2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10 /* ====================================================================
11 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
12 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by
13 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project.
19 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
20 #include "statem_locl.h"
21 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
22 #include <openssl/objects.h>
23 #include <openssl/evp.h>
24 #include <openssl/x509.h>
27 * send s->init_buf in records of type 'type' (SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or
28 * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
30 int ssl3_do_write(SSL
*s
, int type
)
34 ret
= ssl3_write_bytes(s
, type
, &s
->init_buf
->data
[s
->init_off
],
38 if (type
== SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
)
40 * should not be done for 'Hello Request's, but in that case we'll
41 * ignore the result anyway
43 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s
,
44 (unsigned char *)&s
->init_buf
->data
[s
->init_off
],
48 if (ret
== s
->init_num
) {
50 s
->msg_callback(1, s
->version
, type
, s
->init_buf
->data
,
51 (size_t)(s
->init_off
+ s
->init_num
), s
,
60 int tls_close_construct_packet(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, int htype
)
64 if ((htype
!= SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
&& !WPACKET_close(pkt
))
65 || !WPACKET_get_length(pkt
, &msglen
)
68 s
->init_num
= (int)msglen
;
74 int tls_construct_finished(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
81 sender
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->server_finished_label
;
82 slen
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->server_finished_label_len
;
84 sender
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->client_finished_label
;
85 slen
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->client_finished_label_len
;
88 i
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->final_finish_mac(s
,
90 s
->s3
->tmp
.finish_md
);
92 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
96 s
->s3
->tmp
.finish_md_len
= i
;
98 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt
, s
->s3
->tmp
.finish_md
, i
)) {
99 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
104 * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks
107 OPENSSL_assert(i
<= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
);
108 memcpy(s
->s3
->previous_client_finished
, s
->s3
->tmp
.finish_md
, i
);
109 s
->s3
->previous_client_finished_len
= i
;
111 OPENSSL_assert(i
<= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
);
112 memcpy(s
->s3
->previous_server_finished
, s
->s3
->tmp
.finish_md
, i
);
113 s
->s3
->previous_server_finished_len
= i
;
118 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
122 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
124 * ssl3_take_mac calculates the Finished MAC for the handshakes messages seen
127 static void ssl3_take_mac(SSL
*s
)
132 * If no new cipher setup return immediately: other functions will set
133 * the appropriate error.
135 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
== NULL
)
138 sender
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->server_finished_label
;
139 slen
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->server_finished_label_len
;
141 sender
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->client_finished_label
;
142 slen
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->client_finished_label_len
;
145 s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_finish_md_len
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->final_finish_mac(s
,
148 s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_finish_md
);
152 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_change_cipher_spec(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
157 remain
= PACKET_remaining(pkt
);
159 * 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, which should already have
160 * been consumed by ssl_get_message() so there should be no bytes left,
161 * unless we're using DTLS1_BAD_VER, which has an extra 2 bytes
163 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
164 if ((s
->version
== DTLS1_BAD_VER
165 && remain
!= DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH
+ 1)
166 || (s
->version
!= DTLS1_BAD_VER
167 && remain
!= DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH
- 1)) {
168 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
169 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
,
170 SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
);
175 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
176 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
,
177 SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
);
182 /* Check we have a cipher to change to */
183 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
== NULL
) {
184 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
185 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY
);
189 s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
= 1;
190 if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s
)) {
191 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
192 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
196 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
197 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s
, SSL3_CC_READ
);
199 if (s
->version
== DTLS1_BAD_VER
)
200 s
->d1
->handshake_read_seq
++;
202 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
204 * Remember that a CCS has been received, so that an old key of
205 * SCTP-Auth can be deleted when a CCS is sent. Will be ignored if no
208 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_AUTH_CCS_RCVD
, 1, NULL
);
212 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
214 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
215 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
216 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
219 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_finished(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
223 /* If this occurs, we have missed a message */
224 if (!s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
) {
225 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
226 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED
, SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS
);
229 s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
= 0;
231 i
= s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_finish_md_len
;
233 if ((unsigned long)i
!= PACKET_remaining(pkt
)) {
234 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
235 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED
, SSL_R_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH
);
239 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(PACKET_data(pkt
), s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_finish_md
, i
) != 0) {
240 al
= SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
241 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED
, SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED
);
246 * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks
249 OPENSSL_assert(i
<= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
);
250 memcpy(s
->s3
->previous_client_finished
, s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_finish_md
, i
);
251 s
->s3
->previous_client_finished_len
= i
;
253 OPENSSL_assert(i
<= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
);
254 memcpy(s
->s3
->previous_server_finished
, s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_finish_md
, i
);
255 s
->s3
->previous_server_finished_len
= i
;
258 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
260 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
261 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
262 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
265 int tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
267 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, SSL3_MT_CCS
)) {
268 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
269 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
276 unsigned long ssl3_output_cert_chain(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, CERT_PKEY
*cpk
)
278 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u24(pkt
)
279 || !ssl_add_cert_chain(s
, pkt
, cpk
)
280 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
281 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
287 WORK_STATE
tls_finish_handshake(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
289 void (*cb
) (const SSL
*ssl
, int type
, int val
) = NULL
;
291 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
292 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s
))) {
294 ret
= dtls_wait_for_dry(s
);
295 if (ret
!= WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
)
300 /* clean a few things up */
301 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s
);
303 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
305 * We don't do this in DTLS because we may still need the init_buf
306 * in case there are any unexpected retransmits
308 BUF_MEM_free(s
->init_buf
);
312 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s
);
316 if (!s
->server
|| s
->renegotiate
== 2) {
317 /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
322 ssl_update_cache(s
, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER
);
324 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_accept_good
++;
325 s
->handshake_func
= ossl_statem_accept
;
327 ssl_update_cache(s
, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT
);
329 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_hit
++;
331 s
->handshake_func
= ossl_statem_connect
;
332 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_connect_good
++;
335 if (s
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
336 cb
= s
->info_callback
;
337 else if (s
->ctx
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
338 cb
= s
->ctx
->info_callback
;
341 cb(s
, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE
, 1);
343 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
344 /* done with handshaking */
345 s
->d1
->handshake_read_seq
= 0;
346 s
->d1
->handshake_write_seq
= 0;
347 s
->d1
->next_handshake_write_seq
= 0;
348 dtls1_clear_received_buffer(s
);
352 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP
;
355 int tls_get_message_header(SSL
*s
, int *mt
)
357 /* s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */
358 int skip_message
, i
, recvd_type
, al
;
362 p
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
365 while (s
->init_num
< SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
) {
366 i
= s
->method
->ssl_read_bytes(s
, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
, &recvd_type
,
368 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
- s
->init_num
,
371 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
374 if (recvd_type
== SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
376 * A ChangeCipherSpec must be a single byte and may not occur
377 * in the middle of a handshake message.
379 if (s
->init_num
!= 0 || i
!= 1 || p
[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS
) {
380 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
381 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER
,
382 SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
);
385 s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
= *mt
= SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
;
387 s
->s3
->tmp
.message_size
= i
;
389 } else if (recvd_type
!= SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
) {
390 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
391 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER
, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY
);
399 if (p
[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST
)
401 * The server may always send 'Hello Request' messages --
402 * we are doing a handshake anyway now, so ignore them if
403 * their format is correct. Does not count for 'Finished'
406 if (p
[1] == 0 && p
[2] == 0 && p
[3] == 0) {
411 s
->msg_callback(0, s
->version
, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
,
412 p
, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
, s
,
413 s
->msg_callback_arg
);
415 } while (skip_message
);
416 /* s->init_num == SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */
419 s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
= *(p
++);
421 if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s
->rlayer
)) {
423 * Only happens with SSLv3+ in an SSLv2 backward compatible
426 * Total message size is the remaining record bytes to read
427 * plus the SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH bytes that we already read
429 l
= RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec_length(&s
->rlayer
)
430 + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
;
431 s
->s3
->tmp
.message_size
= l
;
433 s
->init_msg
= s
->init_buf
->data
;
434 s
->init_num
= SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
;
437 /* BUF_MEM_grow takes an 'int' parameter */
438 if (l
> (INT_MAX
- SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
)) {
439 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
440 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER
, SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE
);
443 s
->s3
->tmp
.message_size
= l
;
445 s
->init_msg
= s
->init_buf
->data
+ SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
;
451 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
455 int tls_get_message_body(SSL
*s
, unsigned long *len
)
461 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
462 /* We've already read everything in */
463 *len
= (unsigned long)s
->init_num
;
468 n
= s
->s3
->tmp
.message_size
- s
->init_num
;
470 i
= s
->method
->ssl_read_bytes(s
, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
, NULL
,
471 &p
[s
->init_num
], n
, 0);
473 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
481 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
483 * If receiving Finished, record MAC of prior handshake messages for
484 * Finished verification.
