2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
4 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
6 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
7 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
8 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
9 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
14 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
15 #include "statem_locl.h"
16 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
17 #include <openssl/rand.h>
18 #include <openssl/objects.h>
19 #include <openssl/evp.h>
20 #include <openssl/md5.h>
21 #include <openssl/dh.h>
22 #include <openssl/bn.h>
23 #include <openssl/engine.h>
25 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
);
26 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
);
28 static ossl_inline
int cert_req_allowed(SSL
*s
);
29 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL
*s
);
30 static int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL
*s
, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *sk
,
34 * Is a CertificateRequest message allowed at the moment or not?
40 static ossl_inline
int cert_req_allowed(SSL
*s
)
42 /* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */
43 if ((s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
44 && (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aNULL
))
45 || (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aSRP
| SSL_aPSK
)))
52 * Should we expect the ServerKeyExchange message or not?
58 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL
*s
)
60 long alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
63 * Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral
64 * ciphersuite or for SRP
66 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kDHEPSK
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
75 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
76 * handshake state transitions when a TLS1.3 client is reading messages from the
77 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
78 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
80 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
81 * (transition not allowed)
83 static int ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(SSL
*s
, int mt
)
85 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
88 * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO, because we haven't
89 * yet negotiated TLSv1.3 at that point so that is handled by
90 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition()
93 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
97 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
99 * This must a ClientHello following a HelloRetryRequest, so the only
100 * thing we can get now is a ServerHello.
102 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO
) {
103 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
;
108 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
:
109 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
) {
110 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
;
115 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
:
117 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
) {
118 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
;
122 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
) {
123 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
;
126 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
) {
127 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT
;
133 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
:
134 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
) {
135 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT
;
141 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY
) {
142 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
;
147 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
:
148 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
) {
149 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
;
155 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET
) {
156 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
;
159 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE
) {
160 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE
;
166 /* No valid transition found */
171 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
172 * handshake state transitions when the client is reading messages from the
173 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
174 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
176 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
177 * (transition not allowed)
179 int ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL
*s
, int mt
)
181 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
185 * Note that after writing the first ClientHello we don't know what version
186 * we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later.
188 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
189 if (!ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(s
, mt
))
194 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
198 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
199 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO
) {
200 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
;
204 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
205 if (mt
== DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
) {
206 st
->hand_state
= DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
;
212 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA
:
214 * We've not actually selected TLSv1.3 yet, but we have sent early
215 * data. The only thing allowed now is a ServerHello or a
218 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO
) {
219 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
;
224 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
:
226 if (s
->ext
.ticket_expected
) {
227 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET
) {
228 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
;
231 } else if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
232 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
;
236 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && mt
== DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
) {
237 st
->hand_state
= DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
;
239 } else if (s
->version
>= TLS1_VERSION
240 && s
->ext
.session_secret_cb
!= NULL
241 && s
->session
->ext
.tick
!= NULL
242 && mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
244 * Normally, we can tell if the server is resuming the session
245 * from the session ID. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851), however, relies on
246 * the next server message after the ServerHello to determine if
247 * the server is resuming.
250 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
;
252 } else if (!(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
253 & (SSL_aNULL
| SSL_aSRP
| SSL_aPSK
))) {
254 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
) {
255 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT
;
259 ske_expected
= key_exchange_expected(s
);
260 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
262 || ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_PSK
)
263 && mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
)) {
264 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
) {
265 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH
;
268 } else if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
269 && cert_req_allowed(s
)) {
270 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
;
272 } else if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE
) {
273 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
;
282 * The CertificateStatus message is optional even if
283 * |ext.status_expected| is set
285 if (s
->ext
.status_expected
&& mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS
) {
286 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS
;
291 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS
:
292 ske_expected
= key_exchange_expected(s
);
293 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
294 if (ske_expected
|| ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_PSK
)
295 && mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
)) {
296 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
) {
297 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH
;
304 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH
:
305 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
) {
306 if (cert_req_allowed(s
)) {
307 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
;
314 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
:
315 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE
) {
316 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
;
321 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
:
322 if (s
->ext
.ticket_expected
) {
323 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET
) {
324 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
;
327 } else if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
328 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
;
333 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
:
334 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
335 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
;
340 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
:
341 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
) {
342 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
;
348 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST
) {
349 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ
;
356 /* No valid transition found */
357 SSLfatal(s
, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
,
358 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_READ_TRANSITION
,
359 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
364 * ossl_statem_client13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
365 * move to next when the TLSv1.3 client is writing messages to be sent to the
368 static WRITE_TRAN
ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(SSL
*s
)
370 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
373 * Note: There are no cases for TLS_ST_BEFORE because we haven't negotiated
374 * TLSv1.3 yet at that point. They are handled by
375 * ossl_statem_client_write_transition().
377 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
379 /* Shouldn't happen */
380 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
381 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT13_WRITE_TRANSITION
,
382 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
383 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR
;
385 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
:
386 if (s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY
387 || s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING
)
388 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END
;
389 else if ((s
->options
& SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT
) != 0
390 && s
->hello_retry_request
== SSL_HRR_NONE
)
391 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
;
393 st
->hand_state
= (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
!= 0) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT
394 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
395 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
397 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END
:
398 if (s
->ext
.early_data
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED
) {
399 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
;
400 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
404 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
:
405 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
:
406 st
->hand_state
= (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
!= 0) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT
407 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
408 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
411 /* If a non-empty Certificate we also send CertificateVerify */
412 st
->hand_state
= (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
== 1) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
413 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
414 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
416 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
:
417 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
418 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
420 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE
:
421 if (s
->key_update
!= SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE
) {
422 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE
;
423 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
427 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE
:
428 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
:
429 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
:
430 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
431 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
434 if (s
->key_update
!= SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE
) {
435 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE
;
436 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
439 /* Try to read from the server instead */
440 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
445 * ossl_statem_client_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
446 * move to next when the client is writing messages to be sent to the server.
448 WRITE_TRAN
ossl_statem_client_write_transition(SSL
*s
)
450 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
453 * Note that immediately before/after a ClientHello we don't know what
454 * version we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until
458 return ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(s
);
460 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
462 /* Shouldn't happen */
463 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
464 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_WRITE_TRANSITION
,
465 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
466 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR
;
469 if (!s
->renegotiate
) {
471 * We haven't requested a renegotiation ourselves so we must have
472 * received a message from the server. Better read it.
474 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
479 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
;
480 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
482 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
483 if (s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
) {
485 * We are assuming this is a TLSv1.3 connection, although we haven't
486 * actually selected a version yet.
488 if ((s
->options
& SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT
) != 0)
489 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
;
491 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA
;
492 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
495 * No transition at the end of writing because we don't know what
498 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
500 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
:
502 * We only get here in TLSv1.3. We just received an HRR, so issue a
503 * CCS unless middlebox compat mode is off, or we already issued one
504 * because we did early data.
506 if ((s
->options
& SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT
) != 0
507 && s
->early_data_state
!= SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING
)
508 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
;
510 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
;
511 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
513 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA
:
514 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
516 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
517 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
;
518 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
520 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
:
521 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
)
522 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CERT
;
524 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH
;
525 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
528 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH
;
529 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
531 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH
:
533 * For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is
534 * sent, but no verify packet is sent
537 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication in ECDH
538 * cipher suites with ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. We
539 * need to skip the certificate verify message when client's
540 * ECDH public key is sent inside the client certificate.
542 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
== 1) {
543 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
;
545 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
;
547 if (s
->s3
->flags
& TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY
) {
548 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
;
550 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
552 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
:
553 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
;
554 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
556 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
:
557 if (s
->hello_retry_request
== SSL_HRR_PENDING
) {
558 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
;
559 } else if (s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
) {
560 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA
;
562 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
563 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
565 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && s
->s3
->npn_seen
)
566 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO
;
568 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
571 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
573 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
574 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO
:
575 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
576 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
579 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
:
581 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
582 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
584 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
587 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
:
589 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
;
590 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
592 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
593 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
596 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ
:
598 * If we can renegotiate now then do so, otherwise wait for a more
601 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s
, 1)) {
602 if (!tls_setup_handshake(s
)) {
603 /* SSLfatal() already called */
604 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR
;
606 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
;
607 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
609 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
610 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
615 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
616 * the client to the server.
618 WORK_STATE
ossl_statem_client_pre_work(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
620 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
622 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
624 /* No pre work to be done */
627 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
629 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
630 /* every DTLS ClientHello resets Finished MAC */
631 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s
)) {
632 /* SSLfatal() already called */
638 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
:
639 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
642 * We're into the last flight so we don't retransmit these
643 * messages unless we need to.
