2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10 /* ====================================================================
11 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
12 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by
13 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project.
19 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
20 #include "statem_locl.h"
21 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
22 #include <openssl/objects.h>
23 #include <openssl/evp.h>
24 #include <openssl/x509.h>
27 * send s->init_buf in records of type 'type' (SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or
28 * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
30 int ssl3_do_write(SSL
*s
, int type
)
35 ret
= ssl3_write_bytes(s
, type
, &s
->init_buf
->data
[s
->init_off
],
36 s
->init_num
, &written
);
39 if (type
== SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
)
41 * should not be done for 'Hello Request's, but in that case we'll
42 * ignore the result anyway
44 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s
,
45 (unsigned char *)&s
->init_buf
->data
[s
->init_off
],
49 if (written
== s
->init_num
) {
51 s
->msg_callback(1, s
->version
, type
, s
->init_buf
->data
,
52 (size_t)(s
->init_off
+ s
->init_num
), s
,
56 s
->init_off
+= written
;
57 s
->init_num
-= written
;
61 int tls_close_construct_packet(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, int htype
)
65 if ((htype
!= SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
&& !WPACKET_close(pkt
))
66 || !WPACKET_get_length(pkt
, &msglen
)
69 s
->init_num
= (int)msglen
;
75 int tls_construct_finished(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
82 sender
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->server_finished_label
;
83 slen
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->server_finished_label_len
;
85 sender
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->client_finished_label
;
86 slen
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->client_finished_label_len
;
89 finish_md_len
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->final_finish_mac(s
,
91 s
->s3
->tmp
.finish_md
);
92 if (finish_md_len
== 0) {
93 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
97 s
->s3
->tmp
.finish_md_len
= finish_md_len
;
99 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt
, s
->s3
->tmp
.finish_md
, finish_md_len
)) {
100 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
105 * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks
108 OPENSSL_assert(finish_md_len
<= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
);
109 memcpy(s
->s3
->previous_client_finished
, s
->s3
->tmp
.finish_md
,
111 s
->s3
->previous_client_finished_len
= finish_md_len
;
113 OPENSSL_assert(finish_md_len
<= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
);
114 memcpy(s
->s3
->previous_server_finished
, s
->s3
->tmp
.finish_md
,
116 s
->s3
->previous_server_finished_len
= finish_md_len
;
121 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
125 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
127 * ssl3_take_mac calculates the Finished MAC for the handshakes messages seen
130 static void ssl3_take_mac(SSL
*s
)
135 * If no new cipher setup return immediately: other functions will set
136 * the appropriate error.
138 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
== NULL
)
141 sender
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->server_finished_label
;
142 slen
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->server_finished_label_len
;
144 sender
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->client_finished_label
;
145 slen
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->client_finished_label_len
;
148 s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_finish_md_len
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->final_finish_mac(s
,
151 s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_finish_md
);
155 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_change_cipher_spec(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
160 remain
= PACKET_remaining(pkt
);
162 * 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, which should already have
163 * been consumed by ssl_get_message() so there should be no bytes left,
164 * unless we're using DTLS1_BAD_VER, which has an extra 2 bytes
166 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
167 if ((s
->version
== DTLS1_BAD_VER
168 && remain
!= DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH
+ 1)
169 || (s
->version
!= DTLS1_BAD_VER
170 && remain
!= DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH
- 1)) {
171 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
172 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
,
173 SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
);
178 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
179 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
,
180 SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
);
185 /* Check we have a cipher to change to */
186 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
== NULL
) {
187 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
188 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY
);
192 s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
= 1;
193 if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s
)) {
194 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
195 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
199 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
200 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s
, SSL3_CC_READ
);
202 if (s
->version
== DTLS1_BAD_VER
)
203 s
->d1
->handshake_read_seq
++;
205 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
207 * Remember that a CCS has been received, so that an old key of
208 * SCTP-Auth can be deleted when a CCS is sent. Will be ignored if no
211 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_AUTH_CCS_RCVD
, 1, NULL
);
215 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
217 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
218 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
219 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
222 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_finished(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
227 /* If this occurs, we have missed a message */
228 if (!s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
) {
229 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
230 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED
, SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS
);
233 s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
= 0;
235 md_len
= s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_finish_md_len
;
237 if (md_len
!= PACKET_remaining(pkt
)) {
238 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
239 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED
, SSL_R_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH
);
243 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(PACKET_data(pkt
), s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_finish_md
,
245 al
= SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
246 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED
, SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED
);
251 * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks
254 OPENSSL_assert(md_len
<= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
);
255 memcpy(s
->s3
->previous_client_finished
, s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_finish_md
,
257 s
->s3
->previous_client_finished_len
= md_len
;
259 OPENSSL_assert(md_len
<= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
);
260 memcpy(s
->s3
->previous_server_finished
, s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_finish_md
,
262 s
->s3
->previous_server_finished_len
= md_len
;
265 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
267 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
268 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
269 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
272 int tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
274 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, SSL3_MT_CCS
)) {
275 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
276 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
283 unsigned long ssl3_output_cert_chain(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, CERT_PKEY
*cpk
)
285 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u24(pkt
)
286 || !ssl_add_cert_chain(s
, pkt
, cpk
)
287 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
288 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
294 WORK_STATE
tls_finish_handshake(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
296 void (*cb
) (const SSL
*ssl
, int type
, int val
) = NULL
;
298 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
299 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s
))) {
301 ret
= dtls_wait_for_dry(s
);
302 if (ret
!= WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
)
307 /* clean a few things up */
308 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s
);
310 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
312 * We don't do this in DTLS because we may still need the init_buf
313 * in case there are any unexpected retransmits
315 BUF_MEM_free(s
->init_buf
);
319 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s
);
323 if (!s
->server
|| s
->renegotiate
== 2) {
324 /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
329 ssl_update_cache(s
, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER
);
331 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_accept_good
++;
332 s
->handshake_func
= ossl_statem_accept
;
334 ssl_update_cache(s
, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT
);
336 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_hit
++;
338 s
->handshake_func
= ossl_statem_connect
;
339 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_connect_good
++;
342 if (s
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
343 cb
= s
->info_callback
;
344 else if (s
->ctx
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
345 cb
= s
->ctx
->info_callback
;
348 cb(s
, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE
, 1);
350 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
351 /* done with handshaking */
352 s
->d1
->handshake_read_seq
= 0;
353 s
->d1
->handshake_write_seq
= 0;
354 s
->d1
->next_handshake_write_seq
= 0;
355 dtls1_clear_received_buffer(s
);
359 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP
;
362 int tls_get_message_header(SSL
*s
, int *mt
)
364 /* s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */
365 int skip_message
, i
, recvd_type
, al
;
369 p
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
372 while (s
->init_num
< SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
) {
373 i
= s
->method
->ssl_read_bytes(s
, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
, &recvd_type
,
375 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
- s
->init_num
,
378 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
381 if (recvd_type
== SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
383 * A ChangeCipherSpec must be a single byte and may not occur
384 * in the middle of a handshake message.
386 if (s
->init_num
!= 0 || readbytes
!= 1 || p
[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS
) {
387 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
388 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER
,
389 SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
);
392 s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
= *mt
= SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
;
393 s
->init_num
= readbytes
- 1;
394 s
->init_msg
= s
->init_buf
->data
;
395 s
->s3
->tmp
.message_size
= readbytes
;
397 } else if (recvd_type
!= SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
) {
398 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
399 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER
, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY
);
402 s
->init_num
+= readbytes
;
407 if (p
[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST
)
409 * The server may always send 'Hello Request' messages --
410 * we are doing a handshake anyway now, so ignore them if
411 * their format is correct. Does not count for 'Finished'
414 if (p
[1] == 0 && p
[2] == 0 && p
[3] == 0) {
419 s
->msg_callback(0, s
->version
, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
,
420 p
, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
, s
,
421 s
->msg_callback_arg
);
423 } while (skip_message
);
424 /* s->init_num == SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */
427 s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
= *(p
++);
429 if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s
->rlayer
)) {
431 * Only happens with SSLv3+ in an SSLv2 backward compatible
434 * Total message size is the remaining record bytes to read
435 * plus the SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH bytes that we already read
437 l
= RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec_length(&s
->rlayer
)
438 + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
;
439 s
->s3
->tmp
.message_size
= l
;
441 s
->init_msg
= s
->init_buf
->data
;
442 s
->init_num
= SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
;
445 /* BUF_MEM_grow takes an 'int' parameter */
446 if (l
> (INT_MAX
- SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
)) {
447 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
448 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER
, SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE
);
451 s
->s3
->tmp
.message_size
= l
;
453 s
->init_msg
= s
->init_buf
->data
+ SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
;
459 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
463 int tls_get_message_body(SSL
*s
, size_t *len
)
469 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
470 /* We've already read everything in */
471 *len
= (unsigned long)s
->init_num
;
476 n
= s
->s3
->tmp
.message_size
- s
->init_num
;
478 i
= s
->method
->ssl_read_bytes(s
, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
, NULL
,
479 &p
[s
->init_num
], n
, 0, &readbytes
);
481 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
485 s
->init_num
+= readbytes
;
489 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
491 * If receiving Finished, record MAC of prior handshake messages for
492 * Finished verification.