486 if (*s
->init_buf
->data
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
)
490 /* Feed this message into MAC computation. */
491 if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s
->rlayer
)) {
492 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s
, (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
,
494 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_BODY
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
495 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
500 s
->msg_callback(0, SSL2_VERSION
, 0, s
->init_buf
->data
,
501 (size_t)s
->init_num
, s
, s
->msg_callback_arg
);
503 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s
, (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
,
504 s
->init_num
+ SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
)) {
505 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_BODY
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
506 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
511 s
->msg_callback(0, s
->version
, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
, s
->init_buf
->data
,
512 (size_t)s
->init_num
+ SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
, s
,
513 s
->msg_callback_arg
);
517 * init_num should never be negative...should probably be declared
520 if (s
->init_num
< 0) {
521 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_BODY
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
522 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
526 *len
= (unsigned long)s
->init_num
;
530 int ssl_cert_type(const X509
*x
, const EVP_PKEY
*pk
)
532 if (pk
== NULL
&& (pk
= X509_get0_pubkey(x
)) == NULL
)
535 switch (EVP_PKEY_id(pk
)) {
539 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
;
541 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
;
542 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
546 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
547 case NID_id_GostR3410_2001
:
548 return SSL_PKEY_GOST01
;
549 case NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
:
550 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
;
551 case NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
:
552 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
;
557 int ssl_verify_alarm_type(long type
)
562 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT
:
563 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL
:
564 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER
:
565 al
= SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA
;
567 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CERT_SIGNATURE
:
568 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CRL_SIGNATURE
:
569 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY
:
570 case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD
:
571 case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD
:
572 case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD
:
573 case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD
:
574 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID
:
575 case X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID
:
576 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED
:
577 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED
:
578 case X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH
:
579 case X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH
:
580 case X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH
:
581 case X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH
:
582 case X509_V_ERR_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL
:
583 case X509_V_ERR_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL
:
584 case X509_V_ERR_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK
:
585 al
= SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
;
587 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE
:
588 case X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE
:
589 al
= SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
591 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED
:
592 case X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED
:
593 al
= SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED
;
595 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED
:
596 al
= SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED
;
598 case X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED
:
599 case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM
:
600 case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL
:
601 case X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP
:
602 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
604 case X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT
:
605 case X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN
:
606 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY
:
607 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE
:
608 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG
:
609 case X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED
:
610 case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA
:
611 al
= SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA
;
613 case X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION
:
614 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
616 case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE
:
617 al
= SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE
;
620 al
= SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN
;
626 int ssl_allow_compression(SSL
*s
)
628 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION
)
630 return ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_COMPRESSION
, 0, 0, NULL
);
633 static int version_cmp(const SSL
*s
, int a
, int b
)
635 int dtls
= SSL_IS_DTLS(s
);
640 return a
< b
? -1 : 1;
641 return DTLS_VERSION_LT(a
, b
) ? -1 : 1;
646 const SSL_METHOD
*(*cmeth
) (void);
647 const SSL_METHOD
*(*smeth
) (void);
650 #if TLS_MAX_VERSION != TLS1_2_VERSION
651 # error Code needs update for TLS_method() support beyond TLS1_2_VERSION.
