2 * Copyright 2016-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
11 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
12 #include "statem_locl.h"
13 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
15 #define COOKIE_STATE_FORMAT_VERSION 0
18 * 2 bytes for packet length, 2 bytes for format version, 2 bytes for
19 * protocol version, 2 bytes for group id, 2 bytes for cipher id, 1 byte for
20 * key_share present flag, 4 bytes for timestamp, 2 bytes for the hashlen,
21 * EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE for transcript hash, 1 byte for app cookie length, app cookie
22 * length bytes, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH bytes for the HMAC of the whole thing.
24 #define MAX_COOKIE_SIZE (2 + 2 + 2 + 2 + 2 + 1 + 4 + 2 + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + 1 \
25 + SSL_COOKIE_LENGTH + SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH)
28 * Message header + 2 bytes for protocol version + number of random bytes +
29 * + 1 byte for legacy session id length + number of bytes in legacy session id
30 * + 2 bytes for ciphersuite + 1 byte for legacy compression
31 * + 2 bytes for extension block length + 6 bytes for key_share extension
32 * + 4 bytes for cookie extension header + the number of bytes in the cookie
34 #define MAX_HRR_SIZE (SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + 2 + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + 1 \
35 + SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH + 2 + 1 + 2 + 6 + 4 \
39 * Parse the client's renegotiation binding and abort if it's not right
41 int tls_parse_ctos_renegotiate(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
,
42 X509
*x
, size_t chainidx
)
45 const unsigned char *data
;
47 /* Parse the length byte */
48 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &ilen
)
49 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &data
, ilen
)) {
50 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_RENEGOTIATE
,
51 SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_ENCODING_ERR
);
55 /* Check that the extension matches */
56 if (ilen
!= s
->s3
->previous_client_finished_len
) {
57 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_RENEGOTIATE
,
58 SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH
);
62 if (memcmp(data
, s
->s3
->previous_client_finished
,
63 s
->s3
->previous_client_finished_len
)) {
64 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_RENEGOTIATE
,
65 SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH
);
69 s
->s3
->send_connection_binding
= 1;
75 * The servername extension is treated as follows:
77 * - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
78 * - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
79 * in which case an fatal alert is generated.
80 * - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
81 * - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
82 * to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
83 * - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
84 * it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
85 * Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
86 * set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
87 * case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
88 * a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
89 * presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
90 * the value of the Host: field.
91 * - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
92 * if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the
93 * session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername
95 * - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
97 int tls_parse_ctos_server_name(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
,
98 X509
*x
, size_t chainidx
)
100 unsigned int servname_type
;
101 PACKET sni
, hostname
;
103 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &sni
)
104 /* ServerNameList must be at least 1 byte long. */
105 || PACKET_remaining(&sni
) == 0) {
106 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SERVER_NAME
,
107 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION
);
112 * Although the intent was for server_name to be extensible, RFC 4366
113 * was not clear about it; and so OpenSSL among other implementations,
114 * always and only allows a 'host_name' name types.
115 * RFC 6066 corrected the mistake but adding new name types
116 * is nevertheless no longer feasible, so act as if no other
117 * SNI types can exist, to simplify parsing.
119 * Also note that the RFC permits only one SNI value per type,
120 * i.e., we can only have a single hostname.
122 if (!PACKET_get_1(&sni
, &servname_type
)
123 || servname_type
!= TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name
124 || !PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&sni
, &hostname
)) {
125 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SERVER_NAME
,
126 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION
);
131 if (PACKET_remaining(&hostname
) > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name
) {
132 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME
,
133 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SERVER_NAME
,
134 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION
);
138 if (PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&hostname
)) {
139 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME
,
140 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SERVER_NAME
,
141 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION
);
145 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->ext
.hostname
);
146 s
->session
->ext
.hostname
= NULL
;
147 if (!PACKET_strndup(&hostname
, &s
->session
->ext
.hostname
)) {
148 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SERVER_NAME
,
149 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
153 s
->servername_done
= 1;
156 * TODO(openssl-team): if the SNI doesn't match, we MUST
157 * fall back to a full handshake.
159 s
->servername_done
= s
->session
->ext
.hostname
160 && PACKET_equal(&hostname
, s
->session
->ext
.hostname
,
161 strlen(s
->session
->ext
.hostname
));
163 if (!s
->servername_done
&& s
->session
->ext
.hostname
!= NULL
)
164 s
->ext
.early_data_ok
= 0;
170 int tls_parse_ctos_maxfragmentlen(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
,
171 X509
*x
, size_t chainidx
)
175 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 1 || !PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &value
)) {
176 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_MAXFRAGMENTLEN
,
177 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION
);
181 /* Received |value| should be a valid max-fragment-length code. */
182 if (!IS_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT_VALID(value
)) {
183 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
184 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_MAXFRAGMENTLEN
,
185 SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH
);
190 * RFC 6066: The negotiated length applies for the duration of the session
191 * including session resumptions.
192 * We should receive the same code as in resumed session !
194 if (s
->hit
&& s
->session
->ext
.max_fragment_len_mode
!= value
) {
195 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
196 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_MAXFRAGMENTLEN
,
197 SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH
);
202 * Store it in session, so it'll become binding for us
203 * and we'll include it in a next Server Hello.
205 s
->session
->ext
.max_fragment_len_mode
= value
;
209 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
210 int tls_parse_ctos_srp(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
, X509
*x
,
215 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &srp_I
)
216 || PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&srp_I
)) {
217 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,
218 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SRP
,
219 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION
);
224 * TODO(openssl-team): currently, we re-authenticate the user
225 * upon resumption. Instead, we MUST ignore the login.
