1 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
4 * This package is an SSL implementation written
5 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
6 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
9 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
10 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
11 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
12 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
13 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
16 * the code are not to be removed.
17 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
18 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
19 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
20 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
23 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
26 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
27 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
28 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
29 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
30 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
31 * must display the following acknowledgement:
32 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
33 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
34 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
35 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
36 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
37 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
38 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
41 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
42 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
43 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
44 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
45 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
46 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
47 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
48 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
49 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
52 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
53 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
54 * copied and put under another distribution licence
55 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
57 /* ====================================================================
58 * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
60 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
61 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
64 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
65 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
67 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
68 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
69 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
72 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
73 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
74 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
75 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
77 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
78 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
79 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
80 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
82 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
83 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
84 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
86 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
88 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
89 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
91 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
92 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
93 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
94 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
95 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
96 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
97 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
98 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
99 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
100 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
101 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
102 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
103 * ====================================================================
105 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
106 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
107 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
110 /* ====================================================================
111 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
112 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by
113 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project.
119 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
120 #include "statem_locl.h"
121 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
122 #include <openssl/rand.h>
123 #include <openssl/objects.h>
124 #include <openssl/evp.h>
125 #include <openssl/x509.h>
128 * send s->init_buf in records of type 'type' (SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or
129 * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
131 int ssl3_do_write(SSL
*s
, int type
)
135 ret
= ssl3_write_bytes(s
, type
, &s
->init_buf
->data
[s
->init_off
],
139 if (type
== SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
)
141 * should not be done for 'Hello Request's, but in that case we'll
142 * ignore the result anyway
144 ssl3_finish_mac(s
, (unsigned char *)&s
->init_buf
->data
[s
->init_off
],
147 if (ret
== s
->init_num
) {
149 s
->msg_callback(1, s
->version
, type
, s
->init_buf
->data
,
150 (size_t)(s
->init_off
+ s
->init_num
), s
,
151 s
->msg_callback_arg
);
159 int tls_construct_finished(SSL
*s
, const char *sender
, int slen
)
165 p
= ssl_handshake_start(s
);
167 i
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->final_finish_mac(s
,
169 s
->s3
->tmp
.finish_md
);
172 s
->s3
->tmp
.finish_md_len
= i
;
173 memcpy(p
, s
->s3
->tmp
.finish_md
, i
);
177 * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks
180 OPENSSL_assert(i
<= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
);
181 memcpy(s
->s3
->previous_client_finished
, s
->s3
->tmp
.finish_md
, i
);
182 s
->s3
->previous_client_finished_len
= i
;
184 OPENSSL_assert(i
<= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
);
185 memcpy(s
->s3
->previous_server_finished
, s
->s3
->tmp
.finish_md
, i
);
186 s
->s3
->previous_server_finished_len
= i
;
189 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s
, SSL3_MT_FINISHED
, l
)) {
190 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
197 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
199 * ssl3_take_mac calculates the Finished MAC for the handshakes messages seen
202 static void ssl3_take_mac(SSL
*s
)
207 * If no new cipher setup return immediately: other functions will set
208 * the appropriate error.
