint32_t)1000;
1012
1013 if (agesec != 0 && agems / (uint32_t)1000 != agesec) {
1014 /*
1015 * Overflow. Shouldn't happen unless this is a *really* old session.
1016 * If so we just ignore it.
1017 */
1018 goto dopsksess;
1019 }
1020
1021 /*
1022 * Obfuscate the age. Overflow here is fine, this addition is supposed
1023 * to be mod 2^32.
1024 */
1025 agems += s->session->ext.tick_age_add;
1026
1027 reshashsize = EVP_MD_size(mdres);
1028 dores = 1;
1029 }
1030
1031 dopsksess:
1032 if (!dores && s->psksession == NULL)
1033 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1034
1035 if (s->psksession != NULL) {
1036 mdpsk = ssl_md(s->psksession->cipher->algorithm2);
1037 if (mdpsk == NULL) {
1038 /*
1039 * Don't recognize this cipher so we can't use the session.
1040 * If this happens it's an application bug.
1041 */
1042 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK,
1043 SSL_R_BAD_PSK);
1044 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1045 }
1046
1047 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING && mdpsk != handmd) {
1048 /*
1049 * Selected ciphersuite hash does not match the hash for the PSK
1050 * session. This is an application bug.
1051 */
1052 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK,
1053 SSL_R_BAD_PSK);
1054 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1055 }
1056
1057 pskhashsize = EVP_MD_size(mdpsk);
1058 }
1059
1060 /* Create the extension, but skip over the binder for now */
1061 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_psk)
1062 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1063 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1064 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK,
1065 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1066 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1067 }
1068
1069 if (dores) {
1070 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->session->ext.tick,
1071 s->session->ext.ticklen)
1072 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, agems)) {
1073 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK,
1074 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1075 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1076 }
1077 }
1078
1079 if (s->psksession != NULL) {
1080 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->psksession_id,
1081 s->psksession_id_len)
1082 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, 0)) {
1083 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK,
1084 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1085 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1086 }
1087 }
1088
1089 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)
1090 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &binderoffset)
1091 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1092 || (dores
1093 && !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u8(pkt, reshashsize, &resbinder))
1094 || (s->psksession != NULL
1095 && !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u8(pkt, pskhashsize, &pskbinder))
1096 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1097 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1098 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &msglen)
1099 /*
1100 * We need to fill in all the sub-packet lengths now so we can
1101 * calculate the HMAC of the message up to the binders
1102 */
1103 || !WPACKET_fill_lengths(pkt)) {
1104 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK,
1105 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1106 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1107 }
1108
1109 msgstart = WPACKET_get_curr(pkt) - msglen;
1110
1111 if (dores
1112 && tls_psk_do_binder(s, mdres, msgstart, binderoffset, NULL,
1113 resbinder, s->session, 1, 0) != 1) {
1114 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1115 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1116 }
1117
1118 if (s->psksession != NULL
1119 && tls_psk_do_binder(s, mdpsk, msgstart, binderoffset, NULL,
1120 pskbinder, s->psksession, 1, 1) != 1) {
1121 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1122 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1123 }
1124
1125 if (dores)
1126 s->session->ext.tick_identity = 0;
1127 if (s->psksession != NULL)
1128 s->psksession->ext.tick_identity = (dores ? 1 : 0);
1129
1130 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1131 #else
1132 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1133 #endif
1134 }
1135
1136 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_post_handshake_auth(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1137 unsigned int context,
1138 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1139 {
1140 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
1141 if (!s->pha_forced) {
1142 int i, n = 0;
1143
1144 /* check for cert, if present, we can do post-handshake auth */
1145 if (s->cert == NULL)
1146 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1147