227 if (!PACKET_strndup(&srp_I
, &s
->srp_ctx
.login
)) {
228 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SRP
,
229 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
237 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
238 int tls_parse_ctos_ec_pt_formats(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
,
239 X509
*x
, size_t chainidx
)
241 PACKET ec_point_format_list
;
243 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &ec_point_format_list
)
244 || PACKET_remaining(&ec_point_format_list
) == 0) {
245 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_EC_PT_FORMATS
,
246 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION
);
251 if (!PACKET_memdup(&ec_point_format_list
,
252 &s
->session
->ext
.ecpointformats
,
253 &s
->session
->ext
.ecpointformats_len
)) {
254 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
255 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_EC_PT_FORMATS
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
262 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
264 int tls_parse_ctos_session_ticket(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
,
265 X509
*x
, size_t chainidx
)
267 if (s
->ext
.session_ticket_cb
&&
268 !s
->ext
.session_ticket_cb(s
, PACKET_data(pkt
),
269 PACKET_remaining(pkt
),
270 s
->ext
.session_ticket_cb_arg
)) {
271 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
272 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SESSION_TICKET
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
279 int tls_parse_ctos_sig_algs_cert(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
,
280 X509
*x
, size_t chainidx
)
282 PACKET supported_sig_algs
;
284 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &supported_sig_algs
)
285 || PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs
) == 0) {
286 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,
287 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SIG_ALGS_CERT
, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION
);
291 if (!s
->hit
&& !tls1_save_sigalgs(s
, &supported_sig_algs
, 1)) {
292 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,
293 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SIG_ALGS_CERT
, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION
);
300 int tls_parse_ctos_sig_algs(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
, X509
*x
,
303 PACKET supported_sig_algs
;
305 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &supported_sig_algs
)
306 || PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs
) == 0) {
307 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,
308 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SIG_ALGS
, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION
);
312 if (!s
->hit
&& !tls1_save_sigalgs(s
, &supported_sig_algs
, 0)) {
313 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,
314 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SIG_ALGS
, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION
);
321 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
322 int tls_parse_ctos_status_request(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
,
323 X509
*x
, size_t chainidx
)
325 PACKET responder_id_list
, exts
;
327 /* We ignore this in a resumption handshake */
331 /* Not defined if we get one of these in a client Certificate */
335 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt
, (unsigned int *)&s
->ext
.status_type
)) {
336 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,
337 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST
, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION
);
341 if (s
->ext
.status_type
!= TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp
) {
343 * We don't know what to do with any other type so ignore it.
345 s
->ext
.status_type
= TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing
;
349 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2 (pkt
, &responder_id_list
)) {
350 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,
351 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST
, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION
);
356 * We remove any OCSP_RESPIDs from a previous handshake
357 * to prevent unbounded memory growth - CVE-2016-6304
359 sk_OCSP_RESPID_pop_free(s
->ext
.ocsp
.ids
, OCSP_RESPID_free
);
360 if (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list
) > 0) {
361 s
->ext
.ocsp
.ids
= sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null();
362 if (s
->ext
.ocsp
.ids
== NULL
) {
363 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
364 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
368 s
->ext
.ocsp
.ids
= NULL
;
371 while (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list
) > 0) {
374 const unsigned char *id_data
;
376 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&responder_id_list
, &responder_id
)
377 || PACKET_remaining(&responder_id
) == 0) {
378 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,
379 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST
, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION
);
383 id_data
= PACKET_data(&responder_id
);
384 /* TODO(size_t): Convert d2i_* to size_t */
385 id
= d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL
, &id_data
,
386 (int)PACKET_remaining(&responder_id
));
388 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,
389 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST
, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION
);
393 if (id_data
!= PACKET_end(&responder_id
)) {
394 OCSP_RESPID_free(id
);
395 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,
396 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST
, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION
);
401 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s
->ext
.ocsp
.ids
, id
)) {
402 OCSP_RESPID_free(id
);
403 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
404 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
410 /* Read in request_extensions */
411 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &exts
)) {
412 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,
413 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST
, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION
);
417 if (PACKET_remaining(&exts
) > 0) {
418 const unsigned char *ext_data
= PACKET_data(&exts
);
420 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s
->ext
.ocsp
.exts
,
421 X509_EXTENSION_free
);
423 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL
, &ext_data
, (int)PACKET_remaining(&exts
));
424 if (s
->ext
.ocsp
.exts
== NULL
|| ext_data
!= PACKET_end(&exts
)) {
425 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,
426 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST
, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION
);
435 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
436 int tls_parse_ctos_npn(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
, X509
*x
,
440 * We shouldn't accept this extension on a
443 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s
))
451 * Save the ALPN extension in a ClientHello.|pkt| holds the contents of the ALPN
452 * extension, not including type and length. Returns: 1 on success, 0 on error.
454 int tls_parse_ctos_alpn(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
, X509
*x
,
457 PACKET protocol_list
, save_protocol_list
, protocol
;
459 if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s
))
462 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &protocol_list
)
463 || PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list
) < 2) {
464 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_ALPN
,
465 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION
);
469 save_protocol_list
= protocol_list
;
471 /* Protocol names can't be empty. */
472 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&protocol_list
, &protocol
)
473 || PACKET_remaining(&protocol
) == 0) {
474 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_ALPN
,
475 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION
);
478 } while (PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list
) != 0);
480 OPENSSL_free(s
->s3
->alpn_proposed
);
481 s
->s3
->alpn_proposed
= NULL
;
482 s
->s3
->alpn_proposed_len
= 0;
483 if (!PACKET_memdup(&save_protocol_list
,
484 &s
->s3
->alpn_proposed
, &s
->s3
->alpn_proposed_len
)) {
485 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_ALPN
,
486 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
493 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
494 int tls_parse_ctos_use_srtp(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
, X509
*x
,
497 STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE
) *srvr
;
498 unsigned int ct
, mki_len
, id
;
502 /* Ignore this if we have no SRTP profiles */
503 if (SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s
) == NULL
)
506 /* Pull off the length of the cipher suite list and check it is even */
507 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &ct
) || (ct
& 1) != 0
508 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt
, &subpkt
, ct
)) {
509 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_USE_SRTP
,
510 SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST
);
514 srvr
= SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s
);
515 s
->srtp_profile
= NULL
;
516 /* Search all profiles for a match initially */
517 srtp_pref
= sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(srvr
);
519 while (PACKET_remaining(&subpkt
)) {
520 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&subpkt
, &id
)) {
521 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_USE_SRTP
,
522 SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST
);
527 * Only look for match in profiles of higher preference than
529 * If no profiles have been have been configured then this
532 for (i
= 0; i
< srtp_pref
; i
++) {
533 SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE
*sprof
=
534 sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(srvr
, i
);
536 if (sprof
->id
== id
) {
537 s
->srtp_profile
= sprof
;
544 /* Now extract the MKI value as a sanity check, but discard it for now */
545 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &mki_len
)) {
546 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_USE_SRTP
,
547 SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST
);
551 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt
, mki_len
)
552 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
)) {
553 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_USE_SRTP
,
554 SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_MKI_VALUE
);
562 int tls_parse_ctos_etm(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
, X509
*x
,
565 if (!(s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC
))
572 * Process a psk_kex_modes extension received in the ClientHello. |pkt| contains
573 * the raw PACKET data for the extension. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure.