210 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
== NULL
)
213 sender
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->server_finished_label
;
214 slen
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->server_finished_label_len
;
216 sender
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->client_finished_label
;
217 slen
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->client_finished_label_len
;
220 s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_finish_md_len
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->final_finish_mac(s
,
223 s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_finish_md
);
227 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_change_cipher_spec(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
232 remain
= PACKET_remaining(pkt
);
234 * 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, which should already have
235 * been consumed by ssl_get_message() so there should be no bytes left,
236 * unless we're using DTLS1_BAD_VER, which has an extra 2 bytes
238 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
239 if ((s
->version
== DTLS1_BAD_VER
240 && remain
!= DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH
+ 1)
241 || (s
->version
!= DTLS1_BAD_VER
242 && remain
!= DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH
- 1)) {
243 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
244 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
,
245 SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
);
250 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
251 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
,
252 SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
);
257 /* Check we have a cipher to change to */
258 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
== NULL
) {
259 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
260 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY
);
264 s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
= 1;
265 if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s
)) {
266 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
267 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
271 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
272 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s
, SSL3_CC_READ
);
274 if (s
->version
== DTLS1_BAD_VER
)
275 s
->d1
->handshake_read_seq
++;
277 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
279 * Remember that a CCS has been received, so that an old key of
280 * SCTP-Auth can be deleted when a CCS is sent. Will be ignored if no
283 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_AUTH_CCS_RCVD
, 1, NULL
);
287 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
289 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
290 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
291 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
294 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_finished(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
298 /* If this occurs, we have missed a message */
299 if (!s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
) {
300 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
301 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED
, SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS
);
304 s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
= 0;
306 i
= s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_finish_md_len
;
308 if ((unsigned long)i
!= PACKET_remaining(pkt
)) {
309 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
310 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED
, SSL_R_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH
);
314 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(PACKET_data(pkt
), s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_finish_md
, i
) != 0) {
315 al
= SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
316 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED
, SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED
);
321 * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks
324 OPENSSL_assert(i
<= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
);
325 memcpy(s
->s3
->previous_client_finished
, s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_finish_md
, i
);
326 s
->s3
->previous_client_finished_len
= i
;
328 OPENSSL_assert(i
<= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
);
329 memcpy(s
->s3
->previous_server_finished
, s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_finish_md
, i
);
330 s
->s3
->previous_server_finished_len
= i
;
333 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
335 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
336 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
337 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
340 int tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(SSL
*s
)
344 p
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
352 unsigned long ssl3_output_cert_chain(SSL
*s
, CERT_PKEY
*cpk
)
355 unsigned long l
= 3 + SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s
);
357 if (!ssl_add_cert_chain(s
, cpk
, &l
))
360 l
-= 3 + SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s
);
361 p
= ssl_handshake_start(s
);
365 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s
, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
, l
)) {
366 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
369 return l
+ SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s
);
372 WORK_STATE
tls_finish_handshake(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
374 void (*cb
) (const SSL
*ssl
, int type
, int val
) = NULL
;
376 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
377 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s
))) {
379 ret
= dtls_wait_for_dry(s
);
380 if (ret
!= WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
)
385 /* clean a few things up */
386 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s
);
388 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
390 * We don't do this in DTLS because we may still need the init_buf
391 * in case there are any unexpected retransmits
393 BUF_MEM_free(s
->init_buf
);
397 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s
);
401 if (!s
->server
|| s
->renegotiate
== 2) {
402 /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
407 ssl_update_cache(s
, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER
);
409 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_accept_good
++;
410 s
->handshake_func
= ossl_statem_accept
;
412 ssl_update_cache(s
, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT
);
414 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_hit
++;
416 s
->handshake_func
= ossl_statem_connect
;
417 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_connect_good
++;
420 if (s
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
421 cb
= s
->info_callback
;
422 else if (s
->ctx
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
423 cb
= s
->ctx
->info_callback
;
426 cb(s
, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE
, 1);
428 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
429 /* done with handshaking */
430 s
->d1
->handshake_read_seq
= 0;
431 s
->d1
->handshake_write_seq
= 0;
432 s
->d1
->next_handshake_write_seq
= 0;
436 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP
;
439 int tls_get_message_header(SSL
*s
, int *mt
)
441 /* s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */
442 int skip_message
, i
, recvd_type
, al
;
446 p
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
449 while (s
->init_num
< SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
) {
450 i
= s
->method
->ssl_read_bytes(s
, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
, &recvd_type
,
451 &p
[s
->init_num
], SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
- s
->init_num
, 0);
453 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
456 if (recvd_type
== SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
