1 /* ssl/statem/statem_clnt.c */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
124 /* ====================================================================
125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
142 * to make use of the Contribution.
144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
152 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
153 #include "statem_locl.h"
154 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
155 #include <openssl/rand.h>
156 #include <openssl/objects.h>
157 #include <openssl/evp.h>
158 #include <openssl/md5.h>
159 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
160 # include <openssl/dh.h>
162 #include <openssl/bn.h>
163 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
164 # include <openssl/engine.h>
167 static inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL
*s
);
168 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL
*s
);
169 static int ssl_set_version(SSL
*s
);
170 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME
*const *a
, const X509_NAME
*const *b
);
171 static int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL
*s
, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *sk
,
176 * Is a CertificateRequest message allowed at the moment or not?
182 static inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL
*s
)
184 /* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */
185 if ((s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
186 && (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aNULL
))
187 || (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aSRP
| SSL_aPSK
)))
194 * Should we expect the ServerKeyExchange message or not?
201 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL
*s
)
203 long alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
206 * Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral
207 * ciphersuite or for SRP
209 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kDHEPSK
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
215 * Export ciphersuites may have temporary RSA keys if the public key in the
216 * server certificate is longer than the maximum export strength
218 if ((alg_k
& SSL_kRSA
) && SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
)) {
221 pkey
= X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
226 * If the public key in the certificate is shorter than or equal to the
227 * maximum export strength then a temporary RSA key is not allowed
229 if (EVP_PKEY_bits(pkey
)
230 <= SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
))
242 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
243 * handshake state transitions when the client is reading messages from the
244 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
245 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
248 * 1: Success (transition allowed)
249 * 0: Error (transition not allowed)
251 int ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL
*s
, int mt
)
253 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
256 switch(st
->hand_state
) {
257 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
258 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO
) {
259 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
;
263 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
264 if (mt
== DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
) {
265 st
->hand_state
= DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
;
271 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
:
273 if (s
->tlsext_ticket_expected
) {
274 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET
) {
275 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
;
278 } else if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
279 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
;
283 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && mt
== DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
) {
284 st
->hand_state
= DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
;
286 } else if (!(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
287 & (SSL_aNULL
| SSL_aSRP
| SSL_aPSK
))) {
288 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
) {
289 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT
;
293 ske_expected
= key_exchange_expected(s
);
294 if (ske_expected
< 0)
296 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
298 || ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_PSK
)
299 && mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
)) {
300 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
) {
301 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH
;
304 } else if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
305 && cert_req_allowed(s
)) {
306 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
;
308 } else if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE
) {
309 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
;
317 if (s
->tlsext_status_expected
) {
318 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS
) {
319 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS
;
326 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS
:
327 ske_expected
= key_exchange_expected(s
);
328 if (ske_expected
< 0)
330 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
332 || ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_PSK
)
333 && mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
)) {
334 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
) {
335 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH
;
342 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH
:
343 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
) {
344 if (cert_req_allowed(s
)) {
345 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
;
352 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
:
353 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE
) {
354 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
;
359 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
:
360 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET
&& s
->tlsext_ticket_expected
) {
361 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
;
363 } else if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
364 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
;
369 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
:
370 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
371 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
;
376 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
:
377 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
) {
378 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
;
387 /* No valid transition found */
392 * client_write_transition() works out what handshake state to move to next
393 * when the client is writing messages to be sent to the server.
395 WRITE_TRAN
ossl_statem_client_write_transition(SSL
*s
)
397 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
399 switch(st
->hand_state
) {
401 /* Renegotiation - fall through */
403 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
;
404 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
406 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
408 * No transition at the end of writing because we don't know what
411 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
413 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
414 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
;
415 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
417 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
:
418 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
)
419 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CERT
;
421 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH
;
422 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
425 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH
;
426 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
428 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH
:
430 * For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is
431 * sent, but no verify packet is sent
434 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication in ECDH
435 * cipher suites with ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. We
436 * need to skip the certificate verify message when client's
437 * ECDH public key is sent inside the client certificate.
439 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
== 1) {
440 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
;
442 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
;
444 if (s
->s3
->flags
& TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY
) {
445 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
;
447 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
449 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
:
450 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
;
451 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
453 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
:
454 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
455 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
457 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && s
->s3
->next_proto_neg_seen
)
458 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO
;
460 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
462 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
464 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
465 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO
:
466 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
467 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
470 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
:
472 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
473 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s
, 0);
474 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
476 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
479 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
:
481 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
;
482 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
484 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
485 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s
, 0);
486 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
490 /* Shouldn't happen */
491 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR
;
496 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
497 * the client to the server.
499 WORK_STATE
ossl_statem_client_pre_work(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
501 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
503 switch(st
->hand_state
) {
504 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
506 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
507 /* every DTLS ClientHello resets Finished MAC */
508 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s
);
513 return tls_prepare_client_certificate(s
, wst
);
515 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
:
516 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
519 * We're into the last flight so we don't retransmit these
520 * messages unless we need to.
524 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
525 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s
)))
526 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s
);
529 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
532 return tls_finish_handshake(s
, wst
);
535 /* No pre work to be done */
539 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
543 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
544 * client to the server.
546 WORK_STATE
ossl_statem_client_post_work(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
548 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
552 switch(st
->hand_state
) {
553 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
554 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && s
->d1
->cookie_len
> 0 && statem_flush(s
) != 1)
556 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
557 /* Disable buffering for SCTP */
558 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) || !BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s
))) {
561 * turn on buffering for the next lot of output
563 if (s
->bbio
!= s
->wbio
)
564 s
->wbio
= BIO_push(s
->bbio
, s
->wbio
);
565 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
568 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
569 /* Treat the next message as the first packet */
574 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH
:
575 if (tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(s
) == 0)
579 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
:
580 s
->session
->cipher
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
;
581 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
582 s
->session
->compress_meth
= 0;
584 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
== NULL
)
585 s
->session
->compress_meth
= 0;
587 s
->session
->compress_meth
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
->id
;
589 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->setup_key_block(s
))
592 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
593 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE
))
596 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
597 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
600 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
603 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY
,
608 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s
, SSL3_CC_WRITE
);
612 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
:
613 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
614 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_A
&& SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && s
->hit
== 0) {
616 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
619 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY
,
623 if (statem_flush(s
) != 1)
628 /* No post work to be done */
632 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
636 * Construct a message to be sent from the client to the server.
638 * Valid return values are:
642 int ossl_statem_client_construct_message(SSL
*s
)
644 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
646 switch(st
->hand_state
) {
647 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
648 return tls_construct_client_hello(s
);
651 return tls_construct_client_certificate(s
);
653 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH
:
654 return tls_construct_client_key_exchange(s
);
656 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
:
657 return tls_construct_client_verify(s
);
659 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
:
661 return dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec(s
);
663 return tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(s
);
665 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
666 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO
:
667 return tls_construct_next_proto(s
);
669 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
:
670 return tls_construct_finished(s
,
672 ssl3_enc
->client_finished_label
,
674 ssl3_enc
->client_finished_label_len
);
677 /* Shouldn't happen */
685 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
686 * reading. Excludes the message header.
688 unsigned long ossl_statem_client_max_message_size(SSL
*s
)
690 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
692 switch(st
->hand_state
) {
693 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
:
694 return SERVER_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH
;
696 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
697 return HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH
;
700 return s
->max_cert_list
;
702 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS
:
703 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
;
705 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH
:
706 return SERVER_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH
;
708 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
:
709 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
;
711 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
:
712 return SERVER_HELLO_DONE_MAX_LENGTH
;
714 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
:
715 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH
;
717 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
:
718 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
;
720 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
:
721 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH
;
724 /* Shouldn't happen */
732 * Process a message that the client has been received from the server.
734 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
ossl_statem_client_process_message(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
736 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
738 switch(st
->hand_state
) {
739 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
:
740 return tls_process_server_hello(s
, pkt
);
742 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
743 return dtls_process_hello_verify(s
, pkt
);
746 return tls_process_server_certificate(s
, pkt
);
748 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS
:
749 return tls_process_cert_status(s
, pkt
);
751 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH
:
752 return tls_process_key_exchange(s
, pkt
);
754 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
:
755 return tls_process_certificate_request(s
, pkt
);
757 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
:
758 return tls_process_server_done(s
, pkt
);
760 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
:
761 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s
, pkt
);
763 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
:
764 return tls_process_new_session_ticket(s
, pkt
);
766 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
:
767 return tls_process_finished(s
, pkt
);
770 /* Shouldn't happen */
774 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
778 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
781 WORK_STATE
ossl_statem_client_post_process_message(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
783 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
785 switch(st
->hand_state
) {
786 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
787 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
:
788 /* We only get here if we are using SCTP and we are renegotiating */
789 if (BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s
))) {
790 s
->s3
->in_read_app_data
= 2;
791 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
792 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s
));
793 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s
));
794 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s
, 1);
797 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s
, 0);
798 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP
;
805 /* Shouldn't happen */
810 * Work out what version we should be using for the initial ClientHello if
811 * the version is currently set to (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION.
