2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10 /* ====================================================================
11 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
13 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
14 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
16 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
17 * license provided above.
19 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
20 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
23 /* ====================================================================
24 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
26 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
27 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
30 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
31 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
32 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
34 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
35 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
36 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
38 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
39 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
40 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
41 * to make use of the Contribution.
43 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
44 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
45 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
46 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
52 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
53 #include "statem_locl.h"
54 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
55 #include <openssl/rand.h>
56 #include <openssl/objects.h>
57 #include <openssl/evp.h>
58 #include <openssl/md5.h>
59 #include <openssl/dh.h>
60 #include <openssl/bn.h>
61 #include <openssl/engine.h>
63 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_hello_retry_request(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
);
64 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
);
66 static ossl_inline
int cert_req_allowed(SSL
*s
);
67 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL
*s
);
68 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME
*const *a
, const X509_NAME
*const *b
);
69 static int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL
*s
, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *sk
,
73 * Is a CertificateRequest message allowed at the moment or not?
79 static ossl_inline
int cert_req_allowed(SSL
*s
)
81 /* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */
82 if ((s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
83 && (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aNULL
))
84 || (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aSRP
| SSL_aPSK
)))
91 * Should we expect the ServerKeyExchange message or not?
97 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL
*s
)
99 long alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
102 * Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral
103 * ciphersuite or for SRP
105 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kDHEPSK
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
114 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
115 * handshake state transitions when a TLS1.3 client is reading messages from the
116 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
117 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
119 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
120 * (transition not allowed)
122 static int ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(SSL
*s
, int mt
)
124 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
127 * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO, because we haven't
128 * yet negotiated TLSv1.3 at that point so that is handled by
129 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition()
132 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
136 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
138 * This must a ClientHello following a HelloRetryRequest, so the only
139 * thing we can get now is a ServerHello.
141 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO
) {
142 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
;
147 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
:
148 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
) {
149 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
;
154 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
:
156 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
) {
157 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
;
161 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
) {
162 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
;
165 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
) {
166 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT
;
172 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
:
173 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
) {
174 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT
;
180 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY
) {
181 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
;
186 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
:
187 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
) {
188 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
;
194 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET
) {
195 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
;
198 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE
) {
199 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE
;
205 /* No valid transition found */
210 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
211 * handshake state transitions when the client is reading messages from the
212 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
213 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
215 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
216 * (transition not allowed)
218 int ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL
*s
, int mt
)
220 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
224 * Note that after writing the first ClientHello we don't know what version
225 * we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later.
227 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
228 if (!ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(s
, mt
))
233 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
237 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
238 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO
) {
239 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
;
243 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
244 if (mt
== DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
) {
245 st
->hand_state
= DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
;
249 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
) {
250 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
;
256 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA
:
258 * We've not actually selected TLSv1.3 yet, but we have sent early
259 * data. The only thing allowed now is a ServerHello or a
262 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO
) {
263 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
;
266 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
) {
267 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
;
272 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
:
274 if (s
->ext
.ticket_expected
) {
275 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET
) {
276 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
;
279 } else if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
280 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
;
284 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && mt
== DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
) {
285 st
->hand_state
= DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
;
287 } else if (s
->version
>= TLS1_VERSION
288 && s
->ext
.session_secret_cb
!= NULL
289 && s
->session
->ext
.tick
!= NULL
290 && mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
292 * Normally, we can tell if the server is resuming the session
293 * from the session ID. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851), however, relies on
294 * the next server message after the ServerHello to determine if
295 * the server is resuming.
298 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
;
300 } else if (!(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
301 & (SSL_aNULL
| SSL_aSRP
| SSL_aPSK
))) {
302 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
) {
303 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT
;
307 ske_expected
= key_exchange_expected(s
);
308 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
310 || ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_PSK
)
311 && mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
)) {
312 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
) {
313 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH
;
316 } else if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
317 && cert_req_allowed(s
)) {
318 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
;
320 } else if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE
) {
321 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
;
330 * The CertificateStatus message is optional even if
331 * |ext.status_expected| is set
333 if (s
->ext
.status_expected
&& mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS
) {
334 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS
;
339 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS
:
340 ske_expected
= key_exchange_expected(s
);
341 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
342 if (ske_expected
|| ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_PSK
)
343 && mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
)) {
344 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
) {
345 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH
;
352 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH
:
353 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
) {
354 if (cert_req_allowed(s
)) {
355 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
;
362 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
:
363 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE
) {
364 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
;
369 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
:
370 if (s
->ext
.ticket_expected
) {
371 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET
) {
372 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
;
375 } else if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
376 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
;
381 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
:
382 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
383 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
;
388 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
:
389 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
) {
390 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
;
396 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST
) {
397 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ
;
404 /* No valid transition found */
405 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
406 SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_READ_TRANSITION
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
411 * ossl_statem_client13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
412 * move to next when the TLSv1.3 client is writing messages to be sent to the
415 static WRITE_TRAN
ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(SSL
*s
)
417 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
420 * Note: There are no cases for TLS_ST_BEFORE because we haven't negotiated
421 * TLSv1.3 yet at that point. They are handled by
422 * ossl_statem_client_write_transition().
424 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
426 /* Shouldn't happen */
427 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR
;
429 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
430 /* We only hit this in the case of HelloRetryRequest */
431 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
433 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
:
434 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
;
435 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
437 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
:
438 if (s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY
)
439 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END
;
441 st
->hand_state
= (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
!= 0) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT
442 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
443 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
445 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END
:
446 st
->hand_state
= (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
!= 0) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT
447 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
448 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
451 /* If a non-empty Certificate we also send CertificateVerify */
452 st
->hand_state
= (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
== 1) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
453 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
454 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
456 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
:
457 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
458 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
460 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE
:
461 if (s
->key_update
!= SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE
) {
462 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE
;
463 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
467 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE
:
468 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
:
469 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
:
470 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
471 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
474 if (s
->key_update
!= SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE
) {
475 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE
;
476 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
479 /* Try to read from the server instead */
480 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
485 * ossl_statem_client_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
486 * move to next when the client is writing messages to be sent to the server.
488 WRITE_TRAN
ossl_statem_client_write_transition(SSL
*s
)
490 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
493 * Note that immediately before/after a ClientHello we don't know what
494 * version we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until
498 return ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(s
);
500 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
502 /* Shouldn't happen */
503 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR
;
506 if (!s
->renegotiate
) {
508 * We haven't requested a renegotiation ourselves so we must have
509 * received a message from the server. Better read it.
511 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
513 /* Renegotiation - fall through */
515 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
;
516 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
518 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
519 if (s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
) {
521 * We are assuming this is a TLSv1.3 connection, although we haven't
522 * actually selected a version yet.
524 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA
;
525 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
528 * No transition at the end of writing because we don't know what
531 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
533 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA
:
534 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
536 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
537 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
;
538 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
540 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
:
541 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
)
542 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CERT
;
544 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH
;
545 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
548 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH
;
549 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
551 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH
:
553 * For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is
554 * sent, but no verify packet is sent
557 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication in ECDH
558 * cipher suites with ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. We
559 * need to skip the certificate verify message when client's
560 * ECDH public key is sent inside the client certificate.
562 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
== 1) {
563 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
;
565 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
;
567 if (s
->s3
->flags
& TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY
) {
568 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
;
570 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
572 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
:
573 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
;
574 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
576 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
:
577 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
579 hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
581 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && s
->s3
->npn_seen
)
582 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO
;
584 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
586 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
588 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
589 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO
:
590 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
591 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
594 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
:
596 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
597 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
599 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
602 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
:
604 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
;
605 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
607 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
608 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
611 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ
:
613 * If we can renegotiate now then do so, otherwise wait for a more
616 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s
, 1)) {
617 if (!tls_setup_handshake(s
)) {
618 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
619 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR
;
621 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
;
622 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
624 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
625 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
630 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
631 * the client to the server.
633 WORK_STATE
ossl_statem_client_pre_work(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
635 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
637 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
639 /* No pre work to be done */
642 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
644 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
645 /* every DTLS ClientHello resets Finished MAC */
646 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s
)) {
647 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
653 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
:
654 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
657 * We're into the last flight so we don't retransmit these
658 * messages unless we need to.
