2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10 /* ====================================================================
11 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
12 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by
13 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project.
19 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
20 #include "statem_locl.h"
21 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
22 #include <openssl/objects.h>
23 #include <openssl/evp.h>
24 #include <openssl/x509.h>
27 * send s->init_buf in records of type 'type' (SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or
28 * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
30 int ssl3_do_write(SSL
*s
, int type
)
35 ret
= ssl3_write_bytes(s
, type
, &s
->init_buf
->data
[s
->init_off
],
36 s
->init_num
, &written
);
39 if (type
== SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
)
41 * should not be done for 'Hello Request's, but in that case we'll
42 * ignore the result anyway
44 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s
,
45 (unsigned char *)&s
->init_buf
->data
[s
->init_off
],
49 if (written
== s
->init_num
) {
51 s
->msg_callback(1, s
->version
, type
, s
->init_buf
->data
,
52 (size_t)(s
->init_off
+ s
->init_num
), s
,
56 s
->init_off
+= written
;
57 s
->init_num
-= written
;
61 int tls_close_construct_packet(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, int htype
)
65 if ((htype
!= SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
&& !WPACKET_close(pkt
))
66 || !WPACKET_get_length(pkt
, &msglen
)
69 s
->init_num
= (int)msglen
;
75 int tls_construct_finished(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
82 sender
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->server_finished_label
;
83 slen
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->server_finished_label_len
;
85 sender
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->client_finished_label
;
86 slen
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->client_finished_label_len
;
89 finish_md_len
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->final_finish_mac(s
,
91 s
->s3
->tmp
.finish_md
);
92 if (finish_md_len
== 0) {
93 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
97 s
->s3
->tmp
.finish_md_len
= finish_md_len
;
99 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt
, s
->s3
->tmp
.finish_md
, finish_md_len
)) {
100 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
105 * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks
108 OPENSSL_assert(finish_md_len
<= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
);
109 memcpy(s
->s3
->previous_client_finished
, s
->s3
->tmp
.finish_md
,
111 s
->s3
->previous_client_finished_len
= finish_md_len
;
113 OPENSSL_assert(finish_md_len
<= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
);
114 memcpy(s
->s3
->previous_server_finished
, s
->s3
->tmp
.finish_md
,
116 s
->s3
->previous_server_finished_len
= finish_md_len
;
121 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
125 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
127 * ssl3_take_mac calculates the Finished MAC for the handshakes messages seen
130 static void ssl3_take_mac(SSL
*s
)
135 * If no new cipher setup return immediately: other functions will set
136 * the appropriate error.
138 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
== NULL
)
141 sender
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->server_finished_label
;
142 slen
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->server_finished_label_len
;
144 sender
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->client_finished_label
;
145 slen
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->client_finished_label_len
;
148 s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_finish_md_len
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->final_finish_mac(s
,
151 s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_finish_md
);
156 * Comparison function used in a call to qsort (see tls_collect_extensions()
158 * The two arguments |p1| and |p2| are expected to be pointers to RAW_EXTENSIONs
161 * 1 if the type for p1 is greater than p2
162 * 0 if the type for p1 and p2 are the same
163 * -1 if the type for p1 is less than p2
165 static int compare_extensions(const void *p1
, const void *p2
)
167 const RAW_EXTENSION
*e1
= (const RAW_EXTENSION
*)p1
;
168 const RAW_EXTENSION
*e2
= (const RAW_EXTENSION
*)p2
;
170 if (e1
->type
< e2
->type
)
172 else if (e1
->type
> e2
->type
)
179 * Gather a list of all the extensions. We don't actually process the content
180 * of the extensions yet, except to check their types.
182 * Per http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.1.4, there may not be
183 * more than one extension of the same type in a ClientHello or ServerHello.
184 * This function returns 1 if all extensions are unique and we have parsed their
185 * types, and 0 if the extensions contain duplicates, could not be successfully
186 * parsed, or an internal error occurred.
