2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10 /* ====================================================================
11 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
12 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by
13 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project.
19 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
20 #include "statem_locl.h"
21 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
22 #include <openssl/objects.h>
23 #include <openssl/evp.h>
24 #include <openssl/x509.h>
27 * send s->init_buf in records of type 'type' (SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or
28 * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
30 int ssl3_do_write(SSL
*s
, int type
)
35 ret
= ssl3_write_bytes(s
, type
, &s
->init_buf
->data
[s
->init_off
],
36 s
->init_num
, &written
);
39 if (type
== SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
)
41 * should not be done for 'Hello Request's, but in that case we'll
42 * ignore the result anyway
44 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s
,
45 (unsigned char *)&s
->init_buf
->data
[s
->init_off
],
49 if (written
== s
->init_num
) {
51 s
->msg_callback(1, s
->version
, type
, s
->init_buf
->data
,
52 (size_t)(s
->init_off
+ s
->init_num
), s
,
56 s
->init_off
+= written
;
57 s
->init_num
-= written
;
61 int tls_close_construct_packet(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, int htype
)
65 if ((htype
!= SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
&& !WPACKET_close(pkt
))
66 || !WPACKET_get_length(pkt
, &msglen
)
69 s
->init_num
= (int)msglen
;
75 int tls_setup_handshake(SSL
*s
)
77 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s
))
81 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s
)) {
82 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_accept
++;
83 } else if (!s
->s3
->send_connection_binding
&&
85 SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION
)) {
87 * Server attempting to renegotiate with client that doesn't
88 * support secure renegotiation.
90 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_SETUP_HANDSHAKE
,
91 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED
);
92 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
95 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_accept_renegotiate
++;
97 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
= 0;
100 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s
))
101 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_connect
++;
103 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_connect_renegotiate
++;
105 /* mark client_random uninitialized */
106 memset(s
->s3
->client_random
, 0, sizeof(s
->s3
->client_random
));
109 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
= 0;
112 s
->statem
.use_timer
= 1;
119 * Size of the to-be-signed TLS13 data, without the hash size itself:
120 * 64 bytes of value 32, 33 context bytes, 1 byte separator
122 #define TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE 64
123 #define TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE (TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE + 33 + 1)
125 static int get_cert_verify_tbs_data(SSL
*s
, unsigned char *tls13tbs
,
126 void **hdata
, size_t *hdatalen
)
128 static const char *servercontext
= "TLS 1.3, server CertificateVerify";
129 static const char *clientcontext
= "TLS 1.3, client CertificateVerify";
131 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
134 /* Set the first 64 bytes of to-be-signed data to octet 32 */
135 memset(tls13tbs
, 32, TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE
);
136 /* This copies the 33 bytes of context plus the 0 separator byte */
137 if (s
->statem
.hand_state
== TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
138 || s
->statem
.hand_state
== TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY
)
139 strcpy((char *)tls13tbs
+ TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE
, servercontext
);
141 strcpy((char *)tls13tbs
+ TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE
, clientcontext
);
144 * If we're currently reading then we need to use the saved handshake
145 * hash value. We can't use the current handshake hash state because
146 * that includes the CertVerify itself.
148 if (s
->statem
.hand_state
== TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
149 || s
->statem
.hand_state
== TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY
) {
150 memcpy(tls13tbs
+ TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE
, s
->cert_verify_hash
,
151 s
->cert_verify_hash_len
);
152 hashlen
= s
->cert_verify_hash_len
;
153 } else if (!ssl_handshake_hash(s
, tls13tbs
+ TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE
,
154 EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
, &hashlen
)) {
159 *hdatalen
= TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE
+ hashlen
;
163 retlen
= BIO_get_mem_data(s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
, hdata
);
172 int tls_construct_cert_verify(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
174 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
175 const EVP_MD
*md
= NULL
;
176 EVP_MD_CTX
*mctx
= NULL
;
177 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pctx
= NULL
;
178 size_t hdatalen
= 0, siglen
= 0;
180 unsigned char *sig
= NULL
;
181 unsigned char tls13tbs
[TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE
+ EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
];
182 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= s
->s3
->tmp
.sigalg
;
184 if (lu
== NULL
|| s
->s3
->tmp
.cert
== NULL
) {
185 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
188 pkey
= s
->s3
->tmp
.cert
->privatekey
;
189 md
= ssl_md(lu
->hash_idx
);
191 if (pkey
== NULL
|| md
== NULL
) {
192 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
196 mctx
= EVP_MD_CTX_new();
198 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
202 /* Get the data to be signed */
203 if (!get_cert_verify_tbs_data(s
, tls13tbs
, &hdata
, &hdatalen
)) {
204 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
208 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, lu
->sigalg
)) {
209 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
212 siglen
= EVP_PKEY_size(pkey
);
213 sig
= OPENSSL_malloc(siglen
);
215 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
219 if (EVP_DigestSignInit(mctx
, &pctx
, md
, NULL
, pkey
) <= 0
220 || EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mctx
, hdata
, hdatalen
) <= 0) {
221 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
225 if (lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
) {
226 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx
, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING
) <= 0
227 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx
,
228 RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST
) <= 0) {
229 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
232 } else if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
) {
233 if (!EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx
, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET
,
234 (int)s
->session
->master_key_length
,
235 s
->session
->master_key
)) {
236 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
241 if (EVP_DigestSignFinal(mctx
, sig
, &siglen
) <= 0) {
242 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
246 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
248 int pktype
= lu
->sig
;
250 if (pktype
== NID_id_GostR3410_2001
251 || pktype
== NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
252 || pktype
== NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
)
253 BUF_reverse(sig
, NULL
, siglen
);
257 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt
, sig
, siglen
)) {
258 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
262 /* Digest cached records and discard handshake buffer */
263 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 0))
267 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx
);
271 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx
);
272 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
276 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_cert_verify(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
278 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