662 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
663 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s
)))
664 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s
);
669 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA
:
670 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END
:
672 return tls_finish_handshake(s
, wst
, 1);
675 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
679 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
680 * client to the server.
682 WORK_STATE
ossl_statem_client_post_work(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
684 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
688 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
690 /* No post work to be done */
693 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
694 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_A
&& statem_flush(s
) != 1)
697 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
698 /* Treat the next message as the first packet */
702 if (s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
703 && s
->max_early_data
> 0) {
705 * We haven't selected TLSv1.3 yet so we don't call the change
706 * cipher state function associated with the SSL_METHOD. Instead
707 * we call tls13_change_cipher_state() directly.
709 if (!tls13_change_cipher_state(s
,
710 SSL3_CC_EARLY
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE
))
715 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH
:
716 if (tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(s
) == 0)
720 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
:
721 s
->session
->cipher
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
;
722 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
723 s
->session
->compress_meth
= 0;
725 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
== NULL
)
726 s
->session
->compress_meth
= 0;
728 s
->session
->compress_meth
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
->id
;
730 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->setup_key_block(s
))
733 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
734 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE
))
737 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
738 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
741 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
744 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY
,
749 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s
, SSL3_CC_WRITE
);
753 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
:
754 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
755 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_A
&& SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && s
->hit
== 0) {
757 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
760 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY
,
764 if (statem_flush(s
) != 1)
767 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
768 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
769 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE
))
774 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE
:
775 if (statem_flush(s
) != 1)
777 if (!tls13_update_key(s
, 1))
782 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
786 * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the
789 * Valid return values are:
793 int ossl_statem_client_construct_message(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
,
794 confunc_f
*confunc
, int *mt
)
796 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
798 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
800 /* Shouldn't happen */
803 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
:
805 *confunc
= dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec
;
807 *confunc
= tls_construct_change_cipher_spec
;
808 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
;
811 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
812 *confunc
= tls_construct_client_hello
;
813 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO
;
817 *confunc
= tls_construct_client_certificate
;
818 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
;
821 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH
:
822 *confunc
= tls_construct_client_key_exchange
;
823 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
;
826 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
:
827 *confunc
= tls_construct_cert_verify
;
828 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY
;
831 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
832 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO
:
833 *confunc
= tls_construct_next_proto
;
834 *mt
= SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO
;
837 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
:
838 *confunc
= tls_construct_finished
;
839 *mt
= SSL3_MT_FINISHED
;
842 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE
:
843 *confunc
= tls_construct_key_update
;
844 *mt
= SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE
;
852 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
853 * reading. Excludes the message header.
855 size_t ossl_statem_client_max_message_size(SSL
*s
)
857 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
859 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
861 /* Shouldn't happen */
864 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
:
865 return SERVER_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH
;
867 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
868 return HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH
;
870 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
:
871 return HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH
;
874 return s
->max_cert_list
;
876 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
:
877 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
;
879 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS
:
880 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
;
882 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH
:
883 return SERVER_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH
;
885 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
:
887 * Set to s->max_cert_list for compatibility with previous releases. In
888 * practice these messages can get quite long if servers are configured
889 * to provide a long list of acceptable CAs
891 return s
->max_cert_list
;
893 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
:
894 return SERVER_HELLO_DONE_MAX_LENGTH
;
896 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
:
897 if (s
->version
== DTLS1_BAD_VER
)
899 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH
;
901 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
:
902 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
;
904 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
:
905 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH
;
907 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
:
908 return ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS_MAX_LENGTH
;
910 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE
:
911 return KEY_UPDATE_MAX_LENGTH
;
916 * Process a message that the client has been received from the server.
918 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
ossl_statem_client_process_message(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
920 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
922 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
924 /* Shouldn't happen */
925 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
927 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
:
928 return tls_process_server_hello(s
, pkt
);
930 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
931 return dtls_process_hello_verify(s
, pkt
);
933 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
:
934 return tls_process_hello_retry_request(s
, pkt
);
937 return tls_process_server_certificate(s
, pkt
);
939 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
:
940 return tls_process_cert_verify(s
, pkt
);
942 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS
:
943 return tls_process_cert_status(s
, pkt
);
945 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH
:
946 return tls_process_key_exchange(s
, pkt
);
948 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
:
949 return tls_process_certificate_request(s
, pkt
);
951 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
:
952 return tls_process_server_done(s
, pkt
);
954 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
:
955 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s
, pkt
);
957 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
:
958 return tls_process_new_session_ticket(s
, pkt
);
960 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
:
961 return tls_process_finished(s
, pkt
);
963 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ
:
964 return tls_process_hello_req(s
, pkt
);
966 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
:
967 return tls_process_encrypted_extensions(s
, pkt
);
969 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE
:
970 return tls_process_key_update(s
, pkt
);
975 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
978 WORK_STATE
ossl_statem_client_post_process_message(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
980 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
982 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
984 /* Shouldn't happen */
987 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
:
988 return tls_prepare_client_certificate(s
, wst
);
990 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
991 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
:
992 /* We only get here if we are using SCTP and we are renegotiating */
993 if (BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s
))) {
994 s
->s3
->in_read_app_data
= 2;
995 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
996 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s
));
997 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s
));
998 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s
, 1);
1001 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s
, 0);
1002 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP
;
1007 int tls_construct_client_hello(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
1012 int al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1013 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1016 SSL_SESSION
*sess
= s
->session
;
1018 if (!WPACKET_set_max_size(pkt
, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
)) {
1019 /* Should not happen */
1020 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1024 /* Work out what SSL/TLS/DTLS version to use */
1025 protverr
= ssl_set_client_hello_version(s
);
1026 if (protverr
!= 0) {
1027 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
, protverr
);
1031 if ((sess
== NULL
) || !ssl_version_supported(s
, sess
->ssl_version
) ||
1033 * In the case of EAP-FAST, we can have a pre-shared
1034 * "ticket" without a session ID.
1036 (!sess
->session_id_length
&& !sess
->ext
.tick
) ||
1037 (sess
->not_resumable
)) {
1038 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s
, 0))
1041 /* else use the pre-loaded session */
1043 p
= s
->s3
->client_random
;
1046 * for DTLS if client_random is initialized, reuse it, we are
1047 * required to use same upon reply to HelloVerify
1049 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1052 for (idx
= 0; idx
< sizeof(s
->s3
->client_random
); idx
++) {
1061 if (i
&& ssl_fill_hello_random(s
, 0, p
, sizeof(s
->s3
->client_random
)) <= 0)
1065 * version indicates the negotiated version: for example from
1066 * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version
1067 * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also
1068 * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can
1069 * choke if we initially report a higher version then
1070 * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This
1071 * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it
1072 * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports
1075 * Possible scenario with previous logic:
1076 * 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2
1077 * 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0
1078 * 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.
1079 * 4. Handshake proceeds using TLS 1.0.
1080 * 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.
1081 * 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now
1082 * know that is maximum server supports.
1083 * 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret
1084 * containing version 1.0.
1086 * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the
1087 * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely
1088 * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't
1089 * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with
1090 * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using
1091 * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to
1092 * the negotiated version.
1094 * For TLS 1.3 we always set the ClientHello version to 1.2 and rely on the
1095 * supported_versions extension for the real supported versions.