1148 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
1149 if (s->cert->pkeys[i].x509 != NULL
1150 && s->cert->pkeys[i].privatekey != NULL)
1151 n++;
1152 }
1153
1154 /* no identity certificates, so no extension */
1155 if (n == 0)
1156 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1157 }
1158
1159 /* construct extension - 0 length, no contents */
1160 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_post_handshake_auth)
1161 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1162 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1163 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1164 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_POST_HANDSHAKE_AUTH,
1165 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1166 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1167 }
1168
1169 s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_EXT_SENT;
1170
1171 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1172 #else
1173 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1174 #endif
1175 }
1176
1177
1178 /*
1179 * Parse the server's renegotiation binding and abort if it's not right
1180 */
1181 int tls_parse_stoc_renegotiate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
1182 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1183 {
1184 size_t expected_len = s->s3->previous_client_finished_len
1185 + s->s3->previous_server_finished_len;
1186 size_t ilen;
1187 const unsigned char *data;
1188
1189 /* Check for logic errors */
1190 if (!ossl_assert(expected_len == 0
1191 || s->s3->previous_client_finished_len != 0)
1192 || !ossl_assert(expected_len == 0
1193 || s->s3->previous_server_finished_len != 0)) {
1194 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_RENEGOTIATE,
1195 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1196 return 0;
1197 }
1198
1199 /* Parse the length byte */
1200 if (!PACKET_get_1_len(pkt, &ilen)) {
1201 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_RENEGOTIATE,
1202 SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_ENCODING_ERR);
1203 return 0;
1204 }
1205
1206 /* Consistency check */
1207 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != ilen) {
1208 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_RENEGOTIATE,
1209 SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_ENCODING_ERR);
1210 return 0;
1211 }
1212
1213 /* Check that the extension matches */
1214 if (ilen != expected_len) {
1215 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_RENEGOTIATE,
1216 SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH);
1217 return 0;
1218 }
1219
1220 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, s->s3->previous_client_finished_len)
1221 || memcmp(data, s->s3->previous_client_finished,
1222 s->s3->previous_client_finished_len) != 0) {
1223 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_RENEGOTIATE,
1224 SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH);
1225 return 0;
1226 }
1227
1228 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, s->s3->previous_server_finished_len)
1229 || memcmp(data, s->s3->previous_server_finished,
1230 s->s3->previous_server_finished_len) != 0) {
1231 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_RENEGOTIATE,
1232 SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH);
1233 return 0;
1234 }
1235 s->s3->send_connection_binding = 1;
1236
1237 return 1;
1238 }
1239
1240 /* Parse the server's max fragment len extension packet */
1241 int tls_parse_stoc_maxfragmentlen(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
1242 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1243 {
1244 unsigned int value;
1245
1246 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 1 || !PACKET_get_1(pkt, &value)) {
1247 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_MAXFRAGMENTLEN,
1248 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1249 return 0;
1250 }
1251
1252 /* |value| should contains a valid max-fragment-length code. */
1253 if (!IS_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT_VALID(value)) {
1254 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1255 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_MAXFRAGMENTLEN,
1256 SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH);
1257 return 0;
1258 }
1259
1260 /* Must be the same value as client-configured one who was sent to server */
1261 /*-
1262 * RFC 6066: if a client receives a maximum fragment length negotiation
1263 * response that differs from the length it requested, ...
1264 * It must abort with SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER alert
1265 */
1266 if (value != s->ext.max_fragment_len_mode) {
1267 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1268 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_MAXFRAGMENTLEN,
1269 SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH);
1270 return 0;
1271 }
1272
1273 /*
1274 * Maximum Fragment Length Negotiation succeeded.
1275 * The negotiated Maximum Fragment Length is binding now.