279 const unsigned char *data
;
280 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
281 unsigned char *gost_data
= NULL
;
283 int al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ret
= MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
284 int type
= 0, j
, pktype
;
287 const EVP_MD
*md
= NULL
;
290 unsigned char tls13tbs
[TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE
+ EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
];
291 EVP_MD_CTX
*mctx
= EVP_MD_CTX_new();
292 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pctx
= NULL
;
295 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
299 peer
= s
->session
->peer
;
300 pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(peer
);
302 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
306 pktype
= EVP_PKEY_id(pkey
);
307 type
= X509_certificate_type(peer
, pkey
);
309 if (!(type
& EVP_PKT_SIGN
)) {
310 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
,
311 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE
);
312 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
316 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
318 * If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare signature without
319 * length field (CryptoPro implementations at least till CSP 4.0)
321 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
322 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) == 64
323 && EVP_PKEY_id(pkey
) == NID_id_GostR3410_2001
) {
328 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
332 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &sigalg
)) {
333 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
336 rv
= tls12_check_peer_sigalg(s
, sigalg
, pkey
);
339 } else if (rv
== 0) {
340 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
344 fprintf(stderr
, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md
));
346 } else if (!tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(s
, pkey
)) {
347 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
351 md
= ssl_md(s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalg
->hash_idx
);
353 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &len
)) {
354 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
355 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
359 j
= EVP_PKEY_size(pkey
);
360 if (((int)len
> j
) || ((int)PACKET_remaining(pkt
) > j
)
361 || (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) == 0)) {
362 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE
);
363 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
366 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &data
, len
)) {
367 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
368 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
372 if (!get_cert_verify_tbs_data(s
, tls13tbs
, &hdata
, &hdatalen
)) {
373 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
378 fprintf(stderr
, "Using client verify alg %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md
));
380 if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(mctx
, &pctx
, md
, NULL
, pkey
) <= 0
381 || EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(mctx
, hdata
, hdatalen
) <= 0) {
382 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
385 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
387 if (pktype
== NID_id_GostR3410_2001
388 || pktype
== NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
389 || pktype
== NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
) {
390 if ((gost_data
= OPENSSL_malloc(len
)) == NULL
) {
391 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
394 BUF_reverse(gost_data
, data
, len
);
400 if (SSL_USE_PSS(s
)) {
401 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx
, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING
) <= 0
402 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx
,
403 RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST
) <= 0) {
404 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
407 } else if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
408 && !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx
, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET
,
409 (int)s
->session
->master_key_length
,
410 s
->session
->master_key
)) {
411 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
415 if (EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(mctx
, data
, len
) <= 0) {
416 al
= SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
417 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE
);
422 ret
= MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
424 ret
= MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING
;
427 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
428 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
430 BIO_free(s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
);
431 s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
= NULL
;
432 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx
);
433 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
434 OPENSSL_free(gost_data
);
439 int tls_construct_finished(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
441 size_t finish_md_len
;
446 sender
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->server_finished_label
;
447 slen
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->server_finished_label_len
;
449 sender
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->client_finished_label
;
450 slen
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->client_finished_label_len
;
453 finish_md_len
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->final_finish_mac(s
,
455 s
->s3
->tmp
.finish_md
);
456 if (finish_md_len
== 0) {
457 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
461 s
->s3
->tmp
.finish_md_len
= finish_md_len
;
463 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt
, s
->s3
->tmp
.finish_md
, finish_md_len
)) {
464 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
469 * Log the master secret, if logging is enabled. We don't log it for
470 * TLSv1.3: there's a different key schedule for that.
472 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && !ssl_log_secret(s
, MASTER_SECRET_LABEL
,
473 s
->session
->master_key
,
474 s
->session
->master_key_length
))
478 * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks
481 OPENSSL_assert(finish_md_len
<= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
);
482 memcpy(s
->s3
->previous_client_finished
, s
->s3
->tmp
.finish_md
,
484 s
->s3
->previous_client_finished_len
= finish_md_len
;
486 OPENSSL_assert(finish_md_len
<= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
);
487 memcpy(s
->s3
->previous_server_finished
, s
->s3
->tmp
.finish_md
,
489 s
->s3
->previous_server_finished_len
= finish_md_len
;
494 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
498 int tls_construct_key_update(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
500 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, s
->key_update
)) {
501 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_KEY_UPDATE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
505 s
->key_update
= SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE
;
509 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
514 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_key_update(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
516 unsigned int updatetype
;
518 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &updatetype
)
519 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0
520 || (updatetype
!= SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NOT_REQUESTED
521 && updatetype
!= SSL_KEY_UPDATE_REQUESTED
)) {
522 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
523 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE
, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_UPDATE
);
524 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
525 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
528 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
531 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
533 * ssl3_take_mac calculates the Finished MAC for the handshakes messages seen
536 static void ssl3_take_mac(SSL
*s
)
541 * If no new cipher setup return immediately: other functions will set
542 * the appropriate error.