1097 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, s
->client_version
)
1098 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt
, s
->s3
->client_random
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
)) {
1099 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1104 if (s
->new_session
|| s
->session
->ssl_version
== TLS1_3_VERSION
)
1107 sess_id_len
= s
->session
->session_id_length
;
1108 if (sess_id_len
> sizeof(s
->session
->session_id
)
1109 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt
)
1110 || (sess_id_len
!= 0 && !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt
, s
->session
->session_id
,
1112 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
1113 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1117 /* cookie stuff for DTLS */
1118 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1119 if (s
->d1
->cookie_len
> sizeof(s
->d1
->cookie
)
1120 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, s
->d1
->cookie
,
1121 s
->d1
->cookie_len
)) {
1122 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1127 /* Ciphers supported */
1128 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)) {
1129 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1132 /* ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes() raises SSLerr if appropriate */
1133 if (!ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s
, SSL_get_ciphers(s
), pkt
))
1135 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
1136 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1141 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt
)) {
1142 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1145 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1146 if (ssl_allow_compression(s
)
1147 && s
->ctx
->comp_methods
1148 && (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) || s
->s3
->tmp
.max_ver
< TLS1_3_VERSION
)) {
1149 int compnum
= sk_SSL_COMP_num(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
);
1150 for (i
= 0; i
< compnum
; i
++) {
1151 comp
= sk_SSL_COMP_value(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
, i
);
1152 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, comp
->id
)) {
1153 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1159 /* Add the NULL method */
1160 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, 0) || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
1161 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1165 /* TLS extensions */
1166 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s
, pkt
, EXT_CLIENT_HELLO
, NULL
, 0, &al
)) {
1167 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1168 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1175 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
dtls_process_hello_verify(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1181 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt
, 2)
1182 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &cookiepkt
)) {
1183 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1184 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1188 cookie_len
= PACKET_remaining(&cookiepkt
);
1189 if (cookie_len
> sizeof(s
->d1
->cookie
)) {
1190 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1191 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
1195 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&cookiepkt
, s
->d1
->cookie
, cookie_len
)) {
1196 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1197 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1200 s
->d1
->cookie_len
= cookie_len
;
1202 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
1204 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1205 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
1206 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1209 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_server_hello(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1211 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *sk
;
1212 const SSL_CIPHER
*c
;
1213 PACKET session_id
, extpkt
;
1214 size_t session_id_len
;
1215 const unsigned char *cipherchars
;
1216 int i
, al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1217 unsigned int compression
;
1218 unsigned int sversion
;
1219 unsigned int context
;
1221 RAW_EXTENSION
*extensions
= NULL
;
1222 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1226 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &sversion
)) {
1227 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1228 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1232 /* We do this immediately so we know what format the ServerHello is in */
1233 protverr
= ssl_choose_client_version(s
, sversion
);
1234 if (protverr
!= 0) {
1235 al
= SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
1236 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, protverr
);
1241 * In TLSv1.3 a ServerHello message signals a key change so the end of the
1242 * message must be on a record boundary.
1244 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s
->rlayer
)) {
1245 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1246 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY
);
1250 /* load the server hello data */
1251 /* load the server random */
1252 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt
, s
->s3
->server_random
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
)) {
1253 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1254 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1258 /* Get the session-id. */
1259 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1260 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &session_id
)) {
1261 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1262 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1265 session_id_len
= PACKET_remaining(&session_id
);
1266 if (session_id_len
> sizeof s
->session
->session_id
1267 || session_id_len
> SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE
) {
1268 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1269 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1270 SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG
);
1274 PACKET_null_init(&session_id
);
1278 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &cipherchars
, TLS_CIPHER_LEN
)) {
1279 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1280 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1284 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1285 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &compression
)) {
1286 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1287 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1294 /* TLS extensions */
1295 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) == 0) {
1296 PACKET_null_init(&extpkt
);
1297 } else if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &extpkt
)) {
1298 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1299 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH
);
1303 context
= SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) ? EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
1304 : EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
;
1305 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s
, &extpkt
, context
, &extensions
, &al
, NULL
))
1310 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1311 /* This will set s->hit if we are resuming */
1312 if (!tls_parse_extension(s
, TLSEXT_IDX_psk
,
1313 EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
,
1314 extensions
, NULL
, 0, &al
))
1318 * Check if we can resume the session based on external pre-shared
1319 * secret. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851) supports two types of session resumption.
1320 * Resumption based on server-side state works with session IDs.
1321 * Resumption based on pre-shared Protected Access Credentials (PACs)
1322 * works by overriding the SessionTicket extension at the application
1323 * layer, and does not send a session ID. (We do not know whether
1324 * EAP-FAST servers would honour the session ID.) Therefore, the session
1325 * ID alone is not a reliable indicator of session resumption, so we
1326 * first check if we can resume, and later peek at the next handshake
1327 * message to see if the server wants to resume.
1329 if (s
->version
>= TLS1_VERSION
1330 && s
->ext
.session_secret_cb
!= NULL
&& s
->session
->ext
.tick
) {
1331 const SSL_CIPHER
*pref_cipher
= NULL
;
1333 * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for
1334 * backwards compat reasons
1336 int master_key_length
;
1337 master_key_length
= sizeof(s
->session
->master_key
);
1338 if (s
->ext
.session_secret_cb(s
, s
->session
->master_key
,
1341 s
->ext
.session_secret_cb_arg
)
1342 && master_key_length
> 0) {
1343 s
->session
->master_key_length
= master_key_length
;
1344 s
->session
->cipher
= pref_cipher
?
1345 pref_cipher
: ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s
, cipherchars
, 0);
1347 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1348 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1353 if (session_id_len
!= 0
1354 && session_id_len
== s
->session
->session_id_length
1355 && memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id
), s
->session
->session_id
,
1356 session_id_len
) == 0)
1361 if (s
->sid_ctx_length
!= s
->session
->sid_ctx_length
1362 || memcmp(s
->session
->sid_ctx
, s
->sid_ctx
, s
->sid_ctx_length
)) {
1363 /* actually a client application bug */
1364 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1365 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1366 SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT
);
1371 * If we were trying for session-id reuse but the server
1372 * didn't resume, make a new SSL_SESSION.
1373 * In the case of EAP-FAST and PAC, we do not send a session ID,
1374 * so the PAC-based session secret is always preserved. It'll be
1375 * overwritten if the server refuses resumption.
1377 if (s
->session
->session_id_length
> 0
1379 && s
->session
->ext
.tick_identity
1380 != TLSEXT_PSK_BAD_IDENTITY
)) {
1381 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_miss
++;
1382 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s
, 0)) {
1387 s
->session
->ssl_version
= s
->version
;
1388 s
->session
->session_id_length
= session_id_len
;
1389 /* session_id_len could be 0 */
1390 if (session_id_len
> 0)
1391 memcpy(s
->session
->session_id
, PACKET_data(&session_id
),
1395 /* Session version and negotiated protocol version should match */
1396 if (s
->version
!= s
->session
->ssl_version
) {
1397 al
= SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
1399 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1400 SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_VERSION_MISMATCH
);
1404 c
= ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s
, cipherchars
, 0);
1406 /* unknown cipher */
1407 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1408 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED
);
1412 * Now that we know the version, update the check to see if it's an allowed
1415 s
->s3
->tmp
.min_ver
= s
->version
;
1416 s
->s3
->tmp
.max_ver
= s
->version
;
1418 * If it is a disabled cipher we either didn't send it in client hello,
1419 * or it's not allowed for the selected protocol. So we return an error.
1421 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s
, c
, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK
)) {
1422 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1423 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED
);
1427 sk
= ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s
);
1428 i
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk
, c
);
1430 /* we did not say we would use this cipher */
1431 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1432 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED
);
1437 * Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher
1438 * and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that cipher_id is
1439 * set and use it for comparison.
1441 if (s
->session
->cipher
)
1442 s
->session
->cipher_id
= s
->session
->cipher
->id
;
1443 if (s
->hit
&& (s
->session
->cipher_id
!= c
->id
)) {
1444 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1445 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1446 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED
);
1449 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
= c
;
1451 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1452 if (compression
!= 0) {
1453 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1454 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1455 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM
);
1459 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1460 * using compression.