575 int tls_parse_ctos_psk_kex_modes(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
,
576 X509
*x
, size_t chainidx
)
578 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
579 PACKET psk_kex_modes
;
582 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &psk_kex_modes
)
583 || PACKET_remaining(&psk_kex_modes
) == 0) {
584 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK_KEX_MODES
,
585 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION
);
589 while (PACKET_get_1(&psk_kex_modes
, &mode
)) {
590 if (mode
== TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_KE_DHE
)
591 s
->ext
.psk_kex_mode
|= TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE_DHE
;
592 else if (mode
== TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_KE
593 && (s
->options
& SSL_OP_ALLOW_NO_DHE_KEX
) != 0)
594 s
->ext
.psk_kex_mode
|= TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE
;
602 * Process a key_share extension received in the ClientHello. |pkt| contains
603 * the raw PACKET data for the extension. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure.
605 int tls_parse_ctos_key_share(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
, X509
*x
,
608 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
609 unsigned int group_id
;
610 PACKET key_share_list
, encoded_pt
;
611 const uint16_t *clntgroups
, *srvrgroups
;
612 size_t clnt_num_groups
, srvr_num_groups
;
615 if (s
->hit
&& (s
->ext
.psk_kex_mode
& TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE_DHE
) == 0)
619 if (s
->s3
->peer_tmp
!= NULL
) {
620 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE
,
621 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
625 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &key_share_list
)) {
626 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE
,
627 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
631 /* Get our list of supported groups */
632 tls1_get_supported_groups(s
, &srvrgroups
, &srvr_num_groups
);
633 /* Get the clients list of supported groups. */
634 tls1_get_peer_groups(s
, &clntgroups
, &clnt_num_groups
);
635 if (clnt_num_groups
== 0) {
637 * This can only happen if the supported_groups extension was not sent,
638 * because we verify that the length is non-zero when we process that
641 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_MISSING_EXTENSION
, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE
,
642 SSL_R_MISSING_SUPPORTED_GROUPS_EXTENSION
);
646 if (s
->s3
->group_id
!= 0 && PACKET_remaining(&key_share_list
) == 0) {
648 * If we set a group_id already, then we must have sent an HRR
649 * requesting a new key_share. If we haven't got one then that is an
652 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE
,
653 SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE
);
657 while (PACKET_remaining(&key_share_list
) > 0) {
658 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&key_share_list
, &group_id
)
659 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&key_share_list
, &encoded_pt
)
660 || PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt
) == 0) {
661 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE
,
662 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
667 * If we already found a suitable key_share we loop through the
668 * rest to verify the structure, but don't process them.
674 * If we sent an HRR then the key_share sent back MUST be for the group
675 * we requested, and must be the only key_share sent.
677 if (s
->s3
->group_id
!= 0
678 && (group_id
!= s
->s3
->group_id
679 || PACKET_remaining(&key_share_list
) != 0)) {
680 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
681 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE
, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE
);
685 /* Check if this share is in supported_groups sent from client */
686 if (!check_in_list(s
, group_id
, clntgroups
, clnt_num_groups
, 0)) {
687 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
688 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE
, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE
);
692 /* Check if this share is for a group we can use */
693 if (!check_in_list(s
, group_id
, srvrgroups
, srvr_num_groups
, 1)) {
694 /* Share not suitable */
698 if ((s
->s3
->peer_tmp
= ssl_generate_param_group(group_id
)) == NULL
) {
699 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE
,
700 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS
);
704 s
->s3
->group_id
= group_id
;
706 if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(s
->s3
->peer_tmp
,
707 PACKET_data(&encoded_pt
),
708 PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt
))) {
709 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
710 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE
, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT
);
721 int tls_parse_ctos_cookie(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
, X509
*x
,
724 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
725 unsigned int format
, version
, key_share
, group_id
;
728 PACKET cookie
, raw
, chhash
, appcookie
;
730 const unsigned char *data
, *mdin
, *ciphdata
;
731 unsigned char hmac
[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH
];
732 unsigned char hrr
[MAX_HRR_SIZE
];
733 size_t rawlen
, hmaclen
, hrrlen
, ciphlen
;
734 unsigned long tm
, now
;
736 /* Ignore any cookie if we're not set up to verify it */
737 if (s
->ctx
->verify_stateless_cookie_cb
== NULL
738 || (s
->s3
->flags
& TLS1_FLAGS_STATELESS
) == 0)
741 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &cookie
)) {
742 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE
,
743 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
748 data
= PACKET_data(&raw
);
749 rawlen
= PACKET_remaining(&raw
);
750 if (rawlen
< SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH
751 || !PACKET_forward(&raw
, rawlen
- SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH
)) {
752 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE
,
753 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
756 mdin
= PACKET_data(&raw
);
758 /* Verify the HMAC of the cookie */
759 hctx
= EVP_MD_CTX_create();
760 pkey
= EVP_PKEY_new_raw_private_key(EVP_PKEY_HMAC
, NULL
,
761 s
->session_ctx
->ext
.cookie_hmac_key
,
762 sizeof(s
->session_ctx
->ext
764 if (hctx
== NULL
|| pkey
== NULL
) {
765 EVP_MD_CTX_free(hctx
);
767 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE
,
768 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
772 hmaclen
= SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH
;
773 if (EVP_DigestSignInit(hctx
, NULL
, EVP_sha256(), NULL
, pkey
) <= 0
774 || EVP_DigestSign(hctx
, hmac
, &hmaclen
, data
,
775 rawlen
- SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH
) <= 0
776 || hmaclen
!= SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH
) {
777 EVP_MD_CTX_free(hctx
);
779 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE
,
780 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
784 EVP_MD_CTX_free(hctx
);
787 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(hmac
, mdin
, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH
) != 0) {
788 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE
,
789 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH
);
793 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&cookie
, &format
)) {
794 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE
,
795 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
798 /* Check the cookie format is something we recognise. Ignore it if not */
799 if (format
!= COOKIE_STATE_FORMAT_VERSION
)
803 * The rest of these checks really shouldn't fail since we have verified the
807 /* Check the version number is sane */
808 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&cookie
, &version
)) {
809 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE
,
810 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
813 if (version
!= TLS1_3_VERSION
) {
814 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE
,
815 SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER
);
819 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&cookie
, &group_id
)) {
820 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE
,
821 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
825 ciphdata
= PACKET_data(&cookie
);
826 if (!PACKET_forward(&cookie
, 2)) {
827 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE
,
828 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
831 if (group_id
!= s
->s3
->group_id
832 || s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
833 != ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s
, ciphdata
, 0)) {
835 * We chose a different cipher or group id this time around to what is
836 * in the cookie. Something must have changed.