812 * Returns 1 on success
815 static int ssl_set_version(SSL
*s
)
817 unsigned long mask
, options
= s
->options
;
819 if (s
->method
->version
== TLS_ANY_VERSION
) {
821 * SSL_OP_NO_X disables all protocols above X *if* there are
822 * some protocols below X enabled. This is required in order
823 * to maintain "version capability" vector contiguous. So
824 * that if application wants to disable TLS1.0 in favour of
825 * TLS1>=1, it would be insufficient to pass SSL_NO_TLSv1, the
826 * answer is SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1|SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3.
828 mask
= SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1
| SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1
829 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL3)
833 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2_CLIENT)
834 if (options
& SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2
) {
835 if ((options
& mask
) != mask
) {
836 s
->version
= TLS1_1_VERSION
;
838 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_VERSION
, SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE
);
842 s
->version
= TLS1_2_VERSION
;
845 if ((options
& mask
) == mask
) {
846 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_VERSION
, SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE
);
849 s
->version
= TLS1_1_VERSION
;
852 mask
&= ~SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1
;
853 if ((options
& SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1
) && (options
& mask
) != mask
)
854 s
->version
= TLS1_VERSION
;
855 mask
&= ~SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1
;
856 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL3)
857 if ((options
& SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1
) && (options
& mask
) != mask
)
858 s
->version
= SSL3_VERSION
;
861 if (s
->version
!= TLS1_2_VERSION
&& tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
862 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_VERSION
,
863 SSL_R_ONLY_TLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE
);
867 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
&& FIPS_mode()) {
868 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_VERSION
, SSL_R_ONLY_TLS_ALLOWED_IN_FIPS_MODE
);
872 } else if (s
->method
->version
== DTLS_ANY_VERSION
) {
873 /* Determine which DTLS version to use */
874 /* If DTLS 1.2 disabled correct the version number */
875 if (options
& SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2
) {
876 if (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
877 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_VERSION
,
878 SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE
);
882 * Disabling all versions is silly: return an error.
884 if (options
& SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1
) {
885 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_VERSION
, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION
);
889 * Update method so we don't use any DTLS 1.2 features.
891 s
->method
= DTLSv1_client_method();
892 s
->version
= DTLS1_VERSION
;
895 * We only support one version: update method
897 if (options
& SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1
)
898 s
->method
= DTLSv1_2_client_method();
899 s
->version
= DTLS1_2_VERSION
;
903 s
->client_version
= s
->version
;
908 int tls_construct_client_hello(SSL
*s
)
911 unsigned char *p
, *d
;
915 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
919 SSL_SESSION
*sess
= s
->session
;
921 buf
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
923 /* Work out what SSL/TLS/DTLS version to use */
924 if (ssl_set_version(s
) == 0)
927 if ((sess
== NULL
) || (sess
->ssl_version
!= s
->version
) ||
929 * In the case of EAP-FAST, we can have a pre-shared
930 * "ticket" without a session ID.
932 (!sess
->session_id_length
&& !sess
->tlsext_tick
) ||
933 (sess
->not_resumable
)) {
934 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s
, 0))
937 /* else use the pre-loaded session */
939 p
= s
->s3
->client_random
;
942 * for DTLS if client_random is initialized, reuse it, we are
943 * required to use same upon reply to HelloVerify
945 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
948 for (idx
= 0; idx
< sizeof(s
->s3
->client_random
); idx
++) {
957 if (i
&& ssl_fill_hello_random(s
, 0, p
,
958 sizeof(s
->s3
->client_random
)) <= 0)
961 /* Do the message type and length last */
962 d
= p
= ssl_handshake_start(s
);
965 * version indicates the negotiated version: for example from
966 * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version
967 * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also
968 * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can
969 * choke if we initially report a higher version then
970 * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This
971 * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it
972 * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports
975 * Possible scenario with previous logic:
976 * 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2
977 * 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0
978 * 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.
979 * 4. Handhaked proceeds using TLS 1.0.
980 * 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.
981 * 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now
982 * know that is maximum server supports.
983 * 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret
984 * containing version 1.0.
986 * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the
987 * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely
988 * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't
989 * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with
990 * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using
991 * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to
992 * the negotiated version.
994 *(p
++) = s
->client_version
>> 8;
995 *(p
++) = s
->client_version
& 0xff;
998 memcpy(p
, s
->s3
->client_random
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
999 p
+= SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
;
1005 i
= s
->session
->session_id_length
;
1008 if (i
> (int)sizeof(s
->session
->session_id
)) {
1009 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1012 memcpy(p
, s
->session
->session_id
, i
);
1016 /* cookie stuff for DTLS */
1017 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1018 if (s
->d1
->cookie_len
> sizeof(s
->d1
->cookie
)) {
1019 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1022 *(p
++) = s
->d1
->cookie_len
;
1023 memcpy(p
, s
->d1
->cookie
, s
->d1
->cookie_len
);
1024 p
+= s
->d1
->cookie_len
;
1027 /* Ciphers supported */
1028 i
= ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s
, SSL_get_ciphers(s
), &(p
[2]));
1030 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE
);
1033 #ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
1035 * Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes as hack workaround
1036 * chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well below this if we
1039 if (TLS1_get_version(s
) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
1040 && i
> OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
)
1041 i
= OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
& ~1;
1047 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1051 if (!ssl_allow_compression(s
) || !s
->ctx
->comp_methods
)
1054 j
= sk_SSL_COMP_num(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
);
1056 for (i
= 0; i
< j
; i
++) {
1057 comp
= sk_SSL_COMP_value(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
, i
);
1061 *(p
++) = 0; /* Add the NULL method */
1063 /* TLS extensions */
1064 if (ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(s
) <= 0) {
1065 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
);
1069 ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(s
, p
, buf
+ SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
,
1071 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1072 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1077 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s
, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO
, l
)) {
1078 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
1079 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1085 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
1089 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
dtls_process_hello_verify(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1092 unsigned int cookie_len
;
1095 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt
, 2)
1096 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &cookiepkt
)) {
1097 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1098 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1102 cookie_len
= PACKET_remaining(&cookiepkt
);
1103 if (cookie_len
> sizeof(s
->d1
->cookie
)) {
1104 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1105 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
1109 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&cookiepkt
, s
->d1
->cookie
, cookie_len
)) {
1110 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1111 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1114 s
->d1
->cookie_len
= cookie_len
;
1116 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
1118 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1119 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
1120 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1123 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_server_hello(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1125 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *sk
;
1126 const SSL_CIPHER
*c
;
1128 size_t session_id_len
;
1129 unsigned char *cipherchars
;
1130 int i
, al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1131 unsigned int compression
;
1132 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1136 if (s
->method
->version
== TLS_ANY_VERSION
) {
1137 unsigned int sversion
;
1139 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &sversion
)) {
1140 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1141 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1145 #if TLS_MAX_VERSION != TLS1_2_VERSION
1146 #error Code needs updating for new TLS version
1148 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
1149 if ((sversion
== SSL3_VERSION
) && !(s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3
)) {
1151 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1152 SSL_R_ONLY_TLS_ALLOWED_IN_FIPS_MODE
);
1153 al
= SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
1156 s
->method
= SSLv3_client_method();
1159 if ((sversion
== TLS1_VERSION
) && !(s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1
)) {
1160 s
->method
= TLSv1_client_method();
1161 } else if ((sversion
== TLS1_1_VERSION
) &&
1162 !(s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1
)) {
1163 s
->method
= TLSv1_1_client_method();
1164 } else if ((sversion
== TLS1_2_VERSION
) &&
1165 !(s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2
)) {
1166 s
->method
= TLSv1_2_client_method();
1168 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL
);
1169 al
= SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
1172 s
->session
->ssl_version
= s
->version
= s
->method
->version
;
1174 if (!ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_VERSION
, 0, s
->version
, NULL
)) {
1175 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW
);
1176 al
= SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
1179 } else if (s
->method
->version
== DTLS_ANY_VERSION
) {
1180 /* Work out correct protocol version to use */
1181 unsigned int hversion
;
1184 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &hversion
)) {
1185 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1186 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1190 options
= s
->options
;
1191 if (hversion
== DTLS1_2_VERSION
&& !(options
& SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2
))
1192 s
->method
= DTLSv1_2_client_method();
1193 else if (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
1194 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1195 SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE
);
1196 s
->version
= hversion
;
1197 al
= SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
1199 } else if (hversion
== DTLS1_VERSION
&& !(options
& SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1
))
1200 s
->method
= DTLSv1_client_method();
1202 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION
);
1203 s
->version
= hversion
;
1204 al
= SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
1207 s
->session
->ssl_version
= s
->version
= s
->method
->version
;
1209 unsigned char *vers
;
1211 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &vers
, 2)) {
1212 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1213 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1216 if ((vers
[0] != (s
->version
>> 8))
1217 || (vers
[1] != (s
->version
& 0xff))) {
1218 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION
);
1219 s
->version
= (s
->version
& 0xff00) | vers
[1];
1220 al
= SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
1225 /* load the server hello data */
1226 /* load the server random */
1227 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt
, s
->s3
->server_random
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
)) {
1228 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1229 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1235 /* Get the session-id. */
1236 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &session_id
)) {
1237 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1238 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1241 session_id_len
= PACKET_remaining(&session_id
);
1242 if (session_id_len
> sizeof s
->session
->session_id
1243 || session_id_len
> SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE
) {
1244 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1245 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG
);
1249 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &cipherchars
, TLS_CIPHER_LEN
)) {
1250 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1251 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1256 * Check if we can resume the session based on external pre-shared secret.