1462 if (s
->session
->compress_meth
!= 0) {
1463 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION
);
1467 if (s
->hit
&& compression
!= s
->session
->compress_meth
) {
1468 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1469 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1470 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED
);
1473 if (compression
== 0)
1475 else if (!ssl_allow_compression(s
)) {
1476 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1477 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED
);
1480 comp
= ssl3_comp_find(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
, compression
);
1483 if (compression
!= 0 && comp
== NULL
) {
1484 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1485 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1486 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM
);
1489 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
= comp
;
1493 if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s
, context
, extensions
, NULL
, 0, &al
))
1496 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1497 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && s
->hit
) {
1498 unsigned char sctpauthkey
[64];
1499 char labelbuffer
[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
)];
1502 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
1505 memcpy(labelbuffer
, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
,
1506 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
));
1508 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s
, sctpauthkey
,
1509 sizeof(sctpauthkey
),
1511 sizeof(labelbuffer
), NULL
, 0, 0) <= 0)
1514 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
),
1515 BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY
,
1516 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), sctpauthkey
);
1521 * In TLSv1.3 we have some post-processing to change cipher state, otherwise
1522 * we're done with this message
1525 && (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->setup_key_block(s
)
1526 || !s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
1527 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ
))) {
1528 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1529 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER
);
1533 OPENSSL_free(extensions
);
1534 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
1536 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1537 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
1538 OPENSSL_free(extensions
);
1539 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1542 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_hello_retry_request(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1544 unsigned int sversion
;
1546 RAW_EXTENSION
*extensions
= NULL
;
1550 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &sversion
)) {
1551 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1552 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1556 s
->hello_retry_request
= 1;
1558 /* This will fail if it doesn't choose TLSv1.3+ */
1559 errorcode
= ssl_choose_client_version(s
, sversion
);
1560 if (errorcode
!= 0) {
1561 al
= SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
1562 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
, errorcode
);
1566 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &extpkt
)) {
1567 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1568 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH
);
1572 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s
, &extpkt
, EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
,
1573 &extensions
, &al
, NULL
)
1574 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s
, EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
,
1575 extensions
, NULL
, 0, &al
))
1578 OPENSSL_free(extensions
);
1580 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
1582 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1583 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
1584 OPENSSL_free(extensions
);
1585 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1588 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_server_certificate(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1590 int al
, i
, ret
= MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
, exp_idx
;
1591 unsigned long cert_list_len
, cert_len
;
1593 const unsigned char *certstart
, *certbytes
;
1594 STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
= NULL
;
1595 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
1597 unsigned int context
= 0;
1599 if ((sk
= sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL
) {
1600 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1604 if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && !PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &context
))
1606 || !PACKET_get_net_3(pkt
, &cert_list_len
)
1607 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != cert_list_len
) {
1608 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1609 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1612 for (chainidx
= 0; PACKET_remaining(pkt
); chainidx
++) {
1613 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt
, &cert_len
)
1614 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &certbytes
, cert_len
)) {
1615 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1616 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1617 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1621 certstart
= certbytes
;
1622 x
= d2i_X509(NULL
, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes
, cert_len
);
1624 al
= SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
;
1625 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB
);
1628 if (certbytes
!= (certstart
+ cert_len
)) {
1629 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1630 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1631 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1635 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1636 RAW_EXTENSION
*rawexts
= NULL
;
1639 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &extensions
)) {
1640 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1641 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH
);
1644 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s
, &extensions
, EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE
,
1645 &rawexts
, &al
, NULL
)
1646 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s
, EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE
,
1647 rawexts
, x
, chainidx
, &al
)) {
1648 OPENSSL_free(rawexts
);
1651 OPENSSL_free(rawexts
);
1654 if (!sk_X509_push(sk
, x
)) {
1655 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1661 i
= ssl_verify_cert_chain(s
, sk
);
1663 * The documented interface is that SSL_VERIFY_PEER should be set in order
1664 * for client side verification of the server certificate to take place.
1665 * However, historically the code has only checked that *any* flag is set
1666 * to cause server verification to take place. Use of the other flags makes
1667 * no sense in client mode. An attempt to clean up the semantics was
1668 * reverted because at least one application *only* set
1669 * SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT. Prior to the clean up this still caused
1670 * server verification to take place, after the clean up it silently did
1671 * nothing. SSL_CTX_set_verify()/SSL_set_verify() cannot validate the flags
1672 * sent to them because they are void functions. Therefore, we now use the
1673 * (less clean) historic behaviour of performing validation if any flag is
1674 * set. The *documented* interface remains the same.
1676 if (s
->verify_mode
!= SSL_VERIFY_NONE
&& i
<= 0) {
1677 al
= ssl_verify_alarm_type(s
->verify_result
);
1678 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1679 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED
);
1682 ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
1684 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, i
);
1685 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1689 s
->session
->peer_chain
= sk
;
1691 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate,
1692 * which we don't include in statem_srvr.c
1694 x
= sk_X509_value(sk
, 0);
1697 * VRS 19990621: possible memory leak; sk=null ==> !sk_pop_free() @end
1700 pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(x
);
1702 if (pkey
== NULL
|| EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey
)) {
1705 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1706 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS
);
1710 i
= ssl_cert_type(x
, pkey
);
1714 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1715 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE
);
1719 * Check certificate type is consistent with ciphersuite. For TLS 1.3
1720 * skip check since TLS 1.3 ciphersuites can be used with any certificate
1723 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1724 exp_idx
= ssl_cipher_get_cert_index(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
);
1725 if (exp_idx
>= 0 && i
!= exp_idx
1726 && (exp_idx
!= SSL_PKEY_GOST_EC
||
1727 (i
!= SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
&& i
!= SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
1728 && i
!= SSL_PKEY_GOST01
))) {
1730 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1731 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1732 SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE
);
1736 s
->session
->peer_type
= i
;
1738 X509_free(s
->session
->peer
);
1740 s
->session
->peer
= x
;
1741 s
->session
->verify_result
= s
->verify_result
;
1744 /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */
1746 && !ssl_handshake_hash(s
, s
->cert_verify_hash
,
1747 sizeof(s
->cert_verify_hash
),
1748 &s
->cert_verify_hash_len
)) {
1749 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1750 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1754 ret
= MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
1758 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1760 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
1763 sk_X509_pop_free(sk
, X509_free
);
1767 static int tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, int *al
)
1769 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1770 PACKET psk_identity_hint
;
1772 /* PSK ciphersuites are preceded by an identity hint */
1774 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &psk_identity_hint
)) {
1775 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1776 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1781 * Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in
1782 * tls_construct_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of
1783 * a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK
1786 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint
) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
) {
1787 *al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1788 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
1792 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint
) == 0) {
1793 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
);
1794 s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
= NULL
;
1795 } else if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity_hint
,
1796 &s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
)) {
1797 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1803 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1804 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1809 static int tls_process_ske_srp(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, EVP_PKEY
**pkey
, int *al
)
1811 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1812 PACKET prime
, generator
, salt
, server_pub
;
1814 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &prime
)
1815 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &generator
)
1816 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &salt
)
1817 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &server_pub
)) {
1818 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1819 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1823 /* TODO(size_t): Convert BN_bin2bn() calls */
1825 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime
),
1826 (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime
), NULL
)) == NULL
1828 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator
),
1829 (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator
), NULL
)) == NULL
1831 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&salt
),
1832 (int)PACKET_remaining(&salt
), NULL
)) == NULL
1834 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&server_pub
),
1835 (int)PACKET_remaining(&server_pub
), NULL
)) == NULL
) {
1836 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1837 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
1841 if (!srp_verify_server_param(s
, al
)) {
1842 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1843 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP
, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS
);
1847 /* We must check if there is a certificate */
1848 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aRSA
| SSL_aDSS
))
1849 *pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
1853 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1854 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1859 static int tls_process_ske_dhe(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, EVP_PKEY
**pkey
, int *al
)
1861 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1862 PACKET prime
, generator
, pub_key
;
1863 EVP_PKEY
*peer_tmp
= NULL
;
1866 BIGNUM
*p
= NULL
, *g
= NULL
, *bnpub_key
= NULL
;
1870 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &prime
)
1871 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &generator
)
1872 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &pub_key
)) {
1873 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1874 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1878 peer_tmp
= EVP_PKEY_new();
1881 if (peer_tmp
== NULL
|| dh
== NULL
) {
1882 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1883 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1887 /* TODO(size_t): Convert these calls */
1888 p
= BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime
), (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime
), NULL
);
1889 g
= BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator
), (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator
),
1891 bnpub_key
= BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&pub_key
),
1892 (int)PACKET_remaining(&pub_key
), NULL
);
1893 if (p
== NULL
|| g
== NULL
|| bnpub_key
== NULL
) {
1894 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1895 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
1899 /* test non-zero pupkey */
1900 if (BN_is_zero(bnpub_key
)) {
1901 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1902 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
, SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE
);
1906 if (!DH_set0_pqg(dh
, p
, NULL
, g
)) {
1907 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1908 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
1913 if (DH_check_params(dh
, &check_bits
) == 0 || check_bits
!= 0) {
1914 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1915 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
, SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE
);
1919 if (!DH_set0_key(dh
, bnpub_key
, NULL
)) {
1920 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1921 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
1926 if (!ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH
, DH_security_bits(dh
), 0, dh
)) {
1927 *al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1928 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL
);
1932 if (EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(peer_tmp
, dh
) == 0) {
1933 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1934 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
1938 s
->s3
->peer_tmp
= peer_tmp
;
1941 * FIXME: This makes assumptions about which ciphersuites come with
1942 * public keys. We should have a less ad-hoc way of doing this
1944 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aRSA
| SSL_aDSS
))
1945 *pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
1946 /* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
1955 EVP_PKEY_free(peer_tmp
);
1959 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1960 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1965 static int tls_process_ske_ecdhe(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, EVP_PKEY
**pkey
, int *al
)
1967 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1969 const unsigned char *ecparams
;
1971 unsigned int curve_flags
;
1972 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pctx
= NULL
;
1975 * Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH
1976 * public key. For now we only support named (not generic) curves and
1977 * ECParameters in this case is just three bytes.
