2 * Copyright 1995-2023 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
4 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
6 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
7 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
8 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
9 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
15 #include "../ssl_local.h"
16 #include "statem_local.h"
17 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
18 #include <openssl/rand.h>
19 #include <openssl/objects.h>
20 #include <openssl/evp.h>
21 #include <openssl/md5.h>
22 #include <openssl/dh.h>
23 #include <openssl/rsa.h>
24 #include <openssl/bn.h>
25 #include <openssl/engine.h>
26 #include <openssl/trace.h>
27 #include <openssl/core_names.h>
28 #include <openssl/param_build.h>
29 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
31 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
,
33 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
,
36 static ossl_inline
int cert_req_allowed(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
);
37 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
);
38 static int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *sk
,
41 static ossl_inline
int received_server_cert(SSL_CONNECTION
*sc
)
43 return sc
->session
->peer_rpk
!= NULL
|| sc
->session
->peer
!= NULL
;
47 * Is a CertificateRequest message allowed at the moment or not?
53 static ossl_inline
int cert_req_allowed(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
)
55 /* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */
56 if ((s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
57 && (s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aNULL
))
58 || (s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aSRP
| SSL_aPSK
)))
65 * Should we expect the ServerKeyExchange message or not?
71 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
)
73 long alg_k
= s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
76 * Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral
77 * ciphersuite or for SRP
79 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kDHEPSK
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
88 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
89 * handshake state transitions when a TLS1.3 client is reading messages from the
90 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
91 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
93 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
94 * (transition not allowed)
96 static int ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, int mt
)
98 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
101 * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO, because we haven't
102 * yet negotiated TLSv1.3 at that point so that is handled by
103 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition()
106 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
110 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
112 * This must a ClientHello following a HelloRetryRequest, so the only
113 * thing we can get now is a ServerHello.
115 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO
) {
116 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
;
121 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
:
122 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
) {
123 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
;
128 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
:
130 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
) {
131 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
;
135 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
) {
136 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
;
139 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
) {
140 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT
;
143 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP_ALG
144 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_COMPRESSED_CERTIFICATE
145 && s
->ext
.compress_certificate_sent
) {
146 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_COMP_CERT
;
153 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
:
154 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
) {
155 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT
;
158 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP_ALG
159 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_COMPRESSED_CERTIFICATE
160 && s
->ext
.compress_certificate_sent
) {
161 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_COMP_CERT
;
168 case TLS_ST_CR_COMP_CERT
:
169 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY
) {
170 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
;
175 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
:
176 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
) {
177 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
;
183 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET
) {
184 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
;
187 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE
&& !SSL_IS_QUIC_HANDSHAKE(s
)) {
188 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE
;
191 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
) {
192 #if DTLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL != DTLS1_2_VERSION
193 /* Restore digest for PHA before adding message.*/
194 # error Internal DTLS version error
196 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
)
197 && s
->post_handshake_auth
== SSL_PHA_EXT_SENT
) {
198 s
->post_handshake_auth
= SSL_PHA_REQUESTED
;
200 * In TLS, this is called before the message is added to the
201 * digest. In DTLS, this is expected to be called after adding
202 * to the digest. Either move the digest restore, or add the
203 * message here after the swap, or do it after the clientFinished?
205 if (!tls13_restore_handshake_digest_for_pha(s
)) {
206 /* SSLfatal() already called */
209 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
;
216 /* No valid transition found */
221 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
222 * handshake state transitions when the client is reading messages from the
223 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
224 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
226 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
227 * (transition not allowed)
229 int ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, int mt
)
231 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
235 * Note that after writing the first ClientHello we don't know what version
236 * we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later.
238 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
239 if (!ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(s
, mt
))
244 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
248 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
249 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO
) {
250 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
;
254 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
255 if (mt
== DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
) {
256 st
->hand_state
= DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
;
262 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA
:
264 * We've not actually selected TLSv1.3 yet, but we have sent early
265 * data. The only thing allowed now is a ServerHello or a
268 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO
) {
269 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
;
274 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
:
276 if (s
->ext
.ticket_expected
) {
277 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET
) {
278 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
;
281 } else if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
282 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
;
286 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
)
287 && mt
== DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
) {
288 st
->hand_state
= DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
;
290 } else if (s
->version
>= TLS1_VERSION
291 && s
->ext
.session_secret_cb
!= NULL
292 && s
->session
->ext
.tick
!= NULL
293 && mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
295 * Normally, we can tell if the server is resuming the session
296 * from the session ID. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851), however, relies on
297 * the next server message after the ServerHello to determine if
298 * the server is resuming.
301 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
;
303 } else if (!(s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
304 & (SSL_aNULL
| SSL_aSRP
| SSL_aPSK
))) {
305 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
) {
306 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT
;
310 ske_expected
= key_exchange_expected(s
);
311 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
313 || ((s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_PSK
)
314 && mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
)) {
315 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
) {
316 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH
;
319 } else if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
320 && cert_req_allowed(s
)) {
321 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
;
323 } else if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE
) {
324 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
;
332 case TLS_ST_CR_COMP_CERT
:
334 * The CertificateStatus message is optional even if
335 * |ext.status_expected| is set
337 if (s
->ext
.status_expected
&& mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS
) {
338 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS
;
343 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS
:
344 ske_expected
= key_exchange_expected(s
);
345 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
346 if (ske_expected
|| ((s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_PSK
)
347 && mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
)) {
348 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
) {
349 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH
;
356 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH
:
357 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
) {
358 if (cert_req_allowed(s
)) {
359 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
;
366 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
:
367 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE
) {
368 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
;
373 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
:
374 if (s
->ext
.ticket_expected
) {
375 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET
) {
376 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
;
379 } else if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
380 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
;
385 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
:
386 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
387 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
;
392 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
:
393 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
) {
394 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
;
400 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST
) {
401 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ
;
408 /* No valid transition found */
409 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
) && mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
413 * CCS messages don't have a message sequence number so this is probably
414 * because of an out-of-order CCS. We'll just drop it.
417 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
418 rbio
= SSL_get_rbio(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s
));
419 BIO_clear_retry_flags(rbio
);
420 BIO_set_retry_read(rbio
);
423 SSLfatal(s
, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
427 static int do_compressed_cert(SSL_CONNECTION
*sc
)
429 /* If we negotiated RPK, we won't try to compress it */
430 return sc
->ext
.client_cert_type
== TLSEXT_cert_type_x509
431 && sc
->ext
.compress_certificate_from_peer
[0] != TLSEXT_comp_cert_none
;
435 * ossl_statem_client13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
436 * move to next when the TLSv1.3 client is writing messages to be sent to the
439 static WRITE_TRAN
ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
)
441 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
444 * Note: There are no cases for TLS_ST_BEFORE because we haven't negotiated
445 * TLSv1.3 yet at that point. They are handled by
446 * ossl_statem_client_write_transition().
448 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
450 /* Shouldn't happen */
451 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
452 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR
;
454 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
:
455 if (s
->post_handshake_auth
== SSL_PHA_REQUESTED
) {
456 if (do_compressed_cert(s
))
457 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_COMP_CERT
;
459 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CERT
;
460 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
463 * We should only get here if we received a CertificateRequest after
464 * we already sent close_notify
466 if (!ossl_assert((s
->shutdown
& SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN
) != 0)) {
467 /* Shouldn't happen - same as default case */
468 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
469 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR
;
471 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
472 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
474 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
:
475 if (s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY
476 || s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING
)
477 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END
;
478 else if ((s
->options
& SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT
) != 0
479 && s
->hello_retry_request
== SSL_HRR_NONE
)
480 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
;
481 else if (s
->s3
.tmp
.cert_req
== 0)
482 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
483 else if (do_compressed_cert(s
))
484 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_COMP_CERT
;
486 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CERT
;
488 s
->ts_msg_read
= ossl_time_now();
489 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
491 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END
:
492 if (s
->ext
.early_data
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED
) {
493 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
;
494 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
498 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
:
499 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
:
500 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.cert_req
== 0)
501 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
502 else if (do_compressed_cert(s
))
503 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_COMP_CERT
;
505 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CERT
;
506 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
508 case TLS_ST_CW_COMP_CERT
:
510 /* If a non-empty Certificate we also send CertificateVerify */
511 st
->hand_state
= (s
->s3
.tmp
.cert_req
== 1) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
512 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
513 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
515 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
:
516 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
517 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
519 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE
:
520 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE
:
521 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
:
522 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
:
523 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
524 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
527 if (s
->key_update
!= SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE
) {
528 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE
;
529 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
532 /* Try to read from the server instead */
533 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
538 * ossl_statem_client_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
539 * move to next when the client is writing messages to be sent to the server.
541 WRITE_TRAN
ossl_statem_client_write_transition(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
)
543 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
546 * Note that immediately before/after a ClientHello we don't know what
547 * version we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until
550 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
))
551 return ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(s
);
553 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
555 /* Shouldn't happen */
556 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
557 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR
;
560 if (!s
->renegotiate
) {
562 * We haven't requested a renegotiation ourselves so we must have
563 * received a message from the server. Better read it.
565 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
570 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
;
571 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
573 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
574 if (s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
) {
576 * We are assuming this is a TLSv1.3 connection, although we haven't
577 * actually selected a version yet.
579 if ((s
->options
& SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT
) != 0)
580 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
;
582 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA
;
583 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
586 * No transition at the end of writing because we don't know what
589 s
->ts_msg_write
= ossl_time_now();
590 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
592 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
:
594 * We only get here in TLSv1.3. We just received an HRR, so issue a
595 * CCS unless middlebox compat mode is off, or we already issued one
596 * because we did early data.
598 if ((s
->options
& SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT
) != 0
599 && s
->early_data_state
!= SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING
)
600 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
;
602 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
;
603 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
605 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA
:
606 s
->ts_msg_write
= ossl_time_now();
607 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
609 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
610 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
;
611 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
613 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
:
614 s
->ts_msg_read
= ossl_time_now();
615 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.cert_req
)
616 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CERT
;
618 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH
;
619 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
622 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH
;
623 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
625 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH
:
627 * For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is
628 * sent, but no verify packet is sent
631 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication in ECDH
632 * cipher suites with ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. We
633 * need to skip the certificate verify message when client's
634 * ECDH public key is sent inside the client certificate.
636 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.cert_req
== 1) {
637 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
;
639 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
;
641 if (s
->s3
.flags
& TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY
) {
642 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
;
644 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
646 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
:
647 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
;
648 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
650 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
:
651 if (s
->hello_retry_request
== SSL_HRR_PENDING
) {
652 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
;
653 } else if (s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
) {
654 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA
;
656 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
657 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
659 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
) && s
->s3
.npn_seen
)
660 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO
;
662 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
665 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
667 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
668 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO
:
669 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
670 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
673 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
:
675 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
676 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
678 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
681 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
:
683 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
;
684 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
686 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
687 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
690 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ
:
692 * If we can renegotiate now then do so, otherwise wait for a more
695 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s
), 1)) {
696 if (!tls_setup_handshake(s
)) {
697 /* SSLfatal() already called */
698 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR
;
700 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
;
701 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
703 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
704 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
709 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
710 * the client to the server.