189 * TODO(TLS1.3): Refactor ServerHello extension parsing to use this and then
190 * remove tls1_check_duplicate_extensions()
192 int tls_collect_extensions(PACKET
*packet
, RAW_EXTENSION
**res
,
193 size_t *numfound
, int *ad
)
195 PACKET extensions
= *packet
;
196 size_t num_extensions
= 0, i
= 0;
197 RAW_EXTENSION
*raw_extensions
= NULL
;
199 /* First pass: count the extensions. */
200 while (PACKET_remaining(&extensions
) > 0) {
204 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions
, &type
) ||
205 !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions
, &extension
)) {
206 *ad
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
212 if (num_extensions
> 0) {
213 raw_extensions
= OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*raw_extensions
)
215 if (raw_extensions
== NULL
) {
216 *ad
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
217 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_COLLECT_EXTENSIONS
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
221 /* Second pass: collect the extensions. */
222 for (i
= 0; i
< num_extensions
; i
++) {
223 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(packet
, &raw_extensions
[i
].type
) ||
224 !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(packet
,
225 &raw_extensions
[i
].data
)) {
226 /* This should not happen. */
227 *ad
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
228 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_COLLECT_EXTENSIONS
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
233 if (PACKET_remaining(packet
) != 0) {
234 *ad
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
235 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_COLLECT_EXTENSIONS
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
238 /* Sort the extensions and make sure there are no duplicates. */
239 qsort(raw_extensions
, num_extensions
, sizeof(*raw_extensions
),
241 for (i
= 1; i
< num_extensions
; i
++) {
242 if (raw_extensions
[i
- 1].type
== raw_extensions
[i
].type
) {
243 *ad
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
249 *res
= raw_extensions
;
250 *numfound
= num_extensions
;
254 OPENSSL_free(raw_extensions
);
260 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_change_cipher_spec(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
265 remain
= PACKET_remaining(pkt
);
267 * 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, which should already have
268 * been consumed by ssl_get_message() so there should be no bytes left,
269 * unless we're using DTLS1_BAD_VER, which has an extra 2 bytes
271 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
272 if ((s
->version
== DTLS1_BAD_VER
273 && remain
!= DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH
+ 1)
274 || (s
->version
!= DTLS1_BAD_VER
275 && remain
!= DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH
- 1)) {
276 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
277 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
,
278 SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
);
283 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
284 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
,
285 SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
);
290 /* Check we have a cipher to change to */
291 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
== NULL
) {
292 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
293 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY
);
297 s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
= 1;
298 if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s
)) {
299 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
300 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
304 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
305 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s
, SSL3_CC_READ
);
307 if (s
->version
== DTLS1_BAD_VER
)
308 s
->d1
->handshake_read_seq
++;
310 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
312 * Remember that a CCS has been received, so that an old key of
313 * SCTP-Auth can be deleted when a CCS is sent. Will be ignored if no
316 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_AUTH_CCS_RCVD
, 1, NULL
);
320 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
322 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
323 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
324 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
327 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_finished(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
329 int al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
332 /* If this occurs, we have missed a message */
333 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && !s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
) {
334 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
335 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED
, SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS
);
338 s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
= 0;
340 md_len
= s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_finish_md_len
;
342 if (md_len
!= PACKET_remaining(pkt
)) {
343 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
344 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED
, SSL_R_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH
);
348 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(PACKET_data(pkt
), s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_finish_md
,
350 al
= SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
351 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED
, SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED
);
356 * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks
359 OPENSSL_assert(md_len
<= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
);
360 memcpy(s
->s3
->previous_client_finished
, s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_finish_md
,
362 s
->s3
->previous_client_finished_len
= md_len
;
364 OPENSSL_assert(md_len
<= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
);
365 memcpy(s
->s3
->previous_server_finished
, s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_finish_md
,
367 s
->s3
->previous_server_finished_len
= md_len
;
371 * In TLS1.3 we also have to change cipher state and do any final processing
372 * of the initial server flight (if we are a client)
374 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
376 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
377 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ
)) {
378 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED
, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER
);
382 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
383 s
->session
->master_key
, s
->handshake_secret
, 0,
384 &s
->session
->master_key_length
)) {
385 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED
, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER
);
388 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