494 if (*s
->init_buf
->data
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
)
498 /* Feed this message into MAC computation. */
499 if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s
->rlayer
)) {
500 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s
, (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
,
502 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_BODY
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
503 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
508 s
->msg_callback(0, SSL2_VERSION
, 0, s
->init_buf
->data
,
509 (size_t)s
->init_num
, s
, s
->msg_callback_arg
);
511 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s
, (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
,
512 s
->init_num
+ SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
)) {
513 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_BODY
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
514 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
519 s
->msg_callback(0, s
->version
, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
, s
->init_buf
->data
,
520 (size_t)s
->init_num
+ SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
, s
,
521 s
->msg_callback_arg
);
528 int ssl_cert_type(const X509
*x
, const EVP_PKEY
*pk
)
530 if (pk
== NULL
&& (pk
= X509_get0_pubkey(x
)) == NULL
)
533 switch (EVP_PKEY_id(pk
)) {
537 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
;
539 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
;
540 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
544 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
545 case NID_id_GostR3410_2001
:
546 return SSL_PKEY_GOST01
;
547 case NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
:
548 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
;
549 case NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
:
550 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
;
555 int ssl_verify_alarm_type(long type
)
560 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT
:
561 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL
:
562 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER
:
563 al
= SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA
;
565 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CERT_SIGNATURE
:
566 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CRL_SIGNATURE
:
567 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY
:
568 case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD
:
569 case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD
:
570 case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD
:
571 case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD
:
572 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID
:
573 case X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID
:
574 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED
:
575 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED
:
576 case X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH
:
577 case X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH
:
578 case X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH
:
579 case X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH
:
580 case X509_V_ERR_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL
:
581 case X509_V_ERR_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL
:
582 case X509_V_ERR_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK
:
583 al
= SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
;
585 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE
:
586 case X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE
:
587 al
= SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
589 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED
:
590 case X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED
:
591 al
= SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED
;
593 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED
:
594 al
= SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED
;
596 case X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED
:
597 case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM
:
598 case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL
:
599 case X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP
:
600 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
602 case X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT
:
603 case X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN
:
604 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY
:
605 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE
:
606 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG
:
607 case X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED
:
608 case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA
:
609 al
= SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA
;
611 case X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION
:
612 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
614 case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE
:
615 al
= SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE
;
618 al
= SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN
;
624 int ssl_allow_compression(SSL
*s
)
626 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION
)
628 return ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_COMPRESSION
, 0, 0, NULL
);
631 static int version_cmp(const SSL
*s
, int a
, int b
)
633 int dtls
= SSL_IS_DTLS(s
);
638 return a
< b
? -1 : 1;
639 return DTLS_VERSION_LT(a
, b
) ? -1 : 1;
644 const SSL_METHOD
*(*cmeth
) (void);
645 const SSL_METHOD
*(*smeth
) (void);
648 #if TLS_MAX_VERSION != TLS1_3_VERSION
649 # error Code needs update for TLS_method() support beyond TLS1_3_VERSION.