1257 * EAP-FAST (RFC 4851) supports two types of session resumption.
1258 * Resumption based on server-side state works with session IDs.
1259 * Resumption based on pre-shared Protected Access Credentials (PACs)
1260 * works by overriding the SessionTicket extension at the application
1261 * layer, and does not send a session ID. (We do not know whether EAP-FAST
1262 * servers would honour the session ID.) Therefore, the session ID alone
1263 * is not a reliable indicator of session resumption, so we first check if
1264 * we can resume, and later peek at the next handshake message to see if the
1265 * server wants to resume.
1267 if (s
->version
>= TLS1_VERSION
&& s
->tls_session_secret_cb
&&
1268 s
->session
->tlsext_tick
) {
1269 SSL_CIPHER
*pref_cipher
= NULL
;
1270 s
->session
->master_key_length
= sizeof(s
->session
->master_key
);
1271 if (s
->tls_session_secret_cb(s
, s
->session
->master_key
,
1272 &s
->session
->master_key_length
,
1274 s
->tls_session_secret_cb_arg
)) {
1275 s
->session
->cipher
= pref_cipher
?
1276 pref_cipher
: ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s
, cipherchars
);
1278 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1279 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1284 if (session_id_len
!= 0 && session_id_len
== s
->session
->session_id_length
1285 && memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id
), s
->session
->session_id
,
1286 session_id_len
) == 0) {
1287 if (s
->sid_ctx_length
!= s
->session
->sid_ctx_length
1288 || memcmp(s
->session
->sid_ctx
, s
->sid_ctx
, s
->sid_ctx_length
)) {
1289 /* actually a client application bug */
1290 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1291 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1292 SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT
);
1298 * If we were trying for session-id reuse but the server
1299 * didn't echo the ID, make a new SSL_SESSION.
1300 * In the case of EAP-FAST and PAC, we do not send a session ID,
1301 * so the PAC-based session secret is always preserved. It'll be
1302 * overwritten if the server refuses resumption.
1304 if (s
->session
->session_id_length
> 0) {
1305 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s
, 0)) {
1310 s
->session
->session_id_length
= session_id_len
;
1311 /* session_id_len could be 0 */
1312 memcpy(s
->session
->session_id
, PACKET_data(&session_id
),
1316 c
= ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s
, cipherchars
);
1318 /* unknown cipher */
1319 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1320 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED
);
1323 /* Set version disabled mask now we know version */
1324 if (!SSL_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s
))
1325 s
->s3
->tmp
.mask_ssl
= SSL_TLSV1_2
;
1327 s
->s3
->tmp
.mask_ssl
= 0;
1328 /* Skip TLS v1.0 ciphersuites if SSLv3 */
1329 if ((c
->algorithm_ssl
& SSL_TLSV1
) && s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
)
1330 s
->s3
->tmp
.mask_ssl
|= SSL_TLSV1
;
1332 * If it is a disabled cipher we didn't send it in client hello, so
1335 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s
, c
, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK
)) {
1336 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1337 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED
);
1341 sk
= ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s
);
1342 i
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk
, c
);
1344 /* we did not say we would use this cipher */
1345 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1346 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED
);
1351 * Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher
1352 * and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that cipher_id is
1353 * set and use it for comparison.
1355 if (s
->session
->cipher
)
1356 s
->session
->cipher_id
= s
->session
->cipher
->id
;
1357 if (s
->hit
&& (s
->session
->cipher_id
!= c
->id
)) {
1358 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1359 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1360 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED
);
1363 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
= c
;
1365 * Don't digest cached records if no sigalgs: we may need them for client
1368 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
) && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 0))
1370 /* lets get the compression algorithm */
1372 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &compression
)) {
1373 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1374 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1377 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1378 if (compression
!= 0) {
1379 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1380 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1381 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM
);
1385 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1386 * using compression.
1388 if (s
->session
->compress_meth
!= 0) {
1389 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION
);
1393 if (s
->hit
&& compression
!= s
->session
->compress_meth
) {
1394 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1395 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1396 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED
);
1399 if (compression
== 0)
1401 else if (!ssl_allow_compression(s
)) {
1402 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1403 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED
);
1406 comp
= ssl3_comp_find(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
, compression
);
1409 if (compression
!= 0 && comp
== NULL
) {
1410 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1411 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1412 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM
);
1415 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
= comp
;
1419 /* TLS extensions */
1420 if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(s
, pkt
)) {
1421 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT
);
1425 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
1426 /* wrong packet length */
1427 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1428 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH
);
1432 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1433 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && s
->hit
) {
1434 unsigned char sctpauthkey
[64];
1435 char labelbuffer
[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
)];
1438 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
1441 memcpy(labelbuffer
, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
,
1442 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
));
1444 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s
, sctpauthkey
,
1445 sizeof(sctpauthkey
),
1447 sizeof(labelbuffer
), NULL
, 0,
1451 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
),
1452 BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY
,
1453 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), sctpauthkey
);
1457 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
1459 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1461 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
1462 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1465 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_server_certificate(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1467 int al
, i
, ret
= MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
, exp_idx
;
1468 unsigned long cert_list_len
, cert_len
;
1470 unsigned char *certstart
, *certbytes
;
1471 STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
= NULL
;
1472 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
1474 if ((sk
= sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL
) {
1475 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1479 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt
, &cert_list_len
)
1480 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != cert_list_len
) {
1481 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1482 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1485 while (PACKET_remaining(pkt
)) {
1486 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt
, &cert_len
)
1487 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &certbytes
, cert_len
)) {
1488 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1489 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1490 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1494 certstart
= certbytes
;
1495 x
= d2i_X509(NULL
, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes
, cert_len
);
1497 al
= SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
;
1498 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB
);
1501 if (certbytes
!= (certstart
+ cert_len
)) {
1502 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1503 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1504 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1507 if (!sk_X509_push(sk
, x
)) {
1508 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1514 i
= ssl_verify_cert_chain(s
, sk
);
1515 if (s
->verify_mode
!= SSL_VERIFY_NONE
&& i
<= 0) {
1516 al
= ssl_verify_alarm_type(s
->verify_result
);
1517 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1518 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED
);
1521 ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
1523 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, i
);
1524 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1528 s
->session
->peer_chain
= sk
;
1530 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate,
1531 * which we don't include in s3_srvr.c
1533 x
= sk_X509_value(sk
, 0);
1536 * VRS 19990621: possible memory leak; sk=null ==> !sk_pop_free() @end
1539 pkey
= X509_get_pubkey(x
);
1541 if (pkey
== NULL
|| EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey
)) {
1544 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1545 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS
);
1549 i
= ssl_cert_type(x
, pkey
);
1553 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1554 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE
);
1558 exp_idx
= ssl_cipher_get_cert_index(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
);
1559 if (exp_idx
>= 0 && i
!= exp_idx
) {
1561 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1562 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1563 SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE
);
1566 s
->session
->peer_type
= i
;
1568 X509_free(s
->session
->peer
);
1570 s
->session
->peer
= x
;
1571 s
->session
->verify_result
= s
->verify_result