389 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ
)) {
390 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED
, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER
);
393 if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s
, &al
))
398 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
400 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
401 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
402 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
405 int tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
407 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, SSL3_MT_CCS
)) {
408 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
409 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
416 unsigned long ssl3_output_cert_chain(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, CERT_PKEY
*cpk
)
418 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u24(pkt
)
419 || !ssl_add_cert_chain(s
, pkt
, cpk
)
420 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
421 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
427 WORK_STATE
tls_finish_handshake(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
429 void (*cb
) (const SSL
*ssl
, int type
, int val
) = NULL
;
431 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
432 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s
))) {
434 ret
= dtls_wait_for_dry(s
);
435 if (ret
!= WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
)
440 /* clean a few things up */
441 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s
);
443 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
445 * We don't do this in DTLS because we may still need the init_buf
446 * in case there are any unexpected retransmits
448 BUF_MEM_free(s
->init_buf
);
452 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s
);
456 if (!s
->server
|| s
->renegotiate
== 2) {
457 /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
462 ssl_update_cache(s
, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER
);
464 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_accept_good
++;
465 s
->handshake_func
= ossl_statem_accept
;
467 ssl_update_cache(s
, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT
);
469 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_hit
++;
471 s
->handshake_func
= ossl_statem_connect
;
472 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_connect_good
++;
475 if (s
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
476 cb
= s
->info_callback
;
477 else if (s
->ctx
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
478 cb
= s
->ctx
->info_callback
;
481 cb(s
, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE
, 1);
483 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
484 /* done with handshaking */
485 s
->d1
->handshake_read_seq
= 0;
486 s
->d1
->handshake_write_seq
= 0;
487 s
->d1
->next_handshake_write_seq
= 0;
488 dtls1_clear_received_buffer(s
);
492 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP
;
495 int tls_get_message_header(SSL
*s
, int *mt
)
497 /* s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */
498 int skip_message
, i
, recvd_type
, al
;
502 p
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
505 while (s
->init_num
< SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
) {
506 i
= s
->method
->ssl_read_bytes(s
, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
, &recvd_type
,
508 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
- s
->init_num
,
511 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
514 if (recvd_type
== SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
516 * A ChangeCipherSpec must be a single byte and may not occur
517 * in the middle of a handshake message.
519 if (s
->init_num
!= 0 || readbytes
!= 1 || p
[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS
) {
520 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
521 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER
,
522 SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
);
525 s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
= *mt
= SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
;
526 s
->init_num
= readbytes
- 1;
527 s
->init_msg
= s
->init_buf
->data
;
528 s
->s3
->tmp
.message_size
= readbytes
;
530 } else if (recvd_type
!= SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
) {
531 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
532 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER
, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY
);
535 s
->init_num
+= readbytes
;
540 if (p
[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST
)
542 * The server may always send 'Hello Request' messages --
543 * we are doing a handshake anyway now, so ignore them if
544 * their format is correct. Does not count for 'Finished'
547 if (p
[1] == 0 && p
[2] == 0 && p
[3] == 0) {
552 s
->msg_callback(0, s
->version
, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
,
553 p
, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
, s
,
554 s
->msg_callback_arg
);
556 } while (skip_message
);
557 /* s->init_num == SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */
560 s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
= *(p
++);
562 if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s
->rlayer
)) {
564 * Only happens with SSLv3+ in an SSLv2 backward compatible
567 * Total message size is the remaining record bytes to read
568 * plus the SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH bytes that we already read
570 l
= RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec_length(&s
->rlayer
)
571 + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
;
572 s
->s3
->tmp
.message_size
= l
;
574 s
->init_msg
= s
->init_buf
->data
;
575 s
->init_num
= SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
;
578 /* BUF_MEM_grow takes an 'int' parameter */
579 if (l
> (INT_MAX
- SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
)) {
580 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
581 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER
, SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE
);
584 s
->s3
->tmp
.message_size
= l
;
586 s
->init_msg
= s
->init_buf
->data
+ SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
;
592 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
596 int tls_get_message_body(SSL
*s
, size_t *len
)
602 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
603 /* We've already read everything in */
604 *len
= (unsigned long)s
->init_num
;
609 n
= s
->s3
->tmp
.message_size
- s
->init_num
;
611 i
= s
->method
->ssl_read_bytes(s
, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
, NULL
,
612 &p
[s
->init_num
], n
, 0, &readbytes
);
614 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
618 s
->init_num
+= readbytes
;
622 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
624 * If receiving Finished, record MAC of prior handshake messages for
625 * Finished verification.