712 WORK_STATE
ossl_statem_client_pre_work(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
714 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
716 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
718 /* No pre work to be done */
721 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
723 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
724 /* every DTLS ClientHello resets Finished MAC */
725 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s
)) {
726 /* SSLfatal() already called */
729 } else if (s
->ext
.early_data
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_REJECTED
) {
731 * This must be a second ClientHello after an HRR following an
732 * earlier rejected attempt to send early data. Since we were
733 * previously encrypting the early data we now need to reset the
734 * write record layer in order to write in plaintext again.
736 if (!ssl_set_new_record_layer(s
,
738 OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_WRITE
,
739 OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_NONE
,
740 NULL
, 0, NULL
, 0, NULL
, 0, NULL
, 0,
741 NULL
, 0, NID_undef
, NULL
, NULL
,
743 /* SSLfatal already called */
749 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
:
750 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
753 * We're into the last flight so we don't retransmit these
754 * messages unless we need to.
758 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
759 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s
)))) {
760 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
761 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s
);
767 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END
:
769 * If we've been called by SSL_do_handshake()/SSL_write(), or we did not
770 * attempt to write early data before calling SSL_read() then we press
771 * on with the handshake. Otherwise we pause here.
773 if (s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING
774 || s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_NONE
)
775 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
778 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA
:
779 return tls_finish_handshake(s
, wst
, 0, 1);
782 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
783 return tls_finish_handshake(s
, wst
, 1, 1);
786 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
790 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
791 * client to the server.
793 WORK_STATE
ossl_statem_client_post_work(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
795 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
796 SSL
*ssl
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s
);
800 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
802 /* No post work to be done */
805 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
806 if (s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
807 && s
->max_early_data
> 0) {
809 * We haven't selected TLSv1.3 yet so we don't call the change
810 * cipher state function associated with the SSL_METHOD. Instead
811 * we call tls13_change_cipher_state() directly.
813 if ((s
->options
& SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT
) == 0) {
814 if (!tls13_change_cipher_state(s
,
815 SSL3_CC_EARLY
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE
)) {
816 /* SSLfatal() already called */
820 /* else we're in compat mode so we delay flushing until after CCS */
821 } else if (!statem_flush(s
)) {
825 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
826 /* Treat the next message as the first packet */
831 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH
:
832 if (tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(s
) == 0) {
833 /* SSLfatal() already called */
838 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
:
839 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)
840 || s
->hello_retry_request
== SSL_HRR_PENDING
)
842 if (s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
843 && s
->max_early_data
> 0) {
845 * We haven't selected TLSv1.3 yet so we don't call the change
846 * cipher state function associated with the SSL_METHOD. Instead
847 * we call tls13_change_cipher_state() directly.
849 if (!tls13_change_cipher_state(s
,
850 SSL3_CC_EARLY
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE
))
854 s
->session
->cipher
= s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
;
855 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
856 s
->session
->compress_meth
= 0;
858 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.new_compression
== NULL
)
859 s
->session
->compress_meth
= 0;
861 s
->session
->compress_meth
= s
->s3
.tmp
.new_compression
->id
;
863 if (!ssl
->method
->ssl3_enc
->setup_key_block(s
)) {
864 /* SSLfatal() already called */
868 if (!ssl
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
869 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE
)) {
870 /* SSLfatal() already called */
874 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
875 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
878 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
881 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(ssl
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY
,
886 dtls1_increment_epoch(s
, SSL3_CC_WRITE
);
890 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
:
891 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
892 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_A
&& SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
) && s
->hit
== 0) {
894 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
897 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(ssl
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY
,
901 if (statem_flush(s
) != 1)
904 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
905 if (!tls13_save_handshake_digest_for_pha(s
)) {
906 /* SSLfatal() already called */
909 if (s
->post_handshake_auth
!= SSL_PHA_REQUESTED
) {
910 if (!ssl
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
911 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE
)) {
912 /* SSLfatal() already called */
919 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE
:
920 if (statem_flush(s
) != 1)
922 if (!tls13_update_key(s
, 1)) {
923 /* SSLfatal() already called */
929 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
933 * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the
936 * Valid return values are:
940 int ossl_statem_client_construct_message(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
,
941 confunc_f
*confunc
, int *mt
)
943 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
945 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
947 /* Shouldn't happen */
948 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_STATE
);
951 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
:
952 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
))
953 *confunc
= dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec
;
955 *confunc
= tls_construct_change_cipher_spec
;
956 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
;
959 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
960 *confunc
= tls_construct_client_hello
;
961 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO
;
964 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
:
965 *confunc
= tls_construct_end_of_early_data
;
966 *mt
= SSL3_MT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
;
969 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END
:
975 *confunc
= tls_construct_client_certificate
;
976 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
;
979 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP_ALG
980 case TLS_ST_CW_COMP_CERT
:
981 *confunc
= tls_construct_client_compressed_certificate
;
982 *mt
= SSL3_MT_COMPRESSED_CERTIFICATE
;
986 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH
:
987 *confunc
= tls_construct_client_key_exchange
;
988 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
;
991 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
:
992 *confunc
= tls_construct_cert_verify
;
993 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY
;
996 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
997 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO
:
998 *confunc
= tls_construct_next_proto
;
999 *mt
= SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO
;
1002 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
:
1003 *confunc
= tls_construct_finished
;
1004 *mt
= SSL3_MT_FINISHED
;
1007 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE
:
1008 *confunc
= tls_construct_key_update
;
1009 *mt
= SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE
;
1017 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
1018 * reading. Excludes the message header.
1020 size_t ossl_statem_client_max_message_size(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
)
1022 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
1024 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
1026 /* Shouldn't happen */
1029 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
:
1030 return SERVER_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH
;
1032 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
1033 return HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH
;
1035 case TLS_ST_CR_COMP_CERT
:
1036 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT
:
1037 return s
->max_cert_list
;
1039 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
:
1040 return CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_MAX_LENGTH
;
1042 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS
:
1043 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
;
1045 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH
:
1046 return SERVER_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH
;
1048 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
:
1050 * Set to s->max_cert_list for compatibility with previous releases. In
1051 * practice these messages can get quite long if servers are configured
1052 * to provide a long list of acceptable CAs
1054 return s
->max_cert_list
;
1056 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
:
1057 return SERVER_HELLO_DONE_MAX_LENGTH
;
1059 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
:
1060 if (s
->version
== DTLS1_BAD_VER
)
1062 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH
;
1064 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
:
1065 return (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)) ? SESSION_TICKET_MAX_LENGTH_TLS13
1066 : SESSION_TICKET_MAX_LENGTH_TLS12
;
1068 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
:
1069 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH
;
1071 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
:
1072 return ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS_MAX_LENGTH
;
1074 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE
:
1075 return KEY_UPDATE_MAX_LENGTH
;
1080 * Process a message that the client has received from the server.
1082 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
ossl_statem_client_process_message(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
,
1085 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
1087 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
1089 /* Shouldn't happen */
1090 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1091 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1093 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
:
1094 return tls_process_server_hello(s
, pkt
);
1096 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
1097 return dtls_process_hello_verify(s
, pkt
);
1099 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT
:
1100 return tls_process_server_certificate(s
, pkt
);
1102 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP_ALG
1103 case TLS_ST_CR_COMP_CERT
:
1104 return tls_process_server_compressed_certificate(s
, pkt
);
1107 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
:
1108 return tls_process_cert_verify(s
, pkt
);
1110 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS
:
1111 return tls_process_cert_status(s
, pkt
);
1113 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH
:
1114 return tls_process_key_exchange(s
, pkt
);
1116 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
:
1117 return tls_process_certificate_request(s
, pkt
);
1119 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
:
1120 return tls_process_server_done(s
, pkt
);
1122 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
:
1123 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s
, pkt
);
1125 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
:
1126 return tls_process_new_session_ticket(s
, pkt
);
1128 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
:
1129 return tls_process_finished(s
, pkt
);
1131 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ
:
1132 return tls_process_hello_req(s
, pkt
);
1134 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
:
1135 return tls_process_encrypted_extensions(s
, pkt
);
1137 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE
:
1138 return tls_process_key_update(s
, pkt
);
1143 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
1146 WORK_STATE
ossl_statem_client_post_process_message(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
,
1149 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
1151 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
1153 /* Shouldn't happen */
1154 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1157 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT
:
1158 case TLS_ST_CR_COMP_CERT
:
1159 return tls_post_process_server_certificate(s
, wst
);
1161 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
:
1162 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
:
1163 return tls_prepare_client_certificate(s
, wst
);
1167 CON_FUNC_RETURN
tls_construct_client_hello(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
1172 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1175 SSL_SESSION
*sess
= s
->session
;
1176 unsigned char *session_id
;
1177 SSL_CTX
*sctx
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
);
1179 /* Work out what SSL/TLS/DTLS version to use */
1180 protverr
= ssl_set_client_hello_version(s
);
1181 if (protverr
!= 0) {
1182 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, protverr
);
1183 return CON_FUNC_ERROR
;
1187 || !ssl_version_supported(s
, sess
->ssl_version
, NULL
)
1188 || !SSL_SESSION_is_resumable(sess
)) {
1189 if (s
->hello_retry_request
== SSL_HRR_NONE
1190 && !ssl_get_new_session(s
, 0)) {
1191 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1192 return CON_FUNC_ERROR
;
1195 /* else use the pre-loaded session */
1197 p
= s
->s3
.client_random
;
1200 * for DTLS if client_random is initialized, reuse it, we are
1201 * required to use same upon reply to HelloVerify
1203 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1206 for (idx
= 0; idx
< sizeof(s
->s3
.client_random
); idx
++) {
1213 i
= (s
->hello_retry_request
== SSL_HRR_NONE
);
1216 if (i
&& ssl_fill_hello_random(s
, 0, p
, sizeof(s
->s3
.client_random
),
1217 DOWNGRADE_NONE
) <= 0) {
1218 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1219 return CON_FUNC_ERROR
;
1223 * version indicates the negotiated version: for example from
1224 * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version
1225 * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also
1226 * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can
1227 * choke if we initially report a higher version then
1228 * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This
1229 * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it
1230 * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports
1233 * Possible scenario with previous logic:
1234 * 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2
1235 * 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0
1236 * 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.
1237 * 4. Handshake proceeds using TLS 1.0.
1238 * 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.
1239 * 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now
1240 * know that is maximum server supports.
1241 * 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret
1242 * containing version 1.0.
1244 * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the
1245 * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely
1246 * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't
1247 * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with
1248 * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using
1249 * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to
1250 * the negotiated version.
1252 * For TLS 1.3 we always set the ClientHello version to 1.2 and rely on the
1253 * supported_versions extension for the real supported versions.