647 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
648 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s
))) {
649 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
650 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s
);
656 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END
:
658 * If we've been called by SSL_do_handshake()/SSL_write(), or we did not
659 * attempt to write early data before calling SSL_read() then we press
660 * on with the handshake. Otherwise we pause here.
662 if (s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING
663 || s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_NONE
)
664 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
667 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA
:
668 return tls_finish_handshake(s
, wst
, 0, 1);
671 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
672 return tls_finish_handshake(s
, wst
, 1, 1);
675 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
679 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
680 * client to the server.
682 WORK_STATE
ossl_statem_client_post_work(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
684 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
688 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
690 /* No post work to be done */
693 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
694 if (s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
695 && s
->max_early_data
> 0) {
697 * We haven't selected TLSv1.3 yet so we don't call the change
698 * cipher state function associated with the SSL_METHOD. Instead
699 * we call tls13_change_cipher_state() directly.
701 if ((s
->options
& SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT
) == 0) {
702 if (!tls13_change_cipher_state(s
,
703 SSL3_CC_EARLY
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE
)) {
704 /* SSLfatal() already called */
708 /* else we're in compat mode so we delay flushing until after CCS */
709 } else if (!statem_flush(s
)) {
713 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
714 /* Treat the next message as the first packet */
719 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
:
721 * We set the enc_write_ctx back to NULL because we may end up writing
722 * in cleartext again if we get a HelloRetryRequest from the server.
724 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(s
->enc_write_ctx
);
725 s
->enc_write_ctx
= NULL
;
728 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH
:
729 if (tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(s
) == 0) {
730 /* SSLfatal() already called */
735 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
:
736 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) || s
->hello_retry_request
== SSL_HRR_PENDING
)
738 if (s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
739 && s
->max_early_data
> 0) {
741 * We haven't selected TLSv1.3 yet so we don't call the change
742 * cipher state function associated with the SSL_METHOD. Instead
743 * we call tls13_change_cipher_state() directly.
745 if (!tls13_change_cipher_state(s
,
746 SSL3_CC_EARLY
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE
))
750 s
->session
->cipher
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
;
751 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
752 s
->session
->compress_meth
= 0;
754 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
== NULL
)
755 s
->session
->compress_meth
= 0;
757 s
->session
->compress_meth
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
->id
;
759 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->setup_key_block(s
)) {
760 /* SSLfatal() already called */
764 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
765 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE
)) {
766 /* SSLfatal() already called */
770 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
771 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
774 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
777 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY
,
782 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s
, SSL3_CC_WRITE
);
786 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
:
787 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
788 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_A
&& SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && s
->hit
== 0) {
790 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
793 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY
,
797 if (statem_flush(s
) != 1)
800 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
801 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
802 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE
)) {
803 /* SSLfatal() already called */
809 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE
:
810 if (statem_flush(s
) != 1)
812 if (!tls13_update_key(s
, 1)) {
813 /* SSLfatal() already called */
819 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
823 * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the
826 * Valid return values are:
830 int ossl_statem_client_construct_message(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
,
831 confunc_f
*confunc
, int *mt
)
833 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
835 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
837 /* Shouldn't happen */
838 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
839 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_CONSTRUCT_MESSAGE
,
840 SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_STATE
);
843 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
:
845 *confunc
= dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec
;
847 *confunc
= tls_construct_change_cipher_spec
;
848 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
;
851 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
852 *confunc
= tls_construct_client_hello
;
853 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO
;
856 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
:
857 *confunc
= tls_construct_end_of_early_data
;
858 *mt
= SSL3_MT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
;
861 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END
:
867 *confunc
= tls_construct_client_certificate
;
868 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
;
871 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH
:
872 *confunc
= tls_construct_client_key_exchange
;
873 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
;
876 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
:
877 *confunc
= tls_construct_cert_verify
;
878 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY
;
881 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
882 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO
:
883 *confunc
= tls_construct_next_proto
;
884 *mt
= SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO
;
887 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
:
888 *confunc
= tls_construct_finished
;
889 *mt
= SSL3_MT_FINISHED
;
892 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE
:
893 *confunc
= tls_construct_key_update
;
894 *mt
= SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE
;
902 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
903 * reading. Excludes the message header.
905 size_t ossl_statem_client_max_message_size(SSL
*s
)
907 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
909 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
911 /* Shouldn't happen */
914 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
:
915 return SERVER_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH
;
917 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
918 return HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH
;
921 return s
->max_cert_list
;
923 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
:
924 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
;
926 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS
:
927 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
;
929 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH
:
930 return SERVER_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH
;
932 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
:
934 * Set to s->max_cert_list for compatibility with previous releases. In
935 * practice these messages can get quite long if servers are configured
936 * to provide a long list of acceptable CAs
938 return s
->max_cert_list
;
940 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
:
941 return SERVER_HELLO_DONE_MAX_LENGTH
;
943 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
:
944 if (s
->version
== DTLS1_BAD_VER
)
946 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH
;
948 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
:
949 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
;
951 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
:
952 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH
;
954 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
:
955 return ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS_MAX_LENGTH
;
957 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE
:
958 return KEY_UPDATE_MAX_LENGTH
;
963 * Process a message that the client has been received from the server.
965 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
ossl_statem_client_process_message(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
967 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
969 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
971 /* Shouldn't happen */
972 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
973 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_PROCESS_MESSAGE
,
974 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
975 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
977 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
:
978 return tls_process_server_hello(s
, pkt
);
980 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
981 return dtls_process_hello_verify(s
, pkt
);
984 return tls_process_server_certificate(s
, pkt
);
986 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
:
987 return tls_process_cert_verify(s
, pkt
);
989 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS
:
990 return tls_process_cert_status(s
, pkt
);
992 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH
:
993 return tls_process_key_exchange(s
, pkt
);
995 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
:
996 return tls_process_certificate_request(s
, pkt
);
998 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
:
999 return tls_process_server_done(s
, pkt
);
1001 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
:
1002 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s
, pkt
);
1004 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
:
1005 return tls_process_new_session_ticket(s
, pkt
);
1007 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
:
1008 return tls_process_finished(s
, pkt
);
1010 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ
:
1011 return tls_process_hello_req(s
, pkt
);
1013 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
:
1014 return tls_process_encrypted_extensions(s
, pkt
);
1016 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE
:
1017 return tls_process_key_update(s
, pkt
);
1022 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
1025 WORK_STATE
ossl_statem_client_post_process_message(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
1027 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
1029 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
1031 /* Shouldn't happen */
1032 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
1033 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_POST_PROCESS_MESSAGE
,
1034 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1037 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
:
1038 return tls_prepare_client_certificate(s
, wst
);
1042 int tls_construct_client_hello(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
1047 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1050 SSL_SESSION
*sess
= s
->session
;
1051 unsigned char *session_id
;
1053 if (!WPACKET_set_max_size(pkt
, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
)) {
1054 /* Should not happen */
1055 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
1056 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1060 /* Work out what SSL/TLS/DTLS version to use */
1061 protverr
= ssl_set_client_hello_version(s
);
1062 if (protverr
!= 0) {
1063 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1069 || !ssl_version_supported(s
, sess
->ssl_version
)
1070 || !SSL_SESSION_is_resumable(sess
)) {
1071 if (s
->hello_retry_request
== SSL_HRR_NONE
1072 && !ssl_get_new_session(s
, 0)) {
1073 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1077 /* else use the pre-loaded session */
1079 p
= s
->s3
->client_random
;
1082 * for DTLS if client_random is initialized, reuse it, we are
1083 * required to use same upon reply to HelloVerify
1085 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1088 for (idx
= 0; idx
< sizeof(s
->s3
->client_random
); idx
++) {
1095 i
= (s
->hello_retry_request
== SSL_HRR_NONE
);
1098 if (i
&& ssl_fill_hello_random(s
, 0, p
, sizeof(s
->s3
->client_random
),
1099 DOWNGRADE_NONE
) <= 0) {
1100 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1101 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1106 * version indicates the negotiated version: for example from
1107 * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version
1108 * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also
1109 * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can
1110 * choke if we initially report a higher version then
1111 * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This
1112 * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it
1113 * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports
1116 * Possible scenario with previous logic:
1117 * 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2
1118 * 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0
1119 * 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.
1120 * 4. Handshake proceeds using TLS 1.0.
1121 * 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.
1122 * 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now
1123 * know that is maximum server supports.
1124 * 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret
1125 * containing version 1.0.
1127 * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the
1128 * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely
1129 * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't
1130 * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with
1131 * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using
1132 * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to
1133 * the negotiated version.
1135 * For TLS 1.3 we always set the ClientHello version to 1.2 and rely on the
1136 * supported_versions extension for the real supported versions.