652 static const version_info tls_version_table
[] = {
653 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
654 {TLS1_3_VERSION
, tlsv1_3_client_method
, tlsv1_3_server_method
},
656 {TLS1_3_VERSION
, NULL
, NULL
},
658 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2
659 {TLS1_2_VERSION
, tlsv1_2_client_method
, tlsv1_2_server_method
},
661 {TLS1_2_VERSION
, NULL
, NULL
},
663 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_1
664 {TLS1_1_VERSION
, tlsv1_1_client_method
, tlsv1_1_server_method
},
666 {TLS1_1_VERSION
, NULL
, NULL
},
668 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1
669 {TLS1_VERSION
, tlsv1_client_method
, tlsv1_server_method
},
671 {TLS1_VERSION
, NULL
, NULL
},
673 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
674 {SSL3_VERSION
, sslv3_client_method
, sslv3_server_method
},
676 {SSL3_VERSION
, NULL
, NULL
},
681 #if DTLS_MAX_VERSION != DTLS1_2_VERSION
682 # error Code needs update for DTLS_method() support beyond DTLS1_2_VERSION.
685 static const version_info dtls_version_table
[] = {
686 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_2
687 {DTLS1_2_VERSION
, dtlsv1_2_client_method
, dtlsv1_2_server_method
},
689 {DTLS1_2_VERSION
, NULL
, NULL
},
691 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1
692 {DTLS1_VERSION
, dtlsv1_client_method
, dtlsv1_server_method
},
693 {DTLS1_BAD_VER
, dtls_bad_ver_client_method
, NULL
},
695 {DTLS1_VERSION
, NULL
, NULL
},
696 {DTLS1_BAD_VER
, NULL
, NULL
},
702 * ssl_method_error - Check whether an SSL_METHOD is enabled.
704 * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method
705 * @method: the intended method.
707 * Returns 0 on success, or an SSL error reason on failure.
709 static int ssl_method_error(const SSL
*s
, const SSL_METHOD
*method
)
711 int version
= method
->version
;
713 if ((s
->min_proto_version
!= 0 &&
714 version_cmp(s
, version
, s
->min_proto_version
) < 0) ||
715 ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_VERSION
, 0, version
, NULL
) == 0)
716 return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW
;
718 if (s
->max_proto_version
!= 0 &&
719 version_cmp(s
, version
, s
->max_proto_version
) > 0)
720 return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_HIGH
;
722 if ((s
->options
& method
->mask
) != 0)
723 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL
;
724 if ((method
->flags
& SSL_METHOD_NO_SUITEB
) != 0 && tls1_suiteb(s
))
725 return SSL_R_AT_LEAST_TLS_1_2_NEEDED_IN_SUITEB_MODE
;
726 else if ((method
->flags
& SSL_METHOD_NO_FIPS
) != 0 && FIPS_mode())
727 return SSL_R_AT_LEAST_TLS_1_0_NEEDED_IN_FIPS_MODE
;
733 * ssl_version_supported - Check that the specified `version` is supported by
736 * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method
737 * @version: Protocol version to test against
739 * Returns 1 when supported, otherwise 0
741 int ssl_version_supported(const SSL
*s
, int version
)
743 const version_info
*vent
;
744 const version_info
*table
;
746 switch (s
->method
->version
) {
748 /* Version should match method version for non-ANY method */
749 return version_cmp(s
, version
, s
->version
) == 0;
750 case TLS_ANY_VERSION
:
751 table
= tls_version_table
;
753 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION
:
754 table
= dtls_version_table
;
759 vent
->version
!= 0 && version_cmp(s
, version
, vent
->version
) <= 0;
761 if (vent
->cmeth
!= NULL
&&
762 version_cmp(s
, version
, vent
->version
) == 0 &&
763 ssl_method_error(s
, vent
->cmeth()) == 0) {
771 * ssl_check_version_downgrade - In response to RFC7507 SCSV version
772 * fallback indication from a client check whether we're using the highest
773 * supported protocol version.
775 * @s server SSL handle.
777 * Returns 1 when using the highest enabled version, 0 otherwise.
