1 /* ssl/statem/statem_lib.c */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
113 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by
114 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project.
120 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
121 #include "statem_locl.h"
122 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
123 #include <openssl/rand.h>
124 #include <openssl/objects.h>
125 #include <openssl/evp.h>
126 #include <openssl/x509.h>
129 * send s->init_buf in records of type 'type' (SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or
130 * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
132 int ssl3_do_write(SSL
*s
, int type
)
136 ret
= ssl3_write_bytes(s
, type
, &s
->init_buf
->data
[s
->init_off
],
140 if (type
== SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
)
142 * should not be done for 'Hello Request's, but in that case we'll
143 * ignore the result anyway
145 ssl3_finish_mac(s
, (unsigned char *)&s
->init_buf
->data
[s
->init_off
],
148 if (ret
== s
->init_num
) {
150 s
->msg_callback(1, s
->version
, type
, s
->init_buf
->data
,
151 (size_t)(s
->init_off
+ s
->init_num
), s
,
152 s
->msg_callback_arg
);
160 int tls_construct_finished(SSL
*s
, const char *sender
, int slen
)
166 p
= ssl_handshake_start(s
);
168 i
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->final_finish_mac(s
,
170 s
->s3
->tmp
.finish_md
);
173 s
->s3
->tmp
.finish_md_len
= i
;
174 memcpy(p
, s
->s3
->tmp
.finish_md
, i
);
178 * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks
181 OPENSSL_assert(i
<= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
);
182 memcpy(s
->s3
->previous_client_finished
, s
->s3
->tmp
.finish_md
, i
);
183 s
->s3
->previous_client_finished_len
= i
;
185 OPENSSL_assert(i
<= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
);
186 memcpy(s
->s3
->previous_server_finished
, s
->s3
->tmp
.finish_md
, i
);
187 s
->s3
->previous_server_finished_len
= i
;
190 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s
, SSL3_MT_FINISHED
, l
)) {
191 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
198 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
200 * ssl3_take_mac calculates the Finished MAC for the handshakes messages seen
203 static void ssl3_take_mac(SSL
*s
)
208 * If no new cipher setup return immediately: other functions will set
209 * the appropriate error.
211 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
== NULL
)
214 sender
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->server_finished_label
;
215 slen
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->server_finished_label_len
;
217 sender
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->client_finished_label
;
218 slen
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->client_finished_label_len
;
221 s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_finish_md_len
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->final_finish_mac(s
,
224 s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_finish_md
);
228 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_change_cipher_spec(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
233 remain
= PACKET_remaining(pkt
);
235 * 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, which should already have
236 * been consumed by ssl_get_message() so there should be no bytes left,
237 * unless we're using DTLS1_BAD_VER, which has an extra 2 bytes
239 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
240 if ((s
->version
== DTLS1_BAD_VER
241 && remain
!= DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH
+ 1)
242 || (s
->version
!= DTLS1_BAD_VER
243 && remain
!= DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH
- 1)) {
244 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
245 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
,
246 SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
);
251 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
252 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
,
253 SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
);
258 /* Check we have a cipher to change to */
259 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
== NULL
) {
260 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
261 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY
);
265 s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
= 1;
266 if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s
)) {
267 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
268 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
272 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
273 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s
, SSL3_CC_READ
);
275 if (s
->version
== DTLS1_BAD_VER
)
276 s
->d1
->handshake_read_seq
++;
278 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
280 * Remember that a CCS has been received, so that an old key of
281 * SCTP-Auth can be deleted when a CCS is sent. Will be ignored if no
284 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_AUTH_CCS_RCVD
, 1, NULL
);
288 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
290 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
291 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
292 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
295 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_finished(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
299 /* If this occurs, we have missed a message */
300 if (!s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
) {
301 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
302 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED
, SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS
);
305 s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
= 0;
307 i
= s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_finish_md_len
;
309 if ((unsigned long)i
!= PACKET_remaining(pkt
)) {
310 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
311 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED
, SSL_R_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH
);
315 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(PACKET_data(pkt
), s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_finish_md
, i
) != 0) {
316 al
= SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
317 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED
, SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED
);
322 * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks
325 OPENSSL_assert(i
<= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
);
326 memcpy(s
->s3
->previous_client_finished
, s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_finish_md
, i
);
327 s
->s3
->previous_client_finished_len
= i
;
329 OPENSSL_assert(i
<= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
);
330 memcpy(s
->s3
->previous_server_finished
, s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_finish_md
, i
);
331 s
->s3
->previous_server_finished_len
= i
;
334 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
336 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
337 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
338 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
341 int tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(SSL
*s
)
345 p
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
353 unsigned long ssl3_output_cert_chain(SSL
*s
, CERT_PKEY
*cpk
)
356 unsigned long l
= 3 + SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s
);
358 if (!ssl_add_cert_chain(s
, cpk
, &l
))
361 l
-= 3 + SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s
);
362 p
= ssl_handshake_start(s
);
366 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s
, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
, l
)) {
367 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
370 return l
+ SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s
);
373 WORK_STATE
tls_finish_handshake(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
375 void (*cb
) (const SSL
*ssl
, int type
, int val
) = NULL
;
377 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
378 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s
))) {
380 ret
= dtls_wait_for_dry(s
);
381 if (ret
!= WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
)
386 /* clean a few things up */
387 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s
);
389 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
391 * We don't do this in DTLS because we may still need the init_buf
392 * in case there are any unexpected retransmits
394 BUF_MEM_free(s
->init_buf
);
398 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s
);
402 if (!s
->server
|| s
->renegotiate
== 2) {
403 /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
408 ssl_update_cache(s
, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER
);
410 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_accept_good
++;
411 s
->handshake_func
= ossl_statem_accept
;
413 ssl_update_cache(s
, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT
);
415 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_hit
++;
417 s
->handshake_func
= ossl_statem_connect
;
418 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_connect_good
++;
421 if (s
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
422 cb
= s
->info_callback
;
423 else if (s
->ctx
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
424 cb
= s
->ctx
->info_callback
;
427 cb(s
, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE
, 1);
429 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
430 /* done with handshaking */
431 s
->d1
->handshake_read_seq
= 0;
432 s
->d1
->handshake_write_seq
= 0;
433 s
->d1
->next_handshake_write_seq
= 0;
437 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP
;
440 int tls_get_message_header(SSL
*s
, int *mt
)
442 /* s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */
443 int skip_message
, i
, recvd_type
, al
;
447 p
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
450 while (s
->init_num
< SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
) {
451 i
= s
->method
->ssl_read_bytes(s
, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
, &recvd_type
,
452 &p
[s
->init_num
], SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
- s
->init_num
, 0);
454 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
457 if (recvd_type
== SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
458 s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
= *mt
= SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
;
460 s
->s3
->tmp
.message_size
= i
;
462 } else if (recvd_type
!= SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
) {
463 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
464 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER
, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY
);
472 if (p
[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST
)
474 * The server may always send 'Hello Request' messages --
475 * we are doing a handshake anyway now, so ignore them if
476 * their format is correct. Does not count for 'Finished'
479 if (p
[1] == 0 && p
[2] == 0 && p
[3] == 0) {
484 s
->msg_callback(0, s
->version
, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
,
485 p
, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
, s
,
486 s
->msg_callback_arg
);
488 } while (skip_message
);
489 /* s->init_num == SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */
492 s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
= *(p
++);
494 if(RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s
->rlayer
)) {
496 * Only happens with SSLv3+ in an SSLv2 backward compatible
500 * Total message size is the remaining record bytes to read
501 * plus the SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH bytes that we already read
503 l
= RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec_length(&s
->rlayer
)
504 + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
;
505 if (l
&& !BUF_MEM_grow_clean(s
->init_buf
, (int)l
)) {
506 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER
, ERR_R_BUF_LIB
);
509 s
->s3
->tmp
.message_size
= l
;
511 s
->init_msg
= s
->init_buf
->data
;
512 s
->init_num
= SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
;
515 /* BUF_MEM_grow takes an 'int' parameter */
516 if (l
> (INT_MAX
- SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
)) {
517 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
518 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER
, SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE
);
521 if (l
&& !BUF_MEM_grow_clean(s
->init_buf
,
522 (int)l
+ SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
)) {
523 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER
, ERR_R_BUF_LIB
);
526 s
->s3
->tmp
.message_size
= l
;
528 s
->init_msg
= s
->init_buf
->data
+ SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
;
534 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
539 int tls_get_message_body(SSL
*s
, unsigned long *len
)
545 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
546 /* We've already read everything in */
547 *len
= (unsigned long)s
->init_num
;
552 n
= s
->s3
->tmp
.message_size
- s
->init_num
;
554 i
= s
->method
->ssl_read_bytes(s
, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
, NULL
,
555 &p
[s
->init_num
], n
, 0);
557 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
565 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
567 * If receiving Finished, record MAC of prior handshake messages for
568 * Finished verification.