1255 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, s
->client_version
)
1256 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt
, s
->s3
.client_random
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
)) {
1257 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1258 return CON_FUNC_ERROR
;
1262 session_id
= s
->session
->session_id
;
1263 if (s
->new_session
|| s
->session
->ssl_version
== TLS1_3_VERSION
) {
1264 if (s
->version
== TLS1_3_VERSION
1265 && (s
->options
& SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT
) != 0) {
1266 sess_id_len
= sizeof(s
->tmp_session_id
);
1267 s
->tmp_session_id_len
= sess_id_len
;
1268 session_id
= s
->tmp_session_id
;
1269 if (s
->hello_retry_request
== SSL_HRR_NONE
1270 && RAND_bytes_ex(sctx
->libctx
, s
->tmp_session_id
,
1271 sess_id_len
, 0) <= 0) {
1272 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1273 return CON_FUNC_ERROR
;
1279 assert(s
->session
->session_id_length
<= sizeof(s
->session
->session_id
));
1280 sess_id_len
= s
->session
->session_id_length
;
1281 if (s
->version
== TLS1_3_VERSION
) {
1282 s
->tmp_session_id_len
= sess_id_len
;
1283 memcpy(s
->tmp_session_id
, s
->session
->session_id
, sess_id_len
);
1286 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt
)
1287 || (sess_id_len
!= 0 && !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt
, session_id
,
1289 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
1290 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1291 return CON_FUNC_ERROR
;
1294 /* cookie stuff for DTLS */
1295 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1296 if (s
->d1
->cookie_len
> sizeof(s
->d1
->cookie
)
1297 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, s
->d1
->cookie
,
1298 s
->d1
->cookie_len
)) {
1299 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1300 return CON_FUNC_ERROR
;
1304 /* Ciphers supported */
1305 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)) {
1306 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1307 return CON_FUNC_ERROR
;
1310 if (!ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s
, SSL_get_ciphers(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s
)),
1312 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1313 return CON_FUNC_ERROR
;
1315 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
1316 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1317 return CON_FUNC_ERROR
;
1321 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt
)) {
1322 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1323 return CON_FUNC_ERROR
;
1325 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1326 if (ssl_allow_compression(s
)
1327 && sctx
->comp_methods
1328 && (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
)
1329 || s
->s3
.tmp
.max_ver
< TLS1_3_VERSION
)) {
1330 int compnum
= sk_SSL_COMP_num(sctx
->comp_methods
);
1331 for (i
= 0; i
< compnum
; i
++) {
1332 comp
= sk_SSL_COMP_value(sctx
->comp_methods
, i
);
1333 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, comp
->id
)) {
1334 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1335 return CON_FUNC_ERROR
;
1340 /* Add the NULL method */
1341 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, 0) || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
1342 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1343 return CON_FUNC_ERROR
;
1346 /* TLS extensions */
1347 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s
, pkt
, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO
, NULL
, 0)) {
1348 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1349 return CON_FUNC_ERROR
;
1352 return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS
;
1355 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
dtls_process_hello_verify(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1360 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt
, 2)
1361 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &cookiepkt
)) {
1362 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1363 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1366 cookie_len
= PACKET_remaining(&cookiepkt
);
1367 if (cookie_len
> sizeof(s
->d1
->cookie
)) {
1368 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
1369 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1372 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&cookiepkt
, s
->d1
->cookie
, cookie_len
)) {
1373 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1374 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1376 s
->d1
->cookie_len
= cookie_len
;
1378 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
1381 static int set_client_ciphersuite(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
,
1382 const unsigned char *cipherchars
)
1384 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *sk
;
1385 const SSL_CIPHER
*c
;
1387 SSL_CTX
*sctx
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
);
1389 c
= ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s
, cipherchars
, 0);
1391 /* unknown cipher */
1392 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED
);
1396 * If it is a disabled cipher we either didn't send it in client hello,
1397 * or it's not allowed for the selected protocol. So we return an error.
1399 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s
, c
, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK
, 1)) {
1400 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED
);
1404 sk
= ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s
);
1405 i
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk
, c
);
1407 /* we did not say we would use this cipher */
1408 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED
);
1412 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
) && s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
!= NULL
1413 && s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->id
!= c
->id
) {
1414 /* ServerHello selected a different ciphersuite to that in the HRR */
1415 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED
);
1420 * Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher
1421 * and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that cipher_id is
1422 * set and use it for comparison.
1424 if (s
->session
->cipher
!= NULL
)
1425 s
->session
->cipher_id
= s
->session
->cipher
->id
;
1426 if (s
->hit
&& (s
->session
->cipher_id
!= c
->id
)) {
1427 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1428 const EVP_MD
*md
= ssl_md(sctx
, c
->algorithm2
);
1431 * In TLSv1.3 it is valid for the server to select a different
1432 * ciphersuite as long as the hash is the same.
1435 || md
!= ssl_md(sctx
, s
->session
->cipher
->algorithm2
)) {
1436 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1437 SSL_R_CIPHERSUITE_DIGEST_HAS_CHANGED
);
1442 * Prior to TLSv1.3 resuming a session always meant using the same
1445 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1446 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED
);
1450 s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
= c
;
1455 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_server_hello(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1457 PACKET session_id
, extpkt
;
1458 size_t session_id_len
;
1459 const unsigned char *cipherchars
;
1461 unsigned int compression
;
1462 unsigned int sversion
;
1463 unsigned int context
;
1464 RAW_EXTENSION
*extensions
= NULL
;
1465 SSL
*ssl
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s
);
1466 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1470 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &sversion
)) {
1471 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1475 /* load the server random */
1476 if (s
->version
== TLS1_3_VERSION
1477 && sversion
== TLS1_2_VERSION
1478 && PACKET_remaining(pkt
) >= SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1479 && memcmp(hrrrandom
, PACKET_data(pkt
), SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) == 0) {
1480 if (s
->hello_retry_request
!= SSL_HRR_NONE
) {
1481 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
1484 s
->hello_retry_request
= SSL_HRR_PENDING
;
1485 /* Tell the record layer that we know we're going to get TLSv1.3 */
1486 if (!ssl_set_record_protocol_version(s
, s
->version
)) {
1487 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1491 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
)) {
1492 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1496 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt
, s
->s3
.server_random
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
)) {
1497 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1502 /* Get the session-id. */
1503 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &session_id
)) {
1504 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1507 session_id_len
= PACKET_remaining(&session_id
);
1508 if (session_id_len
> sizeof(s
->session
->session_id
)
1509 || session_id_len
> SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE
) {
1510 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG
);
1514 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &cipherchars
, TLS_CIPHER_LEN
)) {
1515 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1519 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &compression
)) {
1520 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1524 /* TLS extensions */
1525 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) == 0 && !hrr
) {
1526 PACKET_null_init(&extpkt
);
1527 } else if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &extpkt
)
1528 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
1529 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH
);
1534 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s
, &extpkt
,
1535 SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
1536 | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
,
1537 &extensions
, NULL
, 1)) {
1538 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1542 if (!ssl_choose_client_version(s
, sversion
, extensions
)) {
1543 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1548 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
) || hrr
) {
1549 if (compression
!= 0) {
1550 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1551 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM
);
1555 if (session_id_len
!= s
->tmp_session_id_len
1556 || memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id
), s
->tmp_session_id
,
1557 session_id_len
) != 0) {
1558 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_R_INVALID_SESSION_ID
);
1564 if (!set_client_ciphersuite(s
, cipherchars
)) {
1565 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1569 return tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(s
, &extpkt
);
1573 * Now we have chosen the version we need to check again that the extensions
1574 * are appropriate for this version.
1576 context
= SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
) ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
1577 : SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
;
1578 if (!tls_validate_all_contexts(s
, context
, extensions
)) {
1579 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION
);
1585 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1587 * In TLSv1.3 a ServerHello message signals a key change so the end of
1588 * the message must be on a record boundary.
1590 if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s
->rlayer
)) {
1591 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
,
1592 SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY
);
1596 /* This will set s->hit if we are resuming */
1597 if (!tls_parse_extension(s
, TLSEXT_IDX_psk
,
1598 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
,
1599 extensions
, NULL
, 0)) {
1600 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1605 * Check if we can resume the session based on external pre-shared
1606 * secret. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851) supports two types of session resumption.
1607 * Resumption based on server-side state works with session IDs.
1608 * Resumption based on pre-shared Protected Access Credentials (PACs)
1609 * works by overriding the SessionTicket extension at the application
1610 * layer, and does not send a session ID. (We do not know whether
1611 * EAP-FAST servers would honour the session ID.) Therefore, the session
1612 * ID alone is not a reliable indicator of session resumption, so we
1613 * first check if we can resume, and later peek at the next handshake
1614 * message to see if the server wants to resume.
1616 if (s
->version
>= TLS1_VERSION
1617 && s
->ext
.session_secret_cb
!= NULL
&& s
->session
->ext
.tick
) {
1618 const SSL_CIPHER
*pref_cipher
= NULL
;
1620 * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for
1621 * backwards compat reasons
1623 int master_key_length
;
1625 master_key_length
= sizeof(s
->session
->master_key
);
1626 if (s
->ext
.session_secret_cb(ssl
, s
->session
->master_key
,
1629 s
->ext
.session_secret_cb_arg
)
1630 && master_key_length
> 0) {
1631 s
->session
->master_key_length
= master_key_length
;
1632 s
->session
->cipher
= pref_cipher
?
1633 pref_cipher
: ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s
, cipherchars
, 0);
1635 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1640 if (session_id_len
!= 0
1641 && session_id_len
== s
->session
->session_id_length
1642 && memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id
), s
->session
->session_id
,
1643 session_id_len
) == 0)
1648 if (s
->sid_ctx_length
!= s
->session
->sid_ctx_length
1649 || memcmp(s
->session
->sid_ctx
, s
->sid_ctx
, s
->sid_ctx_length
)) {
1650 /* actually a client application bug */
1651 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1652 SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT
);
1657 * If we were trying for session-id reuse but the server
1658 * didn't resume, make a new SSL_SESSION.
1659 * In the case of EAP-FAST and PAC, we do not send a session ID,
1660 * so the PAC-based session secret is always preserved. It'll be
1661 * overwritten if the server refuses resumption.
1663 if (s
->session
->session_id_length
> 0) {
1664 ssl_tsan_counter(s
->session_ctx
, &s
->session_ctx
->stats
.sess_miss
);
1665 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s
, 0)) {
1666 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1671 s
->session
->ssl_version
= s
->version
;
1673 * In TLSv1.2 and below we save the session id we were sent so we can
1674 * resume it later. In TLSv1.3 the session id we were sent is just an
1675 * echo of what we originally sent in the ClientHello and should not be
1676 * used for resumption.
1678 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1679 s
->session
->session_id_length
= session_id_len
;
1680 /* session_id_len could be 0 */
1681 if (session_id_len
> 0)
1682 memcpy(s
->session
->session_id
, PACKET_data(&session_id
),
1687 /* Session version and negotiated protocol version should match */
1688 if (s
->version
!= s
->session
->ssl_version
) {
1689 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
,
1690 SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_VERSION_MISMATCH
);
1694 * Now that we know the version, update the check to see if it's an allowed
1697 s
->s3
.tmp
.min_ver
= s
->version
;
1698 s
->s3
.tmp
.max_ver
= s
->version
;
1700 if (!set_client_ciphersuite(s
, cipherchars
)) {
1701 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1705 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1706 if (compression
!= 0) {
1707 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1708 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM
);
1712 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1713 * using compression.