544 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
== NULL
)
547 sender
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->server_finished_label
;
548 slen
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->server_finished_label_len
;
550 sender
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->client_finished_label
;
551 slen
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->client_finished_label_len
;
554 s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_finish_md_len
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->final_finish_mac(s
,
557 s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_finish_md
);
561 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_change_cipher_spec(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
566 remain
= PACKET_remaining(pkt
);
568 * 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, which should already have
569 * been consumed by ssl_get_message() so there should be no bytes left,
570 * unless we're using DTLS1_BAD_VER, which has an extra 2 bytes
572 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
573 if ((s
->version
== DTLS1_BAD_VER
574 && remain
!= DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH
+ 1)
575 || (s
->version
!= DTLS1_BAD_VER
576 && remain
!= DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH
- 1)) {
577 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
578 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
,
579 SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
);
584 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
585 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
,
586 SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
);
591 /* Check we have a cipher to change to */
592 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
== NULL
) {
593 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
594 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY
);
598 s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
= 1;
599 if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s
)) {
600 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
601 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
605 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
606 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s
, SSL3_CC_READ
);
608 if (s
->version
== DTLS1_BAD_VER
)
609 s
->d1
->handshake_read_seq
++;
611 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
613 * Remember that a CCS has been received, so that an old key of
614 * SCTP-Auth can be deleted when a CCS is sent. Will be ignored if no
617 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_AUTH_CCS_RCVD
, 1, NULL
);
621 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
623 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
624 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
625 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
628 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_finished(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
630 int al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
633 /* If this occurs, we have missed a message */
634 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && !s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
) {
635 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
636 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED
, SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS
);
639 s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
= 0;
641 md_len
= s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_finish_md_len
;
643 if (md_len
!= PACKET_remaining(pkt
)) {
644 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
645 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED
, SSL_R_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH
);
649 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(PACKET_data(pkt
), s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_finish_md
,
651 al
= SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
652 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED
, SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED
);
657 * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks
660 OPENSSL_assert(md_len
<= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
);
661 memcpy(s
->s3
->previous_client_finished
, s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_finish_md
,
663 s
->s3
->previous_client_finished_len
= md_len
;
665 OPENSSL_assert(md_len
<= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
);
666 memcpy(s
->s3
->previous_server_finished
, s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_finish_md
,
668 s
->s3
->previous_server_finished_len
= md_len
;
672 * In TLS1.3 we also have to change cipher state and do any final processing
673 * of the initial server flight (if we are a client)
675 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
677 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
678 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ
)) {
679 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED
, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER
);
683 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
684 s
->master_secret
, s
->handshake_secret
, 0,
685 &s
->session
->master_key_length
)) {
686 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED
, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER
);
689 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
690 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ
)) {
691 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED
, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER
);
694 if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s
, &al
))
699 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
701 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
702 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
703 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
706 int tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
708 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, SSL3_MT_CCS
)) {
709 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
710 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
717 /* Add a certificate to the WPACKET */
718 static int ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, X509
*x
, int chain
,
722 unsigned char *outbytes
;
724 len
= i2d_X509(x
, NULL
);
726 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_TO_WPACKET
, ERR_R_BUF_LIB
);
727 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
730 if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u24(pkt
, len
, &outbytes
)
731 || i2d_X509(x
, &outbytes
) != len
) {
732 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_TO_WPACKET
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
733 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
738 && !tls_construct_extensions(s
, pkt
, EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE
, x
,
745 /* Add certificate chain to provided WPACKET */
746 static int ssl_add_cert_chain(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, CERT_PKEY
*cpk
, int *al
)
750 STACK_OF(X509
) *extra_certs
;
751 STACK_OF(X509
) *chain
= NULL
;
752 X509_STORE
*chain_store
;
753 int tmpal
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
755 if (cpk
== NULL
|| cpk
->x509
== NULL
)
761 * If we have a certificate specific chain use it, else use parent ctx.
