2 * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
11 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
12 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
13 #include "statem_locl.h"
15 int tls_construct_ctos_renegotiate(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
,
16 X509
*x
, size_t chainidx
, int *al
)
18 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
22 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate
)
23 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)
24 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, s
->s3
->previous_client_finished
,
25 s
->s3
->previous_client_finished_len
)
26 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
27 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_RENEGOTIATE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
34 int tls_construct_ctos_server_name(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
,
35 X509
*x
, size_t chainidx
, int *al
)
37 if (s
->ext
.hostname
== NULL
)
40 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
41 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name
)
42 /* Sub-packet for server_name extension */
43 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)
44 /* Sub-packet for servername list (always 1 hostname)*/
45 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)
46 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name
)
47 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt
, s
->ext
.hostname
,
48 strlen(s
->ext
.hostname
))
49 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)
50 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
51 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SERVER_NAME
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
58 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
59 int tls_construct_ctos_srp(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
, X509
*x
,
60 size_t chainidx
, int *al
)
62 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
63 if (s
->srp_ctx
.login
== NULL
)
66 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, TLSEXT_TYPE_srp
)
67 /* Sub-packet for SRP extension */
68 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)
69 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt
)
70 /* login must not be zero...internal error if so */
71 || !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt
, WPACKET_FLAGS_NON_ZERO_LENGTH
)
72 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt
, s
->srp_ctx
.login
,
73 strlen(s
->srp_ctx
.login
))
74 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)
75 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
76 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SRP
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
85 static int use_ecc(SSL
*s
)
88 unsigned long alg_k
, alg_a
;
89 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *cipher_stack
= NULL
;
91 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
92 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
)
95 cipher_stack
= SSL_get_ciphers(s
);
96 end
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack
);
97 for (i
= 0; i
< end
; i
++) {
98 const SSL_CIPHER
*c
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack
, i
);
100 alg_k
= c
->algorithm_mkey
;
101 alg_a
= c
->algorithm_auth
;
102 if ((alg_k
& (SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
))
103 || (alg_a
& SSL_aECDSA
)
104 || c
->min_tls
>= TLS1_3_VERSION
)
111 int tls_construct_ctos_ec_pt_formats(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
,
112 X509
*x
, size_t chainidx
, int *al
)
114 const unsigned char *pformats
;
120 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
121 tls1_get_formatlist(s
, &pformats
, &num_formats
);
123 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats
)
124 /* Sub-packet for formats extension */
125 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)
126 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, pformats
, num_formats
)
127 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
128 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EC_PT_FORMATS
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
135 int tls_construct_ctos_supported_groups(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
,
136 unsigned int context
, X509
*x
,
137 size_t chainidx
, int *al
)
139 const unsigned char *pcurves
= NULL
, *pcurvestmp
;
140 size_t num_curves
= 0, i
;
146 * Add TLS extension supported_groups to the ClientHello message
148 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Add support for DHE groups */
149 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s
, 0, &pcurves
, &num_curves
)) {
150 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_GROUPS
,
151 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
154 pcurvestmp
= pcurves
;
156 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_groups
)
157 /* Sub-packet for supported_groups extension */
158 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)
159 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)) {
160 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_GROUPS
,
161 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
164 /* Copy curve ID if supported */
165 for (i
= 0; i
< num_curves
; i
++, pcurvestmp
+= 2) {
166 if (tls_curve_allowed(s
, pcurvestmp
, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED
)) {
167 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, pcurvestmp
[0])
168 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, pcurvestmp
[1])) {
169 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_GROUPS
,
170 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
175 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt
) || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
176 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_GROUPS
,
177 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