;
1574 ret
= MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
1578 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1580 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
1582 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey
);
1584 sk_X509_pop_free(sk
, X509_free
);
1588 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_key_exchange(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1590 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1591 unsigned char *q
, md_buf
[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
* 2];
1594 int al
, j
, verify_ret
;
1596 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
1597 const EVP_MD
*md
= NULL
;
1598 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1601 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1604 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1605 EC_KEY
*ecdh
= NULL
;
1606 BN_CTX
*bn_ctx
= NULL
;
1607 EC_POINT
*srvr_ecpoint
= NULL
;
1610 PACKET save_param_start
, signature
;
1612 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx
);
1614 alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
1616 save_param_start
= *pkt
;
1618 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1619 RSA_free(s
->s3
->peer_rsa_tmp
);
1620 s
->s3
->peer_rsa_tmp
= NULL
;
1622 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1623 DH_free(s
->s3
->peer_dh_tmp
);
1624 s
->s3
->peer_dh_tmp
= NULL
;
1626 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1627 EC_KEY_free(s
->s3
->peer_ecdh_tmp
);
1628 s
->s3
->peer_ecdh_tmp
= NULL
;
1631 alg_a
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
;
1633 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1635 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1636 /* PSK ciphersuites are preceded by an identity hint */
1637 if (alg_k
& SSL_PSK
) {
1638 PACKET psk_identity_hint
;
1639 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &psk_identity_hint
)) {
1640 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1645 * Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in
1646 * ssl3_send_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of
1647 * a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK
1650 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint
) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
) {
1651 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1652 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
1656 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint
) == 0) {
1657 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
);
1658 s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
= NULL
;
1659 } else if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity_hint
,
1660 &s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
)) {
1661 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1666 /* Nothing else to do for plain PSK or RSAPSK */
1667 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kPSK
| SSL_kRSAPSK
)) {
1669 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1670 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1671 if (alg_k
& SSL_kSRP
) {
1672 PACKET prime
, generator
, salt
, server_pub
;
1673 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &prime
)
1674 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &generator
)
1675 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &salt
)
1676 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &server_pub
)) {
1677 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1682 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime
),
1683 PACKET_remaining(&prime
), NULL
)) == NULL
1685 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator
),
1686 PACKET_remaining(&generator
), NULL
)) == NULL
1688 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&salt
),
1689 PACKET_remaining(&salt
), NULL
)) == NULL
1691 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&server_pub
),
1692 PACKET_remaining(&server_pub
), NULL
)) == NULL
) {
1693 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
1697 if (!srp_verify_server_param(s
, &al
)) {
1698 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS
);
1702 /* We must check if there is a certificate */
1703 if (alg_a
& (SSL_aRSA
|SSL_aDSS
))
1704 pkey
= X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
1706 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
1707 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1708 if (alg_k
& SSL_kRSA
) {
1710 /* Temporary RSA keys only allowed in export ciphersuites */
1711 if (!SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
)) {
1712 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1713 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
1717 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &mod
)
1718 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &exp
)) {
1719 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1723 if ((rsa
= RSA_new()) == NULL
) {
1724 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1728 if ((rsa
->n
= BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&mod
), PACKET_remaining(&mod
),
1730 || (rsa
->e
= BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&exp
), PACKET_remaining(&exp
),
1732 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
1736 /* this should be because we are using an export cipher */
1737 if (alg_a
& SSL_aRSA
)
1738 pkey
= X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
1740 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1744 s
->s3
->peer_rsa_tmp
= rsa
;
1747 #else /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
1750 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1751 else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kDHEPSK
)) {
1752 PACKET prime
, generator
, pub_key
;
1754 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &prime
)
1755 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &generator
)
1756 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &pub_key
)) {
1757 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1761 if ((dh
= DH_new()) == NULL
) {
1762 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_DH_LIB
);
1766 if ((dh
->p
= BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime
),
1767 PACKET_remaining(&prime
), NULL
)) == NULL
1768 || (dh
->g
= BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator
),
1769 PACKET_remaining(&generator
), NULL
)) == NULL
1771 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&pub_key
),
1772 PACKET_remaining(&pub_key
), NULL
)) == NULL
) {
1773 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
1777 if (BN_is_zero(dh
->p
) || BN_is_zero(dh
->g
) || BN_is_zero(dh
->pub_key
)) {
1778 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE
);
1782 if (!ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH
, DH_security_bits(dh
), 0, dh
)) {
1783 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1784 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL
);
1787 if (alg_a
& (SSL_aRSA
|SSL_aDSS
))
1788 pkey
= X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
1789 /* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
1791 s
->s3
->peer_dh_tmp
= dh
;
1794 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_DH */
1796 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1797 else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
)) {
1799 const EC_GROUP
*group
;
1801 unsigned char *ecparams
;
1803 if ((ecdh
= EC_KEY_new()) == NULL
) {
1804 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1809 * Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH
1810 * public key. For now we only support named (not generic) curves and
1811 * ECParameters in this case is just three bytes.
1813 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &ecparams
, 3)) {
1814 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1818 * Check curve is one of our preferences, if not server has sent an
1819 * invalid curve. ECParameters is 3 bytes.
1821 if (!tls1_check_curve(s
, ecparams
, 3)) {
1822 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE
);
1826 if ((curve_nid
= tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(*(ecparams
+ 2))) == 0) {
1827 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1828 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1829 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS
);
1833 ngroup
= EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(curve_nid
);
1834 if (ngroup
== NULL
) {
1835 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EC_LIB
);
1838 if (EC_KEY_set_group(ecdh
, ngroup
) == 0) {
1839 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EC_LIB
);
1842 EC_GROUP_free(ngroup
);
1844 group
= EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh
);
1846 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
) &&
1847 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group
) > 163)) {
1848 al
= SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION
;
1849 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1850 SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER
);
1854 /* Next, get the encoded ECPoint */
1855 if (((srvr_ecpoint
= EC_POINT_new(group
)) == NULL
) ||
1856 ((bn_ctx
= BN_CTX_new()) == NULL
)) {
1857 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1861 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &encoded_pt
)) {
1862 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1866 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group
, srvr_ecpoint
, PACKET_data(&encoded_pt
),
1867 PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt
), bn_ctx
) == 0) {
1868 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT
);
1873 * The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign
1874 * ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA
1878 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1879 else if (alg_a
& SSL_aRSA
)
1880 pkey
= X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
1882 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1883 else if (alg_a
& SSL_aECDSA
)
1884 pkey
= X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
1886 /* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
1887 EC_KEY_set_public_key(ecdh
, srvr_ecpoint
);
1888 s
->s3
->peer_ecdh_tmp
= ecdh
;
1890 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx
);
1892 EC_POINT_free(srvr_ecpoint
);
1893 srvr_ecpoint
= NULL
;
1895 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1896 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
1899 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1901 /* if it was signed, check the signature */
1905 * |pkt| now points to the beginning of the signature, so the difference
1906 * equals the length of the parameters.
