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1 /*
2 * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 *
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
8 */
9
10 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
11 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
12 #include "statem_locl.h"
13
14 /*
15 * Parse the client's renegotiation binding and abort if it's not right
16 */
17 int tls_parse_ctos_renegotiate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx,
18 int *al)
19 {
20 unsigned int ilen;
21 const unsigned char *data;
22
23 /* Parse the length byte */
24 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &ilen)
25 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, ilen)) {
26 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_RENEGOTIATE,
27 SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_ENCODING_ERR);
28 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
29 return 0;
30 }
31
32 /* Check that the extension matches */
33 if (ilen != s->s3->previous_client_finished_len) {
34 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_RENEGOTIATE,
35 SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH);
36 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
37 return 0;
38 }
39
40 if (memcmp(data, s->s3->previous_client_finished,
41 s->s3->previous_client_finished_len)) {
42 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_RENEGOTIATE,
43 SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH);
44 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
45 return 0;
46 }
47
48 s->s3->send_connection_binding = 1;
49
50 return 1;
51 }
52
53 /*-
54 * The servername extension is treated as follows:
55 *
56 * - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
57 * - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
58 * in which case an fatal alert is generated.
59 * - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
60 * - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
61 * to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
62 * - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
63 * it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
64 * Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
65 * set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
66 * case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
67 * a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
68 * presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
69 * the value of the Host: field.
70 * - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
71 * if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the
72 * session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername
73 * extension.
74 * - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
75 */
76 int tls_parse_ctos_server_name(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx,
77 int *al)
78 {
79 unsigned int servname_type;
80 PACKET sni, hostname;
81
82 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &sni)
83 /* ServerNameList must be at least 1 byte long. */
84 || PACKET_remaining(&sni) == 0) {
85 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
86 return 0;
87 }
88
89 /*
90 * Although the server_name extension was intended to be
91 * extensible to new name types, RFC 4366 defined the
92 * syntax inextensibly and OpenSSL 1.0.x parses it as
93 * such.
94 * RFC 6066 corrected the mistake but adding new name types
95 * is nevertheless no longer feasible, so act as if no other
96 * SNI types can exist, to simplify parsing.
97 *
98 * Also note that the RFC permits only one SNI value per type,
99 * i.e., we can only have a single hostname.
100 */
101 if (!PACKET_get_1(&sni, &servname_type)
102 || servname_type != TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name
103 || !PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&sni, &hostname)) {
104 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
105 return 0;
106 }
107
108 if (!s->hit) {
109 if (PACKET_remaining(&hostname) > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) {
110 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
111 return 0;
112 }
113
114 if (PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&hostname)) {
115 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
116 return 0;
117 }
118
119 if (!PACKET_strndup(&hostname, &s->session->ext.hostname)) {
120 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
121 return 0;
122 }
123
124 s->servername_done = 1;
125 } else {
126 /*
127 * TODO(openssl-team): if the SNI doesn't match, we MUST
128 * fall back to a full handshake.
129 */
130 s->servername_done = s->session->ext.hostname
131 && PACKET_equal(&hostname, s->session->ext.hostname,
132 strlen(s->session->ext.hostname));
133 }
134
135 return 1;
136 }
137
138 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
139 int tls_parse_ctos_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
140 {
141 PACKET srp_I;
142
143 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &srp_I)
144 || PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&srp_I)) {
145 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
146 return 0;
147 }
148
149 /*
150 * TODO(openssl-team): currently, we re-authenticate the user
151 * upon resumption. Instead, we MUST ignore the login.
