2 * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
11 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
12 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
13 #include "statem_locl.h"
15 int tls_construct_ctos_renegotiate(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
,
16 X509
*x
, size_t chainidx
, int *al
)
18 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
22 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate
)
23 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)
24 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, s
->s3
->previous_client_finished
,
25 s
->s3
->previous_client_finished_len
)
26 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
27 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_RENEGOTIATE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
34 int tls_construct_ctos_server_name(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
,
35 X509
*x
, size_t chainidx
, int *al
)
37 if (s
->ext
.hostname
== NULL
)
40 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
41 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name
)
42 /* Sub-packet for server_name extension */
43 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)
44 /* Sub-packet for servername list (always 1 hostname)*/
45 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)
46 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name
)
47 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt
, s
->ext
.hostname
,
48 strlen(s
->ext
.hostname
))
49 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)
50 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
51 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SERVER_NAME
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
58 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
59 int tls_construct_ctos_srp(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
, X509
*x
,
60 size_t chainidx
, int *al
)
62 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
63 if (s
->srp_ctx
.login
== NULL
)
66 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, TLSEXT_TYPE_srp
)
67 /* Sub-packet for SRP extension */
68 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)
69 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt
)
70 /* login must not be zero...internal error if so */
71 || !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt
, WPACKET_FLAGS_NON_ZERO_LENGTH
)
72 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt
, s
->srp_ctx
.login
,
73 strlen(s
->srp_ctx
.login
))
74 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)
75 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
76 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SRP
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
85 static int use_ecc(SSL
*s
)
88 unsigned long alg_k
, alg_a
;
89 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *cipher_stack
= NULL
;
91 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
92 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
)
95 cipher_stack
= SSL_get_ciphers(s
);
96 end
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack
);
97 for (i
= 0; i
< end
; i
++) {
98 const SSL_CIPHER
*c
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack
, i
);
100 alg_k
= c
->algorithm_mkey
;
101 alg_a
= c
->algorithm_auth
;
102 if ((alg_k
& (SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
))
103 || (alg_a
& SSL_aECDSA
)
104 || c
->min_tls
>= TLS1_3_VERSION
)
111 int tls_construct_ctos_ec_pt_formats(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
,
112 X509
*x
, size_t chainidx
, int *al
)
114 const unsigned char *pformats
;
120 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
121 tls1_get_formatlist(s
, &pformats
, &num_formats
);
123 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats
)
124 /* Sub-packet for formats extension */
125 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)
126 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, pformats
, num_formats
)
127 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
128 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EC_PT_FORMATS
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
135 int tls_construct_ctos_supported_groups(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
,
136 unsigned int context
, X509
*x
,
137 size_t chainidx
, int *al
)
139 const unsigned char *pcurves
= NULL
, *pcurvestmp
;
140 size_t num_curves
= 0, i
;
146 * Add TLS extension supported_groups to the ClientHello message
148 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Add support for DHE groups */
149 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s
, 0, &pcurves
, &num_curves
)) {
150 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_GROUPS
,
151 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
154 pcurvestmp
= pcurves
;
156 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_groups
)
157 /* Sub-packet for supported_groups extension */
158 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)
159 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)) {
160 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_GROUPS
,
161 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
164 /* Copy curve ID if supported */
165 for (i
= 0; i
< num_curves
; i
++, pcurvestmp
+= 2) {
166 if (tls_curve_allowed(s
, pcurvestmp
, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED
)) {
167 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, pcurvestmp
[0])
168 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, pcurvestmp
[1])) {
169 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_GROUPS
,
170 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
175 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt
) || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
176 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_GROUPS
,
177 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
185 int tls_construct_ctos_session_ticket(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
