2 * Copyright 2016-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
11 #include "../ssl_local.h"
12 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
13 #include "statem_local.h"
15 DEFINE_STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE
)
16 DEFINE_STACK_OF_CONST(SSL_CIPHER
)
17 DEFINE_STACK_OF(OCSP_RESPID
)
19 EXT_RETURN
tls_construct_ctos_renegotiate(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
,
20 unsigned int context
, X509
*x
,
23 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
25 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT
;
27 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate
)
28 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)
29 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, s
->s3
.previous_client_finished
,
30 s
->s3
.previous_client_finished_len
)
31 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
32 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_RENEGOTIATE
,
33 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
34 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
37 return EXT_RETURN_SENT
;
40 EXT_RETURN
tls_construct_ctos_server_name(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
,
41 unsigned int context
, X509
*x
,
44 if (s
->ext
.hostname
== NULL
)
45 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT
;
47 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
48 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name
)
49 /* Sub-packet for server_name extension */
50 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)
51 /* Sub-packet for servername list (always 1 hostname)*/
52 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)
53 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name
)
54 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt
, s
->ext
.hostname
,
55 strlen(s
->ext
.hostname
))
56 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)
57 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
58 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SERVER_NAME
,
59 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
60 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
63 return EXT_RETURN_SENT
;
66 /* Push a Max Fragment Len extension into ClientHello */
67 EXT_RETURN
tls_construct_ctos_maxfragmentlen(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
,
68 unsigned int context
, X509
*x
,
71 if (s
->ext
.max_fragment_len_mode
== TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_DISABLED
)
72 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT
;
74 /* Add Max Fragment Length extension if client enabled it. */
76 * 4 bytes for this extension type and extension length
77 * 1 byte for the Max Fragment Length code value.
79 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, TLSEXT_TYPE_max_fragment_length
)
80 /* Sub-packet for Max Fragment Length extension (1 byte) */
81 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)
82 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, s
->ext
.max_fragment_len_mode
)
83 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
84 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
85 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_MAXFRAGMENTLEN
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
86 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
89 return EXT_RETURN_SENT
;
92 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
93 EXT_RETURN
tls_construct_ctos_srp(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
,
94 X509
*x
, size_t chainidx
)
96 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
97 if (s
->srp_ctx
.login
== NULL
)
98 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT
;
100 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, TLSEXT_TYPE_srp
)
101 /* Sub-packet for SRP extension */
102 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)
103 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt
)
104 /* login must not be zero...internal error if so */
105 || !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt
, WPACKET_FLAGS_NON_ZERO_LENGTH
)
106 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt
, s
->srp_ctx
.login
,
107 strlen(s
->srp_ctx
.login
))
108 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)
109 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
110 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SRP
,
111 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
112 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
115 return EXT_RETURN_SENT
;
119 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
120 static int use_ecc(SSL
*s
, int max_version
)
123 unsigned long alg_k
, alg_a
;
124 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *cipher_stack
= NULL
;
125 const uint16_t *pgroups
= NULL
;
126 size_t num_groups
, j
;
128 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
129 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
)
132 cipher_stack
= SSL_get1_supported_ciphers(s
);
133 end
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack
);
134 for (i
= 0; i
< end
; i
++) {
135 const SSL_CIPHER
*c
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack
, i
);
137 alg_k
= c
->algorithm_mkey
;
138 alg_a
= c
->algorithm_auth
;
139 if ((alg_k
& (SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
))
140 || (alg_a
& SSL_aECDSA
)
141 || c
->min_tls
>= TLS1_3_VERSION
) {
146 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(cipher_stack
);
150 /* Check we have at least one EC supported group */
151 tls1_get_supported_groups(s
, &pgroups
, &num_groups
);
152 for (j
= 0; j
< num_groups
; j
++) {
153 uint16_t ctmp
= pgroups
[j
];
155 if (tls_valid_group(s
, ctmp
, max_version
)
156 && tls_group_allowed(s
, ctmp
, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED
))
163 EXT_RETURN
tls_construct_ctos_ec_pt_formats(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
,
164 unsigned int context
, X509
*x
,
167 const unsigned char *pformats
;
169 int reason
, min_version
, max_version
;
171 reason
= ssl_get_min_max_version(s
, &min_version
, &max_version
, NULL
);
173 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
174 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EC_PT_FORMATS
, reason
);
175 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
177 if (!use_ecc(s
, max_version
))
178 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT
;
180 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
181 tls1_get_formatlist(s
, &pformats
, &num_formats
);
183 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats
)
184 /* Sub-packet for formats extension */
185 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)
186 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, pformats
, num_formats
)
187 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
188 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
189 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EC_PT_FORMATS
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
190 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
193 return EXT_RETURN_SENT
;
197 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC)
198 EXT_RETURN
tls_construct_ctos_supported_groups(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
,
199 unsigned int context
, X509
*x
,
202 const uint16_t *pgroups
= NULL
;
203 size_t num_groups
= 0, i
;
204 int min_version
, max_version
, reason
;
206 reason
= ssl_get_min_max_version(s
, &min_version
, &max_version
, NULL
);
208 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
209 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_GROUPS
, reason
);
210 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
213 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC)
214 if (max_version
< TLS1_3_VERSION
)
215 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT
;
217 if (!use_ecc(s
, max_version
) && max_version
< TLS1_3_VERSION
)
218 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT
;
222 * Add TLS extension supported_groups to the ClientHello message
224 tls1_get_supported_groups(s
, &pgroups
, &num_groups
);
226 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_groups
)
227 /* Sub-packet for supported_groups extension */
228 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)
229 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)
230 || !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt
, WPACKET_FLAGS_NON_ZERO_LENGTH
)) {
231 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
232 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_GROUPS
,
233 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
234 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
236 /* Copy group ID if supported */
237 for (i
= 0; i
< num_groups
; i
++) {
238 uint16_t ctmp
= pgroups
[i
];
240 if (tls_valid_group(s
, ctmp
, max_version
)
241 && tls_group_allowed(s
, ctmp
, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED
)) {
242 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, ctmp
)) {
243 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
244 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_GROUPS
,
245 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
246 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
250 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt
) || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
251 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
252 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_GROUPS
,
253 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
254 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
257 return EXT_RETURN_SENT
;
261 EXT_RETURN
tls_construct_ctos_session_ticket(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
,
262 unsigned int context
, X509
*x
,
267 if (!tls_use_ticket(s
))
268 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT
;
270 if (!s
->new_session
&& s
->session
!= NULL
271 && s
->session
->ext
.tick
!= NULL
272 && s
->session
->ssl_version
!= TLS1_3_VERSION
) {
273 ticklen
= s
->session
->ext
.ticklen
;
274 } else if (s
->session
&& s
->ext
.session_ticket
!= NULL
275 && s
->ext
.session_ticket
->data
!= NULL
) {
276 ticklen
= s
->ext
.session_ticket
->length
;
277 s
->session
->ext
.tick
= OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen
);
278 if (s
->session
->ext
.tick
== NULL
) {
279 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
280 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SESSION_TICKET
,
281 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
282 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
284 memcpy(s
->session
->ext
.tick
,
285 s
->ext
.session_ticket
->data
, ticklen
);
286 s
->session
->ext
.ticklen
= ticklen
;
291 if (ticklen
== 0 && s
->ext