838 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE
,
843 if (!PACKET_get_1(&cookie
, &key_share
)
844 || !PACKET_get_net_4(&cookie
, &tm
)
845 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&cookie
, &chhash
)
846 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&cookie
, &appcookie
)
847 || PACKET_remaining(&cookie
) != SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH
) {
848 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE
,
849 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
853 /* We tolerate a cookie age of up to 10 minutes (= 60 * 10 seconds) */
854 now
= (unsigned long)time(NULL
);
855 if (tm
> now
|| (now
- tm
) > 600) {
856 /* Cookie is stale. Ignore it */
860 /* Verify the app cookie */
861 if (s
->ctx
->verify_stateless_cookie_cb(s
, PACKET_data(&appcookie
),
862 PACKET_remaining(&appcookie
)) == 0) {
863 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE
,
864 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH
);
869 * Reconstruct the HRR that we would have sent in response to the original
870 * ClientHello so we can add it to the transcript hash.
871 * Note: This won't work with custom HRR extensions
873 if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(&hrrpkt
, hrr
, sizeof(hrr
), 0)) {
874 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE
,
875 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
878 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(&hrrpkt
, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO
)
879 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u24(&hrrpkt
)
880 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(&hrrpkt
, TLS1_2_VERSION
)
881 || !WPACKET_memcpy(&hrrpkt
, hrrrandom
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
)
882 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(&hrrpkt
, s
->tmp_session_id
,
883 s
->tmp_session_id_len
)
884 || !s
->method
->put_cipher_by_char(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
, &hrrpkt
,
886 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(&hrrpkt
, 0)
887 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(&hrrpkt
)) {
888 WPACKET_cleanup(&hrrpkt
);
889 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE
,
890 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
893 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(&hrrpkt
, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_versions
)
894 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(&hrrpkt
)
895 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Fix this before release */
896 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(&hrrpkt
, s
->version_draft
)
897 || !WPACKET_close(&hrrpkt
)) {
898 WPACKET_cleanup(&hrrpkt
);
899 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE
,
900 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
904 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(&hrrpkt
, TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share
)
905 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(&hrrpkt
)
906 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(&hrrpkt
, s
->s3
->group_id
)
907 || !WPACKET_close(&hrrpkt
)) {
908 WPACKET_cleanup(&hrrpkt
);
909 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE
,
910 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
914 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(&hrrpkt
, TLSEXT_TYPE_cookie
)
915 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(&hrrpkt
)
916 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(&hrrpkt
, data
, rawlen
)
917 || !WPACKET_close(&hrrpkt
) /* cookie extension */
918 || !WPACKET_close(&hrrpkt
) /* extension block */
919 || !WPACKET_close(&hrrpkt
) /* message */
920 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(&hrrpkt
, &hrrlen
)
921 || !WPACKET_finish(&hrrpkt
)) {
922 WPACKET_cleanup(&hrrpkt
);
923 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE
,
924 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
928 /* Reconstruct the transcript hash */
929 if (!create_synthetic_message_hash(s
, PACKET_data(&chhash
),
930 PACKET_remaining(&chhash
), hrr
,
932 /* SSLfatal() already called */
936 /* Act as if this ClientHello came after a HelloRetryRequest */
937 s
->hello_retry_request
= 1;
945 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
946 int tls_parse_ctos_supported_groups(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
,
947 X509
*x
, size_t chainidx
)
949 PACKET supported_groups_list
;
951 /* Each group is 2 bytes and we must have at least 1. */
952 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &supported_groups_list
)
953 || PACKET_remaining(&supported_groups_list
) == 0
954 || (PACKET_remaining(&supported_groups_list
) % 2) != 0) {
955 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,
956 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SUPPORTED_GROUPS
, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION
);
960 if (!s
->hit
|| SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
961 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->ext
.supportedgroups
);
962 s
->session
->ext
.supportedgroups
= NULL
;
963 s
->session
->ext
.supportedgroups_len
= 0;
964 if (!tls1_save_u16(&supported_groups_list
,
965 &s
->session
->ext
.supportedgroups
,
966 &s
->session
->ext
.supportedgroups_len
)) {
967 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
968 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SUPPORTED_GROUPS
,
969 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
978 int tls_parse_ctos_ems(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
, X509
*x
,
981 /* The extension must always be empty */
982 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
983 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,
984 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_EMS
, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION
);
988 s
->s3
->flags
|= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS
;
994 int tls_parse_ctos_early_data(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
,
995 X509
*x
, size_t chainidx
)
997 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
998 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,
999 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_EARLY_DATA
, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION
);
1003 if (s
->hello_retry_request
!= SSL_HRR_NONE