779 int ssl_check_version_downgrade(SSL
*s
)
781 const version_info
*vent
;
782 const version_info
*table
;
785 * Check that the current protocol is the highest enabled version
786 * (according to s->ctx->method, as version negotiation may have changed
789 if (s
->version
== s
->ctx
->method
->version
)
793 * Apparently we're using a version-flexible SSL_METHOD (not at its
794 * highest protocol version).
796 if (s
->ctx
->method
->version
== TLS_method()->version
)
797 table
= tls_version_table
;
798 else if (s
->ctx
->method
->version
== DTLS_method()->version
)
799 table
= dtls_version_table
;
801 /* Unexpected state; fail closed. */
805 for (vent
= table
; vent
->version
!= 0; ++vent
) {
806 if (vent
->smeth
!= NULL
&& ssl_method_error(s
, vent
->smeth()) == 0)
807 return s
->version
== vent
->version
;
813 * ssl_set_version_bound - set an upper or lower bound on the supported (D)TLS
814 * protocols, provided the initial (D)TLS method is version-flexible. This
815 * function sanity-checks the proposed value and makes sure the method is
816 * version-flexible, then sets the limit if all is well.
818 * @method_version: The version of the current SSL_METHOD.
819 * @version: the intended limit.
820 * @bound: pointer to limit to be updated.
822 * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure.
824 int ssl_set_version_bound(int method_version
, int version
, int *bound
)
832 * Restrict TLS methods to TLS protocol versions.
833 * Restrict DTLS methods to DTLS protocol versions.
834 * Note, DTLS version numbers are decreasing, use comparison macros.
836 * Note that for both lower-bounds we use explicit versions, not
837 * (D)TLS_MIN_VERSION. This is because we don't want to break user
838 * configurations. If the MIN (supported) version ever rises, the user's
839 * "floor" remains valid even if no longer available. We don't expect the
840 * MAX ceiling to ever get lower, so making that variable makes sense.
842 switch (method_version
) {
845 * XXX For fixed version methods, should we always fail and not set any
846 * bounds, always succeed and not set any bounds, or set the bounds and
847 * arrange to fail later if they are not met? At present fixed-version
848 * methods are not subject to controls that disable individual protocol
853 case TLS_ANY_VERSION
:
854 if (version
< SSL3_VERSION
|| version
> TLS_MAX_VERSION
)
858 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION
:
859 if (DTLS_VERSION_GT(version
, DTLS_MAX_VERSION
) ||
860 DTLS_VERSION_LT(version
, DTLS1_BAD_VER
))
870 * ssl_choose_server_version - Choose server (D)TLS version. Called when the
871 * client HELLO is received to select the final server protocol version and
872 * the version specific method.
874 * @s: server SSL handle.
876 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure.
878 int ssl_choose_server_version(SSL
*s
)
881 * With version-flexible methods we have an initial state with:
883 * s->method->version == (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION,
884 * s->version == (D)TLS_MAX_VERSION.
886 * So we detect version-flexible methods via the method version, not the
889 int server_version
= s
->method
->version
;
890 int client_version
= s
->client_version
;
891 const version_info
*vent
;
892 const version_info
*table
;
895 switch (server_version
) {
897 if (version_cmp(s
, client_version
, s
->version
) < 0)
898 return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION
;
900 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
901 * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
902 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
903 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
904 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
907 case TLS_ANY_VERSION
:
908 table
= tls_version_table
;
910 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION
:
911 table
= dtls_version_table
;
915 for (vent
= table
; vent
->version
!= 0; ++vent
) {
916 const SSL_METHOD
*method
;
918 if (vent
->smeth
== NULL
||
919 version_cmp(s
, client_version
, vent
->version
) < 0)
921 method
= vent
->smeth();
922 if (ssl_method_error(s
, method
) == 0) {
923 s
->version
= vent
->version
;
929 return disabled
? SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL
: SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW
;
933 * ssl_choose_client_version - Choose client (D)TLS version. Called when the
934 * server HELLO is received to select the final client protocol version and
935 * the version specific method.
937 * @s: client SSL handle.
938 * @version: The proposed version from the server's HELLO.
940 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure.