.session_ticket
!= NULL
&&
292 s
->ext
.session_ticket
->data
== NULL
)
293 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT
;
295 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket
)
296 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt
, s
->session
->ext
.tick
, ticklen
)) {
297 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
298 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SESSION_TICKET
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
299 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
302 return EXT_RETURN_SENT
;
305 EXT_RETURN
tls_construct_ctos_sig_algs(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
,
306 unsigned int context
, X509
*x
,
310 const uint16_t *salg
;
312 if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_SIGALGS(s
))
313 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT
;
315 salglen
= tls12_get_psigalgs(s
, 1, &salg
);
316 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms
)
317 /* Sub-packet for sig-algs extension */
318 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)
319 /* Sub-packet for the actual list */
320 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)
321 || !tls12_copy_sigalgs(s
, pkt
, salg
, salglen
)
322 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)
323 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
324 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SIG_ALGS
,
325 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
326 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
329 return EXT_RETURN_SENT
;
332 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
333 EXT_RETURN
tls_construct_ctos_status_request(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
,
334 unsigned int context
, X509
*x
,
339 /* This extension isn't defined for client Certificates */
341 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT
;
343 if (s
->ext
.status_type
!= TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp
)
344 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT
;
346 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request
)
347 /* Sub-packet for status request extension */
348 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)
349 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp
)
350 /* Sub-packet for the ids */
351 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)) {
352 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
353 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
354 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
356 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s
->ext
.ocsp
.ids
); i
++) {
357 unsigned char *idbytes
;
358 OCSP_RESPID
*id
= sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s
->ext
.ocsp
.ids
, i
);
359 int idlen
= i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id
, NULL
);
362 /* Sub-packet for an individual id */
363 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt
, idlen
, &idbytes
)
364 || i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id
, &idbytes
) != idlen
) {
365 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
366 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST
,
367 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
368 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
371 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt
)
372 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)) {
373 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
374 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
375 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
377 if (s
->ext
.ocsp
.exts
) {
378 unsigned char *extbytes
;
379 int extlen
= i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s
->ext
.ocsp
.exts
, NULL
);
382 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
383 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST
,
384 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
385 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
387 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt
, extlen
, &extbytes
)
388 || i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s
->ext
.ocsp
.exts
, &extbytes
)
390 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
391 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST
,
392 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
393 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
396 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt
) || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
397 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
398 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
399 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
402 return EXT_RETURN_SENT
;
406 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
407 EXT_RETURN
tls_construct_ctos_npn(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
,
408 X509
*x
, size_t chainidx
)
410 if (s
->ctx
->ext
.npn_select_cb
== NULL
|| !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s
))
411 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT
;
414 * The client advertises an empty extension to indicate its support
415 * for Next Protocol Negotiation
417 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg
)
418 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, 0)) {
419 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_NPN
,
420 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
421 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
424 return EXT_RETURN_SENT
;
428 EXT_RETURN
tls_construct_ctos_alpn(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
,
429 X509
*x
, size_t chainidx
)
433 if (s
->ext
.alpn
== NULL
|| !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s
))
434 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT
;
436 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
,
437 TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation
)
438 /* Sub-packet ALPN extension */
439 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)
440 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt
, s
->ext
.alpn
, s
->ext
.alpn_len
)
441 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
442 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_ALPN
,
443 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
444 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
448 return EXT_RETURN_SENT
;
452 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
453 EXT_RETURN
tls_construct_ctos_use_srtp(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
,
454 unsigned int context
, X509
*x
,
457 STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE
) *clnt
= SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s
);
461 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT
;
463 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp
)
464 /* Sub-packet for SRTP extension */
465 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)
466 /* Sub-packet for the protection profile list */
467 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)) {
468 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_USE_SRTP
,
469 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
470 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
473 end
= sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(clnt
);
474 for (i
= 0; i
< end
; i
++) {
475 const SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE
*prof
=
476 sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(clnt
, i
);
478 if (prof
== NULL
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, prof
->id
)) {
479 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
480 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_USE_SRTP
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
481 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
484 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt
)
485 /* Add an empty use_mki value */
486 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, 0)
487 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
488 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_USE_SRTP
,
489 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
490 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
493 return EXT_RETURN_SENT
;
497 EXT_RETURN
tls_construct_ctos_etm(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
,
498 X509
*x
, size_t chainidx
)
500 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC
)
501 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT
;
503 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
)
504 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, 0)) {
505 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_ETM
,
506 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
507 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
510 return EXT_RETURN_SENT
;
513 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
514 EXT_RETURN
tls_construct_ctos_sct(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
,
515 X509
*x
, size_t chainidx
)
517 if (s
->ct_validation_callback
== NULL
)
518 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT
;
520 /* Not defined for client Certificates */
522 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT
;
524 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp
)
525 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, 0)) {
526 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SCT
,
527 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
528 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
531 return EXT_RETURN_SENT
;
535 EXT_RETURN
tls_construct_ctos_ems(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
,
536 X509
*x
, size_t chainidx
)
538 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET
)
539 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT
;
541 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret
)
542 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, 0)) {
543 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EMS
,
544 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
545 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
548 return EXT_RETURN_SENT
;
551 EXT_RETURN
tls_construct_ctos_supported_versions(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
,
552 unsigned int context
, X509
*x
,
555 int currv
, min_version
, max_version
, reason
;
557 reason
= ssl_get_min_max_version(s
, &min_version
, &max_version
, NULL
);
559 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
560 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS
, reason
);
561 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
565 * Don't include this if we can't negotiate TLSv1.3. We can do a straight
566 * comparison here because we will never be called in DTLS.