627 if (*s
->init_buf
->data
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
)
631 /* Feed this message into MAC computation. */
632 if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s
->rlayer
)) {
633 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s
, (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
,
635 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_BODY
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
636 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
641 s
->msg_callback(0, SSL2_VERSION
, 0, s
->init_buf
->data
,
642 (size_t)s
->init_num
, s
, s
->msg_callback_arg
);
644 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s
, (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
,
645 s
->init_num
+ SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
)) {
646 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_BODY
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
647 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
652 s
->msg_callback(0, s
->version
, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
, s
->init_buf
->data
,
653 (size_t)s
->init_num
+ SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
, s
,
654 s
->msg_callback_arg
);
661 int ssl_cert_type(const X509
*x
, const EVP_PKEY
*pk
)
663 if (pk
== NULL
&& (pk
= X509_get0_pubkey(x
)) == NULL
)
666 switch (EVP_PKEY_id(pk
)) {
670 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
;
672 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
;
673 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
677 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
678 case NID_id_GostR3410_2001
:
679 return SSL_PKEY_GOST01
;
680 case NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
:
681 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
;
682 case NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
:
683 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
;
688 int ssl_verify_alarm_type(long type
)
693 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT
:
694 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL
:
695 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER
:
696 al
= SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA
;
698 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CERT_SIGNATURE
:
699 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CRL_SIGNATURE
:
700 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY
:
701 case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD
:
702 case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD
:
703 case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD
:
704 case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD
:
705 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID
:
706 case X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID
:
707 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED
:
708 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED
:
709 case X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH
:
710 case X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH
:
711 case X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH
:
712 case X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH
:
713 case X509_V_ERR_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL
:
714 case X509_V_ERR_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL
:
715 case X509_V_ERR_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK
:
716 al
= SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
;
718 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE
:
719 case X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE
:
720 al
= SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
722 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED
:
723 case X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED
:
724 al
= SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED
;
726 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED
:
727 al
= SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED
;
729 case X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED
:
730 case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM
:
731 case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL
:
732 case X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP
:
733 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
735 case X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT
:
736 case X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN
:
737 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY
:
738 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE
:
739 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG
:
740 case X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED
:
741 case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA
:
742 al
= SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA
;
744 case X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION
:
745 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
747 case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE
:
748 al
= SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE
;
751 al
= SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN
;
757 int ssl_allow_compression(SSL
*s
)
759 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION
)
761 return ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_COMPRESSION
, 0, 0, NULL
);
764 static int version_cmp(const SSL
*s
, int a
, int b
)
766 int dtls
= SSL_IS_DTLS(s
);
771 return a
< b
? -1 : 1;
772 return DTLS_VERSION_LT(a
, b
) ? -1 : 1;
777 const SSL_METHOD
*(*cmeth
) (void);
778 const SSL_METHOD
*(*smeth
) (void);
781 #if TLS_MAX_VERSION != TLS1_3_VERSION
782 # error Code needs update for TLS_method() support beyond TLS1_3_VERSION.