) {
1004 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1005 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_EARLY_DATA
, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION
);
1012 static SSL_TICKET_STATUS
tls_get_stateful_ticket(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*tick
,
1015 SSL_SESSION
*tmpsess
= NULL
;
1017 switch (PACKET_remaining(tick
)) {
1019 return SSL_TICKET_EMPTY
;
1021 case SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH
:
1025 return SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
1028 tmpsess
= lookup_sess_in_cache(s
, PACKET_data(tick
),
1029 SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH
);
1031 if (tmpsess
== NULL
)
1032 return SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
1034 s
->ext
.ticket_expected
= 1;
1036 return SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS
;
1039 int tls_parse_ctos_psk(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
, X509
*x
,
1042 PACKET identities
, binders
, binder
;
1043 size_t binderoffset
, hashsize
;
1044 SSL_SESSION
*sess
= NULL
;
1045 unsigned int id
, i
, ext
= 0;
1046 const EVP_MD
*md
= NULL
;
1049 * If we have no PSK kex mode that we recognise then we can't resume so
1050 * ignore this extension
1052 if ((s
->ext
.psk_kex_mode
1053 & (TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE
| TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE_DHE
)) == 0)
1056 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &identities
)) {
1057 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,
1058 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK
, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION
);
1062 s
->ext
.ticket_expected
= 0;
1063 for (id
= 0; PACKET_remaining(&identities
) != 0; id
++) {
1065 unsigned long ticket_agel
;
1068 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&identities
, &identity
)
1069 || !PACKET_get_net_4(&identities
, &ticket_agel
)) {
1070 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,
1071 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK
, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION
);
1075 idlen
= PACKET_remaining(&identity
);
1076 if (s
->psk_find_session_cb
!= NULL
1077 && !s
->psk_find_session_cb(s
, PACKET_data(&identity
), idlen
,
1079 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
1080 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK
, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION
);
1084 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1086 && s
->psk_server_callback
!= NULL
1087 && idlen
<= PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
) {
1089 unsigned char pskdata
[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
];
1090 unsigned int pskdatalen
;
1092 if (!PACKET_strndup(&identity
, &pskid
)) {
1093 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK
,
1094 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1097 pskdatalen
= s
->psk_server_callback(s
, pskid
, pskdata
,
1099 OPENSSL_free(pskid
);
1100 if (pskdatalen
> PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
) {
1101 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK
,
1102 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1104 } else if (pskdatalen
> 0) {
1105 const SSL_CIPHER
*cipher
;
1106 const unsigned char tls13_aes128gcmsha256_id
[] = { 0x13, 0x01 };
1109 * We found a PSK using an old style callback. We don't know
1110 * the digest so we default to SHA256 as per the TLSv1.3 spec
1112 cipher
= SSL_CIPHER_find(s
, tls13_aes128gcmsha256_id
);
1113 if (cipher
== NULL
) {
1114 OPENSSL_cleanse(pskdata
, pskdatalen
);
1115 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK
,
1116 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1120 sess
= SSL_SESSION_new();
1122 || !SSL_SESSION_set1_master_key(sess
, pskdata
,
1124 || !SSL_SESSION_set_cipher(sess
, cipher
)
1125 || !SSL_SESSION_set_protocol_version(sess
,
1127 OPENSSL_cleanse(pskdata
, pskdatalen
);
1128 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK
,
1129 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1132 OPENSSL_cleanse(pskdata
, pskdatalen
);
1135 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1138 /* We found a PSK */
1139 SSL_SESSION
*sesstmp
= ssl_session_dup(sess
, 0);
1141 if (sesstmp
== NULL
) {
1142 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
1143 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1146 SSL_SESSION_free(sess
);
1150 * We've just been told to use this session for this context so
1151 * make sure the sid_ctx matches up.
1153 memcpy(sess
->sid_ctx
, s
->sid_ctx
, s
->sid_ctx_length
);
1154 sess
->sid_ctx_length
= s
->sid_ctx_length
;
1157 s
->ext
.early_data_ok
= 1;
1159 uint32_t ticket_age
= 0, now
, agesec
, agems
;
1163 * If we are using anti-replay protection then we behave as if
1164 * SSL_OP_NO_TICKET is set - we are caching tickets anyway so there
1165 * is no point in using full stateless tickets.
1167 if ((s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_TICKET
) != 0
1168 || s
->max_early_data
> 0)
1169 ret
= tls_get_stateful_ticket(s
, &identity
, &sess
);
1171 ret
= tls_decrypt_ticket(s
, PACKET_data(&identity
),
1172 PACKET_remaining(&identity
), NULL
, 0,
1175 if (ret
== SSL_TICKET_EMPTY
) {
1176 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK
,
1177 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION
);
1181 if (ret
== SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC
1182 || ret
== SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER
) {
1183 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
1184 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1187 if (ret
== SSL_TICKET_NONE
|| ret
== SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
)
1190 /* Check for replay */
1191 if (s
->max_early_data
> 0
1192 && !SSL_CTX_remove_session(s
->session_ctx
, sess
)) {
1193 SSL_SESSION_free(sess
);
1198 ticket_age
= (uint32_t)ticket_agel
;
1199 now
= (uint32_t)time(NULL
);
1200 agesec
= now
- (uint32_t)sess
->time
;
1201 agems
= agesec
* (uint32_t)1000;
1202 ticket_age
-= sess
->ext
.tick_age_add
;
1205 * For simplicity we do our age calculations in seconds. If the
1206 * client does it in ms then it could appear that their ticket age
1207 * is longer than ours (our ticket age calculation should always be
1208 * slightly longer than the client's due to the network latency).