1715 if (s
->session
->compress_meth
!= 0) {
1716 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION
);
1720 if (s
->hit
&& compression
!= s
->session
->compress_meth
) {
1721 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1722 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED
);
1725 if (compression
== 0)
1727 else if (!ssl_allow_compression(s
)) {
1728 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED
);
1731 comp
= ssl3_comp_find(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
)->comp_methods
,
1735 if (compression
!= 0 && comp
== NULL
) {
1736 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1737 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM
);
1740 s
->s3
.tmp
.new_compression
= comp
;
1744 if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s
, context
, extensions
, NULL
, 0, 1)) {
1745 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1749 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1750 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
) && s
->hit
) {
1751 unsigned char sctpauthkey
[64];
1752 char labelbuffer
[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
)];
1756 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
1759 memcpy(labelbuffer
, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
,
1760 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
));
1762 /* Don't include the terminating zero. */
1763 labellen
= sizeof(labelbuffer
) - 1;
1764 if (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_DTLS_SCTP_LABEL_LENGTH_BUG
)
1767 if (SSL_export_keying_material(ssl
, sctpauthkey
,
1768 sizeof(sctpauthkey
),
1770 labellen
, NULL
, 0, 0) <= 0) {
1771 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1775 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(ssl
),
1776 BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY
,
1777 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), sctpauthkey
);
1782 * In TLSv1.3 we have some post-processing to change cipher state, otherwise
1783 * we're done with this message
1785 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)
1786 && (!ssl
->method
->ssl3_enc
->setup_key_block(s
)
1787 || !ssl
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
1788 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ
))) {
1789 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1793 OPENSSL_free(extensions
);
1794 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
1796 OPENSSL_free(extensions
);
1797 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1800 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
,
1803 RAW_EXTENSION
*extensions
= NULL
;
1806 * If we were sending early_data then any alerts should not be sent using
1807 * the old wrlmethod.
1809 if (s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING
1810 && !ssl_set_new_record_layer(s
,
1812 OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_WRITE
,
1813 OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_NONE
,
1814 NULL
, 0, NULL
, 0, NULL
, 0, NULL
, 0,
1815 NULL
, 0, NID_undef
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
)) {
1816 /* SSLfatal already called */
1819 /* We are definitely going to be using TLSv1.3 */
1820 s
->rlayer
.wrlmethod
->set_protocol_version(s
->rlayer
.wrl
, TLS1_3_VERSION
);
1822 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s
, extpkt
, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
,
1823 &extensions
, NULL
, 1)
1824 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s
, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
,
1825 extensions
, NULL
, 0, 1)) {
1826 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1830 OPENSSL_free(extensions
);
1833 if (s
->ext
.tls13_cookie_len
== 0 && s
->s3
.tmp
.pkey
!= NULL
) {
1835 * We didn't receive a cookie or a new key_share so the next
1836 * ClientHello will not change
1838 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_R_NO_CHANGE_FOLLOWING_HRR
);
1843 * Re-initialise the Transcript Hash. We're going to prepopulate it with
1844 * a synthetic message_hash in place of ClientHello1.
1846 if (!create_synthetic_message_hash(s
, NULL
, 0, NULL
, 0)) {
1847 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1852 * Add this message to the Transcript Hash. Normally this is done
1853 * automatically prior to the message processing stage. However due to the
1854 * need to create the synthetic message hash, we defer that step until now
1857 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s
, (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
,
1858 s
->init_num
+ SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
)) {
1859 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1863 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
1865 OPENSSL_free(extensions
);
1866 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1869 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_server_rpk(SSL_CONNECTION
*sc
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1873 if (!tls_process_rpk(sc
, pkt
, &peer_rpk
)) {
1874 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1875 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1878 if (peer_rpk
== NULL
) {
1879 SSLfatal(sc
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_BAD_CERTIFICATE
);
1880 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1883 EVP_PKEY_free(sc
->session
->peer_rpk
);
1884 sc
->session
->peer_rpk
= peer_rpk
;
1886 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING
;
1889 static WORK_STATE
tls_post_process_server_rpk(SSL_CONNECTION
*sc
,
1893 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP
*clu
;
1895 if (sc
->session
->peer_rpk
== NULL
) {
1896 SSLfatal(sc
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1897 SSL_R_INVALID_RAW_PUBLIC_KEY
);
1901 if (sc
->rwstate
== SSL_RETRY_VERIFY
)
1902 sc
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
1903 if (ssl_verify_rpk(sc
, sc
->session
->peer_rpk
) > 0
1904 && sc
->rwstate
== SSL_RETRY_VERIFY
)
1907 if ((clu
= ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(sc
->session
->peer_rpk
, &certidx
,
1908 SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(sc
))) == NULL
) {
1909 SSLfatal(sc
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE
);
1914 * Check certificate type is consistent with ciphersuite. For TLS 1.3
1915 * skip check since TLS 1.3 ciphersuites can be used with any certificate
1918 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(sc
)) {
1919 if ((clu
->amask
& sc
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
) == 0) {
1920 SSLfatal(sc
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_R_WRONG_RPK_TYPE
);
1925 /* Ensure there is no peer/peer_chain */
1926 X509_free(sc
->session
->peer
);
1927 sc
->session
->peer
= NULL
;
1928 sk_X509_pop_free(sc
->session
->peer_chain
, X509_free
);
1929 sc
->session
->peer_chain
= NULL
;
1930 sc
->session
->verify_result
= sc
->verify_result
;
1932 /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */
1933 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(sc
)
1934 && !ssl_handshake_hash(sc
, sc
->cert_verify_hash
,
1935 sizeof(sc
->cert_verify_hash
),
1936 &sc
->cert_verify_hash_len
)) {
1937 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1941 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
1944 /* prepare server cert verification by setting s->session->peer_chain from pkt */
1945 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_server_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
,
1948 unsigned long cert_list_len
, cert_len
;
1950 const unsigned char *certstart
, *certbytes
;
1952 unsigned int context
= 0;
1953 SSL_CTX
*sctx
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
);
1955 if (s
->ext
.server_cert_type
== TLSEXT_cert_type_rpk
)
1956 return tls_process_server_rpk(s
, pkt
);
1957 if (s
->ext
.server_cert_type
!= TLSEXT_cert_type_x509
) {
1958 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE
,
1959 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE
);
1963 if ((s
->session
->peer_chain
= sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL
) {
1964 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB
);
1968 if ((SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
) && !PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &context
))
1970 || !PACKET_get_net_3(pkt
, &cert_list_len
)
1971 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != cert_list_len
1972 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) == 0) {
1973 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1976 for (chainidx
= 0; PACKET_remaining(pkt
); chainidx
++) {
1977 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt
, &cert_len
)
1978 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &certbytes
, cert_len
)) {
1979 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1983 certstart
= certbytes
;
1984 x
= X509_new_ex(sctx
->libctx
, sctx
->propq
);
1986 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB
);
1989 if (d2i_X509(&x
, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes
,
1990 cert_len
) == NULL
) {
1991 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB
);
1995 if (certbytes
!= (certstart
+ cert_len
)) {
1996 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2000 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
2001 RAW_EXTENSION
*rawexts
= NULL
;
2004 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &extensions
)) {
2005 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH
);
2008 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s
, &extensions
,
2009 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE
, &rawexts
,
2010 NULL
, chainidx
== 0)
2011 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s
, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE
,
2012 rawexts
, x
, chainidx
,
2013 PACKET_remaining(pkt
) == 0)) {
2014 OPENSSL_free(rawexts
);
2015 /* SSLfatal already called */
2018 OPENSSL_free(rawexts
);
2021 if (!sk_X509_push(s
->session
->peer_chain
, x
)) {
2022 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB
);
2027 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING
;
2031 OSSL_STACK_OF_X509_free(s
->session
->peer_chain
);
2032 s
->session
->peer_chain
= NULL
;
2033 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2037 * Verify the s->session->peer_chain and check server cert type.
2038 * On success set s->session->peer and s->session->verify_result.
2039 * Else the peer certificate verification callback may request retry.
2041 WORK_STATE
tls_post_process_server_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
,
2045 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
2046 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP
*clu
;
2050 if (s
->ext
.server_cert_type
== TLSEXT_cert_type_rpk
)
2051 return tls_post_process_server_rpk(s
, wst
);
2053 if (s
->rwstate
== SSL_RETRY_VERIFY
)
2054 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
2055 i
= ssl_verify_cert_chain(s
, s
->session
->peer_chain
);
2056 if (i
> 0 && s
->rwstate
== SSL_RETRY_VERIFY
) {
2060 * The documented interface is that SSL_VERIFY_PEER should be set in order
2061 * for client side verification of the server certificate to take place.
2062 * However, historically the code has only checked that *any* flag is set
2063 * to cause server verification to take place. Use of the other flags makes
2064 * no sense in client mode. An attempt to clean up the semantics was
2065 * reverted because at least one application *only* set
2066 * SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT. Prior to the clean up this still caused
2067 * server verification to take place, after the clean up it silently did
2068 * nothing. SSL_CTX_set_verify()/SSL_set_verify() cannot validate the flags
2069 * sent to them because they are void functions. Therefore, we now use the
2070 * (less clean) historic behaviour of performing validation if any flag is
2071 * set. The *documented* interface remains the same.
2073 if (s
->verify_mode
!= SSL_VERIFY_NONE
&& i
<= 0) {
2074 SSLfatal(s
, ssl_x509err2alert(s
->verify_result
),
2075 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED
);
2078 ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
2081 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate,
2082 * which we don't include in statem_srvr.c
2084 x
= sk_X509_value(s
->session
->peer_chain
, 0);
2086 pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(x
);
2088 if (pkey
== NULL
|| EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey
)) {
2089 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2090 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS
);
2094 if ((clu
= ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey
, &certidx
,
2095 SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
))) == NULL
) {
2096 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE
);
2100 * Check certificate type is consistent with ciphersuite. For TLS 1.3
2101 * skip check since TLS 1.3 ciphersuites can be used with any certificate
2104 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
2105 if ((clu
->amask
& s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
) == 0) {
2106 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE
);
2111 X509_free(s
->session
->peer
);
2113 s
->session
->peer
= x
;
2114 s
->session
->verify_result
= s
->verify_result
;
2115 /* Ensure there is no RPK */
2116 EVP_PKEY_free(s
->session
->peer_rpk
);
2117 s
->session
->peer_rpk
= NULL
;
2119 /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */
2120 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)
2121 && !ssl_handshake_hash(s
, s
->cert_verify_hash
,
2122 sizeof(s
->cert_verify_hash
),
2123 &s
->cert_verify_hash_len
)) {
2124 /* SSLfatal() already called */;
2127 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
2130 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP_ALG
2131 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_server_compressed_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION
*sc
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2133 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret
= MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2135 BUF_MEM
*buf
= BUF_MEM_new();
2137 if (tls13_process_compressed_certificate(sc
, pkt
, &tmppkt
, buf
) != MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
)
2138 ret
= tls_process_server_certificate(sc
, &tmppkt
);
2145 static int tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2147 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2148 PACKET psk_identity_hint
;
2150 /* PSK ciphersuites are preceded by an identity hint */
2152 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &psk_identity_hint
)) {
2153 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2158 * Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in
2159 * tls_construct_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of
2160 * a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK
2163 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint
) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
) {
2164 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2168 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint
) == 0) {
2169 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
);
2170 s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
= NULL
;
2171 } else if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity_hint
,
2172 &s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
)) {
2173 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2179 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2184 static int tls_process_ske_srp(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, EVP_PKEY
**pkey
)
2186 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2187 PACKET prime
, generator
, salt
, server_pub
;
2189 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &prime
)
2190 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &generator
)
2191 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &salt
)
2192 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &server_pub
)) {
2193 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2198 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime
),
2199 (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime
), NULL
)) == NULL
2201 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator
),
2202 (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator
), NULL
)) == NULL
2204 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&salt
),
2205 (int)PACKET_remaining(&salt
), NULL
)) == NULL
2207 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&server_pub
),
2208 (int)PACKET_remaining(&server_pub
), NULL
)) == NULL
) {
2209 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
2213 if (!srp_verify_server_param(s
)) {
2214 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2218 /* We must check if there is a certificate */
2219 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aRSA
| SSL_aDSS
))
2220 *pkey
= tls_get_peer_pkey(s
);
2224 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2229 static int tls_process_ske_dhe(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, EVP_PKEY
**pkey
)
2231 PACKET prime
, generator
, pub_key
;
2232 EVP_PKEY
*peer_tmp
= NULL
;
2233 BIGNUM
*p
= NULL
, *g
= NULL
, *bnpub_key
= NULL
;
2234 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pctx
= NULL
;
2235 OSSL_PARAM
*params
= NULL
;
2236 OSSL_PARAM_BLD
*tmpl
= NULL
;
2237 SSL_CTX
*sctx
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
);
2240 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &prime
)
2241 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &generator
)
2242 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &pub_key
)) {
2243 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2247 p
= BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime
), (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime
), NULL
);
2248 g
= BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator
), (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator
),
2250 bnpub_key
= BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&pub_key
),
2251 (int)PACKET_remaining(&pub_key
), NULL
);
2252 if (p
== NULL
|| g
== NULL
|| bnpub_key
== NULL
) {
2253 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
2257 tmpl
= OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new();
2259 || !OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(tmpl
, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_P
, p
)
2260 || !OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(tmpl
, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_G
, g
)
2261 || !OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(tmpl
, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY
,
2263 || (params
= OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(tmpl
)) == NULL
) {
2264 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2268 pctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(sctx
->libctx
, "DH", sctx
->propq
);
2270 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2273 if (EVP_PKEY_fromdata_init(pctx
) <= 0
2274 || EVP_PKEY_fromdata(pctx
, &peer_tmp
, EVP_PKEY_KEYPAIR
, params
) <= 0) {
2275 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE
);
2279 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
2280 pctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(sctx
->libctx
, peer_tmp
, sctx
->propq
);
2283 * EVP_PKEY_param_check() will verify that the DH params are using
2284 * a safe prime. In this context, because we're using ephemeral DH,
2285 * we're ok with it not being a safe prime.