1908 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(&save_param_start
, ¶ms
,
1909 PACKET_remaining(&save_param_start
) -
1910 PACKET_remaining(pkt
))) {
1911 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1912 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1916 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
1917 unsigned char *sigalgs
;
1919 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &sigalgs
, 2)) {
1920 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1923 rv
= tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md
, s
, sigalgs
, pkey
);
1930 fprintf(stderr
, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md
));
1936 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &signature
)
1937 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
1938 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1941 j
= EVP_PKEY_size(pkey
);
1943 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1948 * Check signature length
1950 if (PACKET_remaining(&signature
) > (size_t)j
) {
1951 /* wrong packet length */
1952 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH
);
1955 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1956 if (pkey
->type
== EVP_PKEY_RSA
&& !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
1962 for (num
= 2; num
> 0; num
--) {
1963 EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx
, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW
);
1964 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx
, (num
== 2)
1965 ? s
->ctx
->md5
: s
->ctx
->sha1
, NULL
);
1966 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx
, &(s
->s3
->client_random
[0]),
1968 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx
, &(s
->s3
->server_random
[0]),
1970 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx
, PACKET_data(¶ms
),
1971 PACKET_remaining(¶ms
));
1972 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx
, q
, &size
);
1977 RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1
, md_buf
, j
, PACKET_data(&signature
),
1978 PACKET_remaining(&signature
), pkey
->pkey
.rsa
);
1979 if (verify_ret
< 0) {
1980 al
= SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
1981 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT
);
1984 if (verify_ret
== 0) {
1986 al
= SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
1987 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE
);
1993 EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&md_ctx
, md
, NULL
);
1994 EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx
, &(s
->s3
->client_random
[0]),
1996 EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx
, &(s
->s3
->server_random
[0]),
1998 EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx
, PACKET_data(¶ms
),
1999 PACKET_remaining(¶ms
));
2000 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&md_ctx
, PACKET_data(&signature
),
2001 PACKET_remaining(&signature
), pkey
) <= 0) {
2003 al
= SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
2004 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE
);
2009 /* aNULL, aSRP or PSK do not need public keys */
2010 if (!(alg_a
& (SSL_aNULL
| SSL_aSRP
)) && !(alg_k
& SSL_PSK
)) {
2011 /* Might be wrong key type, check it */
2012 if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s
))
2013 /* Otherwise this shouldn't happen */
2014 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2017 /* still data left over */
2018 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
2019 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE
);
2023 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey
);
2024 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx
);
2025 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
2027 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
2029 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey
);
2030 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2033 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2036 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2037 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx
);
2038 EC_POINT_free(srvr_ecpoint
);
2041 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx
);
2042 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
2043 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2046 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_certificate_request(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2048 int ret
= MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2049 unsigned int list_len
, ctype_num
, i
, name_len
;
2050 X509_NAME
*xn
= NULL
;
2051 unsigned char *data
;
2052 unsigned char *namestart
, *namebytes
;
2053 STACK_OF(X509_NAME
) *ca_sk
= NULL
;
2055 if ((ca_sk
= sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp
)) == NULL
) {
2056 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2060 /* get the certificate types */
2061 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &ctype_num
)
2062 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &data
, ctype_num
)) {
2063 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
2064 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2067 OPENSSL_free(s
->cert
->ctypes
);
2068 s
->cert
->ctypes
= NULL
;
2069 if (ctype_num
> SSL3_CT_NUMBER
) {
2070 /* If we exceed static buffer copy all to cert structure */
2071 s
->cert
->ctypes
= OPENSSL_malloc(ctype_num
);
2072 if (s
->cert
->ctypes
== NULL
) {
2073 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2076 memcpy(s
->cert
->ctypes
, data
, ctype_num
);
2077 s
->cert
->ctype_num
= (size_t)ctype_num
;
2078 ctype_num
= SSL3_CT_NUMBER
;
2080 for (i
= 0; i
< ctype_num
; i
++)
2081 s
->s3
->tmp
.ctype
[i
] = data
[i
];
2083 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
2084 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &list_len
)
2085 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &data
, list_len
)) {
2086 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
2087 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2088 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2092 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
2093 for (i
= 0; i
< SSL_PKEY_NUM
; i
++) {
2094 s
->s3
->tmp
.md
[i
] = NULL
;
2095 s
->s3
->tmp
.valid_flags
[i
] = 0;
2097 if ((list_len
& 1) || !tls1_save_sigalgs(s
, data
, list_len
)) {
2098 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
2099 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2100 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR
);
2103 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s
)) {
2104 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2105 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2110 /* get the CA RDNs */
2111 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &list_len
)
2112 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != list_len
) {
2113 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
2114 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2118 while (PACKET_remaining(pkt
)) {
2119 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &name_len
)
2120 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &namebytes
, name_len
)) {
2121 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
2122 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2123 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2127 namestart
= namebytes
;
2129 if ((xn
= d2i_X509_NAME(NULL
, (const unsigned char **)&namebytes
,
2130 name_len
)) == NULL
) {
2131 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
2132 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB
);
2136 if (namebytes
!= (namestart
+ name_len
)) {
2137 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
2138 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2139 SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2142 if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk
, xn
)) {
2143 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2148 /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
2149 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
= 1;
2150 s
->s3
->tmp
.ctype_num
= ctype_num
;
2151 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.ca_names
, X509_NAME_free
);
2152 s
->s3
->tmp
.ca_names
= ca_sk
;
2155 ret
= MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
2158 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
2160 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk
, X509_NAME_free
);
2164 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME
*const *a
, const X509_NAME
*const *b
)
2166 return (X509_NAME_cmp(*a
, *b
));
2169 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_new_session_ticket(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2172 unsigned int ticklen
;
2173 unsigned long ticket_lifetime_hint
;
2175 if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt
, &ticket_lifetime_hint
)
2176 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &ticklen
)
2177 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != ticklen
) {
2178 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2179 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2183 /* Server is allowed to change its mind and send an empty ticket. */
2185 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
2187 if (s
->session
->session_id_length
> 0) {
2188 int i
= s
->session_ctx
->session_cache_mode
;
2189 SSL_SESSION
*new_sess
;
2191 * We reused an existing session, so we need to replace it with a new
2194 if (i
& SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT
) {
2196 * Remove the old session from the cache
2198 if (i
& SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE
) {
2199 if (s
->session_ctx
->remove_session_cb
!= NULL
)
2200 s
->session_ctx
->remove_session_cb(s
->session_ctx
,
2203 /* We carry on if this fails */
2204 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s
->session_ctx
, s
->session
);
2208 if ((new_sess
= ssl_session_dup(s
->session
, 0)) == 0) {
2209 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2210 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2214 SSL_SESSION_free(s
->session
);
2215 s
->session
= new_sess
;
2218 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->tlsext_tick
);
2219 s
->session
->tlsext_ticklen
= 0;
2221 s
->session
->tlsext_tick
= OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen
);
2222 if (s
->session
->tlsext_tick
== NULL
) {
2223 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2226 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt
, s
->session
->tlsext_tick
, ticklen
)) {
2227 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2228 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2232 s
->session
->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint
= ticket_lifetime_hint
;
2233 s
->session
->tlsext_ticklen
= ticklen
;
2235 * There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session. One is to set
2236 * an appropriate session ID and then the server must return a match in
2237 * ServerHello. This allows the normal client session ID matching to work
2238 * and we know much earlier that the ticket has been accepted. The
2239 * other way is to set zero length session ID when the ticket is
2240 * presented and rely on the handshake to determine session resumption.
2241 * We choose the former approach because this fits in with assumptions
2242 * elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set to the SHA256 (or SHA1 is
2243 * SHA256 is disabled) hash of the ticket.
2245 EVP_Digest(s
->session
->tlsext_tick
, ticklen
,
2246 s
->session
->session_id
, &s
->session
->session_id_length
,
2247 EVP_sha256(), NULL
);
2248 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
2250 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
2252 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
2253 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2256 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_cert_status(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2259 unsigned long resplen
;
2262 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &type
)
2263 || type
!= TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp
) {
2264 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2265 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS
, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE
);
2268 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt
, &resplen
)
2269 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != resplen
) {
2270 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2271 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2274 OPENSSL_free(s
->tlsext_ocsp_resp
);
2275 s
->tlsext_ocsp_resp
= OPENSSL_malloc(resplen
);
2276 if (s
->tlsext_ocsp_resp
== NULL
) {
2277 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2278 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2281 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt
, s
->tlsext_ocsp_resp
, resplen
)) {
2282 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2283 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2286 s
->tlsext_ocsp_resplen
= resplen
;
2287 if (s
->ctx
->tlsext_status_cb
) {
2289 ret
= s
->ctx
->tlsext_status_cb(s
, s
->ctx
->tlsext_status_arg
);
2291 al
= SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE
;
2292 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS
, SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE
);
2296 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2297 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2301 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
2303 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
2304 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
2305 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2308 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_server_done(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2310 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) > 0) {
2311 /* should contain no data */
2312 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
2313 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2314 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
2315 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2318 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2319 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kSRP
) {
2320 if (SRP_Calc_A_param(s
) <= 0) {
2321 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE
, SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC
);
2322 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2323 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
2324 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2330 * at this point we check that we have the required stuff from
2333 if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s
)) {
2334 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
2335 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
2336 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2339 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
2340 /* Only applies to renegotiation */
2341 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s
))
2342 && s
->renegotiate
!= 0)
2343 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING
;
2346 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
2349 int tls_construct_client_key_exchange(SSL
*s
)
2353 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2354 size_t pskhdrlen
= 0;
2356 unsigned long alg_k
;
2357 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2359 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
2361 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2362 EC_KEY
*clnt_ecdh
= NULL
;
2363 const EC_POINT
*srvr_ecpoint
= NULL
;
2364 EVP_PKEY
*srvr_pub_pkey
= NULL
;
2365 unsigned char *encodedPoint
= NULL
;
2366 int encoded_pt_len
= 0;
2367 BN_CTX
*bn_ctx
= NULL
;
2369 unsigned char *pms
= NULL
;
2371 alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
2373 p
= ssl_handshake_start(s
);
2376 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2377 if (alg_k
& SSL_PSK
) {
2380 * The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes to return a
2381 * \0-terminated identity. The last byte is for us for simulating
2384 char identity
[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
+ 1];
2386 unsigned char psk
[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
];
2389 if (s
->psk_client_callback
== NULL
) {
2390 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2391 SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB
);
2395 memset(identity
, 0, sizeof(identity
));
2397 psklen
= s
->psk_client_callback(s
, s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
,
2398 identity
, sizeof(identity
) - 1,
2401 if (psklen
> PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
) {
2402 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2403 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2405 } else if (psklen
== 0) {
2406 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2407 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND
);
2411 OPENSSL_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
);
2412 s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
= BUF_memdup(psk
, psklen
);
2413 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk
, psklen
);
2415 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
== NULL
) {
2416 OPENSSL_cleanse(identity
, sizeof(identity
));
2420 s
->s3
->tmp
.psklen
= psklen
;
2422 identitylen
= strlen(identity
);
2423 if (identitylen
> PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
) {
2424 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2425 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2428 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->psk_identity
);
2429 s
->session
->psk_identity
= BUF_strdup(identity
);
2430 if (s
->session
->psk_identity
== NULL
) {
2431 OPENSSL_cleanse(identity
, sizeof(identity
));
2435 s2n(identitylen
, p
);
2436 memcpy(p
, identity
, identitylen
);
2437 pskhdrlen
= 2 + identitylen
;
2441 OPENSSL_cleanse(identity
, sizeof(identity
));
2443 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
2447 if (alg_k
& SSL_kPSK
) {
2452 /* Fool emacs indentation */
2455 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2456 else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kRSA
| SSL_kRSAPSK
)) {
2458 pmslen
= SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
;
2459 pms
= OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen
);
2463 if (s
->session
->peer
== NULL
) {
2465 * We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA.