1209 * Therefore we add 1000ms to our age calculation to adjust for
1213 && sess
->timeout
>= (long)agesec
1214 && agems
/ (uint32_t)1000 == agesec
1215 && ticket_age
<= agems
+ 1000
1216 && ticket_age
+ TICKET_AGE_ALLOWANCE
>= agems
+ 1000) {
1218 * Ticket age is within tolerance and not expired. We allow it
1221 s
->ext
.early_data_ok
= 1;
1225 md
= ssl_md(sess
->cipher
->algorithm2
);
1226 if (md
!= ssl_md(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm2
)) {
1227 /* The ciphersuite is not compatible with this session. */
1228 SSL_SESSION_free(sess
);
1230 s
->ext
.early_data_ok
= 0;
1239 binderoffset
= PACKET_data(pkt
) - (const unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
1240 hashsize
= EVP_MD_size(md
);
1242 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &binders
)) {
1243 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK
,
1244 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION
);
1248 for (i
= 0; i
<= id
; i
++) {
1249 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&binders
, &binder
)) {
1250 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK
,
1251 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION
);
1256 if (PACKET_remaining(&binder
) != hashsize
) {
1257 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK
,
1258 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION
);
1261 if (tls_psk_do_binder(s
, md
, (const unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
,
1262 binderoffset
, PACKET_data(&binder
), NULL
, sess
, 0,
1264 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1268 sess
->ext
.tick_identity
= id
;
1270 SSL_SESSION_free(s
->session
);
1274 SSL_SESSION_free(sess
);
1278 int tls_parse_ctos_post_handshake_auth(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
,
1279 X509
*x
, size_t chainidx
)
1281 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
1282 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_POST_HANDSHAKE_AUTH
,
1283 SSL_R_POST_HANDSHAKE_AUTH_ENCODING_ERR
);
1287 s
->post_handshake_auth
= SSL_PHA_EXT_RECEIVED
;
1293 * Add the server's renegotiation binding
1295 EXT_RETURN
tls_construct_stoc_renegotiate(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
,
1296 unsigned int context
, X509
*x
,
1299 if (!s
->s3
->send_connection_binding
)
1300 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT
;
1302 /* Still add this even if SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION is set */
1303 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate
)
1304 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)
1305 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt
)
1306 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt
, s
->s3
->previous_client_finished
,
1307 s
->s3
->previous_client_finished_len
)
1308 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt
, s
->s3
->previous_server_finished
,
1309 s
->s3
->previous_server_finished_len
)
1310 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)
1311 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
1312 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_RENEGOTIATE
,
1313 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1314 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
1317 return EXT_RETURN_SENT
;
1320 EXT_RETURN
tls_construct_stoc_server_name(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
,
1321 unsigned int context
, X509
*x
,
1324 if (s
->hit
|| s
->servername_done
!= 1
1325 || s
->session
->ext
.hostname
== NULL
)
1326 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT
;
1328 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name
)
1329 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, 0)) {
1330 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SERVER_NAME
,
1331 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1332 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
1335 return EXT_RETURN_SENT
;
1338 /* Add/include the server's max fragment len extension into ServerHello */
1339 EXT_RETURN
tls_construct_stoc_maxfragmentlen(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
,
1340 unsigned int context
, X509
*x
,
1343 if (!USE_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT(s
->session
))
1344 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT
;
1347 * 4 bytes for this extension type and extension length
1348 * 1 byte for the Max Fragment Length code value.
1350 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, TLSEXT_TYPE_max_fragment_length
)
1351 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)
1352 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, s
->session
->ext
.max_fragment_len_mode
)
1353 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
1354 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
1355 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_MAXFRAGMENTLEN
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1356 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
1359 return EXT_RETURN_SENT
;
1362 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1363 EXT_RETURN
tls_construct_stoc_ec_pt_formats(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
,
1364 unsigned int context
, X509
*x
,
1367 unsigned long alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
1368 unsigned long alg_a
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
;
1369 int using_ecc
= ((alg_k
& SSL_kECDHE
) || (alg_a
& SSL_aECDSA
))
1370 && (s
->session
->ext
.ecpointformats
!= NULL
);
1371 const unsigned char *plist
;
1375 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT
;
1377 tls1_get_formatlist(s
, &plist
, &plistlen
);
1378 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats
)
1379 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)
1380 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, plist
, plistlen
)
1381 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
1382 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
1383 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_EC_PT_FORMATS
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1384 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
1387 return EXT_RETURN_SENT
;
1391 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1392 EXT_RETURN
tls_construct_stoc_supported_groups(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
,
1393 unsigned int context
, X509
*x
,
1396 const uint16_t *groups
;
1397 size_t numgroups
, i
, first
= 1;
1399 /* s->s3->group_id is non zero if we accepted a key_share */
1400 if (s
->s3
->group_id
== 0)
1401 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT
;
1403 /* Get our list of supported groups */
1404 tls1_get_supported_groups(s
, &groups
, &numgroups
);
1405 if (numgroups
== 0) {
1406 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
1407 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SUPPORTED_GROUPS
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1408 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
1411 /* Copy group ID if supported */
1412 for (i
= 0; i
< numgroups
; i
++) {
1413 uint16_t group
= groups
[i
];
1415 if (tls_curve_allowed(s
, group
, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED
)) {
1418 * Check if the client is already using our preferred group. If
1419 * so we don't need to add this extension
1421 if (s
->s3
->group_id
== group
)
1422 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT
;
1424 /* Add extension header */
1425 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_groups
)
1426 /* Sub-packet for supported_groups extension */
1427 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)
1428 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)) {
1429 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
1430 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SUPPORTED_GROUPS
,
1431 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1432 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
1437 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, group
)) {
1438 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
1439 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SUPPORTED_GROUPS
,
1440 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1441 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
1446 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt
) || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
1447 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
1448 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SUPPORTED_GROUPS
,
1449 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1450 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
1453 return EXT_RETURN_SENT
;
1457 EXT_RETURN
tls_construct_stoc_session_ticket(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
,
1458 unsigned int context
, X509
*x
,
1461 if (!s
->ext
.ticket_expected
|| !tls_use_ticket(s
)) {
1462 s
->ext
.ticket_expected
= 0;
1463 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT
;
1466 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket
)
1467 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, 0)) {
1468 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
1469 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SESSION_TICKET
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1470 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
1473 return EXT_RETURN_SENT
;
1476 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
1477 EXT_RETURN
tls_construct_stoc_status_request(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
,
1478 unsigned int context
, X509
*x
,
1481 if (!s
->ext
.status_expected
)
1482 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT
;
1484 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && chainidx