152 */
153 if (!PACKET_strndup(&srp_I, &s->srp_ctx.login)) {
154 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
155 return 0;
156 }
157
158 return 1;
159 }
160 #endif
161
162 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
163 int tls_parse_ctos_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx,
164 int *al)
165 {
166 PACKET ec_point_format_list;
167
168 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &ec_point_format_list)
169 || PACKET_remaining(&ec_point_format_list) == 0) {
170 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
171 return 0;
172 }
173
174 if (!s->hit) {
175 if (!PACKET_memdup(&ec_point_format_list,
176 &s->session->ext.ecpointformats,
177 &s->session->ext.ecpointformats_len)) {
178 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
179 return 0;
180 }
181 }
182
183 return 1;
184 }
185 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
186
187 int tls_parse_ctos_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx,
188 int *al)
189 {
190 if (s->ext.session_ticket_cb &&
191 !s->ext.session_ticket_cb(s, PACKET_data(pkt),
192 PACKET_remaining(pkt),
193 s->ext.session_ticket_cb_arg)) {
194 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
195 return 0;
196 }
197
198 return 1;
199 }
200
201 int tls_parse_ctos_sig_algs(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx,
202 int *al)
203 {
204 PACKET supported_sig_algs;
205
206 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &supported_sig_algs)
207 || PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) == 0) {
208 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
209 return 0;
210 }
211
212 if (!s->hit && !tls1_save_sigalgs(s, &supported_sig_algs)) {
213 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
214 return 0;
215 }
216
217 return 1;
218 }
219
220 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
221 int tls_parse_ctos_status_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx,
222 int *al)
223 {
224 PACKET responder_id_list, exts;
225
226 /* Not defined if we get one of these in a client Certificate */
227 if (x != NULL)
228 return 1;
229
230 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, (unsigned int *)&s->ext.status_type)) {
231 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
232 return 0;
233 }
234
235 if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
236 /*
237 * We don't know what to do with any other type so ignore it.
238 */
239 s->ext.status_type = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing;
240 return 1;
241 }
242
243 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2 (pkt, &responder_id_list)) {
244 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
245 return 0;
246 }
247
248 /*
249 * We remove any OCSP_RESPIDs from a previous handshake
250 * to prevent unbounded memory growth - CVE-2016-6304
251 */
252 sk_OCSP_RESPID_pop_free(s->ext.ocsp.ids, OCSP_RESPID_free);
253 if (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list) > 0) {
254 s->ext.ocsp.ids = sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null();
255 if (s->ext.ocsp.ids == NULL) {
256 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
257 return 0;
258 }
259 } else {
260 s->ext.ocsp.ids = NULL;
261 }
262
263 while (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list) > 0) {
264 OCSP_RESPID *id;
265 PACKET responder_id;
266 const unsigned char *id_data;
267
268 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&responder_id_list, &responder_id)
269 || PACKET_remaining(&responder_id) == 0) {
270 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
271 return 0;
272 }
273
274 id_data = PACKET_data(&responder_id);
275 /* TODO(size_t): Convert d2i_* to size_t */
276 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &id_data,
277 (int)PACKET_remaining(&responder_id));
278 if (id == NULL) {
279 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
280 return 0;
281 }
282
283 if (id_data != PACKET_end(&responder_id)) {
284 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
285 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
286 return 0;
287 }
288
289 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->ext.ocsp.ids, id)) {
290 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
291 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
292 return 0;
293 }
294 }
295
296 /* Read in request_extensions */
297 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &exts)) {
298 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
299 return 0;
300 }
301
302 if (PACKET_remaining(&exts) > 0) {
303 const unsigned char *ext_data = PACKET_data(&exts);
304
305 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->ext.ocsp.exts,
306 X509_EXTENSION_free);
307 s->ext.ocsp.exts =
308 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &ext_data, (int)PACKET_remaining(&exts));
309 if (s->ext.ocsp.exts == NULL || ext_data != PACKET_end(&exts)) {
310 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
311 return 0;
312 }
313 }
314
315 return 1;
316 }
317 #endif
318
319 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
320 int tls_parse_ctos_npn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
321 {
322 /*
323 * We shouldn't accept this extension on a
324 * renegotiation.
325 */
326 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s))
327 s->s3->npn_seen = 1;
328
329 return 1;
330 }
331 #endif
332
333 /*
334 * Save the ALPN extension in a ClientHello.|pkt| holds the contents of the ALPN
335 * extension, not including type and length. |al| is a pointer to the alert
336 * value to send in the event of a failure. Returns: 1 on success, 0 on error.