185 int tls_construct_ctos_session_ticket(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
,
186 unsigned int context
, X509
*x
,
187 size_t chainidx
, int *al
)
191 if (!tls_use_ticket(s
))
194 if (!s
->new_session
&& s
->session
!= NULL
195 && s
->session
->ext
.tick
!= NULL
196 && s
->session
->ssl_version
!= TLS1_3_VERSION
) {
197 ticklen
= s
->session
->ext
.ticklen
;
198 } else if (s
->session
&& s
->ext
.session_ticket
!= NULL
199 && s
->ext
.session_ticket
->data
!= NULL
) {
200 ticklen
= s
->ext
.session_ticket
->length
;
201 s
->session
->ext
.tick
= OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen
);
202 if (s
->session
->ext
.tick
== NULL
) {
203 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SESSION_TICKET
,
204 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
207 memcpy(s
->session
->ext
.tick
,
208 s
->ext
.session_ticket
->data
, ticklen
);
209 s
->session
->ext
.ticklen
= ticklen
;
214 if (ticklen
== 0 && s
->ext
.session_ticket
!= NULL
&&
215 s
->ext
.session_ticket
->data
== NULL
)
218 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket
)
219 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt
, s
->session
->ext
.tick
, ticklen
)) {
220 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SESSION_TICKET
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
227 int tls_construct_ctos_sig_algs(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
,
228 X509
*x
, size_t chainidx
, int *al
)
231 const uint16_t *salg
;
233 if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_SIGALGS(s
))
236 salglen
= tls12_get_psigalgs(s
, 1, &salg
);
237 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms
)
238 /* Sub-packet for sig-algs extension */
239 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)
240 /* Sub-packet for the actual list */
241 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)
242 || !tls12_copy_sigalgs(s
, pkt
, salg
, salglen
)
243 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)
244 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
245 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SIG_ALGS
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
252 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
253 int tls_construct_ctos_status_request(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
,
254 unsigned int context
, X509
*x
,
255 size_t chainidx
, int *al
)
259 /* This extension isn't defined for client Certificates */
263 if (s
->ext
.status_type
!= TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp
)
266 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request
)
267 /* Sub-packet for status request extension */
268 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)
269 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp
)
270 /* Sub-packet for the ids */
271 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)) {
272 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
275 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s
->ext
.ocsp
.ids
); i
++) {
276 unsigned char *idbytes
;
277 OCSP_RESPID
*id
= sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s
->ext
.ocsp
.ids
, i
);
278 int idlen
= i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id
, NULL
);
281 /* Sub-packet for an individual id */
282 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt
, idlen
, &idbytes
)
283 || i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id
, &idbytes
) != idlen
) {
284 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST
,
285 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
289 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt
)
290 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)) {
291 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
294 if (s
->ext
.ocsp
.exts
) {
295 unsigned char *extbytes
;
296 int extlen
= i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s
->ext
.ocsp
.exts
, NULL
);
299 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST
,
300 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
303 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt
, extlen
, &extbytes
)
304 || i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s
->ext
.ocsp
.exts
, &extbytes
)
306 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST
,
307 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
311 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt
) || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
312 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
320 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
321 int tls_construct_ctos_npn(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
, X509
*x
,
322 size_t chainidx
, int *al
)
324 if (s
->ctx
->ext
.npn_select_cb
== NULL
|| !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s
))
328 * The client advertises an empty extension to indicate its support
329 * for Next Protocol Negotiation
331 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg
)
332 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, 0)) {
333 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_NPN
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
341 int tls_construct_ctos_alpn(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
, X509
*x
,
342 size_t chainidx
, int *al
)
344 s
->s3
->alpn_sent
= 0;
346 if (s
->ext
.alpn
== NULL
|| !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s
))
349 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
,
350 TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation
)
351 /* Sub-packet ALPN extension */
352 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)
353 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt
, s
->ext
.alpn
, s
->ext
.alpn_len
)
354 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
355 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_ALPN
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
358 s
->s3
->alpn_sent
= 1;