457 s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
= *mt
= SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
;
459 s
->s3
->tmp
.message_size
= i
;
461 } else if (recvd_type
!= SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
) {
462 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
463 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER
, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY
);
471 if (p
[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST
)
473 * The server may always send 'Hello Request' messages --
474 * we are doing a handshake anyway now, so ignore them if
475 * their format is correct. Does not count for 'Finished'
478 if (p
[1] == 0 && p
[2] == 0 && p
[3] == 0) {
483 s
->msg_callback(0, s
->version
, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
,
484 p
, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
, s
,
485 s
->msg_callback_arg
);
487 } while (skip_message
);
488 /* s->init_num == SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */
491 s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
= *(p
++);
493 if(RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s
->rlayer
)) {
495 * Only happens with SSLv3+ in an SSLv2 backward compatible
499 * Total message size is the remaining record bytes to read
500 * plus the SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH bytes that we already read
502 l
= RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec_length(&s
->rlayer
)
503 + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
;
504 if (l
&& !BUF_MEM_grow_clean(s
->init_buf
, (int)l
)) {
505 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER
, ERR_R_BUF_LIB
);
508 s
->s3
->tmp
.message_size
= l
;
510 s
->init_msg
= s
->init_buf
->data
;
511 s
->init_num
= SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
;
514 /* BUF_MEM_grow takes an 'int' parameter */
515 if (l
> (INT_MAX
- SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
)) {
516 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
517 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER
, SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE
);
520 if (l
&& !BUF_MEM_grow_clean(s
->init_buf
,
521 (int)l
+ SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
)) {
522 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER
, ERR_R_BUF_LIB
);
525 s
->s3
->tmp
.message_size
= l
;
527 s
->init_msg
= s
->init_buf
->data
+ SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
;
533 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
538 int tls_get_message_body(SSL
*s
, unsigned long *len
)
544 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
545 /* We've already read everything in */
546 *len
= (unsigned long)s
->init_num
;
551 n
= s
->s3
->tmp
.message_size
- s
->init_num
;
553 i
= s
->method
->ssl_read_bytes(s
, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
, NULL
,
554 &p
[s
->init_num
], n
, 0);
556 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
564 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
566 * If receiving Finished, record MAC of prior handshake messages for
567 * Finished verification.
569 if (*s
->init_buf
->data
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
)
573 /* Feed this message into MAC computation. */
574 if(RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s
->rlayer
)) {
575 ssl3_finish_mac(s
, (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
, s
->init_num
);
577 s
->msg_callback(0, SSL2_VERSION
, 0, s
->init_buf
->data
,
578 (size_t)s
->init_num
, s
, s
->msg_callback_arg
);
580 ssl3_finish_mac(s
, (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
,
581 s
->init_num
+ SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
);
583 s
->msg_callback(0, s
->version
, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
, s
->init_buf
->data
,
584 (size_t)s
->init_num
+ SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
, s
,
585 s
->msg_callback_arg
);
589 * init_num should never be negative...should probably be declared
592 if (s
->init_num
< 0) {
593 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_BODY
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
594 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
598 *len
= (unsigned long)s
->init_num
;
602 int ssl_cert_type(X509
*x
, EVP_PKEY
*pk
)
605 (pk
= X509_get0_pubkey(x
)) == NULL
)
608 switch (EVP_PKEY_id(pk
)) {
612 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
;
614 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
;
615 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
619 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
620 case NID_id_GostR3410_2001
:
621 return SSL_PKEY_GOST01
;
622 case NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
:
623 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
;
624 case NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
:
625 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
;
630 int ssl_verify_alarm_type(long type
)
635 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT
:
636 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL
:
637 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER
:
638 al
= SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA
;
640 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CERT_SIGNATURE
:
641 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CRL_SIGNATURE
:
642 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY
:
643 case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD
:
644 case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD
:
645 case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD
:
646 case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD
:
647 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID
:
648 case X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID
:
649 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED
:
650 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED
:
651 al
= SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
;
653 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE
:
654 case X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE
:
655 al
= SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
657 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED
:
658 case X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED
:
659 al
= SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED
;
661 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED
:
662 al
= SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED
;
664 case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM
:
665 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
667 case X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT
:
668 case X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN
:
669 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY
:
670 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE
:
671 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG
:
672 case X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED
:
673 case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA
:
674 al
= SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA
;
676 case X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION
:
677 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
679 case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE
:
680 al
= SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE
;
683 al
= SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN
;
689 int ssl_allow_compression(SSL
*s
)
691 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION
)
693 return ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_COMPRESSION
, 0, 0, NULL
);
696 static int version_cmp(const SSL
*s
, int a
, int b
)
698 int dtls
= SSL_IS_DTLS(s
);
703 return a
< b
? -1 : 1;
704 return DTLS_VERSION_LT(a
, b
) ? -1 : 1;
709 const SSL_METHOD
*(*cmeth
)(void);
710 const SSL_METHOD
*(*smeth
)(void);
713 #if TLS_MAX_VERSION != TLS1_2_VERSION
714 # error Code needs update for TLS_method() support beyond TLS1_2_VERSION.