785 static const version_info tls_version_table
[] = {
786 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
787 {TLS1_3_VERSION
, tlsv1_3_client_method
, tlsv1_3_server_method
},
789 {TLS1_3_VERSION
, NULL
, NULL
},
791 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2
792 {TLS1_2_VERSION
, tlsv1_2_client_method
, tlsv1_2_server_method
},
794 {TLS1_2_VERSION
, NULL
, NULL
},
796 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_1
797 {TLS1_1_VERSION
, tlsv1_1_client_method
, tlsv1_1_server_method
},
799 {TLS1_1_VERSION
, NULL
, NULL
},
801 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1
802 {TLS1_VERSION
, tlsv1_client_method
, tlsv1_server_method
},
804 {TLS1_VERSION
, NULL
, NULL
},
806 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
807 {SSL3_VERSION
, sslv3_client_method
, sslv3_server_method
},
809 {SSL3_VERSION
, NULL
, NULL
},
814 #if DTLS_MAX_VERSION != DTLS1_2_VERSION
815 # error Code needs update for DTLS_method() support beyond DTLS1_2_VERSION.
818 static const version_info dtls_version_table
[] = {
819 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_2
820 {DTLS1_2_VERSION
, dtlsv1_2_client_method
, dtlsv1_2_server_method
},
822 {DTLS1_2_VERSION
, NULL
, NULL
},
824 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1
825 {DTLS1_VERSION
, dtlsv1_client_method
, dtlsv1_server_method
},
826 {DTLS1_BAD_VER
, dtls_bad_ver_client_method
, NULL
},
828 {DTLS1_VERSION
, NULL
, NULL
},
829 {DTLS1_BAD_VER
, NULL
, NULL
},
835 * ssl_method_error - Check whether an SSL_METHOD is enabled.
837 * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method
838 * @method: the intended method.
840 * Returns 0 on success, or an SSL error reason on failure.
842 static int ssl_method_error(const SSL
*s
, const SSL_METHOD
*method
)
844 int version
= method
->version
;
846 if ((s
->min_proto_version
!= 0 &&
847 version_cmp(s
, version
, s
->min_proto_version
) < 0) ||
848 ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_VERSION
, 0, version
, NULL
) == 0)
849 return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW
;
851 if (s
->max_proto_version
!= 0 &&
852 version_cmp(s
, version
, s
->max_proto_version
) > 0)
853 return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_HIGH
;
855 if ((s
->options
& method
->mask
) != 0)
856 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL
;
857 if ((method
->flags
& SSL_METHOD_NO_SUITEB
) != 0 && tls1_suiteb(s
))
858 return SSL_R_AT_LEAST_TLS_1_2_NEEDED_IN_SUITEB_MODE
;
859 else if ((method
->flags
& SSL_METHOD_NO_FIPS
) != 0 && FIPS_mode())
860 return SSL_R_AT_LEAST_TLS_1_0_NEEDED_IN_FIPS_MODE
;
866 * ssl_version_supported - Check that the specified `version` is supported by
869 * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method
870 * @version: Protocol version to test against
872 * Returns 1 when supported, otherwise 0
874 int ssl_version_supported(const SSL
*s
, int version
)
876 const version_info
*vent
;
877 const version_info
*table
;
879 switch (s
->method
->version
) {
881 /* Version should match method version for non-ANY method */
882 return version_cmp(s
, version
, s
->version
) == 0;
883 case TLS_ANY_VERSION
:
884 table
= tls_version_table
;
886 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION
:
887 table
= dtls_version_table
;
892 vent
->version
!= 0 && version_cmp(s
, version
, vent
->version
) <= 0;
894 if (vent
->cmeth
!= NULL
&&
895 version_cmp(s
, version
, vent
->version
) == 0 &&
896 ssl_method_error(s
, vent
->cmeth()) == 0) {
904 * ssl_check_version_downgrade - In response to RFC7507 SCSV version
905 * fallback indication from a client check whether we're using the highest
906 * supported protocol version.