364 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
365 int tls_construct_ctos_use_srtp(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
,
366 X509
*x
, size_t chainidx
, int *al
)
368 STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE
) *clnt
= SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s
);
374 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp
)
375 /* Sub-packet for SRTP extension */
376 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)
377 /* Sub-packet for the protection profile list */
378 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)) {
379 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_USE_SRTP
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
383 end
= sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(clnt
);
384 for (i
= 0; i
< end
; i
++) {
385 const SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE
*prof
=
386 sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(clnt
, i
);
388 if (prof
== NULL
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, prof
->id
)) {
389 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_USE_SRTP
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
393 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt
)
394 /* Add an empty use_mki value */
395 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, 0)
396 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
397 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_USE_SRTP
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
405 int tls_construct_ctos_etm(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
, X509
*x
,
406 size_t chainidx
, int *al
)
408 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC
)
411 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
)
412 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, 0)) {
413 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_ETM
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
420 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
421 int tls_construct_ctos_sct(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
, X509
*x
,
422 size_t chainidx
, int *al
)
424 if (s
->ct_validation_callback
== NULL
)
427 /* Not defined for client Certificates */
431 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp
)
432 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, 0)) {
433 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SCT
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
441 int tls_construct_ctos_ems(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
, X509
*x
,
442 size_t chainidx
, int *al
)
444 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret
)
445 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, 0)) {
446 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EMS
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
453 int tls_construct_ctos_supported_versions(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
,
454 unsigned int context
, X509
*x
,
455 size_t chainidx
, int *al
)
457 int currv
, min_version
, max_version
, reason
;
459 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_versions
)
460 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)
461 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt
)) {
462 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS
,
463 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
467 reason
= ssl_get_client_min_max_version(s
, &min_version
, &max_version
);
469 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS
, reason
);
474 * TODO(TLS1.3): There is some discussion on the TLS list as to whether
475 * we should include versions <TLS1.2. For the moment we do. To be
478 for (currv
= max_version
; currv
>= min_version
; currv
--) {
479 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove this first if clause prior to release!! */
480 if (currv
== TLS1_3_VERSION
) {
481 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT
)) {
482 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS
,
483 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
486 } else if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, currv
)) {
487 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS
,
488 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
492 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt
) || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
493 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS
,
494 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
502 * Construct a psk_kex_modes extension. We only have two modes we know about
503 * at this stage, so we send both.
505 int tls_construct_ctos_psk_kex_modes(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
,
506 X509
*x
, size_t chainidx
, int *al
)
508 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
510 * TODO(TLS1.3): Do we want this list to be configurable? For now we always
511 * just send both supported modes
513 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, TLSEXT_TYPE_psk_kex_modes
)
514 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)
515 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt
)
516 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_KE_DHE
)
517 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_KE
)
518 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)
519 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
520 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK_KEX_MODES
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
524 s
->ext
.psk_kex_mode
= TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE
| TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE_DHE
;
530 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
531 static int add_key_share(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int curve_id
)
533 unsigned char *encoded_point
;
534 EVP_PKEY
*key_share_key
;
537 key_share_key
= ssl_generate_pkey_curve(curve_id
);