1979 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &ecparams
, 3)) {
1980 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1981 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1985 * Check curve is one of our preferences, if not server has sent an
1986 * invalid curve. ECParameters is 3 bytes.
1988 if (!tls1_check_curve(s
, ecparams
, 3)) {
1989 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1990 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE
, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE
);
1994 curve_nid
= tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(*(ecparams
+ 2), &curve_flags
);
1996 if (curve_nid
== 0) {
1997 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1998 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE
,
1999 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS
);
2003 if ((curve_flags
& TLS_CURVE_TYPE
) == TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM
) {
2004 EVP_PKEY
*key
= EVP_PKEY_new();
2006 if (key
== NULL
|| !EVP_PKEY_set_type(key
, curve_nid
)) {
2007 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2008 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
2012 s
->s3
->peer_tmp
= key
;
2014 /* Set up EVP_PKEY with named curve as parameters */
2015 pctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(EVP_PKEY_EC
, NULL
);
2017 || EVP_PKEY_paramgen_init(pctx
) <= 0
2018 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ec_paramgen_curve_nid(pctx
, curve_nid
) <= 0
2019 || EVP_PKEY_paramgen(pctx
, &s
->s3
->peer_tmp
) <= 0) {
2020 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2021 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
2022 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
2025 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
2029 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &encoded_pt
)) {
2030 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2031 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2035 if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(s
->s3
->peer_tmp
,
2036 PACKET_data(&encoded_pt
),
2037 PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt
))) {
2038 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2039 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE
, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT
);
2044 * The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign
2045 * ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA
2048 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aECDSA
)
2049 *pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
2050 else if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aRSA
)
2051 *pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
2052 /* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
2056 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2057 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2062 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_key_exchange(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2066 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
2067 EVP_MD_CTX
*md_ctx
= NULL
;
2068 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pctx
= NULL
;
2069 PACKET save_param_start
, signature
;
2071 alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
2073 save_param_start
= *pkt
;
2075 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
2076 EVP_PKEY_free(s
->s3
->peer_tmp
);
2077 s
->s3
->peer_tmp
= NULL
;
2080 if (alg_k
& SSL_PSK
) {
2081 if (!tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(s
, pkt
, &al
))
2085 /* Nothing else to do for plain PSK or RSAPSK */
2086 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kPSK
| SSL_kRSAPSK
)) {
2087 } else if (alg_k
& SSL_kSRP
) {
2088 if (!tls_process_ske_srp(s
, pkt
, &pkey
, &al
))
2090 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kDHEPSK
)) {
2091 if (!tls_process_ske_dhe(s
, pkt
, &pkey
, &al
))
2093 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
)) {
2094 if (!tls_process_ske_ecdhe(s
, pkt
, &pkey
, &al
))
2097 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
2098 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
2102 /* if it was signed, check the signature */
2106 const EVP_MD
*md
= NULL
;
2109 * |pkt| now points to the beginning of the signature, so the difference
2110 * equals the length of the parameters.
2112 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(&save_param_start
, ¶ms
,
2113 PACKET_remaining(&save_param_start
) -
2114 PACKET_remaining(pkt
))) {
2115 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2116 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2120 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
2121 unsigned int sigalg
;
2124 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &sigalg
)) {
2125 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2126 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
2129 rv
= tls12_check_peer_sigalg(s
, sigalg
, pkey
);
2131 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2133 } else if (rv
== 0) {
2134 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2138 fprintf(stderr
, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md
));
2140 } else if (!tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(s
, pkey
)) {
2141 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2145 md
= ssl_md(s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalg
->hash_idx
);
2147 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &signature
)
2148 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
2149 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2150 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2153 maxsig
= EVP_PKEY_size(pkey
);
2155 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2156 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2161 * Check signature length
2163 if (PACKET_remaining(&signature
) > (size_t)maxsig
) {
2164 /* wrong packet length */
2165 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2166 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2167 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH
);
2171 md_ctx
= EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2172 if (md_ctx
== NULL
) {
2173 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2174 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2178 if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(md_ctx
, &pctx
, md
, NULL
, pkey
) <= 0) {
2179 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2180 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
2183 if (SSL_USE_PSS(s
)) {
2184 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx
, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING
) <= 0
2185 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx
,
2186 RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST
) <= 0) {
2187 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2188 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
2192 if (EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(md_ctx
, &(s
->s3
->client_random
[0]),
2193 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) <= 0
2194 || EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(md_ctx
, &(s
->s3
->server_random
[0]),
2195 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) <= 0
2196 || EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(md_ctx
, PACKET_data(¶ms
),
2197 PACKET_remaining(¶ms
)) <= 0) {
2198 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2199 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
2202 if (EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(md_ctx
, PACKET_data(&signature
),
2203 PACKET_remaining(&signature
)) <= 0) {
2205 al
= SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
2206 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE
);
2209 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx
);
2212 /* aNULL, aSRP or PSK do not need public keys */
2213 if (!(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aNULL
| SSL_aSRP
))
2214 && !(alg_k
& SSL_PSK
)) {
2215 /* Might be wrong key type, check it */
2216 if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s
)) {
2217 /* Otherwise this shouldn't happen */
2218 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2219 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2221 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2225 /* still data left over */
2226 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
2227 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2228 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE
);
2233 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
2236 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
2237 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
2238 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx
);
2239 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2242 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_certificate_request(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2244 int ret
= MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2245 unsigned int i
, name_len
;
2246 X509_NAME
*xn
= NULL
;
2247 const unsigned char *namestart
, *namebytes
;
2248 STACK_OF(X509_NAME
) *ca_sk
= NULL
;
2251 if ((ca_sk
= sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp
)) == NULL
) {
2252 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2256 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
2259 /* Free and zero certificate types: it is not present in TLS 1.3 */
2260 OPENSSL_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.ctype
);
2261 s
->s3
->tmp
.ctype
= NULL
;
2262 s
->s3
->tmp
.ctype_len
= 0;
2263 /* TODO(TLS1.3) need to process request context, for now ignore */
2264 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &reqctx
)) {
2265 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2266 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2272 /* get the certificate types */
2273 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &ctypes
)) {
2274 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
2275 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2276 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2280 if (!PACKET_memdup(&ctypes
, &s
->s3
->tmp
.ctype
, &s
->s3
->tmp
.ctype_len
)) {
2281 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2286 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
2289 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &sigalgs
)) {
2290 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
2291 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2292 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2296 /* Clear certificate validity flags */
2297 for (i
= 0; i
< SSL_PKEY_NUM
; i
++)
2298 s
->s3
->tmp
.valid_flags
[i
] = 0;
2299 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s
, &sigalgs
)) {
2300 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
2301 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2302 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR
);
2305 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s
)) {
2306 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2307 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2312 /* get the CA RDNs */
2313 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &cadns
)) {
2314 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
2315 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2319 while (PACKET_remaining(&cadns
)) {
2320 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&cadns
, &name_len
)
2321 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&cadns
, &namebytes
, name_len
)) {
2322 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
2323 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2324 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2328 namestart
= namebytes
;
2330 if ((xn
= d2i_X509_NAME(NULL
, (const unsigned char **)&namebytes
,
2331 name_len
)) == NULL
) {
2332 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
2333 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB
);
2337 if (namebytes
!= (namestart
+ name_len
)) {
2338 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
2339 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2340 SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2343 if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk
, xn
)) {
2344 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2349 /* TODO(TLS1.3) need to parse and process extensions, for now ignore */
2350 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
2353 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &reqexts
)) {
2354 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
2355 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2356 SSL_R_EXT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2361 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
2362 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
2363 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2367 /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
2368 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
= 1;
2369 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.ca_names
, X509_NAME_free
);
2370 s
->s3
->tmp
.ca_names
= ca_sk
;
2373 ret
= MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING
;
2376 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
2379 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk
, X509_NAME_free
);
2383 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME
*const *a
, const X509_NAME
*const *b
)
2385 return (X509_NAME_cmp(*a
, *b
));
2388 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_new_session_ticket(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2390 int al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2391 unsigned int ticklen
;
2392 unsigned long ticket_lifetime_hint
, age_add
= 0;
2393 unsigned int sess_len
;
2394 RAW_EXTENSION
*exts
= NULL
;
2396 if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt
, &ticket_lifetime_hint
)
2397 || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && !PACKET_get_net_4(pkt
, &age_add
))
2398 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &ticklen
)
2399 || (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != ticklen
)
2401 && (ticklen
== 0 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) < ticklen
))) {
2402 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2407 * Server is allowed to change its mind (in <=TLSv1.2) and send an empty
2408 * ticket. We already checked this TLSv1.3 case above, so it should never
2409 * be 0 here in that instance
2412 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
2414 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Is this a suitable test for TLS1.3? */
2415 if (s
->session
->session_id_length
> 0) {
2416 int i
= s
->session_ctx
->session_cache_mode
;
2417 SSL_SESSION
*new_sess
;
2419 * We reused an existing session, so we need to replace it with a new
2422 if (i
& SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT
) {
2424 * Remove the old session from the cache. We carry on if this fails
2426 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s
->session_ctx
, s
->session
);
2429 if ((new_sess
= ssl_session_dup(s
->session
, 0)) == 0) {
2430 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2431 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2435 SSL_SESSION_free(s
->session
);
2436 s
->session
= new_sess
;
2440 * Technically the cast to long here is not guaranteed by the C standard -
2441 * but we use it elsewhere, so this should be ok.