,
186 unsigned int context
, X509
*x
,
187 size_t chainidx
, int *al
)
191 if (!tls_use_ticket(s
))
194 if (!s
->new_session
&& s
->session
!= NULL
195 && s
->session
->ext
.tick
!= NULL
196 && s
->session
->ssl_version
!= TLS1_3_VERSION
) {
197 ticklen
= s
->session
->ext
.ticklen
;
198 } else if (s
->session
&& s
->ext
.session_ticket
!= NULL
199 && s
->ext
.session_ticket
->data
!= NULL
) {
200 ticklen
= s
->ext
.session_ticket
->length
;
201 s
->session
->ext
.tick
= OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen
);
202 if (s
->session
->ext
.tick
== NULL
) {
203 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SESSION_TICKET
,
204 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
207 memcpy(s
->session
->ext
.tick
,
208 s
->ext
.session_ticket
->data
, ticklen
);
209 s
->session
->ext
.ticklen
= ticklen
;
214 if (ticklen
== 0 && s
->ext
.session_ticket
!= NULL
&&
215 s
->ext
.session_ticket
->data
== NULL
)
218 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket
)
219 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt
, s
->session
->ext
.tick
, ticklen
)) {
220 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SESSION_TICKET
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
227 int tls_construct_ctos_sig_algs(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
,
228 X509
*x
, size_t chainidx
, int *al
)
231 const uint16_t *salg
;
233 if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_SIGALGS(s
))
236 salglen
= tls12_get_psigalgs(s
, 1, &salg
);
237 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms
)
238 /* Sub-packet for sig-algs extension */
239 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)
240 /* Sub-packet for the actual list */
241 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)
242 || !tls12_copy_sigalgs(s
, pkt
, salg
, salglen
)
243 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)
244 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
245 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SIG_ALGS
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
252 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
253 int tls_construct_ctos_status_request(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
,
254 unsigned int context
, X509
*x
,
255 size_t chainidx
, int *al
)
259 /* This extension isn't defined for client Certificates */
263 if (s
->ext
.status_type
!= TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp
)
266 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request
)
267 /* Sub-packet for status request extension */
268 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)
269 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp
)
270 /* Sub-packet for the ids */
271 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)) {
272 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
275 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s
->ext
.ocsp
.ids
); i
++) {
276 unsigned char *idbytes
;
277 OCSP_RESPID
*id
= sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s
->ext
.ocsp
.ids
, i
);
278 int idlen
= i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id
, NULL
);
281 /* Sub-packet for an individual id */
282 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt
, idlen
, &idbytes
)
283 || i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id
, &idbytes
) != idlen
) {
284 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST
,
285 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
289 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt
)
290 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)) {
291 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
294 if (s
->ext
.ocsp
.exts
) {
295 unsigned char *extbytes
;
296 int extlen
= i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s
->ext
.ocsp
.exts
, NULL
);
299 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST
,
300 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
303 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt
, extlen
, &extbytes
)
304 || i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s
->ext
.ocsp
.exts
, &extbytes
)
306 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST
,
307 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
311 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt
) || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
312 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
320 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
321 int tls_construct_ctos_npn(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
, X509
*x
,
322 size_t chainidx
, int *al
)
324 if (s
->ctx
->ext
.npn_select_cb
== NULL
|| !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s
))
328 * The client advertises an empty extension to indicate its support
329 * for Next Protocol Negotiation
331 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg
)
332 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, 0)) {
333 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_NPN
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
341 int tls_construct_ctos_alpn(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
, X509
*x
,
342 size_t chainidx
, int *al
)
344 s
->s3
->alpn_sent
= 0;
346 if (s
->ext
.alpn
== NULL
|| !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s
))
349 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
,
350 TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation
)
351 /* Sub-packet ALPN extension */
352 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)
353 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt
, s
->ext
.alpn
, s
->ext
.alpn_len
)
354 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
355 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_ALPN
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
358 s
->s3
->alpn_sent
= 1;
364 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
365 int tls_construct_ctos_use_srtp(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