717 static const version_info tls_version_table
[] = {
718 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2
719 { TLS1_2_VERSION
, tlsv1_2_client_method
, tlsv1_2_server_method
},
721 { TLS1_2_VERSION
, NULL
, NULL
},
723 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_1
724 { TLS1_1_VERSION
, tlsv1_1_client_method
, tlsv1_1_server_method
},
726 { TLS1_1_VERSION
, NULL
, NULL
},
728 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1
729 { TLS1_VERSION
, tlsv1_client_method
, tlsv1_server_method
},
731 { TLS1_VERSION
, NULL
, NULL
},
733 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
734 { SSL3_VERSION
, sslv3_client_method
, sslv3_server_method
},
736 { SSL3_VERSION
, NULL
, NULL
},
741 #if DTLS_MAX_VERSION != DTLS1_2_VERSION
742 # error Code needs update for DTLS_method() support beyond DTLS1_2_VERSION.
745 static const version_info dtls_version_table
[] = {
746 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_2
747 { DTLS1_2_VERSION
, dtlsv1_2_client_method
, dtlsv1_2_server_method
},
749 { DTLS1_2_VERSION
, NULL
, NULL
},
751 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1
752 { DTLS1_VERSION
, dtlsv1_client_method
, dtlsv1_server_method
},
754 { DTLS1_VERSION
, NULL
, NULL
},
760 * ssl_method_error - Check whether an SSL_METHOD is enabled.
762 * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method
763 * @method: the intended method.
765 * Returns 0 on success, or an SSL error reason on failure.
767 static int ssl_method_error(const SSL
*s
, const SSL_METHOD
*method
)
769 int version
= method
->version
;
771 if ((s
->min_proto_version
!= 0 &&
772 version_cmp(s
, version
, s
->min_proto_version
) < 0) ||
773 ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_VERSION
, 0, version
, NULL
) == 0)
774 return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW
;
776 if (s
->max_proto_version
!= 0 &&
777 version_cmp(s
, version
, s
->max_proto_version
) > 0)
778 return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_HIGH
;
780 if ((s
->options
& method
->mask
) != 0)
781 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL
;
782 if ((method
->flags
& SSL_METHOD_NO_SUITEB
) != 0 && tls1_suiteb(s
))
783 return SSL_R_AT_LEAST_TLS_1_2_NEEDED_IN_SUITEB_MODE
;
784 else if ((method
->flags
& SSL_METHOD_NO_FIPS
) != 0 && FIPS_mode())
785 return SSL_R_AT_LEAST_TLS_1_0_NEEDED_IN_FIPS_MODE
;
791 * ssl_version_supported - Check that the specified `version` is supported by
794 * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method
795 * @version: Protocol version to test against
797 * Returns 1 when supported, otherwise 0
799 int ssl_version_supported(const SSL
*s
, int version
)
801 const version_info
*vent
;
802 const version_info
*table
;
804 switch (s
->method
->version
) {
806 /* Version should match method version for non-ANY method */
807 return version_cmp(s
, version
, s
->version
) == 0;
808 case TLS_ANY_VERSION
:
809 table
= tls_version_table
;
811 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION
:
812 table
= dtls_version_table
;
817 vent
->version
!= 0 && version_cmp(s
, version
, vent
->version
) <= 0;
819 if (vent
->cmeth
!= NULL
&&
820 version_cmp(s
, version
, vent
->version
) == 0 &&
821 ssl_method_error(s
, vent
->cmeth()) == 0) {
829 * ssl_check_version_downgrade - In response to RFC7507 SCSV version
830 * fallback indication from a client check whether we're using the highest
831 * supported protocol version.
833 * @s server SSL handle.
835 * Returns 1 when using the highest enabled version, 0 otherwise.