908 * @s server SSL handle.
910 * Returns 1 when using the highest enabled version, 0 otherwise.
912 int ssl_check_version_downgrade(SSL
*s
)
914 const version_info
*vent
;
915 const version_info
*table
;
918 * Check that the current protocol is the highest enabled version
919 * (according to s->ctx->method, as version negotiation may have changed
922 if (s
->version
== s
->ctx
->method
->version
)
926 * Apparently we're using a version-flexible SSL_METHOD (not at its
927 * highest protocol version).
929 if (s
->ctx
->method
->version
== TLS_method()->version
)
930 table
= tls_version_table
;
931 else if (s
->ctx
->method
->version
== DTLS_method()->version
)
932 table
= dtls_version_table
;
934 /* Unexpected state; fail closed. */
938 for (vent
= table
; vent
->version
!= 0; ++vent
) {
939 if (vent
->smeth
!= NULL
&& ssl_method_error(s
, vent
->smeth()) == 0)
940 return s
->version
== vent
->version
;
946 * ssl_set_version_bound - set an upper or lower bound on the supported (D)TLS
947 * protocols, provided the initial (D)TLS method is version-flexible. This
948 * function sanity-checks the proposed value and makes sure the method is
949 * version-flexible, then sets the limit if all is well.
951 * @method_version: The version of the current SSL_METHOD.
952 * @version: the intended limit.
953 * @bound: pointer to limit to be updated.
955 * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure.
957 int ssl_set_version_bound(int method_version
, int version
, int *bound
)
965 * Restrict TLS methods to TLS protocol versions.
966 * Restrict DTLS methods to DTLS protocol versions.
967 * Note, DTLS version numbers are decreasing, use comparison macros.
969 * Note that for both lower-bounds we use explicit versions, not
970 * (D)TLS_MIN_VERSION. This is because we don't want to break user
971 * configurations. If the MIN (supported) version ever rises, the user's
972 * "floor" remains valid even if no longer available. We don't expect the
973 * MAX ceiling to ever get lower, so making that variable makes sense.
975 switch (method_version
) {
978 * XXX For fixed version methods, should we always fail and not set any
979 * bounds, always succeed and not set any bounds, or set the bounds and
980 * arrange to fail later if they are not met? At present fixed-version
981 * methods are not subject to controls that disable individual protocol
986 case TLS_ANY_VERSION
:
987 if (version
< SSL3_VERSION
|| version
> TLS_MAX_VERSION
)
991 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION
:
992 if (DTLS_VERSION_GT(version
, DTLS_MAX_VERSION
) ||
993 DTLS_VERSION_LT(version
, DTLS1_BAD_VER
))
1003 * ssl_choose_server_version - Choose server (D)TLS version. Called when the
1004 * client HELLO is received to select the final server protocol version and
1005 * the version specific method.
1007 * @s: server SSL handle.
1009 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure.
1011 int ssl_choose_server_version(SSL
*s
, CLIENTHELLO_MSG
*hello
)
1014 * With version-flexible methods we have an initial state with:
1016 * s->method->version == (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION,
1017 * s->version == (D)TLS_MAX_VERSION.