2286 * EVP_PKEY_param_check_quick() skips the safe prime check.
2288 || EVP_PKEY_param_check_quick(pctx
) != 1
2289 || EVP_PKEY_public_check(pctx
) != 1) {
2290 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE
);
2294 if (!ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH
,
2295 EVP_PKEY_get_security_bits(peer_tmp
),
2297 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL
);
2301 s
->s3
.peer_tmp
= peer_tmp
;
2305 * FIXME: This makes assumptions about which ciphersuites come with
2306 * public keys. We should have a less ad-hoc way of doing this
2308 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aRSA
| SSL_aDSS
))
2309 *pkey
= tls_get_peer_pkey(s
);
2310 /* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
2315 OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(tmpl
);
2316 OSSL_PARAM_free(params
);
2317 EVP_PKEY_free(peer_tmp
);
2318 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
2326 static int tls_process_ske_ecdhe(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, EVP_PKEY
**pkey
)
2329 unsigned int curve_type
, curve_id
;
2332 * Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH
2333 * public key. We only support named (not generic) curves and
2334 * ECParameters in this case is just three bytes.
2336 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &curve_type
) || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &curve_id
)) {
2337 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
2341 * Check curve is named curve type and one of our preferences, if not
2342 * server has sent an invalid curve.
2344 if (curve_type
!= NAMED_CURVE_TYPE
2345 || !tls1_check_group_id(s
, curve_id
, 1)) {
2346 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE
);
2350 if ((s
->s3
.peer_tmp
= ssl_generate_param_group(s
, curve_id
)) == NULL
) {
2351 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2352 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS
);
2356 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &encoded_pt
)) {
2357 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2361 if (EVP_PKEY_set1_encoded_public_key(s
->s3
.peer_tmp
,
2362 PACKET_data(&encoded_pt
),
2363 PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt
)) <= 0) {
2364 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT
);
2369 * The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign
2370 * ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA
2373 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aECDSA
)
2374 *pkey
= tls_get_peer_pkey(s
);
2375 else if (s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aRSA
)
2376 *pkey
= tls_get_peer_pkey(s
);
2377 /* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
2379 /* Cache the agreed upon group in the SSL_SESSION */
2380 s
->session
->kex_group
= curve_id
;
2384 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_key_exchange(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2387 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
2388 EVP_MD_CTX
*md_ctx
= NULL
;
2389 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pctx
= NULL
;
2390 PACKET save_param_start
, signature
;
2391 SSL_CTX
*sctx
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
);
2393 alg_k
= s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
2395 save_param_start
= *pkt
;
2397 EVP_PKEY_free(s
->s3
.peer_tmp
);
2398 s
->s3
.peer_tmp
= NULL
;
2400 if (alg_k
& SSL_PSK
) {
2401 if (!tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(s
, pkt
)) {
2402 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2407 /* Nothing else to do for plain PSK or RSAPSK */
2408 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kPSK
| SSL_kRSAPSK
)) {
2409 } else if (alg_k
& SSL_kSRP
) {
2410 if (!tls_process_ske_srp(s
, pkt
, &pkey
)) {
2411 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2414 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kDHEPSK
)) {
2415 if (!tls_process_ske_dhe(s
, pkt
, &pkey
)) {
2416 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2419 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
)) {
2420 if (!tls_process_ske_ecdhe(s
, pkt
, &pkey
)) {
2421 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2425 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
2429 /* if it was signed, check the signature */
2432 const EVP_MD
*md
= NULL
;
2438 * |pkt| now points to the beginning of the signature, so the difference
2439 * equals the length of the parameters.
2441 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(&save_param_start
, ¶ms
,
2442 PACKET_remaining(&save_param_start
) -
2443 PACKET_remaining(pkt
))) {
2444 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2448 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
2449 unsigned int sigalg
;
2451 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &sigalg
)) {
2452 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
2455 if (tls12_check_peer_sigalg(s
, sigalg
, pkey
) <=0) {
2456 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2459 } else if (!tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(s
, pkey
)) {
2460 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2461 SSL_R_LEGACY_SIGALG_DISALLOWED_OR_UNSUPPORTED
);
2465 if (!tls1_lookup_md(sctx
, s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalg
, &md
)) {
2466 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2467 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_DIGEST_ALGORITHM
);
2470 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
))
2471 OSSL_TRACE1(TLS
, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n",
2472 md
== NULL
? "n/a" : EVP_MD_get0_name(md
));
2474 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &signature
)
2475 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
2476 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2480 md_ctx
= EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2481 if (md_ctx
== NULL
) {
2482 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
2486 if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit_ex(md_ctx
, &pctx
,
2487 md
== NULL
? NULL
: EVP_MD_get0_name(md
),
2488 sctx
->libctx
, sctx
->propq
, pkey
,
2490 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
2493 if (SSL_USE_PSS(s
)) {
2494 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx
, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING
) <= 0
2495 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx
,
2496 RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST
) <= 0) {
2497 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
2501 tbslen
= construct_key_exchange_tbs(s
, &tbs
, PACKET_data(¶ms
),
2502 PACKET_remaining(¶ms
));
2504 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2508 rv
= EVP_DigestVerify(md_ctx
, PACKET_data(&signature
),
2509 PACKET_remaining(&signature
), tbs
, tbslen
);
2512 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE
);
2515 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx
);
2518 /* aNULL, aSRP or PSK do not need public keys */
2519 if (!(s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aNULL
| SSL_aSRP
))
2520 && !(alg_k
& SSL_PSK
)) {
2521 /* Might be wrong key type, check it */
2522 if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s
)) {
2523 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_BAD_DATA
);
2525 /* else this shouldn't happen, SSLfatal() already called */
2528 /* still data left over */
2529 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
2530 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE
);
2535 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
2537 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx
);
2538 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2541 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_certificate_request(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
,
2544 /* Clear certificate validity flags */
2545 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.valid_flags
!= NULL
)
2546 memset(s
->s3
.tmp
.valid_flags
, 0, s
->ssl_pkey_num
* sizeof(uint32_t));
2548 s
->s3
.tmp
.valid_flags
= OPENSSL_zalloc(s
->ssl_pkey_num
* sizeof(uint32_t));
2550 /* Give up for good if allocation didn't work */
2551 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.valid_flags
== NULL
)
2554 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
2555 PACKET reqctx
, extensions
;
2556 RAW_EXTENSION
*rawexts
= NULL
;
2558 if ((s
->shutdown
& SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN
) != 0) {
2560 * We already sent close_notify. This can only happen in TLSv1.3
2561 * post-handshake messages. We can't reasonably respond to this, so
2564 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
2567 /* Free and zero certificate types: it is not present in TLS 1.3 */
2568 OPENSSL_free(s
->s3
.tmp
.ctype
);
2569 s
->s3
.tmp
.ctype
= NULL
;
2570 s
->s3
.tmp
.ctype_len
= 0;
2571 OPENSSL_free(s
->pha_context
);
2572 s
->pha_context
= NULL
;
2573 s
->pha_context_len
= 0;
2575 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &reqctx
) ||
2576 !PACKET_memdup(&reqctx
, &s
->pha_context
, &s
->pha_context_len
)) {
2577 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2578 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2581 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &extensions
)) {
2582 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH
);
2583 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2585 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s
, &extensions
,
2586 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2588 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s
, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2589 rawexts
, NULL
, 0, 1)) {
2590 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2591 OPENSSL_free(rawexts
);
2592 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2594 OPENSSL_free(rawexts
);
2595 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s
)) {
2596 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH
);
2597 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2602 /* get the certificate types */
2603 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &ctypes
)) {
2604 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2605 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2608 if (!PACKET_memdup(&ctypes
, &s
->s3
.tmp
.ctype
, &s
->s3
.tmp
.ctype_len
)) {
2609 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2610 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2613 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
2616 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &sigalgs
)) {
2617 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2618 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2622 * Despite this being for certificates, preserve compatibility
2623 * with pre-TLS 1.3 and use the regular sigalgs field.