!= 0)
1485 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT
;
1487 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request
)
1488 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)) {
1489 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
1490 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_STATUS_REQUEST
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1491 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
1495 * In TLSv1.3 we include the certificate status itself. In <= TLSv1.2 we
1496 * send back an empty extension, with the certificate status appearing as a
1499 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && !tls_construct_cert_status_body(s
, pkt
)) {
1500 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1501 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
1503 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
1504 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
1505 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_STATUS_REQUEST
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1506 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
1509 return EXT_RETURN_SENT
;
1513 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1514 EXT_RETURN
tls_construct_stoc_next_proto_neg(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
,
1515 unsigned int context
, X509
*x
,
1518 const unsigned char *npa
;
1519 unsigned int npalen
;
1521 int npn_seen
= s
->s3
->npn_seen
;
1523 s
->s3
->npn_seen
= 0;
1524 if (!npn_seen
|| s
->ctx
->ext
.npn_advertised_cb
== NULL
)
1525 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT
;
1527 ret
= s
->ctx
->ext
.npn_advertised_cb(s
, &npa
, &npalen
,
1528 s
->ctx
->ext
.npn_advertised_cb_arg
);
1529 if (ret
== SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK
) {
1530 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg
)
1531 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt
, npa
, npalen
)) {
1532 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
1533 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_NEXT_PROTO_NEG
,
1534 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1535 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
1537 s
->s3
->npn_seen
= 1;
1540 return EXT_RETURN_SENT
;
1544 EXT_RETURN
tls_construct_stoc_alpn(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
,
1545 X509
*x
, size_t chainidx
)
1547 if (s
->s3
->alpn_selected
== NULL
)
1548 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT
;
1550 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
,
1551 TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation
)
1552 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)
1553 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)
1554 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, s
->s3
->alpn_selected
,
1555 s
->s3
->alpn_selected_len
)
1556 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)
1557 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
1558 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
1559 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_ALPN
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1560 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
1563 return EXT_RETURN_SENT
;
1566 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1567 EXT_RETURN
tls_construct_stoc_use_srtp(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
,
1568 unsigned int context
, X509
*x
,
1571 if (s
->srtp_profile
== NULL
)
1572 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT
;
1574 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp
)
1575 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)
1576 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, 2)
1577 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, s
->srtp_profile
->id
)
1578 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, 0)
1579 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
1580 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_USE_SRTP
,
1581 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1582 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
1585 return EXT_RETURN_SENT
;
1589 EXT_RETURN
tls_construct_stoc_etm(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
,
1590 X509
*x
, size_t chainidx
)
1592 if (!s
->ext
.use_etm
)
1593 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT
;
1596 * Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD or RC4 might want to disable
1597 * for other cases too.
1599 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mac
== SSL_AEAD
1600 || s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_enc
== SSL_RC4
1601 || s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_enc
== SSL_eGOST2814789CNT
1602 || s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_enc
== SSL_eGOST2814789CNT12
) {
1604 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT
;
1607 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
)
1608 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, 0)) {
1609 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_ETM
,
1610 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1611 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
1614 return EXT_RETURN_SENT
;
1617 EXT_RETURN
tls_construct_stoc_ems(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
,
1618 X509
*x
, size_t chainidx
)
1620 if ((s
->s3
->flags
& TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS
) == 0)
1621 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT
;
1623 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret
)
1624 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, 0)) {
1625 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_EMS
,
1626 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1627 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
1630 return EXT_RETURN_SENT
;
1633 EXT_RETURN
tls_construct_stoc_supported_versions(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
,
1634 unsigned int context
, X509
*x
,
1637 if (!ossl_assert(SSL_IS_TLS13(s
))) {
1638 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
1639 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS
,
1640 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1641 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
1644 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_versions
)
1645 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)
1646 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Update to remove the TLSv1.3 draft indicator */
1647 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, s
->version_draft
)
1648 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
1649 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
1650 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS
,
1651 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1652 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
1655 return EXT_RETURN_SENT
;
1658 EXT_RETURN
tls_construct_stoc_key_share(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
,
1659 unsigned int context
, X509
*x
,
1662 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
1663 unsigned char *encodedPoint
;
1664 size_t encoded_pt_len
= 0;
1665 EVP_PKEY
*ckey
= s
->s3
->peer_tmp
, *skey
= NULL
;
1667 if (s
->hello_retry_request
== SSL_HRR_PENDING
) {
1669 /* Original key_share was acceptable so don't ask for another one */
1670 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT
;
1672 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share
)
1673 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)
1674 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, s
->s3
->group_id
)
1675 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
1676 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
1677 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE
,
1678 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1679 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
1682 return EXT_RETURN_SENT
;
1686 /* No key_share received from client - must be resuming */
1687 if (!s
->hit
|| !tls13_generate_handshake_secret(s
, NULL
, 0)) {
1688 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
1689 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1690 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
1692 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT
;
1695 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share
)
1696 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)
1697 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, s
->s3
->group_id
)) {
1698 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
1699 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1700 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
1703 skey
= ssl_generate_pkey(ckey
);
1705 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE
,
1706 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1707 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
1710 /* Generate encoding of server key */
1711 encoded_pt_len
= EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(skey
, &encodedPoint
);
1712 if (encoded_pt_len
== 0) {
1713 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE
,
1715 EVP_PKEY_free(skey
);
1716 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
1719 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt
, encodedPoint
, encoded_pt_len
)
1720 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
1721 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE
,
1722 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1723 EVP_PKEY_free(skey
);
1724 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint
);
1725 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