1276 */
1277 s->session->ext.max_fragment_len_mode = value;
1278
1279 return 1;
1280 }
1281
1282 int tls_parse_stoc_server_name(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
1283 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1284 {
1285 if (s->ext.hostname == NULL) {
1286 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SERVER_NAME,
1287 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1288 return 0;
1289 }
1290
1291 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
1292 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SERVER_NAME,
1293 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1294 return 0;
1295 }
1296
1297 if (!s->hit) {
1298 if (s->session->ext.hostname != NULL) {
1299 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SERVER_NAME,
1300 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1301 return 0;
1302 }
1303 s->session->ext.hostname = OPENSSL_strdup(s->ext.hostname);
1304 if (s->session->ext.hostname == NULL) {
1305 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SERVER_NAME,
1306 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1307 return 0;
1308 }
1309 }
1310
1311 return 1;
1312 }
1313
1314 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1315 int tls_parse_stoc_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
1316 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1317 {
1318 size_t ecpointformats_len;
1319 PACKET ecptformatlist;
1320
1321 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &ecptformatlist)) {
1322 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_EC_PT_FORMATS,
1323 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1324 return 0;
1325 }
1326 if (!s->hit) {
1327 ecpointformats_len = PACKET_remaining(&ecptformatlist);
1328 if (ecpointformats_len == 0) {
1329 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
1330 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_EC_PT_FORMATS, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
1331 return 0;
1332 }
1333
1334 s->session->ext.ecpointformats_len = 0;
1335 OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.ecpointformats);
1336 s->session->ext.ecpointformats = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformats_len);
1337 if (s->session->ext.ecpointformats == NULL) {
1338 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1339 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_EC_PT_FORMATS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1340 return 0;
1341 }
1342
1343 s->session->ext.ecpointformats_len = ecpointformats_len;
1344
1345 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&ecptformatlist,
1346 s->session->ext.ecpointformats,
1347 ecpointformats_len)) {
1348 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1349 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_EC_PT_FORMATS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1350 return 0;
1351 }
1352 }
1353
1354 return 1;
1355 }
1356 #endif
1357
1358 int tls_parse_stoc_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
1359 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1360 {
1361 if (s->ext.session_ticket_cb != NULL &&
1362 !s->ext.session_ticket_cb(s, PACKET_data(pkt),
1363 PACKET_remaining(pkt),
1364 s->ext.session_ticket_cb_arg)) {
1365 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1366 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1367 return 0;
1368 }
1369
1370 if (!tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1371 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION,
1372 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1373 return 0;
1374 }
1375 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
1376 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
1377 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1378 return 0;
1379 }
1380
1381 s->ext.ticket_expected = 1;
1382
1383 return 1;
1384 }
1385
1386 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
1387 int tls_parse_stoc_status_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
1388 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1389 {
1390 /*
1391 * MUST only be sent if we've requested a status
1392 * request message. In TLS <= 1.2 it must also be empty.
1393 */
1394 if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
1395 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION,
1396 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_STATUS_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1397 return 0;
1398 }
1399 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
1400 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
1401 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_STATUS_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1402 return 0;
1403 }
1404
1405 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1406 /* We only know how to handle this if it's for the first Certificate in
1407 * the chain. We ignore any other responses.
1408 */
1409 if (chainidx != 0)
1410 return 1;
1411
1412 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1413 return tls_process_cert_status_body(s, pkt);
1414 }
1415
1416 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
1417 s->ext.status_expected = 1;
1418
1419 return 1;
1420 }
1421 #endif
1422
1423
1424 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
1425 int tls_parse_stoc_sct(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1426 size_t chainidx)
1427 {
1428 /*
1429 * Only take it if we asked for it - i.e if there is no CT validation
1430 * callback set, then a custom extension MAY be processing it, so we
1431 * need to let control continue to flow to that.
1432 */
1433 if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
1434 size_t size = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
1435
1436 /* Simply copy it off for later processing */
1437 OPENSSL_free(s->ext.scts);
1438 s->ext.scts = NULL;
1439
1440 s->ext.scts_len = (uint16_t)size;
1441 if (size > 0) {
1442 s->ext.scts = OPENSSL_malloc(size);
1443 if (s->ext.scts == NULL
1444 || !PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->ext.scts, size)) {
1445 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SCT,
1446 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1447 return 0;
1448 }
1449 }
1450 } else {
1451 ENDPOINT role = (context & SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO) != 0
1452 ? ENDPOINT_CLIENT : ENDPOINT_BOTH;
1453
1454 /*
1455 * If we didn't ask for it then there must be a custom extension,
1456 * otherwise this is unsolicited.