763 if (cpk
->chain
!= NULL
)
764 extra_certs
= cpk
->chain
;
766 extra_certs
= s
->ctx
->extra_certs
;
768 if ((s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN
) || extra_certs
)
770 else if (s
->cert
->chain_store
)
771 chain_store
= s
->cert
->chain_store
;
773 chain_store
= s
->ctx
->cert_store
;
775 if (chain_store
!= NULL
) {
776 X509_STORE_CTX
*xs_ctx
= X509_STORE_CTX_new();
778 if (xs_ctx
== NULL
) {
779 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
782 if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(xs_ctx
, chain_store
, x
, NULL
)) {
783 X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx
);
784 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN
, ERR_R_X509_LIB
);
788 * It is valid for the chain not to be complete (because normally we
789 * don't include the root cert in the chain). Therefore we deliberately
790 * ignore the error return from this call. We're not actually verifying
791 * the cert - we're just building as much of the chain as we can
793 (void)X509_verify_cert(xs_ctx
);
794 /* Don't leave errors in the queue */
796 chain
= X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain(xs_ctx
);
797 i
= ssl_security_cert_chain(s
, chain
, NULL
, 0);
800 /* Dummy error calls so mkerr generates them */
801 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN
, SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL
);
802 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN
, SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL
);
803 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN
, SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK
);
805 X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx
);
806 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN
, i
);
809 chain_count
= sk_X509_num(chain
);
810 for (i
= 0; i
< chain_count
; i
++) {
811 x
= sk_X509_value(chain
, i
);
813 if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s
, pkt
, x
, i
, &tmpal
)) {
814 X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx
);
818 X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx
);
820 i
= ssl_security_cert_chain(s
, extra_certs
, x
, 0);
822 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN
, i
);
825 if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s
, pkt
, x
, 0, &tmpal
))
827 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(extra_certs
); i
++) {
828 x
= sk_X509_value(extra_certs
, i
);
829 if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s
, pkt
, x
, i
+ 1, &tmpal
))
840 unsigned long ssl3_output_cert_chain(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, CERT_PKEY
*cpk
,
843 int tmpal
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
845 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u24(pkt
)
846 || !ssl_add_cert_chain(s
, pkt
, cpk
, &tmpal
)
847 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
848 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
856 * Tidy up after the end of a handshake. In the case of SCTP this may result
857 * in NBIO events. If |clearbufs| is set then init_buf and the wbio buffer is
860 WORK_STATE
tls_finish_handshake(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
, int clearbufs
)
862 void (*cb
) (const SSL
*ssl
, int type
, int val
) = NULL
;
864 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
865 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s
))) {
867 ret
= dtls_wait_for_dry(s
);
868 if (ret
!= WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
)
874 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
876 * We don't do this in DTLS because we may still need the init_buf
877 * in case there are any unexpected retransmits
879 BUF_MEM_free(s
->init_buf
);
882 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s
);
886 if (s
->statem
.cleanuphand
) {
887 /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
890 s
->statem
.cleanuphand
= 0;
892 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s
);
895 ssl_update_cache(s
, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER
);
897 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_accept_good
++;
898 s
->handshake_func
= ossl_statem_accept
;
900 ssl_update_cache(s
, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT
);
902 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_hit
++;
904 s
->handshake_func
= ossl_statem_connect
;
905 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_connect_good
++;
908 if (s
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
909 cb
= s
->info_callback
;
910 else if (s
->ctx
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
911 cb
= s
->ctx
->info_callback
;
914 cb(s
, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE
, 1);
916 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
917 /* done with handshaking */
918 s
->d1
->handshake_read_seq
= 0;
919 s
->d1
->handshake_write_seq
= 0;
920 s
->d1
->next_handshake_write_seq
= 0;
921 dtls1_clear_received_buffer(s
);
926 * If we've not cleared the buffers its because we've got more work to do,
930 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
932 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP
;
935 int tls_get_message_header(SSL
*s
, int *mt
)
937 /* s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */
938 int skip_message
, i
, recvd_type
, al
;
942 p
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
945 while (s
->init_num
< SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
) {
946 i
= s
->method
->ssl_read_bytes(s
, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
, &recvd_type
,
948 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
- s
->init_num
,
951 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
954 if (recvd_type
== SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
956 * A ChangeCipherSpec must be a single byte and may not occur
957 * in the middle of a handshake message.
959 if (s
->init_num
!= 0 || readbytes
!= 1 || p
[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS
) {
960 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
961 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER
,
962 SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
);
965 s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
= *mt
= SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
;
966 s
->init_num
= readbytes
- 1;
967 s
->init_msg
= s
->init_buf
->data
;
968 s
->s3
->tmp
.message_size
= readbytes
;
970 } else if (recvd_type
!= SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
) {
971 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
972 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER
, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY
);
975 s
->init_num
+= readbytes
;
980 if (s
->statem
.hand_state
!= TLS_ST_OK
981 && p
[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST
)
983 * The server may always send 'Hello Request' messages --
984 * we are doing a handshake anyway now, so ignore them if
985 * their format is correct. Does not count for 'Finished'
988 if (p
[1] == 0 && p
[2] == 0 && p
[3] == 0) {
993 s
->msg_callback(0, s
->version
, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
,
994 p
, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
, s
,
995 s
->msg_callback_arg
);
997 } while (skip_message
);
998 /* s->init_num == SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */
1001 s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
= *(p
++);
1003 if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s
->rlayer
)) {
1005 * Only happens with SSLv3+ in an SSLv2 backward compatible
1008 * Total message size is the remaining record bytes to read
1009 * plus the SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH bytes that we already read
1011 l
= RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec_length(&s
->rlayer
)
1012 + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
;
1013 s
->s3
->tmp
.message_size
= l
;
1015 s
->init_msg
= s
->init_buf
->data
;
1016 s
->init_num
= SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
;
1019 /* BUF_MEM_grow takes an 'int' parameter */
1020 if (l
> (INT_MAX
- SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
)) {
1021 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1022 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER
, SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE
);
1025 s
->s3
->tmp
.message_size
= l
;
1027 s
->init_msg
= s
->init_buf
->data
+ SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
;
1033 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1037 int tls_get_message_body(SSL
*s
, size_t *len
)
1039 size_t n
, readbytes
;
1043 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
1044 /* We've already read everything in */
1045 *len
= (unsigned long)s
->init_num
;
1050 n
= s
->s3
->tmp
.message_size
- s
->init_num
;
1052 i
= s
->method
->ssl_read_bytes(s
, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
, NULL
,
1053 &p
[s
->init_num
], n
, 0, &readbytes
);
1055 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
1059 s
->init_num
+= readbytes
;
1063 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1065 * If receiving Finished, record MAC of prior handshake messages for
1066 * Finished verification.