1019 * So we detect version-flexible methods via the method version, not the
1022 int server_version
= s
->method
->version
;
1023 int client_version
= hello
->legacy_version
;
1024 const version_info
*vent
;
1025 const version_info
*table
;
1027 RAW_EXTENSION
*suppversions
;
1029 s
->client_version
= client_version
;
1031 switch (server_version
) {
1034 * TODO(TLS1.3): This check will fail if someone attempts to do
1035 * renegotiation in TLS1.3 at the moment. We need to ensure we disable
1036 * renegotiation for TLS1.3
1038 if (version_cmp(s
, client_version
, s
->version
) < 0)
1039 return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION
;
1041 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
1042 * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
1043 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
1044 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
1045 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
1048 case TLS_ANY_VERSION
:
1049 table
= tls_version_table
;
1051 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION
:
1052 table
= dtls_version_table
;
1056 suppversions
= tls_get_extension_by_type(hello
->pre_proc_exts
,
1057 hello
->num_extensions
,
1058 TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_versions
);
1060 if (suppversions
!= NULL
&& !SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1061 unsigned int candidate_vers
= 0;
1062 unsigned int best_vers
= 0;
1063 const SSL_METHOD
*best_method
= NULL
;
1064 PACKET versionslist
;
1066 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&suppversions
->data
, &versionslist
)) {
1067 /* Trailing or invalid data? */
1068 return SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
;
1071 while (PACKET_get_net_2(&versionslist
, &candidate_vers
)) {
1072 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove this before release */
1073 if (candidate_vers
== TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT
)
1074 candidate_vers
= TLS1_3_VERSION
;
1076 * TODO(TLS1.3): There is some discussion on the TLS list about
1077 * wheter to ignore versions <TLS1.2 in supported_versions. At the
1078 * moment we honour them if present. To be reviewed later
1080 if (version_cmp(s
, candidate_vers
, best_vers
) <= 0)
1083 vent
->version
!= 0 && vent
->version
!= (int)candidate_vers
;
1086 if (vent
->version
!= 0 && vent
->smeth
!= NULL
) {
1087 const SSL_METHOD
*method
;
1089 method
= vent
->smeth();
1090 if (ssl_method_error(s
, method
) == 0) {
1091 best_vers
= candidate_vers
;
1092 best_method
= method
;
1096 if (PACKET_remaining(&versionslist
) != 0) {
1097 /* Trailing data? */
1098 return SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
;
1101 if (best_vers
> 0) {
1102 s
->version
= best_vers
;
1103 s
->method
= best_method
;
1106 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL
;
1110 * If the supported versions extension isn't present, then the highest
1111 * version we can negotiate is TLSv1.2
1113 if (version_cmp(s
, client_version
, TLS1_3_VERSION
) >= 0)
1114 client_version
= TLS1_2_VERSION
;
1117 * No supported versions extension, so we just use the version supplied in
1120 for (vent
= table
; vent
->version
!= 0; ++vent
) {
1121 const SSL_METHOD
*method
;
1123 if (vent
->smeth
== NULL
||
1124 version_cmp(s
, client_version
, vent
->version
) < 0)
1126 method
= vent
->smeth();
1127 if (ssl_method_error(s
, method
) == 0) {
1128 s
->version
= vent
->version
;
1134 return disabled
? SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL
: SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW
;
1138 * ssl_choose_client_version - Choose client (D)TLS version. Called when the
1139 * server HELLO is received to select the final client protocol version and
1140 * the version specific method.
1142 * @s: client SSL handle.
1143 * @version: The proposed version from the server's HELLO.
1145 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure.
1147 int ssl_choose_client_version(SSL
*s
, int version
)
1149 const version_info
*vent
;
1150 const version_info
*table
;
1152 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove this before release */
1153 if (version
== TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT
)
1154 version
= TLS1_3_VERSION
;
1156 switch (s
->method
->version
) {
1158 if (version
!= s
->version
)
1159 return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION
;
1161 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
1162 * (and never did) check min/max, FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
1163 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
1164 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
1165 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
1168 case TLS_ANY_VERSION
:
1169 table
= tls_version_table
;
1171 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION
:
1172 table
= dtls_version_table
;
1176 for (vent
= table
; vent
->version
!= 0; ++vent
) {
1177 const SSL_METHOD
*method
;
1180 if (version
!= vent
->version
)
1182 if (vent
->cmeth
== NULL
)
1184 method
= vent
->cmeth();
1185 err
= ssl_method_error(s
, method
);
1189 s
->version
= version
;
1193 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL
;
1197 * ssl_get_client_min_max_version - get minimum and maximum client version
1198 * @s: The SSL connection
1199 * @min_version: The minimum supported version
1200 * @max_version: The maximum supported version
1202 * Work out what version we should be using for the initial ClientHello if the
1203 * version is initially (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION. We apply any explicit SSL_OP_NO_xxx
1204 * options, the MinProtocol and MaxProtocol configuration commands, any Suite B
1205 * or FIPS_mode() constraints and any floor imposed by the security level here,
1206 * so we don't advertise the wrong protocol version to only reject the outcome later.