568 if (max_version
< TLS1_3_VERSION
)
569 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT
;
571 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_versions
)
572 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)
573 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt
)) {
574 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
575 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS
,
576 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
577 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
580 for (currv
= max_version
; currv
>= min_version
; currv
--) {
581 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, currv
)) {
582 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
583 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS
,
584 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
585 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
588 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt
) || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
589 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
590 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS
,
591 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
592 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
595 return EXT_RETURN_SENT
;
599 * Construct a psk_kex_modes extension.
601 EXT_RETURN
tls_construct_ctos_psk_kex_modes(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
,
602 unsigned int context
, X509
*x
,
605 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
606 int nodhe
= s
->options
& SSL_OP_ALLOW_NO_DHE_KEX
;
608 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, TLSEXT_TYPE_psk_kex_modes
)
609 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)
610 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt
)
611 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_KE_DHE
)
612 || (nodhe
&& !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_KE
))
613 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)
614 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
615 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
616 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK_KEX_MODES
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
617 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
620 s
->ext
.psk_kex_mode
= TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE_DHE
;
622 s
->ext
.psk_kex_mode
|= TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE
;
625 return EXT_RETURN_SENT
;
628 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
629 static int add_key_share(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int curve_id
)
631 unsigned char *encoded_point
= NULL
;
632 EVP_PKEY
*key_share_key
= NULL
;
635 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.pkey
!= NULL
) {
636 if (!ossl_assert(s
->hello_retry_request
== SSL_HRR_PENDING
)) {
637 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_ADD_KEY_SHARE
,
638 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
642 * Could happen if we got an HRR that wasn't requesting a new key_share
644 key_share_key
= s
->s3
.tmp
.pkey
;
646 key_share_key
= ssl_generate_pkey_group(s
, curve_id
);
647 if (key_share_key
== NULL
) {
648 /* SSLfatal() already called */
653 * TODO(3.0) Remove this when EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint()
654 * knows how to get a key from an encoded point with the help of
655 * a OSSL_SERIALIZER deserializer. We know that EVP_PKEY_get0()
656 * downgrades an EVP_PKEY to contain a legacy key.
660 EVP_PKEY_get0(key_share_key
);
661 if (EVP_PKEY_id(key_share_key
) == EVP_PKEY_NONE
) {
662 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_ADD_KEY_SHARE
,
668 /* Encode the public key. */
669 encodedlen
= EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(key_share_key
,
671 if (encodedlen
== 0) {
672 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_ADD_KEY_SHARE
, ERR_R_EC_LIB
);
676 /* Create KeyShareEntry */
677 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, curve_id
)
678 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt
, encoded_point
, encodedlen
)) {
679 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_ADD_KEY_SHARE
,
680 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
685 * TODO(TLS1.3): When changing to send more than one key_share we're
686 * going to need to be able to save more than one EVP_PKEY. For now
687 * we reuse the existing tmp.pkey
689 s
->s3
.tmp
.pkey
= key_share_key
;
690 s
->s3
.group_id
= curve_id
;
691 OPENSSL_free(encoded_point
);
695 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.pkey
== NULL
)
696 EVP_PKEY_free(key_share_key
);
697 OPENSSL_free(encoded_point
);
702 EXT_RETURN
tls_construct_ctos_key_share(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
,
703 unsigned int context
, X509
*x
,
706 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
707 size_t i
, num_groups
= 0;
708 const uint16_t *pgroups
= NULL
;
709 uint16_t curve_id
= 0;
711 /* key_share extension */
712 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share
)
713 /* Extension data sub-packet */
714 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)
715 /* KeyShare list sub-packet */
716 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)) {
717 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_KEY_SHARE
,
718 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
719 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
722 tls1_get_supported_groups(s
, &pgroups
, &num_groups
);
725 * TODO(TLS1.3): Make the number of key_shares sent configurable. For
728 if (s
->s3
.group_id
!= 0) {
729 curve_id
= s
->s3
.group_id
;
731 for (i
= 0; i
< num_groups
; i
++) {
733 if (!tls_group_allowed(s
, pgroups
[i
], SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED
))
736 curve_id
= pgroups
[i
];
742 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_KEY_SHARE
,
743 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_KEY_SHARE
);
744 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
747 if (!add_key_share(s
, pkt
, curve_id
)) {
748 /* SSLfatal() already called */
749 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
752 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt
) || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
753 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_KEY_SHARE
,
754 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
755 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
757 return EXT_RETURN_SENT
;
759 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT
;
763 EXT_RETURN
tls_construct_ctos_cookie(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
,
764 X509
*x
, size_t chainidx
)
766 EXT_RETURN ret
= EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
768 /* Should only be set if we've had an HRR */
769 if (s
->ext
.tls13_cookie_len
== 0)
770 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT
;
772 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, TLSEXT_TYPE_cookie
)
773 /* Extension data sub-packet */
774 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)
775 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt
, s
->ext
.tls13_cookie
,
776 s
->ext
.tls13_cookie_len
)
777 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
778 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_COOKIE
,
779 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
783 ret
= EXT_RETURN_SENT
;
785 OPENSSL_free(s
->ext
.tls13_cookie
);
786 s
->ext
.tls13_cookie
= NULL
;
787 s
->ext
.tls13_cookie_len
= 0;
792 EXT_RETURN
tls_construct_ctos_early_data(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
,
793 unsigned int context
, X509
*x
,
796 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
797 char identity
[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
+ 1];
798 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
799 const unsigned char *id
= NULL
;
801 SSL_SESSION
*psksess
= NULL
;
802 SSL_SESSION
*edsess
= NULL
;
803 const EVP_MD
*handmd
= NULL
;
805 if (s
->hello_retry_request
== SSL_HRR_PENDING
)
806 handmd
= ssl_handshake_md(s
);
808 if (s
->psk_use_session_cb
!= NULL
809 && (!s
->psk_use_session_cb(s
, handmd
, &id
, &idlen
, &psksess
)
811 && psksess
->ssl_version
!= TLS1_3_VERSION
))) {
812 SSL_SESSION_free(psksess
);
813 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA
,
815 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
818 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
819 if (psksess
== NULL
&& s
->psk_client_callback
!= NULL
) {
820 unsigned char psk