1138 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, s
->client_version
)
1139 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt
, s
->s3
->client_random
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
)) {
1140 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1141 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1146 session_id
= s
->session
->session_id
;
1147 if (s
->new_session
|| s
->session
->ssl_version
== TLS1_3_VERSION
) {
1148 if (s
->version
== TLS1_3_VERSION
1149 && (s
->options
& SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT
) != 0) {
1150 sess_id_len
= sizeof(s
->tmp_session_id
);
1151 s
->tmp_session_id_len
= sess_id_len
;
1152 session_id
= s
->tmp_session_id
;
1153 if (s
->hello_retry_request
== SSL_HRR_NONE
1154 && ssl_randbytes(s
, s
->tmp_session_id
,
1155 sess_id_len
) <= 0) {
1156 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
1157 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1158 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1165 sess_id_len
= s
->session
->session_id_length
;
1166 if (s
->version
== TLS1_3_VERSION
) {
1167 s
->tmp_session_id_len
= sess_id_len
;
1168 memcpy(s
->tmp_session_id
, s
->session
->session_id
, sess_id_len
);
1171 if (sess_id_len
> sizeof(s
->session
->session_id
)
1172 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt
)
1173 || (sess_id_len
!= 0 && !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt
, session_id
,
1175 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
1176 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1177 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1181 /* cookie stuff for DTLS */
1182 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1183 if (s
->d1
->cookie_len
> sizeof(s
->d1
->cookie
)
1184 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, s
->d1
->cookie
,
1185 s
->d1
->cookie_len
)) {
1186 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1187 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1192 /* Ciphers supported */
1193 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)) {
1194 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1195 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1199 if (!ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s
, SSL_get_ciphers(s
), pkt
)) {
1200 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1203 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
1204 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1205 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1210 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt
)) {
1211 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1212 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1215 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1216 if (ssl_allow_compression(s
)
1217 && s
->ctx
->comp_methods
1218 && (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) || s
->s3
->tmp
.max_ver
< TLS1_3_VERSION
)) {
1219 int compnum
= sk_SSL_COMP_num(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
);
1220 for (i
= 0; i
< compnum
; i
++) {
1221 comp
= sk_SSL_COMP_value(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
, i
);
1222 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, comp
->id
)) {
1223 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
1224 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1225 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1231 /* Add the NULL method */
1232 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, 0) || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
1233 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1234 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1238 /* TLS extensions */
1239 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s
, pkt
, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO
, NULL
, 0)) {
1240 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1247 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
dtls_process_hello_verify(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1252 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt
, 2)
1253 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &cookiepkt
)) {
1254 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY
,
1255 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1256 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1259 cookie_len
= PACKET_remaining(&cookiepkt
);
1260 if (cookie_len
> sizeof(s
->d1
->cookie
)) {
1261 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY
,
1262 SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
1263 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1266 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&cookiepkt
, s
->d1
->cookie
, cookie_len
)) {
1267 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY
,
1268 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1269 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1271 s
->d1
->cookie_len
= cookie_len
;
1273 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
1276 static int set_client_ciphersuite(SSL
*s
, const unsigned char *cipherchars
)
1278 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *sk
;
1279 const SSL_CIPHER
*c
;
1282 c
= ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s
, cipherchars
, 0);
1284 /* unknown cipher */
1285 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE
,
1286 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED
);
1290 * If it is a disabled cipher we either didn't send it in client hello,
1291 * or it's not allowed for the selected protocol. So we return an error.
1293 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s
, c
, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK
, 1)) {
1294 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE
,
1295 SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED
);
1299 sk
= ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s
);
1300 i
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk
, c
);
1302 /* we did not say we would use this cipher */
1303 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE
,
1304 SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED
);
1308 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
!= NULL
1309 && s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->id
!= c
->id
) {
1310 /* ServerHello selected a different ciphersuite to that in the HRR */
1311 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE
,
1312 SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED
);
1317 * Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher
1318 * and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that cipher_id is
1319 * set and use it for comparison.
1321 if (s
->session
->cipher
!= NULL
)
1322 s
->session
->cipher_id
= s
->session
->cipher
->id
;
1323 if (s
->hit
&& (s
->session
->cipher_id
!= c
->id
)) {
1324 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1326 * In TLSv1.3 it is valid for the server to select a different
1327 * ciphersuite as long as the hash is the same.
1329 if (ssl_md(c
->algorithm2
)
1330 != ssl_md(s
->session
->cipher
->algorithm2
)) {
1331 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1332 SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE
,
1333 SSL_R_CIPHERSUITE_DIGEST_HAS_CHANGED
);
1338 * Prior to TLSv1.3 resuming a session always meant using the same
1341 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE
,
1342 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED
);
1346 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
= c
;
1351 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_server_hello(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1353 PACKET session_id
, extpkt
;
1354 size_t session_id_len
;
1355 const unsigned char *cipherchars
;
1357 unsigned int compression
;
1358 unsigned int sversion
;
1359 unsigned int context
;
1361 RAW_EXTENSION
*extensions
= NULL
;
1362 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1366 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &sversion
)) {
1367 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1368 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1372 /* load the server random */
1373 if (s
->version
== TLS1_3_VERSION
1374 && sversion
== TLS1_2_VERSION
1375 && PACKET_remaining(pkt
) >= SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1376 && memcmp(hrrrandom
, PACKET_data(pkt
), SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) == 0) {
1377 s
->hello_retry_request
= SSL_HRR_PENDING
;
1379 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
)) {
1380 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1381 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1385 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt
, s
->s3
->server_random
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
)) {
1386 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1387 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1392 /* Get the session-id. */
1393 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &session_id
)) {
1394 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1395 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1398 session_id_len
= PACKET_remaining(&session_id
);
1399 if (session_id_len
> sizeof(s
->session
->session_id
)
1400 || session_id_len
> SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE
) {
1401 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1402 SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG
);
1406 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &cipherchars
, TLS_CIPHER_LEN
)) {
1407 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1408 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1412 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &compression
)) {
1413 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1414 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1418 /* TLS extensions */
1419 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) == 0 && !hrr
) {
1420 PACKET_null_init(&extpkt
);
1421 } else if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &extpkt
)
1422 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
1423 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1429 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s
, &extpkt
,
1430 SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
1431 | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
,
1432 &extensions
, NULL
, 1)) {
1433 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1437 if (!ssl_choose_client_version(s
, sversion
, extensions
)) {
1438 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1443 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) || hrr
) {
1444 if (compression
!= 0) {
1445 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1446 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1447 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM
);
1451 if (session_id_len
!= s
->tmp_session_id_len
1452 || memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id
), s
->tmp_session_id
,
1453 session_id_len
) != 0) {
1454 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1455 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_INVALID_SESSION_ID
);
1461 if (!set_client_ciphersuite(s
, cipherchars
)) {
1462 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1466 return tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(s
, &extpkt
);
1470 * Now we have chosen the version we need to check again that the extensions
1471 * are appropriate for this version.
1473 context
= SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
1474 : SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
;
1475 if (!tls_validate_all_contexts(s
, context
, extensions
)) {
1476 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1477 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION
);
1483 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1485 * In TLSv1.3 a ServerHello message signals a key change so the end of
1486 * the message must be on a record boundary.
1488 if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s
->rlayer
)) {
1489 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
,
1490 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1491 SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY
);
1495 /* This will set s->hit if we are resuming */
1496 if (!tls_parse_extension(s
, TLSEXT_IDX_psk
,
1497 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
,
1498 extensions
, NULL
, 0)) {
1499 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1504 * Check if we can resume the session based on external pre-shared
1505 * secret. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851) supports two types of session resumption.
1506 * Resumption based on server-side state works with session IDs.
1507 * Resumption based on pre-shared Protected Access Credentials (PACs)
1508 * works by overriding the SessionTicket extension at the application
1509 * layer, and does not send a session ID. (We do not know whether
1510 * EAP-FAST servers would honour the session ID.) Therefore, the session
1511 * ID alone is not a reliable indicator of session resumption, so we
1512 * first check if we can resume, and later peek at the next handshake
1513 * message to see if the server wants to resume.
1515 if (s
->version
>= TLS1_VERSION
1516 && s
->ext
.session_secret_cb
!= NULL
&& s
->session
->ext
.tick
) {
1517 const SSL_CIPHER
*pref_cipher
= NULL
;
1519 * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for
1520 * backwards compat reasons
1522 int master_key_length
;
1523 master_key_length
= sizeof(s
->session
->master_key
);
1524 if (s
->ext
.session_secret_cb(s
, s
->session
->master_key
,
1527 s
->ext
.session_secret_cb_arg
)
1528 && master_key_length
> 0) {
1529 s
->session
->master_key_length
= master_key_length
;
1530 s
->session
->cipher
= pref_cipher
?