538 if (key_share_key
== NULL
) {
539 SSLerr(SSL_F_ADD_KEY_SHARE
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
543 /* Encode the public key. */
544 encodedlen
= EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(key_share_key
,
546 if (encodedlen
== 0) {
547 SSLerr(SSL_F_ADD_KEY_SHARE
, ERR_R_EC_LIB
);
548 EVP_PKEY_free(key_share_key
);
552 /* Create KeyShareEntry */
553 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, curve_id
)
554 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt
, encoded_point
, encodedlen
)) {
555 SSLerr(SSL_F_ADD_KEY_SHARE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
556 EVP_PKEY_free(key_share_key
);
557 OPENSSL_free(encoded_point
);
562 * TODO(TLS1.3): When changing to send more than one key_share we're
563 * going to need to be able to save more than one EVP_PKEY. For now
564 * we reuse the existing tmp.pkey
566 s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
= key_share_key
;
567 s
->s3
->group_id
= curve_id
;
568 OPENSSL_free(encoded_point
);
574 int tls_construct_ctos_key_share(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
,
575 X509
*x
, size_t chainidx
, int *al
)
577 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
578 size_t i
, num_curves
= 0;
579 const unsigned char *pcurves
= NULL
;
580 unsigned int curve_id
= 0;
582 /* key_share extension */
583 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share
)
584 /* Extension data sub-packet */
585 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)
586 /* KeyShare list sub-packet */
587 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)) {
588 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_KEY_SHARE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
592 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s
, 0, &pcurves
, &num_curves
)) {
593 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_KEY_SHARE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
597 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
!= NULL
) {
598 /* Shouldn't happen! */
599 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_KEY_SHARE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
604 * TODO(TLS1.3): Make the number of key_shares sent configurable. For
607 if (s
->s3
->group_id
!= 0) {
608 curve_id
= s
->s3
->group_id
;
610 for (i
= 0; i
< num_curves
; i
++, pcurves
+= 2) {
612 if (!tls_curve_allowed(s
, pcurves
, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED
))
615 curve_id
= bytestogroup(pcurves
);
621 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_KEY_SHARE
, SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_KEY_SHARE
);
625 if (!add_key_share(s
, pkt
, curve_id
))
628 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt
) || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
629 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_KEY_SHARE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
637 int tls_construct_ctos_cookie(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
,
638 X509
*x
, size_t chainidx
, int *al
)
642 /* Should only be set if we've had an HRR */
643 if (s
->ext
.tls13_cookie_len
== 0)
646 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, TLSEXT_TYPE_cookie
)
647 /* Extension data sub-packet */
648 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)
649 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt
, s
->ext
.tls13_cookie
,
650 s
->ext
.tls13_cookie_len
)
651 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
652 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_COOKIE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
658 OPENSSL_free(s
->ext
.tls13_cookie
);
659 s
->ext
.tls13_cookie
= NULL
;
660 s
->ext
.tls13_cookie_len
= 0;
665 int tls_construct_ctos_early_data(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
,
666 X509
*x
, size_t chainidx
, int *al
)
668 if (s
->early_data_state
!= SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
669 || s
->session
->ext
.max_early_data
== 0) {
670 s
->max_early_data
= 0;
673 s
->max_early_data
= s
->session
->ext
.max_early_data
;
675 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, TLSEXT_TYPE_early_data
)
676 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)
677 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
678 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
683 * We set this to rejected here. Later, if the server acknowledges the
684 * extension, we set it to accepted.
686 s
->ext
.early_data
= SSL_EARLY_DATA_REJECTED
;
691 #define F5_WORKAROUND_MIN_MSG_LEN 0xff
692 #define F5_WORKAROUND_MAX_MSG_LEN 0x200
695 * PSK pre binder overhead =
696 * 2 bytes for TLSEXT_TYPE_psk
697 * 2 bytes for extension length
698 * 2 bytes for identities list length
699 * 2 bytes for identity length
700 * 4 bytes for obfuscated_ticket_age
701 * 2 bytes for binder list length
702 * 1 byte for binder length
703 * The above excludes the number of bytes for the identity itself and the
704 * subsequent binder bytes
706 #define PSK_PRE_BINDER_OVERHEAD (2 + 2 + 2 + 2 + 4 + 2 + 1)
708 int tls_construct_ctos_padding(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
,
709 X509
*x
, size_t chainidx
, int *al
)
711 unsigned char *padbytes
;
714 if ((s
->options
& SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING
) == 0)
718 * Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See RFC7685.
719 * This code calculates the length of all extensions added so far but
720 * excludes the PSK extension (because that MUST be written last). Therefore
721 * this extension MUST always appear second to last.
723 if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt
, &hlen
)) {
724 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PADDING
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
729 * If we're going to send a PSK then that will be written out after this
730 * extension, so we need to calculate how long it is going to be.