[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
];
823 memset(identity
, 0, sizeof(identity
));
824 psklen
= s
->psk_client_callback(s
, NULL
, identity
, sizeof(identity
) - 1,
827 if (psklen
> PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
) {
828 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
829 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
830 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
831 } else if (psklen
> 0) {
832 const unsigned char tls13_aes128gcmsha256_id
[] = { 0x13, 0x01 };
833 const SSL_CIPHER
*cipher
;
835 idlen
= strlen(identity
);
836 if (idlen
> PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
) {
837 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
838 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA
,
839 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
840 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
842 id
= (unsigned char *)identity
;
845 * We found a PSK using an old style callback. We don't know
846 * the digest so we default to SHA256 as per the TLSv1.3 spec
848 cipher
= SSL_CIPHER_find(s
, tls13_aes128gcmsha256_id
);
849 if (cipher
== NULL
) {
850 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
851 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA
,
852 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
853 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
856 psksess
= SSL_SESSION_new();
858 || !SSL_SESSION_set1_master_key(psksess
, psk
, psklen
)
859 || !SSL_SESSION_set_cipher(psksess
, cipher
)
860 || !SSL_SESSION_set_protocol_version(psksess
, TLS1_3_VERSION
)) {
861 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
862 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA
,
863 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
864 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk
, psklen
);
865 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
867 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk
, psklen
);
870 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
872 SSL_SESSION_free(s
->psksession
);
873 s
->psksession
= psksess
;
874 if (psksess
!= NULL
) {
875 OPENSSL_free(s
->psksession_id
);
876 s
->psksession_id
= OPENSSL_memdup(id
, idlen
);
877 if (s
->psksession_id
== NULL
) {
878 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
879 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
880 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
882 s
->psksession_id_len
= idlen
;
885 if (s
->early_data_state
!= SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
886 || (s
->session
->ext
.max_early_data
== 0
887 && (psksess
== NULL
|| psksess
->ext
.max_early_data
== 0))) {
888 s
->max_early_data
= 0;
889 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT
;
891 edsess
= s
->session
->ext
.max_early_data
!= 0 ? s
->session
: psksess
;
892 s
->max_early_data
= edsess
->ext
.max_early_data
;
894 if (edsess
->ext
.hostname
!= NULL
) {
895 if (s
->ext
.hostname
== NULL
896 || (s
->ext
.hostname
!= NULL
897 && strcmp(s
->ext
.hostname
, edsess
->ext
.hostname
) != 0)) {
898 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
899 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA
,
900 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EARLY_DATA_SNI
);
901 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
905 if ((s
->ext
.alpn
== NULL
&& edsess
->ext
.alpn_selected
!= NULL
)) {
906 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA
,
907 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EARLY_DATA_ALPN
);
908 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
912 * Verify that we are offering an ALPN protocol consistent with the early
915 if (edsess
->ext
.alpn_selected
!= NULL
) {
916 PACKET prots
, alpnpkt
;
919 if (!PACKET_buf_init(&prots
, s
->ext
.alpn
, s
->ext
.alpn_len
)) {
920 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
921 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
922 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
924 while (PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&prots
, &alpnpkt
)) {
925 if (PACKET_equal(&alpnpkt
, edsess
->ext
.alpn_selected
,
926 edsess
->ext
.alpn_selected_len
)) {
932 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
933 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA
,
934 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EARLY_DATA_ALPN
);
935 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
939 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, TLSEXT_TYPE_early_data
)
940 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)
941 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
942 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA
,
943 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
944 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
948 * We set this to rejected here. Later, if the server acknowledges the
949 * extension, we set it to accepted.
951 s
->ext
.early_data
= SSL_EARLY_DATA_REJECTED
;
952 s
->ext
.early_data_ok
= 1;
954 return EXT_RETURN_SENT
;
957 #define F5_WORKAROUND_MIN_MSG_LEN 0xff
958 #define F5_WORKAROUND_MAX_MSG_LEN 0x200
961 * PSK pre binder overhead =
962 * 2 bytes for TLSEXT_TYPE_psk
963 * 2 bytes for extension length
964 * 2 bytes for identities list length
965 * 2 bytes for identity length
966 * 4 bytes for obfuscated_ticket_age
967 * 2 bytes for binder list length
968 * 1 byte for binder length
969 * The above excludes the number of bytes for the identity itself and the
970 * subsequent binder bytes
972 #define PSK_PRE_BINDER_OVERHEAD (2 + 2 + 2 + 2 + 4 + 2 + 1)
974 EXT_RETURN
tls_construct_ctos_padding(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
,
975 unsigned int context
, X509
*x
,
978 unsigned char *padbytes
;
981 if ((s
->options
& SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING
) == 0)
982 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT
;
985 * Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See RFC7685.
986 * This code calculates the length of all extensions added so far but
987 * excludes the PSK extension (because that MUST be written last). Therefore
988 * this extension MUST always appear second to last.
990 if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt
, &hlen
)) {
991 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PADDING
,
992 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
993 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
997 * If we're going to send a PSK then that will be written out after this
998 * extension, so we need to calculate how long it is going to be.
1000 if (s
->session
->ssl_version
== TLS1_3_VERSION
1001 && s
->session
->ext
.ticklen
!= 0
1002 && s
->session
->cipher
!= NULL
) {
1003 const EVP_MD
*md
= ssl_md(s
->ctx
, s
->session
->cipher
->algorithm2
);
1007 * Add the fixed PSK overhead, the identity length and the binder
1010 hlen
+= PSK_PRE_BINDER_OVERHEAD
+ s
->session
->ext
.ticklen
1015 if (hlen
> F5_WORKAROUND_MIN_MSG_LEN
&& hlen
< F5_WORKAROUND_MAX_MSG_LEN
) {
1016 /* Calculate the amount of padding we need to add */
1017 hlen
= F5_WORKAROUND_MAX_MSG_LEN
- hlen
;
1020 * Take off the size of extension header itself (2 bytes for type and
1021 * 2 bytes for length bytes), but ensure that the extension is at least
1022 * 1 byte long so as not to have an empty extension last (WebSphere 7.x,
1023 * 8.x are intolerant of that condition)
1030 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, TLSEXT_TYPE_padding
)
1031 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt
, hlen
, &padbytes
)) {
1032 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PADDING
,
1033 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1034 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
1036 memset(padbytes
, 0, hlen
);
1039 return EXT_RETURN_SENT
;
1043 * Construct the pre_shared_key extension
1045 EXT_RETURN
tls_construct_ctos_psk(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
,
1046 X509
*x
, size_t chainidx
)
1048 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
1049 uint32_t now
, agesec
, agems
= 0;
1050 size_t reshashsize
= 0, pskhashsize
= 0, binderoffset
, msglen
;
1051 unsigned char *resbinder
= NULL
, *pskbinder
= NULL
, *msgstart
= NULL
;
1052 const EVP_MD
*handmd
= NULL
, *mdres
= NULL
, *mdpsk
= NULL
;
1055 s
->ext
.tick_identity
= 0;
1058 * Note: At this stage of the code we only support adding a single
1059 * resumption PSK. If we add support for multiple PSKs then the length
1060 * calculations in the padding extension will need to be adjusted.