654 static const version_info tls_version_table
[] = {
655 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2
656 {TLS1_2_VERSION
, tlsv1_2_client_method
, tlsv1_2_server_method
},
658 {TLS1_2_VERSION
, NULL
, NULL
},
660 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_1
661 {TLS1_1_VERSION
, tlsv1_1_client_method
, tlsv1_1_server_method
},
663 {TLS1_1_VERSION
, NULL
, NULL
},
665 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1
666 {TLS1_VERSION
, tlsv1_client_method
, tlsv1_server_method
},
668 {TLS1_VERSION
, NULL
, NULL
},
670 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
671 {SSL3_VERSION
, sslv3_client_method
, sslv3_server_method
},
673 {SSL3_VERSION
, NULL
, NULL
},
678 #if DTLS_MAX_VERSION != DTLS1_2_VERSION
679 # error Code needs update for DTLS_method() support beyond DTLS1_2_VERSION.
682 static const version_info dtls_version_table
[] = {
683 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_2
684 {DTLS1_2_VERSION
, dtlsv1_2_client_method
, dtlsv1_2_server_method
},
686 {DTLS1_2_VERSION
, NULL
, NULL
},
688 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1
689 {DTLS1_VERSION
, dtlsv1_client_method
, dtlsv1_server_method
},
690 {DTLS1_BAD_VER
, dtls_bad_ver_client_method
, NULL
},
692 {DTLS1_VERSION
, NULL
, NULL
},
693 {DTLS1_BAD_VER
, NULL
, NULL
},
699 * ssl_method_error - Check whether an SSL_METHOD is enabled.
701 * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method
702 * @method: the intended method.
704 * Returns 0 on success, or an SSL error reason on failure.
706 static int ssl_method_error(const SSL
*s
, const SSL_METHOD
*method
)
708 int version
= method
->version
;
710 if ((s
->min_proto_version
!= 0 &&
711 version_cmp(s
, version
, s
->min_proto_version
) < 0) ||
712 ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_VERSION
, 0, version
, NULL
) == 0)
713 return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW
;
715 if (s
->max_proto_version
!= 0 &&
716 version_cmp(s
, version
, s
->max_proto_version
) > 0)
717 return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_HIGH
;
719 if ((s
->options
& method
->mask
) != 0)
720 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL
;
721 if ((method
->flags
& SSL_METHOD_NO_SUITEB
) != 0 && tls1_suiteb(s
))
722 return SSL_R_AT_LEAST_TLS_1_2_NEEDED_IN_SUITEB_MODE
;
723 else if ((method
->flags
& SSL_METHOD_NO_FIPS
) != 0 && FIPS_mode())
724 return SSL_R_AT_LEAST_TLS_1_0_NEEDED_IN_FIPS_MODE
;
730 * ssl_version_supported - Check that the specified `version` is supported by
733 * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method
734 * @version: Protocol version to test against
736 * Returns 1 when supported, otherwise 0
738 int ssl_version_supported(const SSL
*s
, int version
)
740 const version_info
*vent
;
741 const version_info
*table
;
743 switch (s
->method
->version
) {
745 /* Version should match method version for non-ANY method */
746 return version_cmp(s
, version
, s
->version
) == 0;
747 case TLS_ANY_VERSION
:
748 table
= tls_version_table
;
750 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION
:
751 table
= dtls_version_table
;
756 vent
->version
!= 0 && version_cmp(s
, version
, vent
->version
) <= 0;
758 if (vent
->cmeth
!= NULL
&&
759 version_cmp(s
, version
, vent
->version
) == 0 &&
760 ssl_method_error(s
, vent
->cmeth()) == 0) {
768 * ssl_check_version_downgrade - In response to RFC7507 SCSV version
769 * fallback indication from a client check whether we're using the highest
770 * supported protocol version.
772 * @s server SSL handle.
774 * Returns 1 when using the highest enabled version, 0 otherwise.
776 int ssl_check_version_downgrade(SSL
*s
)
778 const version_info
*vent
;
779 const version_info
*table
;
782 * Check that the current protocol is the highest enabled version
783 * (according to s->ctx->method, as version negotiation may have changed
786 if (s
->version
== s
->ctx
->method
->version
)
790 * Apparently we're using a version-flexible SSL_METHOD (not at its
791 * highest protocol version).