2625 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s
, &sigalgs
, 0)) {
2626 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2627 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR
);
2628 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2630 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s
)) {
2631 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_SSL_LIB
);
2632 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2636 /* get the CA RDNs */
2637 if (!parse_ca_names(s
, pkt
)) {
2638 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2639 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2643 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
2644 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2645 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2648 /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
2649 s
->s3
.tmp
.cert_req
= 1;
2652 * In TLSv1.3 we don't prepare the client certificate yet. We wait until
2653 * after the CertificateVerify message has been received. This is because
2654 * in TLSv1.3 the CertificateRequest arrives before the Certificate message
2655 * but in TLSv1.2 it is the other way around. We want to make sure that
2656 * SSL_get1_peer_certificate() returns something sensible in
2659 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)
2660 && s
->post_handshake_auth
!= SSL_PHA_REQUESTED
)
2661 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
2663 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING
;
2666 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_new_session_ticket(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
,
2669 unsigned int ticklen
;
2670 unsigned long ticket_lifetime_hint
, age_add
= 0;
2671 unsigned int sess_len
;
2672 RAW_EXTENSION
*exts
= NULL
;
2674 EVP_MD
*sha256
= NULL
;
2675 SSL_CTX
*sctx
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
);
2677 PACKET_null_init(&nonce
);
2679 if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt
, &ticket_lifetime_hint
)
2680 || (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)
2681 && (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt
, &age_add
)
2682 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &nonce
)))
2683 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &ticklen
)
2684 || (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
) ? (ticklen
== 0
2685 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) < ticklen
)
2686 : PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != ticklen
)) {
2687 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2692 * Server is allowed to change its mind (in <=TLSv1.2) and send an empty
2693 * ticket. We already checked this TLSv1.3 case above, so it should never
2694 * be 0 here in that instance
2697 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
2700 * Sessions must be immutable once they go into the session cache. Otherwise
2701 * we can get multi-thread problems. Therefore we don't "update" sessions,
2702 * we replace them with a duplicate. In TLSv1.3 we need to do this every
2703 * time a NewSessionTicket arrives because those messages arrive
2704 * post-handshake and the session may have already gone into the session
2707 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
) || s
->session
->session_id_length
> 0) {
2708 SSL_SESSION
*new_sess
;
2711 * We reused an existing session, so we need to replace it with a new
2714 if ((new_sess
= ssl_session_dup(s
->session
, 0)) == 0) {
2715 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_SSL_LIB
);
2719 if ((s
->session_ctx
->session_cache_mode
& SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT
) != 0
2720 && !SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
2722 * In TLSv1.2 and below the arrival of a new tickets signals that
2723 * any old ticket we were using is now out of date, so we remove the
2724 * old session from the cache. We carry on if this fails
2726 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s
->session_ctx
, s
->session
);
2729 SSL_SESSION_free(s
->session
);
2730 s
->session
= new_sess
;
2733 s
->session
->time
= ossl_time_now();
2734 ssl_session_calculate_timeout(s
->session
);
2736 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->ext
.tick
);
2737 s
->session
->ext
.tick
= NULL
;
2738 s
->session
->ext
.ticklen
= 0;
2740 s
->session
->ext
.tick
= OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen
);
2741 if (s
->session
->ext
.tick
== NULL
) {
2742 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB
);
2745 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt
, s
->session
->ext
.tick
, ticklen
)) {
2746 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2750 s
->session
->ext
.tick_lifetime_hint
= ticket_lifetime_hint
;
2751 s
->session
->ext
.tick_age_add
= age_add
;
2752 s
->session
->ext
.ticklen
= ticklen
;
2754 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
2757 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &extpkt
)
2758 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
2759 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2763 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s
, &extpkt
,
2764 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, &exts
,
2766 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s
,
2767 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
,
2768 exts
, NULL
, 0, 1)) {
2769 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2775 * There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session. One is to set
2776 * an appropriate session ID and then the server must return a match in
2777 * ServerHello. This allows the normal client session ID matching to work
2778 * and we know much earlier that the ticket has been accepted. The
2779 * other way is to set zero length session ID when the ticket is
2780 * presented and rely on the handshake to determine session resumption.
2781 * We choose the former approach because this fits in with assumptions
2782 * elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set to the SHA256 hash of the
2785 sha256
= EVP_MD_fetch(sctx
->libctx
, "SHA2-256", sctx
->propq
);
2786 if (sha256
== NULL
) {
2787 /* Error is already recorded */
2788 SSLfatal_alert(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2792 * We use sess_len here because EVP_Digest expects an int
2793 * but s->session->session_id_length is a size_t
2795 if (!EVP_Digest(s
->session
->ext
.tick
, ticklen
,
2796 s
->session
->session_id
, &sess_len
,
2798 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
2801 EVP_MD_free(sha256
);
2803 s
->session
->session_id_length
= sess_len
;
2804 s
->session
->not_resumable
= 0;
2806 /* This is a standalone message in TLSv1.3, so there is no more to read */
2807 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
2808 const EVP_MD
*md
= ssl_handshake_md(s
);
2809 int hashleni
= EVP_MD_get_size(md
);
2811 static const unsigned char nonce_label
[] = "resumption";
2813 /* Ensure cast to size_t is safe */
2814 if (!ossl_assert(hashleni
>= 0)) {
2815 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2818 hashlen
= (size_t)hashleni
;
2820 if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s
, md
, s
->resumption_master_secret
,
2822 sizeof(nonce_label
) - 1,
2823 PACKET_data(&nonce
),
2824 PACKET_remaining(&nonce
),
2825 s
->session
->master_key
,
2827 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2830 s
->session
->master_key_length
= hashlen
;
2833 ssl_update_cache(s
, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT
);
2834 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
2837 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
2839 EVP_MD_free(sha256
);
2841 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2845 * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to
2846 * parse a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure
2848 int tls_process_cert_status_body(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2853 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &type
)
2854 || type
!= TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp
) {
2855 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE
);
2858 if (!PACKET_get_net_3_len(pkt
, &resplen
)
2859 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != resplen
) {
2860 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2863 s
->ext
.ocsp
.resp
= OPENSSL_malloc(resplen
);
2864 if (s
->ext
.ocsp
.resp
== NULL
) {
2865 s
->ext
.ocsp
.resp_len
= 0;
2866 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB
);
2869 s
->ext
.ocsp
.resp_len
= resplen
;
2870 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt
, s
->ext
.ocsp
.resp
, resplen
)) {
2871 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2879 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_cert_status(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2881 if (!tls_process_cert_status_body(s
, pkt
)) {
2882 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2883 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2886 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
2890 * Perform miscellaneous checks and processing after we have received the
2891 * server's initial flight. In TLS1.3 this is after the Server Finished message.
2892 * In <=TLS1.2 this is after the ServerDone message. Returns 1 on success or 0
2895 int tls_process_initial_server_flight(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
)
2897 SSL_CTX
*sctx
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
);
2900 * at this point we check that we have the required stuff from
2903 if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s
)) {
2904 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2909 * Call the ocsp status callback if needed. The |ext.ocsp.resp| and
2910 * |ext.ocsp.resp_len| values will be set if we actually received a status
2911 * message, or NULL and -1 otherwise
2913 if (s
->ext
.status_type
!= TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing
2914 && sctx
->ext
.status_cb
!= NULL
) {
2915 int ret
= sctx
->ext
.status_cb(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s
),
2916 sctx
->ext
.status_arg
);
2919 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE
,
2920 SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE
);
2924 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2925 SSL_R_OCSP_CALLBACK_FAILURE
);
2929 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
2930 if (s
->ct_validation_callback
!= NULL
) {
2931 /* Note we validate the SCTs whether or not we abort on error */
2932 if (!ssl_validate_ct(s
) && (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
)) {
2933 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2942 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_server_done(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2944 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) > 0) {
2945 /* should contain no data */
2946 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2947 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2949 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2950 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kSRP
) {
2951 if (ssl_srp_calc_a_param_intern(s
) <= 0) {
2952 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC
);
2953 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2958 if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s
)) {
2959 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2960 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2963 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
2966 static int tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
2968 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2971 * The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes to return a
2972 * \0-terminated identity. The last byte is for us for simulating
2975 char identity
[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
+ 1];
2976 size_t identitylen
= 0;
2977 unsigned char psk
[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
];
2978 unsigned char *tmppsk
= NULL
;
2979 char *tmpidentity
= NULL
;
2982 if (s
->psk_client_callback
== NULL
) {
2983 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB
);
2987 memset(identity
, 0, sizeof(identity
));
2989 psklen
= s
->psk_client_callback(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s
),
2990 s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
,
2991 identity
, sizeof(identity
) - 1,
2994 if (psklen
> PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
) {
2995 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2996 psklen
= PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
; /* Avoid overrunning the array on cleanse */
2998 } else if (psklen
== 0) {
2999 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND
);
3003 identitylen
= strlen(identity
);
3004 if (identitylen
> PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
) {
3005 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3009 tmppsk
= OPENSSL_memdup(psk
, psklen
);
3010 tmpidentity
= OPENSSL_strdup(identity
);
3011 if (tmppsk
== NULL
|| tmpidentity
== NULL
) {
3012 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB
);
3016 OPENSSL_free(s
->s3
.tmp
.psk
);
3017 s
->s3
.tmp
.psk
= tmppsk
;
3018 s
->s3
.tmp
.psklen
= psklen
;
3020 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->psk_identity
);
3021 s
->session
->psk_identity
= tmpidentity
;
3024 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt
, identity
, identitylen
)) {
3025 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3032 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk
, psklen
);
3033 OPENSSL_cleanse(identity
, sizeof(identity
));
3034 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmppsk
, psklen
);
3035 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmpidentity
, identitylen
);
3039 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3044 static int tls_construct_cke_rsa(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3046 unsigned char *encdata
= NULL
;
3047 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
3048 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pctx
= NULL
;
3050 unsigned char *pms
= NULL
;
3052 SSL_CTX
*sctx
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
);
3054 if (!received_server_cert(s
)) {
3056 * We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA.