2443 s
->session
->time
= (long)time(NULL
);
2445 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->ext
.tick
);
2446 s
->session
->ext
.tick
= NULL
;
2447 s
->session
->ext
.ticklen
= 0;
2449 s
->session
->ext
.tick
= OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen
);
2450 if (s
->session
->ext
.tick
== NULL
) {
2451 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2454 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt
, s
->session
->ext
.tick
, ticklen
)) {
2455 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2456 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2460 s
->session
->ext
.tick_lifetime_hint
= ticket_lifetime_hint
;
2461 s
->session
->ext
.tick_age_add
= age_add
;
2462 s
->session
->ext
.ticklen
= ticklen
;
2464 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
2467 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &extpkt
)
2468 || !tls_collect_extensions(s
, &extpkt
,
2469 EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
,
2471 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s
, EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
,
2472 exts
, NULL
, 0, &al
)) {
2473 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION
);
2479 * There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session. One is to set
2480 * an appropriate session ID and then the server must return a match in
2481 * ServerHello. This allows the normal client session ID matching to work
2482 * and we know much earlier that the ticket has been accepted. The
2483 * other way is to set zero length session ID when the ticket is
2484 * presented and rely on the handshake to determine session resumption.
2485 * We choose the former approach because this fits in with assumptions
2486 * elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set to the SHA256 (or SHA1 is
2487 * SHA256 is disabled) hash of the ticket.
2490 * TODO(size_t): we use sess_len here because EVP_Digest expects an int
2491 * but s->session->session_id_length is a size_t
2493 if (!EVP_Digest(s
->session
->ext
.tick
, ticklen
,
2494 s
->session
->session_id
, &sess_len
,
2495 EVP_sha256(), NULL
)) {
2496 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
2499 s
->session
->session_id_length
= sess_len
;
2501 /* This is a standalone message in TLSv1.3, so there is no more to read */
2502 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
2504 ssl_update_cache(s
, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT
);
2505 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
2508 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
2510 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
2512 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
2514 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2518 * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to
2519 * parse a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure. On failure
2520 * |*al| is populated with a suitable alert code.
2522 int tls_process_cert_status_body(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, int *al
)
2527 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &type
)
2528 || type
!= TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp
) {
2529 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2530 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY
,
2531 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE
);
2534 if (!PACKET_get_net_3_len(pkt
, &resplen
)
2535 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != resplen
) {
2536 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2537 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2540 s
->ext
.ocsp
.resp
= OPENSSL_malloc(resplen
);
2541 if (s
->ext
.ocsp
.resp
== NULL
) {
2542 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2543 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2546 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt
, s
->ext
.ocsp
.resp
, resplen
)) {
2547 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2548 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2551 s
->ext
.ocsp
.resp_len
= resplen
;
2557 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_cert_status(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2561 if (!tls_process_cert_status_body(s
, pkt
, &al
)) {
2562 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
2563 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
2564 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2567 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
2571 * Perform miscellaneous checks and processing after we have received the
2572 * server's initial flight. In TLS1.3 this is after the Server Finished message.
2573 * In <=TLS1.2 this is after the ServerDone message. Returns 1 on success or 0
2576 int tls_process_initial_server_flight(SSL
*s
, int *al
)
2579 * at this point we check that we have the required stuff from
2582 if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s
)) {
2583 *al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2588 * Call the ocsp status callback if needed. The |ext.ocsp.resp| and
2589 * |ext.ocsp.resp_len| values will be set if we actually received a status
2590 * message, or NULL and -1 otherwise
2592 if (s
->ext
.status_type
!= TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing
2593 && s
->ctx
->ext
.status_cb
!= NULL
) {
2594 int ret
= s
->ctx
->ext
.status_cb(s
, s
->ctx
->ext
.status_arg
);
2597 *al
= SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE
;
2598 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_INITIAL_SERVER_FLIGHT
,
2599 SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE
);
2603 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2604 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_INITIAL_SERVER_FLIGHT
,
2605 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2609 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
2610 if (s
->ct_validation_callback
!= NULL
) {
2611 /* Note we validate the SCTs whether or not we abort on error */
2612 if (!ssl_validate_ct(s
) && (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
)) {
2613 *al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2622 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_server_done(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2624 int al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2626 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) > 0) {
2627 /* should contain no data */
2628 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2629 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2632 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2633 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kSRP
) {
2634 if (SRP_Calc_A_param(s
) <= 0) {
2635 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE
, SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC
);
2642 * Error queue messages are generated directly by this function
2644 if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s
, &al
))
2647 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
2648 /* Only applies to renegotiation */
2649 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s
))
2650 && s
->renegotiate
!= 0)
2651 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING
;
2654 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
2657 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
2658 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
2659 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2662 static int tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, int *al
)
2664 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2667 * The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes to return a
2668 * \0-terminated identity. The last byte is for us for simulating
2671 char identity
[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
+ 1];
2672 size_t identitylen
= 0;
2673 unsigned char psk
[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
];
2674 unsigned char *tmppsk
= NULL
;
2675 char *tmpidentity
= NULL
;
2678 if (s
->psk_client_callback
== NULL
) {
2679 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB
);
2680 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2684 memset(identity
, 0, sizeof(identity
));
2686 psklen
= s
->psk_client_callback(s
, s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
,
2687 identity
, sizeof(identity
) - 1,
2690 if (psklen
> PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
) {
2691 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2692 *al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2694 } else if (psklen
== 0) {
2695 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
,
2696 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND
);
2697 *al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2701 identitylen
= strlen(identity
);
2702 if (identitylen
> PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
) {
2703 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2704 *al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2708 tmppsk
= OPENSSL_memdup(psk
, psklen
);
2709 tmpidentity
= OPENSSL_strdup(identity
);
2710 if (tmppsk
== NULL
|| tmpidentity
== NULL
) {
2711 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2712 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2716 OPENSSL_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
);
2717 s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
= tmppsk
;
2718 s
->s3
->tmp
.psklen
= psklen
;
2720 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->psk_identity
);
2721 s
->session
->psk_identity
= tmpidentity
;
2724 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt
, identity
, identitylen
)) {
2725 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2726 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2733 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk
, psklen
);
2734 OPENSSL_cleanse(identity
, sizeof(identity
));
2735 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmppsk
, psklen
);
2736 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmpidentity
, identitylen
);
2740 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2741 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2746 static int tls_construct_cke_rsa(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, int *al
)
2748 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2749 unsigned char *encdata
= NULL
;
2750 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
2751 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pctx
= NULL
;
2753 unsigned char *pms
= NULL
;
2756 if (s
->session
->peer
== NULL
) {
2758 * We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA.