1531 pref_cipher
: ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s
, cipherchars
, 0);
1533 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
1534 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1539 if (session_id_len
!= 0
1540 && session_id_len
== s
->session
->session_id_length
1541 && memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id
), s
->session
->session_id
,
1542 session_id_len
) == 0)
1547 if (s
->sid_ctx_length
!= s
->session
->sid_ctx_length
1548 || memcmp(s
->session
->sid_ctx
, s
->sid_ctx
, s
->sid_ctx_length
)) {
1549 /* actually a client application bug */
1550 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1551 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1552 SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT
);
1557 * If we were trying for session-id reuse but the server
1558 * didn't resume, make a new SSL_SESSION.
1559 * In the case of EAP-FAST and PAC, we do not send a session ID,
1560 * so the PAC-based session secret is always preserved. It'll be
1561 * overwritten if the server refuses resumption.
1563 if (s
->session
->session_id_length
> 0
1565 && s
->session
->ext
.tick_identity
1566 != TLSEXT_PSK_BAD_IDENTITY
)) {
1567 CRYPTO_atomic_add(&s
->session_ctx
->stats
.sess_miss
, 1, &discard
,
1568 s
->session_ctx
->lock
);
1569 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s
, 0)) {
1570 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1575 s
->session
->ssl_version
= s
->version
;
1577 * In TLSv1.2 and below we save the session id we were sent so we can
1578 * resume it later. In TLSv1.3 the session id we were sent is just an
1579 * echo of what we originally sent in the ClientHello and should not be
1580 * used for resumption.
1582 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1583 s
->session
->session_id_length
= session_id_len
;
1584 /* session_id_len could be 0 */
1585 if (session_id_len
> 0)
1586 memcpy(s
->session
->session_id
, PACKET_data(&session_id
),
1591 /* Session version and negotiated protocol version should match */
1592 if (s
->version
!= s
->session
->ssl_version
) {
1593 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1594 SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_VERSION_MISMATCH
);
1598 * Now that we know the version, update the check to see if it's an allowed
1601 s
->s3
->tmp
.min_ver
= s
->version
;
1602 s
->s3
->tmp
.max_ver
= s
->version
;
1604 if (!set_client_ciphersuite(s
, cipherchars
)) {
1605 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1609 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1610 if (compression
!= 0) {
1611 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1612 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM
);
1616 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1617 * using compression.
1619 if (s
->session
->compress_meth
!= 0) {
1620 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1621 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION
);
1625 if (s
->hit
&& compression
!= s
->session
->compress_meth
) {
1626 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1627 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED
);
1630 if (compression
== 0)
1632 else if (!ssl_allow_compression(s
)) {
1633 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1634 SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED
);
1637 comp
= ssl3_comp_find(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
, compression
);
1640 if (compression
!= 0 && comp
== NULL
) {
1641 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1642 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM
);
1645 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
= comp
;
1649 if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s
, context
, extensions
, NULL
, 0, 1)) {
1650 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1654 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1655 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && s
->hit
) {
1656 unsigned char sctpauthkey
[64];
1657 char labelbuffer
[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
)];
1660 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
1663 memcpy(labelbuffer
, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
,
1664 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
));
1666 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s
, sctpauthkey
,
1667 sizeof(sctpauthkey
),
1669 sizeof(labelbuffer
), NULL
, 0, 0) <= 0) {
1670 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1671 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1675 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
),
1676 BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY
,
1677 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), sctpauthkey
);
1682 * In TLSv1.3 we have some post-processing to change cipher state, otherwise
1683 * we're done with this message
1686 && (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->setup_key_block(s
)
1687 || !s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
1688 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ
))) {
1689 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1693 OPENSSL_free(extensions
);
1694 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
1696 OPENSSL_free(extensions
);
1697 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1700 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(SSL
*s
,
1703 RAW_EXTENSION
*extensions
= NULL
;
1706 * If we were sending early_data then the enc_write_ctx is now invalid and
1707 * should not be used.
1709 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(s
->enc_write_ctx
);
1710 s
->enc_write_ctx
= NULL
;
1712 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s
, extpkt
, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
,
1713 &extensions
, NULL
, 1)
1714 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s
, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
,
1715 extensions
, NULL
, 0, 1)) {
1716 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1720 OPENSSL_free(extensions
);
1723 if (s
->ext
.tls13_cookie_len
== 0
1724 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
1725 && s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
!= NULL
1729 * We didn't receive a cookie or a new key_share so the next
1730 * ClientHello will not change
1732 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1733 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_AS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
,
1734 SSL_R_NO_CHANGE_FOLLOWING_HRR
);
1739 * Re-initialise the Transcript Hash. We're going to prepopulate it with
1740 * a synthetic message_hash in place of ClientHello1.
1742 if (!create_synthetic_message_hash(s
)) {
1743 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1748 * Add this message to the Transcript Hash. Normally this is done
1749 * automatically prior to the message processing stage. However due to the
1750 * need to create the synthetic message hash, we defer that step until now
1753 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s
, (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
,
1754 s
->init_num
+ SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
)) {
1755 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1759 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
1761 OPENSSL_free(extensions
);
1762 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1765 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_server_certificate(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1768 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret
= MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1769 unsigned long cert_list_len
, cert_len
;
1771 const unsigned char *certstart
, *certbytes
;
1772 STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
= NULL
;
1773 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
1774 size_t chainidx
, certidx
;
1775 unsigned int context
= 0;
1776 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP
*clu
;
1778 if ((sk
= sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL
) {
1779 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1780 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1784 if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && !PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &context
))
1786 || !PACKET_get_net_3(pkt
, &cert_list_len
)
1787 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != cert_list_len
1788 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) == 0) {
1789 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1790 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1793 for (chainidx
= 0; PACKET_remaining(pkt
); chainidx
++) {
1794 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt
, &cert_len
)
1795 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &certbytes
, cert_len
)) {
1796 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,
1797 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1798 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1802 certstart
= certbytes
;
1803 x
= d2i_X509(NULL
, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes
, cert_len
);
1805 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
,
1806 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB
);
1809 if (certbytes
!= (certstart
+ cert_len
)) {
1810 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,
1811 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1812 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1816 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1817 RAW_EXTENSION
*rawexts
= NULL
;
1820 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &extensions
)) {
1821 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,
1822 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1826 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s
, &extensions
,
1827 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE
, &rawexts
,
1828 NULL
, chainidx
== 0)
1829 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s
, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE
,
1830 rawexts
, x
, chainidx
,
1831 PACKET_remaining(pkt
) == 0)) {
1832 OPENSSL_free(rawexts
);
1833 /* SSLfatal already called */
1836 OPENSSL_free(rawexts
);
1839 if (!sk_X509_push(sk
, x
)) {
1840 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
1841 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1842 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1848 i
= ssl_verify_cert_chain(s
, sk
);
1850 * The documented interface is that SSL_VERIFY_PEER should be set in order
1851 * for client side verification of the server certificate to take place.
1852 * However, historically the code has only checked that *any* flag is set
1853 * to cause server verification to take place. Use of the other flags makes
1854 * no sense in client mode. An attempt to clean up the semantics was
1855 * reverted because at least one application *only* set
1856 * SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT. Prior to the clean up this still caused
1857 * server verification to take place, after the clean up it silently did
1858 * nothing. SSL_CTX_set_verify()/SSL_set_verify() cannot validate the flags
1859 * sent to them because they are void functions. Therefore, we now use the
1860 * (less clean) historic behaviour of performing validation if any flag is
1861 * set. The *documented* interface remains the same.