837 int ssl_check_version_downgrade(SSL
*s
)
839 const version_info
*vent
;
840 const version_info
*table
;
843 * Check that the current protocol is the highest enabled version
844 * (according to s->ctx->method, as version negotiation may have changed
847 if (s
->version
== s
->ctx
->method
->version
)
851 * Apparently we're using a version-flexible SSL_METHOD (not at its
852 * highest protocol version).
854 if (s
->ctx
->method
->version
== TLS_method()->version
)
855 table
= tls_version_table
;
856 else if (s
->ctx
->method
->version
== DTLS_method()->version
)
857 table
= dtls_version_table
;
859 /* Unexpected state; fail closed. */
863 for (vent
= table
; vent
->version
!= 0; ++vent
) {
864 if (vent
->smeth
!= NULL
&&
865 ssl_method_error(s
, vent
->smeth()) == 0)
866 return s
->version
== vent
->version
;
872 * ssl_set_version_bound - set an upper or lower bound on the supported (D)TLS
873 * protocols, provided the initial (D)TLS method is version-flexible. This
874 * function sanity-checks the proposed value and makes sure the method is
875 * version-flexible, then sets the limit if all is well.
877 * @method_version: The version of the current SSL_METHOD.
878 * @version: the intended limit.
879 * @bound: pointer to limit to be updated.
881 * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure.
883 int ssl_set_version_bound(int method_version
, int version
, int *bound
)
891 * Restrict TLS methods to TLS protocol versions.
892 * Restrict DTLS methods to DTLS protocol versions.
893 * Note, DTLS version numbers are decreasing, use comparison macros.
895 * Note that for both lower-bounds we use explicit versions, not
896 * (D)TLS_MIN_VERSION. This is because we don't want to break user
897 * configurations. If the MIN (supported) version ever rises, the user's
898 * "floor" remains valid even if no longer available. We don't expect the
899 * MAX ceiling to ever get lower, so making that variable makes sense.
901 switch (method_version
) {
904 * XXX For fixed version methods, should we always fail and not set any
905 * bounds, always succeed and not set any bounds, or set the bounds and
906 * arrange to fail later if they are not met? At present fixed-version
907 * methods are not subject to controls that disable individual protocol
912 case TLS_ANY_VERSION
:
913 if (version
< SSL3_VERSION
|| version
> TLS_MAX_VERSION
)
917 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION
:
918 if (DTLS_VERSION_GT(version
, DTLS_MAX_VERSION
) ||
919 DTLS_VERSION_LT(version
, DTLS1_VERSION
))
929 * ssl_choose_server_version - Choose server (D)TLS version. Called when the
930 * client HELLO is received to select the final server protocol version and
931 * the version specific method.
933 * @s: server SSL handle.
935 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure.
937 int ssl_choose_server_version(SSL
*s
)
940 * With version-flexible methods we have an initial state with:
942 * s->method->version == (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION,
943 * s->version == (D)TLS_MAX_VERSION.
945 * So we detect version-flexible methods via the method version, not the
948 int server_version
= s
->method
->version
;
949 int client_version
= s
->client_version
;
950 const version_info
*vent
;
951 const version_info
*table
;
954 switch (server_version
) {
956 if (version_cmp(s
, client_version
, s
->version
) < 0)
957 return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION
;
959 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
960 * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
961 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
962 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
963 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
966 case TLS_ANY_VERSION
:
967 table
= tls_version_table
;
969 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION
:
970 table
= dtls_version_table
;
974 for (vent
= table
; vent
->version
!= 0; ++vent
) {
975 const SSL_METHOD
*method
;
977 if (vent
->smeth
== NULL
||
978 version_cmp(s
, client_version
, vent
->version
) < 0)
980 method
= vent
->smeth();
981 if (ssl_method_error(s
, method
) == 0) {
982 s
->version
= vent
->version
;
988 return disabled
? SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL
: SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW
;
992 * ssl_choose_client_version - Choose client (D)TLS version. Called when the
993 * server HELLO is received to select the final client protocol version and
994 * the version specific method.
996 * @s: client SSL handle.
997 * @version: The proposed version from the server's HELLO.
999 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure.