,
366 X509
*x
, size_t chainidx
, int *al
)
368 STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE
) *clnt
= SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s
);
374 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp
)
375 /* Sub-packet for SRTP extension */
376 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)
377 /* Sub-packet for the protection profile list */
378 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)) {
379 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_USE_SRTP
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
383 end
= sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(clnt
);
384 for (i
= 0; i
< end
; i
++) {
385 const SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE
*prof
=
386 sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(clnt
, i
);
388 if (prof
== NULL
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, prof
->id
)) {
389 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_USE_SRTP
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
393 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt
)
394 /* Add an empty use_mki value */
395 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, 0)
396 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
397 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_USE_SRTP
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
405 int tls_construct_ctos_etm(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
, X509
*x
,
406 size_t chainidx
, int *al
)
408 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC
)
411 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
)
412 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, 0)) {
413 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_ETM
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
420 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
421 int tls_construct_ctos_sct(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
, X509
*x
,
422 size_t chainidx
, int *al
)
424 if (s
->ct_validation_callback
== NULL
)
427 /* Not defined for client Certificates */
431 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp
)
432 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, 0)) {
433 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SCT
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
441 int tls_construct_ctos_ems(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
, X509
*x
,
442 size_t chainidx
, int *al
)
444 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret
)
445 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, 0)) {
446 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EMS
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
453 int tls_construct_ctos_supported_versions(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
,
454 unsigned int context
, X509
*x
,
455 size_t chainidx
, int *al
)
457 int currv
, min_version
, max_version
, reason
;
459 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_versions
)
460 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)
461 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt
)) {
462 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS
,
463 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
467 reason
= ssl_get_min_max_version(s
, &min_version
, &max_version
);
469 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS
, reason
);
474 * TODO(TLS1.3): There is some discussion on the TLS list as to whether
475 * we should include versions <TLS1.2. For the moment we do. To be
478 for (currv
= max_version
; currv
>= min_version
; currv
--) {
479 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove this first if clause prior to release!! */
480 if (currv
== TLS1_3_VERSION
) {
481 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT
)) {
482 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS
,
483 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
486 } else if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, currv
)) {
487 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS
,
488 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
492 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt
) || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
493 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS
,
494 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
502 * Construct a psk_kex_modes extension. We only have two modes we know about
503 * at this stage, so we send both.
505 int tls_construct_ctos_psk_kex_modes(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
,
506 X509
*x
, size_t chainidx
, int *al
)
508 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
510 * TODO(TLS1.3): Do we want this list to be configurable? For now we always
511 * just send both supported modes
513 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, TLSEXT_TYPE_psk_kex_modes
)
514 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)
515 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt
)
516 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_KE_DHE
)
517 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_KE
)
518 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)
519 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
520 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK_KEX_MODES
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
524 s
->ext
.psk_kex_mode
= TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE
| TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE_DHE
;
530 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
531 static int add_key_share(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int curve_id
)
533 unsigned char *encoded_point
= NULL
;
534 EVP_PKEY
*key_share_key
= NULL
;
537 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
!= NULL
) {
538 assert(s
->hello_retry_request
);
539 if (!s
->hello_retry_request
) {
540 SSLerr(SSL_F_ADD_KEY_SHARE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