1863 if (s
->verify_mode
!= SSL_VERIFY_NONE
&& i
<= 0) {
1864 SSLfatal(s
, ssl_verify_alarm_type(s
->verify_result
),
1865 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1866 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED
);
1869 ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
1871 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
1872 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, i
);
1876 s
->session
->peer_chain
= sk
;
1878 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate,
1879 * which we don't include in statem_srvr.c
1881 x
= sk_X509_value(sk
, 0);
1884 pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(x
);
1886 if (pkey
== NULL
|| EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey
)) {
1888 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1889 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS
);
1893 if ((clu
= ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey
, &certidx
)) == NULL
) {
1895 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1896 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1897 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE
);
1901 * Check certificate type is consistent with ciphersuite. For TLS 1.3
1902 * skip check since TLS 1.3 ciphersuites can be used with any certificate
1905 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1906 if ((clu
->amask
& s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
) == 0) {
1908 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1909 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1910 SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE
);
1914 s
->session
->peer_type
= certidx
;
1916 X509_free(s
->session
->peer
);
1918 s
->session
->peer
= x
;
1919 s
->session
->verify_result
= s
->verify_result
;
1922 /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */
1924 && !ssl_handshake_hash(s
, s
->cert_verify_hash
,
1925 sizeof(s
->cert_verify_hash
),
1926 &s
->cert_verify_hash_len
)) {
1927 /* SSLfatal() already called */;
1931 ret
= MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
1935 sk_X509_pop_free(sk
, X509_free
);
1939 static int tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1941 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1942 PACKET psk_identity_hint
;
1944 /* PSK ciphersuites are preceded by an identity hint */
1946 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &psk_identity_hint
)) {
1947 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
,
1948 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1953 * Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in
1954 * tls_construct_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of
1955 * a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK
1958 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint
) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
) {
1959 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
1960 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
,
1961 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
1965 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint
) == 0) {
1966 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
);
1967 s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
= NULL
;
1968 } else if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity_hint
,
1969 &s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
)) {
1970 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
,
1971 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1977 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
,
1978 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1983 static int tls_process_ske_srp(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, EVP_PKEY
**pkey
)
1985 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1986 PACKET prime
, generator
, salt
, server_pub
;
1988 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &prime
)
1989 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &generator
)
1990 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &salt
)
1991 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &server_pub
)) {
1992 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP
,
1993 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1997 /* TODO(size_t): Convert BN_bin2bn() calls */
1999 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime
),
2000 (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime
), NULL
)) == NULL
2002 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator
),
2003 (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator
), NULL
)) == NULL
2005 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&salt
),
2006 (int)PACKET_remaining(&salt
), NULL
)) == NULL
2008 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&server_pub
),
2009 (int)PACKET_remaining(&server_pub
), NULL
)) == NULL
) {
2010 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP
,
2015 if (!srp_verify_server_param(s
)) {
2016 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2020 /* We must check if there is a certificate */
2021 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aRSA
| SSL_aDSS
))
2022 *pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
2026 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP
,
2027 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2032 static int tls_process_ske_dhe(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, EVP_PKEY
**pkey
)
2034 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2035 PACKET prime
, generator
, pub_key
;
2036 EVP_PKEY
*peer_tmp
= NULL
;
2039 BIGNUM
*p
= NULL
, *g
= NULL
, *bnpub_key
= NULL
;
2043 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &prime
)
2044 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &generator
)
2045 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &pub_key
)) {
2046 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
,
2047 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2051 peer_tmp
= EVP_PKEY_new();
2054 if (peer_tmp
== NULL
|| dh
== NULL
) {
2055 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
,
2056 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2060 /* TODO(size_t): Convert these calls */
2061 p
= BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime
), (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime
), NULL
);
2062 g
= BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator
), (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator
),
2064 bnpub_key
= BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&pub_key
),
2065 (int)PACKET_remaining(&pub_key
), NULL
);
2066 if (p
== NULL
|| g
== NULL
|| bnpub_key
== NULL
) {
2067 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
,
2072 /* test non-zero pubkey */
2073 if (BN_is_zero(bnpub_key
)) {
2074 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
,
2075 SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE
);
2079 if (!DH_set0_pqg(dh
, p
, NULL
, g
)) {
2080 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
,
2086 if (DH_check_params(dh
, &check_bits
) == 0 || check_bits
!= 0) {
2087 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
,
2088 SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE
);
2092 if (!DH_set0_key(dh
, bnpub_key
, NULL
)) {
2093 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
,
2099 if (!ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH
, DH_security_bits(dh
), 0, dh
)) {
2100 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
,
2101 SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL
);
2105 if (EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(peer_tmp
, dh
) == 0) {
2106 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
,
2111 s
->s3
->peer_tmp
= peer_tmp
;
2114 * FIXME: This makes assumptions about which ciphersuites come with
2115 * public keys. We should have a less ad-hoc way of doing this
2117 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aRSA
| SSL_aDSS
))
2118 *pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
2119 /* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
2128 EVP_PKEY_free(peer_tmp
);
2132 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
,
2133 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2138 static int tls_process_ske_ecdhe(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, EVP_PKEY
**pkey
)
2140 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2142 unsigned int curve_type
, curve_id
;
2145 * Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH
2146 * public key. We only support named (not generic) curves and
2147 * ECParameters in this case is just three bytes.
2149 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &curve_type
) || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &curve_id
)) {
2150 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE
,
2151 SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
2155 * Check curve is named curve type and one of our preferences, if not
2156 * server has sent an invalid curve.
2158 if (curve_type
!= NAMED_CURVE_TYPE
|| !tls1_check_group_id(s
, curve_id
)) {
2159 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE
,
2164 if ((s
->s3
->peer_tmp
= ssl_generate_param_group(curve_id
)) == NULL
) {
2165 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE
,
2166 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS
);
2170 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &encoded_pt
)) {
2171 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE
,
2172 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2176 if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(s
->s3
->peer_tmp
,
2177 PACKET_data(&encoded_pt
),
2178 PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt
))) {
2179 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE
,
2185 * The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign
2186 * ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA
2189 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aECDSA
)
2190 *pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
2191 else if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aRSA
)
2192 *pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
2193 /* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
2197 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE
,
2198 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2203 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_key_exchange(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2206 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
2207 EVP_MD_CTX
*md_ctx
= NULL
;
2208 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pctx
= NULL
;
2209 PACKET save_param_start
, signature
;
2211 alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
2213 save_param_start
= *pkt
;
2215 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
2216 EVP_PKEY_free(s
->s3
->peer_tmp
);
2217 s
->s3
->peer_tmp
= NULL
;
2220 if (alg_k
& SSL_PSK
) {
2221 if (!tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(s
, pkt
)) {
2222 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2227 /* Nothing else to do for plain PSK or RSAPSK */
2228 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kPSK
| SSL_kRSAPSK
)) {
2229 } else if (alg_k
& SSL_kSRP
) {
2230 if (!tls_process_ske_srp(s
, pkt
, &pkey
)) {
2231 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2234 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kDHEPSK
)) {
2235 if (!tls_process_ske_dhe(s
, pkt
, &pkey
)) {
2236 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2239 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
)) {
2240 if (!tls_process_ske_ecdhe(s
, pkt
, &pkey
)) {
2241 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2245 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2246 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
2250 /* if it was signed, check the signature */
2254 const EVP_MD
*md
= NULL
;
2260 * |pkt| now points to the beginning of the signature, so the difference
2261 * equals the length of the parameters.