1068 if (*s
->init_buf
->data
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
)
1072 /* Feed this message into MAC computation. */
1073 if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s
->rlayer
)) {
1074 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s
, (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
,
1076 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_BODY
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
1077 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1081 if (s
->msg_callback
)
1082 s
->msg_callback(0, SSL2_VERSION
, 0, s
->init_buf
->data
,
1083 (size_t)s
->init_num
, s
, s
->msg_callback_arg
);
1085 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s
, (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
,
1086 s
->init_num
+ SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
)) {
1087 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_BODY
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
1088 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1092 if (s
->msg_callback
)
1093 s
->msg_callback(0, s
->version
, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
, s
->init_buf
->data
,
1094 (size_t)s
->init_num
+ SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
, s
,
1095 s
->msg_callback_arg
);
1102 int ssl_cert_type(const X509
*x
, const EVP_PKEY
*pk
)
1104 if (pk
== NULL
&& (pk
= X509_get0_pubkey(x
)) == NULL
)
1107 switch (EVP_PKEY_id(pk
)) {
1111 return SSL_PKEY_RSA
;
1113 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
;
1114 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1116 return SSL_PKEY_ECC
;
1118 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
1119 case NID_id_GostR3410_2001
:
1120 return SSL_PKEY_GOST01
;
1121 case NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
:
1122 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
;
1123 case NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
:
1124 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
;
1129 int ssl_verify_alarm_type(long type
)
1134 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT
:
1135 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL
:
1136 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER
:
1137 al
= SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA
;
1139 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CERT_SIGNATURE
:
1140 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CRL_SIGNATURE
:
1141 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY
:
1142 case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD
:
1143 case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD
:
1144 case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD
:
1145 case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD
:
1146 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID
:
1147 case X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID
:
1148 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED
:
1149 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED
:
1150 case X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH
:
1151 case X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH
:
1152 case X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH
:
1153 case X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH
:
1154 case X509_V_ERR_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL
:
1155 case X509_V_ERR_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL
:
1156 case X509_V_ERR_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK
:
1157 al
= SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
;
1159 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE
:
1160 case X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE
:
1161 al
= SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
1163 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED
:
1164 case X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED
:
1165 al
= SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED
;
1167 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED
:
1168 al
= SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED
;
1170 case X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED
:
1171 case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM
:
1172 case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL
:
1173 case X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP
:
1174 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1176 case X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT
:
1177 case X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN
:
1178 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY
:
1179 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE
:
1180 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG
:
1181 case X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED
:
1182 case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA
:
1183 al
= SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA
;
1185 case X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION
:
1186 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1188 case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE
:
1189 al
= SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE
;
1192 al
= SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN
;
1198 int ssl_allow_compression(SSL
*s
)
1200 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION
)
1202 return ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_COMPRESSION
, 0, 0, NULL
);
1205 static int version_cmp(const SSL
*s
, int a
, int b
)
1207 int dtls
= SSL_IS_DTLS(s
);
1212 return a
< b
? -1 : 1;
1213 return DTLS_VERSION_LT(a
, b
) ? -1 : 1;
1218 const SSL_METHOD
*(*cmeth
) (void);
1219 const SSL_METHOD
*(*smeth
) (void);
1222 #if TLS_MAX_VERSION != TLS1_3_VERSION
1223 # error Code needs update for TLS_method() support beyond TLS1_3_VERSION.
1226 static const version_info tls_version_table
[] = {
1227 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
1228 {TLS1_3_VERSION
, tlsv1_3_client_method
, tlsv1_3_server_method
},
1230 {TLS1_3_VERSION
, NULL
, NULL
},
1232 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2
1233 {TLS1_2_VERSION
, tlsv1_2_client_method
, tlsv1_2_server_method
},
1235 {TLS1_2_VERSION
, NULL
, NULL
},
1237 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_1
1238 {TLS1_1_VERSION
, tlsv1_1_client_method
, tlsv1_1_server_method
},
1240 {TLS1_1_VERSION
, NULL
, NULL
},
1242 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1
1243 {TLS1_VERSION
, tlsv1_client_method
, tlsv1_server_method
},
1245 {TLS1_VERSION
, NULL
, NULL
},
1247 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
1248 {SSL3_VERSION
, sslv3_client_method
, sslv3_server_method
},
1250 {SSL3_VERSION
, NULL
, NULL
},
1255 #if DTLS_MAX_VERSION != DTLS1_2_VERSION
1256 # error Code needs update for DTLS_method() support beyond DTLS1_2_VERSION.