793 if (s
->ctx
->method
->version
== TLS_method()->version
)
794 table
= tls_version_table
;
795 else if (s
->ctx
->method
->version
== DTLS_method()->version
)
796 table
= dtls_version_table
;
798 /* Unexpected state; fail closed. */
802 for (vent
= table
; vent
->version
!= 0; ++vent
) {
803 if (vent
->smeth
!= NULL
&& ssl_method_error(s
, vent
->smeth()) == 0)
804 return s
->version
== vent
->version
;
810 * ssl_set_version_bound - set an upper or lower bound on the supported (D)TLS
811 * protocols, provided the initial (D)TLS method is version-flexible. This
812 * function sanity-checks the proposed value and makes sure the method is
813 * version-flexible, then sets the limit if all is well.
815 * @method_version: The version of the current SSL_METHOD.
816 * @version: the intended limit.
817 * @bound: pointer to limit to be updated.
819 * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure.
821 int ssl_set_version_bound(int method_version
, int version
, int *bound
)
829 * Restrict TLS methods to TLS protocol versions.
830 * Restrict DTLS methods to DTLS protocol versions.
831 * Note, DTLS version numbers are decreasing, use comparison macros.
833 * Note that for both lower-bounds we use explicit versions, not
834 * (D)TLS_MIN_VERSION. This is because we don't want to break user
835 * configurations. If the MIN (supported) version ever rises, the user's
836 * "floor" remains valid even if no longer available. We don't expect the
837 * MAX ceiling to ever get lower, so making that variable makes sense.
839 switch (method_version
) {
842 * XXX For fixed version methods, should we always fail and not set any
843 * bounds, always succeed and not set any bounds, or set the bounds and
844 * arrange to fail later if they are not met? At present fixed-version
845 * methods are not subject to controls that disable individual protocol
850 case TLS_ANY_VERSION
:
851 if (version
< SSL3_VERSION
|| version
> TLS_MAX_VERSION
)
855 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION
:
856 if (DTLS_VERSION_GT(version
, DTLS_MAX_VERSION
) ||
857 DTLS_VERSION_LT(version
, DTLS1_BAD_VER
))
867 * ssl_choose_server_version - Choose server (D)TLS version. Called when the
868 * client HELLO is received to select the final server protocol version and
869 * the version specific method.
871 * @s: server SSL handle.
873 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure.
875 int ssl_choose_server_version(SSL
*s
)
878 * With version-flexible methods we have an initial state with:
880 * s->method->version == (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION,
881 * s->version == (D)TLS_MAX_VERSION.
883 * So we detect version-flexible methods via the method version, not the
886 int server_version
= s
->method
->version
;
887 int client_version
= s
->client_version
;
888 const version_info
*vent
;
889 const version_info
*table
;
892 switch (server_version
) {
894 if (version_cmp(s
, client_version
, s
->version
) < 0)
895 return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION
;
897 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
898 * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
899 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
900 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
901 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
904 case TLS_ANY_VERSION
:
905 table
= tls_version_table
;
907 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION
:
908 table
= dtls_version_table
;
912 for (vent
= table
; vent
->version
!= 0; ++vent
) {
913 const SSL_METHOD
*method
;
915 if (vent
->smeth
== NULL
||
916 version_cmp(s
, client_version
, vent
->version
) < 0)
918 method
= vent
->smeth();
919 if (ssl_method_error(s
, method
) == 0) {
920 s
->version
= vent
->version
;
926 return disabled
? SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL
: SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW
;
930 * ssl_choose_client_version - Choose client (D)TLS version. Called when the
931 * server HELLO is received to select the final client protocol version and
932 * the version specific method.
934 * @s: client SSL handle.
935 * @version: The proposed version from the server's HELLO.
937 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure.