732 if (s
->session
->ssl_version
== TLS1_3_VERSION
733 && s
->session
->ext
.ticklen
!= 0
734 && s
->session
->cipher
!= NULL
) {
735 const EVP_MD
*md
= ssl_md(s
->session
->cipher
->algorithm2
);
739 * Add the fixed PSK overhead, the identity length and the binder
742 hlen
+= PSK_PRE_BINDER_OVERHEAD
+ s
->session
->ext
.ticklen
747 if (hlen
> F5_WORKAROUND_MIN_MSG_LEN
&& hlen
< F5_WORKAROUND_MAX_MSG_LEN
) {
748 /* Calculate the amount of padding we need to add */
749 hlen
= F5_WORKAROUND_MAX_MSG_LEN
- hlen
;
752 * Take off the size of extension header itself (2 bytes for type and
753 * 2 bytes for length bytes)
760 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, TLSEXT_TYPE_padding
)
761 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt
, hlen
, &padbytes
)) {
762 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PADDING
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
765 memset(padbytes
, 0, hlen
);
772 * Construct the pre_shared_key extension
774 int tls_construct_ctos_psk(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
, X509
*x
,
775 size_t chainidx
, int *al
)
777 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
778 uint32_t now
, agesec
, agems
;
779 size_t hashsize
, binderoffset
, msglen
;
780 unsigned char *binder
= NULL
, *msgstart
= NULL
;
784 s
->session
->ext
.tick_identity
= TLSEXT_PSK_BAD_IDENTITY
;
787 * Note: At this stage of the code we only support adding a single
788 * resumption PSK. If we add support for multiple PSKs then the length
789 * calculations in the padding extension will need to be adjusted.
793 * If this is an incompatible or new session then we have nothing to resume
794 * so don't add this extension.
796 if (s
->session
->ssl_version
!= TLS1_3_VERSION
797 || s
->session
->ext
.ticklen
== 0)
800 if (s
->session
->cipher
== NULL
) {
801 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
805 md
= ssl_md(s
->session
->cipher
->algorithm2
);
807 /* Don't recognize this cipher so we can't use the session. Ignore it */
811 if (s
->hello_retry_request
&& md
!= ssl_handshake_md(s
)) {
813 * Selected ciphersuite hash does not match the hash for the session so
820 * Technically the C standard just says time() returns a time_t and says
821 * nothing about the encoding of that type. In practice most implementations
822 * follow POSIX which holds it as an integral type in seconds since epoch.
823 * We've already made the assumption that we can do this in multiple places
824 * in the code, so portability shouldn't be an issue.
826 now
= (uint32_t)time(NULL
);
827 agesec
= now
- (uint32_t)s
->session
->time
;
829 if (s
->session
->ext
.tick_lifetime_hint
< agesec
) {
830 /* Ticket is too old. Ignore it. */
835 * Calculate age in ms. We're just doing it to nearest second. Should be
838 agems
= agesec
* (uint32_t)1000;
840 if (agesec
!= 0 && agems
/ (uint32_t)1000 != agesec
) {
842 * Overflow. Shouldn't happen unless this is a *really* old session. If
843 * so we just ignore it.
849 * Obfuscate the age. Overflow here is fine, this addition is supposed to
852 agems
+= s
->session
->ext
.tick_age_add
;
854 hashsize
= EVP_MD_size(md
);
856 /* Create the extension, but skip over the binder for now */
857 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, TLSEXT_TYPE_psk
)
858 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)
859 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)
860 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt
, s
->session
->ext
.tick
,
861 s
->session
->ext
.ticklen
)
862 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt
, agems
)
863 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)
864 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt
, &binderoffset
)
865 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)
866 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u8(pkt
, hashsize
, &binder
)
867 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)
868 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)
869 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt
, &msglen
)
871 * We need to fill in all the sub-packet lengths now so we can
872 * calculate the HMAC of the message up to the binders
874 || !WPACKET_fill_lengths(pkt
)) {
875 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
879 msgstart
= WPACKET_get_curr(pkt
) - msglen
;
881 if (tls_psk_do_binder(s
, md
, msgstart
, binderoffset
, NULL
, binder
,
882 s
->session
, 1) != 1) {
883 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
887 s
->session
->ext
.tick_identity
= 0;
898 * Parse the server's renegotiation binding and abort if it's not right
900 int tls_parse_stoc_renegotiate(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
,
901 X509
*x
, size_t chainidx
, int *al
)
903 size_t expected_len
= s
->s3
->previous_client_finished_len
904 + s
->s3
->previous_server_finished_len
;
906 const unsigned char *data
;
908 /* Check for logic errors */
909 assert(expected_len
== 0 || s
->s3
->previous_client_finished_len
!= 0);
910 assert(expected_len
== 0 || s
->s3
->previous_server_finished_len
!= 0);
912 /* Parse the length byte */
913 if (!PACKET_get_1_len(pkt