1064 * If this is an incompatible or new session then we have nothing to resume
1065 * so don't add this extension.
1067 if (s
->session
->ssl_version
!= TLS1_3_VERSION
1068 || (s
->session
->ext
.ticklen
== 0 && s
->psksession
== NULL
))
1069 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT
;
1071 if (s
->hello_retry_request
== SSL_HRR_PENDING
)
1072 handmd
= ssl_handshake_md(s
);
1074 if (s
->session
->ext
.ticklen
!= 0) {
1075 /* Get the digest associated with the ciphersuite in the session */
1076 if (s
->session
->cipher
== NULL
) {
1077 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK
,
1078 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1079 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
1081 mdres
= ssl_md(s
->ctx
, s
->session
->cipher
->algorithm2
);
1082 if (mdres
== NULL
) {
1084 * Don't recognize this cipher so we can't use the session.
1090 if (s
->hello_retry_request
== SSL_HRR_PENDING
&& mdres
!= handmd
) {
1092 * Selected ciphersuite hash does not match the hash for the session
1093 * so we can't use it.
1099 * Technically the C standard just says time() returns a time_t and says
1100 * nothing about the encoding of that type. In practice most
1101 * implementations follow POSIX which holds it as an integral type in
1102 * seconds since epoch. We've already made the assumption that we can do
1103 * this in multiple places in the code, so portability shouldn't be an
1106 now
= (uint32_t)time(NULL
);
1107 agesec
= now
- (uint32_t)s
->session
->time
;
1109 * We calculate the age in seconds but the server may work in ms. Due to
1110 * rounding errors we could overestimate the age by up to 1s. It is
1111 * better to underestimate it. Otherwise, if the RTT is very short, when
1112 * the server calculates the age reported by the client it could be
1113 * bigger than the age calculated on the server - which should never
1119 if (s
->session
->ext
.tick_lifetime_hint
< agesec
) {
1120 /* Ticket is too old. Ignore it. */
1125 * Calculate age in ms. We're just doing it to nearest second. Should be
1128 agems
= agesec
* (uint32_t)1000;
1130 if (agesec
!= 0 && agems
/ (uint32_t)1000 != agesec
) {
1132 * Overflow. Shouldn't happen unless this is a *really* old session.
1133 * If so we just ignore it.
1139 * Obfuscate the age. Overflow here is fine, this addition is supposed
1142 agems
+= s
->session
->ext
.tick_age_add
;
1144 reshashsize
= EVP_MD_size(mdres
);
1145 s
->ext
.tick_identity
++;
1150 if (!dores
&& s
->psksession
== NULL
)
1151 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT
;
1153 if (s
->psksession
!= NULL
) {
1154 mdpsk
= ssl_md(s
->ctx
, s
->psksession
->cipher
->algorithm2
);
1155 if (mdpsk
== NULL
) {
1157 * Don't recognize this cipher so we can't use the session.
1158 * If this happens it's an application bug.
1160 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK
,
1162 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
1165 if (s
->hello_retry_request
== SSL_HRR_PENDING
&& mdpsk
!= handmd
) {
1167 * Selected ciphersuite hash does not match the hash for the PSK
1168 * session. This is an application bug.
1170 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK
,
1172 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
1175 pskhashsize
= EVP_MD_size(mdpsk
);
1178 /* Create the extension, but skip over the binder for now */
1179 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, TLSEXT_TYPE_psk
)
1180 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)
1181 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)) {
1182 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK
,
1183 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1184 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
1188 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt
, s
->session
->ext
.tick
,
1189 s
->session
->ext
.ticklen
)
1190 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt
, agems
)) {
1191 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK
,
1192 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1193 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
1197 if (s
->psksession
!= NULL
) {
1198 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt
, s
->psksession_id
,
1199 s
->psksession_id_len
)
1200 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt
, 0)) {
1201 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK
,
1202 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1203 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
1205 s
->ext
.tick_identity
++;
1208 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt
)
1209 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt
, &binderoffset
)
1210 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)
1212 && !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u8(pkt
, reshashsize
, &resbinder
))
1213 || (s
->psksession
!= NULL
1214 && !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u8(pkt
, pskhashsize
, &pskbinder
))
1215 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)
1216 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)
1217 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt
, &msglen
)
1219 * We need to fill in all the sub-packet lengths now so we can
1220 * calculate the HMAC of the message up to the binders
1222 || !WPACKET_fill_lengths(pkt
)) {
1223 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK
,
1224 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1225 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
1228 msgstart
= WPACKET_get_curr(pkt
) - msglen
;
1231 && tls_psk_do_binder(s
, mdres
, msgstart
, binderoffset
, NULL
,
1232 resbinder
, s
->session
, 1, 0) != 1) {
1233 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1234 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
1237 if (s
->psksession
!= NULL
1238 && tls_psk_do_binder(s
, mdpsk
, msgstart
, binderoffset
, NULL
,
1239 pskbinder
, s
->psksession
, 1, 1) != 1) {
1240 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1241 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
1244 return EXT_RETURN_SENT
;
1246 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT
;
1250 EXT_RETURN
tls_construct_ctos_post_handshake_auth(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
,
1251 unsigned int context
,
1252 X509
*x
, size_t chainidx
)
1254 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
1255 if (!s
->pha_enabled
)
1256 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT
;
1258 /* construct extension - 0 length, no contents */
1259 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, TLSEXT_TYPE_post_handshake_auth
)
1260 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)
1261 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
1262 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
1263 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_POST_HANDSHAKE_AUTH
,
1264 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1265 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
1268 s
->post_handshake_auth
= SSL_PHA_EXT_SENT
;
1270 return EXT_RETURN_SENT
;
1272 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT
;
1278 * Parse the server's renegotiation binding and abort if it's not right
1280 int tls_parse_stoc_renegotiate(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
,
1281 X509
*x
, size_t chainidx
)
1283 size_t expected_len
= s
->s3
.previous_client_finished_len
1284 + s
->s3
.previous_server_finished_len
;
1286 const unsigned char *data
;
1288 /* Check for logic errors */
1289 if (!ossl_assert(expected_len
== 0
1290 || s
->s3
.previous_client_finished_len
!= 0)
1291 || !ossl_assert(expected_len
== 0
1292 || s
->s3
.previous_server_finished_len
!= 0)) {
1293 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_RENEGOTIATE
,
1294 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1298 /* Parse the length byte */