1208 * Computing the right floor matters. If, e.g., TLS 1.0 and 1.2 are enabled,
1209 * TLS 1.1 is disabled, but the security level, Suite-B and/or MinProtocol
1210 * only allow TLS 1.2, we want to advertise TLS1.2, *not* TLS1.
1212 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. On failure
1213 * min_version and max_version will also be set to 0.
1215 int ssl_get_client_min_max_version(const SSL
*s
, int *min_version
,
1220 const SSL_METHOD
*single
= NULL
;
1221 const SSL_METHOD
*method
;
1222 const version_info
*table
;
1223 const version_info
*vent
;
1225 switch (s
->method
->version
) {
1228 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
1229 * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
1230 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
1231 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
1232 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
1234 *min_version
= *max_version
= s
->version
;
1236 case TLS_ANY_VERSION
:
1237 table
= tls_version_table
;
1239 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION
:
1240 table
= dtls_version_table
;
1245 * SSL_OP_NO_X disables all protocols above X *if* there are some protocols
1246 * below X enabled. This is required in order to maintain the "version
1247 * capability" vector contiguous. Any versions with a NULL client method
1248 * (protocol version client is disabled at compile-time) is also a "hole".
1250 * Our initial state is hole == 1, version == 0. That is, versions above
1251 * the first version in the method table are disabled (a "hole" above
1252 * the valid protocol entries) and we don't have a selected version yet.
1254 * Whenever "hole == 1", and we hit an enabled method, its version becomes
1255 * the selected version, and the method becomes a candidate "single"
1256 * method. We're no longer in a hole, so "hole" becomes 0.
1258 * If "hole == 0" and we hit an enabled method, then "single" is cleared,
1259 * as we support a contiguous range of at least two methods. If we hit
1260 * a disabled method, then hole becomes true again, but nothing else
1261 * changes yet, because all the remaining methods may be disabled too.
1262 * If we again hit an enabled method after the new hole, it becomes
1263 * selected, as we start from scratch.
1265 *min_version
= version
= 0;
1267 for (vent
= table
; vent
->version
!= 0; ++vent
) {
1269 * A table entry with a NULL client method is still a hole in the
1270 * "version capability" vector.
1272 if (vent
->cmeth
== NULL
) {
1276 method
= vent
->cmeth();
1277 if (ssl_method_error(s
, method
) != 0) {
1281 *min_version
= method
->version
;
1283 version
= (single
= method
)->version
;
1284 *min_version
= version
;
1289 *max_version
= version
;
1291 /* Fail if everything is disabled */
1293 return SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE
;
1299 * ssl_set_client_hello_version - Work out what version we should be using for
1300 * the initial ClientHello.legacy_version field.
1302 * @s: client SSL handle.
1304 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure.
1306 int ssl_set_client_hello_version(SSL
*s
)
1308 int ver_min
, ver_max
, ret
;
1310 ret
= ssl_get_client_min_max_version(s
, &ver_min
, &ver_max
);
1315 s
->version
= ver_max
;
1317 /* TLS1.3 always uses TLS1.2 in the legacy_version field */
1318 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && ver_max
> TLS1_2_VERSION
)
1319 ver_max
= TLS1_2_VERSION
;
1321 s
->client_version
= ver_max
;