337 */
338 int tls_parse_ctos_alpn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
339 {
340 PACKET protocol_list, save_protocol_list, protocol;
341
342 if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s))
343 return 1;
344
345 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &protocol_list)
346 || PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) < 2) {
347 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
348 return 0;
349 }
350
351 save_protocol_list = protocol_list;
352 do {
353 /* Protocol names can't be empty. */
354 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&protocol_list, &protocol)
355 || PACKET_remaining(&protocol) == 0) {
356 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
357 return 0;
358 }
359 } while (PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) != 0);
360
361 if (!PACKET_memdup(&save_protocol_list,
362 &s->s3->alpn_proposed, &s->s3->alpn_proposed_len)) {
363 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
364 return 0;
365 }
366
367 return 1;
368 }
369
370 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
371 int tls_parse_ctos_use_srtp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx,
372 int *al)
373 {
374 STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *srvr;
375 unsigned int ct, mki_len, id;
376 int i, srtp_pref;
377 PACKET subpkt;
378
379 /* Ignore this if we have no SRTP profiles */
380 if (SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s) == NULL)
381 return 1;
382
383 /* Pull off the length of the cipher suite list and check it is even */
384 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ct) || (ct & 1) != 0
385 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &subpkt, ct)) {
386 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_USE_SRTP,
387 SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST);
388 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
389 return 0;
390 }
391
392 srvr = SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s);
393 s->srtp_profile = NULL;
394 /* Search all profiles for a match initially */
395 srtp_pref = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(srvr);
396
397 while (PACKET_remaining(&subpkt)) {
398 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&subpkt, &id)) {
399 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_USE_SRTP,
400 SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST);
401 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
402 return 0;
403 }
404
405 /*
406 * Only look for match in profiles of higher preference than
407 * current match.
408 * If no profiles have been have been configured then this
409 * does nothing.
410 */
411 for (i = 0; i < srtp_pref; i++) {
412 SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *sprof =
413 sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(srvr, i);
414
415 if (sprof->id == id) {
416 s->srtp_profile = sprof;
417 srtp_pref = i;
418 break;
419 }
420 }
421 }
422
423 /* Now extract the MKI value as a sanity check, but discard it for now */
424 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &mki_len)) {
425 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_USE_SRTP,
426 SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST);
427 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
428 return 0;
429 }
430
431 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, mki_len)
432 || PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
433 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_USE_SRTP, SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_MKI_VALUE);
434 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
435 return 0;
436 }
437
438 return 1;
439 }
440 #endif
441
442 int tls_parse_ctos_etm(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
443 {
444 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC))
445 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
446
447 return 1;
448 }
449
450 /*
451 * Checks a list of |groups| to determine if the |group_id| is in it. If it is
452 * and |checkallow| is 1 then additionally check if the group is allowed to be
453 * used. Returns 1 if the group is in the list (and allowed if |checkallow| is
454 * 1) or 0 otherwise.
455 */
456 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
457 static int check_in_list(SSL *s, unsigned int group_id,
458 const unsigned char *groups, size_t num_groups,
459 int checkallow)
460 {
461 size_t i;
462
463 if (groups == NULL || num_groups == 0)
464 return 0;
465
466 for (i = 0; i < num_groups; i++, groups += 2) {
467 unsigned int share_id = (groups[0] << 8) | (groups[1]);
468
469 if (group_id == share_id
470 && (!checkallow
471 || tls_curve_allowed(s, groups, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK))) {
472 break;
473 }
474 }
475
476 /* If i == num_groups then not in the list */
477 return i < num_groups;
478 }
479 #endif
480
481 /*
482 * Process a key_share extension received in the ClientHello. |pkt| contains
483 * the raw PACKET data for the extension. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure.
484 * If a failure occurs then |*al| is set to an appropriate alert value.
485 */
486 int tls_parse_ctos_key_share(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx,
487 int *al)
488 {
489 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
490 unsigned int group_id;
491 PACKET key_share_list, encoded_pt;
492 const unsigned char *clntcurves, *srvrcurves;
493 size_t clnt_num_curves, srvr_num_curves;
494 int group_nid, found = 0;
495 unsigned int curve_flags;
496
497 if (s->hit)
498 return 1;
499
500 /* Sanity check */
501 if (s->s3->peer_tmp != NULL) {
502 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
503 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
504 return 0;
505 }
506
507 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &key_share_list)) {
508 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
509 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
510 return 0;
511 }
512
513 /* Get our list of supported curves */
514 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &srvrcurves, &srvr_num_curves)) {
515 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
516 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
517 return 0;
518 }
519
520 /*
521 * Get the clients list of supported curves.
522 * TODO(TLS1.3): We should validate that we actually received
523 * supported_groups!
524 */
525 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 1, &clntcurves, &clnt_num_curves)) {
526 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
527 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
528 return 0;
529 }
530
531 while (PACKET_remaining(&key_share_list) > 0) {
532 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&key_share_list, &group_id)
533 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&key_share_list, &encoded_pt)
534 || PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt) == 0) {
535 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
536 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE,
537 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
538 return 0;
539 }
540
541 /*
542 * If we already found a suitable key_share we loop through the
543 * rest to verify the structure, but don't process them.