939 int ssl_choose_client_version(SSL
*s
, int version
)
941 const version_info
*vent
;
942 const version_info
*table
;
944 switch (s
->method
->version
) {
946 if (version
!= s
->version
)
947 return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION
;
949 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
950 * (and never did) check min/max, FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
951 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
952 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
953 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
956 case TLS_ANY_VERSION
:
957 table
= tls_version_table
;
959 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION
:
960 table
= dtls_version_table
;
964 for (vent
= table
; vent
->version
!= 0; ++vent
) {
965 const SSL_METHOD
*method
;
968 if (version
!= vent
->version
)
970 if (vent
->cmeth
== NULL
)
972 method
= vent
->cmeth();
973 err
= ssl_method_error(s
, method
);
977 s
->version
= version
;
981 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL
;
985 * ssl_get_client_min_max_version - get minimum and maximum client version
986 * @s: The SSL connection
987 * @min_version: The minimum supported version
988 * @max_version: The maximum supported version
990 * Work out what version we should be using for the initial ClientHello if the
991 * version is initially (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION. We apply any explicit SSL_OP_NO_xxx
992 * options, the MinProtocol and MaxProtocol configuration commands, any Suite B
993 * or FIPS_mode() constraints and any floor imposed by the security level here,
994 * so we don't advertise the wrong protocol version to only reject the outcome later.
996 * Computing the right floor matters. If, e.g., TLS 1.0 and 1.2 are enabled,
997 * TLS 1.1 is disabled, but the security level, Suite-B and/or MinProtocol
998 * only allow TLS 1.2, we want to advertise TLS1.2, *not* TLS1.
1000 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. On failure
1001 * min_version and max_version will also be set to 0.
1003 int ssl_get_client_min_max_version(const SSL
*s
, int *min_version
,
1008 const SSL_METHOD
*single
= NULL
;
1009 const SSL_METHOD
*method
;
1010 const version_info
*table
;
1011 const version_info
*vent
;
1013 switch (s
->method
->version
) {
1016 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
1017 * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
1018 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
1019 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
1020 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
1022 *min_version
= *max_version
= s
->version
;
1024 case TLS_ANY_VERSION
:
1025 table
= tls_version_table
;
1027 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION
:
1028 table
= dtls_version_table
;
1033 * SSL_OP_NO_X disables all protocols above X *if* there are some protocols
1034 * below X enabled. This is required in order to maintain the "version
1035 * capability" vector contiguous. Any versions with a NULL client method
1036 * (protocol version client is disabled at compile-time) is also a "hole".
1038 * Our initial state is hole == 1, version == 0. That is, versions above
1039 * the first version in the method table are disabled (a "hole" above
1040 * the valid protocol entries) and we don't have a selected version yet.
1042 * Whenever "hole == 1", and we hit an enabled method, its version becomes
1043 * the selected version, and the method becomes a candidate "single"
1044 * method. We're no longer in a hole, so "hole" becomes 0.
1046 * If "hole == 0" and we hit an enabled method, then "single" is cleared,
1047 * as we support a contiguous range of at least two methods. If we hit
1048 * a disabled method, then hole becomes true again, but nothing else
1049 * changes yet, because all the remaining methods may be disabled too.
1050 * If we again hit an enabled method after the new hole, it becomes
1051 * selected, as we start from scratch.
1053 *min_version
= version
= 0;
1055 for (vent
= table
; vent
->version
!= 0; ++vent
) {
1057 * A table entry with a NULL client method is still a hole in the
1058 * "version capability" vector.
1060 if (vent
->cmeth
== NULL
) {
1064 method
= vent
->cmeth();
1065 if (ssl_method_error(s
, method
) != 0) {
1069 *min_version
= method
->version
;
1071 version
= (single
= method
)->version
;
1072 *min_version
= version
;
1077 *max_version
= version
;
1079 /* Fail if everything is disabled */
1081 return SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE
;
1087 * ssl_set_client_hello_version - Work out what version we should be using for
1088 * the initial ClientHello.
1090 * @s: client SSL handle.
1092 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure.
1094 int ssl_set_client_hello_version(SSL
*s
)
1096 int ver_min
, ver_max
, ret
;
1098 ret
= ssl_get_client_min_max_version(s
, &ver_min
, &ver_max
);
1103 s
->client_version
= s
->version
= ver_max
;