1457 */
1458 if (custom_ext_find(&s->cert->custext, role,
1459 TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp,
1460 NULL) == NULL) {
1461 SSLfatal(s, TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SCT,
1462 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1463 return 0;
1464 }
1465
1466 if (!custom_ext_parse(s, context,
1467 TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp,
1468 PACKET_data(pkt), PACKET_remaining(pkt),
1469 x, chainidx)) {
1470 /* SSLfatal already called */
1471 return 0;
1472 }
1473 }
1474
1475 return 1;
1476 }
1477 #endif
1478
1479
1480 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1481 /*
1482 * ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
1483 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly
1484 * fill the length of the block. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure.
1485 */
1486 static int ssl_next_proto_validate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1487 {
1488 PACKET tmp_protocol;
1489
1490 while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
1491 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &tmp_protocol)
1492 || PACKET_remaining(&tmp_protocol) == 0) {
1493 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_NEXT_PROTO_VALIDATE,
1494 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1495 return 0;
1496 }
1497 }
1498
1499 return 1;
1500 }
1501
1502 int tls_parse_stoc_npn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1503 size_t chainidx)
1504 {
1505 unsigned char *selected;
1506 unsigned char selected_len;
1507 PACKET tmppkt;
1508
1509 /* Check if we are in a renegotiation. If so ignore this extension */
1510 if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s))
1511 return 1;
1512
1513 /* We must have requested it. */
1514 if (s->ctx->ext.npn_select_cb == NULL) {
1515 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_NPN,
1516 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1517 return 0;
1518 }
1519
1520 /* The data must be valid */
1521 tmppkt = *pkt;
1522 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(s, &tmppkt)) {
1523 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1524 return 0;
1525 }
1526 if (s->ctx->ext.npn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len,
1527 PACKET_data(pkt),
1528 PACKET_remaining(pkt),
1529 s->ctx->ext.npn_select_cb_arg) !=
1530 SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1531 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_NPN,
1532 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1533 return 0;
1534 }
1535
1536 /*
1537 * Could be non-NULL if server has sent multiple NPN extensions in
1538 * a single Serverhello
1539 */
1540 OPENSSL_free(s->ext.npn);
1541 s->ext.npn = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
1542 if (s->ext.npn == NULL) {
1543 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_NPN,
1544 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1545 return 0;
1546 }
1547
1548 memcpy(s->ext.npn, selected, selected_len);
1549 s->ext.npn_len = selected_len;
1550 s->s3->npn_seen = 1;
1551
1552 return 1;
1553 }
1554 #endif
1555
1556 int tls_parse_stoc_alpn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1557 size_t chainidx)
1558 {
1559 size_t len;
1560
1561 /* We must have requested it. */
1562 if (!s->s3->alpn_sent) {
1563 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_ALPN,
1564 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1565 return 0;
1566 }
1567 /*-
1568 * The extension data consists of:
1569 * uint16 list_length
1570 * uint8 proto_length;
1571 * uint8 proto[proto_length];
1572 */
1573 if (!PACKET_get_net_2_len(pkt, &len)
1574 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != len || !PACKET_get_1_len(pkt, &len)
1575 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != len) {
1576 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_ALPN,
1577 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1578 return 0;
1579 }
1580 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1581 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
1582 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
1583 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_ALPN,
1584 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1585 return 0;
1586 }
1587 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->s3->alpn_selected, len)) {
1588 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_ALPN,
1589 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1590 return 0;
1591 }
1592 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
1593
1594 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL
1595 || s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len != len
1596 || memcmp(s->session->ext.alpn_selected, s->s3->alpn_selected, len)
1597 != 0) {
1598 /* ALPN not consistent with the old session so cannot use early_data */
1599 s->ext.early_data_ok = 0;
1600 }
1601 if (!s->hit) {
1602 /* If a new session then update it with the selected ALPN */
1603 s->session->ext.alpn_selected =
1604 OPENSSL_memdup(s->s3->alpn_selected, s->s3->alpn_selected_len);
1605 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL) {
1606 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_ALPN,
1607 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1608 return 0;
1609 }
1610 s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
1611 }
1612
1613 return 1;
1614 }
1615
1616 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1617 int tls_parse_stoc_use_srtp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1618 size_t chainidx)
1619 {
1620 unsigned int id, ct, mki;
1621 int i;
1622 STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *clnt;
1623 SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *prof;
1624