2263 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(&save_param_start
, ¶ms
,
2264 PACKET_remaining(&save_param_start
) -
2265 PACKET_remaining(pkt
))) {
2266 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2267 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2271 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
2272 unsigned int sigalg
;
2274 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &sigalg
)) {
2275 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2276 SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
2279 if (tls12_check_peer_sigalg(s
, sigalg
, pkey
) <=0) {
2280 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2283 } else if (!tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(s
, pkey
)) {
2284 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2285 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2289 if (!tls1_lookup_md(s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalg
, &md
)) {
2290 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2291 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2295 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
))
2296 fprintf(stderr
, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md
));
2299 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &signature
)
2300 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
2301 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2302 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2305 maxsig
= EVP_PKEY_size(pkey
);
2307 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2308 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2313 * Check signature length
2315 if (PACKET_remaining(&signature
) > (size_t)maxsig
) {
2316 /* wrong packet length */
2317 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2318 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH
);
2322 md_ctx
= EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2323 if (md_ctx
== NULL
) {
2324 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2325 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2329 if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(md_ctx
, &pctx
, md
, NULL
, pkey
) <= 0) {
2330 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2334 if (SSL_USE_PSS(s
)) {
2335 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx
, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING
) <= 0
2336 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx
,
2337 RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST
) <= 0) {
2338 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2339 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
2343 tbslen
= construct_key_exchange_tbs(s
, &tbs
, PACKET_data(¶ms
),
2344 PACKET_remaining(¶ms
));
2346 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2350 rv
= EVP_DigestVerify(md_ctx
, PACKET_data(&signature
),
2351 PACKET_remaining(&signature
), tbs
, tbslen
);
2354 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2355 SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE
);
2358 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx
);
2361 /* aNULL, aSRP or PSK do not need public keys */
2362 if (!(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aNULL
| SSL_aSRP
))
2363 && !(alg_k
& SSL_PSK
)) {
2364 /* Might be wrong key type, check it */
2365 if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s
)) {
2366 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2369 /* else this shouldn't happen, SSLfatal() already called */
2372 /* still data left over */
2373 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
2374 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2375 SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE
);
2380 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
2382 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx
);
2383 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2386 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_certificate_request(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2390 /* Clear certificate validity flags */
2391 for (i
= 0; i
< SSL_PKEY_NUM
; i
++)
2392 s
->s3
->tmp
.valid_flags
[i
] = 0;
2394 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
2395 PACKET reqctx
, extensions
;
2396 RAW_EXTENSION
*rawexts
= NULL
;
2398 /* Free and zero certificate types: it is not present in TLS 1.3 */
2399 OPENSSL_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.ctype
);
2400 s
->s3
->tmp
.ctype
= NULL
;
2401 s
->s3
->tmp
.ctype_len
= 0;
2403 /* TODO(TLS1.3) need to process request context, for now ignore */
2404 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &reqctx
)) {
2405 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,
2406 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2407 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2408 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2411 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &extensions
)) {
2412 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,
2413 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2415 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2417 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s
, &extensions
,
2418 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2420 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s
, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2421 rawexts
, NULL
, 0, 1)) {
2422 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2423 OPENSSL_free(rawexts
);
2424 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2426 OPENSSL_free(rawexts
);
2427 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s
)) {
2428 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2429 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2431 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2436 /* get the certificate types */
2437 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &ctypes
)) {
2438 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,
2439 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2440 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2441 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2444 if (!PACKET_memdup(&ctypes
, &s
->s3
->tmp
.ctype
, &s
->s3
->tmp
.ctype_len
)) {
2445 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2446 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2447 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2448 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2451 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
2454 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &sigalgs
)) {
2455 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2456 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2457 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2458 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2461 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s
, &sigalgs
)) {
2462 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2463 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2464 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR
);
2465 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2467 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s
)) {
2468 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2469 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2470 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2471 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2475 /* get the CA RDNs */
2476 if (!parse_ca_names(s
, pkt
)) {
2477 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2478 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2482 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
2483 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2484 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2485 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2486 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2489 /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
2490 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
= 1;
2492 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING
;
2495 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_new_session_ticket(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2497 unsigned int ticklen
;
2498 unsigned long ticket_lifetime_hint
, age_add
= 0;
2499 unsigned int sess_len
;
2500 RAW_EXTENSION
*exts
= NULL
;
2503 if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt
, &ticket_lifetime_hint
)
2505 && (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt
, &age_add
)
2506 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &nonce
)
2507 || !PACKET_memdup(&nonce
, &s
->session
->ext
.tick_nonce
,
2508 &s
->session
->ext
.tick_nonce_len
)))
2509 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &ticklen
)
2510 || (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != ticklen
)
2512 && (ticklen
== 0 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) < ticklen
))) {
2513 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
,
2514 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2519 * Server is allowed to change its mind (in <=TLSv1.2) and send an empty
2520 * ticket. We already checked this TLSv1.3 case above, so it should never
2521 * be 0 here in that instance
2524 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
2527 * Sessions must be immutable once they go into the session cache. Otherwise
2528 * we can get multi-thread problems. Therefore we don't "update" sessions,
2529 * we replace them with a duplicate. In TLSv1.3 we need to do this every
2530 * time a NewSessionTicket arrives because those messages arrive
2531 * post-handshake and the session may have already gone into the session
2534 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) || s
->session
->session_id_length
> 0) {
2535 int i
= s
->session_ctx
->session_cache_mode
;
2536 SSL_SESSION
*new_sess
;
2538 * We reused an existing session, so we need to replace it with a new
2541 if ((new_sess
= ssl_session_dup(s
->session
, 0)) == 0) {
2542 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2543 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
,
2544 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2548 if (i
& SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT
) {
2550 * Remove the old session from the cache. We carry on if this fails
2552 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s
->session_ctx
, s
->session
);
2555 SSL_SESSION_free(s
->session
);
2556 s
->session
= new_sess
;
2560 * Technically the cast to long here is not guaranteed by the C standard -
2561 * but we use it elsewhere, so this should be ok.
2563 s
->session
->time
= (long)time(NULL
);
2565 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->ext
.tick
);
2566 s
->session
->ext
.tick
= NULL
;
2567 s
->session
->ext
.ticklen
= 0;
2569 s
->session
->ext
.tick
= OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen
);
2570 if (s
->session
->ext
.tick
== NULL
) {
2571 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
,
2572 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2575 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt
, s
->session
->ext
.tick
, ticklen
)) {
2576 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
,
2577 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2581 s
->session
->ext
.tick_lifetime_hint
= ticket_lifetime_hint
;
2582 s
->session
->ext
.tick_age_add
= age_add
;
2583 s
->session
->ext
.ticklen
= ticklen
;
2585 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
2588 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &extpkt
)
2589 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0
2590 || !tls_collect_extensions(s
, &extpkt
,
2591 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
,
2593 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s
,
2594 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
,
2595 exts
, NULL
, 0, 1)) {
2596 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2602 * There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session. One is to set
2603 * an appropriate session ID and then the server must return a match in
2604 * ServerHello. This allows the normal client session ID matching to work
2605 * and we know much earlier that the ticket has been accepted. The
2606 * other way is to set zero length session ID when the ticket is
2607 * presented and rely on the handshake to determine session resumption.
2608 * We choose the former approach because this fits in with assumptions
2609 * elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set to the SHA256 (or SHA1 is
2610 * SHA256 is disabled) hash of the ticket.
2613 * TODO(size_t): we use sess_len here because EVP_Digest expects an int
2614 * but s->session->session_id_length is a size_t
2616 if (!EVP_Digest(s
->session
->ext
.tick
, ticklen
,
2617 s
->session
->session_id
, &sess_len
,
2618 EVP_sha256(), NULL
)) {
2619 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
,
2623 s
->session
->session_id_length
= sess_len
;
2625 /* This is a standalone message in TLSv1.3, so there is no more to read */
2626 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
2628 ssl_update_cache(s
, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT
);
2629 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
2632 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
2635 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2639 * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to
2640 * parse a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure
2642 int tls_process_cert_status_body(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2647 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &type
)
2648 || type
!= TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp
) {
2649 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY
,
2650 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE
);
2653 if (!PACKET_get_net_3_len(pkt
, &resplen
)
2654 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != resplen
) {
2655 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY
,
2656 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2659 s
->ext
.ocsp
.resp
= OPENSSL_malloc(resplen
);
2660 if (s
->ext
.ocsp
.resp
== NULL
) {
2661 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY
,
2662 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2665 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt
, s
->ext
.ocsp
.resp
, resplen
)) {
2666 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY
,
2667 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2670 s
->ext
.ocsp
.resp_len
= resplen
;
2676 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_cert_status(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2678 if (!tls_process_cert_status_body(s
, pkt
)) {
2679 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2680 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2683 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
2687 * Perform miscellaneous checks and processing after we have received the
2688 * server's initial flight. In TLS1.3 this is after the Server Finished message.
2689 * In <=TLS1.2 this is after the ServerDone message. Returns 1 on success or 0
2692 int tls_process_initial_server_flight(SSL
*s
)
2695 * at this point we check that we have the required stuff from
2698 if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s
)) {
2699 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2704 * Call the ocsp status callback if needed. The |ext.ocsp.resp| and
2705 * |ext.ocsp.resp_len| values will be set if we actually received a status
2706 * message, or NULL and -1 otherwise
2708 if (s
->ext
.status_type
!= TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing
2709 && s
->ctx
->ext
.status_cb
!= NULL
) {
2710 int ret
= s
->ctx
->ext
.status_cb(s
, s
->ctx
->ext
.status_arg
);
2713 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE
,
2714 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_INITIAL_SERVER_FLIGHT
,
2715 SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE
);
2719 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2720 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_INITIAL_SERVER_FLIGHT
,
2721 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2725 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
2726 if (s
->ct_validation_callback
!= NULL
) {
2727 /* Note we validate the SCTs whether or not we abort on error */
2728 if (!ssl_validate_ct(s
) && (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
)) {
2729 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2738 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_server_done(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2740 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) > 0) {
2741 /* should contain no data */
2742 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE
,
2743 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2744 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2746 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2747 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kSRP
) {
2748 if (SRP_Calc_A_param(s
) <= 0) {
2749 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE
,
2751 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2756 if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s
)) {
2757 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2758 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2761 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
2764 static int tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
2766 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2769 * The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes to return a
2770 * \0-terminated identity. The last byte is for us for simulating
2773 char identity
[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
+ 1];
2774 size_t identitylen
= 0;
2775 unsigned char psk
[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
];
2776 unsigned char *tmppsk
= NULL
;
2777 char *tmpidentity
= NULL
;
2780 if (s
->psk_client_callback
== NULL
) {
2781 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
,
2782 SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB
);
2786 memset(identity
, 0, sizeof(identity
));
2788 psklen
= s
->psk_client_callback(s
, s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
,
2789 identity
, sizeof(identity
) - 1,
2792 if (psklen
> PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
) {
2793 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
2794 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2796 } else if (psklen
== 0) {
2797 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
2798 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
,
2799 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND
);
2803 identitylen
= strlen(identity
);
2804 if (identitylen
> PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
) {
2805 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
,
2806 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2810 tmppsk
= OPENSSL_memdup(psk
, psklen
);
2811 tmpidentity
= OPENSSL_strdup(identity
);
2812 if (tmppsk
== NULL
|| tmpidentity
== NULL
) {
2813 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
,
2814 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2818 OPENSSL_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
);
2819 s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
= tmppsk
;
2820 s
->s3
->tmp
.psklen
= psklen
;
2822 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->psk_identity
);
2823 s
->session
->psk_identity
= tmpidentity
;
2826 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt
, identity
, identitylen
)) {
2827 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
,
2828 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2835 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk
, psklen
);
2836 OPENSSL_cleanse(identity
, sizeof(identity
));
2837 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmppsk
, psklen
);
2838 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmpidentity
, identitylen
);
2842 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
,
2843 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2848 static int tls_construct_cke_rsa(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
2850 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2851 unsigned char *encdata
= NULL
;
2852 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
2853 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pctx
= NULL
;
2855 unsigned char *pms
= NULL
;
2858 if (s
->session
->peer
== NULL
) {
2860 * We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA.