544 * Could happen if we got an HRR that wasn't requesting a new key_share
546 key_share_key
= s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
;
548 key_share_key
= ssl_generate_pkey_curve(curve_id
);
549 if (key_share_key
== NULL
) {
550 SSLerr(SSL_F_ADD_KEY_SHARE
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
555 /* Encode the public key. */
556 encodedlen
= EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(key_share_key
,
558 if (encodedlen
== 0) {
559 SSLerr(SSL_F_ADD_KEY_SHARE
, ERR_R_EC_LIB
);
563 /* Create KeyShareEntry */
564 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, curve_id
)
565 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt
, encoded_point
, encodedlen
)) {
566 SSLerr(SSL_F_ADD_KEY_SHARE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
571 * TODO(TLS1.3): When changing to send more than one key_share we're
572 * going to need to be able to save more than one EVP_PKEY. For now
573 * we reuse the existing tmp.pkey
575 s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
= key_share_key
;
576 s
->s3
->group_id
= curve_id
;
577 OPENSSL_free(encoded_point
);
581 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
== NULL
)
582 EVP_PKEY_free(key_share_key
);
583 OPENSSL_free(encoded_point
);
588 int tls_construct_ctos_key_share(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
,
589 X509
*x
, size_t chainidx
, int *al
)
591 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
592 size_t i
, num_curves
= 0;
593 const unsigned char *pcurves
= NULL
;
594 unsigned int curve_id
= 0;
596 /* key_share extension */
597 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share
)
598 /* Extension data sub-packet */
599 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)
600 /* KeyShare list sub-packet */
601 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)) {
602 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_KEY_SHARE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
606 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s
, 0, &pcurves
, &num_curves
)) {
607 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_KEY_SHARE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
612 * TODO(TLS1.3): Make the number of key_shares sent configurable. For
615 if (s
->s3
->group_id
!= 0) {
616 curve_id
= s
->s3
->group_id
;
618 for (i
= 0; i
< num_curves
; i
++, pcurves
+= 2) {
620 if (!tls_curve_allowed(s
, pcurves
, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED
))
623 curve_id
= bytestogroup(pcurves
);
629 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_KEY_SHARE
, SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_KEY_SHARE
);
633 if (!add_key_share(s
, pkt
, curve_id
))
636 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt
) || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
637 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_KEY_SHARE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
645 int tls_construct_ctos_cookie(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
,
646 X509
*x
, size_t chainidx
, int *al
)
650 /* Should only be set if we've had an HRR */
651 if (s
->ext
.tls13_cookie_len
== 0)
654 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, TLSEXT_TYPE_cookie
)
655 /* Extension data sub-packet */
656 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)
657 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt
, s
->ext
.tls13_cookie
,
658 s
->ext
.tls13_cookie_len
)
659 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
660 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_COOKIE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
666 OPENSSL_free(s
->ext
.tls13_cookie
);
667 s
->ext
.tls13_cookie
= NULL
;
668 s
->ext
.tls13_cookie_len
= 0;
673 int tls_construct_ctos_early_data(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
,
674 X509
*x
, size_t chainidx
, int *al
)
676 if (s
->early_data_state
!= SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
677 || s
->session
->ext
.max_early_data
== 0) {
678 s
->max_early_data
= 0;
681 s
->max_early_data
= s
->session
->ext
.max_early_data
;
683 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, TLSEXT_TYPE_early_data
)
684 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)
685 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
686 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
691 * We set this to rejected here. Later, if the server acknowledges the
692 * extension, we set it to accepted.
694 s
->ext
.early_data
= SSL_EARLY_DATA_REJECTED
;
699 #define F5_WORKAROUND_MIN_MSG_LEN 0xff
700 #define F5_WORKAROUND_MAX_MSG_LEN 0x200
703 * PSK pre binder overhead =
704 * 2 bytes for TLSEXT_TYPE_psk
705 * 2 bytes for extension length
706 * 2 bytes for identities list length
707 * 2 bytes for identity length
708 * 4 bytes for obfuscated_ticket_age
709 * 2 bytes for binder list length
710 * 1 byte for binder length
711 * The above excludes the number of bytes for the identity itself and the
712 * subsequent binder bytes
714 #define PSK_PRE_BINDER_OVERHEAD (2 + 2 + 2 + 2 + 4 + 2 + 1)
716 int tls_construct_ctos_padding(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
,
717 X509
*x
, size_t chainidx
, int *al
)
719 unsigned char *padbytes
;
722 if ((s
->options
& SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING
) == 0)
726 * Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See RFC7685.
727 * This code calculates the length of all extensions added so far but
728 * excludes the PSK extension (because that MUST be written last). Therefore
729 * this extension MUST always appear second to last.
731 if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt
, &hlen
)) {
732 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PADDING
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
737 * If we're going to send a PSK then that will be written out after this
738 * extension, so we need to calculate how long it is going to be.