1001 int ssl_choose_client_version(SSL
*s
, int version
)
1003 const version_info
*vent
;
1004 const version_info
*table
;
1006 switch (s
->method
->version
) {
1008 if (version
!= s
->version
)
1009 return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION
;
1011 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
1012 * (and never did) check min/max, FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
1013 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
1014 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
1015 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
1018 case TLS_ANY_VERSION
:
1019 table
= tls_version_table
;
1021 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION
:
1022 table
= dtls_version_table
;
1026 for (vent
= table
; vent
->version
!= 0; ++vent
) {
1027 const SSL_METHOD
*method
;
1030 if (version
!= vent
->version
)
1032 if (vent
->cmeth
== NULL
)
1034 method
= vent
->cmeth();
1035 err
= ssl_method_error(s
, method
);
1039 s
->version
= version
;
1043 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL
;
1047 * ssl_get_client_min_max_version - get minimum and maximum client version
1048 * @s: The SSL connection
1049 * @min_version: The minimum supported version
1050 * @max_version: The maximum supported version
1052 * Work out what version we should be using for the initial ClientHello if the
1053 * version is initially (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION. We apply any explicit SSL_OP_NO_xxx
1054 * options, the MinProtocol and MaxProtocol configuration commands, any Suite B
1055 * or FIPS_mode() constraints and any floor imposed by the security level here,
1056 * so we don't advertise the wrong protocol version to only reject the outcome later.
1058 * Computing the right floor matters. If, e.g., TLS 1.0 and 1.2 are enabled,
1059 * TLS 1.1 is disabled, but the security level, Suite-B and/or MinProtocol
1060 * only allow TLS 1.2, we want to advertise TLS1.2, *not* TLS1.
1062 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. On failure
1063 * min_version and max_version will also be set to 0.
1065 int ssl_get_client_min_max_version(const SSL
*s
, int *min_version
, int *max_version
)
1069 const SSL_METHOD
*single
= NULL
;
1070 const SSL_METHOD
*method
;
1071 const version_info
*table
;
1072 const version_info
*vent
;
1074 switch (s
->method
->version
) {
1077 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
1078 * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
1079 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
1080 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
1081 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
1083 *min_version
= *max_version
= s
->version
;
1085 case TLS_ANY_VERSION
:
1086 table
= tls_version_table
;
1088 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION
:
1089 table
= dtls_version_table
;
1094 * SSL_OP_NO_X disables all protocols above X *if* there are some protocols
1095 * below X enabled. This is required in order to maintain the "version
1096 * capability" vector contiguous. Any versions with a NULL client method
1097 * (protocol version client is disabled at compile-time) is also a "hole".
1099 * Our initial state is hole == 1, version == 0. That is, versions above
1100 * the first version in the method table are disabled (a "hole" above
1101 * the valid protocol entries) and we don't have a selected version yet.
1103 * Whenever "hole == 1", and we hit an enabled method, its version becomes
1104 * the selected version, and the method becomes a candidate "single"
1105 * method. We're no longer in a hole, so "hole" becomes 0.
1107 * If "hole == 0" and we hit an enabled method, then "single" is cleared,
1108 * as we support a contiguous range of at least two methods. If we hit
1109 * a disabled method, then hole becomes true again, but nothing else
1110 * changes yet, because all the remaining methods may be disabled too.
1111 * If we again hit an enabled method after the new hole, it becomes
1112 * selected, as we start from scratch.
1114 *min_version
= version
= 0;
1116 for (vent
= table
; vent
->version
!= 0; ++vent
) {
1118 * A table entry with a NULL client method is still a hole in the
1119 * "version capability" vector.
1121 if (vent
->cmeth
== NULL
) {
1125 method
= vent
->cmeth();
1126 if (ssl_method_error(s
, method
) != 0) {
1130 *min_version
= method
->version
;
1132 version
= (single
= method
)->version
;
1133 *min_version
= version
;
1138 *max_version
= version
;
1140 /* Fail if everything is disabled */
1142 return SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE
;
1148 * ssl_set_client_hello_version - Work out what version we should be using for
1149 * the initial ClientHello.
1151 * @s: client SSL handle.
1153 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure.
1155 int ssl_set_client_hello_version(SSL
*s
)
1157 int ver_min
, ver_max
, ret
;
1159 ret
= ssl_get_client_min_max_version(s
, &ver_min
, &ver_max
);
1164 s
->client_version
= s
->version
= ver_max
;