1625 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ct) || ct != 2
1626 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &id)
1627 || !PACKET_get_1(pkt, &mki)
1628 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1629 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_USE_SRTP,
1630 SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST);
1631 return 0;
1632 }
1633
1634 if (mki != 0) {
1635 /* Must be no MKI, since we never offer one */
1636 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_USE_SRTP,
1637 SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_MKI_VALUE);
1638 return 0;
1639 }
1640
1641 /* Throw an error if the server gave us an unsolicited extension */
1642 clnt = SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s);
1643 if (clnt == NULL) {
1644 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_USE_SRTP,
1645 SSL_R_NO_SRTP_PROFILES);
1646 return 0;
1647 }
1648
1649 /*
1650 * Check to see if the server gave us something we support (and
1651 * presumably offered)
1652 */
1653 for (i = 0; i < sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(clnt); i++) {
1654 prof = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(clnt, i);
1655
1656 if (prof->id == id) {
1657 s->srtp_profile = prof;
1658 return 1;
1659 }
1660 }
1661
1662 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_USE_SRTP,
1663 SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST);
1664 return 0;
1665 }
1666 #endif
1667
1668 int tls_parse_stoc_etm(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1669 size_t chainidx)
1670 {
1671 /* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */
1672 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
1673 && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD
1674 && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_RC4)
1675 s->ext.use_etm = 1;
1676
1677 return 1;
1678 }
1679
1680 int tls_parse_stoc_ems(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1681 size_t chainidx)
1682 {
1683 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
1684 if (!s->hit)
1685 s->session->flags |= SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS;
1686
1687 return 1;
1688 }
1689
1690 int tls_parse_stoc_supported_versions(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
1691 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1692 {
1693 unsigned int version;
1694
1695 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &version)
1696 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1697 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
1698 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS,
1699 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1700 return 0;
1701 }
1702
1703 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove this before release */
1704 if (version == TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT)
1705 version = TLS1_3_VERSION;
1706
1707 /* We ignore this extension for HRRs except to sanity check it */
1708 if (context == SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST) {
1709 /*
1710 * The only protocol version we support which has an HRR message is
1711 * TLSv1.3, therefore we shouldn't be getting an HRR for anything else.
1712 */
1713 if (version != TLS1_3_VERSION) {
1714 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
1715 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS,
1716 SSL_R_BAD_HRR_VERSION);
1717 return 0;
1718 }
1719 return 1;
1720 }
1721
1722 /* We just set it here. We validate it in ssl_choose_client_version */
1723 s->version = version;
1724
1725 return 1;
1726 }
1727
1728 int tls_parse_stoc_key_share(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1729 size_t chainidx)
1730 {
1731 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
1732 unsigned int group_id;
1733 PACKET encoded_pt;
1734 EVP_PKEY *ckey = s->s3->tmp.pkey, *skey = NULL;
1735
1736 /* Sanity check */
1737 if (ckey == NULL || s->s3->peer_tmp != NULL) {
1738 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE,
1739 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1740 return 0;
1741 }
1742
1743 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &group_id)) {
1744 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE,
1745 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1746 return 0;
1747 }
1748
1749 if ((context & SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST) != 0) {
1750 const uint16_t *pgroups = NULL;
1751 size_t i, num_groups;
1752
1753 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1754 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE,
1755 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1756 return 0;
1757 }
1758
1759 /*
1760 * It is an error if the HelloRetryRequest wants a key_share that we
1761 * already sent in the first ClientHello
1762 */
1763 if (group_id == s->s3->group_id) {
1764 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1765 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE);
1766 return 0;
1767 }
1768
1769 /* Validate the selected group is one we support */
1770 tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &pgroups, &num_groups);
1771 for (i = 0; i < num_groups; i++) {
1772 if (group_id == pgroups[i])
1773 break;
1774 }
1775 if (i >= num_groups
1776 || !tls_curve_allowed(s, group_id, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) {
1777 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1778 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE);
1779 return 0;
1780 }
1781
1782 s->s3->group_id = group_id;
1783 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
1784 s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL;
1785 return 1;
1786 }
1787
1788 if (group_id != s->s3->group_id) {
1789 /*
1790 * This isn't for the group that we sent in the original
1791 * key_share!