740 if (s
->session
->ssl_version
== TLS1_3_VERSION
741 && s
->session
->ext
.ticklen
!= 0
742 && s
->session
->cipher
!= NULL
) {
743 const EVP_MD
*md
= ssl_md(s
->session
->cipher
->algorithm2
);
747 * Add the fixed PSK overhead, the identity length and the binder
750 hlen
+= PSK_PRE_BINDER_OVERHEAD
+ s
->session
->ext
.ticklen
755 if (hlen
> F5_WORKAROUND_MIN_MSG_LEN
&& hlen
< F5_WORKAROUND_MAX_MSG_LEN
) {
756 /* Calculate the amount of padding we need to add */
757 hlen
= F5_WORKAROUND_MAX_MSG_LEN
- hlen
;
760 * Take off the size of extension header itself (2 bytes for type and
761 * 2 bytes for length bytes)
768 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, TLSEXT_TYPE_padding
)
769 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt
, hlen
, &padbytes
)) {
770 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PADDING
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
773 memset(padbytes
, 0, hlen
);
780 * Construct the pre_shared_key extension
782 int tls_construct_ctos_psk(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
, X509
*x
,
783 size_t chainidx
, int *al
)
785 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
786 uint32_t now
, agesec
, agems
;
787 size_t hashsize
, binderoffset
, msglen
;
788 unsigned char *binder
= NULL
, *msgstart
= NULL
;
792 s
->session
->ext
.tick_identity
= TLSEXT_PSK_BAD_IDENTITY
;
795 * Note: At this stage of the code we only support adding a single
796 * resumption PSK. If we add support for multiple PSKs then the length
797 * calculations in the padding extension will need to be adjusted.
801 * If this is an incompatible or new session then we have nothing to resume
802 * so don't add this extension.
804 if (s
->session
->ssl_version
!= TLS1_3_VERSION
805 || s
->session
->ext
.ticklen
== 0)
808 if (s
->session
->cipher
== NULL
) {
809 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
813 md
= ssl_md(s
->session
->cipher
->algorithm2
);
815 /* Don't recognize this cipher so we can't use the session. Ignore it */
819 if (s
->hello_retry_request
&& md
!= ssl_handshake_md(s
)) {
821 * Selected ciphersuite hash does not match the hash for the session so
828 * Technically the C standard just says time() returns a time_t and says
829 * nothing about the encoding of that type. In practice most implementations
830 * follow POSIX which holds it as an integral type in seconds since epoch.
831 * We've already made the assumption that we can do this in multiple places
832 * in the code, so portability shouldn't be an issue.
834 now
= (uint32_t)time(NULL
);
835 agesec
= now
- (uint32_t)s
->session
->time
;
837 if (s
->session
->ext
.tick_lifetime_hint
< agesec
) {
838 /* Ticket is too old. Ignore it. */
843 * Calculate age in ms. We're just doing it to nearest second. Should be
846 agems
= agesec
* (uint32_t)1000;
848 if (agesec
!= 0 && agems
/ (uint32_t)1000 != agesec
) {
850 * Overflow. Shouldn't happen unless this is a *really* old session. If
851 * so we just ignore it.
857 * Obfuscate the age. Overflow here is fine, this addition is supposed to
860 agems
+= s
->session
->ext
.tick_age_add
;
862 hashsize
= EVP_MD_size(md
);
864 /* Create the extension, but skip over the binder for now */
865 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, TLSEXT_TYPE_psk
)
866 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)
867 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)
868 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt
, s
->session
->ext
.tick
,
869 s
->session
->ext
.ticklen
)
870 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt
, agems
)
871 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)
872 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt
, &binderoffset
)
873 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)
874 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u8(pkt
, hashsize
, &binder
)
875 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)
876 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)
877 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt
, &msglen
)
879 * We need to fill in all the sub-packet lengths now so we can
880 * calculate the HMAC of the message up to the binders
882 || !WPACKET_fill_lengths(pkt
)) {
883 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
887 msgstart
= WPACKET_get_curr(pkt
) - msglen
;
889 if (tls_psk_do_binder(s
, md
, msgstart
, binderoffset
, NULL
, binder
,
890 s
->session
, 1) != 1) {
891 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
895 s
->session
->ext
.tick_identity
= 0;
906 * Parse the server's renegotiation binding and abort if it's not right
908 int tls_parse_stoc_renegotiate(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
,
909 X509
*x
, size_t chainidx
, int *al
)
911 size_t expected_len
= s
->s3
->previous_client_finished_len
912 + s
->s3
->previous_server_finished_len
;
914 const unsigned char *data
;
916 /* Check for logic errors */
917 assert(expected_len
== 0 || s
->s3
->previous_client_finished_len
!= 0);
918 assert(expected_len
== 0 || s
->s3
->previous_server_finished_len
!= 0);
920 /* Parse the length byte */
921 if (!PACKET_get_1_len(pkt
, &ilen