1299 if (!PACKET_get_1_len(pkt
, &ilen
)) {
1300 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_RENEGOTIATE
,
1301 SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_ENCODING_ERR
);
1305 /* Consistency check */
1306 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != ilen
) {
1307 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_RENEGOTIATE
,
1308 SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_ENCODING_ERR
);
1312 /* Check that the extension matches */
1313 if (ilen
!= expected_len
) {
1314 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_RENEGOTIATE
,
1315 SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH
);
1319 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &data
, s
->s3
.previous_client_finished_len
)
1320 || memcmp(data
, s
->s3
.previous_client_finished
,
1321 s
->s3
.previous_client_finished_len
) != 0) {
1322 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_RENEGOTIATE
,
1323 SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH
);
1327 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &data
, s
->s3
.previous_server_finished_len
)
1328 || memcmp(data
, s
->s3
.previous_server_finished
,
1329 s
->s3
.previous_server_finished_len
) != 0) {
1330 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_RENEGOTIATE
,
1331 SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH
);
1334 s
->s3
.send_connection_binding
= 1;
1339 /* Parse the server's max fragment len extension packet */
1340 int tls_parse_stoc_maxfragmentlen(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
,
1341 X509
*x
, size_t chainidx
)
1345 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 1 || !PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &value
)) {
1346 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_MAXFRAGMENTLEN
,
1347 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION
);
1351 /* |value| should contains a valid max-fragment-length code. */
1352 if (!IS_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT_VALID(value
)) {
1353 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1354 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_MAXFRAGMENTLEN
,
1355 SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH
);
1359 /* Must be the same value as client-configured one who was sent to server */
1361 * RFC 6066: if a client receives a maximum fragment length negotiation
1362 * response that differs from the length it requested, ...
1363 * It must abort with SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER alert
1365 if (value
!= s
->ext
.max_fragment_len_mode
) {
1366 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1367 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_MAXFRAGMENTLEN
,
1368 SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH
);
1373 * Maximum Fragment Length Negotiation succeeded.
1374 * The negotiated Maximum Fragment Length is binding now.
1376 s
->session
->ext
.max_fragment_len_mode
= value
;
1381 int tls_parse_stoc_server_name(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
,
1382 X509
*x
, size_t chainidx
)
1384 if (s
->ext
.hostname
== NULL
) {
1385 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SERVER_NAME
,
1386 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1390 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) > 0) {
1391 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SERVER_NAME
,
1392 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION
);
1397 if (s
->session
->ext
.hostname
!= NULL
) {
1398 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SERVER_NAME
,
1399 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1402 s
->session
->ext
.hostname
= OPENSSL_strdup(s
->ext
.hostname
);
1403 if (s
->session
->ext
.hostname
== NULL
) {
1404 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SERVER_NAME
,
1405 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1413 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1414 int tls_parse_stoc_ec_pt_formats(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
,
1415 X509
*x
, size_t chainidx
)
1417 size_t ecpointformats_len
;
1418 PACKET ecptformatlist
;
1420 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &ecptformatlist
)) {
1421 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_EC_PT_FORMATS
,
1422 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION
);
1426 ecpointformats_len
= PACKET_remaining(&ecptformatlist
);
1427 if (ecpointformats_len
== 0) {
1428 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,
1429 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_EC_PT_FORMATS
, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH
);
1433 s
->ext
.peer_ecpointformats_len
= 0;
1434 OPENSSL_free(s
->ext
.peer_ecpointformats
);
1435 s
->ext
.peer_ecpointformats
= OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformats_len
);
1436 if (s
->ext
.peer_ecpointformats
== NULL
) {
1437 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
1438 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_EC_PT_FORMATS
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1442 s
->ext
.peer_ecpointformats_len
= ecpointformats_len
;
1444 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&ecptformatlist
,
1445 s
->ext
.peer_ecpointformats
,
1446 ecpointformats_len
)) {
1447 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
1448 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_EC_PT_FORMATS
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1457 int tls_parse_stoc_session_ticket(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
,
1458 X509
*x
, size_t chainidx
)
1460 if (s
->ext
.session_ticket_cb
!= NULL
&&
1461 !s
->ext
.session_ticket_cb(s
, PACKET_data(pkt
),
1462 PACKET_remaining(pkt
),
1463 s
->ext
.session_ticket_cb_arg
)) {
1464 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
1465 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SESSION_TICKET
, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION
);
1469 if (!tls_use_ticket(s
)) {
1470 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION
,
1471 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SESSION_TICKET
, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION
);
1474 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) > 0) {
1475 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,
1476 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SESSION_TICKET
, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION
);
1480 s
->ext
.ticket_expected
= 1;
1485 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
1486 int tls_parse_stoc_status_request(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
,
1487 X509
*x
, size_t chainidx
)
1489 if (context
== SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
) {
1490 /* We ignore this if the server sends a CertificateRequest */
1491 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Add support for this */
1496 * MUST only be sent if we've requested a status
1497 * request message. In TLS <= 1.2 it must also be empty.
1499 if (s
->ext
.status_type
!= TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp
) {
1500 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION
,
1501 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_STATUS_REQUEST
, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION
);
1504 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && PACKET_remaining(pkt
) > 0) {
1505 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,
1506 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_STATUS_REQUEST
, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION
);
1510 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1511 /* We only know how to handle this if it's for the first Certificate in
1512 * the chain. We ignore any other responses.