942 int ssl_choose_client_version(SSL
*s
, int version
)
944 const version_info
*vent
;
945 const version_info
*table
;
947 switch (s
->method
->version
) {
949 if (version
!= s
->version
)
950 return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION
;
952 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
953 * (and never did) check min/max, FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
954 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
955 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
956 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
959 case TLS_ANY_VERSION
:
960 table
= tls_version_table
;
962 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION
:
963 table
= dtls_version_table
;
967 for (vent
= table
; vent
->version
!= 0; ++vent
) {
968 const SSL_METHOD
*method
;
971 if (version
!= vent
->version
)
973 if (vent
->cmeth
== NULL
)
975 method
= vent
->cmeth();
976 err
= ssl_method_error(s
, method
);
980 s
->version
= version
;
984 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL
;
988 * ssl_get_client_min_max_version - get minimum and maximum client version
989 * @s: The SSL connection
990 * @min_version: The minimum supported version
991 * @max_version: The maximum supported version
993 * Work out what version we should be using for the initial ClientHello if the
994 * version is initially (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION. We apply any explicit SSL_OP_NO_xxx
995 * options, the MinProtocol and MaxProtocol configuration commands, any Suite B
996 * or FIPS_mode() constraints and any floor imposed by the security level here,
997 * so we don't advertise the wrong protocol version to only reject the outcome later.
999 * Computing the right floor matters. If, e.g., TLS 1.0 and 1.2 are enabled,
1000 * TLS 1.1 is disabled, but the security level, Suite-B and/or MinProtocol
1001 * only allow TLS 1.2, we want to advertise TLS1.2, *not* TLS1.
1003 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. On failure
1004 * min_version and max_version will also be set to 0.
1006 int ssl_get_client_min_max_version(const SSL
*s
, int *min_version
,
1011 const SSL_METHOD
*single
= NULL
;
1012 const SSL_METHOD
*method
;
1013 const version_info
*table
;
1014 const version_info
*vent
;
1016 switch (s
->method
->version
) {
1019 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
1020 * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
1021 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
1022 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
1023 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
1025 *min_version
= *max_version
= s
->version
;
1027 case TLS_ANY_VERSION
:
1028 table
= tls_version_table
;
1030 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION
:
1031 table
= dtls_version_table
;
1036 * SSL_OP_NO_X disables all protocols above X *if* there are some protocols
1037 * below X enabled. This is required in order to maintain the "version
1038 * capability" vector contiguous. Any versions with a NULL client method
1039 * (protocol version client is disabled at compile-time) is also a "hole".
1041 * Our initial state is hole == 1, version == 0. That is, versions above
1042 * the first version in the method table are disabled (a "hole" above
1043 * the valid protocol entries) and we don't have a selected version yet.
1045 * Whenever "hole == 1", and we hit an enabled method, its version becomes
1046 * the selected version, and the method becomes a candidate "single"
1047 * method. We're no longer in a hole, so "hole" becomes 0.
1049 * If "hole == 0" and we hit an enabled method, then "single" is cleared,
1050 * as we support a contiguous range of at least two methods. If we hit
1051 * a disabled method, then hole becomes true again, but nothing else
1052 * changes yet, because all the remaining methods may be disabled too.
1053 * If we again hit an enabled method after the new hole, it becomes
1054 * selected, as we start from scratch.
1056 *min_version
= version
= 0;
1058 for (vent
= table
; vent
->version
!= 0; ++vent
) {
1060 * A table entry with a NULL client method is still a hole in the
1061 * "version capability" vector.
1063 if (vent
->cmeth
== NULL
) {
1067 method
= vent
->cmeth();
1068 if (ssl_method_error(s
, method
) != 0) {
1072 *min_version
= method
->version
;
1074 version
= (single
= method
)->version
;
1075 *min_version
= version
;
1080 *max_version
= version
;
1082 /* Fail if everything is disabled */
1084 return SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE
;
1090 * ssl_set_client_hello_version - Work out what version we should be using for
1091 * the initial ClientHello.
1093 * @s: client SSL handle.
1095 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure.
1097 int ssl_set_client_hello_version(SSL
*s
)
1099 int ver_min
, ver_max
, ret
;
1101 ret
= ssl_get_client_min_max_version(s
, &ver_min
, &ver_max
);
1106 s
->client_version
= s
->version
= ver_max
;