3058 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3062 if ((pkey
= tls_get_peer_pkey(s
)) == NULL
) {
3063 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3067 if (!EVP_PKEY_is_a(pkey
, "RSA")) {
3068 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3072 pmslen
= SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
;
3073 pms
= OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen
);
3075 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB
);
3079 pms
[0] = s
->client_version
>> 8;
3080 pms
[1] = s
->client_version
& 0xff;
3081 if (RAND_bytes_ex(sctx
->libctx
, pms
+ 2, pmslen
- 2, 0) <= 0) {
3082 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_RAND_LIB
);
3086 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
3087 if (s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
&& !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)) {
3088 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3092 pctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(sctx
->libctx
, pkey
, sctx
->propq
);
3093 if (pctx
== NULL
|| EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pctx
) <= 0
3094 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx
, NULL
, &enclen
, pms
, pmslen
) <= 0) {
3095 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
3098 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt
, enclen
, &encdata
)
3099 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx
, encdata
, &enclen
, pms
, pmslen
) <= 0) {
3100 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT
);
3103 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
3106 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
3107 if (s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
&& !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
3108 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3112 /* Log the premaster secret, if logging is enabled. */
3113 if (!ssl_log_rsa_client_key_exchange(s
, encdata
, enclen
, pms
, pmslen
)) {
3114 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3118 s
->s3
.tmp
.pms
= pms
;
3119 s
->s3
.tmp
.pmslen
= pmslen
;
3123 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms
, pmslen
);
3124 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
3129 static int tls_construct_cke_dhe(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3131 EVP_PKEY
*ckey
= NULL
, *skey
= NULL
;
3132 unsigned char *keybytes
= NULL
;
3134 unsigned char *encoded_pub
= NULL
;
3135 size_t encoded_pub_len
, pad_len
;
3138 skey
= s
->s3
.peer_tmp
;
3140 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3144 ckey
= ssl_generate_pkey(s
, skey
);
3146 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3150 if (ssl_derive(s
, ckey
, skey
, 0) == 0) {
3151 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3155 /* send off the data */
3157 /* Generate encoding of server key */
3158 encoded_pub_len
= EVP_PKEY_get1_encoded_public_key(ckey
, &encoded_pub
);
3159 if (encoded_pub_len
== 0) {
3160 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3161 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey
);
3162 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
3166 * For interoperability with some versions of the Microsoft TLS
3167 * stack, we need to zero pad the DHE pub key to the same length
3170 prime_len
= EVP_PKEY_get_size(ckey
);
3171 pad_len
= prime_len
- encoded_pub_len
;
3173 if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt
, pad_len
, &keybytes
)) {
3174 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3177 memset(keybytes
, 0, pad_len
);
3180 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt
, encoded_pub
, encoded_pub_len
)) {
3181 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3187 OPENSSL_free(encoded_pub
);
3188 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey
);
3192 static int tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3194 unsigned char *encodedPoint
= NULL
;
3195 size_t encoded_pt_len
= 0;
3196 EVP_PKEY
*ckey
= NULL
, *skey
= NULL
;
3199 skey
= s
->s3
.peer_tmp
;
3201 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3205 ckey
= ssl_generate_pkey(s
, skey
);
3207 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_SSL_LIB
);
3211 if (ssl_derive(s
, ckey
, skey
, 0) == 0) {
3212 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3216 /* Generate encoding of client key */
3217 encoded_pt_len
= EVP_PKEY_get1_encoded_public_key(ckey
, &encodedPoint
);
3219 if (encoded_pt_len
== 0) {
3220 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_EC_LIB
);
3224 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, encodedPoint
, encoded_pt_len
)) {
3225 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3231 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint
);
3232 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey
);
3236 static int tls_construct_cke_gost(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3238 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3239 /* GOST key exchange message creation */
3240 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pkey_ctx
= NULL
;
3241 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
3243 unsigned int md_len
;
3244 unsigned char shared_ukm
[32], tmp
[256];
3245 EVP_MD_CTX
*ukm_hash
= NULL
;
3246 int dgst_nid
= NID_id_GostR3411_94
;
3247 unsigned char *pms
= NULL
;
3249 SSL_CTX
*sctx
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
);
3251 if ((s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aGOST12
) != 0)
3252 dgst_nid
= NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256
;
3255 * Get server certificate PKEY and create ctx from it
3257 if ((pkey
= tls_get_peer_pkey(s
)) == NULL
) {
3258 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
3259 SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER
);
3263 pkey_ctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(sctx
->libctx
,
3266 if (pkey_ctx
== NULL
) {
3267 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
3271 * If we have send a certificate, and certificate key
3272 * parameters match those of server certificate, use
3273 * certificate key for key exchange
3276 /* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */
3278 pms
= OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen
);
3280 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB
);
3284 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx
) <= 0
3285 /* Generate session key
3287 || RAND_bytes_ex(sctx
->libctx
, pms
, pmslen
, 0) <= 0) {
3288 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3292 * Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context
3295 ukm_hash
= EVP_MD_CTX_new();
3296 if (ukm_hash
== NULL
3297 || EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash
, EVP_get_digestbynid(dgst_nid
)) <= 0
3298 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash
, s
->s3
.client_random
,
3299 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) <= 0
3300 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash
, s
->s3
.server_random
,
3301 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) <= 0
3302 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash
, shared_ukm
, &md_len
) <= 0) {
3303 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3306 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash
);
3308 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx
, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT
,
3309 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV
, 8, shared_ukm
) <= 0) {
3310 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG
);
3313 /* Make GOST keytransport blob message */
3315 * Encapsulate it into sequence
3318 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx
, tmp
, &msglen
, pms
, pmslen
) <= 0) {
3319 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG
);
3323 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE
| V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED
)
3324 || (msglen
>= 0x80 && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, 0x81))
3325 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, tmp
, msglen
)) {
3326 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3330 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx
);
3331 s
->s3
.tmp
.pms
= pms
;
3332 s
->s3
.tmp
.pmslen
= pmslen
;
3336 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx
);
3337 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms
, pmslen
);
3338 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash
);
3341 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3346 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3347 int ossl_gost18_cke_cipher_nid(const SSL_CONNECTION
*s
)
3349 if ((s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_enc
& SSL_MAGMA
) != 0)
3350 return NID_magma_ctr
;
3351 else if ((s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_enc
& SSL_KUZNYECHIK
) != 0)
3352 return NID_kuznyechik_ctr
;
3357 int ossl_gost_ukm(const SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, unsigned char *dgst_buf
)
3359 EVP_MD_CTX
* hash
= NULL
;
3360 unsigned int md_len
;
3361 SSL_CTX
*sctx
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
);
3362 const EVP_MD
*md
= ssl_evp_md_fetch(sctx
->libctx
, NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256
,
3368 if ((hash
= EVP_MD_CTX_new()) == NULL
3369 || EVP_DigestInit(hash
, md
) <= 0
3370 || EVP_DigestUpdate(hash
, s
->s3
.client_random
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) <= 0
3371 || EVP_DigestUpdate(hash
, s
->s3
.server_random
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) <= 0
3372 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(hash
, dgst_buf
, &md_len
) <= 0) {
3373 EVP_MD_CTX_free(hash
);
3374 ssl_evp_md_free(md
);
3378 EVP_MD_CTX_free(hash
);
3379 ssl_evp_md_free(md
);
3384 static int tls_construct_cke_gost18(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3386 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3387 /* GOST 2018 key exchange message creation */
3388 unsigned char rnd_dgst
[32];
3389 unsigned char *encdata
= NULL
;
3390 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pkey_ctx
= NULL
;
3392 unsigned char *pms
= NULL
;
3395 int cipher_nid
= ossl_gost18_cke_cipher_nid(s
);
3396 SSL_CTX
*sctx
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
);
3398 if (cipher_nid
== NID_undef
) {
3399 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3403 if (ossl_gost_ukm(s
, rnd_dgst
) <= 0) {
3404 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3408 /* Pre-master secret - random bytes */
3410 pms
= OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen
);
3412 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB
);
3416 if (RAND_bytes_ex(sctx
->libctx
, pms
, pmslen
, 0) <= 0) {
3417 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3421 /* Get server certificate PKEY and create ctx from it */
3422 if ((pkey
= tls_get_peer_pkey(s
)) == NULL
) {
3423 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
3424 SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER
);
3428 pkey_ctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(sctx
->libctx
,
3431 if (pkey_ctx
== NULL
) {
3432 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
3436 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx
) <= 0) {
3437 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3441 /* Reuse EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, make choice in engine code */
3442 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx
, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT
,
3443 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV
, 32, rnd_dgst
) <= 0) {
3444 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG
);
3448 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx
, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT
,
3449 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_CIPHER
, cipher_nid
, NULL
) <= 0) {
3450 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG
);
3454 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx
, NULL
, &msglen
, pms
, pmslen
) <= 0) {
3455 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
3459 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt
, msglen
, &encdata
)
3460 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx
, encdata
, &msglen
, pms
, pmslen
) <= 0) {
3461 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
3465 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx
);
3467 s
->s3
.tmp
.pms
= pms
;
3468 s
->s3
.tmp
.pmslen
= pmslen
;
3472 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx
);
3473 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms
, pmslen
);
3476 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3481 static int tls_construct_cke_srp(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3483 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3484 unsigned char *abytes
= NULL
;
3486 if (s
->srp_ctx
.A
== NULL
3487 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt
, BN_num_bytes(s
->srp_ctx
.A
),
3489 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3492 BN_bn2bin(s
->srp_ctx
.A
, abytes
);
3494 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->srp_username
);
3495 s
->session
->srp_username
= OPENSSL_strdup(s
->srp_ctx
.login
);
3496 if (s
->session
->srp_username
== NULL
) {
3497 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB
);
3503 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3508 CON_FUNC_RETURN
tls_construct_client_key_exchange(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
,
3511 unsigned long alg_k
;
3513 alg_k
= s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
3516 * All of the construct functions below call SSLfatal() if necessary so
3517 * no need to do so here.
3519 if ((alg_k
& SSL_PSK
)
3520 && !tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(s
, pkt
))
3523 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kRSA
| SSL_kRSAPSK
)) {
3524 if (!tls_construct_cke_rsa(s
, pkt
))
3526 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kDHEPSK
)) {
3527 if (!tls_construct_cke_dhe(s
, pkt
))
3529 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
)) {
3530 if (!tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(s
, pkt
))
3532 } else if (alg_k
& SSL_kGOST
) {
3533 if (!tls_construct_cke_gost(s
, pkt
))
3535 } else if (alg_k
& SSL_kGOST18
) {
3536 if (!tls_construct_cke_gost18(s
, pkt
))
3538 } else if (alg_k
& SSL_kSRP
) {
3539 if (!tls_construct_cke_srp(s
, pkt
))
3541 } else if (!(alg_k
& SSL_kPSK
)) {
3542 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3546 return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS
;
3548 OPENSSL_clear_free(s
->s3
.tmp
.pms
, s
->s3
.tmp
.pmslen
);
3549 s
->s3
.tmp
.pms
= NULL
;
3550 s
->s3
.tmp
.pmslen
= 0;
3551 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
3552 OPENSSL_clear_free(s
->s3
.tmp
.psk
, s
->s3
.tmp
.psklen
);
3553 s
->s3
.tmp
.psk
= NULL
;
3554 s
->s3
.tmp
.psklen
= 0;
3556 return CON_FUNC_ERROR
;
3559 int tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
)
3561 unsigned char *pms
= NULL
;
3564 pms
= s
->s3
.tmp
.pms
;
3565 pmslen
= s
->s3
.tmp
.pmslen
;
3567 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3569 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kSRP
) {
3570 if (!srp_generate_client_master_secret(s
)) {
3571 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3578 if (pms
== NULL
&& !(s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kPSK
)) {
3579 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT
);
3582 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s
, pms
, pmslen
, 1)) {
3583 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3584 /* ssl_generate_master_secret frees the pms even on error */
3592 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
3593 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
3594 unsigned char sctpauthkey
[64];
3595 char labelbuffer
[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
)];
3597 SSL
*ssl
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s
);
3600 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
3603 memcpy(labelbuffer
, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
,
3604 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
));
3606 /* Don't include the terminating zero. */
3607 labellen
= sizeof(labelbuffer
) - 1;
3608 if (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_DTLS_SCTP_LABEL_LENGTH_BUG
)
3611 if (SSL_export_keying_material(ssl
, sctpauthkey
,
3612 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), labelbuffer
,
3613 labellen
, NULL
, 0, 0) <= 0) {
3614 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3618 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(ssl
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY
,
3619 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), sctpauthkey
);
3625 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms
, pmslen
);
3626 s
->s3
.tmp
.pms
= NULL
;
3627 s
->s3
.tmp
.pmslen
= 0;
3632 * Check a certificate can be used for client authentication. Currently check
3633 * cert exists, if we have a suitable digest for TLS 1.2 if static DH client
3634 * certificates can be used and optionally checks suitability for Suite B.
3636 static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
)
3638 /* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */
3639 if (!tls_choose_sigalg(s
, 0) || s
->s3
.tmp
.sigalg
== NULL
)
3642 * If strict mode check suitability of chain before using it. This also
3643 * adjusts suite B digest if necessary.