1517 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1518 return tls_process_cert_status_body(s
, pkt
);
1521 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
1522 s
->ext
.status_expected
= 1;
1529 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
1530 int tls_parse_stoc_sct(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
, X509
*x
,
1533 if (context
== SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
) {
1534 /* We ignore this if the server sends it in a CertificateRequest */
1535 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Add support for this */
1540 * Only take it if we asked for it - i.e if there is no CT validation
1541 * callback set, then a custom extension MAY be processing it, so we
1542 * need to let control continue to flow to that.
1544 if (s
->ct_validation_callback
!= NULL
) {
1545 size_t size
= PACKET_remaining(pkt
);
1547 /* Simply copy it off for later processing */
1548 OPENSSL_free(s
->ext
.scts
);
1551 s
->ext
.scts_len
= (uint16_t)size
;
1553 s
->ext
.scts
= OPENSSL_malloc(size
);
1554 if (s
->ext
.scts
== NULL
1555 || !PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt
, s
->ext
.scts
, size
)) {
1556 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SCT
,
1557 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1562 ENDPOINT role
= (context
& SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
) != 0
1563 ? ENDPOINT_CLIENT
: ENDPOINT_BOTH
;
1566 * If we didn't ask for it then there must be a custom extension,
1567 * otherwise this is unsolicited.
1569 if (custom_ext_find(&s
->cert
->custext
, role
,
1570 TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp
,
1572 SSLfatal(s
, TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION
, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SCT
,
1573 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION
);
1577 if (!custom_ext_parse(s
, context
,
1578 TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp
,
1579 PACKET_data(pkt
), PACKET_remaining(pkt
),
1581 /* SSLfatal already called */
1591 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1593 * ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
1594 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly
1595 * fill the length of the block. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure.
1597 static int ssl_next_proto_validate(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1599 PACKET tmp_protocol
;
1601 while (PACKET_remaining(pkt
)) {
1602 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &tmp_protocol
)
1603 || PACKET_remaining(&tmp_protocol
) == 0) {
1604 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_SSL_NEXT_PROTO_VALIDATE
,
1605 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION
);
1613 int tls_parse_stoc_npn(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
, X509
*x
,
1616 unsigned char *selected
;
1617 unsigned char selected_len
;
1620 /* Check if we are in a renegotiation. If so ignore this extension */
1621 if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s
))
1624 /* We must have requested it. */
1625 if (s
->ctx
->ext
.npn_select_cb
== NULL
) {
1626 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION
, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_NPN
,
1627 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION
);
1631 /* The data must be valid */
1633 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(s
, &tmppkt
)) {
1634 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1637 if (s
->ctx
->ext
.npn_select_cb(s
, &selected
, &selected_len
,
1639 PACKET_remaining(pkt
),
1640 s
->ctx
->ext
.npn_select_cb_arg
) !=
1641 SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK
) {
1642 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_NPN
,
1643 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION
);
1648 * Could be non-NULL if server has sent multiple NPN extensions in
1649 * a single Serverhello
1651 OPENSSL_free(s
->ext
.npn
);
1652 s
->ext
.npn
= OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len
);
1653 if (s
->ext
.npn
== NULL
) {
1654 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_NPN
,
1655 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1659 memcpy(s
->ext
.npn
, selected
, selected_len
);
1660 s
->ext
.npn_len
= selected_len
;
1667 int tls_parse_stoc_alpn(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
, X509
*x
,
1672 /* We must have requested it. */
1673 if (!s
->s3
.alpn_sent
) {
1674 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION
, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_ALPN
,
1675 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION
);
1679 * The extension data consists of:
1680 * uint16 list_length
1681 * uint8 proto_length;
1682 * uint8 proto[proto_length];
1684 if (!PACKET_get_net_2_len(pkt
, &len
)
1685 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != len
|| !PACKET_get_1_len(pkt
, &len
)
1686 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != len
) {
1687 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_ALPN
,
1688 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION
);
1691 OPENSSL_free(s
->s3
.alpn_selected
);
1692 s
->s3
.alpn_selected
= OPENSSL_malloc(len
);
1693 if (s
->s3
.alpn_selected
== NULL
) {
1694 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_ALPN
,
1695 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1698 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt
, s
->s3
.alpn_selected
, len
)) {
1699 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_ALPN
,
1700 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION
);
1703 s
->s3
.alpn_selected_len
= len
;
1705 if (s
->session
->ext
.alpn_selected
== NULL
1706 || s
->session
->ext
.alpn_selected_len
!= len
1707 || memcmp(s
->session
->ext
.alpn_selected
, s
->s3
.alpn_selected
, len
)
1709 /* ALPN not consistent with the old session so cannot use early_data */
1710 s
->ext
.early_data_ok
= 0;
1714 * This is a new session and so alpn_selected should have been
1715 * initialised to NULL. We should update it with the selected ALPN.
1717 if (!ossl_assert(s
->session
->ext
.alpn_selected
== NULL
)) {
1718 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_ALPN
,
1719 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1722 s
->session
->ext
.alpn_selected
=
1723 OPENSSL_memdup(s
->s3
.alpn_selected
, s
->s3
.alpn_selected_len
);
1724 if (s
->session
->ext
.alpn_selected
== NULL
) {
1725 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_ALPN
,
1726 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1729 s
->session
->ext
.alpn_selected_len
= s
->s3
.alpn_selected_len
;
1735 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1736 int tls_parse_stoc_use_srtp(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
, X509
*x
,
1739 unsigned int id
, ct
, mki
;
1741 STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE
) *clnt
;
1742 SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE
*prof
;
1744 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &ct
) || ct
!= 2
1745 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &id
)
1746 || !PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &mki
)
1747 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
1748 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_USE_SRTP
,
1749 SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST
);
1754 /* Must be no MKI, since we never offer one */
1755 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_USE_SRTP
,
1756 SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_MKI_VALUE
);
1760 /* Throw an error if the server gave us an unsolicited extension */
1761 clnt
= SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s
);
1763 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_USE_SRTP
,
1764 SSL_R_NO_SRTP_PROFILES
);
1769 * Check to see if the server gave us something we support (and
1770 * presumably offered)
1772 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(clnt
); i
++) {
1773 prof
= sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(clnt
, i
);
1775 if (prof
->id
== id
) {
1776 s
->srtp_profile
= prof
;
1781 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_USE_SRTP
,
1782 SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST
);
1787 int tls_parse_stoc_etm(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
, X509
*x
,
1790 /* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */
1791 if (!(s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC
)
1792 && s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mac
!= SSL_AEAD
1793 && s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_enc
!= SSL_RC4
)
1799 int tls_parse_stoc_ems(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
, X509
*x
,
1802 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET
)
1804 s
->s3
.flags
|= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS
;
1806 s
->session
->flags
|= SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS
;
1811 int tls_parse_stoc_supported_versions(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
,
1812 X509
*x
, size_t chainidx
)
1814 unsigned int version
;
1816 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &version
)
1817 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
1818 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,
1819 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS
,
1820 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1825 * The only protocol version we support which is valid in this extension in
1826 * a ServerHello is TLSv1.3 therefore we shouldn't be getting anything else.