2467 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2468 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2472 if (s
->s3
->peer_rsa_tmp
!= NULL
)
2473 rsa
= s
->s3
->peer_rsa_tmp
;
2475 pkey
= X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
2476 if ((pkey
== NULL
) || (pkey
->type
!= EVP_PKEY_RSA
)
2477 || (pkey
->pkey
.rsa
== NULL
)) {
2478 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2479 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2480 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey
);
2483 rsa
= pkey
->pkey
.rsa
;
2484 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey
);
2487 pms
[0] = s
->client_version
>> 8;
2488 pms
[1] = s
->client_version
& 0xff;
2489 if (RAND_bytes(pms
+ 2, pmslen
- 2) <= 0)
2493 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2494 if (s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
)
2496 n
= RSA_public_encrypt(pmslen
, pms
, p
, rsa
, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING
);
2498 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_1
)
2500 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_2
)
2504 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2505 SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT
);
2509 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2510 if (s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
) {
2516 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2517 else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kDHr
| SSL_kDHd
| SSL_kDHEPSK
)) {
2518 DH
*dh_srvr
, *dh_clnt
;
2519 if (s
->s3
->peer_dh_tmp
!= NULL
)
2520 dh_srvr
= s
->s3
->peer_dh_tmp
;
2522 /* we get them from the cert */
2523 EVP_PKEY
*spkey
= NULL
;
2525 spkey
= X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
2527 dh_srvr
= EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(spkey
);
2528 EVP_PKEY_free(spkey
);
2530 if (dh_srvr
== NULL
) {
2531 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2532 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2536 if (s
->s3
->flags
& TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY
) {
2537 /* Use client certificate key */
2538 EVP_PKEY
*clkey
= s
->cert
->key
->privatekey
;
2541 dh_clnt
= EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(clkey
);
2542 if (dh_clnt
== NULL
) {
2543 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2544 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2548 /* generate a new random key */
2549 if ((dh_clnt
= DHparams_dup(dh_srvr
)) == NULL
) {
2550 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_DH_LIB
);
2553 if (!DH_generate_key(dh_clnt
)) {
2554 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_DH_LIB
);
2560 pmslen
= DH_size(dh_clnt
);
2561 pms
= OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen
);
2566 * use the 'p' output buffer for the DH key, but make sure to
2567 * clear it out afterwards
2570 n
= DH_compute_key(pms
, dh_srvr
->pub_key
, dh_clnt
);
2571 if (s
->s3
->peer_dh_tmp
== NULL
)
2575 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_DH_LIB
);
2581 if (s
->s3
->flags
& TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY
)
2584 /* send off the data */
2585 n
= BN_num_bytes(dh_clnt
->pub_key
);
2587 BN_bn2bin(dh_clnt
->pub_key
, p
);
2595 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2596 else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kECDHr
| SSL_kECDHe
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
)) {
2597 const EC_GROUP
*srvr_group
= NULL
;
2599 int ecdh_clnt_cert
= 0;
2602 * Did we send out the client's ECDH share for use in premaster
2603 * computation as part of client certificate? If so, set
2604 * ecdh_clnt_cert to 1.
2606 if ((alg_k
& (SSL_kECDHr
| SSL_kECDHe
)) && (s
->cert
!= NULL
)) {
2608 * XXX: For now, we do not support client
2609 * authentication using ECDH certificates.
2610 * To add such support, one needs to add
2611 * code that checks for appropriate
2612 * conditions and sets ecdh_clnt_cert to 1.
2613 * For example, the cert have an ECC
2614 * key on the same curve as the server's
2615 * and the key should be authorized for
2618 * One also needs to add code in ssl3_connect
2619 * to skip sending the certificate verify
2622 * if ((s->cert->key->privatekey != NULL) &&
2623 * (s->cert->key->privatekey->type ==
2624 * EVP_PKEY_EC) && ...)
2625 * ecdh_clnt_cert = 1;
2629 if (s
->s3
->peer_ecdh_tmp
!= NULL
) {
2630 tkey
= s
->s3
->peer_ecdh_tmp
;
2632 /* Get the Server Public Key from Cert */
2633 srvr_pub_pkey
= X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
2634 if ((srvr_pub_pkey
== NULL
)
2635 || (srvr_pub_pkey
->type
!= EVP_PKEY_EC
)
2636 || (srvr_pub_pkey
->pkey
.ec
== NULL
)) {
2637 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2638 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2642 tkey
= srvr_pub_pkey
->pkey
.ec
;
2645 srvr_group
= EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey
);
2646 srvr_ecpoint
= EC_KEY_get0_public_key(tkey
);
2648 if ((srvr_group
== NULL
) || (srvr_ecpoint
== NULL
)) {
2649 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2650 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2654 if ((clnt_ecdh
= EC_KEY_new()) == NULL
) {
2655 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2656 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2660 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(clnt_ecdh
, srvr_group
)) {
2661 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EC_LIB
);
2664 if (ecdh_clnt_cert
) {
2666 * Reuse key info from our certificate We only need our
2667 * private key to perform the ECDH computation.