)) {
922 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_RENEGOTIATE
,
923 SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_ENCODING_ERR
);
924 *al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
928 /* Consistency check */
929 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != ilen
) {
930 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_RENEGOTIATE
,
931 SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_ENCODING_ERR
);
932 *al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
936 /* Check that the extension matches */
937 if (ilen
!= expected_len
) {
938 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_RENEGOTIATE
,
939 SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH
);
940 *al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
944 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &data
, s
->s3
->previous_client_finished_len
)
945 || memcmp(data
, s
->s3
->previous_client_finished
,
946 s
->s3
->previous_client_finished_len
) != 0) {
947 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_RENEGOTIATE
,
948 SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH
);
949 *al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
953 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &data
, s
->s3
->previous_server_finished_len
)
954 || memcmp(data
, s
->s3
->previous_server_finished
,
955 s
->s3
->previous_server_finished_len
) != 0) {
956 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_RENEGOTIATE
,
957 SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH
);
958 *al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
961 s
->s3
->send_connection_binding
= 1;
966 int tls_parse_stoc_server_name(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
,
967 X509
*x
, size_t chainidx
, int *al
)
969 if (s
->ext
.hostname
== NULL
|| PACKET_remaining(pkt
) > 0) {
970 *al
= SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME
;
975 if (s
->session
->ext
.hostname
!= NULL
) {
976 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
979 s
->session
->ext
.hostname
= OPENSSL_strdup(s
->ext
.hostname
);
980 if (s
->session
->ext
.hostname
== NULL
) {
981 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
989 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
990 int tls_parse_stoc_ec_pt_formats(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
,
991 X509
*x
, size_t chainidx
, int *al
)
993 unsigned int ecpointformats_len
;
994 PACKET ecptformatlist
;
996 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &ecptformatlist
)) {
997 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1001 ecpointformats_len
= PACKET_remaining(&ecptformatlist
);
1002 s
->session
->ext
.ecpointformats_len
= 0;
1004 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->ext
.ecpointformats
);
1005 s
->session
->ext
.ecpointformats
= OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformats_len
);
1006 if (s
->session
->ext
.ecpointformats
== NULL
) {
1007 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1011 s
->session
->ext
.ecpointformats_len
= ecpointformats_len
;
1013 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&ecptformatlist
,
1014 s
->session
->ext
.ecpointformats
,
1015 ecpointformats_len
)) {
1016 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1025 int tls_parse_stoc_session_ticket(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
,
1026 X509
*x
, size_t chainidx
, int *al
)
1028 if (s
->ext
.session_ticket_cb
!= NULL
&&
1029 !s
->ext
.session_ticket_cb(s
, PACKET_data(pkt
),
1030 PACKET_remaining(pkt
),
1031 s
->ext
.session_ticket_cb_arg
)) {
1032 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1036 if (!tls_use_ticket(s
) || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) > 0) {
1037 *al
= SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION
;
1041 s
->ext
.ticket_expected
= 1;
1046 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
1047 int tls_parse_stoc_status_request(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
,
1048 X509
*x
, size_t chainidx
, int *al
)
1051 * MUST only be sent if we've requested a status
1052 * request message. In TLS <= 1.2 it must also be empty.
1054 if (s
->ext
.status_type
!= TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp
1055 || (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && PACKET_remaining(pkt
) > 0)) {
1056 *al
= SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION
;
1060 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1061 /* We only know how to handle this if it's for the first Certificate in
1062 * the chain. We ignore any other responses.
1066 return tls_process_cert_status_body(s
, pkt
, al
);
1069 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
1070 s
->ext
.status_expected
= 1;
1077 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
1078 int tls_parse_stoc_sct(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
, X509
*x
,
1079 size_t chainidx
, int *al
)
1082 * Only take it if we asked for it - i.e if there is no CT validation
1083 * callback set, then a custom extension MAY be processing it, so we
1084 * need to let control continue to flow to that.