544 */
545 if (found)
546 continue;
547
548 /* Check if this share is in supported_groups sent from client */
549 if (!check_in_list(s, group_id, clntcurves, clnt_num_curves, 0)) {
550 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
551 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE);
552 return 0;
553 }
554
555 /* Check if this share is for a group we can use */
556 if (!check_in_list(s, group_id, srvrcurves, srvr_num_curves, 1)) {
557 /* Share not suitable */
558 continue;
559 }
560
561 group_nid = tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(group_id, &curve_flags);
562
563 if (group_nid == 0) {
564 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
565 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE,
566 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
567 return 0;
568 }
569
570 if ((curve_flags & TLS_CURVE_TYPE) == TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM) {
571 /* Can happen for some curves, e.g. X25519 */
572 EVP_PKEY *key = EVP_PKEY_new();
573
574 if (key == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_set_type(key, group_nid)) {
575 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
576 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
577 EVP_PKEY_free(key);
578 return 0;
579 }
580 s->s3->peer_tmp = key;
581 } else {
582 /* Set up EVP_PKEY with named curve as parameters */
583 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(EVP_PKEY_EC, NULL);
584
585 if (pctx == NULL
586 || EVP_PKEY_paramgen_init(pctx) <= 0
587 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ec_paramgen_curve_nid(pctx,
588 group_nid) <= 0
589 || EVP_PKEY_paramgen(pctx, &s->s3->peer_tmp) <= 0) {
590 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
591 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
592 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
593 return 0;
594 }
595 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
596 pctx = NULL;
597 }
598 s->s3->group_id = group_id;
599
600 if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->peer_tmp,
601 PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
602 PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt))) {
603 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
604 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
605 return 0;
606 }
607
608 found = 1;
609 }
610 #endif
611
612 return 1;
613 }
614
615 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
616 int tls_parse_ctos_supported_groups(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, X509 *x,
617 size_t chainidx, int *al)
618 {
619 PACKET supported_groups_list;
620
621 /* Each group is 2 bytes and we must have at least 1. */
622 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &supported_groups_list)
623 || PACKET_remaining(&supported_groups_list) == 0
624 || (PACKET_remaining(&supported_groups_list) % 2) != 0) {
625 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
626 return 0;
627 }
628
629 if (!s->hit
630 && !PACKET_memdup(&supported_groups_list,
631 &s->session->ext.supportedgroups,
632 &s->session->ext.supportedgroups_len)) {
633 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
634 return 0;
635 }
636
637 return 1;
638 }
639 #endif
640
641 int tls_parse_ctos_ems(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
642 {
643 /* The extension must always be empty */
644 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
645 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
646 return 0;
647 }
648
649 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
650
651 return 1;
652 }
653
654 /*
655 * Add the server's renegotiation binding
656 */
657 int tls_construct_stoc_renegotiate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t
658 chainidx, int *al)
659 {
660 if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding)
661 return 1;
662
663 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
664 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
665 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
666 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->previous_client_finished,
667 s->s3->previous_client_finished_len)
668 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->previous_server_finished,
669 s->s3->previous_server_finished_len)
670 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
671 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
672 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_RENEGOTIATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
673 return 0;
674 }
675
676 return 1;
677 }
678
679 int tls_construct_stoc_server_name(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x,
680 size_t chainidx, int *al)
681 {
682 if (s->hit || s->servername_done != 1
683 || s->session->ext.hostname == NULL)
684 return 1;
685
686 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
687 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
688 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SERVER_NAME, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
689 return 0;
690 }
691
692 return 1;
693 }
694
695 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
696 int tls_construct_stoc_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x,
697 size_t chainidx, int *al)
698 {
699 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
700 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
701 int using_ecc = ((alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))
702 && (s->session->ext.ecpointformats != NULL);
703 const unsigned char *plist;
704 size_t plistlen;
705
706 if (!using_ecc)
707 return 1;
708
709 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
710 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
711 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
712 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, plist, plistlen)
713 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
714 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_EC_PT_FORMATS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
715 return 0;
716 }
717
718 return 1;
719 }
720 #endif
721
722 int tls_construct_stoc_session_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x,
723 size_t chainidx, int *al)
724 {
725 if (!s->ext.ticket_expected || !tls_use_ticket(s)) {
726 s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
727 return 1;
728 }
729
730 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
731 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
732 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
733 return 0;
734 }
735
736 return 1;
737 }
738
739 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
740 int tls_construct_stoc_status_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x,
741 size_t chainidx, int *al)
742 {
743 if (!s->ext.status_expected)
744 return 1;
745
746 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && chainidx != 0)
747 return 1;
748
749 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
750 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
751 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
752 return 0;
753 }
754
755 /*
756 * In TLSv1.3 we include the certificate status itself. In <= TLSv1.2 we