, &ilen
)) {
914 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_RENEGOTIATE
,
915 SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_ENCODING_ERR
);
916 *al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
920 /* Consistency check */
921 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != ilen
) {
922 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_RENEGOTIATE
,
923 SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_ENCODING_ERR
);
924 *al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
928 /* Check that the extension matches */
929 if (ilen
!= expected_len
) {
930 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_RENEGOTIATE
,
931 SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH
);
932 *al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
936 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &data
, s
->s3
->previous_client_finished_len
)
937 || memcmp(data
, s
->s3
->previous_client_finished
,
938 s
->s3
->previous_client_finished_len
) != 0) {
939 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_RENEGOTIATE
,
940 SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH
);
941 *al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
945 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &data
, s
->s3
->previous_server_finished_len
)
946 || memcmp(data
, s
->s3
->previous_server_finished
,
947 s
->s3
->previous_server_finished_len
) != 0) {
948 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_RENEGOTIATE
,
949 SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH
);
950 *al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
953 s
->s3
->send_connection_binding
= 1;
958 int tls_parse_stoc_server_name(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
,
959 X509
*x
, size_t chainidx
, int *al
)
961 if (s
->ext
.hostname
== NULL
|| PACKET_remaining(pkt
) > 0) {
962 *al
= SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME
;
967 if (s
->session
->ext
.hostname
!= NULL
) {
968 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
971 s
->session
->ext
.hostname
= OPENSSL_strdup(s
->ext
.hostname
);
972 if (s
->session
->ext
.hostname
== NULL
) {
973 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
981 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
982 int tls_parse_stoc_ec_pt_formats(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
,
983 X509
*x
, size_t chainidx
, int *al
)
985 unsigned int ecpointformats_len
;
986 PACKET ecptformatlist
;
988 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &ecptformatlist
)) {
989 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
993 ecpointformats_len
= PACKET_remaining(&ecptformatlist
);
994 s
->session
->ext
.ecpointformats_len
= 0;
996 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->ext
.ecpointformats
);
997 s
->session
->ext
.ecpointformats
= OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformats_len
);
998 if (s
->session
->ext
.ecpointformats
== NULL
) {
999 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1003 s
->session
->ext
.ecpointformats_len
= ecpointformats_len
;
1005 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&ecptformatlist
,
1006 s
->session
->ext
.ecpointformats
,
1007 ecpointformats_len
)) {
1008 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1017 int tls_parse_stoc_session_ticket(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
,
1018 X509
*x
, size_t chainidx
, int *al
)
1020 if (s
->ext
.session_ticket_cb
!= NULL
&&
1021 !s
->ext
.session_ticket_cb(s
, PACKET_data(pkt
),
1022 PACKET_remaining(pkt
),
1023 s
->ext
.session_ticket_cb_arg
)) {
1024 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1028 if (!tls_use_ticket(s
) || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) > 0) {
1029 *al
= SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION
;
1033 s
->ext
.ticket_expected
= 1;
1038 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
1039 int tls_parse_stoc_status_request(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
,
1040 X509
*x
, size_t chainidx
, int *al
)
1043 * MUST only be sent if we've requested a status
1044 * request message. In TLS <= 1.2 it must also be empty.
1046 if (s
->ext
.status_type
!= TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp
1047 || (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && PACKET_remaining(pkt
) > 0)) {
1048 *al
= SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION
;
1052 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1053 /* We only know how to handle this if it's for the first Certificate in
1054 * the chain. We ignore any other responses.
1058 return tls_process_cert_status_body(s
, pkt
, al
);
1061 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
1062 s
->ext
.status_expected
= 1;
1069 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
1070 int tls_parse_stoc_sct(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
, X509
*x
,
1071 size_t chainidx
, int *al
)
1074 * Only take it if we asked for it - i.e if there is no CT validation
1075 * callback set, then a custom extension MAY be processing it, so we
1076 * need to let control continue to flow to that.