1259 static const version_info dtls_version_table
[] = {
1260 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_2
1261 {DTLS1_2_VERSION
, dtlsv1_2_client_method
, dtlsv1_2_server_method
},
1263 {DTLS1_2_VERSION
, NULL
, NULL
},
1265 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1
1266 {DTLS1_VERSION
, dtlsv1_client_method
, dtlsv1_server_method
},
1267 {DTLS1_BAD_VER
, dtls_bad_ver_client_method
, NULL
},
1269 {DTLS1_VERSION
, NULL
, NULL
},
1270 {DTLS1_BAD_VER
, NULL
, NULL
},
1276 * ssl_method_error - Check whether an SSL_METHOD is enabled.
1278 * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method
1279 * @method: the intended method.
1281 * Returns 0 on success, or an SSL error reason on failure.
1283 static int ssl_method_error(const SSL
*s
, const SSL_METHOD
*method
)
1285 int version
= method
->version
;
1287 if ((s
->min_proto_version
!= 0 &&
1288 version_cmp(s
, version
, s
->min_proto_version
) < 0) ||
1289 ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_VERSION
, 0, version
, NULL
) == 0)
1290 return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW
;
1292 if (s
->max_proto_version
!= 0 &&
1293 version_cmp(s
, version
, s
->max_proto_version
) > 0)
1294 return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_HIGH
;
1296 if ((s
->options
& method
->mask
) != 0)
1297 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL
;
1298 if ((method
->flags
& SSL_METHOD_NO_SUITEB
) != 0 && tls1_suiteb(s
))
1299 return SSL_R_AT_LEAST_TLS_1_2_NEEDED_IN_SUITEB_MODE
;
1300 else if ((method
->flags
& SSL_METHOD_NO_FIPS
) != 0 && FIPS_mode())
1301 return SSL_R_AT_LEAST_TLS_1_0_NEEDED_IN_FIPS_MODE
;
1307 * ssl_version_supported - Check that the specified `version` is supported by
1310 * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method
1311 * @version: Protocol version to test against
1313 * Returns 1 when supported, otherwise 0
1315 int ssl_version_supported(const SSL
*s
, int version
)
1317 const version_info
*vent
;
1318 const version_info
*table
;
1320 switch (s
->method
->version
) {
1322 /* Version should match method version for non-ANY method */
1323 return version_cmp(s
, version
, s
->version
) == 0;
1324 case TLS_ANY_VERSION
:
1325 table
= tls_version_table
;
1327 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION
:
1328 table
= dtls_version_table
;
1333 vent
->version
!= 0 && version_cmp(s
, version
, vent
->version
) <= 0;
1335 if (vent
->cmeth
!= NULL
&&
1336 version_cmp(s
, version
, vent
->version
) == 0 &&
1337 ssl_method_error(s
, vent
->cmeth()) == 0) {
1345 * ssl_check_version_downgrade - In response to RFC7507 SCSV version
1346 * fallback indication from a client check whether we're using the highest
1347 * supported protocol version.
1349 * @s server SSL handle.
1351 * Returns 1 when using the highest enabled version, 0 otherwise.
1353 int ssl_check_version_downgrade(SSL
*s
)
1355 const version_info
*vent
;
1356 const version_info
*table
;
1359 * Check that the current protocol is the highest enabled version
1360 * (according to s->ctx->method, as version negotiation may have changed
1363 if (s
->version
== s
->ctx
->method
->version
)
1367 * Apparently we're using a version-flexible SSL_METHOD (not at its
1368 * highest protocol version).
1370 if (s
->ctx
->method
->version
== TLS_method()->version
)
1371 table
= tls_version_table
;
1372 else if (s
->ctx
->method
->version
== DTLS_method()->version
)
1373 table
= dtls_version_table
;
1375 /* Unexpected state; fail closed. */
1379 for (vent
= table
; vent
->version
!= 0; ++vent
) {
1380 if (vent
->smeth
!= NULL
&& ssl_method_error(s
, vent
->smeth()) == 0)
1381 return s
->version
== vent
->version
;
1387 * ssl_set_version_bound - set an upper or lower bound on the supported (D)TLS
1388 * protocols, provided the initial (D)TLS method is version-flexible. This
1389 * function sanity-checks the proposed value and makes sure the method is
1390 * version-flexible, then sets the limit if all is well.
1392 * @method_version: The version of the current SSL_METHOD.
1393 * @version: the intended limit.
1394 * @bound: pointer to limit to be updated.
1396 * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure.
1398 int ssl_set_version_bound(int method_version
, int version
, int *bound
)
1406 * Restrict TLS methods to TLS protocol versions.
1407 * Restrict DTLS methods to DTLS protocol versions.
1408 * Note, DTLS version numbers are decreasing, use comparison macros.
1410 * Note that for both lower-bounds we use explicit versions, not
1411 * (D)TLS_MIN_VERSION. This is because we don't want to break user
1412 * configurations. If the MIN (supported) version ever rises, the user's
1413 * "floor" remains valid even if no longer available. We don't expect the
1414 * MAX ceiling to ever get lower, so making that variable makes sense.