2669 const BIGNUM
*priv_key
;
2670 tkey
= s
->cert
->key
->privatekey
->pkey
.ec
;
2671 priv_key
= EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey
);
2672 if (priv_key
== NULL
) {
2673 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2674 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2677 if (!EC_KEY_set_private_key(clnt_ecdh
, priv_key
)) {
2678 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EC_LIB
);
2682 /* Generate a new ECDH key pair */
2683 if (!(EC_KEY_generate_key(clnt_ecdh
))) {
2684 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2691 * use the 'p' output buffer for the ECDH key, but make sure to
2692 * clear it out afterwards
2695 field_size
= EC_GROUP_get_degree(srvr_group
);
2696 if (field_size
<= 0) {
2697 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB
);
2700 pmslen
= (field_size
+ 7) / 8;
2701 pms
= OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen
);
2704 n
= ECDH_compute_key(pms
, pmslen
, srvr_ecpoint
, clnt_ecdh
, NULL
);
2705 if (n
<= 0 || pmslen
!= (size_t)n
) {
2706 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB
);
2710 if (ecdh_clnt_cert
) {
2711 /* Send empty client key exch message */
2715 * First check the size of encoding and allocate memory
2719 EC_POINT_point2oct(srvr_group
,
2720 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_ecdh
),
2721 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED
,
2724 encodedPoint
= (unsigned char *)
2725 OPENSSL_malloc(encoded_pt_len
* sizeof(unsigned char));
2726 bn_ctx
= BN_CTX_new();
2727 if ((encodedPoint
== NULL
) || (bn_ctx
== NULL
)) {
2728 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2729 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2733 /* Encode the public key */
2734 n
= EC_POINT_point2oct(srvr_group
,
2735 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_ecdh
),
2736 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED
,
2737 encodedPoint
, encoded_pt_len
, bn_ctx
);
2739 *p
= n
; /* length of encoded point */
2740 /* Encoded point will be copied here */
2742 /* copy the point */
2743 memcpy(p
, encodedPoint
, n
);
2744 /* increment n to account for length field */
2748 /* Free allocated memory */
2749 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx
);
2750 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint
);
2751 EC_KEY_free(clnt_ecdh
);
2752 EVP_PKEY_free(srvr_pub_pkey
);
2754 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2755 else if (alg_k
& SSL_kGOST
) {
2756 /* GOST key exchange message creation */
2757 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pkey_ctx
;
2760 unsigned int md_len
;
2761 unsigned char shared_ukm
[32], tmp
[256];
2762 EVP_MD_CTX
*ukm_hash
;
2766 pms
= OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen
);
2771 * Get server sertificate PKEY and create ctx from it
2773 peer_cert
= s
->session
->peer
;
2775 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2776 SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER
);
2780 pkey_ctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pub_key
=
2781 X509_get_pubkey(peer_cert
), NULL
);
2782 if (pkey_ctx
== NULL
) {
2783 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2784 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2788 * If we have send a certificate, and certificate key
2790 * * parameters match those of server certificate, use
2791 * certificate key for key exchange
2794 /* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */
2796 EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx
);
2797 /* Generate session key */
2798 if (RAND_bytes(pms
, pmslen
) <= 0) {
2799 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx
);
2800 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2801 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2805 * If we have client certificate, use its secret as peer key
2807 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
&& s
->cert
->key
->privatekey
) {
2808 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer
2809 (pkey_ctx
, s
->cert
->key
->privatekey
) <= 0) {
2811 * If there was an error - just ignore it. Ephemeral key
2818 * Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context
2821 ukm_hash
= EVP_MD_CTX_create();
2822 EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash
,
2823 EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_94
));
2824 EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash
, s
->s3
->client_random
,
2826 EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash
, s
->s3
->server_random
,
2828 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash
, shared_ukm
, &md_len
);
2829 EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(ukm_hash
);
2830 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
2831 (pkey_ctx
, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT
, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV
, 8,
2833 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2837 /* Make GOST keytransport blob message */
2839 * Encapsulate it into sequence
2841 *(p
++) = V_ASN1_SEQUENCE
| V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED
;
2843 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx
, tmp
, &msglen
, pms
, pmslen
) < 0) {
2844 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2848 if (msglen
>= 0x80) {
2850 *(p
++) = msglen
& 0xff;
2853 *(p
++) = msglen
& 0xff;
2856 memcpy(p
, tmp
, msglen
);
2857 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2858 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
2859 (pkey_ctx
, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY
, 2, NULL
) > 0) {
2860 /* Set flag "skip certificate verify" */
2861 s
->s3
->flags
|= TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY
;
2863 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx
);
2864 EVP_PKEY_free(pub_key
);
2867 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2868 else if (alg_k
& SSL_kSRP
) {
2869 if (s
->srp_ctx
.A
!= NULL
) {
2870 /* send off the data */
2871 n
= BN_num_bytes(s
->srp_ctx
.A
);
2873 BN_bn2bin(s
->srp_ctx
.A
, p
);
2876 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2877 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2880 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->srp_username
);
2881 s
->session
->srp_username
= BUF_strdup(s
->srp_ctx
.login
);
2882 if (s
->session
->srp_username
== NULL
) {
2883 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2884 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2890 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
2891 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2895 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2899 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s
, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, n
)) {
2900 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
2901 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2905 s
->s3
->tmp
.pms
= pms
;
2906 s
->s3
->tmp
.pmslen
= pmslen
;
2910 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2911 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2913 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms
, pmslen
);
2914 s
->s3
->tmp
.pms
= NULL
;
2915 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2916 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx
);
2917 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint
);
2918 EC_KEY_free(clnt_ecdh
);
2919 EVP_PKEY_free(srvr_pub_pkey
);
2921 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2922 OPENSSL_clear_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
, s
->s3
->tmp
.psklen
);
2923 s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
= NULL
;
2925 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
2929 int tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(SSL
*s
)
2931 unsigned char *pms
= NULL
;
2934 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2936 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kSRP
) {
2937 if (!srp_generate_client_master_secret(s
)) {
2938 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK
,
2939 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2945 pms
= s
->s3
->tmp
.pms
;
2946 pmslen
= s
->s3
->tmp
.pmslen
;
2948 if (pms
== NULL
&& !(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kPSK
)) {
2949 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2950 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2953 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s
, pms
, pmslen
, 1)) {
2954 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2955 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2959 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
2960 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
2961 unsigned char sctpauthkey
[64];
2962 char labelbuffer
[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
)];
2965 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
2968 memcpy(labelbuffer
, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
,
2969 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
));
2971 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s
, sctpauthkey
,
2972 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), labelbuffer
,
2973 sizeof(labelbuffer
), NULL
, 0, 0) <= 0)
2976 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY
,
2977 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), sctpauthkey
);
2983 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms
, pmslen
);
2984 s
->s3
->tmp
.pms
= NULL
;
2988 int tls_construct_client_verify(SSL
*s
)
2991 unsigned char data
[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
+ SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
];
2993 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pctx
= NULL
;
2999 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx
);
3001 p
= ssl_handshake_start(s
);
3002 pkey
= s
->cert
->key
->privatekey
;
3003 /* Create context from key and test if sha1 is allowed as digest */
3004 pctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey
, NULL
);
3006 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3009 EVP_PKEY_sign_init(pctx
);
3010 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md(pctx
, EVP_sha1()) > 0) {
3011 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
))
3012 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->cert_verify_mac(s
,
3015 [MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
]));
3020 * For TLS v1.2 send signature algorithm and signature using agreed
3021 * digest and cached handshake records.
3023 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
3026 const EVP_MD
*md
= s
->s3
->tmp
.md
[s
->cert
->key
- s
->cert
->pkeys
];
3027 hdatalen
= BIO_get_mem_data(s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
, &hdata
);
3028 if (hdatalen
<= 0 || !tls12_get_sigandhash(p
, pkey
, md
)) {
3029 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3034 fprintf(stderr
, "Using TLS 1.2 with client alg %s\n",
3037 if (!EVP_SignInit_ex(&mctx
, md
, NULL
)
3038 || !EVP_SignUpdate(&mctx
, hdata
, hdatalen
)
3039 || !EVP_SignFinal(&mctx
, p
+ 2, &u
, pkey
)) {
3040 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
3045 /* Digest cached records and discard handshake buffer */
3046 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 0))
3049 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3050 if (pkey
->type
== EVP_PKEY_RSA
) {
3051 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->cert_verify_mac(s
, NID_md5
, &(data
[0]));
3052 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1
, data
,
3053 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
+ SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
,
3054 &(p
[2]), &u
, pkey
->pkey
.rsa
) <= 0) {
3055 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_RSA_LIB
);
3062 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3063 if (pkey
->type
== EVP_PKEY_DSA
) {
3064 if (!DSA_sign(pkey
->save_type
,
3065 &(data
[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
]),
3066 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
, &(p
[2]),
3067 (unsigned int *)&j
, pkey
->pkey
.dsa
)) {
3068 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_DSA_LIB
);
3075 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3076 if (pkey
->type
== EVP_PKEY_EC
) {
3077 if (!ECDSA_sign(pkey
->save_type
,
3078 &(data
[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
]),
3079 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
, &(p
[2]),
3080 (unsigned int *)&j
, pkey
->pkey
.ec
)) {
3081 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_ECDSA_LIB
);
3088 if (pkey
->type
== NID_id_GostR3410_2001
) {
3089 unsigned char signbuf
[64];
3091 size_t sigsize
= 64;
3092 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->cert_verify_mac(s
,
3093 NID_id_GostR3411_94
, data
);
3094 if (EVP_PKEY_sign(pctx
, signbuf
, &sigsize
, data
, 32) <= 0) {
3095 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3098 for (i
= 63, j
= 0; i
>= 0; j
++, i
--) {
3099 p
[2 + j
] = signbuf
[i
];
3104 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3107 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s
, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY
, n
)) {
3108 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3112 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx
);
3113 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
3116 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx
);
3117 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
3122 * Check a certificate can be used for client authentication. Currently check
3123 * cert exists, if we have a suitable digest for TLS 1.2 if static DH client
3124 * certificates can be used and optionally checks suitability for Suite B.