1086 if (s
->ct_validation_callback
!= NULL
) {
1087 size_t size
= PACKET_remaining(pkt
);
1089 /* Simply copy it off for later processing */
1090 OPENSSL_free(s
->ext
.scts
);
1093 s
->ext
.scts_len
= size
;
1095 s
->ext
.scts
= OPENSSL_malloc(size
);
1096 if (s
->ext
.scts
== NULL
1097 || !PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt
, s
->ext
.scts
, size
)) {
1098 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1103 if (custom_ext_parse(s
, context
,
1104 TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp
,
1105 PACKET_data(pkt
), PACKET_remaining(pkt
),
1106 x
, chainidx
, al
) <= 0)
1115 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1117 * ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
1118 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly
1119 * fill the length of the block. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure.
1121 static int ssl_next_proto_validate(PACKET
*pkt
)
1123 PACKET tmp_protocol
;
1125 while (PACKET_remaining(pkt
)) {
1126 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &tmp_protocol
)
1127 || PACKET_remaining(&tmp_protocol
) == 0)
1134 int tls_parse_stoc_npn(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
, X509
*x
,
1135 size_t chainidx
, int *al
)
1137 unsigned char *selected
;
1138 unsigned char selected_len
;
1141 /* Check if we are in a renegotiation. If so ignore this extension */
1142 if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s
))
1145 /* We must have requested it. */
1146 if (s
->ctx
->ext
.npn_select_cb
== NULL
) {
1147 *al
= SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION
;
1151 /* The data must be valid */
1153 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(&tmppkt
)) {
1154 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1157 if (s
->ctx
->ext
.npn_select_cb(s
, &selected
, &selected_len
,
1159 PACKET_remaining(pkt
),
1160 s
->ctx
->ext
.npn_select_cb_arg
) !=
1161 SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK
) {
1162 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1167 * Could be non-NULL if server has sent multiple NPN extensions in
1168 * a single Serverhello
1170 OPENSSL_free(s
->ext
.npn
);
1171 s
->ext
.npn
= OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len
);
1172 if (s
->ext
.npn
== NULL
) {
1173 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1177 memcpy(s
->ext
.npn
, selected
, selected_len
);
1178 s
->ext
.npn_len
= selected_len
;
1179 s
->s3
->npn_seen
= 1;
1185 int tls_parse_stoc_alpn(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
, X509
*x
,
1186 size_t chainidx
, int *al
)
1190 /* We must have requested it. */
1191 if (!s
->s3
->alpn_sent
) {
1192 *al
= SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION
;
1196 * The extension data consists of:
1197 * uint16 list_length
1198 * uint8 proto_length;
1199 * uint8 proto[proto_length];
1201 if (!PACKET_get_net_2_len(pkt
, &len
)
1202 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != len
|| !PACKET_get_1_len(pkt
, &len
)
1203 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != len
) {
1204 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1207 OPENSSL_free(s
->s3
->alpn_selected
);
1208 s
->s3
->alpn_selected
= OPENSSL_malloc(len
);
1209 if (s
->s3
->alpn_selected
== NULL
) {
1210 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1213 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt
, s
->s3
->alpn_selected
, len
)) {
1214 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1217 s
->s3
->alpn_selected_len
= len
;
1222 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1223 int tls_parse_stoc_use_srtp(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
, X509
*x
,
1224 size_t chainidx
, int *al
)
1226 unsigned int id
, ct
, mki
;
1228 STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE
) *clnt
;
1229 SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE
*prof
;
1231 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &ct
) || ct
!= 2
1232 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &id
)
1233 || !PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &mki
)
1234 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
1235 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_USE_SRTP
,
1236 SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST
);
1237 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1242 /* Must be no MKI, since we never offer one */
1243 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_USE_SRTP
, SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_MKI_VALUE
);
1244 *al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1248 /* Throw an error if the server gave us an unsolicited extension */
1249 clnt
= SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s
);
1251 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_USE_SRTP
, SSL_R_NO_SRTP_PROFILES
);
1252 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1257 * Check to see if the server gave us something we support (and
1258 * presumably offered)
1260 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(clnt
); i
++) {
1261 prof
= sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(clnt
, i
);
1263 if (prof
->id
== id
) {
1264 s
->srtp_profile
= prof
;
1270 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_USE_SRTP
,
1271 SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST
);
1272 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1277 int tls_parse_stoc_etm(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
, X509
*x
,
1278 size_t chainidx
, int *al
)
1280 /* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */
1281 if (!(s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC
)
1282 && s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mac
!= SSL_AEAD
1283 && s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_enc
!= SSL_RC4
)
1289 int tls_parse_stoc_ems(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
, X509
*x
,