2862 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
,
2863 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2867 pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
2868 if (EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pkey
) == NULL
) {
2869 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
,
2870 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2874 pmslen
= SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
;
2875 pms
= OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen
);
2877 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
,
2878 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2882 pms
[0] = s
->client_version
>> 8;
2883 pms
[1] = s
->client_version
& 0xff;
2884 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
2885 if (ssl_randbytes(s
, pms
+ 2, (int)(pmslen
- 2)) <= 0) {
2886 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
,
2887 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2891 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2892 if (s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
&& !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)) {
2893 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
,
2894 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2897 pctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey
, NULL
);
2898 if (pctx
== NULL
|| EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pctx
) <= 0
2899 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx
, NULL
, &enclen
, pms
, pmslen
) <= 0) {
2900 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
,
2904 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt
, enclen
, &encdata
)
2905 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx
, encdata
, &enclen
, pms
, pmslen
) <= 0) {
2906 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
,
2907 SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT
);
2910 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
2913 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2914 if (s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
&& !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
2915 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
,
2916 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2920 /* Log the premaster secret, if logging is enabled. */
2921 if (!ssl_log_rsa_client_key_exchange(s
, encdata
, enclen
, pms
, pmslen
)) {
2922 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2926 s
->s3
->tmp
.pms
= pms
;
2927 s
->s3
->tmp
.pmslen
= pmslen
;
2931 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms
, pmslen
);
2932 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
2936 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
,
2937 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2942 static int tls_construct_cke_dhe(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
2944 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2946 const BIGNUM
*pub_key
;
2947 EVP_PKEY
*ckey
= NULL
, *skey
= NULL
;
2948 unsigned char *keybytes
= NULL
;
2950 skey
= s
->s3
->peer_tmp
;
2952 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE
,
2953 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2957 ckey
= ssl_generate_pkey(skey
);
2959 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE
,
2960 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2964 dh_clnt
= EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey
);
2966 if (dh_clnt
== NULL
) {
2967 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE
,
2968 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2972 if (ssl_derive(s
, ckey
, skey
, 0) == 0) {
2973 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2977 /* send off the data */
2978 DH_get0_key(dh_clnt
, &pub_key
, NULL
);
2979 if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt
, BN_num_bytes(pub_key
),
2981 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE
,
2982 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2986 BN_bn2bin(pub_key
, keybytes
);
2987 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey
);
2991 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey
);
2994 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE
,
2995 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3000 static int tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3002 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3003 unsigned char *encodedPoint
= NULL
;
3004 size_t encoded_pt_len
= 0;
3005 EVP_PKEY
*ckey
= NULL
, *skey
= NULL
;
3008 skey
= s
->s3
->peer_tmp
;
3010 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE
,
3011 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3015 ckey
= ssl_generate_pkey(skey
);
3017 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE
,
3018 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3022 if (ssl_derive(s
, ckey
, skey
, 0) == 0) {
3023 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3027 /* Generate encoding of client key */
3028 encoded_pt_len
= EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey
, &encodedPoint
);
3030 if (encoded_pt_len
== 0) {
3031 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE
,
3036 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, encodedPoint
, encoded_pt_len
)) {
3037 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE
,
3038 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3044 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint
);
3045 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey
);
3048 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE
,
3049 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3054 static int tls_construct_cke_gost(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3056 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3057 /* GOST key exchange message creation */
3058 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pkey_ctx
= NULL
;
3061 unsigned int md_len
;
3062 unsigned char shared_ukm
[32], tmp
[256];
3063 EVP_MD_CTX
*ukm_hash
= NULL
;
3064 int dgst_nid
= NID_id_GostR3411_94
;
3065 unsigned char *pms
= NULL
;
3068 if ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aGOST12
) != 0)
3069 dgst_nid
= NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256
;
3072 * Get server certificate PKEY and create ctx from it
3074 peer_cert
= s
->session
->peer
;
3076 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
,
3077 SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER
);
3081 pkey_ctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(X509_get0_pubkey(peer_cert
), NULL
);
3082 if (pkey_ctx
== NULL
) {
3083 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
,
3084 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3088 * If we have send a certificate, and certificate key
3089 * parameters match those of server certificate, use
3090 * certificate key for key exchange
3093 /* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */
3095 pms
= OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen
);
3097 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
,
3098 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3102 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx
) <= 0
3103 /* Generate session key
3104 * TODO(size_t): Convert this function
3106 || ssl_randbytes(s
, pms
, (int)pmslen
) <= 0) {
3107 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
,
3108 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3112 * Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context
3115 ukm_hash
= EVP_MD_CTX_new();
3116 if (ukm_hash
== NULL
3117 || EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash
, EVP_get_digestbynid(dgst_nid
)) <= 0
3118 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash
, s
->s3
->client_random
,
3119 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) <= 0
3120 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash
, s
->s3
->server_random
,
3121 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) <= 0
3122 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash
, shared_ukm
, &md_len
) <= 0) {
3123 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
,
3124 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3127 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash
);
3129 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx
, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT
,
3130 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV
, 8, shared_ukm
) < 0) {
3131 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
,
3135 /* Make GOST keytransport blob message */
3137 * Encapsulate it into sequence
3140 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx
, tmp
, &msglen
, pms
, pmslen
) <= 0) {
3141 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
,
3146 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE
| V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED
)
3147 || (msglen
>= 0x80 && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, 0x81))
3148 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, tmp
, msglen
)) {
3149 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
,
3150 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3154 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx
);
3155 s
->s3
->tmp
.pms
= pms
;
3156 s
->s3
->tmp
.pmslen
= pmslen
;
3160 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx
);
3161 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms
, pmslen
);
3162 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash
);
3165 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
,
3166 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3171 static int tls_construct_cke_srp(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3173 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3174 unsigned char *abytes
= NULL
;
3176 if (s
->srp_ctx
.A
== NULL
3177 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt
, BN_num_bytes(s
->srp_ctx
.A
),
3179 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP
,
3180 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3183 BN_bn2bin(s
->srp_ctx
.A
, abytes
);
3185 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->srp_username
);
3186 s
->session
->srp_username
= OPENSSL_strdup(s
->srp_ctx
.login
);
3187 if (s
->session
->srp_username
== NULL
) {
3188 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP
,
3189 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3195 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP
,
3196 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3201 int tls_construct_client_key_exchange(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3203 unsigned long alg_k
;
3205 alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
3208 * All of the construct functions below call SSLfatal() if necessary so
3209 * no need to do so here.
3211 if ((alg_k
& SSL_PSK
)
3212 && !tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(s
, pkt
))
3215 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kRSA
| SSL_kRSAPSK
)) {
3216 if (!tls_construct_cke_rsa(s
, pkt
))
3218 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kDHEPSK
)) {
3219 if (!tls_construct_cke_dhe(s
, pkt
))
3221 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
)) {
3222 if (!tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(s
, pkt
))
3224 } else if (alg_k
& SSL_kGOST
) {
3225 if (!tls_construct_cke_gost(s
, pkt
))
3227 } else if (alg_k
& SSL_kSRP
) {
3228 if (!tls_construct_cke_srp(s
, pkt
))
3230 } else if (!(alg_k
& SSL_kPSK
)) {
3231 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3232 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3238 OPENSSL_clear_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.pms
, s
->s3
->tmp
.pmslen
);
3239 s
->s3
->tmp
.pms
= NULL
;
3240 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
3241 OPENSSL_clear_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
, s
->s3
->tmp
.psklen
);
3242 s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
= NULL
;
3247 int tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(SSL
*s
)
3249 unsigned char *pms
= NULL
;
3252 pms
= s
->s3
->tmp
.pms
;
3253 pmslen
= s
->s3
->tmp
.pmslen
;
3255 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3257 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kSRP
) {
3258 if (!srp_generate_client_master_secret(s
)) {
3259 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3266 if (pms
== NULL
&& !(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kPSK
)) {
3267 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3268 SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3271 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s
, pms
, pmslen
, 1)) {
3272 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3273 /* ssl_generate_master_secret frees the pms even on error */
3281 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
3282 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
3283 unsigned char sctpauthkey
[64];
3284 char labelbuffer
[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
)];
3287 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
3290 memcpy(labelbuffer
, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
,
3291 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
));
3293 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s
, sctpauthkey
,
3294 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), labelbuffer
,
3295 sizeof(labelbuffer
), NULL
, 0, 0) <= 0) {
3296 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3297 SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK
,
3298 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3302 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY
,
3303 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), sctpauthkey
);
3309 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms
, pmslen
);
3310 s
->s3
->tmp
.pms
= NULL
;
3315 * Check a certificate can be used for client authentication. Currently check
3316 * cert exists, if we have a suitable digest for TLS 1.2 if static DH client
3317 * certificates can be used and optionally checks suitability for Suite B.