1416 switch (method_version
) {
1419 * XXX For fixed version methods, should we always fail and not set any
1420 * bounds, always succeed and not set any bounds, or set the bounds and
1421 * arrange to fail later if they are not met? At present fixed-version
1422 * methods are not subject to controls that disable individual protocol
1427 case TLS_ANY_VERSION
:
1428 if (version
< SSL3_VERSION
|| version
> TLS_MAX_VERSION
)
1432 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION
:
1433 if (DTLS_VERSION_GT(version
, DTLS_MAX_VERSION
) ||
1434 DTLS_VERSION_LT(version
, DTLS1_BAD_VER
))
1444 * ssl_choose_server_version - Choose server (D)TLS version. Called when the
1445 * client HELLO is received to select the final server protocol version and
1446 * the version specific method.
1448 * @s: server SSL handle.
1450 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure.
1452 int ssl_choose_server_version(SSL
*s
, CLIENTHELLO_MSG
*hello
)
1455 * With version-flexible methods we have an initial state with:
1457 * s->method->version == (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION,
1458 * s->version == (D)TLS_MAX_VERSION.
1460 * So we detect version-flexible methods via the method version, not the
1463 int server_version
= s
->method
->version
;
1464 int client_version
= hello
->legacy_version
;
1465 const version_info
*vent
;
1466 const version_info
*table
;
1468 RAW_EXTENSION
*suppversions
;
1470 s
->client_version
= client_version
;
1472 switch (server_version
) {
1474 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1475 if (version_cmp(s
, client_version
, s
->version
) < 0)
1476 return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION
;
1478 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
1479 * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
1480 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
1481 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
1482 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
1487 * Fall through if we are TLSv1.3 already (this means we must be after
1488 * a HelloRetryRequest
1490 case TLS_ANY_VERSION
:
1491 table
= tls_version_table
;
1493 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION
:
1494 table
= dtls_version_table
;
1498 suppversions
= &hello
->pre_proc_exts
[TLSEXT_IDX_supported_versions
];
1500 if (suppversions
->present
&& !SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1501 unsigned int candidate_vers
= 0;
1502 unsigned int best_vers
= 0;
1503 const SSL_METHOD
*best_method
= NULL
;
1504 PACKET versionslist
;
1506 suppversions
->parsed
= 1;
1508 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&suppversions
->data
, &versionslist
)) {
1509 /* Trailing or invalid data? */
1510 return SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
;
1513 while (PACKET_get_net_2(&versionslist
, &candidate_vers
)) {
1514 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove this before release */
1515 if (candidate_vers
== TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT
)
1516 candidate_vers
= TLS1_3_VERSION
;
1518 * TODO(TLS1.3): There is some discussion on the TLS list about
1519 * wheter to ignore versions <TLS1.2 in supported_versions. At the
1520 * moment we honour them if present. To be reviewed later
1522 if (version_cmp(s
, candidate_vers
, best_vers
) <= 0)
1525 vent
->version
!= 0 && vent
->version
!= (int)candidate_vers
;
1528 if (vent
->version
!= 0 && vent
->smeth
!= NULL
) {
1529 const SSL_METHOD
*method
;
1531 method
= vent
->smeth();
1532 if (ssl_method_error(s
, method
) == 0) {
1533 best_vers
= candidate_vers
;
1534 best_method
= method
;
1538 if (PACKET_remaining(&versionslist
) != 0) {
1539 /* Trailing data? */
1540 return SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
;
1543 if (best_vers
> 0) {
1544 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1546 * We get here if this is after a HelloRetryRequest. In this
1547 * case we just check that we still negotiated TLSv1.3
1549 if (best_vers
!= TLS1_3_VERSION
)
1550 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL
;
1553 s
->version
= best_vers
;
1554 s
->method
= best_method
;
1557 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL
;
1561 * If the supported versions extension isn't present, then the highest
1562 * version we can negotiate is TLSv1.2
1564 if (version_cmp(s
, client_version
, TLS1_3_VERSION
) >= 0)
1565 client_version
= TLS1_2_VERSION
;
1568 * No supported versions extension, so we just use the version supplied in
1571 for (vent
= table
; vent
->version
!= 0; ++vent
) {
1572 const SSL_METHOD
*method
;
1574 if (vent
->smeth
== NULL
||
1575 version_cmp(s
, client_version
, vent
->version
) < 0)
1577 method
= vent
->smeth();
1578 if (ssl_method_error(s
, method
) == 0) {
1579 s
->version
= vent
->version
;
1585 return disabled
? SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL
: SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW
;
1589 * ssl_choose_client_version - Choose client (D)TLS version. Called when the
1590 * server HELLO is received to select the final client protocol version and
1591 * the version specific method.
1593 * @s: client SSL handle.
1594 * @version: The proposed version from the server's HELLO.
1596 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure.