757 * send back an empty extension, with the certificate status appearing as a
758 * separate message
759 */
760 if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !tls_construct_cert_status_body(s, pkt))
761 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
762 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
763 return 0;
764 }
765
766 return 1;
767 }
768 #endif
769
770 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
771 int tls_construct_stoc_next_proto_neg(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x,
772 size_t chainidx, int *al)
773 {
774 const unsigned char *npa;
775 unsigned int npalen;
776 int ret;
777 int npn_seen = s->s3->npn_seen;
778
779 s->s3->npn_seen = 0;
780 if (!npn_seen || s->ctx->ext.npn_advertised_cb == NULL)
781 return 1;
782
783 ret = s->ctx->ext.npn_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen,
784 s->ctx->ext.npn_advertised_cb_arg);
785 if (ret == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
786 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg)
787 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, npa, npalen)) {
788 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_NEXT_PROTO_NEG,
789 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
790 return 0;
791 }
792 s->s3->npn_seen = 1;
793 }
794
795 return 1;
796 }
797 #endif
798
799 int tls_construct_stoc_alpn(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx,
800 int *al)
801 {
802 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL)
803 return 1;
804
805 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt,
806 TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)
807 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
808 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
809 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->s3->alpn_selected,
810 s->s3->alpn_selected_len)
811 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
812 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
813 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_ALPN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
814 return 0;
815 }
816
817 return 1;
818 }
819
820 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
821 int tls_construct_stoc_use_srtp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx,
822 int *al)
823 {
824 if (s->srtp_profile == NULL)
825 return 1;
826
827 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
828 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
829 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 2)
830 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->srtp_profile->id)
831 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)
832 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
833 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_USE_SRTP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
834 return 0;
835 }
836
837 return 1;
838 }
839 #endif
840
841 int tls_construct_stoc_etm(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx,
842 int *al)
843 {
844 if ((s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) == 0)
845 return 1;
846
847 /*
848 * Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD or RC4 might want to disable
849 * for other cases too.
850 */
851 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD
852 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4
853 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT
854 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT12) {
855 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
856 return 1;
857 }
858
859 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
860 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
861 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_ETM, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
862 return 0;
863 }
864
865 return 1;
866 }
867
868 int tls_construct_stoc_ems(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx,
869 int *al)
870 {
871 if ((s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) == 0)
872 return 1;
873
874 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret)
875 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
876 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_EMS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
877 return 0;
878 }
879
880 return 1;
881 }
882
883 int tls_construct_stoc_key_share(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx,
884 int *al)
885 {
886 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
887 unsigned char *encodedPoint;
888 size_t encoded_pt_len = 0;
889 EVP_PKEY *ckey = s->s3->peer_tmp, *skey = NULL;
890
891 if (s->hit)
892 return 1;
893
894 if (ckey == NULL) {
895 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
896 return 0;
897 }
898
899 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share)
900 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
901 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->s3->group_id)) {
902 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
903 return 0;
904 }
905
906 skey = ssl_generate_pkey(ckey);
907 if (skey == NULL) {
908 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
909 return 0;
910 }
911
912 /* Generate encoding of server key */
913 encoded_pt_len = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(skey, &encodedPoint);
914 if (encoded_pt_len == 0) {
915 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
916 EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
917 return 0;
918 }
919
920 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len)
921 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
922 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
923 EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
924 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
925 return 0;
926 }
927 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
928
929 /* This causes the crypto state to be updated based on the derived keys */
930 s->s3->tmp.pkey = skey;
931 if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) {
932 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
933 return 0;
934 }
935 #endif
936
937 return 1;
938 }
939
940 int tls_construct_stoc_cryptopro_bug(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x,
941 size_t chainidx, int *al)
942 {
943 const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
944 0xfd, 0xe8, /* 65000 */
945 0x00, 0x20, /* 32 bytes length */
946 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
947 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
948 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
949 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17
950 };
951
952 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) != 0x80
953 && (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) != 0x81)
954 || (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG) == 0)
955 return 1;
956
957 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, cryptopro_ext, sizeof(cryptopro_ext))) {
958 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_CRYPTOPRO_BUG, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
959 return 0;
960 }
961
962 return 1;
963 }