1078 if (s
->ct_validation_callback
!= NULL
) {
1079 size_t size
= PACKET_remaining(pkt
);
1081 /* Simply copy it off for later processing */
1082 OPENSSL_free(s
->ext
.scts
);
1085 s
->ext
.scts_len
= size
;
1087 s
->ext
.scts
= OPENSSL_malloc(size
);
1088 if (s
->ext
.scts
== NULL
1089 || !PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt
, s
->ext
.scts
, size
)) {
1090 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1095 if (custom_ext_parse(s
, 0, TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp
,
1096 PACKET_data(pkt
), PACKET_remaining(pkt
), al
) <= 0)
1105 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1107 * ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
1108 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly
1109 * fill the length of the block. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure.
1111 static int ssl_next_proto_validate(PACKET
*pkt
)
1113 PACKET tmp_protocol
;
1115 while (PACKET_remaining(pkt
)) {
1116 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &tmp_protocol
)
1117 || PACKET_remaining(&tmp_protocol
) == 0)
1124 int tls_parse_stoc_npn(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
, X509
*x
,
1125 size_t chainidx
, int *al
)
1127 unsigned char *selected
;
1128 unsigned char selected_len
;
1131 /* Check if we are in a renegotiation. If so ignore this extension */
1132 if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s
))
1135 /* We must have requested it. */
1136 if (s
->ctx
->ext
.npn_select_cb
== NULL
) {
1137 *al
= SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION
;
1141 /* The data must be valid */
1143 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(&tmppkt
)) {
1144 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1147 if (s
->ctx
->ext
.npn_select_cb(s
, &selected
, &selected_len
,
1149 PACKET_remaining(pkt
),
1150 s
->ctx
->ext
.npn_select_cb_arg
) !=
1151 SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK
) {
1152 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1157 * Could be non-NULL if server has sent multiple NPN extensions in
1158 * a single Serverhello
1160 OPENSSL_free(s
->ext
.npn
);
1161 s
->ext
.npn
= OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len
);
1162 if (s
->ext
.npn
== NULL
) {
1163 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1167 memcpy(s
->ext
.npn
, selected
, selected_len
);
1168 s
->ext
.npn_len
= selected_len
;
1169 s
->s3
->npn_seen
= 1;
1175 int tls_parse_stoc_alpn(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
, X509
*x
,
1176 size_t chainidx
, int *al
)
1180 /* We must have requested it. */
1181 if (!s
->s3
->alpn_sent
) {
1182 *al
= SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION
;
1186 * The extension data consists of:
1187 * uint16 list_length
1188 * uint8 proto_length;
1189 * uint8 proto[proto_length];
1191 if (!PACKET_get_net_2_len(pkt
, &len
)
1192 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != len
|| !PACKET_get_1_len(pkt
, &len
)
1193 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != len
) {
1194 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1197 OPENSSL_free(s
->s3
->alpn_selected
);
1198 s
->s3
->alpn_selected
= OPENSSL_malloc(len
);
1199 if (s
->s3
->alpn_selected
== NULL
) {
1200 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1203 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt
, s
->s3
->alpn_selected
, len
)) {
1204 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1207 s
->s3
->alpn_selected_len
= len
;
1212 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1213 int tls_parse_stoc_use_srtp(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
, X509
*x
,
1214 size_t chainidx
, int *al
)
1216 unsigned int id
, ct
, mki
;
1218 STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE
) *clnt
;
1219 SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE
*prof
;
1221 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &ct
) || ct
!= 2
1222 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &id
)
1223 || !PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &mki
)
1224 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
1225 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_USE_SRTP
,
1226 SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST
);
1227 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1232 /* Must be no MKI, since we never offer one */
1233 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_USE_SRTP
, SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_MKI_VALUE
);
1234 *al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1238 /* Throw an error if the server gave us an unsolicited extension */
1239 clnt
= SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s
);
1241 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_USE_SRTP
, SSL_R_NO_SRTP_PROFILES
);
1242 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1247 * Check to see if the server gave us something we support (and
1248 * presumably offered)
1250 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(clnt
); i
++) {
1251 prof
= sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(clnt
, i
);
1253 if (prof
->id
== id
) {
1254 s
->srtp_profile
= prof
;
1260 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_USE_SRTP
,
1261 SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST
);
1262 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1267 int tls_parse_stoc_etm(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
, X509
*x
,
1268 size_t chainidx
, int *al
)
1270 /* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */
1271 if (!(s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC
)
1272 && s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mac
!= SSL_AEAD
1273 && s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_enc
!= SSL_RC4
)
1279 int tls_parse_stoc_ems(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
, X509
*x
,
1280 size_t chainidx