2760 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2764 pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
2765 if (EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pkey
) == NULL
) {
2766 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2770 pmslen
= SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
;
2771 pms
= OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen
);
2773 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2774 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2778 pms
[0] = s
->client_version
>> 8;
2779 pms
[1] = s
->client_version
& 0xff;
2780 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
2781 if (RAND_bytes(pms
+ 2, (int)(pmslen
- 2)) <= 0) {
2785 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2786 if (s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
&& !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)) {
2787 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2790 pctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey
, NULL
);
2791 if (pctx
== NULL
|| EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pctx
) <= 0
2792 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx
, NULL
, &enclen
, pms
, pmslen
) <= 0) {
2793 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
2796 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt
, enclen
, &encdata
)
2797 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx
, encdata
, &enclen
, pms
, pmslen
) <= 0) {
2798 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT
);
2801 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
2804 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2805 if (s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
&& !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
2806 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2810 s
->s3
->tmp
.pms
= pms
;
2811 s
->s3
->tmp
.pmslen
= pmslen
;
2813 /* Log the premaster secret, if logging is enabled. */
2814 if (!ssl_log_rsa_client_key_exchange(s
, encdata
, enclen
, pms
, pmslen
))
2819 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms
, pmslen
);
2820 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
2824 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2825 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2830 static int tls_construct_cke_dhe(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, int *al
)
2832 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2834 const BIGNUM
*pub_key
;
2835 EVP_PKEY
*ckey
= NULL
, *skey
= NULL
;
2836 unsigned char *keybytes
= NULL
;
2838 skey
= s
->s3
->peer_tmp
;
2842 ckey
= ssl_generate_pkey(skey
);
2846 dh_clnt
= EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey
);
2848 if (dh_clnt
== NULL
|| ssl_derive(s
, ckey
, skey
, 0) == 0)
2851 /* send off the data */
2852 DH_get0_key(dh_clnt
, &pub_key
, NULL
);
2853 if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt
, BN_num_bytes(pub_key
), &keybytes
))
2856 BN_bn2bin(pub_key
, keybytes
);
2857 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey
);
2861 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey
);
2863 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2864 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2868 static int tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, int *al
)
2870 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2871 unsigned char *encodedPoint
= NULL
;
2872 size_t encoded_pt_len
= 0;
2873 EVP_PKEY
*ckey
= NULL
, *skey
= NULL
;
2876 skey
= s
->s3
->peer_tmp
;
2878 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2882 ckey
= ssl_generate_pkey(skey
);
2884 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2888 if (ssl_derive(s
, ckey
, skey
, 0) == 0) {
2889 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
2893 /* Generate encoding of client key */
2894 encoded_pt_len
= EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey
, &encodedPoint
);
2896 if (encoded_pt_len
== 0) {
2897 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE
, ERR_R_EC_LIB
);
2901 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, encodedPoint
, encoded_pt_len
)) {
2902 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2908 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint
);
2909 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey
);
2912 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2913 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2918 static int tls_construct_cke_gost(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, int *al
)
2920 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2921 /* GOST key exchange message creation */
2922 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pkey_ctx
= NULL
;
2925 unsigned int md_len
;
2926 unsigned char shared_ukm
[32], tmp
[256];
2927 EVP_MD_CTX
*ukm_hash
= NULL
;
2928 int dgst_nid
= NID_id_GostR3411_94
;
2929 unsigned char *pms
= NULL
;
2932 if ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aGOST12
) != 0)
2933 dgst_nid
= NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256
;
2936 * Get server sertificate PKEY and create ctx from it
2938 peer_cert
= s
->session
->peer
;
2940 *al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2941 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
,
2942 SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER
);
2946 pkey_ctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(X509_get0_pubkey(peer_cert
), NULL
);
2947 if (pkey_ctx
== NULL
) {
2948 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2949 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2953 * If we have send a certificate, and certificate key
2954 * parameters match those of server certificate, use
2955 * certificate key for key exchange
2958 /* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */
2960 pms
= OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen
);
2962 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2963 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2967 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx
) <= 0
2968 /* Generate session key
2969 * TODO(size_t): Convert this function
2971 || RAND_bytes(pms
, (int)pmslen
) <= 0) {
2972 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2973 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2977 * Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context
2980 ukm_hash
= EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2981 if (ukm_hash
== NULL
2982 || EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash
, EVP_get_digestbynid(dgst_nid
)) <= 0
2983 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash
, s
->s3
->client_random
,
2984 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) <= 0
2985 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash
, s
->s3
->server_random
,
2986 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) <= 0
2987 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash
, shared_ukm
, &md_len
) <= 0) {
2988 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2989 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2992 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash
);
2994 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx
, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT
,
2995 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV
, 8, shared_ukm
) < 0) {
2996 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2997 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG
);
3000 /* Make GOST keytransport blob message */
3002 * Encapsulate it into sequence
3005 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx
, tmp
, &msglen
, pms
, pmslen
) <= 0) {
3006 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3007 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG
);
3011 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE
| V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED
)
3012 || (msglen
>= 0x80 && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, 0x81))
3013 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, tmp
, msglen
)) {
3014 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3015 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3019 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx
);
3020 s
->s3
->tmp
.pms
= pms
;
3021 s
->s3
->tmp
.pmslen
= pmslen
;
3025 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx
);
3026 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms
, pmslen
);
3027 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash
);
3030 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3031 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3036 static int tls_construct_cke_srp(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, int *al
)
3038 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3039 unsigned char *abytes
= NULL
;
3041 if (s
->srp_ctx
.A
== NULL
3042 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt
, BN_num_bytes(s
->srp_ctx
.A
),
3044 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3047 BN_bn2bin(s
->srp_ctx
.A
, abytes
);
3049 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->srp_username
);
3050 s
->session
->srp_username
= OPENSSL_strdup(s
->srp_ctx
.login
);
3051 if (s
->session
->srp_username
== NULL
) {
3052 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3058 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3059 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3064 int tls_construct_client_key_exchange(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3066 unsigned long alg_k
;
3069 alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
3071 if ((alg_k
& SSL_PSK
)
3072 && !tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(s
, pkt
, &al
))
3075 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kRSA
| SSL_kRSAPSK
)) {
3076 if (!tls_construct_cke_rsa(s
, pkt
, &al
))
3078 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kDHEPSK
)) {
3079 if (!tls_construct_cke_dhe(s
, pkt
, &al
))
3081 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
)) {
3082 if (!tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(s
, pkt
, &al
))
3084 } else if (alg_k
& SSL_kGOST
) {
3085 if (!tls_construct_cke_gost(s
, pkt
, &al
))
3087 } else if (alg_k
& SSL_kSRP
) {
3088 if (!tls_construct_cke_srp(s
, pkt
, &al
))
3090 } else if (!(alg_k
& SSL_kPSK
)) {
3091 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
3092 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3099 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
3100 OPENSSL_clear_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.pms
, s
->s3
->tmp
.pmslen
);
3101 s
->s3
->tmp
.pms
= NULL
;
3102 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
3103 OPENSSL_clear_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
, s
->s3
->tmp
.psklen
);
3104 s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
= NULL
;
3109 int tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(SSL
*s
)
3111 unsigned char *pms
= NULL
;
3114 pms
= s
->s3
->tmp
.pms
;
3115 pmslen
= s
->s3
->tmp
.pmslen
;
3117 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3119 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kSRP
) {
3120 if (!srp_generate_client_master_secret(s
)) {
3121 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK
,
3122 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3129 if (pms
== NULL
&& !(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kPSK
)) {
3130 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3131 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3134 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s
, pms
, pmslen
, 1)) {
3135 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3136 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3137 /* ssl_generate_master_secret frees the pms even on error */
3145 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
3146 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
3147 unsigned char sctpauthkey
[64];
3148 char labelbuffer
[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
)];
3151 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
3154 memcpy(labelbuffer
, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
,
3155 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
));
3157 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s
, sctpauthkey
,
3158 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), labelbuffer
,
3159 sizeof(labelbuffer
), NULL
, 0, 0) <= 0)
3162 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY
,
3163 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), sctpauthkey
);
3169 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms
, pmslen
);
3170 s
->s3
->tmp
.pms
= NULL
;
3175 * Check a certificate can be used for client authentication. Currently check
3176 * cert exists, if we have a suitable digest for TLS 1.2 if static DH client
3177 * certificates can be used and optionally checks suitability for Suite B.