570 if (*s
->init_buf
->data
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
)
574 /* Feed this message into MAC computation. */
575 if(RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s
->rlayer
)) {
576 ssl3_finish_mac(s
, (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
, s
->init_num
);
578 s
->msg_callback(0, SSL2_VERSION
, 0, s
->init_buf
->data
,
579 (size_t)s
->init_num
, s
, s
->msg_callback_arg
);
581 ssl3_finish_mac(s
, (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
,
582 s
->init_num
+ SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
);
584 s
->msg_callback(0, s
->version
, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
, s
->init_buf
->data
,
585 (size_t)s
->init_num
+ SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
, s
,
586 s
->msg_callback_arg
);
590 * init_num should never be negative...should probably be declared
593 if (s
->init_num
< 0) {
594 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_BODY
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
595 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
599 *len
= (unsigned long)s
->init_num
;
603 int ssl_cert_type(X509
*x
, EVP_PKEY
*pkey
)
609 pk
= X509_get_pubkey(x
);
616 if (i
== EVP_PKEY_RSA
) {
617 ret
= SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
;
618 } else if (i
== EVP_PKEY_DSA
) {
619 ret
= SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
;
621 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
622 else if (i
== EVP_PKEY_EC
) {
626 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
627 else if (i
== NID_id_GostR3410_2001
) {
628 ret
= SSL_PKEY_GOST01
;
629 } else if (i
== NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
) {
630 ret
= SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
;
631 } else if (i
== NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
) {
632 ret
= SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
;
642 int ssl_verify_alarm_type(long type
)
647 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT
:
648 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL
:
649 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER
:
650 al
= SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA
;
652 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CERT_SIGNATURE
:
653 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CRL_SIGNATURE
:
654 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY
:
655 case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD
:
656 case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD
:
657 case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD
:
658 case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD
:
659 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID
:
660 case X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID
:
661 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED
:
662 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED
:
663 al
= SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
;
665 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE
:
666 case X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE
:
667 al
= SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
669 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED
:
670 case X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED
:
671 al
= SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED
;
673 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED
:
674 al
= SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED
;
676 case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM
:
677 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
679 case X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT
:
680 case X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN
:
681 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY
:
682 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE
:
683 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG
:
684 case X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED
:
685 case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA
:
686 al
= SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA
;
688 case X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION
:
689 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
691 case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE
:
692 al
= SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE
;
695 al
= SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN
;
701 int ssl_allow_compression(SSL
*s
)
703 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION
)
705 return ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_COMPRESSION
, 0, 0, NULL
);
708 static int version_cmp(SSL
*s
, int a
, int b
)
710 int dtls
= SSL_IS_DTLS(s
);
715 return a
< b
? -1 : 1;
716 return DTLS_VERSION_LT(a
, b
) ? -1 : 1;
721 const SSL_METHOD
*(*cmeth
)(void);
722 const SSL_METHOD
*(*smeth
)(void);
725 #if TLS_MAX_VERSION != TLS1_2_VERSION
726 # error Code needs update for TLS_method() support beyond TLS1_2_VERSION.
729 static const version_info tls_version_table
[] = {
730 { TLS1_2_VERSION
, TLSv1_2_client_method
, TLSv1_2_server_method
},
731 { TLS1_1_VERSION
, TLSv1_1_client_method
, TLSv1_1_server_method
},
732 { TLS1_VERSION
, TLSv1_client_method
, TLSv1_server_method
},
733 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
734 { SSL3_VERSION
, SSLv3_client_method
, SSLv3_server_method
},
739 #if DTLS_MAX_VERSION != DTLS1_2_VERSION
740 # error Code needs update for DTLS_method() support beyond DTLS1_2_VERSION.
743 static const version_info dtls_version_table
[] = {
744 { DTLS1_2_VERSION
, DTLSv1_2_client_method
, DTLSv1_2_server_method
},
745 { DTLS1_VERSION
, DTLSv1_client_method
, DTLSv1_server_method
},
750 * ssl_method_error - Check whether an SSL_METHOD is enabled.
752 * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method
753 * @method: the intended method.
755 * Returns 0 on success, or an SSL error reason on failure.