1792 */
1793 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE,
1794 SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE);
1795 return 0;
1796 }
1797
1798 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &encoded_pt)
1799 || PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt) == 0) {
1800 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE,
1801 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1802 return 0;
1803 }
1804
1805 skey = ssl_generate_pkey(ckey);
1806 if (skey == NULL) {
1807 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE,
1808 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1809 return 0;
1810 }
1811 if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(skey, PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
1812 PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt))) {
1813 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE,
1814 SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
1815 EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
1816 return 0;
1817 }
1818
1819 if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 1) == 0) {
1820 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1821 EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
1822 return 0;
1823 }
1824 s->s3->peer_tmp = skey;
1825 #endif
1826
1827 return 1;
1828 }
1829
1830 int tls_parse_stoc_cookie(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1831 size_t chainidx)
1832 {
1833 PACKET cookie;
1834
1835 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &cookie)
1836 || !PACKET_memdup(&cookie, &s->ext.tls13_cookie,
1837 &s->ext.tls13_cookie_len)) {
1838 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_COOKIE,
1839 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1840 return 0;
1841 }
1842
1843 return 1;
1844 }
1845
1846 int tls_parse_stoc_early_data(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
1847 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1848 {
1849 if (context == SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET) {
1850 unsigned long max_early_data;
1851
1852 if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &max_early_data)
1853 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1854 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_EARLY_DATA,
1855 SSL_R_INVALID_MAX_EARLY_DATA);
1856 return 0;
1857 }
1858
1859 s->session->ext.max_early_data = max_early_data;
1860
1861 return 1;
1862 }
1863
1864 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1865 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_EARLY_DATA,
1866 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1867 return 0;
1868 }
1869
1870 if (!s->ext.early_data_ok
1871 || !s->hit
1872 || s->session->ext.tick_identity != 0) {
1873 /*
1874 * If we get here then we didn't send early data, or we didn't resume
1875 * using the first identity, or the SNI/ALPN is not consistent so the
1876 * server should not be accepting it.
1877 */
1878 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_EARLY_DATA,
1879 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1880 return 0;
1881 }
1882
1883 s->ext.early_data = SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED;
1884
1885 return 1;
1886 }
1887
1888 int tls_parse_stoc_psk(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1889 size_t chainidx)
1890 {
1891 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
1892 unsigned int identity;
1893
1894 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &identity) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1895 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_PSK,
1896 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1897 return 0;
1898 }
1899
1900 if (s->session->ext.tick_identity == (int)identity) {
1901 s->hit = 1;
1902 SSL_SESSION_free(s->psksession);
1903 s->psksession = NULL;
1904 return 1;
1905 }
1906
1907 if (s->psksession == NULL
1908 || s->psksession->ext.tick_identity != (int)identity) {
1909 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_PSK,
1910 SSL_R_BAD_PSK_IDENTITY);
1911 return 0;
1912 }
1913
1914 /*
1915 * If we used the external PSK for sending early_data then s->early_secret
1916 * is already set up, so don't overwrite it. Otherwise we copy the
1917 * early_secret across that we generated earlier.
1918 */
1919 if ((s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY
1920 && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING)
1921 || s->session->ext.max_early_data > 0
1922 || s->psksession->ext.max_early_data == 0)
1923 memcpy(s->early_secret, s->psksession->early_secret, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
1924
1925 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
1926 s->session = s->psksession;
1927 s->psksession = NULL;
1928 s->hit = 1;
1929 #endif
1930
1931 return 1;
1932 }
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