, int *al
)
1282 s
->s3
->flags
|= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS
;
1284 s
->session
->flags
|= SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS
;
1289 int tls_parse_stoc_key_share(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
, X509
*x
,
1290 size_t chainidx
, int *al
)
1292 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
1293 unsigned int group_id
;
1295 EVP_PKEY
*ckey
= s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
, *skey
= NULL
;
1298 if (ckey
== NULL
|| s
->s3
->peer_tmp
!= NULL
) {
1299 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1300 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1304 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &group_id
)) {
1305 *al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1306 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1310 if ((context
& SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
) != 0) {
1311 unsigned const char *pcurves
= NULL
;
1312 size_t i
, num_curves
;
1314 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
1315 *al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1316 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1321 * It is an error if the HelloRetryRequest wants a key_share that we
1322 * already sent in the first ClientHello
1324 if (group_id
== s
->s3
->group_id
) {
1325 *al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1326 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE
, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE
);
1330 /* Validate the selected group is one we support */
1331 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s
, 0, &pcurves
, &num_curves
)) {
1332 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1335 for (i
= 0; i
< num_curves
; i
++, pcurves
+= 2) {
1336 if (group_id
== bytestogroup(pcurves
))
1340 || !tls_curve_allowed(s
, pcurves
, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED
)) {
1341 *al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1342 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE
, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE
);
1346 s
->s3
->group_id
= group_id
;
1347 EVP_PKEY_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
);
1348 s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
= NULL
;
1352 if (group_id
!= s
->s3
->group_id
) {
1354 * This isn't for the group that we sent in the original
1357 *al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1358 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE
, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE
);
1362 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &encoded_pt
)
1363 || PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt
) == 0) {
1364 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1365 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1369 skey
= ssl_generate_pkey(ckey
);
1371 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1372 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1375 if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(skey
, PACKET_data(&encoded_pt
),
1376 PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt
))) {
1377 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1378 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE
, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT
);
1379 EVP_PKEY_free(skey
);
1383 if (ssl_derive(s
, ckey
, skey
, 1) == 0) {
1384 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1385 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1386 EVP_PKEY_free(skey
);
1389 s
->s3
->peer_tmp
= skey
;
1395 int tls_parse_stoc_cookie(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
, X509
*x
,
1396 size_t chainidx
, int *al
)
1400 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &cookie
)
1401 || !PACKET_memdup(&cookie
, &s
->ext
.tls13_cookie
,
1402 &s
->ext
.tls13_cookie_len
)) {
1403 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1404 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_COOKIE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1411 int tls_parse_stoc_early_data(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
,
1412 X509
*x
, size_t chainidx
, int *al
)
1414 if (context
== SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
) {
1415 unsigned long max_early_data
;
1417 if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt
, &max_early_data
)
1418 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
1419 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_EARLY_DATA
,
1420 SSL_R_INVALID_MAX_EARLY_DATA
);
1421 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1425 s
->session
->ext
.max_early_data
= max_early_data
;
1430 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
1431 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1435 if (s
->ext
.early_data
!= SSL_EARLY_DATA_REJECTED
1437 || s
->session
->ext
.tick_identity
!= 0) {
1439 * If we get here then we didn't send early data, or we didn't resume
1440 * using the first identity so the server should not be accepting it.
1442 *al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1446 s
->ext
.early_data
= SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED
;
1451 int tls_parse_stoc_psk(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
, X509
*x
,
1452 size_t chainidx
, int *al
)
1454 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
1455 unsigned int identity
;
1457 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &identity
) || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
1458 *al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1459 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_PSK
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1463 if (s
->session
->ext
.tick_identity
!= (int)identity
) {
1464 *al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1465 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_PSK
, SSL_R_BAD_PSK_IDENTITY
);