757 static int ssl_method_error(SSL
*s
, const SSL_METHOD
*method
)
759 int version
= method
->version
;
761 if ((s
->min_proto_version
!= 0 &&
762 version_cmp(s
, version
, s
->min_proto_version
) < 0) ||
763 ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_VERSION
, 0, version
, NULL
) == 0)
764 return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW
;
766 if (s
->max_proto_version
!= 0 &&
767 version_cmp(s
, version
, s
->max_proto_version
) > 0)
768 return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_HIGH
;
770 if ((s
->options
& method
->mask
) != 0)
771 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL
;
772 if ((method
->flags
& SSL_METHOD_NO_SUITEB
) != 0 && tls1_suiteb(s
))
773 return SSL_R_AT_LEAST_TLS_1_2_NEEDED_IN_SUITEB_MODE
;
774 else if ((method
->flags
& SSL_METHOD_NO_FIPS
) != 0 && FIPS_mode())
775 return SSL_R_AT_LEAST_TLS_1_0_NEEDED_IN_FIPS_MODE
;
781 * ssl_check_version_downgrade - In response to RFC7507 SCSV version
782 * fallback indication from a client check whether we're using the highest
783 * supported protocol version.
785 * @s server SSL handle.
787 * Returns 1 when using the highest enabled version, 0 otherwise.
789 int ssl_check_version_downgrade(SSL
*s
)
791 const version_info
*vent
;
792 const version_info
*table
;
795 * Check that the current protocol is the highest enabled version
796 * (according to s->ctx->method, as version negotiation may have changed
799 if (s
->version
== s
->ctx
->method
->version
)
803 * Apparently we're using a version-flexible SSL_METHOD (not at its
804 * highest protocol version).
806 if (s
->ctx
->method
->version
== TLS_method()->version
)
807 table
= tls_version_table
;
808 else if (s
->ctx
->method
->version
== DTLS_method()->version
)
809 table
= dtls_version_table
;
811 /* Unexpected state; fail closed. */
815 for (vent
= table
; vent
->version
!= 0; ++vent
) {
816 if (vent
->smeth
!= NULL
&&
817 ssl_method_error(s
, vent
->smeth()) == 0)
818 return s
->version
== vent
->version
;
824 * ssl_set_version_bound - set an upper or lower bound on the supported (D)TLS
825 * protocols, provided the initial (D)TLS method is version-flexible. This
826 * function sanity-checks the proposed value and makes sure the method is
827 * version-flexible, then sets the limit if all is well.
829 * @method_version: The version of the current SSL_METHOD.
830 * @version: the intended limit.
831 * @bound: pointer to limit to be updated.
833 * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure.
835 int ssl_set_version_bound(int method_version
, int version
, int *bound
)
843 * Restrict TLS methods to TLS protocol versions.
844 * Restrict DTLS methods to DTLS protocol versions.
845 * Note, DTLS version numbers are decreasing, use comparison macros.
847 * Note that for both lower-bounds we use explicit versions, not
848 * (D)TLS_MIN_VERSION. This is because we don't want to break user
849 * configurations. If the MIN (supported) version ever rises, the user's
850 * "floor" remains valid even if no longer available. We don't expect the
851 * MAX ceiling to ever get lower, so making that variable makes sense.
853 switch (method_version
) {
856 * XXX For fixed version methods, should we always fail and not set any
857 * bounds, always succeed and not set any bounds, or set the bounds and
858 * arrange to fail later if they are not met? At present fixed-version
859 * methods are not subject to controls that disable individual protocol
864 case TLS_ANY_VERSION
:
865 if (version
< SSL3_VERSION
|| version
> TLS_MAX_VERSION
)
869 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION
:
870 if (DTLS_VERSION_GT(version
, DTLS_MAX_VERSION
) ||
871 DTLS_VERSION_LT(version
, DTLS1_VERSION
))
881 * ssl_choose_server_version - Choose server (D)TLS version. Called when the
882 * client HELLO is received to select the final server protocol version and
883 * the version specific method.
885 * @s: server SSL handle.
887 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure.
889 int ssl_choose_server_version(SSL
*s
)
892 * With version-flexible methods we have an initial state with:
894 * s->method->version == (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION,
895 * s->version == (D)TLS_MAX_VERSION.