1828 if (version
!= TLS1_3_VERSION
) {
1829 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1830 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS
,
1831 SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER
);
1835 /* We ignore this extension for HRRs except to sanity check it */
1836 if (context
== SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
)
1839 /* We just set it here. We validate it in ssl_choose_client_version */
1840 s
->version
= version
;
1845 int tls_parse_stoc_key_share(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
, X509
*x
,
1848 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
1849 unsigned int group_id
;
1851 EVP_PKEY
*ckey
= s
->s3
.tmp
.pkey
, *skey
= NULL
;
1854 if (ckey
== NULL
|| s
->s3
.peer_tmp
!= NULL
) {
1855 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE
,
1856 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1860 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &group_id
)) {
1861 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE
,
1862 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1866 if ((context
& SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
) != 0) {
1867 const uint16_t *pgroups
= NULL
;
1868 size_t i
, num_groups
;
1870 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
1871 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE
,
1872 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1877 * It is an error if the HelloRetryRequest wants a key_share that we
1878 * already sent in the first ClientHello
1880 if (group_id
== s
->s3
.group_id
) {
1881 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1882 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE
, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE
);
1886 /* Validate the selected group is one we support */
1887 tls1_get_supported_groups(s
, &pgroups
, &num_groups
);
1888 for (i
= 0; i
< num_groups
; i
++) {
1889 if (group_id
== pgroups
[i
])
1893 || !tls_group_allowed(s
, group_id
, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED
)) {
1894 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1895 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE
, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE
);
1899 s
->s3
.group_id
= group_id
;
1900 EVP_PKEY_free(s
->s3
.tmp
.pkey
);
1901 s
->s3
.tmp
.pkey
= NULL
;
1905 if (group_id
!= s
->s3
.group_id
) {
1907 * This isn't for the group that we sent in the original
1910 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE
,
1911 SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE
);
1915 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &encoded_pt
)
1916 || PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt
) == 0) {
1917 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE
,
1918 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1922 skey
= EVP_PKEY_new();
1923 if (skey
== NULL
|| EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(skey
, ckey
) <= 0) {
1924 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE
,
1925 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1930 * TODO(3.0) Remove this when EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint()
1931 * knows how to get a key from an encoded point with the help of
1932 * a OSSL_SERIALIZER deserializer. We know that EVP_PKEY_get0()
1933 * downgrades an EVP_PKEY to contain a legacy key.
1937 EVP_PKEY_get0(skey
);
1938 if (EVP_PKEY_id(skey
) == EVP_PKEY_NONE
) {
1939 EVP_PKEY_free(skey
);
1940 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE
,
1941 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1945 if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(skey
, PACKET_data(&encoded_pt
),
1946 PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt
))) {
1947 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE
,
1949 EVP_PKEY_free(skey
);
1953 if (ssl_derive(s
, ckey
, skey
, 1) == 0) {
1954 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1955 EVP_PKEY_free(skey
);
1958 s
->s3
.peer_tmp
= skey
;
1964 int tls_parse_stoc_cookie(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
, X509
*x
,
1969 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &cookie
)
1970 || !PACKET_memdup(&cookie
, &s
->ext
.tls13_cookie
,
1971 &s
->ext
.tls13_cookie_len
)) {
1972 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_COOKIE
,
1973 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1980 int tls_parse_stoc_early_data(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
,
1981 X509
*x
, size_t chainidx
)
1983 if (context
== SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
) {
1984 unsigned long max_early_data
;
1986 if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt
, &max_early_data
)
1987 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
1988 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_EARLY_DATA
,
1989 SSL_R_INVALID_MAX_EARLY_DATA
);
1993 s
->session
->ext
.max_early_data
= max_early_data
;
1998 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
1999 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_EARLY_DATA
,
2000 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION
);
2004 if (!s
->ext
.early_data_ok
2007 * If we get here then we didn't send early data, or we didn't resume
2008 * using the first identity, or the SNI/ALPN is not consistent so the
2009 * server should not be accepting it.
2011 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_EARLY_DATA
,
2012 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION
);
2016 s
->ext
.early_data
= SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED
;
2021 int tls_parse_stoc_psk(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
, X509
*x
,
2024 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
2025 unsigned int identity
;
2027 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &identity
) || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
2028 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_PSK
,
2029 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2033 if (identity
>= (unsigned int)s
->ext
.tick_identity
) {
2034 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_PSK
,
2035 SSL_R_BAD_PSK_IDENTITY
);
2040 * Session resumption tickets are always sent before PSK tickets. If the
2041 * ticket index is 0 then it must be for a session resumption ticket if we
2042 * sent two tickets, or if we didn't send a PSK ticket.
2044 if (identity
== 0 && (s
->psksession
== NULL
|| s
->ext
.tick_identity
== 2)) {
2046 SSL_SESSION_free(s
->psksession
);
2047 s
->psksession
= NULL
;
2051 if (s
->psksession
== NULL
) {
2052 /* Should never happen */
2053 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_PSK
,
2054 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2059 * If we used the external PSK for sending early_data then s->early_secret
2060 * is already set up, so don't overwrite it. Otherwise we copy the
2061 * early_secret across that we generated earlier.
2063 if ((s
->early_data_state
!= SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY
2064 && s
->early_data_state
!= SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING
)
2065 || s
->session
->ext
.max_early_data
> 0
2066 || s
->psksession
->ext
.max_early_data
== 0)
2067 memcpy(s
->early_secret
, s
->psksession
->early_secret
, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
);
2069 SSL_SESSION_free(s
->session
);
2070 s
->session
= s
->psksession
;
2071 s
->psksession
= NULL
;
2073 /* Early data is only allowed if we used the first ticket */
2075 s
->ext
.early_data_ok
= 0;