3319 static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL
*s
)
3321 /* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */
3322 if (!tls_choose_sigalg(s
, 0) || s
->s3
->tmp
.sigalg
== NULL
)
3325 * If strict mode check suitability of chain before using it. This also
3326 * adjusts suite B digest if necessary.
3328 if (s
->cert
->cert_flags
& SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT
&&
3329 !tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, -2))
3334 WORK_STATE
tls_prepare_client_certificate(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
3337 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
3340 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_A
) {
3341 /* Let cert callback update client certificates if required */
3342 if (s
->cert
->cert_cb
) {
3343 i
= s
->cert
->cert_cb(s
, s
->cert
->cert_cb_arg
);
3345 s
->rwstate
= SSL_X509_LOOKUP
;
3349 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3350 SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3351 SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED
);
3354 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
3356 if (ssl3_check_client_certificate(s
))
3357 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
3359 /* Fall through to WORK_MORE_B */
3363 /* We need to get a client cert */
3364 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_B
) {
3366 * If we get an error, we need to ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3367 * return(-1); We then get retied later
3369 i
= ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s
, &x509
, &pkey
);
3371 s
->rwstate
= SSL_X509_LOOKUP
;
3374 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
3375 if ((i
== 1) && (pkey
!= NULL
) && (x509
!= NULL
)) {
3376 if (!SSL_use_certificate(s
, x509
) || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s
, pkey
))
3378 } else if (i
== 1) {
3380 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3381 SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK
);
3385 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey
);
3386 if (i
&& !ssl3_check_client_certificate(s
))
3389 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
) {
3390 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
= 0;
3391 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_WARNING
, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE
);
3392 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
3394 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
= 2;
3395 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 0)) {
3396 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3402 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
3405 /* Shouldn't ever get here */
3406 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3407 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3411 int tls_construct_client_certificate(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3414 * TODO(TLS1.3): For now we must put an empty context. Needs to be filled in
3417 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, 0)) {
3418 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3419 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3422 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s
, pkt
,
3423 (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
== 2) ? NULL
3425 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3430 && SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s
)
3431 && (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
3432 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE
))) {
3434 * This is a fatal error, which leaves enc_write_ctx in an inconsistent
3435 * state and thus ssl3_send_alert may crash.
3437 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3438 SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER
);
3445 int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL
*s
)
3447 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP
*clu
;
3451 alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
3452 alg_a
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
;
3454 /* we don't have a certificate */
3455 if (!(alg_a
& SSL_aCERT
))
3458 /* This is the passed certificate */
3459 clu
= ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
), &idx
);
3461 /* Check certificate is recognised and suitable for cipher */
3462 if (clu
== NULL
|| (alg_a
& clu
->amask
) == 0) {
3463 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
3464 SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3465 SSL_R_MISSING_SIGNING_CERT
);
3469 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3470 if (clu
->amask
& SSL_aECDSA
) {
3471 if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(s
->session
->peer
, s
))
3473 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
3474 SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT
);
3478 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3479 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kRSA
| SSL_kRSAPSK
) && idx
!= SSL_PKEY_RSA
) {
3480 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
3481 SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3482 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT
);
3486 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3487 if ((alg_k
& SSL_kDHE
) && (s
->s3
->peer_tmp
== NULL
)) {
3488 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3489 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3497 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3498 int tls_construct_next_proto(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3500 size_t len
, padding_len
;
3501 unsigned char *padding
= NULL
;
3503 len
= s
->ext
.npn_len
;
3504 padding_len
= 32 - ((len
+ 2) % 32);
3506 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, s
->ext
.npn
, len
)
3507 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u8(pkt
, padding_len
, &padding
)) {
3508 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEXT_PROTO
,
3509 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3513 memset(padding
, 0, padding_len
);
3519 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_hello_req(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
3521 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) > 0) {
3522 /* should contain no data */
3523 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_REQ
,
3524 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3525 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
3528 if ((s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION
)) {
3529 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_WARNING
, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION
);
3530 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
3534 * This is a historical discrepancy (not in the RFC) maintained for
3535 * compatibility reasons. If a TLS client receives a HelloRequest it will
3536 * attempt an abbreviated handshake. However if a DTLS client receives a
3537 * HelloRequest it will do a full handshake. Either behaviour is reasonable
3538 * but doing one for TLS and another for DTLS is odd.
3543 SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated(s
);
3545 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
3548 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
3551 RAW_EXTENSION
*rawexts
= NULL
;
3553 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &extensions
)
3554 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
3555 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
,
3556 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3560 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s
, &extensions
,
3561 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
, &rawexts
,
3563 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s
, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
,
3564 rawexts
, NULL
, 0, 1)) {
3565 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3569 OPENSSL_free(rawexts
);
3570 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
3573 OPENSSL_free(rawexts
);
3574 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
3577 int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL
*s
, X509
**px509
, EVP_PKEY
**ppkey
)
3580 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
3581 if (s
->ctx
->client_cert_engine
) {
3582 i
= ENGINE_load_ssl_client_cert(s
->ctx
->client_cert_engine
, s
,
3583 SSL_get_client_CA_list(s
),
3584 px509
, ppkey
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
);
3589 if (s
->ctx
->client_cert_cb
)
3590 i
= s
->ctx
->client_cert_cb(s
, px509
, ppkey
);
3594 int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL
*s
, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *sk
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3597 size_t totlen
= 0, len
, maxlen
, maxverok
= 0;
3598 int empty_reneg_info_scsv
= !s
->renegotiate
;
3599 /* Set disabled masks for this session */
3600 ssl_set_client_disabled(s
);
3603 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES
,
3604 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3608 #ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
3609 # if OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH < 6
3610 # error Max cipher length too short
3613 * Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes as hack workaround
3614 * chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well below this if we
3617 if (TLS1_get_version(s
) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
)
3618 maxlen
= OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
& ~1;
3621 /* Maximum length that can be stored in 2 bytes. Length must be even */
3624 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv
)
3626 if (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV
)
3629 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk
) && totlen
< maxlen
; i
++) {
3630 const SSL_CIPHER
*c
;
3632 c
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk
, i
);
3633 /* Skip disabled ciphers */
3634 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s
, c
, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED
, 0))
3637 if (!s
->method
->put_cipher_by_char(c
, pkt
, &len
)) {
3638 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES
,
3639 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3643 /* Sanity check that the maximum version we offer has ciphers enabled */
3645 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
3646 if (DTLS_VERSION_GE(c
->max_dtls
, s
->s3
->tmp
.max_ver
)
3647 && DTLS_VERSION_LE(c
->min_dtls
, s
->s3
->tmp
.max_ver
))
3650 if (c
->max_tls
>= s
->s3
->tmp
.max_ver
3651 && c
->min_tls
<= s
->s3
->tmp
.max_ver
)
3659 if (totlen
== 0 || !maxverok
) {
3660 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES
,
3661 SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE
);
3664 ERR_add_error_data(1, "No ciphers enabled for max supported "
3671 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv
) {
3672 static SSL_CIPHER scsv
= {
3673 0, NULL
, NULL
, SSL3_CK_SCSV
, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3675 if (!s
->method
->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv
, pkt
, &len
)) {
3676 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3677 SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3681 if (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV
) {
3682 static SSL_CIPHER scsv
= {
3683 0, NULL
, NULL
, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV
, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3685 if (!s
->method
->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv
, pkt
, &len
)) {
3686 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3687 SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3696 int tls_construct_end_of_early_data(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3698 if (s
->early_data_state
!= SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY
3699 && s
->early_data_state
!= SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING
) {
3700 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3701 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
,
3702 ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED
);
3706 s
->early_data_state
= SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING
;