1290 size_t chainidx
, int *al
)
1292 s
->s3
->flags
|= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS
;
1294 s
->session
->flags
|= SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS
;
1299 int tls_parse_stoc_key_share(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
, X509
*x
,
1300 size_t chainidx
, int *al
)
1302 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
1303 unsigned int group_id
;
1305 EVP_PKEY
*ckey
= s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
, *skey
= NULL
;
1308 if (ckey
== NULL
|| s
->s3
->peer_tmp
!= NULL
) {
1309 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1310 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1314 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &group_id
)) {
1315 *al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1316 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1320 if ((context
& SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
) != 0) {
1321 unsigned const char *pcurves
= NULL
;
1322 size_t i
, num_curves
;
1324 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
1325 *al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1326 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1331 * It is an error if the HelloRetryRequest wants a key_share that we
1332 * already sent in the first ClientHello
1334 if (group_id
== s
->s3
->group_id
) {
1335 *al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1336 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE
, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE
);
1340 /* Validate the selected group is one we support */
1341 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s
, 0, &pcurves
, &num_curves
)) {
1342 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1345 for (i
= 0; i
< num_curves
; i
++, pcurves
+= 2) {
1346 if (group_id
== bytestogroup(pcurves
))
1350 || !tls_curve_allowed(s
, pcurves
, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED
)) {
1351 *al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1352 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE
, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE
);
1356 s
->s3
->group_id
= group_id
;
1357 EVP_PKEY_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
);
1358 s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
= NULL
;
1362 if (group_id
!= s
->s3
->group_id
) {
1364 * This isn't for the group that we sent in the original
1367 *al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1368 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE
, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE
);
1372 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &encoded_pt
)
1373 || PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt
) == 0) {
1374 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1375 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1379 skey
= ssl_generate_pkey(ckey
);
1381 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1382 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1385 if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(skey
, PACKET_data(&encoded_pt
),
1386 PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt
))) {
1387 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1388 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE
, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT
);
1389 EVP_PKEY_free(skey
);
1393 if (ssl_derive(s
, ckey
, skey
, 1) == 0) {
1394 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1395 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1396 EVP_PKEY_free(skey
);
1399 s
->s3
->peer_tmp
= skey
;
1405 int tls_parse_stoc_cookie(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
, X509
*x
,
1406 size_t chainidx
, int *al
)
1410 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &cookie
)
1411 || !PACKET_memdup(&cookie
, &s
->ext
.tls13_cookie
,
1412 &s
->ext
.tls13_cookie_len
)) {
1413 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1414 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_COOKIE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1421 int tls_parse_stoc_early_data(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
,
1422 X509
*x
, size_t chainidx
, int *al
)
1424 if (context
== SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
) {
1425 unsigned long max_early_data
;
1427 if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt
, &max_early_data
)
1428 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
1429 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_EARLY_DATA
,
1430 SSL_R_INVALID_MAX_EARLY_DATA
);
1431 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1435 s
->session
->ext
.max_early_data
= max_early_data
;
1440 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
1441 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1445 if (s
->ext
.early_data
!= SSL_EARLY_DATA_REJECTED
1447 || s
->session
->ext
.tick_identity
!= 0) {
1449 * If we get here then we didn't send early data, or we didn't resume
1450 * using the first identity so the server should not be accepting it.
1452 *al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1456 s
->ext
.early_data
= SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED
;
1461 int tls_parse_stoc_psk(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
, X509
*x
,
1462 size_t chainidx
, int *al
)
1464 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
1465 unsigned int identity
;
1467 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &identity
) || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
1468 *al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1469 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_PSK
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1473 if (s
->session
->ext
.tick_identity
!= (int)identity
) {
1474 *al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1475 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_PSK
, SSL_R_BAD_PSK_IDENTITY
);