3126 static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL
*s
)
3128 unsigned long alg_k
;
3129 if (!s
->cert
|| !s
->cert
->key
->x509
|| !s
->cert
->key
->privatekey
)
3131 /* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */
3132 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
) && !s
->s3
->tmp
.md
[s
->cert
->key
- s
->cert
->pkeys
])
3135 * If strict mode check suitability of chain before using it. This also
3136 * adjusts suite B digest if necessary.
3138 if (s
->cert
->cert_flags
& SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT
&&
3139 !tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, -2))
3141 alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
3142 /* See if we can use client certificate for fixed DH */
3143 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHr
| SSL_kDHd
)) {
3144 int i
= s
->session
->peer_type
;
3145 EVP_PKEY
*clkey
= NULL
, *spkey
= NULL
;
3146 clkey
= s
->cert
->key
->privatekey
;
3147 /* If client key not DH assume it can be used */
3148 if (EVP_PKEY_id(clkey
) != EVP_PKEY_DH
)
3151 spkey
= X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
3153 /* Compare server and client parameters */
3154 i
= EVP_PKEY_cmp_parameters(clkey
, spkey
);
3155 EVP_PKEY_free(spkey
);
3159 s
->s3
->flags
|= TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY
;
3164 WORK_STATE
tls_prepare_client_certificate(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
3167 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
3170 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_A
) {
3171 /* Let cert callback update client certificates if required */
3172 if (s
->cert
->cert_cb
) {
3173 i
= s
->cert
->cert_cb(s
, s
->cert
->cert_cb_arg
);
3175 s
->rwstate
= SSL_X509_LOOKUP
;
3179 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3180 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
3183 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
3185 if (ssl3_check_client_certificate(s
))
3186 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
3188 /* Fall through to WORK_MORE_B */
3192 /* We need to get a client cert */
3193 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_B
) {
3195 * If we get an error, we need to ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3196 * return(-1); We then get retied later
3198 i
= ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s
, &x509
, &pkey
);
3200 s
->rwstate
= SSL_X509_LOOKUP
;
3203 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
3204 if ((i
== 1) && (pkey
!= NULL
) && (x509
!= NULL
)) {
3205 if (!SSL_use_certificate(s
, x509
) || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s
, pkey
))
3207 } else if (i
== 1) {
3209 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3210 SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK
);
3214 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey
);
3215 if (i
&& !ssl3_check_client_certificate(s
))
3218 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
) {
3219 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
= 0;
3220 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_WARNING
, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE
);
3221 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
3223 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
= 2;
3224 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 0)) {
3225 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3226 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
3232 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
3235 /* Shouldn't ever get here */
3239 int tls_construct_client_certificate(SSL
*s
)
3241 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s
,
3242 (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
==
3243 2) ? NULL
: s
->cert
->key
)) {
3244 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3245 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3246 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
3253 #define has_bits(i,m) (((i)&(m)) == (m))
3255 int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL
*s
)
3259 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
3261 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3264 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3267 int al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
3269 alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
3270 alg_a
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
;
3272 /* we don't have a certificate */
3273 if ((alg_a
& SSL_aNULL
) || (alg_k
& SSL_kPSK
))
3275 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3276 rsa
= s
->s3
->peer_rsa_tmp
;
3278 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3279 dh
= s
->s3
->peer_dh_tmp
;
3282 /* This is the passed certificate */
3284 idx
= s
->session
->peer_type
;
3285 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3286 if (idx
== SSL_PKEY_ECC
) {
3287 if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(s
->session
->peer
, s
) == 0) {
3289 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT
);
3294 } else if (alg_a
& SSL_aECDSA
) {
3295 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3296 SSL_R_MISSING_ECDSA_SIGNING_CERT
);
3298 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kECDHr
| SSL_kECDHe
)) {
3299 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
, SSL_R_MISSING_ECDH_CERT
);
3303 pkey
= X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
3304 pkey_bits
= EVP_PKEY_bits(pkey
);
3305 i
= X509_certificate_type(s
->session
->peer
, pkey
);
3306 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey
);
3308 /* Check that we have a certificate if we require one */
3309 if ((alg_a
& SSL_aRSA
) && !has_bits(i
, EVP_PK_RSA
| EVP_PKT_SIGN
)) {
3310 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3311 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_SIGNING_CERT
);
3314 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3315 else if ((alg_a
& SSL_aDSS
) && !has_bits(i
, EVP_PK_DSA
| EVP_PKT_SIGN
)) {
3316 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3317 SSL_R_MISSING_DSA_SIGNING_CERT
);
3321 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3322 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kRSA
| SSL_kRSAPSK
)) {
3323 if (!SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
) &&
3324 !has_bits(i
, EVP_PK_RSA
| EVP_PKT_ENC
)) {
3325 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3326 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT
);
3328 } else if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
)) {
3329 if (pkey_bits
<= SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
)) {
3330 if (!has_bits(i
, EVP_PK_RSA
| EVP_PKT_ENC
)) {
3331 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3332 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT
);
3336 /* server key exchange is not allowed. */
3337 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3338 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3345 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3346 if ((alg_k
& SSL_kDHE
) && (dh
== NULL
)) {
3347 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3348 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3350 } else if ((alg_k
& SSL_kDHr
) && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
) &&
3351 !has_bits(i
, EVP_PK_DH
| EVP_PKS_RSA
)) {
3352 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3353 SSL_R_MISSING_DH_RSA_CERT
);
3356 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3357 else if ((alg_k
& SSL_kDHd
) && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
) &&
3358 !has_bits(i
, EVP_PK_DH
| EVP_PKS_DSA
)) {
3359 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3360 SSL_R_MISSING_DH_DSA_CERT
);
3366 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
) &&
3367 pkey_bits
> SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
)) {
3368 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3369 if (alg_k
& SSL_kRSA
) {
3371 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3372 SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_RSA_KEY
);
3374 } else if (RSA_bits(rsa
) >
3375 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
)) {
3376 /* We have a temporary RSA key but it's too large. */
3377 al
= SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION
;
3378 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3379 SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_RSA_KEY
);
3384 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3385 if (alg_k
& SSL_kDHE
) {
3387 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
)) {
3388 /* We have a temporary DH key but it's too large. */
3389 al
= SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION
;
3390 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3391 SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_DH_KEY
);
3394 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHr
| SSL_kDHd
)) {
3395 /* The cert should have had an export DH key. */
3396 al
= SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION
;
3397 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3398 SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_DH_KEY
);
3403 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3404 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE
);
3410 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
3414 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3415 int tls_construct_next_proto(SSL
*s
)
3417 unsigned int len
, padding_len
;
3420 len
= s
->next_proto_negotiated_len
;
3421 padding_len
= 32 - ((len
+ 2) % 32);
3422 d
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
3424 memcpy(d
+ 5, s
->next_proto_negotiated
, len
);
3425 d
[5 + len
] = padding_len
;
3426 memset(d
+ 6 + len
, 0, padding_len
);
3427 *(d
++) = SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO
;
3428 l2n3(2 + len
+ padding_len
, d
);
3429 s
->init_num
= 4 + 2 + len
+ padding_len
;
3436 int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL
*s
, X509
**px509
, EVP_PKEY
**ppkey
)
3439 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
3440 if (s
->ctx
->client_cert_engine
) {
3441 i
= ENGINE_load_ssl_client_cert(s
->ctx
->client_cert_engine
, s
,
3442 SSL_get_client_CA_list(s
),
3443 px509
, ppkey
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
);
3448 if (s
->ctx
->client_cert_cb
)
3449 i
= s
->ctx
->client_cert_cb(s
, px509
, ppkey
);
3453 int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL
*s
, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *sk
,
3459 int empty_reneg_info_scsv
= !s
->renegotiate
;
3460 /* Set disabled masks for this session */
3461 ssl_set_client_disabled(s
);
3467 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk
); i
++) {
3468 c
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk
, i
);
3469 /* Skip disabled ciphers */
3470 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s
, c
, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED
))
3472 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3473 if (c
->id
== SSL3_CK_SCSV
) {
3474 if (!empty_reneg_info_scsv
)
3477 empty_reneg_info_scsv
= 0;
3480 j
= s
->method
->put_cipher_by_char(c
, p
);
3484 * If p == q, no ciphers; caller indicates an error. Otherwise, add
3488 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv
) {
3489 static SSL_CIPHER scsv
= {
3490 0, NULL
, SSL3_CK_SCSV
, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3492 j
= s
->method
->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv
, p
);
3494 #ifdef OPENSSL_RI_DEBUG
3496 "TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV sent by client\n");
3499 if (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV
) {
3500 static SSL_CIPHER scsv
= {
3501 0, NULL
, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV
, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3503 j
= s
->method
->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv
, p
);