3645 if (s
->cert
->cert_flags
& SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT
&&
3646 !tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, -2))
3651 WORK_STATE
tls_prepare_client_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
3654 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
3656 SSL
*ssl
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s
);
3658 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_A
) {
3659 /* Let cert callback update client certificates if required */
3660 if (s
->cert
->cert_cb
) {
3661 i
= s
->cert
->cert_cb(ssl
, s
->cert
->cert_cb_arg
);
3663 s
->rwstate
= SSL_X509_LOOKUP
;
3667 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED
);
3670 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
3672 if (ssl3_check_client_certificate(s
)) {
3673 if (s
->post_handshake_auth
== SSL_PHA_REQUESTED
) {
3674 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP
;
3676 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
3679 /* Fall through to WORK_MORE_B */
3683 /* We need to get a client cert */
3684 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_B
) {
3686 * If we get an error, we need to ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3687 * return(-1); We then get retied later
3689 i
= ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s
, &x509
, &pkey
);
3691 s
->rwstate
= SSL_X509_LOOKUP
;
3694 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
3695 if ((i
== 1) && (pkey
!= NULL
) && (x509
!= NULL
)) {
3696 if (!SSL_use_certificate(ssl
, x509
)
3697 || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(ssl
, pkey
))
3699 } else if (i
== 1) {
3701 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK
);
3705 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey
);
3706 if (i
&& !ssl3_check_client_certificate(s
))
3709 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
) {
3710 s
->s3
.tmp
.cert_req
= 0;
3711 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_WARNING
, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE
);
3712 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
3714 s
->s3
.tmp
.cert_req
= 2;
3715 s
->ext
.compress_certificate_from_peer
[0] = TLSEXT_comp_cert_none
;
3716 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 0)) {
3717 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3723 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)
3724 || (s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_TX_CERTIFICATE_COMPRESSION
) != 0)
3725 s
->ext
.compress_certificate_from_peer
[0] = TLSEXT_comp_cert_none
;
3727 if (s
->post_handshake_auth
== SSL_PHA_REQUESTED
)
3728 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP
;
3729 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
3732 /* Shouldn't ever get here */
3733 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3737 CON_FUNC_RETURN
tls_construct_client_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
,
3740 CERT_PKEY
*cpk
= NULL
;
3741 SSL
*ssl
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s
);
3743 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
3744 if (s
->pha_context
== NULL
) {
3745 /* no context available, add 0-length context */
3746 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, 0)) {
3747 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3748 return CON_FUNC_ERROR
;
3750 } else if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, s
->pha_context
, s
->pha_context_len
)) {
3751 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3752 return CON_FUNC_ERROR
;
3755 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.cert_req
!= 2)
3757 switch (s
->ext
.client_cert_type
) {
3758 case TLSEXT_cert_type_rpk
:
3759 if (!tls_output_rpk(s
, pkt
, cpk
)) {
3760 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3761 return CON_FUNC_ERROR
;
3764 case TLSEXT_cert_type_x509
:
3765 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s
, pkt
, cpk
, 0)) {
3766 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3767 return CON_FUNC_ERROR
;
3771 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3772 return CON_FUNC_ERROR
;
3775 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)
3776 && SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s
)
3777 && (!ssl
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
3778 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE
))) {
3780 * This is a fatal error, which leaves enc_write_ctx in an inconsistent
3781 * state and thus ssl3_send_alert may crash.
3783 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT
, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER
);
3784 return CON_FUNC_ERROR
;
3787 return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS
;
3790 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP_ALG
3791 CON_FUNC_RETURN
tls_construct_client_compressed_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION
*sc
,
3794 SSL
*ssl
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(sc
);
3796 BUF_MEM
*buf
= NULL
;
3799 COMP_METHOD
*method
;
3800 COMP_CTX
*comp
= NULL
;
3803 int alg
= sc
->ext
.compress_certificate_from_peer
[0];
3805 /* Note that sc->s3.tmp.cert_req == 2 is checked in write transition */
3807 if ((buf
= BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL
|| !WPACKET_init(&tmppkt
, buf
))
3810 /* Use the |tmppkt| for the to-be-compressed data */
3811 if (sc
->pha_context
== NULL
) {
3812 /* no context available, add 0-length context */
3813 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(&tmppkt
, 0))
3815 } else if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(&tmppkt
, sc
->pha_context
, sc
->pha_context_len
))
3818 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(sc
, &tmppkt
, sc
->cert
->key
, 0)) {
3819 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3823 /* continue with the real |pkt| */
3824 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, alg
)
3825 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(&tmppkt
, &length
)
3826 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u24(pkt
, length
))
3830 case TLSEXT_comp_cert_zlib
:
3831 method
= COMP_zlib_oneshot();
3833 case TLSEXT_comp_cert_brotli
:
3834 method
= COMP_brotli_oneshot();
3836 case TLSEXT_comp_cert_zstd
:
3837 method
= COMP_zstd_oneshot();
3842 max_length
= ossl_calculate_comp_expansion(alg
, length
);
3844 if ((comp
= COMP_CTX_new(method
)) == NULL
3845 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u24(pkt
)
3846 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt
, max_length
, NULL
))
3849 comp_len
= COMP_compress_block(comp
, WPACKET_get_curr(pkt
), max_length
,
3850 (unsigned char *)buf
->data
, length
);
3854 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt
, comp_len
, NULL
)
3855 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
))
3858 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(sc
)
3859 && (!ssl
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(sc
,
3860 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE
))) {
3862 * This is a fatal error, which leaves sc->enc_write_ctx in an
3863 * inconsistent state and thus ssl3_send_alert may crash.
3865 SSLfatal(sc
, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT
, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER
);
3872 SSLfatal(sc
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3875 /* If |buf| is NULL, then |tmppkt| could not have been initialized */
3876 WPACKET_cleanup(&tmppkt
);
3879 COMP_CTX_free(comp
);
3884 int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
)
3886 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP
*clu
;
3891 alg_k
= s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
3892 alg_a
= s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
;
3894 /* we don't have a certificate */
3895 if (!(alg_a
& SSL_aCERT
))
3898 /* This is the passed certificate */
3899 pkey
= tls_get_peer_pkey(s
);
3900 clu
= ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey
, &idx
, SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
));
3902 /* Check certificate is recognised and suitable for cipher */
3903 if (clu
== NULL
|| (alg_a
& clu
->amask
) == 0) {
3904 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_R_MISSING_SIGNING_CERT
);
3908 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kRSA
| SSL_kRSAPSK
) && idx
!= SSL_PKEY_RSA
) {
3909 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
3910 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT
);
3914 if ((alg_k
& SSL_kDHE
) && (s
->s3
.peer_tmp
== NULL
)) {
3915 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3919 /* Early out to skip the checks below */
3920 if (s
->session
->peer_rpk
!= NULL
)
3923 if (clu
->amask
& SSL_aECDSA
) {
3924 if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(s
->session
->peer
, s
))
3926 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT
);
3933 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3934 CON_FUNC_RETURN
tls_construct_next_proto(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3936 size_t len
, padding_len
;
3937 unsigned char *padding
= NULL
;
3939 len
= s
->ext
.npn_len
;
3940 padding_len
= 32 - ((len
+ 2) % 32);
3942 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, s
->ext
.npn
, len
)
3943 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u8(pkt
, padding_len
, &padding
)) {
3944 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3945 return CON_FUNC_ERROR
;
3948 memset(padding
, 0, padding_len
);
3950 return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS
;
3954 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_hello_req(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
3956 SSL
*ssl
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s
);
3958 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) > 0) {
3959 /* should contain no data */
3960 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3961 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
3964 if ((s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION
)) {
3965 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_WARNING
, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION
);
3966 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
3970 * This is a historical discrepancy (not in the RFC) maintained for
3971 * compatibility reasons. If a TLS client receives a HelloRequest it will
3972 * attempt an abbreviated handshake. However if a DTLS client receives a
3973 * HelloRequest it will do a full handshake. Either behaviour is reasonable
3974 * but doing one for TLS and another for DTLS is odd.
3976 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
))
3977 SSL_renegotiate(ssl
);
3979 SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated(ssl
);
3981 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
3984 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
,
3988 RAW_EXTENSION
*rawexts
= NULL
;
3990 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &extensions
)
3991 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
3992 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3996 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s
, &extensions
,
3997 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
, &rawexts
,
3999 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s
, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
,
4000 rawexts
, NULL
, 0, 1)) {
4001 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4005 OPENSSL_free(rawexts
);
4006 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
4009 OPENSSL_free(rawexts
);
4010 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
4013 int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, X509
**px509
, EVP_PKEY
**ppkey
)
4016 SSL_CTX
*sctx
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
);
4018 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
4019 if (sctx
->client_cert_engine
) {
4020 i
= tls_engine_load_ssl_client_cert(s
, px509
, ppkey
);
4025 if (sctx
->client_cert_cb
)
4026 i
= sctx
->client_cert_cb(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s
), px509
, ppkey
);
4030 int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *sk
,
4034 size_t totlen
= 0, len
, maxlen
, maxverok
= 0;
4035 int empty_reneg_info_scsv
= !s
->renegotiate
4036 && (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
)
4037 || s
->min_proto_version
< TLS1_3_VERSION
);
4038 SSL
*ssl
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s
);
4040 /* Set disabled masks for this session */
4041 if (!ssl_set_client_disabled(s
)) {
4042 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE
);
4047 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
4051 #ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
4052 # if OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH < 6
4053 # error Max cipher length too short
4056 * Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes as hack workaround
4057 * chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well below this if we
4060 if (TLS1_get_version(ssl
) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
)
4061 maxlen
= OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
& ~1;
4064 /* Maximum length that can be stored in 2 bytes. Length must be even */
4067 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv
)
4069 if (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV
)
4072 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk
) && totlen
< maxlen
; i
++) {
4073 const SSL_CIPHER
*c
;
4075 c
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk
, i
);
4076 /* Skip disabled ciphers */
4077 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s
, c
, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED
, 0))
4080 if (!ssl
->method
->put_cipher_by_char(c
, pkt
, &len
)) {
4081 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
4085 /* Sanity check that the maximum version we offer has ciphers enabled */
4087 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
4088 if (DTLS_VERSION_GE(c
->max_dtls
, s
->s3
.tmp
.max_ver
)
4089 && DTLS_VERSION_LE(c
->min_dtls
, s
->s3
.tmp
.max_ver
))
4092 if (c
->max_tls
>= s
->s3
.tmp
.max_ver
4093 && c
->min_tls
<= s
->s3
.tmp
.max_ver
)
4101 if (totlen
== 0 || !maxverok
) {
4102 const char *maxvertext
=
4104 ? "No ciphers enabled for max supported SSL/TLS version"
4107 SSLfatal_data(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE
,
4113 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv
) {
4114 static SSL_CIPHER scsv
= {
4115 0, NULL
, NULL
, SSL3_CK_SCSV
, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
4117 if (!ssl
->method
->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv
, pkt
, &len
)) {
4118 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
4122 if (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV
) {
4123 static SSL_CIPHER scsv
= {
4124 0, NULL
, NULL
, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV
, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
4126 if (!ssl
->method
->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv
, pkt
, &len
)) {
4127 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
4136 CON_FUNC_RETURN
tls_construct_end_of_early_data(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
4138 if (s
->early_data_state
!= SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY
4139 && s
->early_data_state
!= SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING
) {
4140 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED
);
4141 return CON_FUNC_ERROR
;
4144 s
->early_data_state
= SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING
;
4145 return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS
;