1727 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint
);
1729 /* This causes the crypto state to be updated based on the derived keys */
1730 s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
= skey
;
1731 if (ssl_derive(s
, skey
, ckey
, 1) == 0) {
1732 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1733 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
1735 return EXT_RETURN_SENT
;
1737 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
1741 EXT_RETURN
tls_construct_stoc_cookie(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
,
1742 X509
*x
, size_t chainidx
)
1744 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
1745 unsigned char *hashval1
, *hashval2
, *appcookie1
, *appcookie2
, *cookie
;
1746 unsigned char *hmac
, *hmac2
;
1747 size_t startlen
, ciphlen
, totcookielen
, hashlen
, hmaclen
, appcookielen
;
1750 int ret
= EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
1752 if ((s
->s3
->flags
& TLS1_FLAGS_STATELESS
) == 0)
1753 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT
;
1755 if (s
->ctx
->gen_stateless_cookie_cb
== NULL
) {
1756 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE
,
1757 SSL_R_NO_COOKIE_CALLBACK_SET
);
1758 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
1761 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, TLSEXT_TYPE_cookie
)
1762 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)
1763 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)
1764 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt
, &startlen
)
1765 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt
, MAX_COOKIE_SIZE
, &cookie
)
1766 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, COOKIE_STATE_FORMAT_VERSION
)
1767 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, TLS1_3_VERSION
)
1768 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, s
->s3
->group_id
)
1769 || !s
->method
->put_cipher_by_char(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
, pkt
,
1771 /* Is there a key_share extension present in this HRR? */
1772 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, s
->s3
->peer_tmp
== NULL
)
1773 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt
, (unsigned int)time(NULL
))
1774 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)
1775 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt
, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
, &hashval1
)) {
1776 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE
,
1777 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1778 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
1782 * Get the hash of the initial ClientHello. ssl_handshake_hash() operates
1783 * on raw buffers, so we first reserve sufficient bytes (above) and then
1784 * subsequently allocate them (below)
1786 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 0)
1787 || !ssl_handshake_hash(s
, hashval1
, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
, &hashlen
)) {
1788 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1789 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
1792 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt
, hashlen
, &hashval2
)
1793 || !ossl_assert(hashval1
== hashval2
)
1794 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)
1795 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt
)
1796 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt
, SSL_COOKIE_LENGTH
, &appcookie1
)) {
1797 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE
,
1798 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1799 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
1802 /* Generate the application cookie */
1803 if (s
->ctx
->gen_stateless_cookie_cb(s
, appcookie1
, &appcookielen
) == 0) {
1804 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE
,
1805 SSL_R_COOKIE_GEN_CALLBACK_FAILURE
);
1806 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
1809 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt
, appcookielen
, &appcookie2
)
1810 || !ossl_assert(appcookie1
== appcookie2
)
1811 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)
1812 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt
, &totcookielen
)
1813 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt
, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH
, &hmac
)) {
1814 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE
,
1815 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1816 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
1818 hmaclen
= SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH
;
1820 totcookielen
-= startlen
;
1821 if (!ossl_assert(totcookielen
<= MAX_COOKIE_SIZE
- SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH
)) {
1822 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE
,
1823 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1824 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
1827 /* HMAC the cookie */
1828 hctx
= EVP_MD_CTX_create();
1829 pkey
= EVP_PKEY_new_raw_private_key(EVP_PKEY_HMAC
, NULL
,
1830 s
->session_ctx
->ext
.cookie_hmac_key
,
1831 sizeof(s
->session_ctx
->ext
1833 if (hctx
== NULL
|| pkey
== NULL
) {
1834 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE
,
1835 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1839 if (EVP_DigestSignInit(hctx
, NULL
, EVP_sha256(), NULL
, pkey
) <= 0
1840 || EVP_DigestSign(hctx
, hmac
, &hmaclen
, cookie
,
1841 totcookielen
) <= 0) {
1842 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE
,
1843 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1847 if (!ossl_assert(totcookielen
+ hmaclen
<= MAX_COOKIE_SIZE
)) {
1848 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE
,
1849 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1853 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt
, hmaclen
, &hmac2
)
1854 || !ossl_assert(hmac
== hmac2
)
1855 || !ossl_assert(cookie
== hmac
- totcookielen
)
1856 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)
1857 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
1858 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE
,
1859 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1863 ret
= EXT_RETURN_SENT
;
1866 EVP_MD_CTX_free(hctx
);
1867 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey
);
1870 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
1874 EXT_RETURN
tls_construct_stoc_cryptopro_bug(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
,
1875 unsigned int context
, X509
*x
,
1878 const unsigned char cryptopro_ext
[36] = {
1879 0xfd, 0xe8, /* 65000 */
1880 0x00, 0x20, /* 32 bytes length */
1881 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1882 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1883 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1884 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17
1887 if (((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->id
& 0xFFFF) != 0x80
1888 && (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->id
& 0xFFFF) != 0x81)
1889 || (SSL_get_options(s
) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG
) == 0)
1890 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT
;
1892 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt
, cryptopro_ext
, sizeof(cryptopro_ext
))) {
1893 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
1894 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_CRYPTOPRO_BUG
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1895 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
1898 return EXT_RETURN_SENT
;
1901 EXT_RETURN
tls_construct_stoc_early_data(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
,
1902 unsigned int context
, X509
*x
,
1905 if (context
== SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
) {
1906 if (s
->max_early_data
== 0)
1907 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT
;
1909 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, TLSEXT_TYPE_early_data
)
1910 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)
1911 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt
, s
->max_early_data
)
1912 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
1913 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
1914 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_EARLY_DATA
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1915 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
1918 return EXT_RETURN_SENT
;
1921 if (s
->ext
.early_data
!= SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED
)
1922 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT
;
1924 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, TLSEXT_TYPE_early_data
)
1925 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)
1926 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
1927 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_EARLY_DATA
,
1928 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1929 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
1932 return EXT_RETURN_SENT
;
1935 EXT_RETURN
tls_construct_stoc_psk(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
,
1936 X509
*x
, size_t chainidx
)
1939 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT
;
1941 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, TLSEXT_TYPE_psk
)
1942 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)
1943 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, s
->session
->ext
.tick_identity
)
1944 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
1945 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
1946 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_PSK
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1947 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
1950 return EXT_RETURN_SENT
;