1598 int ssl_choose_client_version(SSL
*s
, int version
)
1600 const version_info
*vent
;
1601 const version_info
*table
;
1603 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove this before release */
1604 if (version
== TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT
)
1605 version
= TLS1_3_VERSION
;
1607 switch (s
->method
->version
) {
1609 if (version
!= s
->version
)
1610 return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION
;
1612 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
1613 * (and never did) check min/max, FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
1614 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
1615 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
1616 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
1619 case TLS_ANY_VERSION
:
1620 table
= tls_version_table
;
1622 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION
:
1623 table
= dtls_version_table
;
1627 for (vent
= table
; vent
->version
!= 0; ++vent
) {
1628 const SSL_METHOD
*method
;
1631 if (version
!= vent
->version
)
1633 if (vent
->cmeth
== NULL
)
1635 if (s
->hello_retry_request
&& version
!= TLS1_3_VERSION
)
1636 return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION
;
1638 method
= vent
->cmeth();
1639 err
= ssl_method_error(s
, method
);
1643 s
->version
= version
;
1647 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL
;
1651 * ssl_get_client_min_max_version - get minimum and maximum client version
1652 * @s: The SSL connection
1653 * @min_version: The minimum supported version
1654 * @max_version: The maximum supported version
1656 * Work out what version we should be using for the initial ClientHello if the
1657 * version is initially (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION. We apply any explicit SSL_OP_NO_xxx
1658 * options, the MinProtocol and MaxProtocol configuration commands, any Suite B
1659 * or FIPS_mode() constraints and any floor imposed by the security level here,
1660 * so we don't advertise the wrong protocol version to only reject the outcome later.
1662 * Computing the right floor matters. If, e.g., TLS 1.0 and 1.2 are enabled,
1663 * TLS 1.1 is disabled, but the security level, Suite-B and/or MinProtocol
1664 * only allow TLS 1.2, we want to advertise TLS1.2, *not* TLS1.
1666 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. On failure
1667 * min_version and max_version will also be set to 0.
1669 int ssl_get_client_min_max_version(const SSL
*s
, int *min_version
,
1674 const SSL_METHOD
*single
= NULL
;
1675 const SSL_METHOD
*method
;
1676 const version_info
*table
;
1677 const version_info
*vent
;
1679 switch (s
->method
->version
) {
1682 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
1683 * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
1684 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
1685 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
1686 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
1688 *min_version
= *max_version
= s
->version
;
1690 case TLS_ANY_VERSION
:
1691 table
= tls_version_table
;
1693 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION
:
1694 table
= dtls_version_table
;
1699 * SSL_OP_NO_X disables all protocols above X *if* there are some protocols
1700 * below X enabled. This is required in order to maintain the "version
1701 * capability" vector contiguous. Any versions with a NULL client method
1702 * (protocol version client is disabled at compile-time) is also a "hole".
1704 * Our initial state is hole == 1, version == 0. That is, versions above
1705 * the first version in the method table are disabled (a "hole" above
1706 * the valid protocol entries) and we don't have a selected version yet.
1708 * Whenever "hole == 1", and we hit an enabled method, its version becomes
1709 * the selected version, and the method becomes a candidate "single"
1710 * method. We're no longer in a hole, so "hole" becomes 0.
1712 * If "hole == 0" and we hit an enabled method, then "single" is cleared,
1713 * as we support a contiguous range of at least two methods. If we hit
1714 * a disabled method, then hole becomes true again, but nothing else
1715 * changes yet, because all the remaining methods may be disabled too.
1716 * If we again hit an enabled method after the new hole, it becomes
1717 * selected, as we start from scratch.
1719 *min_version
= version
= 0;
1721 for (vent
= table
; vent
->version
!= 0; ++vent
) {
1723 * A table entry with a NULL client method is still a hole in the
1724 * "version capability" vector.
1726 if (vent
->cmeth
== NULL
) {
1730 method
= vent
->cmeth();
1731 if (ssl_method_error(s
, method
) != 0) {
1735 *min_version
= method
->version
;
1737 version
= (single
= method
)->version
;
1738 *min_version
= version
;
1743 *max_version
= version
;
1745 /* Fail if everything is disabled */
1747 return SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE
;
1753 * ssl_set_client_hello_version - Work out what version we should be using for
1754 * the initial ClientHello.legacy_version field.
1756 * @s: client SSL handle.
1758 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure.
1760 int ssl_set_client_hello_version(SSL
*s
)
1762 int ver_min
, ver_max
, ret
;
1764 ret
= ssl_get_client_min_max_version(s
, &ver_min
, &ver_max
);
1769 s
->version
= ver_max
;
1771 /* TLS1.3 always uses TLS1.2 in the legacy_version field */
1772 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && ver_max
> TLS1_2_VERSION
)
1773 ver_max
= TLS1_2_VERSION
;
1775 s
->client_version
= ver_max
;
1780 * Checks a list of |groups| to determine if the |group_id| is in it. If it is
1781 * and |checkallow| is 1 then additionally check if the group is allowed to be
1782 * used. Returns 1 if the group is in the list (and allowed if |checkallow| is
1783 * 1) or 0 otherwise.
1785 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1786 int check_in_list(SSL
*s
, unsigned int group_id
, const unsigned char *groups
,
1787 size_t num_groups
, int checkallow
)
1791 if (groups
== NULL
|| num_groups
== 0)
1794 for (i
= 0; i
< num_groups
; i
++, groups
+= 2) {
1795 unsigned int share_id
= (groups
[0] << 8) | (groups
[1]);
1797 if (group_id
== share_id
1799 || tls_curve_allowed(s
, groups
, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK
))) {
1804 /* If i == num_groups then not in the list */
1805 return i
< num_groups
;