897 * So we detect version-flexible methods via the method version, not the
900 int server_version
= s
->method
->version
;
901 int client_version
= s
->client_version
;
902 const version_info
*vent
;
903 const version_info
*table
;
906 switch (server_version
) {
908 if (version_cmp(s
, client_version
, s
->version
) < 0)
909 return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION
;
911 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
912 * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
913 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
914 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
915 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
918 case TLS_ANY_VERSION
:
919 table
= tls_version_table
;
921 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION
:
922 table
= dtls_version_table
;
926 for (vent
= table
; vent
->version
!= 0; ++vent
) {
927 const SSL_METHOD
*method
;
929 if (vent
->smeth
== NULL
||
930 version_cmp(s
, client_version
, vent
->version
) < 0)
932 method
= vent
->smeth();
933 if (ssl_method_error(s
, method
) == 0) {
934 s
->version
= vent
->version
;
940 return disabled
? SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL
: SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW
;
944 * ssl_choose_client_version - Choose client (D)TLS version. Called when the
945 * server HELLO is received to select the final client protocol version and
946 * the version specific method.
948 * @s: client SSL handle.
949 * @version: The proposed version from the server's HELLO.
951 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure.
953 int ssl_choose_client_version(SSL
*s
, int version
)
955 const version_info
*vent
;
956 const version_info
*table
;
958 switch (s
->method
->version
) {
960 if (version
!= s
->version
)
961 return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION
;
963 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
964 * (and never did) check min/max, FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
965 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
966 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
967 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
969 s
->session
->ssl_version
= s
->version
;
971 case TLS_ANY_VERSION
:
972 table
= tls_version_table
;
974 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION
:
975 table
= dtls_version_table
;
979 for (vent
= table
; vent
->version
!= 0; ++vent
) {
980 const SSL_METHOD
*method
;
983 if (version
!= vent
->version
)
985 if (vent
->cmeth
== NULL
)
987 method
= vent
->cmeth();
988 err
= ssl_method_error(s
, method
);
992 s
->session
->ssl_version
= s
->version
= version
;
996 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL
;
1000 * ssl_set_client_hello_version - Work out what version we should be using for
1001 * the initial ClientHello if the version is initially (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION. We
1002 * apply any explicit SSL_OP_NO_xxx options, the MinProtocol and MaxProtocol
1003 * configuration commands, any Suite B or FIPS_mode() constraints and any floor
1004 * imposed by the security level here, so we don't advertise the wrong protocol
1005 * version to only reject the outcome later.
1007 * Computing the right floor matters. If, e.g., TLS 1.0 and 1.2 are enabled,
1008 * TLS 1.1 is disabled, but the security level, Suite-B and/or MinProtocol
1009 * only allow TLS 1.2, we want to advertise TLS1.2, *not* TLS1.
1011 * @s: client SSL handle.
1013 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure.
1015 int ssl_set_client_hello_version(SSL
*s
)
1019 const SSL_METHOD
*single
= NULL
;
1020 const SSL_METHOD
*method
;
1021 const version_info
*table
;
1022 const version_info
*vent
;
1024 switch (s
->method
->version
) {
1027 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
1028 * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
1029 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
1030 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
1031 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
1033 s
->client_version
= s
->version
;
1035 case TLS_ANY_VERSION
:
1036 table
= tls_version_table
;
1038 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION
:
1039 table
= dtls_version_table
;
1044 * SSL_OP_NO_X disables all protocols above X *if* there are some protocols
1045 * below X enabled. This is required in order to maintain the "version
1046 * capability" vector contiguous. Any versions with a NULL client method
1047 * (protocol version client is disabled at compile-time) is also a "hole".
1049 * Our initial state is hole == 1, version == 0. That is, versions above
1050 * the first version in the method table are disabled (a "hole" above
1051 * the valid protocol entries) and we don't have a selected version yet.
1053 * Whenever "hole == 1", and we hit an enabled method, its version becomes
1054 * the selected version, and the method becomes a candidate "single"
1055 * method. We're no longer in a hole, so "hole" becomes 0.
1057 * If "hole == 0" and we hit an enabled method, then "single" is cleared,
1058 * as we support a contiguous range of at least two methods. If we hit
1059 * a disabled method, then hole becomes true again, but nothing else
1060 * changes yet, because all the remaining methods may be disabled too.
1061 * If we again hit an enabled method after the new hole, it becomes
1062 * selected, as we start from scratch.
1066 for (vent
= table
; vent
->version
!= 0; ++vent
) {
1068 * A table entry with a NULL client method is still a hole in the
1069 * "version capability" vector.
1071 if (vent
->cmeth
== NULL
) {
1075 method
= vent
->cmeth();
1076 if (ssl_method_error(s
, method
) != 0) {
1081 version
= (single
= method
)->version
;
1086 /* Fail if everything is disabled */
1088 return SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE
;
1092 s
->client_version
= s
->version
= version
;