3179 static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL
*s
)
3181 /* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */
3182 if (!tls_choose_sigalg(s
, NULL
) || s
->s3
->tmp
.sigalg
== NULL
)
3185 * If strict mode check suitability of chain before using it. This also
3186 * adjusts suite B digest if necessary.
3188 if (s
->cert
->cert_flags
& SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT
&&
3189 !tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, -2))
3194 WORK_STATE
tls_prepare_client_certificate(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
3197 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
3200 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_A
) {
3201 /* Let cert callback update client certificates if required */
3202 if (s
->cert
->cert_cb
) {
3203 i
= s
->cert
->cert_cb(s
, s
->cert
->cert_cb_arg
);
3205 s
->rwstate
= SSL_X509_LOOKUP
;
3209 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3210 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
3213 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
3215 if (ssl3_check_client_certificate(s
))
3216 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
3218 /* Fall through to WORK_MORE_B */
3222 /* We need to get a client cert */
3223 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_B
) {
3225 * If we get an error, we need to ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3226 * return(-1); We then get retied later
3228 i
= ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s
, &x509
, &pkey
);
3230 s
->rwstate
= SSL_X509_LOOKUP
;
3233 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
3234 if ((i
== 1) && (pkey
!= NULL
) && (x509
!= NULL
)) {
3235 if (!SSL_use_certificate(s
, x509
) || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s
, pkey
))
3237 } else if (i
== 1) {
3239 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3240 SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK
);
3244 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey
);
3245 if (i
&& !ssl3_check_client_certificate(s
))
3248 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
) {
3249 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
= 0;
3250 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_WARNING
, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE
);
3251 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
3253 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
= 2;
3254 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 0)) {
3255 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3256 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
3262 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
3265 /* Shouldn't ever get here */
3269 int tls_construct_client_certificate(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3271 int al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3274 * TODO(TLS1.3): For now we must put an empty context. Needs to be filled in
3277 if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, 0))
3278 || !ssl3_output_cert_chain(s
, pkt
,
3279 (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
== 2) ? NULL
3282 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3287 && SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s
)
3288 && (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
3289 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE
))) {
3290 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3291 SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER
);
3297 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
3301 #define has_bits(i,m) (((i)&(m)) == (m))
3303 int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL
*s
)
3306 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3310 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
3311 int al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
3313 alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
3314 alg_a
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
;
3316 /* we don't have a certificate */
3317 if ((alg_a
& SSL_aNULL
) || (alg_k
& SSL_kPSK
))
3320 /* This is the passed certificate */
3322 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3323 idx
= s
->session
->peer_type
;
3324 if (idx
== SSL_PKEY_ECC
) {
3325 if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(s
->session
->peer
, s
) == 0) {
3327 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT
);
3332 } else if (alg_a
& SSL_aECDSA
) {
3333 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3334 SSL_R_MISSING_ECDSA_SIGNING_CERT
);
3338 pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
3339 i
= X509_certificate_type(s
->session
->peer
, pkey
);
3341 /* Check that we have a certificate if we require one */
3342 if ((alg_a
& SSL_aRSA
) && !has_bits(i
, EVP_PK_RSA
| EVP_PKT_SIGN
)) {
3343 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3344 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_SIGNING_CERT
);
3347 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3348 else if ((alg_a
& SSL_aDSS
) && !has_bits(i
, EVP_PK_DSA
| EVP_PKT_SIGN
)) {
3349 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3350 SSL_R_MISSING_DSA_SIGNING_CERT
);
3354 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3355 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kRSA
| SSL_kRSAPSK
) &&
3356 !has_bits(i
, EVP_PK_RSA
| EVP_PKT_ENC
)) {
3357 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3358 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT
);
3362 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3363 if ((alg_k
& SSL_kDHE
) && (s
->s3
->peer_tmp
== NULL
)) {
3364 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3365 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3372 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
3376 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3377 int tls_construct_next_proto(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3379 size_t len
, padding_len
;
3380 unsigned char *padding
= NULL
;
3382 len
= s
->ext
.npn_len
;
3383 padding_len
= 32 - ((len
+ 2) % 32);
3385 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, s
->ext
.npn
, len
)
3386 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u8(pkt
, padding_len
, &padding
)) {
3387 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEXT_PROTO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3391 memset(padding
, 0, padding_len
);
3395 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3400 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_hello_req(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
3402 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) > 0) {
3403 /* should contain no data */
3404 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_REQ
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3405 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
3406 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
3407 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
3411 * This is a historical discrepancy (not in the RFC) maintained for
3412 * compatibility reasons. If a TLS client receives a HelloRequest it will
3413 * attempt an abbreviated handshake. However if a DTLS client receives a
3414 * HelloRequest it will do a full handshake. Either behaviour is reasonable
3415 * but doing one for TLS and another for DTLS is odd.
3420 SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated(s
);
3422 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
3425 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
3427 int al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3429 RAW_EXTENSION
*rawexts
= NULL
;
3431 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &extensions
)) {
3432 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
3433 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3437 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s
, &extensions
, EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
,
3438 &rawexts
, &al
, NULL
)
3439 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s
, EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
,
3440 rawexts
, NULL
, 0, &al
))
3443 OPENSSL_free(rawexts
);
3444 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
3447 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
3448 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
3449 OPENSSL_free(rawexts
);
3450 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
3453 int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL
*s
, X509
**px509
, EVP_PKEY
**ppkey
)
3456 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
3457 if (s
->ctx
->client_cert_engine
) {
3458 i
= ENGINE_load_ssl_client_cert(s
->ctx
->client_cert_engine
, s
,
3459 SSL_get_client_CA_list(s
),
3460 px509
, ppkey
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
);
3465 if (s
->ctx
->client_cert_cb
)
3466 i
= s
->ctx
->client_cert_cb(s
, px509
, ppkey
);
3470 int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL
*s
, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *sk
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3473 size_t totlen
= 0, len
, maxlen
;
3474 int empty_reneg_info_scsv
= !s
->renegotiate
;
3475 /* Set disabled masks for this session */
3476 ssl_set_client_disabled(s
);
3481 #ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
3482 # if OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH < 6
3483 # error Max cipher length too short
3486 * Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes as hack workaround
3487 * chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well below this if we
3490 if (TLS1_get_version(s
) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
)
3491 maxlen
= OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
& ~1;
3494 /* Maximum length that can be stored in 2 bytes. Length must be even */
3497 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv
)
3499 if (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV
)
3502 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk
) && totlen
< maxlen
; i
++) {
3503 const SSL_CIPHER
*c
;
3505 c
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk
, i
);
3506 /* Skip disabled ciphers */
3507 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s
, c
, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED
))
3510 if (!s
->method
->put_cipher_by_char(c
, pkt
, &len
)) {
3511 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3519 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES
, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE
);
3524 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv
) {
3525 static SSL_CIPHER scsv
= {
3526 0, NULL
, SSL3_CK_SCSV
, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3528 if (!s
->method
->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv
, pkt
, &len
)) {
3529 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3533 if (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV
) {
3534 static SSL_CIPHER scsv
= {
3535 0, NULL
, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV
, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3537 if (!s
->method
->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv
, pkt
, &len
)) {
3538 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);